LiveAtState: Nuclear Security Summit 2016
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation
Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs
MR ZELTAKALNS: Welcome to LiveAtState, the State Department’s interactive online video press conference for international media. I’m Michael Zeltakalns and I’m delighted to welcome journalists today joining us from around the world. We’ll talk with Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman and Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins about the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit, which will take place Friday here in Washington.
You can start submitting your questions now in the bottom of the window titled “Questions for State Department official.” If you have difficulty submitting your questions, you may email them as well to firstname.lastname@example.org. We welcome your questions and we want to try to get to as many as possible in the time we have today. Please note that we can only accept questions in English.
You can follow our guests today on Twitter using the handles at the handles at the bottom of your screen now and follow the Nuclear Security Summit using #NSS2016. You can find a wealth of information about the Nuclear Security Summit at nss2016.org. With that, let’s get started.
Assistant Secretary Countryman, thank you very much for joining us today, and I’ll turn it over to you.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Well, good morning and thank you. And thank all of our journalists around the world for joining this press conference. Many of your countries will be sending delegations to this week’s Nuclear Security Summit here in Washington, D.C. The Nuclear Security Summit, which has been held every two years, is a crucial element of the United States strategy to keep terrorists from acquiring fissile material to make nuclear weapons. This year’s summit is not just about declarations but about real-world results. It’s not just the elimination of highly enriched uranium and plutonium stocks from many countries, it also means a genuine improvement in the physical security and, just as importantly, the security procedures in every country that possesses significant stocks of fissile material.
However, improving security of nuclear materials is only one part of our broader strategy in nonproliferation and arms control. We work every day to reduce the risk that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons could pose to the United States and to the world.
For example, take the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. The nuclear deal that the P5+1 and the European Union reached with Iran to ensure its nuclear program is entirely peaceful was a significant nonproliferation success. It has strengthened the international nonproliferation treaty regime. And its successful implementation will mean that we have fewer concerns about proliferation in that region specifically and around the world.
Another great issue of concern is the continued nuclear threat-making of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The international community came together and passed United Nations Resolution 2270 – the toughest set of sanctions in more than two decades. This resolution sends an unambiguous message to the regime in North Korea that the world will work relentlessly to stop and roll back its nuclear and missile programs.
Additional global efforts in nonproliferation include the Proliferation Security Initiative, a commitment among 105 nations to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. Countries that have endorsed the PSI cooperate to intercept shipments of WMD-related materials. Also, the U.S. continues to co-chair with the Russian Federation the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. And the United States has bilateral Joint Action Plans with 14 countries to help build capacities for countering nuclear smuggling.
Here at home, we continue our efforts to educate and build support for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT is good for the U.S. and for international security. And when it is in force, it will be more difficult for states without nuclear weapons to develop advanced weapons capabilities.
These advancements in nonproliferation are built upon the United States keeping its own commitments and obligations. Last year, the United States ratified the Nuclear Terrorism Convention and the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. This important international convention needs now fewer than 10 ratifications before it comes into force, and I am confident that will happen this year.
The summit is this year’s big event, and it fits into our broader efforts to make the world a safer place.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you, Assistant Secretary Countryman.
Ambassador Jenkins, over to you.
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Thank you, Michael. In April 2009, during President Obama’s Prague speech, Obama identified the risk of nuclear terrorism as the most immediate threat to global security. He called for a worldwide effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material and a summit to raise the issue of nuclear terrorism to the highest levels of government. Seven years later, this week, the President is hosting what is the fourth Nuclear Security Summit. The U.S. hosted the first summit in 2010, South Korea hosted the summit in 2012, and the Netherlands hosted the 2014 summit. Since the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, the international community and international organizations have made significant steps to strengthen the security of nuclear material, including successfully removing or downblending highly enriched uranium, or HEU, and plutonium from over 50 facilities in 30 countries, which is enough material for 130 nuclear weapons.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you, Ambassador Jenkins, Assistant Secretary Countryman. I think I’d like you both to take a crack at this first question from Suprasanthi Devi of All India Radio: “The Nuclear Security Summit, initiated by President Obama, is intended to galvanize all countries toward nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and secure the existing nuclear arsenals. Do you think that the past three summits have helped achieve targeted results in this direction?”
