Remarks

(As Prepared for Delivery)

Thank you for that extraordinarily generous introduction, Colonel Liszewski. This great marine you have as Commandant I’ve known a very long time. And this is a history conference, and so we’ve actually made a little history here today, which is when the 2^nd Commandant of Midshipmen introduces the 1^st Commandant of Midshipmen. And I remember well when I was selected for that position, my slightly irreverent class, the great bicentennial class of 1976, decided to call it “the great experiment.”

And so I leave, and 13 years later, we get around to having another Marine Commandant of Midshipmen. And I think that’s a very good thing, and it’s particularly good given the talent of this magnificent officer. And as he said I had the opportunity and honor to teach him when I was a Major on the staff of the Political Science Department. And as was the case with most midshipmen who went through my coursework here at the Naval Academy, he was extraordinarily well rested. I put more midshipmen to sleep than almost any other professor you could ever imagine at this institution.

But then, in a very serious way, during some of the worst fighting in the worst place in the entire Iraq War, which was the al-Anbar Province, your Commandant was a battalion commander of an artillery battalion and served magnificently there, again, during not just the critical moment of that fight, but the pivotal moment of that fight, because it indeed did look bad for us in that war. And the moment of pivot where we went from largely being on the strategic defensive to taking the battle to the enemy and ultimately defeating al-Qa’ida, started in the al-Anbar province and started with commanders like this Commandant.

And then I had a third wonderful opportunity to serve with him: He was an artillery regimental commander serving in Afghanistan when I was the commander there. And so our paths, as it is the case within the Marine Corps frequently, have crossed many times over the years. And I could not be happier than to see this exceptional officer, and his lady, and his family here at the Naval Academy. And so for my class, the class of ’76, lightning does strike periodically, and we got a second Marine as Commandant.

I spent a lot of time writing a speech I wanted to give today in the context of the venue that we have together, which is about military history. That speech was going to be about how the abiding and constant and enduring study of military history had a profound effect on my development as an officer from the very earliest moments of marines to the moment where I would take off my uniform and four stars. It truly did enable my career, and I wanted to take you through some of those occasions, good and bad, where the study of history helped me profoundly not just to understand the operational environment, and the social and the economic and political conditions which had served me up a crisis or a battle or a conflict, but perhaps even more importantly how history had helped me to prepare myself intellectually, spiritually, and physically for the rigors of war, and the rigors of leading small and large formations in combat and conflict.

History prepared me intellectually for the conflict and history prepared me personally for the rigors of command in war. And I would like someday to share that with you here because it’s not too early or too late to have those considerations.

But I chose not to give that speech today, because I’ve been involved now as the Commandant said as the President’s Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to defeat Da’esh, to counter Da’esh, now for about thirteen going on fourteen months. And I know that there’s a great thirst for an understanding of how this is going, because frankly it’s very difficult to get a clear vision of this conflict both in terms of the organization called ISIL or IS or ISIS or the Caliphate. I prefer to and will refer to it throughout this presentation by its Arabic acronym Da’esh.

It’s difficult to get a sense of what it is, what it’s doing, what the larger implications are for an organization like this as a symptom of a bigger problem, and how we’re attempting as a nation and as a community of nations to deal with it. So it would seem to me perhaps that I could provide you with some of my thoughts on that and to give you a sense of the Coalition.

I am just back from Baghdad, where I met with all the senior Iraqi leadership. I am just back from the Kurdish region, where I met with the Kurdish leadership. I’m just back from Amman, where I met with His Majesty the King and the Royal Court and his senior leaders. And I leave in 48 hours to head back to the Gulf to meet with all of our partners there.

]So this is a very dynamic environment in which we find ourselves today and in fact I do believe it is an environment that will an effect upon U.S. national security for years to come.

And so with that in mind, rather than to talk about the role of history per se, in the formation of one officer’s career, what I wanted to do was to give you a sense of the role of the Coalition to Counter ISIL, what we’re doing across the board and perhaps answer some of your questions in that regard.

