Strategic Goal 4: Weapons of Mass Destruction - Performance Results for Performance Goal 1

FY 2003 Performance and Accountability Report
Bureau of Resource Management
December 2003
Report

VII. Performance Results

 

PERFORMANCE GOAL 1

Protection of critical physical and cyber infrastructure networks through agreements and enhanced cooperation

 

I/P #1: CURB ACCESS

Curb access of proliferators, terrorists, and state sponsors of terrorism to material, equipment and technology for WMD and missiles.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #1: Access to Weapons of Mass Destruction Impeded

FY Results History 2000
  1. Russia: Provided technology and assistance to Iran and India.
  2. China: Announced it would not assist other countries in developing ballistic missiles.
  3. North Korea: Negotiated about ending missile exports.
  4. Former Soviet Union Countries: One (Ukraine) of twelve Former Soviet Union countries enforced export controls.
2001
  1. Russia: Partially halted assistance to Iran.
  2. China: Implemented its 1997 nuclear commitment, but not its 2000 missile commitment.
  3. North Korea: Did not export nuclear material or technology, but continued to seek buyers for missile exports.
  4. Former Soviet Union Countries: Marked increase in meeting export control standards and in interdicting WMD and related components.
2002
  1. Russia: Exported technology; increased attention to Iran's WMD and missile programs.
  2. China: Implemented its 1997 nuclear commitment but not its 2000 missile commitment.
  3. North Korea: Accepted U.S. offer for talks, but continued to export missile-related items.
  4. Former Soviet Union Countries: European countries developed export controls; some NIS countries moved towards controls.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. Russia: Maintained its cooperation with Iran's program, but expresses increasing concern as IAEA establishes Iranian safeguard violations. International consensus against supply to Iran remains in place.
  2. China: Continues to cooperate. Attention, however, has been given to other priorities that have arisen.
  3. North Korea: Has not contributed to nuclear programs in other countries, but ballistic missile exports contributes to destabilizing already volatile regions of the Middle East/North Africa and South Asia.
  4. Export Control: Over twenty countries, including Former Soviet Union countries in Europe and Eurasia have adopted export control laws, or strengthened export control systems and enforcement mechanisms.
  5. G8 Initiative: Accepts assistance from the G-8 to determine what regulatory provisions need to be adopted to ensure that Russia's nuclear safety regime will be consistent with the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
    • Russia becomes a member of the Nuclear safety and Security group.
    • Ukrainians increase staff to meet its increasing responsibilities.
    • New Safe Confinement conceptual design is completed and obtains regulatory approval.
    • Stabilization contractor is selected and mobilized.
Target
  1. Russia: Stops nuclear cooperation with Iran; no nuclear contracts with India.
  2. China: Fully implements and adheres to 1997 nuclear commitment and November 2000 missile commitment, including effective enforcement of comprehensive missile-related export controls.
  3. North Korea: Eliminates or freezes its MTCR class missile programs exports; agrees to complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs.
  4. Export Control: Make significant progress by targeted countries towards establishment and enforcement of export control standards.
  5. Former Soviet Union Countries: Significant progress by NIS and other countries towards enforcement of export control standards.
Rating On Target
Impact These results, as a whole, signify progress toward proliferation control.
The North Korean exports represent a continuing concern, although the Russian reconsideration of cooperation with Iran is encouraging.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #2: States Conform to International Non-Proliferation Norms of Behavior

FY Results History 2000
  1. South Asia: Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoria, restraints in nuclear and missile program, stronger export controls. Experts cooperated with India to improve export control regulation and mechanisms.
  2. Middle East: Iraq defied UN inspectors. Iran continued WMD development.
  3. East Asia: North Korean moratorium on missile testing and freeze at Agreed Framework continues, but North Korea continued missile exports.
2001
  1. South Asia: Continued unilateral nuclear testing moratoria; restraints in nuclear and missile program; stronger export controls.
  2. Middle East: Iraq defied UN inspectors. Iran continued WMD development.
  3. East Asia: North Korean moratorium on missile testing and freeze at Agreed Framework continues, but continued missile exports.
2002
  1. South Asia: Onward proliferation concerns remain.
  2. Middle East: Broad international support for pressure on Iraq leads to two landmark UN Security Council Resolutions; Goods Review List (1409) and resumption of weapons inspections (1441). Smart sanctions denied Iraq technologies necessary for WMD and missiles. Iran continued WMD and missile development. Strengthened export controls in region.
  3. East Asia: North Korea acknowledged its uranium enrichment program, lifted the Agreed Framework freeze, announced withdrawal from the NPT, and expelled IAEA monitors. The Long Range Missile flighttest moratorium continued, but North Korea's missile-related exports also continued.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. South Asia: Five technical export control cooperation exchanges completed with India. Indian officials work toward exchanges in export control system; make arrests and begin prosecution of notorious proliferating entity and investigate additional entities. Technical export control cooperation with Pakistan initiated, with first meetings held in February.
  2. Middle East: UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors withdrawn from Iraq prior to military action to disarm Iraq. Iran's nuclear program is under intense scrutiny, as IAEA Director General reports numerous safeguards failures. Under a deadline set by the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) on September 12, unanimously found it to be "essential and urgent" that Iran cooperate fully with the IAEA to address questions arising from Iran's safeguards failures and called on Iran to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. WMD and other related technology are denied to Libya.
  3. East Asia: North Korea agreed to multilateral talks to address concerns about its nuclear program. Three-party talks among the U.S., North Korea, and China were held in April 2003. Six-party talks; U.S., North Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the Republic of Korea were held in August 2003. States particularly welcomed the six-party talks in Beijing in August 2003. The talks, and the consensus that emerged from them, are "a clear step in the right direction", the resolution said. The IAEA General Conference adopted a resolution calling for North Korea to promptly accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards and cooperate in their full and effective implementation.
Target
  1. South Asia: Restraint on missile programs and testing moratoria continue. Progress by India and Pakistan on bringing export controls in line with international standards.
  2. Middle East: Controls on Iran receive international support. Iran denied nuclear weapons technologies. Stronger export controls throughout region.
  3. East Asia: Progress on verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile policy; and the verifiable and irreversible end to its nuclear weapons program.
Rating Above Target
Impact The curbs on Iran's nuclear program and worldwide consensus about the dangers it poses, will impede Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons capability. The FY 2003 results as a whole serve to curb access to WMD which in turn help make the world a safer place.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #3: Progress Toward Implementing Fissile Material Projects

