Andean Counterdrug Initiative

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement: FY 2006 Budget Justification
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
April 2005


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness

  • Disrupt the transportation and export/trans-shipment of illegal coca leaf and precursor chemicals: The GOB will interdict 14 percent of Bolivia's potential cocaine production.

  • Help GOB develop and maintain programs that reduce coca production and control marketing of licit coca leaf: A new GOB Yungas strategy seeks first to slow the growth of potential cocaine production in 2005 and 2006, then to begin to reduce it in 2007; a fully institutionalized DIGECO (the agency charged with controlling marketing of legal coca) enforces new regulations explicitly limiting new licenses to trade coca leaves.

  • Help develop and maintain strong counternarcotics and anti-crime policies and programs within the GOB; support GOB initiatives to strengthen and secure its own borders against transnational crime; develop the professional capabilities of counternarcotics forces within the GOB's judiciary and police: Successful prosecution of major drug cases increases 15% over 2005; 90% of all CN police/prosecutors/legal assistants are trained in advanced drug case investigative techniques; an elite group of Bolivian National Police is trained in anti-terrorist investigative techniques. Information sharing with international partners is increased, and domestic and international cooperation is improved.

  • Encourage public awareness of the drug trafficking threat and greater domestic support for counternarcotics policies and programs: A National Drug Prevention office designs and implements programs; a national drug prevention network is formed; DARE program begins reaching 25,000-30,000 middle school students throughout the country during FY 2006. Our strategy will also include seed grants to strengthen NGO's and civil society organizations that play a meaningful role in drug prevention. Public opinion support in favor of overall CN goals increases by 2% over FY 2005.

  • Promote development of a stable, representative government characterized by political and social order, citizen confidence in the political system and strengthened democratic institutions: Public satisfaction in local governance is increased to approximately 49 percent; police structure developed based upon modern policing principles, which is responsive to complaints of corruption and abuse; percentage of complaints made against members of the Bolivia National Police resolved within six months is ten percent higher than in FY 2005. 

  • Provide viable, licit employment and income-generating alternatives to the cultivation of coca in the Chapare and Yungas regions: 30,000 farm families in the Chapare (cumulative 1999-2006) and 15,000 farm families in the Yungas (cumulative 2001-2006) benefit from alternative development; the wholesale value of licit products leaving the Chapare increases to $40 million; average income of Yungas families involved in specialty coffee projects increases by 41% from FY 2005 to FY 2006.

Program Justification

Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts have reached a critical juncture due to serious challenges to democratic stability that reach far beyond counternarcotics policies. Porous borders, feeble institutions, endemic poverty and a succession of weak governments make fertile territory for throwback Marxist and other radical opposition groups, regional terrorist organizations, narcotics traffickers, diverse criminal interests, and illegal immigration. Because of these factors Bolivia has become a significant transit zone for Peruvian and Colombian cocaine. A year of political turbulence has also threatened Bolivia's hard-won gains in democratization, macroeconomic stability, and the fight against drug trafficking. Counternarcotics successes are also overshadowed by the expanding coca cultivation in the Yungas. The volatile nature of the Yungas region, with its severe topography and a long history of traditional coca cultivation, works against replicating the successful Chapare forced eradication strategy. It is the GOB's principal CN challenge now and for the foreseeable future, and will require significant assistance to the GOB to increase government presence in the Yungas.

Of equal concern is the adoption of violence as a means of protest and intimidation throughout the country. Alternative Development (AD) farmers, advisors, and NGOs have fallen victim to bombings, beatings, and seizure of their property by local unions and organizations tied to cocaleros -- with the tacit approval of municipal governments controlled by or sympathetic to cocalero interests. While an alarming increase in attacks on eradicators in 2003 resulted in seven deaths and scores of injuries by shootings and remotely activated booby-trap bombs, GOB/cocalero agreements in 2004 helped reduce the level of violence. The increasingly sophisticated violence suggests the possibility of foreign financing and infiltration of Bolivia by foreign terrorist organizations (case in point: Francisco "Pacho" Cortez, an ELN activist cozy with MAS and Chapare cocaleros, was arrested when caught with plans to overthrow the GOB), presenting a growing danger to Bolivian national security. USAID has provided increased security to AD projects.

Program Accomplishments

Due largely to long-term USG support for effective GOB eradication policies, Bolivia has dropped to third after Colombia and Peru in world cocaine production. Our integrated framework of support for interdiction, eradication, alternative development, and drug use prevention has yielded important results in the Chapare: the illegal coca crop of the Chapare region, once the world's largest production area, is less than a tenth of the mid-1990's level, and over 144,000 hectares there previously devoted to illegal coca now produce licit crops. The record-breaking seizures of both drugs and precursor chemicals in 2003 and the GOB's continuing strong interdiction performance in 2004 demonstrate the value of long-term investments made in developing special counternarcotics police units (FELCN). Total potential cocaine production in Bolivia decreased from an estimated 240 metric tons in 1995 to 65 metric tons in 2004. The FELCN and the Bolivian National Police (BNP) both created Offices of Professional Responsibility (OPR) that have already resolved numerous cases of alleged corruption among the police. The GOB has instituted greater control over coca licensing procedures, reducing the diversion of coca to cocaine production through USG support for the General Directorate for the Legal Trade of Coca (DIGECO). With assistance from USAID and OAS/CICAD (funded by INL), the GOB has focused increasing attention on delivering land titles in the Chapare and the Yungas. New AD activities in the Yungas are beginning to show their value, with demand for support exceeding available funding. In September 2004, President Mesa approved a new National Drug Strategy for 2004-08 that included a Plan of Action for the Yungas; its effective implementation will require considerable donor support.

FY 2006 Program

The FY 2006 request of $80 million is aimed at sustaining prior gains and continuing effective programs in eradication, interdiction, drug prevention/social communication, and integrated alternative development that will enable Bolivia to: further reduce coca cultivation, control the diversion of (licit) Yungas coca to cocaine production, interdict Bolivian and transshipped Peruvian and Colombian cocaine, expand demand reduction programs in schools, increase social awareness of the harm caused by excess coca, drug trafficking, and drug consumption, maintain program-appropriate ready-rates for land, riverine and air assets that support eradication and interdiction operations, provide advanced training to police, improve efforts against money laundering, and extend alternative development to tens of thousands of families in the Chapare and the Yungas.


To continue interdiction activities, NAS will be obliged in FY 2006 to assume costs previously covered by DEA Plan Colombia funding to support economic incentives, travel, fuel, etc. However, with a reduction in overall funding levels for FY 2006, NAS must reduce some elements of the program (principally salary supplements, the number of personnel, U.S.-based training, etc.). We will maximize the capacity of remaining program personnel by replacing aging vehicles (about 100 in FY 2006 alone) and maintaining current levels of various office and communications equipment, building maintenance and in-country training. The number of prosecutors has been reduced and capped by mutual agreement at 110, and FELCN personnel at 1,648; however, more personnel cuts may be necessary if DEA annual project funding falls below that of prior years. The FELCN units that NAS supports include: a command staff; GIAEF (money laundering investigations); GISUQ (chemical control); CANES (canine detection); UMOPAR (rural patrol unit); and, GIOE (intelligence and special operations) and its subunits: SIU (a highly specialized intelligence unit, managed by DEA); GRIRMO (mobile roadblocks unit); and GICC (containers investigation group). The GARRAS Jungle Training School (a regional training center for CN police from Bolivia and other Latin American countries, provides essential training (e.g., jungle survival skills, basic criminal investigation procedures, and human rights) to increase individual effectiveness and institutionalize modern police principles. Approximately 100 Garras candidates will be trained in jungle operations courses, and 200 police agents in 18 advanced or refresher courses in intelligence, information management, defensive driving, paramedic/first aid skills, etc., in remote locations throughout the country. The project will also fund two basic courses for new prosecutors and five advanced training courses for the rest. The CANINE program will support approximately 82 dog/handler teams -- which will fall short of rising demand for its unique capabilities, including the canine explosives detection capacity to assist in force protection. Police, security and judicial infrastructure will have to be stretched to implement the Yungas Plan of Action under the GOB's new National Drug Strategy.


The Joint Task Force (JTF) and other GOB entities (including DIRECO and the Ecological Police) accomplish forced eradication in the Chapare using roughly 1,500 military, police and civilian personnel. CNC estimates suggest that in recent years the GOB has been able to eradicate roughly as fast as cocaleros replant in that zone. The GOB's Drug Strategy for 2004-8 calls for a shift in FY 2006 from voluntary reduction in parts of the Yungas to some form of forced eradication. Forced eradication in the Yungas is a significantly different undertaking than in the Chapare, requiring substantial budgetary resources and political will to face a more hostile populace--the lack of either of which would scuttle the endeavor. The USG is the only country providing support to GOB eradication efforts in the Chapare. Unfortunately, nearly half of the Air Wing fleet of helicopters will be retired by FY 2006 due to lack of funding for critical flight safety upgrades, depriving eradication efforts in the Yungas of a key logistical capability necessary for success. FY 2006 funding will be adequate only to sustain eradication activities in the Chapare, with support for food, communications equipment, fuel, field equipment and other materiel. After DIGECO, the GOB agency that regulates the domestic trade in licit coca, has been institutionalized, its infrastructure has been upgraded and its regulations have been amended to curtail additional commercialization licenses, NAS will cease all support to DIGECO.

Policy Development/Demand Reduction

The Policy Development project will help strengthen the National Drug Control Board (CONALTID). Project support will help this ministerial body to effectively coordinate the GOB's anti-drug strategy; develop the coordination and policy development capacity of the Vice Ministries of Social Defense, Alternative Development, and Health as CONALTID's technical secretariats; and help the GOB develop and implement its social communication policies related to counternarcotics activities. The project will provide technical advice, equipment, training, consultancies, and other support as appropriate. Strengthening the coordinating role of CONALTID is crucial to the implementation of a coherent GOB CN policy. The project will also enhance GOB capability to manage the implementation of the new National Drug Strategy (in the face of likely resistance) and to design and implement a social communication strategy to promote popular support for the GOB's CN activities. The Demand Reduction Project will develop a demand reduction network among NGOs -- funding drug consumption surveys, focus groups and attitudinal studies, and holding training seminars for teachers, community organizations and NGOs on related issues. The project also funds the BNP's DARE program, which will expand to reach some 25,000-30,000 middle school students and certify additional members of the FELCN as DARE instructors.

Operational/Logistical Support

Bolivia covers a huge expanse of territory, and its poverty has left its transportation infrastructure largely underdeveloped, leaving it highly accessible to drug traffickers who utilize a variety of means to move drugs and precursor chemicals. The GOB would be unable to conduct counternarcotics operations in the absence of the logistical support these projects provide. The backbone of the entire counternarcotics program in Bolivia is a logistical infrastructure involving airplanes, boats, various land vehicles, helicopters and a decentralized warehousing and supply system designed to support the extended system of urban and rural bases and offices occupied by project personnel. The Blue Devils Task Force (BDTF) -- with its mobile bases and roving river patrols, ranging across 40 percent of Bolivia's land mass-- forces traffickers to utilize costlier overland or air routes, increasing the risks associated with drug production and trafficking in the remote north of Bolivia. The BDTF provides logistical support to UMOPAR in the riverine zones, especially in Beni/Pando, which is a major transit area for both drugs (from Bolivia, and Peru and Colombia) and chemicals. The BDTF also provides limited support to the eradication forces operating in the Chapare. In FY 2006 reduced funding will require a reduction in the BDTF project by approximately 50 percent, enabling it to provide riverine support only in the most operationally critical areas, such as the areas surrounding the Yungas and the Chapare. The Green Devils Task Force (GDTF) principally supports the eradication forces operating in the Chapare. Cuts in the use of helicopters in the Chapare due to reduced levels of funding in FY 2006 will require the GDTF to absorb additional logistical and operational requirements. The majority of vehicles in the project were excess defense items, and constant replenishment of motors and spare parts is required to keep them operational. The Field Support Program pays the operating expenses and leases for NAS facilities located outside of La Paz. These facilities -- field offices, vehicle maintenance facilities and warehouses in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, Trinidad, Chimor� and Villa Tunari -- provide a common support platform for NAS-supported activities throughout the country.

Border and Transportation Control

In FY 2006, the Secure Borders Project will support nascent GOB activities to combat transnational and domestic organized crime, including Trafficking in Persons. The objectives will be training an elite group of approximately 40 Bolivian National Police (BNP) through two courses in investigative techniques that lead to successful terrorism-related prosecutions, and pursuing the drafting and passage of legislation that more effectively addresses the many manifestations of transnational crime. The project will assist the GOB customs authority to fulfill its obligations under the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA).

Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering

The Law Enforcement Development Program (LEDP) project supports administrative and organizational development, improvement of criminal investigative capabilities, the development of training resources and capabilities of both police and prosecutorial personnel, as well as anti-corruption and police/prosecutorial reform activities. The LEDP coordinates with MilGroup and DEA regarding training provided to Bolivian security forces and with USAID regarding training for Bolivian prosecutors. The effectiveness of the BNP and the office of the Attorney General are key to the success of justice sector reform within Bolivia. In FY 2006, the program will provide four basic training courses for 200 new police and 30 advanced courses for an additional 2,000 police and 150 prosecutors, and purchase training materials, hire in-country trainers/consultants, and fund participant travel.

The FIU Development project will support GOB initiatives to develop its money laundering intelligence unit within the Banking Superintendent's Office. An effectively functioning FIU would complement the important work of the GIAEF (the FELCN unit specializing in money laundering investigations). Both units will coordinate to identify and freeze assets held by drug traffickers, terrorists or other criminals involved in transnational crime. Since this is a new project, start-up costs include office and computer equipment for a unit of 20 personnel as well as incentives, travel, and legal consultancies to draft new legislation.


