Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction - Performance Results for Performance Goal 3

FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003
Report

PERFORMANCE GOAL 3

Verification integrated throughout the negotiation and implementation of nonproliferation and arms control agreements and commitments and rigorous enforcement of compliance with implementation and inspection regimes

 

I/P #8: ARMS CONTROL AND NON PROLIFERATION VERIFICATION

Integrate Verification into Negotiations and implementation of arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments.

INPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #1: Status of Verification of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002

Baseline:

  1. Moscow Treaty Verifiability Report completed.
  2. U.S. positions on verification requirements developed.
  3. Transparency Measures for the Moscow Treaty developed.
  4. Prepared assessment of the elements of the verifiable dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons capability.
  5. Prepared assessment of the elements of a ban on North Korean indigenous and export programs for ballistic missiles.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. The Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty in June 2003. Began implementation of Moscow Treaty through its Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC).
  2. Considered role of transparency measures in terms of the BIC; however the BIC did not meet in FY 2003.
  3. Integrated verification concepts into USG deliberations and negotiations toward verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear program, including preparation of core interagency building blocks.
Target
  1. The Senate provides advice and consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty.
  2. Analyze and make decisions on role of transparency measures to support Moscow Treaty implementation and Bilateral Implementation Commission activities.
  3. Fully integrate verification concepts into USG deliberations and into negotiations toward verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear program.
Rating On Target
Impact
  1. Implementing the Moscow Treaty through the Bilateral Implementation Commission and exploring transparency measures serves to enhance the viability of the Treaty and strategic reductions.
  2. Integrating verification concepts into deliberations and negotiations toward verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear programs offers a more sustainable and effective negotiating outcome, contributes significantly to U.S. national security, and safeguards the global community from weapons of mass destruction.

 

I/P #9: PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL NON-COMPLIANCE REPORT

Prepare and coordinate Presidential Reports on Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments and other Congressionally mandated reports.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #2: Report on World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) Published

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 Baseline:
Release of most of WMEAT 1999-2000 Report (with CY 1998-1999 updates) on Internet and SIPRNET.
2002 WMEAT 1999-2000 Report completed and printed.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results WMEAT 2000-2003 (With CY 2000-2002 updates) in progress and will be completed in 2004.
Target Release WMEAT 2002 Report (CY 2002 updates) by the end of 2003.
Rating Slightly Below Target
Impact Publication delay will not have an adverse effect on national security.
Other Issues Beginning in FY 2004, this indicator will be tracked internally only. The Department will no longer report these results via the Performance and Accountability Report.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #3: Submission of Presidential Report on Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments

FY Results History 2000 CY 1999 Annual Noncompliance Report submitted to Congress, but not on time.
2001 CY2000 Annual Noncompliance Report not submitted to Congress on time, and instead was combined with the CY 2001 report.
2002
  1. CY 2001 Annual Noncompliance Report submitted to the NSC on time, but needed revision to meet more fully Congressional requirements.
  2. CY 2001 Report on Compliance with the CWC submitted to the NSC, but needed revision to meet Congressional requirements more fully.
  3. CY 2001 Report on Compliance with the Conventional/Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty submitted to the NSC on time.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results N/A (See "Other Issues" below).
Target
  1. Timely submission of the CY 2002 Annual Noncompliance Report to Congress.
  2. Pursuant to Senate Resolutions of Ratification, prepare and submit to the Congress, the CY 2002 Annual Reports on Compliance with the CWC and the CFE Treaty.
Rating N/A
Impact N/A
Other Issues Indicator was dropped. Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed into indicator four.

 

I/P #10: COMPLIANCE DIPLOMACY

Develop and implement compliance diplomacy strategy to enforce compliance with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments. Ensure implementation of inspection regimes.

INPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #4: Status of Implementation of a Global Norm of Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Nonproliferation Agreements and Commitments

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002

Baseline: Compliance issues associated with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) enforced.

  • Visits conducted in four countries under the provisions of Article IX of the CWC to clarify and resolve compliance issues. Compliance issues resolved as a result of several of these visits.
  • During these bilateral discussions with several States Parties, the United States identified its concerns and necessary mitigating steps. The United States also proposed to a State Party a plan for conducting possible site visits to address U.S. CWC compliance concerns.
  • Five States Parties responded to follow-up demarches and the Department resolved its compliance concerns with some States Parties.

Baseline: Compliance issues with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) enforced.