So it was just two weeks ago at the UN General Assembly in New York City that President Obama convened the Heads of State of more than 100 countries, 20 multinational institutions and organizations, and 120 civil society groups from around the world, to include partners from the private sector. And we gathered to talk about how we would tackle the growing phenomenon of violent extremism, and in particular how we would deal with the scourge of Da’esh.

Last year the President called on the international community at that UN General Assembly to recognize the world was “at a crossroads.”

And the work I have been honored to perform over the past year as the President’s Special Envoy deeply impressed by the diverse group of partners who have joined this campaign and by the willingness of so many to bear burdens and step up and take on leading roles to deal with this scourge. We have sought to send a clear message, a message to Da’esh and a message to the world: We refuse to observe and stand idly by its atrocities. We reject its toxic, false ideology and doctrines. And we abhor its vicious and continual assault on human dignity.

And ladies and gentlemen, we can never ever accept that organizations like Da’esh can become the new normal. It cannot become the new normal. And we must never lose our outrage at what we have seen this organization do and are doing every day, and what it intends to do to the people that it subjugates, and to the people in this room if left unchecked.

Coalition Assembly / Organization

The initial action that we took last year that was intended to impede and halt Da’esh’s momentum was immediately essential, but by no means sufficient to counter the enduring danger this organization represents. At root, Da’esh is not an Iraq or Syria problem; Da’esh is a regional problem with global implications.

Since I began serving in this role I have now traveled to 30 of the capitals of the Coalition, many of them repeatedly, and during that time we have assembled a global coalition, welcoming at the UN General Assembly just two weeks ago three new members – Nigeria, Tunisia and Malaysia – which brings the Coalition now to 65 nations and international organizations.

Unlike other Coalition campaigns of which I have been a part, we have had to build this Coalition out of whole cloth. When I served as Commander of our forces in Afghanistan for instance, that was a mature situation in a mature theater of war. And we relied for our authorities to wage hostilities on a UN Security Council Resolution and later for our organizational structure on the North Atlantic Council of NATO. We didn’t have time for either of those when this emergency broke this time last year. And so we quickly organized the 60+ nations of the Coalition and moved off as a community of nations bound together with a common purpose, and a common set of values to confront the dangers at hand.

While it is often the Coalition’s kinetic actions that receive the most attention, it is the aggregate effect of the Coalition’s activities across multiple lines of effort that will determine the Coalition’s success:

• A military component to deny Da’esh safe haven and provide security assistance to local partners;
•  Providing stabilization and humanitarian relief to liberated areas;
• Disrupting Da’esh’s access to financial resources;
• Countering Da’esh’s messaging – or defeating Da’esh as an idea;
• And disrupting the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

So let me provide an overview of the Coalition’s progress over our central lines of effort and some of the ways the Coalition is evolving to confront Da’esh as it adapts.

Military

There is no question that is going to be a long-term conflict and there will be much work remaining as we attempt … and will succeed … to degrade and defeat this organization.

If you recall, the situation one year ago was dire. Da’esh had advanced unimpeded into Iraq. We were seeing atrocities, more horrific than I have ever seen or even could have imagined: the beheadings, the crucifixions, the electrocutions, the drownings, and of course the one that I think captured the imagination of the world, the nightmarish burning, the immolation of captain Moaz al-Kasasbeh, the Jordanian pilot captured by Da’esh. Erbil and Baghdad were under threat as Da’esh advanced rapidly on those cities, where U.S. government personnel were located. Tikrit, the iconic Sunni city, had fallen. Kirkuk was threatened. The Mosul Dam, critical strategic infrastructure on the Tigris River, had been taken. They had also laid siege to a place no one had ever heard of before in this country or in the West, a place called Sinjar Mountain, where Da’esh intended to annihilate the Yezidi population.