USAID's Administration of Justice (AOJ) project supports the creation of more effective, accessible and accountable law enforcement and administration of justice systems. The AOJ project will assist the GOB to: enact legislation complementary to Bolivia's Code of Criminal Procedures (CCP); achieve institutional reforms required by the CCP (including the development of multi-service justice centers to improve access to justice within conflictive regions and the provision of equipment and training to the newly established Forensic Investigations Institute); and, increase understanding of the CCP throughout the legal community and by the public.

Integrity is essential to institutional reform of the BNP. A police structure based on modern policing principles --one that is responsive to complaints of corruption and abuse-- will also help improve public confidence in the democratic system itself, since the public interacts more with the police than with any other public sector entity in their daily lives. The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) (593) has a small corps of investigators with a solid grounding in human rights and the new disciplinary code. Tribunals are hearing cases under this system. Ninety OPR personnel and 40 Tribunal personnel spread throughout Bolivia's nine departments all require furniture, office equipment and vehicles. All new personnel will require training, with personnel changing every two years.


The Red Devils Task Force (RDTF) is a Bolivian Air Force rotary wing aviation unit that provides general aviation support for the JTF. In FY 2006, reduced funding levels will support only three to four remaining UH-1H helicopters and four Huey II helicopters with fuel, in-country per diem, incentives, uniforms for 169 personnel, and maintenance of forward operating locations. NAS funding will also provide funding for one additional Huey II helicopter upgrade. A small staff of AMCIT contractors will continue to assist the RDTF with maintenance, quality control, logistics, and training. Interdiction and eradication operations are highly dependent upon reliable helicopter support due to the near impassability of many roads at any time, but especially during the lengthy rainy season. However, by FY 2006, the much-reduced RDTF will only be able to support eradication logistical requirements.

The Black Devils Task Force (BlkDTF) project supports three C-130 aircraft. The BlkDTF transports CN forces and project supplies throughout Bolivia and moves rotary aircraft parts, program supplies and equipment to and from CONUS, which saves shipping costs and time. The BlkDTF is the only heavy-lift, in-country support available for transporting helicopter fuel blivets to forward operating locations. With the severe reductions in the RDTF program in FY 2006, the C-130 aircraft will be key to moving resources to forward operating locations, particularly those difficult to reach over land. The project funds provide maintenance, repairs, parts and required inspections as well as operating costs, including in-country per diem, fuel, uniforms, equipment and incentives for 81 personnel. FY 2006 funding will maintain a 1,000-hour flight-hour capability.

Alternative Development

Assisting farm families to exit coca cultivation will depend upon continued economic and social development support in coca-growing regions. In FY 2006 the AD project (administered by USAID) will: promote the sustainable production of licit crops; provide infrastructure, institutional support for producers' associations and legal land tenure; encourage the development of more democratic and effective municipal governments; improve services for education, health and vocational training; increase opportunities for off-farm employment and market access for products; and ensure improvement of the administration of justice, conflict resolution and citizen security in coca-growing areas. Continued funding is required to increase assistance to reach a total of 45,000 farm families in FY-2006, as they move out of coca and into licit activity, creating approximately 4,000 jobs, and to strengthen nascent AD efforts in the Yungas in the face of increasing coca cultivation.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
FELCN, UMOPAR, GIOE, GISUQ, GIAEF, K9, Garras School, Prosecutors 12,532 - 12,532 - 12,992
JTF, Eco Police, DIRECO, DIGECO 11,760 - 11,383 - 10,194
Policy Development/Demand Reduction 993 - 993 - 847
VM/SD, Demand Reduction
Operational/Logistical Support 7,989 - 8,603 - 7,156
BDTF, GDTF, Field Support
Border and Transportation Control 34 - 34 - 34
Secure Borders
Terrorist Financing/Money Laundering 1,664 - 1,664 - 767
LEDP, FIU Development
Anti Corruption 193 - 620 - 593
Aviation 10,633 - 9,493 - 6,667
RDTF, BlkDTF, Helo Upgrade
Sub Total 45,798 - 45,322 - 39,250
Administration of Justice * 3,480 - 4,500 - 3,000
Alternative Development * 38,272 - 37,164 - 34,000
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 656 - 676 - 795
Non-U.S. Personnel 1,040 - 1,012 - 1,293
ICASS Costs 695 - 750 - 788
Program Support 1,059 - 848 - 874
Sub-Total 3,450 - 3,286 - 3,750
Total 91,000 - 90,272 - 80,000
* This is an INL-funded and USAID-administrated program.   


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Performance Indicators

Support to the Government of Brazil (GOB) will: disrupt major trafficking organizations, increase interdiction activities, improve control of precursor chemicals, reduce money laundering, improve the capabilities of and enhance cooperation among Brazilian law enforcement agencies, and raise awareness of the dangers of drug-related crimes.

Training and equipment funds to Brazilian federal police will enhance operational effectiveness as well as the physical and procedural security at borders, ports, and airports.

An extended GOB presence in the Amazon region will result in more riverine patrols and increases in interdiction.

Improved federal/state cooperation and information sharing on anti-drug issues will enhance the GOB's ability to conduct sustained interdiction operations.

Greater regional cooperation will build alliances between law enforcement agencies in Brazil and neighboring countries to disrupt major trafficking organizations operating in Brazil and to prevent any spillover cultivation of illicit crops from the major producing nations.

The Brazilian criminal justice system will investigate and prosecute drug traffickers and money launderers, reduce money laundering and dismantle international criminal organizations.

Training to improve investigative techniques will lead to more arrests and prosecutions for drug-related and money-laundering crimes.

Improvements in the GOB's anti-money laundering regulatory apparatus will continue. The GOB's new national strategy for combating money laundering will be implemented.

Increased public awareness of the dangers of drug trafficking and drug abuse will deter the rising domestic consumption of illicit drugs.

Public support for law enforcement efforts increases as drug awareness programs deliver their message.

Support to local treatment and demand reduction facilities will decrease drug abuse in Brazil.

Program Justification

Although Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, it is the only country that borders all three coca-producing countries in the Andes -- Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. The sparsely populated Amazon region comprises more than one half of the country, which has long, porous borders. The GOB has been particularly concerned about the security of the Amazon since the implementation of Plan Colombia. Brazil has relatively well-developed communications, infrastructure and banking services that, together with major international airports and seaports, makes it a desirable transit route for illicit narcotics bound for the U.S. and European markets. Money laundering in Brazil is primarily related to drugs, corruption, and trade in contraband.

These factors, coupled with increasingly successful enforcement efforts in neighboring countries, contribute to a growing drug transit problem in Brazil. Brazil is a transit country for cocaine base moving from other Andean cultivation areas to processing laboratories in Colombia. It is also a conduit for cocaine from the source countries to North America, Europe and Brazilian cities. By assisting Brazil to improve its law enforcement capabilities, the U.S. will diminish the flow of illicit drugs passing through Brazil to the U.S., as well as have an impact on illegal arms shipments and money laundering in Brazil.

Program Accomplishments

Recent USG efforts in Brazil have improved the performance of GOB counterdrug law enforcement agencies and have assisted in the implementation of regional initiatives to reduce both the supply of, and the demand for, illicit drugs. In 2004, the Federal Police seized 7.7 metric tons of cocaine, 120 kilograms of crack, and 149 metric tons of marijuana. Continued USG support for Project COBRA, a project on Brazil's border with Colombia, was decisive in the GOB's determination to establish additional border control projects on the borders of other neighboring countries such as Peru (PEBRA), Venezuela (VEBRA), and Bolivia (BRABO). Finally, programs along Brazil's border with Suriname and Guyana (operation GUISU) are conducted to destroy illegal landing strips. In 2004, the GOB further exercised a regional counternarcotics leadership role when it implemented "Operation Six Borders" to disrupt the illegal flow of precursor chemicals.

In 2004, the GOB, in partnership with UNODC, hosted a money-laundering seminar with Brazilian President Lula. In addition, the GOB adopted and began implementing a new national strategy document for combating money laundering. The first major coordination action taken under the new plan was the creation of a new high-level coordination council (the GGI-LD), led by the Ministry of Justice's Office for Asset Seizure and International Judicial Cooperation. The GGI-LD determines overall strategy and priorities, which are then implemented by Brazil's financial intelligence unit, the Council for the Control of Financial Activities (COAF). Among the more ambitious efforts, the COAF is drafting legislative changes to facilitate greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow administrative freezing of assets and facilitate prosecutions of money laundering - and terrorism finance - cases by refining the legal definition of money laundering.

The recent inclusion of the majority of Brazil's 26 states and one federal district into the Unified Public Safety System led to the creation in 2004 of a National Guard by the National Public Safety Secretariat, SENASP, a federal entity responsible for the integration of diverse state civil and militarized police forces. With INL support, SENASP coordinated and delivered several national training activities. The GOB's effort to implement a unified reporting system for law enforcement and statistical crime and narcotics seizures is also underway. By the end of 2004, the GOB revised its central reporting database and encouraged state law enforcement agencies to adhere to this centralized system.

The DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance and Education) program is now active in all 26 states of Brazil and the Federal District. INL support to the National Antidrug Secretariat (SENAD) and the Ministry of Education in 2004 trained over 5,0000 school teachers on an anti-drug curriculum. During the same year, INL support assisted SENAD's implementation of a nation-wide drug use survey and established a toll-free counseling hotline, which provides callers with facts about the consequences of illicit drug use.

FY 2006 Program

INL resources will support projects designed to secure Brazil's borders in order to combat the transit of illegal narcotics in Brazilian territory. Also, INL programs will prevent precursor chemicals and arms produced in Brazil from being shipped to Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. INL resources will also assist state law enforcement agencies and the Federal Police through training and acquisition of basic law enforcement equipment. Finally, INL support will reinforce Brazil's efforts to combat money laundering, promote public awareness, and support demand reduction programs.

Narcotics Law Enforcement: Funding will provide operational support and equipment to the Brazilian Federal Police to conduct more effective investigations and interdiction operations against international narcotics cartel leaders. In addition, the project will continue to build on training already provided by INL and other USG agencies to enhance port and airport security, and to other illegal activities such as arms trafficking, chemical diversion and money laundering. Progress will be measured by improved investigative techniques, increases in seizures, and number of arrests and convictions.

Northern Brazil Law Enforcement: This project will continue to provide operational support to Brazil's Projects COBRA, PEBRA, VEBRA and BRABO, which are aimed at fortifying the northern border through riverine control, linked to a tactical command center in Tabatinga. Continued funding will support those initiatives that are still in their initial start-up phase such as: VEBRA (Venezuela), PEBRA (Peru), and BRABO (Bolivia). Progress will be measured in terms of the deployment of material and personnel resources to operating locations in the Amazon as well as the performance of the command center.

State Security Law Enforcement: This project will assist the Brazilian National Public Safety Secretariat and promote improved coordination of counternarcotics activities within Brazil's law enforcement community. Funds will provide equipment and training to Brazilian state, civil and military police forces and may also include training for community-oriented police forces. Progress will be measured in terms of increased effectiveness of state police investigations and number of officials trained.

Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction: The recognition of the seriousness of the increase in illegal drug use in Brazil, particularly among young people, has led to the passage of drug legislation that emphasizes demand reduction. In FY 2006 the Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction project will continue support for SENAD programs that focus on drug education to increase public awareness of Brazil's drug problem and demand for illegal drugs. INL will seek to build public support for counternarcotics efforts by providing grants to individual state drug councils, federal and state government agencies, university educational research groups, private organizations and youth programs. Progress will be measured in terms of the capacity of Brazilian organizations to produce effective demand reduction programs and changes in drug consumption patterns.

Program Development and Support (PD&S): PD&S funds will provide necessary resources for salaries, benefits, and allowances of U.S. and foreign national direct hire and contract personnel, field travel, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs, and other general administrative and operating expenses for program planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Narcotics Law Enforcement
Narcotics Law Enforcement 3,780 - 3,500 - 2,300
Northern Brazil Law Enforcement 4,500 - 3,000 - 2,000
State Security Law Enforcement 1,000 - 1,528 - 700
Sub Total 9,280 8,028 5,000
Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 500 - 500 - 500
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 166 - 178 - 178
Non-U.S. Personnel 44 - 77 - 77
ICASS Costs 90 - 106 - 106
Program Support 120 - 39 - 139
Sub-Total 420 - 400 - 500
Total 10,200 - 8,928 - 6,000


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness

Disrupt Illicit Drugs

Reduce the cultivation of coca and opium poppy to a non-commercial level.

  • All coca and opium poppy will be sprayed to disrupt the market and deter replanting.

  • Forced eradication and alternative development will continue to reduce and discourage cultivation in traditional growing areas, as well as potential new areas for cultivation.

  • Manual Eradication will increase in areas where aerial spraying is not feasible

Dismantle major drug trafficking organizations and prevent their resurgence.

  • Interdiction of cocaine and heroin will continue at current high levels in the near term until production capacity has been more severely reduced.

  • Technical assistance and training will be employed to allow the Government of Colombia to investigate arrest, prosecute, and convict more key narcoterrorists, particularly those who are Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOT).

  • Extradition of major narcotraffickers to the U.S. will continue as Colombia persists in dismantling narcotrafficking organizations at a rapid pace.

  • Police and military aircraft, including Air Bridge Denial (ABD) assets, will achieve and maintain optimal mission capable rates, despite an increased operational tempo in support of expanded mission requirements.

Halt the diversion of precursor chemicals as well as the laundering of money.

  • Money laundering units trained and equipped in recent years will increase the amount of money seizures and the number of prosecutions.

  • Robust Chemical Control efforts will continue and seizures of precursor chemicals and prosecutions will increase

Strengthen Institutions

Develop greater respect for rule of law throughout Colombia and increase access to justice.

