Additional Details on FY 2003 Performance Results - Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction

FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003
Report

Performance Goal 1: Bilateral Measures

Initiative/Program #1: Curb Access

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #1: ACCESS TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IMPEDED
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Russia: Stops nuclear cooperation with Iran; fully adheres to NSG guidelines. 1. Russia: Stops nuclear cooperation with Iran; no nuclear contracts with India. 1. Russia: While maintaining its cooperation with Iran's program, expressed increasing concern as IAEA establishes Iranian safeguard violations. International consensus against supply to Iran remains in place. On Target
2. China: Fully implements and adheres to 1997 nuclear commitment and November 2000 missile commitment, including effective enforcement of comprehensive missile-related export controls. 2. N/A 2. China continues to cooperate. Attention, however, has been given to other priorities that have arisen. On Target
3. North Korea: Eliminates or freezes its MTCR class missile programs exports; agrees to all commitments in the Agreed Framework. 3. N/A 3. North Korea: Has not contributed to nuclear programs in other countries, but North Korean ballistic missile exports contribute to destabilizing already volatile regions of the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia. On Target
4. NIS Countries: Significant progress by NIS and other countries towards enforcement of export control standards. 4. Export Control Cooperation: Significant progress by targeted countries towards establishment and enforcement of export control standards (reflects globalization of export control; we are moving into East Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America and key transshipment states in eastern and central Europe). 4. Export Control: Over 20 countries, including former NIS, in Europe and Eurasia have adopted export control laws, or strengthened export control systems and enforcement mechanism.

G8 Initiative: Accepts assistance from the G-7 to determine what regulatory provisions need to be adopted to ensure that Russia's nuclear safety regime will be consistent with the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Russia becomes a member of the Nuclear safety and Security group. Ukrainians increase staff to meet its increasing responsibilities. New Safe Confinement conceptual design is completed and obtains regulatory approval. Stabilization contractor is selected and mobilized.
On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revisions: Targets were revised because the term NIS (New Independent States) is dated and also because the goals of Export Control are now "globalized" and geared toward a wider target.
  • Data Reliability: Data on progress come from diplomatic cables and first hand accounts of activities. Both are expected to be highly reliable.
  • Data Validation: The observation and assessment of the activities in question determine that they are valid measures of progress toward this goal.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies MTCR, NSG, DOE and others.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #2: STATES CONFORM TO INTERNATIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION NORMS OF BEHAVIOR
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. South Asia: Restraint on missile programs and testing moratoria continue. Progress by India and Pakistan on bringing export controls in line with international standards. 1. N/A 1. South Asia: Five technical export control cooperation exchanges completed with India. Indian officials draft and work toward exchanges in export control system; make arrests and begin prosecution of notorious proliferating entity and investigate additional entities. Technical export control cooperation with Pakistan initiated, with first meetings held in February. Above Target
2. Middle East: Controls on Iran receive international support. Iran denied nuclear weapons technologies. Stronger export controls throughout region. 2. N/A 2. Middle East: UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors withdrawn from Iraq prior to military action to disarm Iraq. Iran's nuclear program is under intense scrutiny, as IAEA Director General reports numerous safeguards failures. Under a deadline set by the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) on September 12, unanimously found it to be "essential and urgent" that Iran cooperate fully with the IAEA to address questions arising from Iran's safeguards failures and called on Iran to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. WMD and other related technology are denied to Libya. Above Target
3. East Asia: Progress on verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile policy; and the verifiable and irreversible end to its nuclear weapons program. 3. N/A 3. East Asia: North Korea agreed to multilateral talks to address concerns about its nuclear program. Three-party talks among the U.S., North Korea, and China were held in April 2003. Six-party talks; U.S., North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the Republic of Korea were held in August 2003. States particularly welcomed the six-party talks in Beijing in August 2003. The talks, and the consensus that emerged from them, are "a clear step in the right direction." The IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution calling for North Korea to promptly accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and cooperate in their full and effective implementation. Above Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: These data generally covers all relevant issues related to this indicator.
    The actions of the countries in question are observed and analyzed in order to draw a reasonable conclusion.
  • Data Validation: The data are interpreted on whether or not they represent positive steps toward the desired result.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies, IAEA, NSG, UNMOVIC and others.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #3: PROGRESS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING FISSILE MATERIAL PROJECTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Russian warhead dismantling continuing. 1. PPRA and subsidiary documents concluded; implementation begins. 1. Russia decided to use the same design for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility as in the U.S.; negotiations of a multilateral framework to support to support Russian plutonium disposition started and continued. On Target
2. U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement and financing structures for assistance completed. 2. U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement and financing structures for assistance completed. 2. PPRA Amendment and replacement implementing agreement signed; access arrangements for U.S. personnel overseeing projects to construct/refurbish fossil fuel plants to replace production reactors signed; initial contracts signed and implementation underway. PPRA monitoring of shutdown reactors and weapon-grade plutonium in storage continue smoothly. On Target
3. N/A 3. Mayak FMSF transparency arrangements concluded. 3. Negotiations continued on Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) transparency arrangements. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revision: Revised target is a more accurate description of Department goals.
  • Data Reliability: These data come from signed agreements and monitoring of Russian actions. These are considered highly reliable.
  • Data Validation: Data is confirmation of prescribed steps therefore considered valid.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies, IAEA, NSG, DOE and others.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #4: U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR/NON-NP PARTNER PROJECT FUNDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL U.S. PROJECT FUNDING; AND, NUMBER OF INSTITUTES SECURING ALTERNATE FUNDING AND "GRADUATING" OUT OF SCIENCE CENTER FUNDING[1]
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Continued expansion of partnerships and technology markets. N/A U.S. private sector industry partners total over 60. Five new projects funded at three newly engaged BW and CW institutes. Three new U.S. industry partners recruited thus far, with partial year results for U.S. non-NP Partner funding at 14% of total project funding. The Bio-Industry Initiative has funded long-term commercialization and sustainability programs at large-scale biologic production facilities in Russia and Kazakhstan; has developed Russian Bioconsortium of former BW research and production facilities; has developed relationships with Dow Chemical and Eli Lilly. Above Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: These are observed "hard" data. Actual results (measures) of the program(s) by technical and financial auditors are taken periodically.
  • Data Validation: The measures align with the goals they are based on: Number of former BW/CW institutes now engaged in civilian research projects. Percentage of U.S. private sector funding. Number of institutes" graduated" from Science Center program support. Number of former BW scientists now engaged in drug and vaccine development.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies, private enterprise and others.
  • Other Issues: Indicator has been re-titled, but reports the same results: "Number of Russian/ NIS Weapons Scientists Redirected in Civilian Activities and Progress in Developing Self-Sustaining Civilian Alternative Employment."

