Underlying Suspicious Activity

The FATF non-cooperative countries and territories exercise encompasses some of the essential tenets of PDD-42. It has brought together the 29 FATF member nations in a multilateral effort to not only define what makes a country vulnerable to money laundering but to then clearly identify those nations whose substandard anti-money laundering regimes attract illegal proceeds that underwrite international criminal activity. The United States, in making its contribution to FATF, draws upon the collective expertise of the federal interagency community. That community has played a vital role by assessing the money laundering threat in various regions, analyzing the shortcomings in existing national laws, regulations and practices, crafting countermeasures and providing training and technical assistance to identified jurisdictions making a conscientious effort at improvement. During 2000, this integrated federal effort in support of the FATF initiative on non-cooperative jurisdictions has focused international attention and brought unprecedented progress in dealing with the global challenge of money laundering.

The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), which was established at the G-7 Economic Summit in Paris in 1989, is an inter-governmental body whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies to combat money laundering. In 1990, the FATF issued Forty Recommendations to fight this phenomenon. The Recommendations were revised in 1996 to reflect changes in money laundering trends. These recommendations are designed to prevent proceeds of crime from being utilized in future criminal activities and from affecting legitimate economic activities.

The following is a draft text currently being considered: 

1. "Criminalized Drug Money Laundering": The jurisdiction has enacted laws criminalizing the offense of money laundering related to drug trafficking.

2. "Criminalized Beyond Drugs": The jurisdiction has extended anti-money laundering statutes and regulations to include non-drug-related money laundering.

3. "Record Large Transactions": By law or regulation, banks are required to maintain records of large transactions in currency or other monetary instruments.

4. "Maintain Records Over Time": By law or regulation, banks are required to keep records, especially of large or unusual transactions, for a specified period of time, e.g., five years.

5. "Report Suspicious Transactions": An "M" (for "mandatory") indicates that by law or regulation, banks are required to record and report suspicious or unusual transactions to designated authorities. A "P" indicates that by law or regulation, banks are permitted to record and report suspicious transactions. An effective know-your-customer policy is considered a prerequisite in this category.

6. "Financial Intelligence Unit": The jurisdiction has established a central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), analyzing, and disseminating to the competent authorities disclosures of financial information concerning suspected proceeds of crime, or required by national legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering. These reflect those jurisdictions that are members of the Egmont Group.

7. "System for Identifying and Forfeiting Assets": The jurisdiction has enacted laws authorizing the tracing, freezing, seizure and forfeiture of assets identified as relating to or generated by money laundering activities.

8. "Arrangements for Asset Sharing": By law, regulation or bilateral agreement, the jurisdiction permits sharing of seized assets with third party jurisdictions which assisted in the conduct of the underlying investigation.

9. "Cooperates w/Domestic Law Enforcement": By law or regulation, banks are required to cooperate with authorized law enforcement investigations into money laundering or the predicate offense, including production of bank records, or otherwise lifting the veil of bank secrecy.

10. "Cooperates w/International Law Enforcement": By law or regulation, banks are permitted/required to cooperate with authorized investigations involving or initiated by third party jurisdictions, including sharing of records or other financial data.

11. "International Transportation of Currency": By law or regulation, the jurisdiction, in cooperation with banks, controls or monitors the flow of currency and monetary instruments crossing its borders. Of critical weight here are the presence or absence of wire transfer regulations and use of reports completed by each person transiting the jurisdiction and reports of monetary instrument transmitters.

12. "Mutual Legal Assistance": By law or through treaty, the jurisdiction has agreed to provide and receive mutual legal assistance, including the sharing of records and data.

13. "Non-Bank Financial Institutions": By law or regulation, the jurisdiction requires non-bank financial institutions to meet the same customer identification standards and adhere to the same reporting requirements that it imposes on banks.

14. "Disclosure Protection Safe Harbor": By law, the jurisdiction provides a "safe harbor" defense to banks or other financial institutions and their employees who provide otherwise confidential banking data to authorities in pursuit of authorized investigations.

15. "Offshore Financial Centers": By law or regulation, the jurisdiction authorizes the licensing of offshore banking and business facilities.

16. "States Parties to 1988 UN Drug Convention": As of December 31, 2000, a party to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, or a territorial entity to which the application of the Convention has been extended by a party to the Convention.