Assistant Secretary Countryman, let’s go to you first.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Thanks. In general terms, of course, the Nuclear Security Summit is not just about weapons, not just about arsenals. It is also about securing supplies of highly enriched uranium or plutonium that may be the result of or an input to nuclear reactors or other research. And in the case of both civilian and military use of fissile material, the summit process has no doubt shown that the security of these materials is stronger in every country that has participated in the summit.
And Ambassador Jenkins, maybe you want to add.
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Yes, thank you for the question. It’s important to note, of course that the Nuclear Security Summit – the focus is predominantly on nuclear materials. And while the issues of nonproliferation and disarming are clearly important, there is a – the format and the basis of the summit has always been focusing on nuclear material. There’s been quite a bit that’s been accomplished both through commitments made as well as actual highly enriched uranium that’s been downblended or removed – excess highly enriched uranium that’s been removed. Some of the figures that I could give you is, for example, there’s been physical protection upgrades at over 650 international radiological facilities. There’s been upgrades, physical protection upgrades, at over 32 nuclear material facilities. Over 13 countries have established what’s called centers of excellence. We have quite a bit of radioactive upgrades in terms of border security, radioactive detection equipment at border crossings and airports and seaports. Exactly 328, for example, have been done with that. And, of course, we have more countries that have ratified the treaties that we need to – that we need to have implemented and engaged for this effort.
So these are just some of the numbers. Michael had mentioned already what the website is, if you want to go and get more information on what exactly we’ve accomplished in this international effort on nuclear security in the past few years. But I can confidently say that we have done quite a bit.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you, Ambassador Jenkins. Our next question is on North Korea. It comes from Bloomberg News: “North Korea has recently conducted its fourth nuclear test and is threatening to detonate another device soon. How big an issue will North Korea’s nuclear arms program be at the Nuclear Security Summit, and why? Will that be a topic of talks between President Obama and President Xi?” Assistant Secretary Countryman?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Well, several points to make here. First, the Nuclear Security Summit does not attempt to solve every issue related to nuclear power or nuclear weapons in the world. It is focused on the very specific question of preventing one of the most frightening outcomes: terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials in order to make an improvised nuclear device. The broader agenda of disarmament and nonproliferation proceeds separately from the Nuclear Security Summit process. We concluded an agreement with Iran separate from the summit process. We seek to reopen disarmament and arms limitation negotiations with the Russian Federation outside of the Nuclear Security Summit process. And in the case of North Korea, the unanimous international community condemnation of North Korea’s provocation takes place outside of the summit process. In addition, the enforcement of sanctions, the efforts to peacefully require the North Korean regime to change its approach, takes place outside of the summit process.
So without question, there will be plenty of discussion of North Korea. It is the most active and provocative threat to security in East Asia today, but it is not the central focus of the summit itself.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. Our next question comes from Lin Xiaochun of Xinhua News Agency and it’s for Ambassador Jenkins: “The U.S. and China share an interest in nuclear nonproliferation. And earlier this month, China’s Nuclear Security Center of Excellence, the largest nuclear security center in the Asia Pacific region, was – which was financed by both governments, opened in Beijing. So what is your comment on China’s effort in nuclear nonproliferation, and why is the cooperation between the two countries in nuclear nonproliferation so important? How does nuclear cooperation between China and the U.S. contribute to the development of bilateral ties between the two powers, as well as the global efforts to enhance nuclear security?”
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Thank you for the question. Yes, China did open its COE, the center of excellence. And it was a – quite a momentous occasion. China had actually committed to doing a COE, opening a COE at one of the earliest summits, in 2010. And so we were very happy to see that this occasion finally happened. The U.S., as you said, is very – has worked very closely and very well with China in the establishment and opening of the center. And so we look forward to the future training of the center. They’re going to be working with Japan and Korea, South Korea, who also have centers of excellence. And they’re going to be working together and collaborating, working also with the IAEA in that effort – International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, in that effort.
