Comparison of the START Treaty, Moscow Treaty, and New START Treaty

Fact Sheet
Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation
April 8, 2010



Moscow Treaty



warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers

1,700 – 2,200
strategic nuclear warheads

deployed warheads*

Delivery Vehicles

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and their associated launchers, and heavy bombers)

Not limited

deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments

deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments

* Includes warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.

START Verification Regime: START, which expired on December 5, 2009, had an extensive verification regime to verify its numerous and diverse Treaty obligations and prohibitions. The use of national technical means (NTM) of verification was supplemented by: on-site inspections; periodically exchanged data on weapons systems and facilities; regular notifications updating the data; exchange of telemetry information to verify technical missile parameters pertaining specifically to obligations and requirements of the treaty; cooperative measures; and continuous monitoring at mobile ICBM assembly facilities.

Moscow Treaty Verification Regime: The Moscow Treaty has no verification regime, but relied upon START’s verification regime -- until START’s expiration -- to provide insight into each Party’s strategic forces. The Moscow Treaty will be superseded by the New START Treaty when the new Treaty enters into force.

New START Verification Regime: The obligations and prohibitions of New START are different than those in START, reflecting both the improved U.S.-Russian relationship and lessons learned from our experience implementing START. Accordingly, the Treaty’s verification provisions are simpler and less costly to implement than those in START. The New START Treaty prohibits interference with NTM and prohibits the use of concealment measures to avoid NTM. NTM will be supplemented by: on-site inspections; periodically exchanged data on weapons systems and facilities; regular notifications and data updates; and a requirement to assign a unique alphanumeric identifier to each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber. This unique identifier may be confirmed during inspections and will be included in the database and applicable notifications. To promote openness and transparency, the Parties will also conduct an annual exchange of telemetry information on up to five ICBM or SLBM launches, as chosen by the Party conducting the launches.