Note 1: This indicator is entirely new, but reports the same results as the previous indicator: "Number of Russian/ NIS Weapons Scientists Redirected in Civilian Activities and Progress in Developing Self-Sustaining Civilian Alternative Employment."

 

Initiative/Program #2: Cooperation with Allies/Friends on Missile Defense

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #5: STATUS OF COOPERATION WITH ALLIES ON NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
NATO allies agree to specific missile deployment goals/options. Allies and friends agree to specific missile defense goals/options. The UK agreed to support the upgrade of the early warning radar at Fylingdales; discussions with Denmark on upgrading the early warning radar in Greenland are progressing well. The U.S. and UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding missile defense cooperation in June 2003. The U.S. worked with Germany and Italy on the Medium Extended Air Defense System. The U.S. and Canada established a regular consultation mechanism to explore potential areas of joint cooperation on missile defense. At the November 2002 Summit, the U.S. obtained NATO agreement to study the feasibility of missile defenses to protect population and territory, and the U.S. continues to work closely with NATO on this. The U.S. worked closely on missile defense with Japan, whose government has significantly increased its budget request for missile defense-related work. The U.S. and Australia discussed Canberra's interest in missile defense and opportunities for cooperation. The U.S. and India discussed how India could conduct a missile defense requirements analysis. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revision: Accuracy. The U.S. is cooperating with non-NATO allies and friends as well. Also, we are not seeking agreement on specific deployment options, but missile defense options.
  • Data Reliability: The data is reliable because it derives from direct contact with foreign governments, and from such information as contracts, MOUs, etc.
  • Data Validation: Achieving this target reflects extensive consultations and meetings, and concrete results are demonstrated in contracts, MOUs, licensing and technical assistance agreements, or other government-to-government or industry-to-industry agreements or undertakings. Therefore, reporting meetings and numbers of agreements or undertakings directly measures progress.
  • Partners: State Department works closely with the Department of Defense on all aspects of missile defense cooperation. While DoD develops U.S. plans and programs for missile defense, and engages in consultations regarding cooperative endeavors with other countries, the diplomatic process of explaining U.S. plans and programs, and of determining whether and how other countries might cooperate with the U.S. is primarily a State Department function.