  • Permanent police presence in conflictive areas will be strengthened to cement recently established government presence and additional stations will be constructed as needed. 

  • Additional legal assistance offices and oral trial courtrooms will be set up to complete the transition to the oral system of justice and more judges, prosecutors, and police will be trained.

  • Human rights early warning system and training will be expanded to ensure that affected communities are alerted and violations are investigated and prosecuted in a timely fashion.

  • Internally displaced persons and demobilized combatants have either returned to their homes or have established a suitable permanent residence elsewhere

Develop Alternatives

Provide legal economic opportunities via alternative development and social infrastructure projects to former small field coca growers and other vulnerable groups.

  • Number of families assisted and hectares of licit crops replacing illicit crops with licit crops through alternative development projects will increase.

  • Number of employment opportunities for residents in or near to areas of aerial spraying and illegal cultivation will increase.

  • Avenues to deliver products produced by alternative development will be increased.

Program Justification

Colombia's position as the supplier of over 90% of the cocaine and 50% of the heroin entering the United States makes the aggressive disruption of the illicit drug trade a top priority among the numerous important USG interests in Colombia. It is much easier and more cost effective to eradicate and interdict this cocaine and heroin in or close to the source before it is shipped to international markets and before narcoterrorista can reap a profit from them. Interdiction and eradication programs in Colombia, in effect, extend our borders out to the Andean region. Without them, narcotraffickers would have open lanes to the U.S. borders and no significant impediment to their production capacity. Colombia is home to three Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). These groups finance a large part of their operations with proceeds from the drug trade and are a threat to the security of the entire hemisphere. As Colombia continues to have success in battling these FTOs, they could become more desperate and prone to use their resources and networks to earn money by servicing potentially new allies who could be other terrorist organizations. The USG cannot afford to allow terrorists organizations with tens of thousands of well-armed and trained members to operate unimpeded in this hemisphere.

The funding requested in FY 2006 will set the stage to lock-in the successes of the Plan Colombia Supplemental of 2000 and subsequent Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) programs. Earlier programs have put increasing pressure on every aspect of the illegal narcotics industry in Colombia, but it is important to follow through and further develop and strengthen GOC institutions, so we can hand off these programs to Colombia. Without our sustained support for the near-term, the hard-won gains of the joint effort between Colombia and the U.S. may well be reversed. We are clearly at a tipping point and we must continue to keep the pressure on the narcoterrorists.

Program Accomplishments

The Government of Colombia (GOC) announced its Plan Colombia in 1999, as a six-year program with a balanced and wide-ranging strategy designed to end the country's 40-year armed conflict, eliminate narcotrafficking, promote economic and social development, strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law, and promote respect for human rights and humanitarian programs. The Uribe Administration, which took office in 2002, continues to be fully committed to the goals and objectives of Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia, by any measurement, has had exceptional success in attaining the objectives it established, but the job is not finished and we must continue to consolidate the progress so far made.

2004 was the fourth consecutive record-breaking year of aerial eradication. Aircraft sprayed over 136,500 hectares of coca through the year and 3061 hectares of opium poppy. Despite narcotraffickers' aggressive efforts to defend their illicit cultivations, the number of ground fire impacts decreased by nearly 50 percent compared to 2003 because of improved intelligence, security, and coordination. Coca cultivation was at 170,000 hectares in 2001, shrank to 145,000 hectares in 2002, and 114,000 hectares in 2003. Although U.S. Government's illicit crop estimates for 2004 will not be available until March 2005, the UN estimated a 30 percent reduction in Colombian coca during the first six months of 2004. Our efforts with Colombia in eradicating and interdicting illicit drugs and dismantling terrorist networks are paying off in other areas as well. Homicides were down by over 15% in 2004. Kidnappings were down by over 30% during the same period. Arrests of narcotraffickers increased in 2004 by 33%. Field losses of the AUC were up by 80% and 10% for the FARC in 2004. Terrorist attacks were down by over 47% and attacks against small municipalities decreased by 75% in 2004. Since 1998, the GOC has extradited over 260 fugitives to the United States. People in Colombia are now talking about peace as something that could really happen sooner rather than later and this will bring greater prosperity and security to Colombia and the hemisphere.

The results of the Colombian National Police Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN) and the Colombian Army's (COLAR) Counterdrug Brigade are outstanding. During 2004, they seized more cocaine and coca base than ever, building on record increases since 2001. In 2001, seizures were 80 metric tons. In 2002 seizures were 124 metric tons, and in 2004 seizures were at least 178 metric tons. The DIRAN alone destroyed over 150 cocaine laboratories in 2004; while the number destroyed by all Police and Military units were 200. The DIRAN also regularly conducts cooperative, or joint, operations with the Colombian Air Force, Army, and Navy. The COLAR Counterdrug Brigade conducts drug interdiction and provides essential ground security for aerial eradication, a crucial element in reducing ground fire aimed at our spray aircraft.

Since 2001, over two million internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been assisted in Colombia, along with over two thousand child soldiers. The Early Warning System, created in 2001 by Plan Colombia to prevent massacres and forced displacement is functioning and ensuring prompt GOC responses to possible violations. This program has also created 11 new mobile satellite units of the national human rights units, bringing the total to 21. The Promotion of the Rule of Law program has established 37 Justice Centers (Casas de Justicia) since inception and over 2.6 million cases have been processed. Thirty-five oral trial courtrooms were constructed with U.S. financing. These will be crucial to Colombia's recently begun transition to an oral justice system.

USAID supported medium- and long-term alternative development programs have historically concentrated in the southern departments of Putumayo and Caquet�, the areas of Colombia's densest coca cultivation. By the end of 2004, programs had aided almost 40,000 families and established over 55,000 hectares of licit crops since their inception. In addition, USAID constructed over 200 social infrastructure projects in 2004, bringing the total to 874, since the project began. Nevertheless, the formidable security threat and lack of viable economic infrastructure in many parts of the Putumayo pose formidable obstacles and have caused the USG to refocus alternative development to expand activities beyond southern Colombia to other areas with illicit cultivation but where a greater number of legal economic activities already exist and have shown a potential for success. This will boost income-generating opportunities through private sector partnerships that emphasize infrastructure development, along with direct crop substitution when feasible.

FY 2006 Program

Following on the successes of the last two years, INL's plan is to continue to effect a total, lasting, systematic dismantling of narcoterrorism in Colombia. The Colombian forces trained by INL and other USG agencies will be supported by INL air assets, as they seek out and destroy narcoterrorist organizations. Infrastructure development now taking place in the climate of increased security in Colombia will continue to be protected by programs funded by INL and victims of kidnappings and assaults carried out by guerrilla groups will continue to be rescued by USG-trained and supported units. All of this will be in addition to the continued high levels of eradication and interdiction operations. These programs form the core of what we must do to succeed in wiping out the narcotics trade in Colombia and stop the terrorism that threatens the elected democracy in one of our key Latin American allies and the stability of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Anticipating the conclusion of Plan Colombia in late 2005, the Colombian Government has begun planning a follow-on strategy that would build on and consolidate the progress made to date. INL, in conjunction with others in the USG, will work to support three areas described by the Colombian Government that in general represent a continuation of programs we are already undertaking:

(a) Fighting terrorism, narcotics trafficking and international organized crime

(b) Economic and social reactivation

(c) Institutional and justice system strengthening

A fourth area proposed by the GOC, that of "peace negotiations, demobilization and reintegration of illegal armed groups," is the result of progress made by Plan Colombia. Because of the pace at which peace negotiations with the paramilitaries have developed, specific significant assistance has not yet been programmed and is to be the subject of additional consultations with the Congress.

Support to the Colombian Military

Colombian Army Aviation Support: COLAR Aviation support directly enhances the ability to conduct both interdiction and eradication operations. This funding provides fuel, spare parts, repair and maintenance costs for the 82 helicopters (26 UH-1N's, 16 UH-60's, 35 Huey II's and 5 K-Max) that provide essential airlift capacity for operations against high value narcoterrorist targets and provide vital security to eradication missions. The fleet has grown significantly in recent years, as has the number of operations. FY 2006 funds will also support helicopters and facilities dedicated to protecting the critical petroleum infrastructure in Arauca Department. COLAR support includes training crews and technicians and providing aviation infrastructure support. In FY 2006, there is a projected increase in the number of missions, areas of operations, and number of vetted units receiving U.S. support. The strategic focus will be to capitalize on the COLAR's ability to use aggressive, small, mobile units to go after long-standing and newly developing narcotrafficking organizations. This will require sustained high levels of helicopter airlift support. Three battalions of the CD Brigade have been retrained and retooled and in conjunction with COLAR Aviation, will continue to expand their area of operations from the conflict regions of Colombia.

Colombian Army (COLAR) Counterdrug (CD) Mobile Brigade: Continued Support and development of the CD Brigade enhances the host nation's ability to conduct sustained eradication operations. The CD Brigade will continue to utilize its specialized training to focus on the fragmented heroin trade as well as the coca industry. Funding for this project in FY2006 will provide ongoing logistical and operations support to the COLAR CD Brigade's interdiction operations, including high value targets, as well as to the CNP's aerial eradication missions. This requires the purchase of additional military equipment and ammunition, as well as funding to establish new simple forward operating locations and general sustainment for this vital unit, whose operational pace has increased every year since its establishment, although our support has decreased in recent years.

Air Force Interdiction and Surveillance: Narcoterrorists have traditionally exploited Colombia's vast and relatively unsecured borders to move illicit narcotics, weapons, money and other contraband via air. Logistical and technical assistance support will be provided to assist the Colombian Air Force in interdiction and surveillance programs in support of endgame operations against unauthorized aircraft flights and in coordinating with Colar and CNP Aviation units. These funds will cover in-country local expenses in support of the Air Bridge Denial program. Uses include assistance in the maintenance and operation of forward operating locations, minor infrastructure improvements, fuel, training, and specialized equipment.

Navy/Maritime Interdiction: Colombia's extensive riverine network connects the interior with the coastal regions and is a key link between narcotics cultivation and processing facilities and embarkation points. These funds will be used to train and equip specialized units to analyze operational intelligence and interdict contraband traffic, particularly along Colombia's Pacific littoral, with a particular focus on fast boat operations.

Support to the Colombian Police

Colombian National Police (CNP) Aviation Support: CNP Aviation directly supports Colombia's ability to conduct both interdiction and eradication operations. Funding for the CNP Air Service (ARAVI) aircraft supports transport aircraft, eradication escorts, and intelligence platforms. Ongoing expenses have increased due to an increased operational pace brought about by the success in Colombia. Other increases include: rising cost of fuel; additional aircraft for support, transport, spraying, and intelligence gathering; operation and maintenance costs; training for CNP personnel; and upgrading of existing aircraft. Funds are used to support the growing fleet of 62 rotary-wing and 24 fixed-wing ARAVI aircraft. Funding will also be used to purchase spare parts, tools, maintenance, armaments and ammunition, training, communications support, and aviation-related infrastructure costs. Spraying in 2005 and 2006 should be the last peak years before Colombia begins to enter a "maintenance spraying" phase. The 2006 spray plan will reflect a further pursuit of smaller, more dispersed fields, as well as more frequent repeat spraying of key cultivation areas. Aircraft range limitations and severe topography will diminish efficiency and keep eradication flight hours high in order to meet our goals.

CNP Support for Eradication: This program enhances the host nation's ability to conduct sustained eradication operations to ensure the downward trend in illicit cultivation in Colombia. Funding will provide for operations and maintenance for the eradication aircraft fleet that includes spray aircraft, escort helicopters, imagery gathering aircraft, and heavy transport aircraft. These funds will also be used to purchase the glyphosate and surfactant used for eradication. More dispersed cultivations, as well as the projection of our spray operations to areas more distant from fixed operating bases and more frequent repeat spraying of key cultivation areas, will increase transport costs and other logistical expenses. These programs are an ongoing cost of making illicit drug cultivation non-sustainable in Colombia. These funds will also support upgrades and maintenance of reconnaissance aircraft equipped with advanced imagery and mapping devices to improve the CNP's ability to locate illicit crops. Manual eradication efforts will be increased in areas where aerial spraying is not feasible, although we will proceed with caution since manual eradication is more dangerous than aerial eradication. We will provide equipment, training, and technical assistance to protect these units from mines, explosive devices, and narcotraffickers.

CNP Support for Interdiction: Continued support for this program enhances Colombia's ability to conduct interdiction operations by funding non-aviation CNP anti-narcotics directorate (DIRAN) activities, including training and equipping DIRAN's 20 operational companies and three airmobile interdiction companies (Junglas). The Junglas are among the finest Special Forces units in Colombia, if not Latin America. Funding will cover DIRAN and Junglas training costs in Colombia and in U.S. military and commercial training institutions. It will also upgrade existing DIRAN interdiction facilities and construct new facilities, especially along Colombia's eastern, southern and western zones so that DIRAN can project force into these remote, but critical areas. Funding will also provide equipment, and training to sustain a DIRAN Polygraph Unit to ensure the integrity of personnel conducting interdiction and security duties in Colombia's ports and other locations. The Airport Security program will continue to develop with funding for small equipment purchases, operational expenses, machine maintenance, training of new anti-narcotics police assigned to the airports, and recertification of canines and handlers. As with eradication efforts, these programs are an ongoing cost of making the illicit drug trade unsustainable in Colombia.

CNP Administrative Support: The focus here will be on continuing base improvements, purchase of munitions and arms, upgrading security, maintenance and upgrading of equipment necessitated by the increase operation tempo of the last two years. The program of establishing an interoperable communications and information system to bring the bulk of the CNP to a modern and professional level will continue as the CNP grows and existing equipment becomes obsolete.

