Strategic Goal 10: Humanitarian Response - Performance Results for Performance Goal 1

FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003
Report

VII. Performance Results

PERFORMANCE GOAL 1

Effective protection, assistance, and durable solutions for refugees, internally displaced persons, and conflict victims

 

I/P #1: REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Address the humanitarian needs of refugees, victims of conflict, and internally displaced persons.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #1: Crude Mortality Rates (CMR)

FY Results History 2000 No reports of excessive mortality rates based on set criteria.
2001 Refugee crises did not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people/day. Links established between the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and USAID to strengthen data collection.
2002 Where data were available, refugee crises did not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people/day for an extended period. PRM and USAID developed tools to measure and track CMR and the nutritional status of children under 5 years of age. A training workshop for practitioners was held in July.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. Where data was available, crude mortality rates did not exceed 1/10,000 people per day in refugee crises.
  2. Efforts to expand pilot data collection have been delayed; PRM implementing partner was behind schedule and did not reach the pilot stage of the project, but finalized guidelines and methodology for CMR surveys.
Target
  1. Refugee crises do not exceed a CMR of 1/10,000 people per day.
  2. Expand pilot data collection to other countries.
Rating On Target
Impact Lives of refugees were saved; humanitarian interventions prevented excess mortality.

Guidelines and methodology were finalized to provide tools for improved data collection and reporting on CMR and child nutritional status.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #2: Nutritional Status of Refugee Children Under 5 Years of Age

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002 N/A
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results

Baseline: In humanitarian crises where Department funds were provided, at least 90% of children under five had weight-for-height ratios that were greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of greater than or equal to -2), or greater than 80 percent median weight-for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema.

Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya is one exception where slightly less than 90% of children under five had weight-for-height ratios that were greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of greater than or equal to -2), or greater than 80 percent median weight-for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema. An anthropometric survey of Kakuma camp by the International Rescue Committee in January 2003 found that 12.5 percent of Somali Bantu children and 14.3 percent of other children under five suffered from acute malnutrition.

PRM and USAID continued to support the development of tools and measures to improve data collection and reporting on nutritional status.

Target
  • In humanitarian crises, 90% of children under five have weight-for-height ratios that are greater than or equal to 2 standard deviations below the mean (Z score of greater than or equal to -2), or greater than 80 percent median weight- for-height, and an absence of nutritional edema.
  • Improve and expand data collection and reporting.
Rating On Target
Impact Children caught up in humanitarian crises did not experience acute malnutrition (wasting) and were therefore at lower risk of death.

 

Photo showing an official at the International Organization of Migration (I O M) offices in Nairobi giving lessons to Sudanese refugees.

An official at the International Organization of Migration (IOM) offices in Nairobi gives lessons to some Sudanese refugees after they arrived from Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya. The first group of 74 Somali Bantus and 20 Sudanese will leave for the United States after a 10-day cultural orientation course for all those approved for resettlement. The lessons include U.S. laws, employment, housing, cultural adjustment and day to day modern life. Between 8,000 and 12,000 Somali Bantu have been approved by the U.S. State Department to resettle in about 50 U.S. cities. � AP Photo/Khalil Senosi

A nomadic boy waits for his turn to receive the ration of vegetable oil at a site of the project called "Emergency Food Assistance for Nomadic Families" funded by the World Food Program (WFP) in Kandahar, Afghanistan. About 1,224 nomadic families from Southern Afghanistan migrated to Kandahar due to seven years of drought. Each family collects 100 kilograms (about 22 pounds) of wheat, 25 kilograms (about 5.5 pounds) of lentils and 9 kilograms (about 20 pounds) of vegetable oil every two months. � AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko

Photo showing a nomadic boy waiting for his turn to receive the ration of vegetable oil at a site of the project called Emergency Food Assistance for Nomadic Families funded by the World Food Program (WFP) in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

 

I/P #2: REFUGEE ADMISSIONS TO THE U.S.

Resettled refugees are received and initially assisted in appropriate ways, so that they can begin the process of becoming self-sufficient, fully integrated members of U.S. society.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #3: Refugees Resettled in the U.S. as a Percentage of the Allocated Ceiling
(The ceiling is established by Presidential determination each year through consultations with voluntary agencies,
Congress, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Health and Human Services.)