 

Initiative/Program #3: Cooperation with Russia on New Strategic Framework

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #6: STATUS OF COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Agreement reached on transparency and predictability measures to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and missile defenses. 1. Entry into Force of the Moscow Treaty. 1. The Moscow Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. Discussions on procedures for, and scheduling of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission began. On Target
2. N/A 2. Transparency and predictability efforts underway to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and missile defenses. 2. The Department opened regular consultations on arms control and related issues with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Assistant Secretary level. CGSS Working Groups on offensive strategic affairs and missile defense, including transparency and cooperation, met twice and three times, respectively. The U.S. and Russia began exchanging information on their plans for reductions under the Moscow Treaty. In February 2003, NATO and Russia agreed on a work plan that includes some nuclear Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). Discussions on START implementation continued, on a more positive basis than in previous years; meetings of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) took place in June and August 2003. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revision: Target on the Moscow Treaty added since it was not achieved in FY 2002 and was assumed when the original target was written. The original target also updated because current U.S. policy is to engage in transparency cooperatively instead of negotiating formal "measures" or "agreements."
  • Data Reliability: The results data is based on meetings held with Russia and official reporting, and is therefore fully reliable. What is not reliable is any estimation of future Russian positions or activities.
  • Data Validation: Work with Russia on deepening the new strategic framework is conducted through the course of meetings and consultations. Therefore, the fact that meetings occur, and the reportable results of such meetings, will indicate whether progress has been made. In the area of missile defense-related projects, progress will be evidenced by agreements, contracts or MOUs.
  • Partners: The Department of Defense defines U.S. missile defense plans and programs, while the State Department works the diplomatic aspects of U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses. The Department of Defense also implements the U.S. strategic nuclear warhead reductions required by the Moscow Treaty, while the State Department generally takes the lead in discussing strategic and nuclear issues with Russia. The U.S. collaborates as a member of NATO to put together a work plan for the NATO-Russia Council's Nuclear Experts' Consultations, which focuses on nuclear CSBMs.

Performance Goal 2: Multilateral Agreements and Nuclear Safety

Initiative/Program #4: Strengthen Global Norms

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #1: STATUS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
AND INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. The NPT remains strong. 1. N/A 1. PrepCom II for the 2005 NPT Review Conference concluded successfully. Cuba and East Timor joined the treaty. The international community urged Iran to comply with the NPT and North Korea to reverse its position on NPT withdrawal. On Target
2. The review process continues with no disruption. Several more states sign or bring into force the IAEA safeguards protocol. 2. N/A 2. Eleven more states signed an Additional Protocol, bringing the total to seventy-eight, of which, thirty-seven protocols have entered into force. On Target
3. The IAEA anti-nuclear terrorism program receives adequate funding and expands assistance. 3. N/A 3. Voluntary contributions to the IAEA anti-nuclear terrorism program funding doubled in FY 2003. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: These are reliable measurements of the progress toward our overall goal. The strength of the NPT regime is closely tied to (1) degree to which the NPT review process focuses on strengthening the Treaty and (2) the degree to which the IAEA has the fiscal and political support to fully implement its safeguards system.
  • Data Validation: The indicators are straightforward measures; i.e. (1) number of countries adopting strengthened safeguards (2) real growth in IAEA safe guards budget and anti-terrorism funding.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies, the IAEA and others.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #2: STRENGTHEN THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION CONVENTION (CPPNM)
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Conference approves a series of amendments to the CPPNM to cover nuclear material in domestic use. N/A After two meetings, the Drafting Group has concluded its work without reaching consensus on a revision proposal, but did identify a set of possible amendments warranting consideration by States Parties as the basis for a proposal. Slightly Below Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: Data on progress come from diplomatic cables and first hand accounts of activities. Both are expected to be highly reliable.
  • Data Validation: The measurement is straightforward, which is the degree of progress toward the goal. This is determined by completed activities.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies, the IAEA and others.