Promote Social & Economic Progress

The programs under this heading are programs carried out by USAID. The USAID program has three principal objectives: stemming the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging small producers to join the legal economy through licit economic activities and infrastructure projects; promoting more responsive, participatory and accountable democracy; and relieving the plight of Colombian internally displaced persons.

Alternative Development: USAID's alternative development (AD) program provides income and employment opportunities to rural residents and small farmers who have eradicated and agree not to grow illicit crops and supports small and medium private enterprises that generate licit income and employment opportunities. Assistance is also provided for social and productive infrastructure projects as a means for improving access to markets and services. The strengthening of licit economic opportunities in zones in and near illicit cultivation will contribute to permanent abandonment of illicit crop production. The AD program will strengthen national and local institutions that carry out alternative development planning and trade capacity building. The AD program will also support the strengthening of democratic local governance and decentralization efforts. Technical assistance will also be provided to improve the management and conservation of natural resources in buffer zones around national parks and to support indigenous communities by improving their livelihoods through the implementation of sustainable, productive activities.

Support for Democracy: USAID's democracy program provides technical assistance and training to modernize the criminal justice system; protect and promote human rights; increase government transparency and accountability; support peace initiatives; strengthen political parties and potentially support the reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants. Activities will promote a strong democratic government presence to counter the negative effects that illicit activities have on transparency, accountability and the ability of local officials to practice good governance.

Support to Vulnerable Groups/IDPs: The IDP program helps to improve community infrastructure and provide economic alternatives to deter people from participating in illegal narcotics activities. USAID's Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) humanitarian assistance program provides economic and social assistance to vulnerable groups, including ex-child soldiers, youth at risk of recruitment by illegal armed groups, host communities, and persons displaced by civil strife and violence. USAID-funded activities are primarily focused on medium and longer-term solutions leading to the sustainable re-integration of IDPs and former child soldiers into mainstream Colombian society through programs at the national and local levels. Adult ex-combatants may also be assisted on a limited basis after consultations with Congress in support of demobilization and reintegration of the AUC.

Promote the Rule of Law

Reestablish Public Security in Conflict Zones: The reestablishment of public security and general government presence in conflict zones program will require an expansion of the CNP's presence in these zones so that the GOC can provide the social and economic benefits of democracy to all Colombians. Funds will be used to organize, train and equip additional members of municipal police units to be stationed in new areas or areas that are currently severely understaffed in very dangerous locations. Funding will also be used to organize, train and equip additional 150-man, mobile "Carabineros" (rural police) squadrons that have proven to be quite successful. Equipment purchases will include field equipment, light weapons and munitions, communications/command and control systems, medical supplies, force protection upgrades, vehicles, and operational logistics support. U.S. funds will also be used to continue to construct and upgrade hardened police stations in the larger municipalities to provide cover for reinserted CNP units in particularly conflicted areas.

Judicial Reforms Program: Colombia's transition to an accusatorial judicial system similar to our own has required a significant amount of training and technical assistance over the last few years. The first oral case was recently argued a few months ago and Colombia is on its way, but much remains to be done. Significant training and technical assistance will be provided in the area of money laundering, asset forfeiture, and organized crime investigations that are complex and time consuming and require special skills not normally needed in more routine cases. As in our police and military programs, there will be significant emphasis on respect for human rights and anticorruption measures. Specialized units will receive training in investigating and prosecuting these types of cases. Technical assistance and training will also be provided to support areas crucial to the new judicial system like forensics and professionalization with small purchases of specialized equipment that supports these activities.

Other Promote the Rule of Law Programs: This portion of the budget includes drug awareness and demand reduction efforts and the important Culture of Lawfulness program that promotes a respect and appreciation for rule of law in the youth who comprise the future of Colombia. We will also provide limited technical assistance and equipment to the GOC for its individual deserter program that began in 2002 and has seen an increase in deserters in the last three years. There is also a small program for promoting institutional reform within the Ministry of Defense. This program will expand reforms within MOD related to institution building, to include strengthening civilian management and direction. We will also continue expanding the expertise and equipment base of the bomb squad and explosive database center and provide limited support to the Prison Security project.

Program Development and Support (PD&S)

PD&S funds are used for the general administrative and operating expenses for the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of INL programs in Colombia. Expenses include the salaries, benefits, and allowances of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, leases, field travel, and International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) costs.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Support to the Colombia Military
Army Counterdrug Mobile Brigade 5,000 - 3,080 - 1,850
Army Aviation Support 147,304 - 125,236 - 124,700
Air Bridge Denial Program 7,121 - - - -
Air Force Interdiction and Surveillance - - 4,620 - 4,620
Navy Maritime Interdiction Support - - 460 - 460
Sub-Total 159,425 - 133,396 - 131,630
Support to Colombian National Police
Aviation Support 71,238 - 70,000 - 71,230
Support for Eradication 44,185 - 82,500 - 82,520
Support for Interdiction 40,973 - 16,931 - 16,680
Administrative Support 2,000 - 1,390 - 1,390
Sub-Total 158,396 - 170,821 - 171,820
Support to PRM
Support to Population, Refugees and Migrations Groups/IDPs 5,000 - - - -
Sub-Total 5,000 - - - -
Promote Social & Economic Progress
Support for Democracy * 24,000 - 22,000 - 19,000
Alternative Development * 59,845 - 70,694 - 83,257
Support for Vulnerable Groups/IDP * 37,634 - 32,000 - 22,500
Sub Total 121,479 - 124,694 - 124,757
Promote the Rule of Law
Bomb Squad/Explosive Database Center  500 - 700 - 230
Prison Security/Drug Rehabilitation Training  500 - - - 90
Judicial Reforms Program 7,500 - 6,000 - 6,000
Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 250 - 200 - 230
Culture of Lawfulness Program 250 - 400 - 600
Reinsertion Program for Armed Groups  - - - - 363
Institutional Reform for Ministry of  Defense  - - - - 180
Reestablish Public Security in Conflict Zones  13,800 - 20,079 - 19,700
Sub-Total 22,800 - 27,379 27,393
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 2,000 - 2,000 - 2,400
Non-U.S. Personnel 1,500 - 1,400 - 1,700
ICASS Costs 1,000 - 1,000 - 1,000
Program Support 2,300 - 2,077 - 2,300
Sub-Total 6,800 - 6,477 - 7,400
Total 473,900 - 462,767 - 463,000
*  Funds are transferred to USAID who manages these programs.


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Performance Indicators


Improved performance by the Ecuadorian National Police, the criminal justice system and military forces, and improved cooperation among the three, disrupt the transit of drugs through Ecuador from neighboring countries.

A ten percent increase in counternarcotics police stationed along frequently used or newly emergent trafficking routes create choke points and improve interdiction results.

A ten percent increase in patrolling in remote areas by units of special mobile anti-narcotics police, including special operations such as regional sweeps, targeted intelligence gathering and random roadblocks to keep pace with quickly-changing trafficking patterns.

Provision of additional small boats, land vehicles, communications gear, field equipment, operational support and training improve interdiction operations by the Ecuadorian Army and Navy in the country's coastal waters and along land borders.

Improvements in intelligence, mobility, communications and technical inspections increase disruption of drug trafficking organizations and lead to a twenty percent increase in drug seizures by the counternarcotics police.


Government presence along Ecuador's northern border inhibits incursions of criminals and narcoterrorists from Colombia.


USAID will provide technical expertise and training to leaders and viable public sector and civil society institutions within the Ecuadorian Anticorruption System (SAE) to develop policy dialogue activities among the parties to collaborate with other USAID implementers and donors to advance SAE initiatives. This training will promote the access of SAE institutions and civil society to the best practices and expertise in the world. The program will improve SAE institutional capacity for transparency and accountability in GOE planning, budgeting, procurement and sensitive operations.

Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) works on improving law enforcement and judicial capabilities enables government institutions to better combat drug trafficking and other forms of organized crime. USAID has an on-going criminal justice program to train justice sector officials and criminal lawyers to implement the Oral Accusatory Justice System.

NAS trains police units and new counternarcotics personnel in advanced interdiction methods, conduct of joint operations and maximization of intelligence increase interdictions and arrests.

Additional police personnel are hired and trained.

Greater specialized expertise maximizes the implementation of money laundering and precursor chemical controls, resulting in increased prosecutions for violations.


Improvement in economic/social infrastructure decreases the vulnerability of Ecuador to the production and domestic use of illicit drugs.

Popular support of national and local governmental institutions improves as measured by public opinion surveys.

Public education activities increase awareness of the dangers of drug use, strengthening popular resistance to drug trafficking as measured by public opinion surveys.

Public infrastructure improvements increase access to markets for licit crops and improve competitiveness of indigenous industries as measured by increasing sales and family income.

Program Justification

Sharing porous borders and a contiguous seacoast with Colombia and Peru, Ecuador is a major transit country for illicit drugs and chemicals. The armed conflict in Colombia complicates drug interdiction on Ecuador's northern border. Weak public institutions, widespread corruption and a poorly regulated financial system make Ecuador vulnerable to organized crime. Uneven implementation of the new criminal procedures code, a faulty judicial system and conflicting laws hamper prosecutions. Border controls of persons and goods are undependable. Much of the population lives in poverty. Scanty government presence in a large portion of the country contributes to lawlessness. The National Police (ENP) and military forces are inadequately equipped and trained.

The Ecuadorian Government is making an earnest effort to curtail drug trafficking and other international organized crime. Military and police presence in the northern border area is growing in size, extent and effectiveness. Ecuadorian authorities are seeking to improve port cargo inspections; three of Ecuador's public ports met ISPS standards on time. The use of advanced inspection technology increased in 2004. Cocaine seizures through November 2004 were at levels below those of 2003, but seizures of heroin and precursor chemicals continued at a high level.

Ecuadorian national resources are insufficient to meet all of the challenges presented by narco-guerrilla and other transnational criminal organizations. USG assistance is vital to Ecuador's struggle to maintain its territorial integrity and promote the rule of law.

USG-funded counternarcotics "preventive alternative development" programs are working to contain the spread of the Andean coca/cocaine economy into Ecuador. To implement the 2003-2006 strategy along Ecuador's Northern Border, ACI-funded initiatives contributing directly to this objective are executed under two broad approaches: 1) Those aimed at increasing citizen satisfaction with performance of local democratic institutions; and 2) Those designed to increase licit income and employment for small and medium farmers in Ecuador's northern border provinces.

Program Accomplishments

In 2004, Ecuadorian army units along the northern border were provided with computers, field supplies and ground vehicles, including 50 Humvees and heavy trucks. Resources were provided to the Ecuadorian Navy for expanded patrol and interdiction operations on Ecuador's northwestern estuaries, rivers and coast. Support to Ecuador's army and navy is strengthening Ecuador's northern border and its ability to control the movement of goods and persons through ports. Military-police cooperation in joint missions on the northern border continued to improve. Army and police forces in Sucumbios province continue to interdict large volumes of illicit precursor chemical, petroleum ether, en route to Colombia. Drug seizures have not increased, but the presence and increasing mobility of Government of Ecuador (GOE) military and police has presented a strong deterrent to further criminal expansion.

A port inspection station for the counternarcotics police in Ecuador's second-largest port, Manta, was completed in March 2004, and a major addition to the police base in the northern border town of San Lorenzo will be completed in January 2005. A police checkpoint is under construction in San Jeronimo, also in the northern border area, with an estimated July 2005 completion date. Expanded and improved living quarters and kennels for drug detecting dogs are being built in the USG-constructed police base in Lago Agrio, also near the Colombian border. Designs for two additional inspection stations in southwestern Ecuador, one inside Puerto Bolivar, and another at the highway intersection Y de Jobo, are completed, and construction should begin in February 2005. Site preparation has begun for a provincial counternarcotics police headquarters in Tulcan, the Colombia-Ecuador crossing point of the Pan American Highway, with construction planned for 2005. These new facilities will expand police presence and counternarcotics operations in areas especially vulnerable to drug trafficking.

The Police and Judicial Training project is training trainers to improve police, prosecutorial and judicial professionalism and capabilities while reinforcing principles of rule of law and human rights. The Port Security project's U.S. Customs (DHS/ICE) advisor in Guayaquil plays a key role in mobilizing the area's private sector through the Business Anti-smuggling Coalition (BASC). The advisor continues to improve the police's investigative and search techniques, and monitors their performance at seaports and airports.

To increase citizen satisfaction and legitimacy of democratic institutions in the northern border area, a social and productive infrastructure program totaling over $24 million has built dozens of water and sanitation systems, bridges and small irrigation projects --, infrastructure which is crucial to economic development. Complementing the infrastructure program, a new northern border local government development program was initiated in July 2004, to strengthen local governments and citizen participation in ten priority municipalities.

Licit income and employment opportunities are being developed by strengthening the competitiveness of rural enterprises through improved farm-to-market linkages in selected sectors, utilizing state of the art technical assistance, training and financial incentives. At the core is a focus on competitive rural industries within "clusters" (including distributors, wholesalers, processors, post-harvest agents, producers, raw material suppliers, etc), working in unison to identify and overcome constraints to greater productivity, stronger competitiveness and sustainability. The initial priority sub-sectors being supported are cacao, coffee and vegetables.

FY 2006 Program

Interdiction and Eradication

Police Operations: Funds will support the Counternarcotics Police Directorate (DNA) port and canine operations; a mobile interdiction strike force; acquisition of law enforcement and communications equipment; vehicle acquisition, fuel, maintenance, repair and operational costs; and the cost of providing a port advisor from the U.S. Customs Service (DHS/ICE). Jointly with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the NAS will support a small, mobile technical intelligence unit.

Military Border and Coastal Control: The project will sustain and reinforce military surveillance and interdiction capabilities along the northern seacoast and the land border with Colombia. Funds will be used to maintain and, if needed, to replace or augment land vehicles, boats and field equipment provided to Army and Navy forces in 2002-2005. This project will also support some field operations of the new Quick Reaction Forces being established by the Ecuadorian Army on the northern border.