So that’s all very positive, and we see this as a way in which we can continue to work with China on other areas, including nonproliferation, which I will let Tom say a little bit more about. But this has been a really strong effort in terms of strengthening nuclear security, in terms of – particularly now, at this – what we call this transition summit, where we are looking at how do we capture the successes from this summit and make sure they transition to after the summit into the future and maintain all of the great work that’s been accomplished to date. So by having this center of excellence established by China is a way in which we can – it helps us to feel confident that China and other countries in the region will continue to strengthen the efforts to secure nuclear material in the future – and of course, importantly, train the people who are very important – the scientists, the technicians, engineers and everyone else who play a role in nuclear security. This is very important, to make sure you take into account the human factor.
I’ll turn it over to Tom to see if he has anything else to add.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Just the same as in every other important global issue, it is vital that China and the United States understand each other and cooperate with each other when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation. We’ve done that successfully in the case of the joint comprehensive agreement with Iran. We’ve worked together on writing a Security Council resolution to respond to North Korea’s violations and provocations. And we work together also because we recognize that when Iran or North Korea wants to go shopping for nuclear or ballistic materials, ballistic missile materials, they frequently seek that equipment and technology in the Chinese economy. So we cooperate and we are becoming ever closer in our cooperation in preventing the spread of the technology that enables a regime like North Korea to threaten its neighbors. That’s how important the relationship with China is.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you, Assistant Secretary Countryman and Ambassador Jenkins. The next question is from CQ Researcher, Bill Wanlund, and I’ll go to Assistant Secretary Countryman first: “The President and a host of other world leaders have called nuclear terrorism one of the greatest dangers facing the world today. Many in the disarmament community, however, feel it’s a remote possibility and a lower priority threat. Please discuss State’s view of nuclear terrorism – the nature and likelihood of the threat, what needs to be done. How worried should we be? Are existing treaties and agreements sufficient to monitor and control the threat? If not, what security areas should diplomacy focus on?”
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Well, it’s a good question. And as in the case of anything where you’re describing the risk from an unknown actor, from a terrorist or a terrorist organization, you can’t quantify what that risk is. So I’m not going to put a label on the threat of nuclear terrorism being remote or imminent, because that is not knowable. But what we do know is that the threat has been greatly reduced by the actions taken by countries under the Nuclear Security Summit process. As a consequence of all of these steps, nuclear material in each of the countries where it exists is under tighter control, tighter security, than it ever was before. In addition, we’ve expanded our capability to have – to track a trade, a commerce in nuclear and radioactive materials. We have agreements now with 14 countries that may be on the path of such traffic in nuclear materials.
So the threat is greatly reduced from where it was when President Obama made his speech in Prague in 2009. Yes, there’s other threats, and yes, there are other things that we have to do to combat terrorism. Specifically, I don’t think we need additional agreements. What we need is the continued vigilance of all countries around the world to track what terrorists are up to and to foreclose the most dangerous options that terrorists are trying to exploit.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Ambassador Jenkins, anything to add?
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Yes. The only thing I would add to that is that, as Ambassador Countryman was saying, there’s quite a number of activities and projects and work that’s being done in terms of nuclear security. And we look at that all as a nuclear security architecture. And so that architecture includes everything from treaties, conventions, international organizations like the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency, initiatives like the Global Partnership to Prevent the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It includes counter-nuclear smuggling teams. It includes funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency. It includes the centers of excellence that we were talking about.
All of these are activities that were strengthened with the Nuclear Security Summit, and countries who were part of the summit have actually strengthened their activities in all of these areas. And so in the future, when we talk about what’s needed in the future, we need to continue to strengthen that entire architecture and the work that all the organizations and initiatives are engaged in to continue the diplomacy work with countries, and also to extend it so that countries who are not part of the summit are also part of this effort increasingly in the future. And we do that through international organizations, through the – including the International Atomic Energy Agency, and also through helping countries to continue to ratify treaties, to implement the treaties, to get the proper legislation to implement these treaties. So it’s all architecture, and the treaties and conventions are part of this larger effort that has to continue into the future.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. The next question is for Assistant Secretary Countryman and it comes from Japanese outlet NHK: “The U.S. Government has recently expressed their concerns again about the plutonium reprocessing which Japan and others are planning to do in the future. Do you object to the Japanese reprocessing plan and urge Japan to give up the plan? If yes, why? If not, why not?”