 

Initiative/Program #5: Chemical Weapons Convention

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #3: STATUS OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. A total of 150 States Parties. 1. N/A 1. A total of 156 States Parties. Above Target
2. One CW destruction facility in Russia begins operations. 2. N/A 2. The first Russian destruction facility started operations in December 2002, and Russia met its revised deadline of destroying 400 agent tons by April 2003. Construction of a second destruction facility has begun. Above Target
3. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) under good management and conducting full inspection program. 3. N/A 3. OPCW has significantly recovered from the financial and administrative crisis it faced a year ago. The new Director-General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat has undertaken necessary management and financial reforms. Inspections, a key operation for the OPCW, have increased by over 15 percent, while the budget increase has been held to less than 10 percent, indicating an increase in efficiency as well. Inspections have also been retargeted to focus better on potential chemical weapons (CW) threats. Above Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: Data regarding accession of states to the CWC and regarding the Russian CW destruction program are based on factual information directly from governments and are therefore reliable. In assessing results regarding the good management of the OPCW, more subjectivity is involved; the assessment is based on facts regarding numbers of inspections, analysis by management standards of the distribution of personnel and grade structure, budget analysis, and comparison with other international organizations.
  • Data Validation: Keeping track of the number of States Parties indicates whether we are progressing toward the ultimate goal of universal adherence to the CWC. There are major political reasons why some key states are not yet States Parties, and that is beyond the control of the OPCW. Every country that does become a State Party increases the legitimacy and weight of international opinion on the need to eliminate chemical weapons globally. A major objective the CWC is the destruction of current CW stockpiles, of which Russia has the largest amount. It is a huge and expensive undertaking, but vitally necessary. At some point in the future, when several destruction facilities are operating, we will be able to measure progress in terms of tonnage of chemical agent destroyed. For the time being, however, meaningful measurement is in terms of the number of destruction facilities. Another major objective of the CWC is ensuring that legitimate chemical industries are not used illegitimately to produce chemical weapons. Therefore, it is essential that the OPCW have the resources to carry out the full schedule of inspections of chemical industry facilities (as well as military sites). When the OPCW is carrying out the full schedule, has sufficient financial reserves to cover short-term cash flow problems, and has a full, expert staff, then we will be able to say that the OPCW is efficiently and effectively carrying out its responsibilities for ensuring implementation of the CWC.
  • Partners: The Department works closely with the Departments of Commerce and Defense in managing inspections of U.S. chemical industry facilities and military sites. The Department works closely with the Department of Defense in interfacing with the OPCW concerning destruction of U.S. stockpiles. The Department works closely with the U.S. chemical industry and the American Chemistry Council (formerly the Chemical Manufacturers Association) to ensure that U.S. industry is fully informed about U.S. objectives and actions and that their concerns are taken into account.

 

Initiative/Program #6: Biological Weapons Convention

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #4: NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES WHO INCORPORATE U.S. PROPOSALS IN THEIR NATIONAL APPROACHES TO CONTROLLING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS THREAT
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
U.S. alternative proposals incorporated by 18-20 BWC States Parties in their national approaches to control the BW threat. N/A States Parties agreed at the November 2002 Review Conference to a work program based on U.S. proposals. At the August 2003 experts meeting, at least 25 states reported that national legislation, mirroring U.S. laws to control the BW threat, was already in place. The 80 states participating agreed that such legislation was an important element of their obligations as parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). While all participants agreed on the importance of measures to improve biosecurity, evidence of implementation was more fragmentary. However, at least 20 States Parties acknowledged the validity of the U.S. approach and indicated they had at least begun an awareness-raising program in their countries. At the November 2003 meeting of States Parties, the U.S. got an agreed pledge that all Parties will work to implement and enforce appropriate safeguards in their respective countries. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: The data is based on reports from foreign governments outlining national actions taken to improve BWC implementation, and therefore is reliable. In addition, the actual legislative actions will in most cases become part of the public record and accessible by independent research.
  • Data Validation: All BWC States Parties have expressed determination to improve and strengthen implementation of the BWC. The U.S. has put forward proposals for doing so. If all States Parties were to incorporate U.S. proposals into their national approaches to controlling the biological weapons threat, significant progress toward that objective would have been made.
  • Partners: In addition to collaborations through normal interagency processes, the Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, and Energy made significant contributions to our efforts to prepare and deliver presentations at the August experts meeting of BWC States Parties. Consultations were also held with the American Society for Microbiology, PharMA, and BIO. The U.S. sought cooperation and guidance from three international organizations: the World Health Organization, the Office Internationale des Epizooties, and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The two former organizations actively participated with the U.S. in presenting recommendations for pathogen security.