FY Results History 2000 U.S.-Russian agreement on plutonium disposition completed.
2001 Plutonium disposition suspended; Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement (PPRA) suspended.
2002
  1. Progress made on Russian plutonium stockpile implementation and transparency issues.
  2. Preparations for negotiations of U.S.-Russian plutonium-disposition multilateral framework are on track.
  3. PPRA Amendment and fossil fuel implementing agreement concluded, awaiting Russian government approval to sign.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. Russia decided to use the same design for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility as in the U.S.; negotiations of a multilateral framework to support Russian plutonium disposition started and continued.
  2. PPRA Amendment and replacement implementing agreement signed; access arrangements for U.S. personnel overseeing projects to construct/refurbish fossil fuel plants to replace production reactors signed; initial contracts signed and implementation underway. PPRA monitoring of shutdown reactors and weapon-grade plutonium in storage continue smoothly.
  3. Negotiations continued on Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF).
Target
  1. PPRA and subsidiary documents concluded; implementation begins.
  2. U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreement and financing structures for assistance completed.
  3. Mayak FMSF transparency arrangements concluded.
Rating On Target
Impact Progress made toward eliminating sources of proliferation from Russia, thus keeping them out of the hands of terrorists and dangerous countries.

OUTPUT INDICATOR

Indicator #4: U.S. Private Sector/non-NP Partner Project Funding as a Percentage of Total U.S. Project Funding; and, Number of Institutes Securing Alternate Funding and "Graduating" From Science Center FundingRead Footnote 11

FY Results History 2000
  1. Engaged more than 30,000 scientists in peaceful civilian efforts.
  2. Moved to support sustainable transition from weapons to civilian work.
2001 Up to 40,000 scientists and several new high-interest institutes now engaged.
2002
  1. Engaged 363 former WMD institutes compared to 9 high-priority Biological Weapons (BW) and Chemical Weapons (CW) institutes not able to be accessed.
  2. Eight new U.S. industry partners recruited.
  3. U.S. private sector and non-NP governmental Partner project funding was 8% of total U.S. project funding.
  4. launched BioIndustry Initiative (BII) designed to reconfigure former BW production facilities for peaceful uses and to engage former BW scientists in accelerated drug and vaccine development.
  5. Three new technological applications brought to market, including Neurok TechSoft (linear differential equation solver), a laser-based flourocarbon detector, and new computer animation technology.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. U.S. private sector industry partners total over 60.
  2. Five new projects funded at three newly engaged BW and CW institutes.
  3. Three new U.S. industry partners recruited thus far, with partial year results for U.S. non-NP Partner funding at 14% of total project funding.
  4. The BioIndustry Initiative has funded long-term commercialization and sustainability programs at large-scale biologic production facilities in Russia and Kazakhstan; has developed Russian Bioconsortium of former BW research and production facilities; has developed relationships with DOW Chemical and Eli Lilly.
Target Continue the expansion of partnerships and technology markets.
Rating Above Target
Impact Every institute and most scientists redirected to non-weapons related research represents a victory of nonproliferation policies. Institutes attaining global standards or that patent unique achievements lessen their dependence on weapons related work.
1: This indicator is entirely new, but reports the same results as the predecessor indicator: "Number of Russian/ NIS Weapons Scientists Redirected in Civilian Activities and Progress in Developing Self-Sustaining Civilian Alternative Employment."Back to Table

 

U.S. President George W. Bush (L) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) exchange documents during the ceremony of the signing of the protocol on the ratification of a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in St. Petersburg. � AP Photo

Image showing U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin exchanging documents during the ceremony of the signing of the protocol on the ratification of a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in St. Petersburg.