Police Facilities Construction: Funding will support expansion of police presence and counternarcotics operations in sensitive locations inadequately protected against narcotics trafficking. The FY 2006 project will provide construction of counternarcotics police bases in Huaquillas and Loja, both key points on trafficking routes from Peru into Ecuador. The project is intended to increase the numbers of counternarcotics police stationed in the target areas, to continually maintain 30- to 40-member units at key interdiction points, including remote outlying sites.

Police and Judicial Training: With 150 new DNA personnel annually being added through 2006, basic and advanced training will emphasize ground and airborne field operations, intelligence methods, and cargo and personnel inspection techniques, with military co-trained with police where appropriate. The project will extend and refine police, prosecutorial and judicial training in implementation of the new Code of Criminal Procedures.

Money Laundering and Chemical Control: Ecuador has a dollar economy and weak banking controls; the country also produces chemical precursors and is a transit corridor for diverted chemicals. In FY 2006, the project will provide training and equipment to assist the GOE as it establishes new financial intelligence and chemical control units and associated enforcement units.

Drug Awareness/Public Diplomacy: The project will give direct support to drug awareness projects operated by the GOE. It will counter misunderstandings and disinformation in the Ecuadorian public regarding USG counternarcotics policies and activities and the true nature of the drug, terrorism and other transnational challenges by providing informational materials, sponsoring travel to view USG counternarcotics projects and activities, and funding guest speakers.

Program Development and Support: PD&S funds are used for the salaries, benefits, allowances and travel of direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, residential leasing, ICASS costs and other general administrative and operating expenses for counternarcotics and anti-crime program planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Alternative Development and Institution Building

Northern Border Development: FY 2006 activities will increase the project's geographic reach in expanding infrastructure, local government institutional support and strengthening communities into more municipalities in the Northern Border area. The final phase of the project,due to end in FY 2006, will continue to increase jobs and incomes in the North by supporting the competitiveness of existing rural enterprises. Activities will include capital investment and complementary technical assistance to help local governments build and sustain social and productive infrastructure; technical assistance and training to municipal governments and local communities to identify and resolve local development problems democratically; support for small farmers to legalize land holdings; and support to strengthen the competitiveness of existing agricultural and related enterprises in the North.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Narcotics Law Enforcement
Police Operations 8,188 - 3,962 - 2,735
Police Facilities Construction 3,565 - 1,960 - 1,500
Police and Judicial Training 1,000 - 945 - 900
Money Laundering and Chemical
Control 150 - 270 - 300
Sub-Total 12,903 - 7,137 - 5,435
Military Border and Coastal Control 6,000 - 3,000 - 2,000
Drug Awareness/Public Diplomacy 150 - 75 - 75
Alternative Development * 14,912 - 14,880 - 11,540
Cacao Project 300 - - - -
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 210 - 400 - 400
Non-U.S. Personnel 85 - 90 - 90
ICASS Costs 240 - 130 - 255
Program Support 200 - 80 - 205
Sub-Total 735 - 700 - 950
Total 35,000 - 25,792 - 20,000
* Funds are transferred to USAID who manages these programs.


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Performance Indicators


Significantly improve Panama's ability to interdict land and maritime shipments of illicit drugs, chemicals, weapons, and people, and enhance control of its borders, airports, and seaports.

Refurbishing the Panamanian National Police's (PNP) truck fleet, augmenting its small boat unit, and expanding its communications results in an increase over FY 2005 in the amount of PNP seizures of illegal goods.

Training and specialized equipment provided to a new customs manifest review unit improves security at Panama's Atlantic Ports and the Colon Free Trade Zone, resulting in a 10 percent increase over FY 2005 in the number of seizures of shipments of illicit goods at these ports and at the Colon Free Trade Zone.

Rebuilding the National Maritime Service's (SMN) truck fleet, expanding its network of bases, and upgrading its small patrol boats increases the capabilities of the SMN, with an increase over FY 2005 in the number of maritime seizures of illicit goods.

Strengthening the National Air Service's (SAN) operations center, upgrading its fixed wing fleet, and enhancing maritime patrol capability makes the SAN more efficient in assisting other agencies in the interdiction of illicit goods.


Increase Panama's institutional capabilities to investigate and prosecute criminal activities, cooperate with other nations including USG law enforcement, seize and forfeit assets, and cripple criminal organizations engaged in such crimes as drug and arms trafficking, alien smuggling, money laundering, and terrorism.

Modernization of the PNP through training, adoption of "neighborhood policing" principles, and employment of a law enforcement advisor results in a 10 percent increase over FY 2005 in the number and importance of traffickers arrested and successfully prosecuted, deported, or extradited as a result of GOP investigations.

Improving the forensics laboratories of the Technical Judicial Police (PTJ) and training a new PTJ narcotics unit significantly enhances the PTJ's institutional capacity, resulting in an increase over FY 2005 in PTJ investigations and arrests.

Increase Panama's ability to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes, and to coordinate effectively with international partners.

Having trained the Financial Analysis Unit (FAU) of the Presidency, the NAS will continue to focus on strengthening the capacity in Panama City of the Financial Investigation Units (FIU) of the Technical Judicial Police and expanding to two new cities through training and equipment, resulting in a 10 percent increase over FY 2005 in the number of investigations, arrests, and prosecutions of money laundering cases.

Strengthen Panama's institutional capacity to investigate and prosecute cases of public corruption, which has undermined GOP efforts against narcotraffickers and organized crime.

Enhancing the ability of the new anti-corruption unit created in FY 2005 results in a 10 percent increase over FY 2005 in the number of cases investigated and prosecuted. Illegally obtained funds are returned to government coffers.

Program Justification

Panama's strategic location between North and South America makes it a crossroads for international commerce, but also a transit country and center for illegal activity such as drug trafficking, money laundering, trafficking in arms, and illegal immigration. As law enforcement activities in Colombia become more effective, Panama will be under increasing pressure as a haven for illegal activity and a crossroads for the transshipment of narcotics and other illicit goods. Despite excellent bilateral law enforcement cooperation, international drug shipments continue to be trafficked through Panama destined for the U.S. and Europe because of the country's strategic position and developed infrastructure. A criminal justice system that is undermined by corruption and inadequate maritime, airport, and border controls all contribute to Panama's vulnerability to transnational organized crime. In addition to drug trafficking, criminal groups engage in money laundering, chemical diversion, arms trafficking, alien smuggling and other illicit activities. The steady flow of illicit drugs has taken a toll on Panamanian society by increasing domestic drug abuse and undermining key institutions.

Panama is an attractive site for money laundering operations due to its dollar-based economy and large, sophisticated banking and trading sectors. Panama continues to need technical assistance and material support to enhance its efforts to implement and enforce the new money laundering legislation and to dismantle criminal and terrorist groups engaged in money laundering, particularly in the Colon Free Trade Zone. The United States must continue cooperative efforts with Panamanian law enforcement and other government and non-governmental entities to counter transnational crime.

Program Accomplishments

In the last few years, law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and Panama has been outstanding. The relationship has further matured under the Torrijos Administration, which immediately upon taking office in September 2004 established an inter-agency task force to coordinate narcotics enforcement activities. In 2004, INL funds were used to support programs and activities critical to GOP and USG shared law enforcement objectives. Even before the newly elected Torrijos Administration took office, INL sponsored a planning workshop for incoming minister-level GOP officials to develop a national security strategy. Technical assistance and equipment provided by INL to law enforcement agencies at the border, on key transit routes, and in airports has increased the GOP's capacity to interdict drugs and secure its borders. Of note in 2004, INL began construction of a border checkpost in the Chiriqui province, supported SAN efforts to identify clandestine airfields, and launched an initiative to improve security in the Port of Colon, which has been linked to arms and drugs trafficking and money laundering. Furthermore, INL has supported interdiction efforts through assistance to the Joint Information Coordination Center. This assistance has led to enhanced information sharing and cooperation between U.S. and GOP law enforcement agencies, as demonstrated by the 2004 capture and deportation to the United States of Colombia kingpin Henao Montoya. The USG has proposed text and expects to conclude a CNIES agreement in early 2005. INL funds have played a key role in interdiction successes of the National Maritime Service (SMN) by providing training, technical assistance and equipment upgrades. INL support has further enhanced GOP capability to investigate narcotics cases through the continued training and equipping of the Public Ministry/Technical Judicial Police (PTJ) vetted unit in 2004.

Panama has also made strides in other law enforcement areas. Although gang violence is not yet a significant problem in Panama, INL's PNP modernization project included the development of an anti-gang unit in 2004. Also in 2004, one year ahead of schedule, INL began a program to strengthen the GOP's Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office with training and equipment. The continued cooperation of the Prosecutor's Office has been invaluable in the investigation, prosecution, and conviction in Nicaragua of several high-level Nicaraguan government officials who used Panama to launder funds. INL funds provided infrastructure support, equipment and training for airport and border control facilities to enhance control of the entry of aliens into the country, including drug traffickers and smugglers. In 2004, INL helped establish Panama's new Diplomatic Protection Unit to address counter-terrorism issues. In 2004, Panama and the United States co-hosted a Key Leaders Conference, attended by law enforcement officials from the hemisphere, as part of the effort to create a Latin America International Law Enforcement Academy.

FY 2006 Program

National Police: Due to its geographical location, Panama is a primary trafficking route and transshipment point for Colombian narcotics moving northward toward the U.S. The PNP is on the front line of efforts to stop this flow of drugs as near to the source as possible and to control land trafficking routes. This is the fourth year of a five-year program to train and equip select small units of the PNP. This year, INL funds will be used to refurbish the PNP's fleet of 2 � ton trucks, augment the PNP's small boat unit, expand the PNP's communications capacity. In addition, the employment of a new law enforcement advisor will help professionalize the PNP.

National Air Service: Because of the shared border with Colombia, the flow of drugs through Panamanian air space is a significant concern. Funding will be provided to the SAN to strengthen its fixed wing fleet and maritime patrol capability and establish a forward operating location in the remote Darien region bordering Colombia.

Border Enhancement: Effective control of Panama's land, sea, and airports is vital to controlling the illicit flow of narcotics and other crime. In addition to border-related enhancements to the PNP, SMN, SAN, and Customs, the NAS will dedicate funds to develop an elite maritime immigration unit to strengthen controls at vital seaports.

National Maritime Service: A significant percentage of illicit goods transit through Panama's territorial waters. GOP narcotics maritime interdiction capabilities will be further enhanced with the rebuilding of the SMN's 2 � ton truck fleet and the expansion of the SMN's network of bases along the Atlantic Coast.

Panamanian Customs Service: Operational assistance and training will be provided to Panamanian Customs officials for cargo inspections, investigations into black market peso exchange, money laundering, and infringements of intellectual property rights. In 2006, the NAS will help establish a Customs manifest review unit to improve port and Colon Free Zone security.

Technical Judicial Police: Having provided training and commodities to the sex crimes unit of the PTJ in FY 2005, the NAS will focus on improving the mobility, forensics laboratories, and narcotics unit of the PTJ.

Financial Investigations Unit: Training will continue to be provided to prosecutors and the FIU to improve investigative skills and enable the prosecution of increasingly sophisticated money-laundering cases, particularly those related to Black Peso exchange.

Anti-Corruption Program: This continuing project will strengthen the institutional capacity of the PTJ's specialized anti-corruption unit established in FY 2005 and the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office to successfully investigate and prosecute cases involving misuse of public funds.

Drug Awareness and Demand Reduction: The NAS will provide funds to the Ministry of Education to develop drug awareness programs and strategies based on epidemiological survey, funded in FY 2005, which examined the links between risk factors and drug use and violence.

Program Development & Support (PD&S): PD&S funds will be used to pay salaries, benefits and allowances for U.S. and foreign national direct hire and contract personnel, field travel, International Cooperative Administrative Support Service (ICASS) costs, and general administrative and operating expenses for program planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Border Control Enhancement
National Police 750 - 750 - 900
National Air Service 487 - 500 - 300
Border Enhancement 750 - 500 - 350
National Maritime Service 1,000 - 750 - 600
Port Security 300 - 240 - 250
Sub-Total 3,287 - 2,740 - 2,400
Law Enforcement Enhancement
Public Ministry Special Investigations Unit - - 500 - -
Panamian Customs Service 300 - 200 - 100
Technical Judicial Police 500 - 500 - 400
Financial Investigations Unit 250 - 200 - 200
Law Enforcement Modernization 650 - 500 - -
Sub-Total 1,700 - 1,900 - 700
Anti-Corruption Initiatives 600 - 450 - 450
Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 100 - 100 - 100
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 330 - 320 - 400
Non-U.S. Personnel 50 - 45 - 50
ICASS Costs 320 - 300 - 300
Program Support 100 - 97 - 100
Sub-Total 800 - 762 - 850
Total 6,487 - 5,952 - 4,500


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Performance Indicators

The Government of Peru (GOP) institutionalizes policy-making and coordination and begins to take over management of certain counternarcotics programs.

The maintenance and operation of Peruvian National Police air wing is performed 100 percent by Peruvian nationals. USG contractor provides oversight on maintenance, training, and operations of equipment and helicopters.

Completion of ongoing upgrades in the INL helicopters operated by the police aviation unit allows the extension of counternarcotics-related law enforcement efforts to remote areas of Peru.

Capability of, and coordination among, those Peruvian agencies involved in counter-narcotics law enforcement improves, leads to more effective action against illicit drug trafficking east of the Andes.

Planning begins on a comprehensive maritime and port interdiction program to thwart exploitation of Peru's northern ports by narco-traffickers.

Improvements in the efficiency of the Peruvian judicial sector allow it to effectively process drug cases.