  • Protocol to the BWC was not supported at the BWC Ad Hoc Group, nor revived at the Fifth Review Conference.
    The United States called for violators to come into compliance with the BWC.
  • Concerns about noncompliance with the BWC were raised in all BWC consultations leading up to the resumed Fifth BWC Review Conference; the United States made this a major focus of the Conference.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. Proliferation Behavior Reviewed: Improved and prepared the Annual Noncompliance Report. Thus the Department is better positioned to affect compliance enforcement through compliance diplomacy and sanctions. Coordination of the Report serves as a means of establishing U.S. policy regarding noncompliance activities.
  2. Non-proliferation Compliance/ Enforcement: Sought clarification and resolution of U.S. compliance concerns related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) through visits conducted under Article IX of the CWC. Bilateral compliance consultations were also conducted. We also worked with Congress to enforce Russian compliance with the CWC.

    Articulated and sought international support for enforcement of compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) at appropriate forums and in bilateral consultations. Sought to gain adherence of all countries to the BWC.
  3. Start Treaty: In August 2003, the Department held consultations with Russia's Representative to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the unclassified version of the Noncompliance Report for the year 2002. In September 2003, A/S for Verification and Compliance sent a follow-up letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department of Security Affairs and Disarmament. The letter reiterated the earlier explanation from the consultations that the law requiring the President to submit the Noncompliance Report to Congress was changed to require more specificity in the unclassified version and that the United States intended to fulfill the requirement in the upcoming Report. In response to a subsequent request from the Russian MFA, a copy of the law containing the requirements for submitting the Report to Congress was delivered to the Russian MFA on September 26. Russia has yet to provide official comments in response to the consultations.
  4. Sanctions: During 2003, the Department imposed sanctions on entities for transferring items that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction and delivery system programs as well as lethal military equipment sales. During 2003, the Department imposed sanctions on a number of foreign entities. For example, in May 2003, the Department placed export and import ban sanctions on the Chinese entity China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).
Target
  1. Proliferation Behavior: Participate in rigorous review of proliferation behavior to determine sanctionable activities. (The Non-Compliance Report)
  2. Non-proliferation Compliance/ Enforcement: Compliance associated with arms control and nonproliferation agreements and commitments enforced.
  3. Start Treaty: Conducted START Treaty-related consultations.
  4. Sanctions: Expanded use of sanctions to induce foreign states' compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.
Rating On Target
Impact

Better compliance enforcement through diplomacy and sanctions sends a strong message of U.S. resolve to prevent the proliferation of dangerous weapons.

  • Department efforts led to the resolution of several CWC compliance concerns with other States Parties, advanced U.S. interests in the destruction of Soviet era Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, and in the amendment of another State Party's declaration under the CWC. In answer to both administration and Congressional concerns, Russia has offered to provide access to documents that may be key to resolving U.S. CWC compliance concerns with that country.
  • U.S. emphasis on BWC compliance has reinvigorated BWC consultations. A highly successful experts meeting took place in August at which state parties exchanged information on bio-security and bio-safety.
  • Sanctions efforts are an important nonproliferation tool. They help deter entities from transferring items of concern and punish those that have them.
  • Increased use of sanctions has created a stigma against proliferant activities. In addition, these sanctions often have a substantial financial impact on proliferators. For example,it is estimated that the import ban sanctions against the Chinese firm China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) will cost them approximately $150 million dollars in U.S. business.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #5: Nuclear Verification Information System (NVIS) Enhances Verification of Compliance With Nuclear Testing Treaties and Moratoria

FY Results History 2000 Identified need to improve classified and open source information access for verifying compliance with nuclear testing treaties and moratoria.
2001 Initial contracts concluded for development of Phase I of the NVIS tool on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).
2002 Received and used information from U.S. National Technical Means (NTM) and open sources to verify compliance with nuclear testing treaties, commitments, and moratoria.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results N/A (See "other issues" below).
Target Use NVIS to verify international compliance with nuclear testing treaties, commitments and moratoria and to develop USG compliance positions.
Rating N/A
Impact N/A
Other Issues Indicator was dropped. Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed into indicator four.

 

I/P #11: ALL SOURCE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND TECHNOLOGY R&D

Promote Intelligence Collection Resources and Technology Research and Development to Support Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Verification Objectives and Secure and Protect Intelligence Information.