 

I/P #2: COOPERATION WITH ALLIES/FRIENDS ON MISSILE DEFENSE

Seek the support of allies and friends for the new strategic relationship with Russia and the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Seek their cooperation in countering new WMD threats and in missile defense development and deployment aimed at dissuading rogue states from acquiring WMD and ballistic missiles and deterring their use.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #5: Status of Cooperation With Allies on new Strategic Framework

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 Baseline: Consultations began with allies on New Strategic Framework.
2002 The Department led or participated in over 125 consultation visits on U.S. missile defense efforts, threat assessments, ABM Treaty withdrawal, and the Moscow Treaty. Allies and friends welcomed the Moscow Treaty, and accepted U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. The UK agreed to support the upgrade of the early warning radar at Fylingdales; discussions with Denmark on upgrading the early warning radar in Greenland are progressing well. The U.S. and UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding regarding missile defense cooperation in June 2003.
  2. The U.S. worked with Germany and Italy on the Medium Extended Air Defense System.
  3. The U.S. and Canada established a regular consultation mechanism and to explore potential areas of joint cooperation on missile defense.
  4. At the November 2002 Summit, the U.S. obtained NATO agreement to study the feasibility of missile defenses to protect population and territory, and the U.S. continues to work closely with NATO on this.
  5. The U.S. worked closely on missile defense with Japan, whose government has significantly increased its budget request for missile defense-related work.
  6. The U.S. and Australia discussed Canberra's interest in missile defense and opportunities for cooperation.
  7. The U.S. and India discussed how India could conduct a missile defense requirements analysis.
Target Allies and friends agree to specific missile defense goals and options.
Rating On Target
Impact

Cooperation on missile defense addresses threats to the U.S., its allies and friends by reducing the appeal of ballistic missiles for states considering their acquisition, enhancing deterrence and reinforcing stability.

Cooperation on missile defense development and deployment reduces the technical risks and costs of missile defense. For example, multinational cooperation can improve the effectiveness of layered defenses, in which offensive missiles are detected, tracked, and intercepted along the entire flight path, by making available basing areas that provide geographical advantages not available to similar facilities on U.S. territory.

Made it possible for three Dutch Patriot batteries to be deployed to Turkey and for U.S. Patriot batteries to be deployed to Kuwait during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

 

I/P #3: COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON NEW STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

Give further content and definition to the Administration's commitment to deepening the strategic relationship with Russia.

OUTCOME INDICATOR

Indicator #6: Status of Cooperation with Russia on New Strategic Framework

FY Results History 2000 N/A
2001 Baseline: Consultations began with Russia on New Strategic Framework.
2002
  1. USG established the basis of a New Strategic Framework for its security relationship with Russia that consists of, among other things, a new approach to deterrence that relies on both offensive and defensive means. The U.S. and Russia signed the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) on May 24, 2002, and issued a Joint Declaration on the Framework, establishing a Consultative Group on Strategic Security (CGSS).
  2. The U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, removing the principal legal obstacle to pursuing alternative approaches to developing an effective missile defense system.
  3. The Department instituted a regular dialogue with Russia designed to increase transparency and openness in missile defense endeavors.
FY 2003
Data
2003 Results
  1. The Moscow Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. Discussions on procedures for, and scheduling of the Moscow Treaty's Bilateral Implementation Commission began.

    The Department opened regular consultations on arms control and related issues with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Assistant Secretary level. CGSS Working Groups on offensive strategic affairs and missile defense, including transparency and cooperation, met twice and three times, respectively. The U.S. and Russia began exchanging information on their plans for reductions under the Moscow Treaty.
  2. In February 2003, NATO and Russia agreed on a work plan that includes some nuclear Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Discussions on START implementation continued, on a more positive basis than in previous years; meetings of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) took place in June and August 2003.
Target
  1. Entry into Force of the Moscow Treaty.
  2. Transparency and predictability efforts underway to enhance confidence in strategic reductions and missile defenses.
Rating On Target
Impact
  1. Entry into force of the Moscow Treaty codifies the mutual commitments of the U.S. and Russia to make deep strategic offensive reductions. It facilitates the transition from strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership. The Treaty is an important element of the New Strategic Framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts with Russia in political, economic, and security areas.
  2. The START Treaty also continues in force. Its comprehensive verification regime provides the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. The Parties are beginning to deal with START implementation issues more in keeping with our new strategic relationship, enabling resolution of some long-standing issues and removing irritants in our relationship.
  3. Working Groups established by the CGSS are intended to exchange information and foster transparency regarding offensive nuclear forces and missile defense. Data exchanges and cooperative activities serve to reduce uncertainties, enhance openness, foster a more predictable strategic environment, and build trust. Eventually, we hope that bilateral transparency with Russia will mirror the cooperative interaction we enjoy with friendly nuclear powers.