Afghanistan (Other). Afghanistan has no formal credit institutions, and its financial institutions are rudimentary. Afghanistan is not considered a center for money laundering. However, Afghanistan does play a key role in the heroin trade. The proceeds of heroin trafficking generally are laundered in other countries, or through the hawala alternative remittance system. Reports indicate that the Taliban and other factions in Afghanistan are involved in narcotics trafficking. The private investment of drug profits reportedly has fueled a surge in construction and commercial activity in Kandahar City in recent years.

Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Albania (Concern). Albania is at significant risk to money laundering because it is a transit country for trafficking in narcotics, arms, contraband, and illegal aliens. Organized crime groups use Albania as a base of operations for conducting criminal activities in other countries. The proceeds from these activities are easily laundered in Albania because of official corruption and weak government controls.

Albania criminalized all forms of money laundering through Article 287 of the Albanian Criminal Code of 1995. In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) assisted Albania in drafting anti-money laundering legislation that was subsequently approved by Albania's legislature. The law reportedly would establish an agency to coordinate the Government of Albania's (GOA) efforts to detect and prevent money laundering. This agency will fall under the control of the Ministry of Finance and will evaluate reports filed by financial institutions. If the agency suspects that a transaction involves the proceeds of criminal activity, it must forward the information to the prosecutor's office.

The legislation would also require financial institutions to report to the anti-money laundering agency all transactions that exceed approximately US $10,000. Financial institutions would be required to report transactions within 48 hours if the origin of the money cannot be determined. In addition, private and state entities would be required to report all financial transactions that exceed certain thresholds.

In December 2000, Albania signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Albania is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV).

The GOA should enact and fully implement the provisions of its anti-money laundering legislation. In particular, the GOA should provide adequate resources and support to the new anti-money laundering agency.

Algeria (Other). Algeria is not a financial center, and currently there is no available information suggesting that money laundering is a significant problem there. However, the Algerian government has not enacted anti-money laundering legislation nor does it have in place any procedures such as a suspicious transaction reporting system to detect money laundering. Individuals entering Algeria must declare all foreign currency, but it remains unclear how strictly this is enforced.

Algeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Angola (Other). Money laundering does not appear to be a significant problem in Angola because of its poorly developed financial sector. However, Angola does not have in place a set of comprehensive laws, regulations, and other procedures to detect money laundering and financial crime. Angola's counternarcotics laws criminalize money laundering related to drug trafficking.

In December 2000, Angola signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Anguilla (Other). Anguilla has a small but growing offshore financial sector that renders it vulnerable to money laundering. As with the other United Kingdom Caribbean Overseas Territories, Anguilla underwent a thorough evaluation of its financial regulations in 2000, co-sponsored by the local and British governments.

Anguilla's domestic financial sector includes four domestic banks and 17 insurance companies. The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises Anguilla's four domestic banks. The offshore sector includes two banks, one captive insurance company, and approximately 2000 international business companies (IBCs) and 43 trusts. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares that conceal the identity of the beneficial owner of these entities.

In 2000, Anguilla enacted several pieces of legislation to improve its anti-money laundering regime. The Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Act (PCCA) 2000 extends the predicate offenses for money laundering to all indictable offenses. It provides for suspicious activity reporting and a safe harbor for this reporting. The Money Laundering Reporting Authority Act (MLRA) 2000 requires persons involved in the provision of financial services to report any suspicious transactions derived from drugs or criminal conduct. It also details provisions for a Reporting Authority that will receive the suspicious transaction reports required and may forward information to the police for further investigation. The Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) (Anguilla) Act 2000 enables Anguilla to directly cooperate with other jurisdictions through mutual legal assistance.

Anguilla is subject to the US/UK MLAT and the US/UK extradition treaty. Anguilla is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and through the UK, is subject to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Anguilla has developed important legal tools for detecting and investigating money laundering and other financial crimes. It should move quickly to implement provisions of the PCCA and the MLRA and establish a Reporting Authority that can easily cooperate with foreign authorities. Anguilla should also adopt consider measures to ensure complete identification of beneficial owners of IBCs so that international criminals do not use these entities to perpetuate financial crimes.

Antigua and Barbuda (Primary). Although Antigua and Barbuda remains vulnerable to money laundering because of its offshore financial sector and its internet gaming industry, it has made significant progress toward improving the regulation of the offshore financial sector since the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions in April 1999. In its advisory the Treasury Department recommended "enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions routed into or out of Antigua and Barbuda" because of 1998 amendments that had seriously weakened Antigua and Barbuda's anti-money laundering regime. The United Kingdom (UK) also issued a bank advisory at that time and France publicly expressed it concerns.