A year later, with support to local forces on the ground, the Coalition has applied significant pressure on this organization, hitting Da’esh with more than 7,000 airstrikes, taking out numerous commanders, over 1,700 vehicles and tanks, over 170 artillery and mortar positions, nearly 4,000 fighting positions, checkpoints, buildings, bunkers, staging areas and barracks, including 26 training camps, in both Iraq and Syria.

In Iraq, 18 Coalition members have to date trained more than 13,000 Iraqi and Peshmerga soldiers. Da’esh has lost the freedom to operate in over 30% of the populated territory they held last August. The city of Tikrit has been liberated, with 75% of the population having returned.

And four columns of Iraqi troops are now closing in on Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, which we lost to Da’esh last year. I fought in Ramadi in 2007. I just spoke with a Marine Lieutenant Colonel earlier today, who was wounded in Ramadi in 2004. That’s an iconic city for us as well, for Marines and for the U.S. Military and the U.S. Army certainly. I met with the commanders just several days ago and I believe we’ll see some success emerge from Ramadi relatively soon, and that will be the next liberated population.

In Syria, Da’esh has lost significant territory in northern Syria and is now cut off from all but 68 miles of the nearly 600-mile border between Syria and Turkey. And for the last year I have been in and out of Turkey frequently, negotiating with our great partner and ally for base access so that we could conduct strike operations out of Turkey and to conduct operations to close the border. And when I started these negotiations with the Turks the maps that they used showed Da’esh virtually along the entire border, and the color on their maps was black for Da’esh, which is their own color of their banner. In essence, the Turks said their border had gone black. In the period of time from then till now, the entire border from Iraq to the Euphrates has been recovered from Da’esh and we’re in the process working closely with the Turks to recover the final 68 miles. And we’re doing that working close with Syrian Sunni Arab groups just to the south of that region.

Coalition strikes have taken out a number of senior Da’esh leaders: including the number two of the so-called Caliphate, Hajji Mutazz, as well as Abu Sayyaf, a key emir involved in financing for the organization, if you will, the “Chief Financial Officer” of that organization, and recently we killed Junaid Hussain, a Da’esh member who sought to target Western interests and key Western leaders and officials in their own countries by locally recruiting assassins. They’re just three of a very long list of Da’esh leaders that we are eliminating on a regular basis

And we must not forget Turkey, a critical partner in this fight, who recently increased its participation in the Coalition, as I described. But as a geographic chokepoint in the flow of foreign fighters, Turkey has worked with us closely to increase detentions, arrests, and prosecution of suspected foreign fighters, as well as to share information with international partners, and to take steps to improve Turkey’s control of the southern border.

But this horrific attack, the suicide bombings that occurred last weekend at a peace rally in Ankara portrays the fact that Turkey is now under direct attack. And the U.S. and NATO stand resolutely with Turkey at this moment. And our thoughts and our prayers are with all of the Turks who were affected by these typically cowardly suicide attacks, but more broadly our thoughts and our prayers are with the Turkish people, as they bear up under this burden.

Stabilization support

And so to confront Da’esh in this new battlespace part of what we have to do is stabilize communities that are liberated from Da’esh. It is so important, and is why Coalition support for these activities is central to the long-term success in its elimination of threats and its recovering of those populations back into the embrace of their governments.

The Coalition has helped the Iraqis plan and resource these efts. The Germans and Emiratis are helping organize contributions from more than 20 Coalition partners to provide stabilization support. The Italians are leading an effort to train an effective Iraqi police force. The Canadians have stepped forward to ensure protections and programs for women and girls are incorporated. And several nations, including the United States, have made sizable contributions to a stabilization fund, which we have created with the UN Development Program, which permits us to very quickly meet the urgent needs of returning Iraqis, such as water, electricity, and healthcare … services that were destroyed or deteriorated under Da’esh’s heel.

And already we are seeing some progress: Displaced Iraqis have been returning to Salah ad-Din province; since Tikrit has been liberated, three quarters of the city’s original residents have returned to their homes and have begun to rebuild their community. The Coalition in partnership with the UN is working tirelessly to ensure areas liberated of Da’esh control are secure, stable, and hospitable the internally displaced persons who number in the hundreds of thousands inside Iraq.