Continuing USG support for special narcotics prosecutors and support for judicial personnel in regions with heavy narcotics caseloads results in an increase in the number of arrests/prosecutions of major criminals and narcotics traffickers and a decrease in time suspects are held in jail pending trial.

The illegal cultivation of coca and opium poppy is reduced and eventually Peru becomes a marginal rather than major source of illicit drugs and drug trafficking.

Forced and voluntary eradication will eliminate 10,000 hectares of illicit coca in CY 2006.

The GOP identifies coca for traditional licit uses and establishes tracking system.

The GOP, with the help of the USG, develops a reconnaissance capability to identify and eradicate opium poppy cultivations.

The number of port and road counternarcotics interdiction checkpoints east of the Peruvian Andes are increased by ten percent in 2005, resulting in a ten percent increase in the number and amount of cocaine seizures over previous years.

Continued project efforts to upgrade DIRANDRO and SUNAT-Customs operations at Peru's ports leads to an increase in drug seizures from commercial planes and passengers.

New equipment for Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) makes it more effective and the number of drug-related money laundering arrests and prosecutions increase by 10 percent a year.

Improvements in economic and social infrastructure and services, increase legal income generation, and social communication and community development activities provide incentives for communities of farmers to eliminate illicit coca cultivation.

Alternative development activities increase the legal economic opportunities available to farmers in and around the coca-growing areas.

Implementation of comprehensive macroeconomic policy reforms expands the licit economy.

An increased awareness of the dangers of drug trafficking and drug abuse increases public support for counternarcotics policies and leads to a reduction in the demand for illicit drugs.

Peru conducts surveys to better identify popular concern about drug abuse and related criminal activity and uses that information to target public awareness campaigns more effectively.

Both public support and GOP political will for law enforcement efforts against illegal drug cultivation and trafficking increases.

Both survey results and GOP actions indicate that Peruvians will no longer tolerate illegal drug cultivation and trafficking.

Program Justification

Peru is the second largest cocaine producing country in the world and a major exporter of high purity cocaine and cocaine base to markets in South America, Mexico, the United

States, and Europe. Although coca cultivation decreased 15 percent in 2003 and is 84,000 hectares below the 1995 level, narcotraffickers appear to be increasing the density of coca plants per hectare in response to aggressive eradication in Colombia. The CNC coca cultivation figures for 2004 show a slight decrease in coca cultivation, but measure only tended coca plants in traditional growing areas. There are strong indications that coca is being cultivated in new areas and using new methods which yield more leaf. Peru legally produces cocaine base and coca leaf for medical and commercial consumption in the U.S. and Europe, and leaf for traditional use in Peru.

The principal goal of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Peru is to transform the country from a major to a marginal supplier of cocaine by reducing coca cultivation to the levels needed for traditional uses, and eliminating the production and processing of opium poppy. This goal is consistent with the President's National Drug Control Strategy and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, which seeks to deny traffickers the ability to spillover from one country to another as law enforcement successes eliminate established drug cultivation and operational areas. The means to achieve this goal are firmly rooted in implementing complementary programs of eradication, interdiction, and alternative development in the coca cultivation areas and to intercept coca movement throughout Peru.

To decrease coca cultivation, funding is required for eradication and interdiction. It is also needed to support airlift for drug crop eradication and law enforcement interdiction; for police protection of civilian eradicators; to gather and process intelligence needed to support air, ground and water-based law enforcement endgames; to support USAID-implemented voluntary coca eradication efforts, and to strengthen alternative development in and near drug cultivation areas and economic development in areas that drug growers migrate from. In addition to sustainable alternative development programs, there is an immediate need for emergency assistance to help meet nutritional and health needs and short-term, family income generation in areas transitioning to licit economies.

Shortly after taking office, President Toledo followed through on his promise to appoint the first ever Drug Czar for Peru with cabinet level authority. Peru, where over half the population lives in poverty, lacks the financial resources and equipment to adequately address drug production and consumption. These problems are exacerbated by frequent demonstrations by coca growers, strikes by several sectors of the national economy, terrorism, and continued corruption.

Anticipated European assistance pledged during donor conferences to support GOP alternative development efforts has not materialized in the amounts anticipated.

Program Accomplishments

GOP eradication efforts resulted in a decline in the number of hectares under coca cultivation from 36,600 in 2002 to 31,150 in CY 2003, the lowest level of coca cultivation in Peru since 1986. CNC figures for 2004 show a slight decrease, but are limited to the specific areas targeted by CNC.. In CY 2004, the GOP eradicated nearly 10,500 hectares of coca, which includes close to 8,000 hectares from forced eradication programs and 2,700 from voluntary eradication programs, despite continued attacks against eradication efforts. The GOP also eliminated seedling nurseries that could have planted another 2,500 hectares of illegal coca. The impulse to expand coca cultivation to non-traditional areas in Peru may be related to the sustained high levels of eradication in neighboring Colombia.

In 2004, INL supported the initiation of a pilot program of voluntary coca eradication, implemented by USAID and the GOP. This program supports 372 communities with over 28,000 families that have entered into formal agreements with the government to eradicate their coca. In 2004, voluntary eradication exceeded its annual target with the elimination of more than 2,700 hectares of coca in Peru; to date, voluntary eradication has resulted in the elimination of over 8,300 hectares of coca since October of 2002. Under this program, community members improve social services and receive temporary income by participating in the construction of labor-intensive infrastructure works, such as road rehabilitation, bridges, schools, health posts and sanitation systems. At the same time, alternative development funding provides technical assistance and inputs for market-oriented crops as well as scholarships and land titling to lay the groundwork for longer-term economic viability.

While the police were able to take some actions to eliminate opium poppy, overall eradication totals were small as limited intelligence, the remoteness of the growing areas, and heavy cloud cover made it difficult to locate and eradicate the poppy. Police units did, however, step up foot patrols in suspected poppy-growing areas in an effort to locate more fields.

During 2004, the Peruvian National Police Narcotics Directorate (DIRANDRO) conducted well-coordinated operations in the Monzon Valley, a notoriously lawless area where large-scale coca cultivation and processing is rampant, and in the Apurimac Valley. In 2004, DIRANDRO destroyed 821 clandestine cocaine base laboratories; 1,759 tons of coca leaf, 1,347 tons of precursor chemicals; 7.3 tons of cocaine hydrochloride; 6.3 tons of cocaine base; 98 hectares of opium; 285 kilos of opium latex; 153 kilos of opium alkaloids; and 43 tons of marijuana.

DIRANDRO also continued its campaign of truck and vehicle inspections of suspected drug and chemical smugglers on the roads and highways of Peru. The PNP Road Unit conducted weekly road operations using drug-sniffing dogs on the major east-west highways going from the coca-producing jungle region to the coast, on major roads entering Lima, and throughout key Departments in Peru. In cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies, private shipping companies improved their abilities to monitor sea cargo containers. They provided DIRANDRO and Peruvian Customs with information to support investigations of major Peruvian and other international trafficking organizations using sea cargo containers to transport large shipments of cocaine to the U.S., Mexico, and Europe.

The GOP established a Financial Investigations Unit (FIU). The Peruvian Congress passed legislation in mid-2003 placing the FIU under the Prime Minister's office and provided it with initial funding. Senior FIU leadership have made clear their intent to have the Peruvian FIU join the Egmont Group of international FIUs as soon as possible. Peru's FIU began accepting suspicious activity reports from banks on September 1, 2003.

The USG and the GOP are coordinating anti-narcotics efforts to gather, process, and disseminate actionable intelligence so that Peruvian law enforcement and military units are able to undertake air, ground, and water-based end games against trafficking targets.

Recent opinion polls show that 90% of urban Peruvians recognize the link between coca leaf cultivation and drug consumption. A nationwide political stakeholder analysis revealed that key players see coca cultivation and narco-trafficking as important problems in Peru.

In the Alternative Development program, key results through 2004 included:

372 communities (over 28,000 families) have signed voluntary eradication agreements and over 300 communities are now coca-free. Over 2,700 hectares of coca were eradicated in these communities in CY2004 for a cumulative total of over 8,000 hectares in just over two years.

The inclusion of more than 18,000 families in productive activities including over 20,000 hectares of licit crops, and the completion of 200 infrastructure projects including 205 km of road rehabilitation and maintenance, 12 bridges, 134 water systems, schools and health posts, and 6 electricity systems among others.

The generation of $16.5 million in new sales of licit products in coca growing regions.

FY 2006 Program

Interdiction and Eradication

Law Enforcement Support: A wider range of law enforcement operations is planned for FY 2006, with activities envisioned not just in the major coca-growing valleys and the transit zones, but in those areas that have been traditionally hard to penetrate as well. As in the past, the operations will be conducted by air, on land, in seaports, on rivers, and with the use of dogs. FY 2006 plans include providing additional training and field exercises to enhance the capabilities of DIRANDRO to conduct advanced road interdiction exercises as well as to provide greater security for eradication teams in outlying areas. These law enforcement efforts will require additional vehicles, communications equipment, field gear, emergency/safety reaction gear, and drug-sniffing dogs. Progress will be measured in terms of the amount/frequency of seizures and arrests, and the increase in the interdiction and enforcement capability of DIRANDO units.

Aviation Support: Aviation support is an ongoing project that funds pilots, aircrews, and support personnel for 24 USG-owned UH-2 ("Super" Huey 2) helicopters, two INL-owned fixed wing aircraft, and 4 Peruvian Mi-17 helicopters, all of which support coca eradication and law enforcement actions in the field. FY 2006 funds will also cover fuel, maintenance, hangars and warehousing, aircraft rental when needed, and operational support for PNP Aviation (DIRAVPOL) personnel.

Eradication and interdiction missions are becoming more difficult and dangerous, because of the need to access illicit crops (particularly opium poppy) at higher altitudes in more rugged terrain and because of the growing potential for narco-trafficker inspired violence. The need to eradicate zones of coca expansion before they become fully entrenched means that airlift is required to distant and isolated areas, increasing flying time and complicating logistical support. To help protect both program assets and personnel, funds will be used to acquire a second C-208 aircraft that can carry imaging acquisition and other sensor equipment, thus allowing law enforcement efforts to take place in a more secure environment. Progress will be measured in terms of eradication/interdiction figures and the extent to which the GOP personnel can take further responsibility for repair and maintenance functions.

Seaport Security Support: FY 2006 funding will focus on readying Peru to conduct wide-ranging and effective counter-drug enforcement operations in and around Peru's commercial and fishing ports. The principal goal of our efforts will be to consolidate the GOP's capability to maintain an effective seaport drug interdiction program through facilities improvements, equipment acquisitions, training, and operational planning and execution. Emphasis will be placed on the construction and development of additional Manifest Review Units (MRUs) based on the NAS-sponsored MRU established at Peru's largest seaport of Callao. Progress will be measured in terms of the number of drug seizures and MRUs established as well as the GOP's ability to respond to actionable intelligence about the movement of suspected coca products through Peru's seaports.

Coca and Opium Poppy Eradication: In 2006, coca eradication will be more difficult now that the areas of less resistance have been cleared of coca. Eradication will target more established cultivation areas and areas of expansion. The GOP will continue its two-track approach of voluntary eradication in selected communities and involuntary eradication in national protected areas, new growth areas, jurisdictions that reject voluntary eradication, and around drug-processing facilities. The FY 2006 budget will support eradication efforts by the GOP's Coca Reduction Agency (CORAH) at a wider array of sites by including added logistical and transportation costs. Eradication efforts will likely be concentrated on three kinds of targets: a) remaining hard-core trafficker dominated areas such as the Monzon and Apurimac-Ene Valleys, b) other zones where coca has increased in recent years, such as the Puno and Quillabamba areas, and c) continual monitoring and mop-up of new coca. There are indications that drug traffickers are trying to jump-start an opium poppy-growing industry in Peru by providing seeds to farmers to grow in high-altitude, difficult-to-reach locations. The FY 2006 budget will also strengthen PNP efforts to eradicate opium poppies wherever detected. The ongoing conversion of the UH-1H (Huey-1) helicopters in the INL fleet to Huey-2s will assist the GOP in locating opium poppy cultivation. Progress will be measured in terms of the number of hectares of coca/opium eradicated and the reduction of hectares under coca cultivation.

The CORAH civil construction unit will provide support to counternarcotics law enforcement and military agencies in the construction and renovation of facilities in outlying areas. CORAH construction services have allowed the police to establish forward operational bases in key coca cultivation areas.

Support to the Armed Forces: The USG and the GOP are currently working to improve the capacity of the Peruvian military and police to effect air, ground, seaport, and river end games based upon actionable intelligence. Support costs for this program will likely include facility renovation and improvement, aircraft modification, fuel facilities and training.

Customs Interdiction: The Peruvian Customs Service is responsible for inspecting arriving and departing passengers and cargo at Lima's air and maritime terminals, at other air and maritime ports of entry, and at land border checkpoints. The Service's customs drug enforcement section specifically concentrates on interdicting narcotics, principally at the country's airports and ports. In FY 2006, funds will provide increased training and items such as X-ray equipment, thus expanding our cooperative relationship in drug enforcement activities and encouraging increased DIRANDRO focus on this area. Continued funding will not only allow the Custom's drug enforcement section and DIRANDRO to bolster their ongoing programs at the country's principal airport and port, but other smaller installations as well. Progress will be measured in terms of the number of cocaine and opium poppy derivatives seized.

Narcotics Prosecution: In FY 2006, funding will continue to support a cadre of GOP prosecutors assigned to oversee police and military drug enforcement operations, interrogate suspects and witnesses, secure evidence, supervise the destruction of illegal facilities such as laboratories or airstrips, and prepare cases for trial. Additional funding will permit the USG to provide higher-level training to prosecutors already in the program and entry-level training to those that have just come on-board. In addition, funding will allow selected jurisdictions with inadequate resources to better handle heavy narcotics caseloads. Progress will be measured in terms of the number of arrests/prosecutions of major criminals and narcotics traffickers and any decrease in time suspects are held in jail pending trial. Prosecutors are also needed to accompany eradication in confrontational areas to serve as impartial witnesses that rights are not being violated and to defuse protests.