In response to this international action, in 1999 the Government of Antigua and Barbuda (GOAB) repealed those amendments to the Money-Laundering (Prevention) Act (MLPA) of 1996 that had effectively strengthened bank secrecy, inhibited money laundering investigations and infringed on international cooperation. Additionally, in 2000 the GOAB amended the International Business Corporations Act (IBCA) of 1982 in order to excise the 1998 amendments that had given the International Financial Sector Regulatory Authority (IFSRA) responsibility to market and regulate the offshore sector, as well as to allow members of the IFSRA Board of Directors to maintain ties to the offshore industry.

In August 2000, the GOAB again amended the IBCA to require resident agents to ensure the accuracy of the records and registers that are kept at the Registrar's office, and to know the names of beneficial owners of IBC's and to disclose such information to authorities upon request. Furthermore, in December 2000 the GOAB issued a Statutory Instrument, which has the force of law, requiring banks to establish the true identities of account holders and to verify the nature of an account holder's business, source of funds and beneficiaries. The GOAB has also drafted an International Trusts Bill and a Mutual Funds Bill.

The GOAB has established and staffed the Supervisory Authority (SA) within the ONDCP as mandated by the MLPA, and has issued regulations that implement its suspicious transactions reporting system. According to an Antiguan official, by year's end Antiguan and Barbudian financial institutions had filed a total of between ten and twenty suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

During 1999 and 2000, the GOAB conducted an extensive review of the offshore banking sector. As a result, 21 offshore banks had their licenses revoked, were dissolved, were placed in receivership, or were otherwise put out of business. Currently, Antigua and Barbuda has 26 licensed offshore banks of which only 18 are currently in operation and in good standing.

Like most of the other countries in the Eastern Caribbean, GOAB does not have a unified regulatory structure or uniform supervisory practices for its financial services sector. This is due to the fact that the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises Antigua and Barbuda's domestic banking sector, conducting both on-site and off-site reviews of the country's financial institutions. Examiners review information related to savings and demand deposits during on-site inspections. To date, the ECCB has not begun supervising offshore banks.

The IFSRA issues licenses for the offshore sector, including the issuance of licenses for offshore banks and international business corporations, of which there are approximately 12,000. The license application requires disclosure of the names and addresses of directors-who must be natural persons-the activities the corporation intends to engage in, and the names of shareholders and number of shares that they will hold. Additionally, the IFSRA is responsible for the supervision of the offshore banking sector. IFSRA is currently increasing its staff in order to effectively perform on-site and off-site examinations of licensed offshore banks. To date, IFSRA has not performed any on-site examinations.

In October 2000, a joint US and UK interagency team visited Antigua and Barbuda to review the GOAB's progress in enacting and implementing legislation that addresses the issues raised in the 1999 US and UK advisories. As a result the UK subsequently issued a statement announcing modification of its advisory which reads in part:

HM Treasury recognizes the considerable effort that the Government of Antigua and Barbuda has made since April 1999 to strengthen the system of supervision and control, with a particular view to strengthening anti-money laundering systems. Although it is too early to judge whether these new systems have been fully successful, it is clear that there has been a step-change in the culture of combating money laundering in the Government and supervisory structures. But as has been recognized by the Government of Antigua and Barbuda, there is still room for further improvement before the jurisdiction meets the highest standards of international anti-money laundering laws and practice.

While waiting for the new systems to bed down, and the final legislative changes to be made, the UK still believes that financial institutions should continue to undertake additional due diligence when accepting new business from the financial institutions in Antigua and Barbuda. In particular, UK financial institutions should be aware of concerns that there are serious risks associated with involvement in transactions linked to the offshore gaming industry.

The report of the US members of the assessment team and recommendations regarding the US advisory are pending.

During 2000, the GOAB continued its bilateral and multilateral cooperation in various criminal and civil investigations and prosecutions. The GOAB has provided substantial assistance to US law enforcement and prosecutors investigating and prosecuting fraud and money laundering cases involving Antiguan-licensed American International Bank, European Union Bank and European Federal Credit Bank. As a result of Operation Risky Business, an FBI and US Customs Service investigation in which 19 individuals were convicted for fraud and money laundering, a request for the extradition of Antiguan citizen William Cooper, who assisted in the establishment of Antiguan-licensed Caribbean American Bank, was made in 1999. The request is currently pending in the Antiguan courts. In 1999, the GOAB charged former Ukrainian Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko with money laundering and froze approximately $83 million in alleged fraud proceeds that had been deposited in European Federal Credit Bank. This money was ultimately forfeited by an Antiguan court in 2000, but the court's decision has been appealed. Lazarenko is currently in US custody awaiting trial on money laundering charges filed in the Northern District of California.