 

Initiative/Program #7: Promote Safe Nuclear Cooperation

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #5: UNSAFE REACTOR CLOSURES AND NUCLEAR WASTE IMPROVEMENTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Closure of key plants in the former Eastern Bloc; G-7 and Russia agree to new reactor closure agenda; the international community funds programs to deal with Russian nuclear waste problems. N/A Ignalina initiates closure procedures for Unit 1 and plans for closure of Unit 2. Russia is working on a comprehensive plan for de-commissioning of some of its reactors; begins a comprehensive plan for addressing nuclear waste issues. Above Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: Data gained from observation and official reports. Both are deemed highly reliable.
  • Data Validation: These data refer to prescribed steps in the process to achieve the goal(s). Completion of any step represents progress toward that goal.
  • Partners: Coordinates with DOE, WRC, USAID.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #6: EXTENSION OF BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION TO U.S. PARTNERS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS OF EXISTING COOPERATION AGREEMENTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Peaceful nuclear cooperation with China proceeds smoothly. 1. N/A 1. U.S.-China concluded agreement on re-transfer consents. Nuclear committee with Argentina established. Very successful first meeting held. Committees with South Africa and Brazil remain under active discussion. On Target
2. GIF proceeds as a viable forum for reactor cooperation. 2. N/A 2. GIF moves forward on developing joint research proposals. The Department of Energy agrees to facilitate by R&D agreements with foreign partners. On Target
3. No security problems arise from U.S.-origin nuclear material; other cooperation programs proceed normally. 3. N/A 3. U.S. continued active participation in international forums. Continued contributions to the IAEA TC fund - along with in-kind contributions. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Data Reliability: Observed data. These are prescribed steps toward achieving the goal of peaceful nuclear cooperation.
  • Data Validation: The completion of each prescribed step is a valid measurement of progress.
  • Partners: Coordinates with intelligence agencies, the IAEA and others.

Performance Goal 3: Verification and Compliance

Initiative/Program #8: Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Verification

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #1: STATUS OF VERIFICATION OF ARMS CONTROL
AND NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. The Senate provides its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty. 1. Analyze and make decisions on role of transparency measures to support Moscow Treaty implementation and Bilateral Implementation Commission activities. 1. The Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty in June 2003. Began implementation of Moscow Treaty through its Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC). Considered role of transparency measures in terms of the BIC, but the BIC did not meet in FY 2003. On Target
2. Analyze and make decisions on role of transparency measures to support Moscow Treaty implementation and Bilateral Implementation Commission activities. 2. Analyze and make decisions on role of transparency measures to support Moscow Treaty implementation and Bilateral Implementation Commission activities. Fully integrate verification concepts into USG deliberations and into negotiations toward verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear program. 2. Integrated verification concepts into USG deliberations and negotiations toward verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear program, including preparation of core interagency building blocks. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason For Target Revision: North Korea nuclear program is a key Department concern.
  • Data Validation: Department continued assessment of the role of transparency measures.
  • Partners: Coordination with other agencies, including DOE, DOD, and the Intelligence Community is necessary for a sustainable USG approach to the Moscow Treaty and strategic reductions.