The process won’t be quick and it won’t be easy, but it will continue to move forward. Liberating areas from Da’esh will never be enough. It isn’t just about defeating Da’esh as an organization; it’s about recovering the population that was ultimately subjugated. That constitutes the defeat of Da’esh.

Counter-Finance

Squeezing Da’esh’s access to financial resources and networks in both Syria and Iraq, and more broadly globally, is one of the best ways to disrupt their operations and free populations from their hold. You’ll recall earlier this year in May, we conducted a Tier I Special Operations Strike Force raid on the compound of an individual named, Abu Sayyaf. Now that raid did not go well for him. And sadly he stepped in front of a raider’s bullet and that was it. But we did capture his wife Umm Sayyaf, who was responsible in the Da’esh organization for the slave trade, and more specifically the sex slave trade. And she’ll be held accountable for her actions. We also liberated one of the Yezidi women, who was undergoing the nightmare of being a slave in Da’esh’s territory. And then beyond that we also took off the objective seven terabytes of information: hard drives, thumb drives, DVDs, CDs, paper – and the exploitation of that material is giving us very important insights into the organization of Da’esh and its economic portfolio.

We know Da’esh’s leadership places enormous focus on closely monitoring its finances, and is riven with well-founded fears of internal corruption. Because frankly, ladies and gentlemen, this is my fourth counterinsurgency, and typically insurgencies rely often on a network of criminality to give them the capacity to move money and guns and weapons, and to conduct illicit activities to provide support to the organization. So it’s not surprise to us, and it should be no surprise to an observer of this conflict that there is significant mistrust inside Da’esh.

We know from media reports that some of Da’esh’s leaders have fled the fight in Iraq and Syria, absconding with millions of dollars. One of Da’esh’s financial emirs in Syria fled to Turkey with over one million dollars raised from extortion schemes; another emir from in Eastern Syria fled with $10 million. Not only does that give us insights into the morale of the organization at the central level and the senior levels; it gives us insights into corruption, difficulties for command and control, and gives us the grist for counter-messaging in an attempt to dissuade those that would want to become a part of this organization.

We also know there are dozens of active oil fields, primarily centered in Eastern Syrian, right by their administrative nerve center, their capital if you will, in Raqqa. Those fields are estimated to produce at least 40,000 barrels of oil a day – worth at least one million dollars. Having now discovered the extent of this, we’ve enhanced our targeting of these fields to conduct more aggressive air strikes on the modular refineries, and to drive the oil industry out of the number one slot, as the principal means by which Da’esh supports itself.

But Da’esh has also proved more resilient and more capable than initially estimated. And this underscores the importance of maintaining pressure on this group and their supporters in this economic enterprise. And in that endeavor we will enlist the services of our partner intelligence organizations, our partner law enforcement organizations, and the governments of the Coalition, and more broadly the community of nations to help us to detach and to maintain that detachment of Da’esh from the international financial system.

Beyond its energy resources, Da’esh also continues to draw on diverse sources of financial support:

• Extorting its subjugated population by imposing “taxes” on everything from salaries, to commerce, to real estate, to cash withdrawals from banks.
• And let’s not forget kidnaping for ransom, human trafficking, a slave trade, and profit from the sale and taxation of plundered antiquities.

We have made progress in recent weeks targeting those sources of income. Two weeks ago, the Treasury and State Departments designated 25 key Da’esh leaders and facilitators, including some engaged in facilitating travel for foreign terrorist fighters, not just in Iraq, but from the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Algeria.

The State Department has also authorized a reward of up to $5 million dollars for information that helps to significantly disrupt Da’esh’s illicit oil and antiquities trade, and hopefully generates more actionable intelligence on the smuggling networks, methods, and routes underlying these activities.