Casinos and sports book-wagering operations in the Free Trade Zone are regulated and supervised by the Directorate of Offshore Gaming (DOG) and are required to incorporate under the IBCA. The DOG has issued Internet Gaming Technical Standards and guidelines; however, it is not clear whether these standards and guidelines are mandatory. Moreover, it is not clear if casinos and other gaming-related entities are subject to provisions of the IBCA or the MLPB. The GOAB is considering legislation and has drafted "Regulations for the Licencing of Interactive Gaming And Interactive Wagering in Antigua and Barbuda" to address possible money laundering through client accounts of Internet gambling operations.

Antigua and Barbuda is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Antigua and Barbuda is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In 1999, Antigua and Barbuda became the first country in the eastern Caribbean to exchange the instruments of ratification to bring into force Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Treaties with the United States Government.

During the last two years, the GOAB has shown a clear commitment to the creation of a legal and regulatory anti-money laundering regime that will meet international standards. The GOAB is urged to fully implement and enforce all provisions of its anti-money laundering legislation. Moreover, the GOAB must ensure that its gambling sector is covered by anti-money laundering legislation and that it is adequately supervised.

Argentina (Concern). High-profile regional investigations have produced evidence that Mexican and Colombian drug cartels are infiltrating Argentina's banking sector, which is the sector most affected by money laundering activities. It is believed that contraband and bribery also contribute to the money laundering occurring in Argentina, and that the use of companies, shell companies, trusts, financial advisors, accountants and notaries facilitate money laundering.

New money laundering legislation, Law 25.246, was passed in May 2000. While the October 1989 law applied only to the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking activities, the new law extends the money laundering offenses to include all existing crimes in the Penal Code and makes it a crime to launder proceeds of crimes committed in other countries. The new law sets a stricter regulatory framework for banks and a wide range of other entities. Under previous central bank regulations, the requirements for record-keeping customer identification, recording of cash transactions over US $10,000, and reporting of suspicious transactions applied only to banks, financial companies, credit unions, savings institutions, credit card issuers and money exchange dealers. Law 25.246 expands the customer identification, record-keeping and suspicious transactions reporting to a wide range of entities including foreign exchange houses, money remitters, gambling outlets, exporters/importers of jewels and precious metals, property registration agents, stock brokers, insurance companies, art dealers, notaries, accountants, and travelers' checks companies. The law forbids these financial and commercial entities to notify their clients of the filing of suspicious financial transaction reports, and provides a safe harbor from liability for reporting the transactions.

To aid Argentina in its fight against money laundering, Law 25.246 creates a financial intelligence unit (FIU), an autonomous agency under the administration of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating to the Office of the Attorney General information to prevent and impede money laundering. The FIU is not yet operational.

One money laundering case is currently being prosecuted under the 1989 legislation.

Argentina is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Argentina is an active participant in international anti-money laundering groups. Following their September 1999 admission as an observer member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Argentina underwent an evaluation by the FATF in early 2000 and became a full member in June 2000. Argentina is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Argentina also played a leading role in the creation of the South American Financial Action Task Force in December 2000. Argentina and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1993.

The government of Argentina is encouraged to issue implementing regulations for Law 25.2456, and make its FIU operational as soon as possible to enable it to participate in the Egmont Group. This will enable it to cooperate more comprehensively in domestic and international efforts to combat money laundering.

Armenia (Other). Armenia is not a major financial center, however its status as a transit country for narcotics trafficking and smuggling, combined with lax border controls, creates a favorable money-laundering environment. High unemployment, low salaries, corruption, a large underground economy, and the presence of organized crime also increase Armenia's vulnerability to money laundering. Armenian authorities are generally not cognizant of the threat of money laundering and have devoted inadequate resources to the problem. Schemes used to launder funds include the under-invoicing of imports, double bookkeeping, and misuse of the banking system.

Armenia currently has no anti-money laundering statutes. However, the new draft Armenian criminal code includes a statute that for the first time would criminalize money laundering. The Government of Armenia expects the new draft criminal code to pass its third and final reading in parliament in early 2001.