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 Baseline: As a percentage of the established ceiling, 87 percent of refugees were resettled.
2002 Out of a ceiling of 70,000 refugees, 27,113 (or 39 percent) were resettled. This number was significantly affected by developments following the events of 9/11.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results Out of an allocated ceiling of 70,000 refugees, 28,421 (or 41 percent) were resettled.
Target 100%
Rating Significantly Below Target
Impact Many refugees not resettled in the U.S. continue to seek durable solutions to their plight. The U.S. Refugee Program encourages other countries to develop or expand programs to enhance resettlement as a durable solution for refugees.
Other Issues

Refugee admissions to the U.S. continue to be affected by developments related to the events of September 11, 2001. Performance was contingent upon a number of external factors, such as unanticipated refugee approval rates, security constraints on processing overseas, and the capacity to expeditiously process security checks in coordination with other agencies.

The Department is making significant efforts to improve performance, by:

  • Identifying new populations in need of resettlement;
  • Providing appropriate resources to UNHCR to develop resettlement referrals;
  • Training Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to identify refugees for resettlement; and
  • Expediting the transmission of Security Advisory Opinions for resettlement applicants.

 

Southern Missouri State University students observe demining demonstration at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri. � AP Photo

Photo showing Southern Missouri State University students observing demining demonstration.

 

I/P #3: HUMANITARIAN DEMINING

Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) reduces casualties, allows refugees and IDPs to return in safety, and allows for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, food, and medical services.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #4: Percentage Point Change in Reported Landmine Casualties in U.S. Program Countries[1]

FY Results History 2000 5%
2001 10%
2002 6%
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results 6%
Target 5%
Rating Above Target
Impact The lives saved and injuries prevented aid families to be economically self-sufficient, able to work, tend crops, and care for children, contributing in general to well-being of society.
Note 1: Results are calculated on an annual, not fiscal, year basis.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #5: Square meters of Land Cleared of Mines in U.S. Program Countries

FY Results History 2000 7,000,000 m2
2001 211,000,000 m2
2002 82,500,000 m2
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results 103,319,920 m2
Target 72,000,000 m2
Rating Above Target
Impact Thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons were able to return to their homes. Farmland and other areas needed for infrastructure were reclaimed for post-conflict economic recovery.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #6: Number of U.S. Program Countries in Sustainment or End State (Cumulative)

FY Results History 2000 5
2001 7
2002 9
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results 19
Target 13
Rating Above Target
Impact New country programs were added at significant funding levels for FY 2004 and funding for existing programs in severely impacted countries was increased, speeding progress to end-state.

 

I/P #4: WORLD FOOD PROGRAM DONOR BASE

Coordinate humanitarian assistance and head off actions contrary to U.S. foreign policy objectives.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #7: Percentage of Non-U.S. Donors to the World Food Program (WFP)

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002 Baseline: Of a total of $1.8 billion, U.S. contributions were 52 percent and non-U.S. contributions were 48 percent.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. As of September 22, 2003, WFP had nine new donors. "New donors" are defined as those that did not contribute in either 2002 or 2001. They are: Cameroon, El Salvador, Greece, Kuwait, Malta, Marshall Islands, Qatar, Russia, and Vietnam.
  2. As of September 22, 2003, non-USG contributions to WFP totaled $877 million, compared to $871 million as of December 31, 2002, an increase of 0.7 percent (short of the 4 percent target). By December 31, 2003, the percentage increase will likely be greater.
Target
  1. Increase the number of donors to WFP by four.
  2. Increase non-U.S. contributions by 4 percent over CY 2002.
Rating

On Target

  • Although the number of new donors was more than double the targeted number (see target/result #1), the percentage of non-USG dollar value contributions was lower than expected. (see Target/Result #2)
Impact It is important to attract new donors to WFP to increase worldwide interest in and commitment to international humanitarian assistance. For example, Russia, a new donor, provided $10 million worth of food aid to WFP for North Korea, and $1 million for Angola.