Our understanding of Da’esh’s financial networks is quickly improving as we process a greater share of what was seized in the raid on Abu Sayyef. As we operationalize more of this information, Coalition counter-finance efforts will only accelerate.

Counter-Messaging

Our counter-messaging effort is also advancing as Coalition partners coordinate to contest Da’esh’s narrative across the many platforms and languages in which they appear.

Here, it is important that key, credible Muslim voices and scholars speak out and publicly reject Da’esh’s ideology. I was recently in Amman, as I said, where I met with His Majesty King Abdullah II, and he has said for a long time in this conflict and he has been a leader in this conflict, that for our counter-messaging to occur, we members of the face of Islam, to recover our faith from the grasp of Da’esh, there must be an Arab face and a Muslim voice to the counter-messaging strategy. And we agree. And in many respects, that’s the principal motivating factor behind our counter-messaging strategy: strategic guidance, local application. And we’ll continue to do that.

Already we are beginning to see Da’esh’s media enterprise diminish, as social media companies become more vigilant and responsive to removing content, coupled by the efforts of many of our Coalition partners.

Just as important as preventing individuals from joining the fight is helping to amplify the stories of those who have fought under Daesh and have broken free from its ranks.

The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications managed a multimedia campaign of “Da’esh Defectors.” The campaign leveraged the testimonies of former Da’esh members through U.S. government messengers, Coalition partners, and third-party NGOs, generating some 900 news articles, reaching an estimated 90 million people worldwide.

The United Arab Emirates has launched a joint messaging center with the United States in Abu Dhabi called the Sawab or “Right Path” Center, which is coordinating and driving counter-Da’esh messaging activity in the region. Through direct online engagement, the center is countering Da’esh’s efforts to recruit foreign fighters, raise funds, and terrorize local populations. As we learn from Sawab’s operations we will explore establishing additional regional messaging hubs in Southeast Asia and Europe.

So wherever Da’esh’s message can maneuver in the information space, we cannot allow it to go unchallenged. No matter how much progress the Coalition makes over other lines of effort, we cannot truly be satisfied with our progress until the very idea of Da’esh has been thoroughly delegitimized. And this is one of the greatest challenges that we have right now.

Foreign Fighters

The final line of effort I will mention today is an area that evokes nearly universal concern in my conversations with Coalition partners: The effort to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

Let me give you a sense of the scale of the current threat: Some 20,000 foreign fighters joined the fight in Afghanistan against the Soviets over the course of the 1980s; some 10,000 foreign fighters travelled to Afghanistan over 13 years during the most recent conflict.

Since the start of the conflict in Syria, around 23,000 individuals, from over 100 countries, have traveled to fight in Syria and Iraq. Now to be sure, not all of them have joined Da’esh; some have joined other organizations: moderate Syrians, the al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. But 30,000 individuals left their homes and traveled to the region to become part of this conflict.

While we’ve taken back Tal Abyad, the #1 border crossing along Turkey’s border with Syria, the Turkish border is in fact the last line of defense in this equation … and as I already mentioned, we are now working with Turkey and local partners to clear Da’esh from the final 68 miles of that border.

We need all nations working together at each link along the chain … from the point of radicalization, to the point of violence, and to the point of return and rehabilitation.

Since the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014, which required countries to take steps to address the foreign fighter threat, 22 countries have enacted laws to create greater obstacles for traveling to Syria and Iraq. At least 34 countries have arrested foreign fighters or aspirants, and 12 have successfully prosecuted.

Today, through INTERPOL’s Counterterrorism Fusion Center, 52 countries now share foreign terrorist fighter profiles. And bilaterally, the United States has concluded arrangements with over 40 international partners to provide a mechanism for sharing terrorist travel information.

But we must continue to do more and to adapt to different circumstances and contexts in which extremism arises. We must appreciate that there is no one “type” of foreign fighter, no single method of recruitment, and no one source to support them financially.

Da’esh succeeds only when men and women feel little connection to their governments, and to opportunity in their societies. We must work together to offer different models.