Armenia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Aruba (Concern). Aruba has a growing offshore industry, casinos, and free zones that make it both attractive and vulnerable to money launderers. However, the Government of Aruba (GOA) is establishing a solid anti-money laundering program. Money laundering is a crime in Aruba, and money-laundering offenses extend to all predicate criminal offenses, including tax offenses.

The GOA has developed a comprehensive anti-money laundering program, and further strengthened its legislation this year. The GOA's new anti-money laundering initiatives include four State Decrees: a State Decree listing suspicious activity indicators for casinos, which will take effect in April 2001; a State Decree on the supervision of captive insurers, and one on the supervision of insurance underwriters, both of which will be introduced in February 2001; and a State Decree, which becomes effective January 1, 2001, that will permit the Central Bank of Aruba to supervise insurance companies. The Central Bank of Aruba is in charge of implementing this Decree, which provides the legal basis for supervision of onshore or offshore insurance companies operating in Aruba.

In March 2001, a State Ordinance is expected to be issued that will extend reporting and identification requirements to casinos.

In October 2000, a State Ordinance was enacted requiring life insurance agents to report unusual transactions, based on indicators. As of January 1, 2000, the Government of Aruba began working on the principles of the law, which will be implemented during the first half of the year 2001.

On July 4, 2000, the Aruban Parliament unanimously approved the State Ordinance Free Zones Aruba, which will implement standards for the sector. Aruba is also working with its counterparts in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) to develop regional standards for free zones, since none currently exist. Once developed, CFATF members have agreed to implement these standards.

In June 2000, Aruba enacted a State Ordinance making it a legal requirement to report both the importation and exportation of currency in excess of 20,000 Aruban guilders (approximately US $11,235). The State decree to implement the law will be introduced in the early part of 2001.

The GOA has prepared a State Ordinance for the Supervision of Trust Companies. The draft ordinance provides for the oversight of thrift companies to ensure that they follow "Know Your Customer" procedures. The draft was submitted to an advisory committee. After the committee completes its review and provides comments, the draft will be returned to the government officials responsible for the law and then submitted to parliament for approval. Aruban officials are striving to enact the Ordinance early in 2001.

All financial institutions report unusual transactions to the Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties (MOT), Aruba's financial intelligence unit. The MOT is a member of the Egmont Group. A draft law, which would authorize the MOT to share information with foreign counterpart organizations with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), is now with the central committee.

Aruba has a small offshore sector compared to more established offshore jurisdictions. Services include finance companies, offshore banks, investment and holding companies and the Aruba Exempt Company (AEC). There are approximately 4700 AECs that are permitted to offer bearer shares. AECs pay an annual registration fee of approximately US $280, and must have a minimum authorized capital of US $6,000. AECs cannot participate in the economy of Aruba, and are exempt from several obligations-they are exempt from all taxes and currency restrictions, and need not file annual financial statements. Trust companies provide a wide range of corporate management and professional services to AECs, including looking after the interests of its shareholders, stockholders, or other creditors. In May 2000, the GOA issued Guidance Notes on sound corporate governance practices.

On August 31, 2000, the United States signed a multilateral agreement, with Aruba, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela, to establish an international task force to fight the money laundering that occurs through the "Black Market Peso Exchange"(BMPE). The BMPE is believed to be the largest money laundering system in the Western Hemisphere, and the primary money laundering method used by Colombian drug cartels. The task force will develop policy options and recommend enforcement actions to detect, prevent and prosecute money laundering by the BPME. The agreement also provides for enhanced information sharing among the signatories. The first task force meeting was held in Aruba on October 21, 2000 and was chaired by the director of the Aruba Free Zone. The next meeting will take place in March 2001.

Aruba, which has autonomous control over its internal affairs, is a part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and, as such, is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Aruba has signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the Unite States. Aruban judicial authorities have maintained an excellent record of cooperation under the MLAT.

Aruba's anti-money laundering legislation largely adheres to the recommendations of FATF and the CFATF. Furthermore, Aruba's efforts this year culminated in their first money laundering prosecution for drug trafficking. The Government of Aruba has shown a commitment to combating money laundering. With continued vigilance Aruba's vulnerability to money laundering should decrease.

Australia (Primary). The Government of Australia (GOA) has in place a balanced, comprehensive system to detect, prevent, and prosecute money laundering. In 1995, a comprehensive money laundering study commissioned by the GOA estimated that each year approximately US $2.8 billion is laundered in or through Australia, or offshore. The major sources of criminal proceeds laundered in Australia are narcotics trafficking and financial fraud.