 

Initiative/Program #9: President's Annual Non-Compliance Report

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #2: REPORT ON WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES
AND ARMS TRANSFERS (WMEAT) PUBLISHED
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Release of WMEAT 2003 Report
(CY 2002 updates) by the end 2003.
N/A WMEAT 1999-2000 printed, distributed, and posted on the Internet and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). WMEAT 2000-2003 (with CY 2000-2002 updates) in progress to be completed in 2004. Slightly Below Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Other Issues: Indicator has been dropped and will no longer be reported. Indicator is not a priority target.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #3: SUBMISSION OF PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. CY 2001 Annual Noncompliance Report (which incorporated CY 2000 activities) was submitted to the NSC, but not yet submitted to Congress. 1. Timely submission of the CY 2002 Annual Noncompliance Report to Congress. 1. N/A (See "other issues" below). N/A
2. Timely submission of the CY 2002 Annual Noncompliance Report to Congress. 2. Pursuant to Senate Resolutions of Ratification, prepare and submit to the Congress , the CY 2002 Annual Reports on Compliance with the CWC and the CFE Treaty. 2. N/A (See "other issues" below). N/A
3. Participate in rigorous review of proliferation behavior to determine sanctionable activities. 3. N/A 3. N/A (See "other issues" below). N/A
4. Pursuant to Senate Resolutions of Ratification, prepared and submitted to the NSC, the CY 2002 Annual Reports on Compliance with the CWC and the CFE Treaty. Reports submitted to the Senate. 4. N/A 4. N/A
Details of 2003 Results
  • Other Issues: Indicator was dropped. Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed into indicator four.

 

Initiative/Program #10: Compliance Diplomacy

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #4: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF A GLOBAL NORM OF ADHERENCE TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Clarify and seek resolution of U.S. compliance concerns. Visits under Article IX of the CWC will be proposed to clarify and resolve compliance issues. Bilateral compliance consultations will be conducted. 1. Proliferation Behavior: Participate in rigorous review of proliferation behavior to determine sanction able activities. (The Non compliance Report). 1. Proliferation Behavior Reviewed: In preparing and improving the Annual Noncompliance Report, the Department is better positioned to affect compliance enforcement through compliance diplomacy and sanctions. Coordination of report serves as a means of establishing U.S. Policy regarding noncompliance activities. On Target
2. Work with Congress to enlist support in enforcing Russian compliance. 2. Nonproliferation Compliance/ Enforcement: Compliance associated with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments enforced. 2. Nonproliferation Compliance/Enforcement: Sought clarification and resolution of U.S. compliance concerns related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) through visits conducted under Article IX of the CWC. Bilateral compliance consultations were also conducted. We also worked with Congress enforce Russian compliance with the CWC. On Target
3. Work with Congress to enlist support in enforcing Russian compliance. 3. Start Treaty: Conducted START Treaty-related consultations. 3. Start Treaty: In August 2003, the Department held consultations with Russia's Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the unclassified version of the Noncompliance Report for the year 2002. In September 2003, the Department sent a follow-up letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament. The letter reiterated the earlier explanation from the consultations that the law requiring the President to submit the Noncompliance Report to Congress was changed to require more specificity in the unclassified version and that the United States intended to fulfill the requirement in the upcoming Report. In response to a subsequent request from the Russian MFA, a copy of the law containing the requirements for submitting the Report to Congress was delivered to the Russian MFA on September 26. Russia has yet to provide official comments in response to the consultations. On Target
4. N/A 4. Sanctions: Expanded use of sanctions to induce foreign states' compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. 4. Sanctions: During 2003, the Department imposed sanctions on entities for transferring items that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programs as well as lethal military equipment sales. During FY 2003, the Department imposed sanctions on a number of foreign entities. For example, in May 2003, the Department placed export and import ban sanctions on the Chinese entity China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target #1 Revision: Major Department activity related to sanctions needs to be highlighted as Department priority.
  • Reason for Target #2 Revision: More accurate description of Department compliance enforcement goals.
  • Reason for Target #3 Revision: Activity conducted in FY 2003.
  • Reason for Target #4 Revision: Based on review of proliferation behavior, export controls can be appropriately applied.
  • Data Validation: Data is considered valid for this measurement.
  • Partners: Coordination with other agencies is essential to reaching viable and sustainable USG positions related to compliance enforcement, sanctions and related consultations with other governments. Dialogue with Congress is also essential in this process.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #5: NUCLEAR VERIFICATION INFORMATION SYSTEM (NVIS) ENHANCES VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH NUCLEAR TESTING TREATIES AND MORATORIA
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Use NVIS to verify international compliance with nuclear testing treaties, commitments and moratoria and to develop USG compliance positions. N/A N/A (See "other issues" below) N/A
Details of 2003 Results
  • Other Issues: Indicator was dropped. Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed into indicator four.