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Japan has been a pioneer in the civilian use of nuclear energy, and in this field – civilian nuclear energy – the United States has no partner more important and closer to us than Japan. In pursuing its fuel-cycle policy, Japan has made a commitment that it will not accumulate plutonium for which the employment, the use of that plutonium is not clearly foreseen. And Japan has kept that promise. They’ve done it in a transparent manner for the whole world to see. So we have no concern that Japan would either violate that policy or violate its very perfect record on nonproliferation issues.
So when it comes to the accumulation of plutonium, that is a choice Japan has made under its national fuel-cycle policy. That’s a choice for Japan. It is not the role of the United States to endorse or to oppose that policy choice. However, as the closest of allies, we do have an obligation for transparency, for both of us to be very clear about the nonproliferation concerns, the security concerns, the economic concerns that go along with choices in fuel-cycle policy. And so we seek to be as transparent as we can with each other and with the Japanese people about those choices.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. Next question is for Ambassador Jenkins and it’s from Tomasz at the Dutch weekly newspaper Elsevier: “What is the impact in the absence of Russia from the summit? Do you think it will reduce the success of the summit?”
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Thank you for that question. Yes, Russia will not be at the Nuclear Security Summit. However, Russia has been a part of the past three summits. They’ve been part of the negotiations and the agreements on all of the communiques that we have had, as well as on the 2010 Nuclear Security Work Plan which actually outlines activities that countries committed to engage.
So we understand that Russia, for its own – made its own decision not to attend the summit. Fortunately, the summit process has gone forward. We’ve had our meetings, our Sherpa meetings that led up to the summit which will take place on Friday. We continue to work with Russia, however, on other activities such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, where they co-chair with the United States. We’ve worked with them last year in removing HEU out of Uzbekistan.
So our activities have continued; of course, they’ve been reduced – they have continued, though. And they’ll – and the process for the summit itself has gone forward. It’s unfortunate Russia is not there, but we believe that in the future, as we go forward past the summit as part of our efforts, that we will continue to work with Russia, we will continue to work with other countries who are not part of the summit to ensure that the issue of nuclear security is something that is still very important for the international community.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: I would only note also that Russia, which possesses a large amount of the material that we’re concerned about – highly enriched uranium and plutonium – has steadily and greatly improved its controls, its internal security, both before and since the first summit. And this is a concrete result of our cooperation.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. The next question is from the Brookings Institution, from Leore: “What should we expect the five-year action plans to look like and what will the text include?” And we’ll go to Ambassador Jenkins first.
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Thank you. The five-year action plans which are – of the five action plans which are going to be released this week, are actions that five international or international organizations or institutions are going to be taking forward from the summit. More specifically, as part of the effort to transition to help ensure that the importance of nuclear security continues after Friday, it was understood that we would look at institutions to see how we could strengthen institutions who are already engaged in nuclear security to see how we could strengthen their work past the summit, post-’16, 2016 summit.
So there was an agreement, a negotiation by the Sherpas for the – for five institutions: the United Nations; International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA; Interpol; the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, GICNT; and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, or the Global Partnership. And what took place is there was discussions amongst the Sherpas to strengthen these institutions and initiatives with actions, and that’s why it’s called – they’re called action plans – specific actions that these – that the summit participants agreed that they would pursue within these different institutions.
So you will see different plans for each institution or initiative with actual steps that these institutions can take to strengthen nuclear security and the work that they do within their own particular mandates.
MR ZELTAKALNS: The next question comes from Press Trust of India, from Lalit, and we’ll go to Assistant Secretary Countryman first: “What is your assessment of security and safety of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in Pakistan, especially in view of the series of high-profile terrorist attacks that have taken place in the country recently? And secondly, how serious is the threat from ISIS, who are eyeing nuclear weapons?”