The Government of Australia (GOA) has enacted comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that criminalizes money laundering related to serious crimes, and mandates various forms of reporting. Moreover, the legislation provides for assistance to other governments with asset seizure and forfeiture. Three pieces of legislation form the basis of Australia's anti-money laundering regime: the Financial Transaction Reports Act (FTR) of 1988; the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACMA) of 1987; and the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) of 1987.

The FTR was enacted in 1988 to combat tax evasion, money laundering and serious crime. The FTR requires that the following entities report suspicious transactions, cash transactions in excess of Australian $10,000, and international funds transfers to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), Australia's financial intelligence unit: financial institutions; insurance businesses; securities dealers; trustees; sellers of monetary instruments; bullion dealers; gaming establishments and services; persons who collect, hold, or deliver currency on behalf of others; and persons who prepare payrolls for others in whole or in part from collected currency. AUSTRAC was established under section 35 of the FTR, and was given a regulatory role vis-a-vis Australia's financial services sector. The MACMA allows Australian authorities to assist other countries in identifying, freezing, seizing, and confiscating the proceeds of crime. The POCA criminalized money laundering for all serious crimes, and contains provisions to assist investigations and prosecutions in the form of production orders, search warrants, and monitoring orders.

Australia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the South Pacific Forum, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. AUSTRAC is a member of the Egmont Group. Australia continues to promote the adoption of effective anti-money laundering measures by countries in the Asia/Pacific region, through its funding and hosting of the Secretariat of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and by raising the issue of money laundering to a priority concern at the Asia/Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. In September 1999, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Australia and the United States entered into force. AUSTRAC and FinCEN have signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the exchange of information. AUSTRAC also has bilateral agreements allowing the exchange of information with the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Belgium, France, Hungary, and Denmark.

Australia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Australia continues to have a comprehensive and effective anti-money laundering regime that adheres to the FATF Forty Recommendations. Australia's approach to combat money laundering and its demonstrated ability to adapt to change, serve as a model for other countries to emulate. The GOA should continue to support the APG and provide money laundering training and technical assistance for the Asia/Pacific region.

Austria (Primary). Austria is not a major financial center. Money laundering has been a criminal offense in Austria since 1993. A major risk for money laundering in Austria has been the existence of anonymous bank accounts known as Sparbuch (savings book) accounts. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) threatened to suspend Austria's membership if Austria did not terminate these accounts by June 15, 2000.

In June 2000, the Government of Austria (GOA) approved legislation, the Banking Act Amendment, that addressed the FATF's concerns. Beginning November 2, 2000, applicants for new passbook accounts must be identified. In addition, if deposits are made to an existing passbook account, the holder must be identified-except for deposit transfers from anonymous securities accounts opened prior to August 1, 1996. After June 30, 2002, if a withdrawal is made from an existing passbook account-and the holder has not previously been identified-the holder must be identified. A June 15, 2000 press release indicates that the FATF will closely monitor Austria's implementation of these measures. The GOA in 1996 abolished anonymous securities accounts. Although new deposits are not allowed, customers can continue to make withdrawals and sales from these accounts without identification until June 2002.

In June 2000, the Ministry of Finance sent a circular to Austrian banks advising them to use special diligence in splitting passbook account balances-except among family members-exceeding one million Austrian schillings (approximately US $68,500). Austrian banks are required to continue exercising this enhanced diligence until anonymous accounts are completely phased out in June 2002.

The GOA imposes customer identification requirements for bank transactions exceeding Austrian shillings 200,000 (approximately US $13,700) for customers without a permanent business relationship with the bank. Bank records must be maintained for a minimum of five years after the business relationship has terminated. Banks, insurers, and foreign exchange bureaus are required to report suspicious transactions. Austria's financial intelligence unit, the Central Department for Combating Organized Crime, receives and analyzes financial disclosures, and is a member of the Egmont Group.

Austria has not enacted domestic legislation that provides for sharing narcotics-related assets with other governments. However, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) has been in force since August 1, 1998 between the GOA and the United States, which contains an asset-sharing provision. The GOA has been cooperative with US law enforcement investigations. Austria has a bilateral agreement with Hungary concerning the exchange of information related to money laundering. Austria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Austria is a member of the FATF and the European Union.