Counternarcotics Policy Development: Under Peruvian law, only the official government agency set up to control all legal coca cultivation and purchases (ENACO) can legally purchase and sell coca leaves. Legal uses include pharmaceuticals and local consumption in the form of chewing and teas. However, it is clear that the GOP's system for marketing coca for licit uses is completely dysfunctional, and therefore presents a serious obstacle to counternarcotics efforts. For example, according to a recent survey by the GOP's statistical institute, it is estimated that ENACO meets only about one-third of licit demand, while 80-90% of coca produced in Peru is destined for illicit uses. INL funding is being used to support preliminary reviews by FONAFE, the Ministry of Finance agency with oversight responsibility for parastatals, to analyze ENACO's purchase/sales records and mechanisms, as a first step towards a drastic reform of the GOP's system to control licit coca uses, which could entail changes with ENACO or its dissolution. INL funding will be used to support the GOP if they move in this direction.

Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction: This project will focus on providing the Peruvian public with information about the harmful personal and societal effects of cocaine production and abuse, conducting surveys on drug abuse to identify groups requiring assistance, and supporting educational fora for prevention and treatment professionals. This project will continue to provide assistance to institutions that combat drug abuse and support drug awareness. Progress will be measured in terms of public awareness of the illegal drug problem and changes in public drug consumption patterns.

Crop Monitoring and Research: A branch of CORAH called CADA (Crops for Assistance to Alternative Development) monitors and maps coca and poppy cultivation and provides a means to verify the extent of coca eradication within communities, which is a critical condition of continued alternative development funding. In FY 2006, this project will expand efforts to verify licit crop development in coca growing areas in conjunction with forced and voluntary eradication efforts. Demand for CADA expertise has been high: CADA's statistical information is being used by the international community, e.g., the OAS Drug Commission, to prioritize its alternative development projects; its measurement and mapping are basic to the auto-eradication program. Progress will be measured in terms of the degree to which CADA can provide support for specific activities like verification of coca eradication.

In addition, a joint USG/OAS/CICAD Alternative Crop Research and Extension project complements the bilateral alternative development program. This project will continue to perform field research into coffee and cacao diseases, with a focus on finding ways to increase production yields in alternative development areas and developing international markets. The U.S. private sector has responded favorably to these efforts, and has provided supplementary personnel and funds for expert marketing and scientific assistance. The Institute for Tropical Crops is also a resource for research into coca production. FY 2006 funding will support the dissemination of the practical research results to alternative development farmers throughout the region.

Public Relations and Media Engagement: Among some sectors in Peruvian society, the prevailing attitude is that coca cultivation, which occurs far from major urban areas, is an activity that does not adversely affect most Peruvians. Too few public figures speak out against coca cultivation in the local media. This situation hinders the ability of the GOP to carry out its anti-drug program. To remedy this problem, INL will assist NGO partners to better inform the Peruvian public of the dangers the illegal drug trade and the parallel increase in local drug use pose to the country. Progress will be measured in terms of changes in the public's attitudes towards efforts to control the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs. This initiative is especially important in light of the narcotrafficking-financed attempts to position coca as the "sacred leaf" and producers as "poor farmers."

Money Laundering Support: Although Peru continues to suffer from narcotics-related money laundering and other financial crimes; the GOP lacks both the resources and the expertise to address this problem in a comprehensive manner. This project will provide the GOP with badly needed resources and greatly enhance its technical capability to combat money laundering, thus furthering USG efforts to disrupt international criminal organizations and activities in Peru. Specifically, the project will fund the second year of a two-year technical assistance program and will provide direct support (i.e., procurement of computers, maintenance of databases, and administrative costs) for the Financial Intelligence Unit's operations. Progress will be measured in terms of the number of money laundering cases successfully prosecuted and the money laundering training provided to judicial, police, and banking officials.

Chemical Control: The GOP urgently needs to devise a national plan to control the commerce of precursor chemicals and to dispose of seized illicit chemicals. Discussions between the USG and the GOP have identified initiatives addressing chemical importation, illicit diversion, environmental safety, and proper disposal of chemicals used in the production of cocaine. FY 2006 funds will be used to establish a training program for police in the legal, technical, and enforcement aspects of chemical control. The project will also provide resources to the PNP for the establishment of a chemical controls program at checkpoints on the major roads connecting Lima to the source zones. Progress will be measured in terms of the amount of precursor and essential chemicals seized, tracked, and disposed.

Program Development & Support (PD&S): PD&S funds will be used to pay salaries, benefits, and allowances for U.S. and foreign national direct hire and contract personnel, field travel, International Cooperative Administrative Support Service (ICASS) costs, and general administrative and operating expenses for program planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Alternative Development and Institution Building

In FY 2006, INL will fund, and USAID will implement, an integrated development approach that will create jobs in coca-growing regions, strengthen local institutions and reduce coca cultivation. The program consists of the following components:

Voluntary eradication: USAID will continue funding small, labor-intensive, infrastructure works, such as roads and bridges, schools, health posts, and sanitation systems as a means of improving local services and providing temporary income for families in communities or areas that voluntarily eradicate all of their coca. USAID will also provide technical assistance and inputs for market-oriented crops, and will finance scholarships, land titling, and health/nutrition services in participating communities. Participatory processes to identify and prioritize these projects will be coordinated with local governments.

Sustainable local/regional development: USAID will assist entrepreneurs and small producers with information and technical assistance to link their production to market demand and encourage private investment in licit productive activities. USAID will promote private-public partnerships in economic infrastructure (mainly transportation and electrification) in target areas; and will fund the rehabilitation/maintenance of the Juanjui-Tocache road, and related interventions with communities along the road. The program will support sustainable productive forest management, including concession processes and forest product certification, thus protecting large areas from encroachment from coca farmers while generating jobs and income. Alternative development will also facilitate increased state presence and improved governance in target regions. A credit mechanism will guarantee commercial bank loans to licit economic projects in the priority regions.

National framework for counternarcotics/economic development: Specific studies and advocacy efforts will support policy changes related to such issues as precursor chemicals control, control of licit coca leaf production and commercialization, and policies and procedures that catalyze greater economic growth and more effective and responsive state presence in the coca-producing regions. USAID will continue providing specialized consultancy services and fund selected costs of the Government of Peru's counter-narcotics coordinating body (DEVIDA), and other GOP agencies, to improve its institutional capacity to implement the Peruvian government's counternarcotics strategy.

Communications/operational research: A range of media will be used to: a) convince families in coca growing areas to embrace a licit lifestyle and reject illegal coca cultivation; b) increase awareness among the general public of the negative impacts of and links between illegal coca and narco-trafficking; and c) gain support among decision-makers in favor of AD/counternarcotics-related policy reforms. INL counter-narcotics funds will be used to finance mechanisms to monitor program implementation and carry out operational research, in order to guide the implementation of U.S. Government/GOP counternarcotics and alternative development activities.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Narcotics Law Enforcement
Law Enforcement Support 11,000 - 19,517 - 11,350
Aviation Support 35,635 - 17,400 - 17,545
Maritime Security Program 2,000 - 992 - 1,700
Sub-Total 48,635 - 37,909 - 30,595
Coca and Opium Poppy Eradication 7,000 - 7,640 - 7,700
Support to the Armed Forces 1,000 - 2,140 - 1,660
Peruvian Customs 50 - 1,500 - 500
Administration of Justice/Prosecutors 700 - 1,685 - 1,700
Institutional Development 400 - 248 - 250
Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 1,000 - 1,585 - 1,600
Money Laundering Support - - 496 - 500
Crop Monitoring and Research 4,300 - 3,970 - 4,005
Public Relations and Media - - 635 - 640
Chemical Control 124 125
Alternative Development* 49,705 - 53,866 - 43,000
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 875 - 875 - 875
Non-U.S. Personnel 925 - 929 - 929
ICASS Costs 705 - 805 - 805
Program Support 705 - 963 - 2,116
Sub-Total 3,210 - 3,572 - 4,725
Total 116,000 - 115,370 - 97,000
* Funds are transferred to USAID who manages these programs.


Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Performance Indicators


Venezuela, geographically adjacent to Colombia's major illicit narcotics production centers, disrupts the transshipment of drugs over its border and through its ports.

Develop operational capabilities and procedures to detect and seize narcotics, chemical and radiological arms shipments at Venezuela's primary seaports, airports and border points of entry. These improvements will be result an increase from five metric tons in base year 2003 to ten metric tons in 2006; cocaine seizures at airports will increase to three metric tons and heroin seizures to 500 kilograms over the same period.

Improve follow-up investigations that will result in greater intelligence information on organized crime methods of operation, organizational structure, and identities as well as arrests of key perpetrators.


Increased intelligence, knowledge and understanding of narcotrafficking organizations (NTOs), members, and drug smuggling methods will result in a corresponding increase in actionable criminal intelligence available to criminal investigators and prosecutors. Within 12-24 months, the intelligence fusion and analysis program should be able to identify the majority of key criminals trafficking drugs in and through Venezuela, as well as provide detailed information on their organizational structures and methods of operation.

Reduce the sale and diversion of legal chemicals and precursor substances to the illegal narcotics production industry will result in the installation and maintenance of the UNDCP data base program for tracking the sale and distribution of precursor chemicals.


Develop institutional capabilities of the Venezuelan criminal justice system to investigate and try cases against organized crime members, particularly those related to narcotics trafficking. These improvements will lead to an increased conviction rate of narcotraffickers to 40%; reduction in the backlog of pending cases for narcotrafficking; and improved handling and control of evidence.


Improve the monitoring procedures of Venezuelan financial institutions and their investigation and reporting of suspicious financial transactions, in order to provide actionable intelligence to GBRV financial crime enforcement agencies with the goal of prosecution and sentencing for financial crimes. These procedures will result in terms of the establishment and implementation of a system of financial crimes indicators, with the assistance of the USG's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) to supplement and enhance the current system of suspicious transaction reporting.

Program Justification

Colombian narcotics traffickers heavily exploit neighboring Venezuela's position to route illicit drugs going to the U.S. by air, land, and sea. Poorly regulated border crossings permit the transport of illicit drugs by land and river from Colombia to Venezuela's seaports, particularly Puerto Cabello, where most of the large containerized shipments of cocaine seized in the United States originate. The significant level of uncontrolled commercial shipping activity also provides opportunities for smuggling weapons and other contraband into the United States. Venezuela also has a modern but weakly regulated financial sector that is a target for the laundering of drug proceeds.

Program Accomplishments

Seizures of cocaine have risen sharply over the past four years, from 14 MT in 2001, to almost 15 MT in 2002, to 19 MT in 2003. The cocaine seizures during the first six months of 2004 equaled the amount seized in Venezuela during all of 2003. Heroin seizures have also been strong, with Venezuela leading South America for the fourth straight year: from 19KG in 2000, to 228 KG in 2001, to 563 KG in 2002, to 364 KG in 2003. State-of-the-art X-ray machines installed at two airports contributed to the near-daily seizures at Maiqueta International Airport, and work is near completion on the state-of-the-art model cargo inspection facility at Venezuela's primary container port at Puerto Cabello1. It should be fully operational by mid-2005.

Despite these achievements, political turmoil in Venezuela distracted the GOV from important law enforcement tasks: passing needed legislation against organized crime, enhancing Venezuela's chemical control regulations, and fulfilling requirements of the U.N. International Convention for the Repression of Terrorism Financing (2000) and the U.N. International Convention Against Transnational Crime (the Palermo Convention - 2000).

In October 2004, the Venezuelan National Guard flew CONACUID and UNODC observers over the Serrania de Perija mountain range. The group detected several small fields of coca and what appeared to be a small cocaine lab. No eradication operations were conducted in 2004; the last significant eradication operation was conducted in May 2001. For the third year in a row, no opium poppy eradication was reported.

FY 2006 Program

Port Security and Border Point of Entry Security: Each of Venezuela's commercial seaports and major land points of entry will be systematically surveyed to identify weaknesses in physical, document and personnel security, and corrective measures will be recommended. Funding in FY 2006 will be used for the procurement, maintenance and recalibration of search and inspection equipment (including ion scanners, X-ray machines, and density sensors); automated data processing and communications equipment; vehicles; and training and operations support for the canine program. Funding will also support on-site advisory assistance by USG experts. Emphasis will be placed upon analysis of bills of lading and other shipping documentation that will help to detect suspicious shipments and identify the origin of contraband shipments that will improve the GOV's ability to further increase drug seizures, and enhance the GOV's ability to conduct controlled deliveries - which will enable the GOV to collect intelligence on smuggling patterns and narcotrafficking organizations and members.

Airport Security: Airport cargo inspection and immigration control efforts will be enhanced by procurement and maintenance of improved document and cargo inspection equipment (such as ion scanners and X-ray equipment) to detect the presence of narcotics and explosives. Operator training and immigration control advisory assistance will conduct a thorough survey of current procedures, determine corrective measures and assure quality control in the implementation of procedures and equipment.

Intelligence Fusion and Analysis: FY 2006 funding will include the development of a drug intelligence fusion and analysis center that will support the design, procurement and installation of an automated wide-area network to connect intelligence field offices to a national-level database to facilitate assembly, collation and analysis of trafficking trends, methods and organizational structures. The resulting fusion of information will provide an ever-expanding and clarifying view of narcotrafficker organizational structures, methods and personalities with which to direct criminal investigations against key organizational personnel. The Joint Intelligence Coordination Center (JICC) will be the central focus of this project. Additionally, satellite intelligence offices at key port and border locations will be established to facilitate the two-way flow of information between the JICC and those field locations.