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Well, on the first question, I’ll give Ambassador Jenkins a chance to talk about Pakistan’s Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security. Without question, Pakistan takes very seriously its responsibility to provide security for both nuclear material and nuclear weapons. And as a consequence of this summit process as well as of our bilateral cooperation, they’ve taken important steps forward in providing that security.
Islamic State, of course, would like to get its hands on weapons of mass destruction. At the moment, again, thanks to the important steps that have been taken by countries throughout the region, as well as the fact that the international coalition is pushing back Islamic State, the threat is not immediate from Islamic State seeking nuclear weapons. But it’s not an issue that we ever ignore or take for granted.
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Just to add, Pakistan has been part of the Nuclear Security Summit from the very beginning and we’re very happy that they have been part of the process and part of the discussions on securing nuclear material, and we know that they take that issue seriously. I had the pleasure of being in Pakistan a couple weeks ago for – to visit their center of excellence. They also have a center of excellence. The International Atomic Energy Agency hosted a meeting there for a network that’s called the Nuclear Security Support Center Network, which is a network of centers of excellence who want to work together and learn from each other and share best practices. We had the first meeting of this network outside Vienna, where the IAEA is located, in Islamabad. And so we had a chance to visit their center of excellence. We went to their nuclear regulatory authority as well. And so we were there for a week and had very successful meetings, and it showed what they’re doing in terms of training individuals on issues of nuclear security.
In addition to that, I should note that Pakistan did recently ratify the amendment for the Convention on Physical Protection, which is a very – which was very helpful to try to move that convention even closer to the point where it can enter into force. Thank you.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. And our last question will go to Assistant Secretary Countryman first. I’m sorry, we have two more questions. This next one is from the Defense News, Aaron Mehta. He asks: “The nonproliferation community has expressed concern that while the budget for nuclear weapons modernization is going up, the NNSA budget for reducing nuclear material is trending downwards. Does that make – does that budget figure need to be increased or reinforced in order to make sure of the success of the NSS discussions in the future?”
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Well, it’s a great question. And of course, it’s a question that gets immediately into our domestic processes and the close collaboration that the Administration has to have with the Congress in very difficult budget times. From my side of the equation, where I’m not focused on the nuclear weapons budget, but I do look at the nuclear nonproliferation budget, I can say with absolute conviction that the money that the Congress allocates to the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense and other agencies for nonproliferation purposes, is well spent. It contributes immediately to the security of partners around the world and it contributes immediately as well to the national security of the United States and its citizens.
I would hope that we would be in a budget position where we could continue to devote strong resources in order to collaborate with partners around the world who take these threats as seriously as we do. But I hope you’ll forgive me if I don’t get into a specific budget debate with our friends in Congress in this medium.
MR ZELTAKALNS: And our last question comes from Xinhua News Agency, and I’ll give this to Ambassador Jenkins for a crack at first: “So far, not much has been revealed about the summit’s agenda except that participating leaders will deliver a series of speeches. What will be the highlights of this summit’s agenda and what substantial outcome can we expect from it? With the presidents’ campaign underway, will the next – with the presidential campaign underway, will the next president carry on President Obama’s legacy for these four summits?”
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: Thank you. One of the things that we have done is when we describe the summit, not only do we say it’s a transition summit, we also say it’s the last summit in its current format. The reason why we use that phrase is because we cannot say that this is the last summit, since we don’t know. Another leader from another country may decide to call a summit, the next president of the United States may decide to have – hold the summit. So we don’t know that. So what we say is it’s the last one in its current format, leaving open the door for other formats in the future.
The summit itself – actually, if you go to the website that Michael mentioned earlier, we do – we just posted some information about what’s going to happen that day, so there is a little bit more out there. But I don’t want to reveal too much what’s going to happen because I want everyone to stay tuned to what happens on Frida. But of course, we talked about the action plans. There will be, of course, a communique. There’s going to be a scenario, which will give an opportunity for the leaders to respond to questions based on a scenario exercise. And of course, there’ll be some – there’ll be the national statements where countries will make commitments as well as the progress reports, which are also very – always very important, because you get a chance to see what countries have done and accomplished since the last summit. And those are always good for everyone to look at to see what’s actually been done in the area of nuclear security by these countries.