Russia

I’d like to also comment on what will undoubtedly be at the forefront of many of your minds … and that is Russia’s recent intervention in the Syrian Civil War.

The topline message I want everybody here to understand is that we are going to continue to go after Da’esh. We are going to continue to reach out to the moderate Syrian opposition. We reject Russia’s assertion that everybody opposed to the regime of Bashar al-Asad is a terrorist. We think that is self-defeating and will only draw Russia into a quagmire. And can only be used as a further recruitment tool for foreign fighters to join groups like Da’esh. And this wasn’t helped by the way by the Russian Orthodox Church’s recent declaration that Russia’s involvement in Syria is a “holy battle.”

Let me be clear: Mr. Putin had to go into Syria not out of strength but out of weakness, because his client, Mr. Asad, was crumbling. And only Iran is lining up behind him to support this plan.

This is neither a smart nor a strategic move on Russia’s part. Russia is making itself a target for violent extremists in Syria, from within Russia itself, and from other parts of the world. Russia has committed its own forces into a situation where not only the overwhelming majority Syrians now see it as the enemy, but now one where the Sunni population throughout the Middle East sees Russia as a supporter, an enabler, and an endorser of a regime that routinely barrel bombs the innocent population.

There may be some short-term appearance of tactical benefit, as Russia stabilizes and props up the Asad regime, but unless Russia remains to assist Asad in crushing every component of the Syrian Opposition, the Asad regime will continue to require foreign support to survive. And as I said so far, the foreign support that has lined up with that regime is Russia, Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Shia extremist militias. There is a problem with that list.

Let me also observe that Russia as it was entering the fray in Syria portrayed its entry as potentially in partnership with us to defeat Da’esh within Syria. Yet when you plot the airstrikes and the long-range missile strikes and the cruise-missile strikes, what you find is that the vast majority of Russian strikes are going against opposition groups other than Da’esh, which in the end reduces the effectiveness of the moderate Syrian opposition, and strengthens Da’esh.

Let me be clear, this is NOT a contest between the United States and Russia. It is in our interest for Russia to be a responsible, effective actor on the international stage.

Our battle remains, and will continue to remain, with Da’esh. And our battle, along with the entire international community, is to resolve the conflict in a way that can end the bloodshed and end the refugee crisis, and allow people to be at home, go to work, grow food, keep their children in shelter, and send those kids to school. That’s the side we’re on. And, unlike Russia, in those valiant efforts we are joined by a coalition of 65 partners around the world.

As President Obama and Secretary Kerry have repeated, we are prepared to work with any partner … including the Russians and the Iranians … as long as their focus is on defeating Da’esh and on a clear understanding that the only way forward in Syria is a political transition away from Asad. Nobody pretends that will be easy, but we believe it is still possible and we are keeping lines of communication open in that regard.

From a practical perspective, the moderate opposition in Syria will need to be part of any political transition in Syria. And the Russian policy to drive that opposition underground or to eliminate its effectiveness, can only strengthen Da’esh’s hand.

Conclusion

As a Coalition, we cannot eliminate rivalries among nations and faiths, or address historic grievances. But in coordinating this global effort against Da’esh, with mutual interest and mutual respect, we can change how nations come and work together to fight the complex challenges of our time.

I view this fight as a regional conflict from my perspective of having been a theater commander in war. And in that context it’s not clear yet whether the Russian role can contribute to facilitate a political transition in Syria or in the end stabilize a murderous regime and dictator. If it is the former, there is the potential for cooperation, but if it is the latter, it is difficult to envisage a near-term political outcome that can end the violent and place Syria on a path towards humanitarian, economic, social and political recovery.

Alongside these efforts, the Coalition that I have described will remain focused on the challenges ahead. Aspects of countering Da’esh, like defeating Da’esh’s ideology, may take a generation or more. But we as an international community can and must rise to this challenge.

I look forward to taking your questions today, and to learning and drawing from your insights as our Coalition campaign continues to progress. Thank you.