Money Laundering Control: The money-laundering project will provide funding for training and computer equipment to support the expanding role of the National Financial Intelligence Unit. While current legislation only criminalizes money laundering if the funds can be specifically tied to drug trafficking, this will change with the passing of the Organized Crime Bill, a third of which is dedicated to financial crimes. Seminars on money laundering will keep positive debate alive during the development and progress of legislation on financial crime, and promote understanding of the new laws once enacted.

Administration of Justice: This project will continue to train Venezuela's 1,200 public prosecutors through the Department of Justice's Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program (OPDAT), the American Bar Association (ABA) and commercial training. Training additional public prosecutors and criminal investigators will focus on improving Venezuela's prosecutors and police investigators to gather and preserve evidence, build and manage cases, and effectively prosecute crimes under Venezuela's new accusatorial judicial system. Funding will include the purchase of 160 computers to run the Prosecutor General's new Case Management System at field offices around the country. Extensive work will also be done to install two interconnected local area networks of computers at the Venezuelan drug czar's offices in Caracas. Components of the administration of justice project include extensive support for the Prosecutor's Drug Task Force (PDTF). With the assistance of DEA advisors and INL/NAS logistical support, the PDTF conducted successful investigations throughout 2004; including a successful operation in June 2004 against the Hasbun narcotrafficking organization where 5.9 MT of cocaine was seized.

Program Development and Support: PD&S funds are used for the salaries, benefits, allowances and travel of the direct hire and contract U.S. and foreign national personnel, residential housing, International Cooperative Agreement Support Services (ICASS) costs and other general administrative and operating expenses for counternarcotics and anticrime program planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Narcotics Law Enforcement
Port Security 750 - 451 - 450
Border Security 750 - 450 - 450
Mobile Inspection 60 - - - -
Airport Security - - 325 - 350
Intelligence Fusion and Analysis 250 - 200 200
Precursor Chemical Control 50 - 25 - 25
Money Laundering Control 50 - 50 - 50
Sub-Total 1,910 - 1,501 - 1,525
Administration of Justice
Prosecutor Training 900 - 150 - 150
Prosecutor's Drug task Force 1,000 - 400 - 360
MOJ Infrastructure Development 300 - 100 - 100
Sub-Total 2,200 - 650 - 610
Drug Awareness/Demand Reduction 50 - 25 - 25
Program Development and Support
U.S. Personnel 295 - 308 - 339
Non-U.S. Personnel 33 - 106 - 117
ICASS Costs 252 - 226 - 250
Program Support 260 - 160 - 134
Sub-Total 840 - 800 - 840
Total 5,000 - 2,976 - 3,000

Airbridge Denial Program

Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives and Performance Indicators


The Airbridge Denial Program (ABD) will provide effective intelligence and surveillance that will lead to increased interdiction of illicit drug trafficking aircraft and provide a real deterrent to the narco-traffickers in the region. The overall goal is to deter drug traffickers from using Colombian airspace to transport illegal drugs or the proceeds from those drugs.

Establishment of additional forward operating locations to support the increase of Colombian Air Force tracking aircraft will improve the Colombian Air Force's ability to conduct missions in previously untracked air space. The number of successful interdictions of Unidentified Assumed Suspect (UAS) air tracks will increase.

Training of pilots, technical operators, and maintenance personnel will keep the air fleet at high readiness and begin to focus on a future shift of more program and fiscal responsibility to Colombia.

Regional illicit aerial drug trafficking flight patterns will be established and the number of aerial interdictions will increase as Colombia and Brazil begin sharing information and conducting cross-border interdictions of suspect narco-trafficking flights.

Number of suspect aerial tracks within Colombian air space and coming out of Colombia.

Program Justification

The ABD Program is a program that has been created at the direction of the President to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) in their fight against narcotics trafficking. The goal of the ABD Program in Colombia is to deter aerial trafficking of drugs and drug-related material into and within Colombia airspace. Under the program's concept of operations, non-commercial aircraft flying in specifically designated and publicly declared areas of Colombia could be subject to special scrutiny by ground and aerial detection assets to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. Safety procedures have been established for intercepting and interdicting such aircraft.

INL has contracted for engineering, maintenance of equipment, training and safety oversight of this program in Colombia. Five Cessna Citation 560 and two C-26 aircraft have been specifically modified to provide the Colombian Air Force with the necessary aircraft to support aerial surveillance and interdiction. To ensure effective utilization of these powerful resources, Colombia continues to be trained in the tactics, techniques, and related doctrine that will lead to a systems approach in their counternarcotics surveillance and interdiction efforts. Additional USG contractor personnel along with Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S) will provide safety oversight of the program in accordance with agreed upon safety procedures and checklists.

Program Accomplishments


The ABD program in Colombia is in its second year of operation. The President signed a second Presidential Determination on August 17, 2004. This Program has given the GOC the ability to monitor, detect, sort and interdict unidentified assumed suspect flights. GOC inputs to the program consist of personnel salaries, travel and deployment costs, interceptor aircraft, maintenance, spare parts, weapons and ammunition. The USG support consists of contractor logistical support for USG supplied aircraft (5 - Cessna Citation 560) and 2-Colombian Air Force C-26 aircraft, contractor safety oversight personnel, communications equipment, infrastructure support and fuel.

The results for CY2004 are as follows:

Total number of Unidentified Assumed Suspect (UAS) Flights: over 500

  • Total number of these flights sorted as friendly: 150
  • Total number of these flights where no action was taken: 300
  • Total number of these flights where action was taken: 88
  • Total number of UAS aircraft forced down: 15
  • Total number of UAS aircraft destroyed: 13
  • Total number of aircraft impounded: 3
  • Total number of drugs seized: 2.8 metric tons of cocaine

FY 2006 Program


In FY 2006, the ABD Program budget will support the Colombian ABD Program. This support will include Contractor Logistical Support (CLS) including maintenance of aircraft, spare parts, and training and USG safety monitor oversight. Additionally, this funding will support up to three additional forward operating locations in order for the Colombian Air Force to conduct ABD operational missions in different parts of Colombia.

Our primary emphasis will be to continue training Colombian pilots and sensor operators for the Cessna Citation 560 and C-26 aircraft and to ensure that the aircraft are maintained properly while fully supporting operational ABD interdiction missions. Colombian self-sufficiency of the ABD program remains an important goal and INL will begin to explore ways to increase the level of host nation funding and involvement in order to decrease USG contributions.

Critical Flight Safety Program

Budget Summary ($000)

FY 2004 Actual

FY 2005 Estimate

FY 2006 Request




Program Objectives

INL Air Wing assists key governments with the combating of drug trafficking and terrorism by providing aviation expertise and resources to eradicate and interdict illicit drugs, strengthen law enforcement, support counter-terrorist operations, and develop internal institutional counter-narcotics (CN) and counter-terrorism (CT) capabilities.

The primary objective of the multi-year Critical flight Safety Program is to ensure safety, specifically structural integrity, of the aircraft operated by the INL Air Wing. Upon completion of this program the Department will have ensured to the best of it's ability that the INL aviation fleet will not suffer loss of life or valuable aviation resources due to structural fatigue and aging aircraft. The secondary objective of the Critical Flight Safety Plan is to refurbish 30-year old, Vietnam-era military aircraft to a modern commercially supportable standard, therefore making them cheaper to operate, easier to maintain, and more reliable.

In summary, the Air Wing CFSP will:

  • Increase safety for aircrews and personnel flying in these aircraft.
  • Extend the service lifetime of these aircraft, maximizing their value to the USG.
  • ontrol or potentially eliminate excessively high maintenance and part cost growth rates; make aircraft commercially supportable.
  • Increase operational readiness and sustain mission success.

INL/A has embarked on this multi-level Critical Flight Safety Program (CFSP) to stop the degradation and extend the life of its severely aged aircraft to sustain its CN/CT missions. Specifically, we will conduct the following in FY 2006:

  • Conducting a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of 15 OV-10 D aircraft used to conduct aerial eradication in high threat environments.
  • Refurbishing a total of 39 UH-1N helicopters providing support to both aerial eradication and Colombian Army counterterrorism operations.
  • Converting the INL/A remaining UH-1H Vietnam era helicopter fleet to a modern Huey-II configuration (Peru and Bolivia).
  • Instituting a depot level maintenance program on the congressionally funded Plan Colombia UH-60 Blackhawks to prevent them from deteriorating like the INL/A UH-1H's.
  • Purchasing four UH-60 helicopters to conduct Search and Rescue (SAR) operations as replacements for the existing marginally adequate UH-1N's.

FY 2006: Specifically, in FY 2006 we will initiate refurbishment and upgrade of aging Vietnam era UH-1H helicopters, refurbishment UH-1N helicopters (first priority to eradication helicopters), extending the service life of OV-10D airframes, and initiate armament upgrades for Colombia SAR aircraft.

Performance Indicators

In early FY 2004 the Air Wing staff developed a Strategic Plan (SP) to better match Air Wing resources against its mission over the next 3-5 years at a time when the aging of the fleet threatens readiness, safety, and operational effectiveness. The SP formed the foundation of the CFSP.

The SP and CFSP are built around specific annual and long-term goals that are based on operational requirements and utilize standard aviation industry metrics for performance evaluation and validation. The performance Indicators support these metrics and are concrete and measurable.

  •  Near-term Strategy (Key Annual Goals):

      1. Purchase 10 engines for immediate installation in UH-1N helicopters.

      2. Complete Depot level repairs on 4 UH-1N airframes to sustain future readiness.

      3. Conduct Airframe Condition Evaluation (ACE) inspections / assessments on UH-1N helicopters.

      4. Complete SLEP process on 4 of 15 OV-10D aircraft.

      5. Convert 4 UH-1H airframes to Huey-II helicopters for Bolivia.

Program Justification

This program is a critical flight safety program. The Department runs the risk of a catastrophic in-flight failure leading to loss of life due to the age of the aircraft INL/A is operating. The Air Wing has suffered serious in-flight structural failures and has been fortunate that no aircrews and aircraft were lost as a result. The Air Wing has already removed from service at least three helicopters due to structural problems not economically repairable, and will continue to remove further aircraft from service as problems are found.

Three factors have converged that have brought us to this critical juncture. First, the sustained extraordinarily high operations tempo in Colombia; second, the fact that we have been steadily flying the same Vietnam-vintage aircraft in Peru and Bolivia for over 15 years now, and third, we have never funded a much needed depot level inspect-and-repair-as-necessary program.

We note loudly and clearly that the INL/A is maintaining its aircraft safely; or, more accurately stated, as safely as possible without conducting the inspections and refurbishments listed in the program objectives. If an aircraft is deemed unsafe, it will be grounded.

In spite of our best efforts, we have a documented steady reduction in aircraft availability, particularly the older eradication aircraft (OV-10 and supporting UH-1N's) over the past two years. These aircraft are excess defense aircraft that are no longer supported or, are being discontinued in the Department of Defense inventory, and have not gone through any major airframe Programmed Depot Maintenance. Many aircraft are over 35 years old and have greater than 10,100 airframe hours. As a note, DoD typically removes for service helicopters that were flown in excess of 4,000 hours.

Additionally, major aircraft components are obsolete and no longer being manufactured or have limited repair capability. In many cases these components such as engine assemblies are experiencing premature removals far more frequently and never reach time-life expectancy. Failure and removal rates of major components are compounded by the incidence of ground fire and operations in a high optempo austere environment. These factors make managing readiness and controlling cost an extremely difficult challenge.

The requested funding for the CFSP for FY 2006 is essential to eliminate these safety and mission readiness risks. The CFSP will upgrade, sustain, and replace aircraft necessary for INL's eradication, interdiction, and CN/CT programs throughout Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

Program Accomplishments

The Air Wing provides core level aviation services necessary to operate, sustain, and maintain a fleet of over 180 fixed and rotary wing aircraft of ten types. The aircraft support CN/CT aviation eradication, interdiction, counter-terrorism and border security programs in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru.

Colombia. In Colombia, the Air Wing in conjunction, with the Colombian National Police, has had four consecutive years of record breaking aerial eradication of coca. As a result of the aerial eradication campaign in 2002 we saw the first reduction in the size of the coca crop in Colombia and another reduction in 2003. We fully expect to see a further reduction after the campaign in 2004 (pending CNC figures as of this time). In addition, the Colombian Army Plan Colombia Helicopter program, providing air mobility for the Colombia Army Counter Drug Brigade, has changed the balance of power in Colombia and enabled the GOC to project force into area not under central government control for years; such as the Putumayo.

The Air Wing accomplished the following spray goals in Colombia:

Fiscal Year

Coca Sprayed (Hectares)*

Poppy Sprayed (Hectares)*

Percent Reduction Coca

Percent Reduction Poppy
















* True Ground Area Covered (TGAC)
** Data is computed from CNC illicit crop estimates that is not expected before the end of 2QFY05

Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia and Peru, two countries facing serious challenges to fragile democracies in part fueled by organized cocaleros and the traffickers supporting them, the Air Wing helicopter programs remain key components of the country team counter narcotics strategies. In Peru virtually all manual eradication is dependent on support from the Air Program.

Critical Flight Safety
INL Budget

FY 2004 FY 2004
FY 2005 FY 2005
FY 2006
Critical Flight Safety Program
UH-1N Program (Long Term) - - - - 11,000
UH-1N Interim Program - - - -
Engines PT6-3B - - - - 8,300
Depot Level Repairs - - - - 0
OV-10D Service Life Extension Program - - - - 9,700
Huey-II Program Conversion (UH-1H to Huey-II) - - - - 11,000
Sub-Total - - - - 40,000
Total - - - - 40,000