INPUT INDICATOR

Performance Indicator #6: Prepared for Rapid Assessment of Allegations of Biological and Chemical Weapons Use

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002 Requirement for rapid assessment policy identified. Team formed and research begun on methodology and policies to accomplish.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results N/A (See "other issues below)
Target Department develops U.S. policy for the rapid assessment of allegations of biological and chemical weapons use.
Rating N/A
Impact N/A
Other Issues Indicator was dropped. Work pertaining to this indicator was subsumed into indicator seven.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #7: Intelligence Collection Resources Promoted to Support Arms Control and Nonproliferation Verification Objectives

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 N/A
2002
  1. Verification Assets Fund (V-Fund) utilized.
  2. Verification Technology R&D and intelligence assets coordinated and supported.
  3. The Department provided $400,000 to initiate a Program Office and to advocate funding the replacement for the COBRA JUDY radar (operated by the Department of Defense and the intelligence community), critical for verification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and for missile proliferation assessments.
  4. The Verification and Compliance Bureau (VC) co-chaired the interagency Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG), which acts as a central Coordinator for verification technology and identifies shortfalls in funding for critical arms control and nonproliferation R&D projects.
  5. The Department finalized the biennial NPAC TWG Report. As co-chair, VC assisted in sponsoring major symposia on Biological Weapons Detectors, Nuclear Explosion Detection, Chemical Weapons Detectors, and Unattended Radiation Sensors.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. USG did not seek funding from Congress for the V Fund, but Department identified projects and funded key intelligence programs using Department funds, important for verification of agreements and for ascertaining WMD-related activities.
  2. The annual Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) Conference was postponed due to the war in Iraq.
  3. Participated in over 20 USG intelligence groups that monitor and assess weapons and proliferation activities.
  4. Directed appropriate action related to sensors and other assets in support of arms control and nonproliferation objectives.
  5. With the assistance of other USG agencies and departments, the Department began compiling data related to the assessment of allegations of chemical and biological weapons use or accidental release of dangerous pathogens.
Target
  1. Finance the Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) mandated by Congress in 1999 in support of preserving intelligence assets and funding R&D critical for supporting arms control and nonproliferation objectives.
  2. Conduct the annual Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (NPAC TWG) Conference. Assist in conducting several major symposia involving NPAC TWG focus groups.
  3. Identify and fund V Fund projects which are important for monitoring WMD activities.
  4. Urge and obtain redeployment of key intelligence assets against significant threats.
  5. Begin work on establishing a task force to assess allegations of chemical and biological weapons use or accidental release of dangerous pathogens.
Rating On Target
Impact
  • Funding of key intelligence assets is critical to verify agreements and commitments, assess compliance, and respond to WMD-related activities.
  • Participation in intelligence groups is essential to preserving and enhancing our ability to verify arms control and
    nonproliferation agreements and commitments and for assessing and enforcing compliance.
  • Establishing a task force on allegations of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) use or an accidental release of dangerous pathogens will enhance the United States' ability to effectively assess and respond to CBW events.

 

I/P #12: RAPID AND ACCURATE COMMUNICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL

Ensure the rapid transmission of important information regarding compliance
with nonproliferation/arms control restrictions.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #8: Reliable Communications and Timely Upgrades

FY Results History 2000
  1. U.S.-Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) Agreement Amendment Protocol signed by the Secretary in January 2000.
  2. Study of architecture for Government-to-Government Communications Links (GGCL) replacement system began (the current system is operational only until 2005).
2001 Study of architecture for GGCL replacement system took place.
2002
  1. START partners (former Soviet nuclear states) considered completed U.S. proposal for replacement of current GGCL system.
  2. Integrated Notification Application (INA), designed to support the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Open Skies and the Vienna Document (VC) 1999 notification exchange was tested; OSCE Network Phase II Migration was on-track.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. GGCL preliminary modernization authorized by START partners in the summer of 2003.
  2. The INA became operational.
  3. Network migration completed, with startup of Internet-based Virtual Private Network (VPN). All Network members successfully migrated.
Target
  1. Begin coordination of international testing of accepted GGCL replacement architectural designs.
  2. INA fully functional with installation by all Network members. The three former notification-processing applications supporting CFE, the Vienna Document, 1999, and Open Skies to be discontinued.
  3. More non-connected OSCE Network states join the Network. The reduced communications costs of the VPN are realized.
Rating On Target
Impact These improvements will result in more rapid and accurate communications among the United States, Russia, and the other START Treaty parties, thereby facilitating implementation and compliance and reducing the likelihood of misunderstandings among governments.