So I think I’ll just leave it at that and hopefully people will stay tuned.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: Let me add, because I think there’s an important political question there and a point that I would like our friends everywhere in the world to understand. Since President Eisenhower 60 years ago, every American president has paid careful attention to questions of disarmament and nonproliferation. President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, President Reagan, President Bush – all of them made substantial contributions to making the world a safer place. And President Obama has elevated that issue in importance for this Administration.
But this is not an issue of a single party or a single Administration. It is an issue on which both parties have cooperated, which every president has paid careful attention to. As a consequence, today we have 80 percent fewer nuclear weapons than we had at the peak of the Cold War. We have mechanisms for cooperation not just with the Russian Federation, but with the other key partners around the world. And we have the capability to say, as President Obama did in his speech in Prague in 2009, that the risk of an all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States has greatly receded.
We need to move ahead, of course, we need to take nothing for granted. And I have every confidence that regardless of the outcome of this year’s election in the United States, America’s determination to continue to partner with the entire world to make this world safer will continue.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. I know this is an extremely busy week for both of you, so I want to thank you for the taking time out to join us here today, and give you the opportunity for some closing remarks.
And Assistant Secretary Countryman, would you like to take first crack?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY COUNTRYMAN: I think I just said the most important thing about this being a long-term priority for the United States. The President in 2009 talked not just about fighting the risk of nuclear terrorism; he talked about taking steps today that will lead us to the conditions for a world without nuclear weapon. It is a long struggle. It’s one that requires persistent effort and long-term thinking, and it requires us to listen to and to work with our partners around the world. But that’s the commitment of the United States, and this week’s summit is an important aspect of building towards that world free of nuclear weapons.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. Ambassador Jenkins, over to you.
AMBASSADOR JENKINS: I would just say that I’ve had the real privilege of working all four of these Nuclear Security Summits. And it’s been a real honor to see how the international community can come together to really achieve a lot on an issue that’s a global issue and a global concern and is a global threat. After President Obama made his speech in Prague about the importance of raising this issue of nuclear security and nuclear terrorism to the heads of state in the highest level, we’ve seen that happen. And we’ve seen how when the highest level of government can really focus on an issue that has concern to everyone, that a lot can be accomplished.
I would ask all of you to, when you have a chance, to go to the website nss2016.org and look at all the historical documents that have come from these summits. Look at all the progress reports, the national commitments, the statements, the communiques, the work plan, all of the what we call these gift baskets, which are commitments by smaller subsets of countries of the summit to make commitments to actually take action. I think you’ll be impressed by the wealth of activity and the wealth of progress that has been made on this important issue.
And so now the important thing is to make sure that what’s been done is not wasted, to make sure that we continue to work on this issue as an international community through international organizations, through the work that you’re doing with conventions and implementing conventions, through all the other activities that you will see if you go to the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan, which is a seven-page document which outlines all the activities that can be taking place, and you also look at all the gift baskets of activities. You will see that all countries can take a part in this and play a role in this, whether they were part of the summit or not.
So for me, this has been a successful effort. There’s still more to do. We can’t relax. We have to make sure this continues in the future, and I look forward to a successful summit this week.
MR ZELTAKALNS: Thank you. And that’s all the time we have for today. Thank you for your questions, and of course, Ambassador Jenkins and Assistant Secretary Countryman, thank you very much for your time today.
For those viewing at home, we will send you audio and video files via link and a transcript of today’s program shortly. Again, if you would like to continue to engage on these issues, you may join us on Twitter, @NSS2016, or the handles at the bottom of the screen now, and also on Facebook. And as Ambassador Jenkins mentioned, be sure to visit us at nss2016.org for more information about the summit. We hope you can join us again soon for another LiveAtState.