The GOA should continue to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. By enacting legislation to eliminate anonymous passbook accounts, the GOA has taken an important step toward combating money laundering. The GOA should ensure full implementation of this new law. Continued diligence on the part of the GOA will be instrumental in helping to thwart money laundering in Austria.

Azerbaijan (Other). Azerbaijan's banking system is rudimentary; and its banking laws change frequently. Several banks have been closed as part of a government effort to consolidate the banking sector. Available information suggests that non-bank financial institutions probably are used to launder money related to tax evasion and avoidance of customs fees. The transportation of illegal source currency falls within the purview of the Organized Crime Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of National Security. However, these agencies probably are more concerned with stopping the transportation of funds used for anti-state activities such as anti-government propaganda and terrorism than funds generated from narcotics trafficking. Azerbaijan does not have anti-money laundering legislation.

Azerbaijan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Bahamas (Primary). The Commonwealth of The Bahamas is an important regional financial center; its well-developed offshore financial center, strong bank secrecy laws, weak regulation of international business companies (IBCs), and inadequate customer identification requirements have made it vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes. The offshore financial industry includes trust companies, 413 banks, 580 mutual funds, 30 insurance companies, and approximately 100,000 International Business Companies (IBCs).

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified The Bahamas as "non-cooperative in the fight against money laundering." In its report, FATF stated cited the following concerns:

Although The Bahamas has comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, there are serious deficiencies in its system. In particular, there is a lack of information about the beneficial ownership as to trusts and IBCs, which are allowed to issue bearer shares. There is also a serious breach in identification rules since certain intermediaries can invoke their professional code of conduct to avoid revealing the identity of their clients. International cooperation has been marked by long delays and restricted responses to requests for assistance and there is no room to cooperate outside of judicial channels.

In July 2000, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them to give enhanced scrutiny to financial transactions involving The Bahamas, particularly those transactions that do not involve established and adequately identified commercial or investment enterprises.

Under legislation in force prior to December 2000, The Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas (GOCB) supervisory officials had to seek a court order to obtain access to customer information held by Bahamian banks and trust companies. Moreover, the failure of Bahamian banks to obtain identifying information about customers limited their effectiveness in recognizing and avoiding money-laundering transactions. Banks were not required to verify the identity of customers whose accounts were opened by Bahamian lawyers and certain other intermediaries. It is unclear whether these entities' legal obligation to report suspicious transactions was preempted by their professional secrecy obligations.

The GCOB has taken significant steps to address the shortcomings in its anti-money laundering regime. In May 2000, the GCOB enacted legislation requiring that individuals declare currency in excess of US $10,000 when entering or leaving the country. Moreover, in December 2000, the GCOB enacted the following legislation and regulations: Proceeds of Crime Act No. 44 of 2000, Dangerous Drugs Act 2000, Criminal Justice (International Co-Operation) Act 2000, Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2000, the Central Bank of the Bahamas Act 2000, Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 2000, Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act 2000, International Business Companies (IBC) Act 2000, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Act 2000, Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Regulations Act of 2000, and Financial Transactions Reporting Regulations of 2000.

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2000, which supersedes the amended Money Laundering (Proceeds of Crime) Act, also expands the number of predicate crimes for money laundering to include drug trafficking, bribery, public corruption, and other serious crimes; expands the definition of the money laundering offence by introducing the concept of "reasonable suspicion," rather than requiring actual knowledge of the nature of the proceeds; and provides immunity from civil liability for disclosure of information to the Supervisory Authority or the Attorney General. In addition, for the first time, the new Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 provides for seizure, detention and forfeiture of the proceeds of crime, including money laundering; establishes penalties for failure to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering; and, authorizes enforcement of domestic and external confiscation orders.

The International Business Companies Act (IBC), 2000, ends anonymous ownership of IBCs. The new legislation requires IBCs to have a registered office and agent in The Bahamas, to hold general meetings at least annually, to maintain a register of officers and directors that is available to the public, and to maintain a share register containing the names and addresses of the beneficial owners of shares, along with other information that is accessible by supervisory authorities. The Act also eliminates bearer shares and requires current owners of bearer shares to convert them to regular shares within a specified time frame. IBCs that fail to comply with these provisions will be struck from the register of companies.

The Financial and Corporate Service Providers Act 2000 regulates lawyers, accountants, and business managers engaged in the registration or management of IBCs.