 

Initiative/Program #11: All Source Intelligence Collection and Technology R&D

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #6: PREPARED FOR RAPID ASSESSMENT OF ALLEGATIONS
OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
Department develops U.S. policy for the rapid assessment of allegations of biological and chemical weapons use. N/A N/A (See "other issues" below) N/A
Details of 2003 Results
  • Other Issues: Indicator was dropped. Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed into indicator seven.
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #7: INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION RESOURCES PROMOTED TO SUPPORT ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Seek Congressional support for endowing the Verification Assets Fund mandated by Congress in 1999 in support of preserving intelligence assets and funding R&D critical for supporting arms control and nonproliferation objectives. 1. Finance the Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) mandated by Congress in 1999 in support of preserving intelligence assets and funding R&D critical for supporting arms control and nonproliferation objectives. 1. USG did not seek funding from Congress for the V Fund, but Department identified projects and funded key intelligence programs using Department funds, important for verification of agreements and for ascertaining WMD-related activities. On Target
2. Conduct the annual NPAC TWG Conference. Assist in conducting several major symposia involving NPAC TWG focus groups. 2. N/A 2. The annual Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) Conference was postponed due to the war in Iraq. On Target
3. Identify and fund Verification Assets Fund projects which are important for monitoring WMD activities. 3. N/A 3. Participated in over 20 USG intelligence groups that monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities. On Target
4. Urge and obtain redeployment of key intelligence assets against a significant threat. 4. N/A 4. Directed appropriate action related to sensors and other assets in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. On Target
5. N/A 5. Begin work on establishing a task force to assess allegations of chemical and biological weapons use or accidental release of dangerous pathogens. 5. With the assistance of other USG agencies and departments, the Department began compiling data related to the assessment of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use or accidental release of dangerous pathogens. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revisions: This target was consolidated from a previous indicator that has now been dropped.
  • Partners: Coordination with other agencies, departments, and governments is essential to combat proliferation and threats to national and global security. Relative to CBW use, consultations were conducted with the Medical Intelligence Agency, U.S. Army Medical Center for the Study of Infectious Diseases, Department of Agriculture, and other agencies.

 

Initiative/Program #12: Rapid and Accurate Communication for Arms Control

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR #8: RELIABLE COMMUNICATIONS AND TIMELY UPGRADES
Initial FY 2003 Target Revised Target FY 2003 Result FY 2003 Performance Ratings
1. Proof of concept tests conducted on U.S. end for the preferred GGCL replacement design. 1. Begin coordination of international testing of accepted GGCL replacement architectural designs. 1. GGCL preliminary modernization authorized by START partners in the summer of 2003. On Target
2. START Treaty Parties consider and accept U.S. design for GGCL architecture. 2. INA fully functional with installation by all Network members. The three former notification-processing applications for CFE, the Vienna Document '99 and Open Skies to be discontinued. 2. The INA became operational for 44 out of 55 Organizationan for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) countries. On Target
3. N/A 3. More non-connected OSCE Network states join the Network. The reduced communications costs of the VPN are realized. 3. Network migration completed, with startup of Internet-based Virtual Private Network (VPN) for 44 out of 55 OSCE countries. On Target
Details of 2003 Results
  • Reason for Target Revisions: Important to note that most OSCE countries became part of the VPN, resulting in greater effectiveness.
  • Data Reliability: INA became operational, greatly improving efficiency in notification processing. OSCE Network Management Team distributes data derived from notifications circulated via the VPN.
  • Data Validation: INA being implemented, progress of OSCE countries' connectivity continues to be measured by the OSCE Network Management Team.
  • Partners: Coordination with other agencies and governments is critical to successful communications.