The Financial Intelligence Unit Act 2000 establishes the GCOB's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The Act gives the FIU authority to compel production-without a court order-of information and documents, and to exchange information with foreign FIUs. The Act also permits the lifting of financial secrecy provisions for inquiries concerning money laundering. Moreover, the FIU-in consultation with financial regulators-will issue specific guidelines to financial institutions for the mandatory reporting of suspicious transactions. The Act also establishes "safe harbor" protection from criminal, civil, and professional sanctions for individuals who provide information to the FIU. The GCOB has consulted with the Caribbean Anti-Money Laundering Programme for guidance in the establishment of an FIU. More recently, the GCOB requested that the United Nations Global Program Against Money Laundering provide it with a list of candidates from which to select a long-term mentor to assist with the development of its FIU. As currently envisioned, the FIU will have a staff of ten. Managerial positions have been filled, and the FIU is expected to become fully operational in 2001.

The Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2000 establishes "know your customer" requirements for banks, trust companies, securities broker-dealers, casinos, real estate brokers, insurance companies, co-operative societies, counsel/attorneys/accountants relative to certain transactions and others. These entities will be required to verify the identities of existing customers within 12 months, and report suspicious transactions to the FIU. The Act also creates a Compliance Commission to ensure the financial sector's compliance with the Act by institutions other than banks and trust companies. In accordance with the Act, in December 2000, the Ministry of Finance issued the Financial Transactions Reporting Regulations 2000. These regulations require institutions to verify the identity of persons conducting transactions of $10,000 or more.

The Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 2000 provides for cross-border supervision by banking regulators of foreign banks and trust companies with branches or subsidiaries operating in The Bahamas consistent with the principles established by the Basle Committee. The Central Bank of Bahamas Act 2000 expands the powers of the central bank to respond to requests for information from foreign regulatory authorities. The Act also grants the central bank governor the authority to deny licenses to banks or trusts that are deemed unfit to conduct business in The Bahamas.

The Bahamas is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of the CFATF and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. The Attorney General has established an International Affairs Unit to deal specifically with mutual legal assistance matters. The Bahamas has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, which entered into force in 1990.

The GCOB continues to further its anti-money laundering efforts with enactment of new laws, establishment of an FIU, and its stated intention to join the Egmont Group. The GCOB has enacted substantial reforms that could reduce its financial sector's vulnerability to money laundering. The GCOB now needs to focus on fully implementing its new legislation.

Bahrain (Concern). Bahrain is vulnerable to money laundering because it is a regional financial and offshore center. The most common sources of illegal proceeds in Bahrain include narcotics trafficking, fraud, and evasion of international sanctions. Bahrain recently passed legislation that reportedly criminalizes money laundering.

Bahrain has 19 commercial banking institutions-seven locally incorporated and 12 subsidiaries of foreign banks-and has 48 offshore banking units (OBUs). The Bahrain Monetary Authority (BMA) licenses OBUs. The BMA requires that OBUs be audited yearly by outside firms that have been approved by the BMA. OBUs cannot do business with residents of Bahrain-except for agencies of the GOB-and must conduct all transactions in foreign currency. However, OBUs may participate in domestic development projects with the approval of the BMA. OBUs also must be fully staffed, and a majority of the staff must be Bahraini nationals. The books and records of OBUs must be available for examination by the BMA at all times. OBUs are required to submit statistical reports to the BMA twice yearly. OBUs are exempt from taxes and are not subject to restrictions regarding foreign exchange payments or receipts.

Bahrain also permits formation of two forms of international business companies (IBCs): offshore resident companies and offshore non-resident companies. Offshore resident companies must have a principal office in Bahrain and a minimum capitalization of US $54,000. The company must obtain a license from the BMA if it conducts financial activities. Offshore non-resident companies are exempt from the requirement of maintaining an office in Bahrain, and may instead appoint a law or auditing firm in Bahrain as their resident address. Non-resident companies must have a minimum capitalization of US $6,750, but cannot engage in insurance or other financial activities. Registration of an IBC can take as little as seven days, and there are no restrictions on remittances sent abroad.

In January 2001, new legislation went into effect by Amiri decree that reportedly criminalizes money laundering for a number of predicate offenses, requires the reporting of large transactions, provides specific guidelines for accepting transactions, and increases monitoring of banking activity.

Legislation in force prior to the enactment Bahrain's new anti-money laundering legislation obligates financial institutions to report suspicious transactions greater than Bahraini dinars (BD) 10,000 (approximately US $26,000) to the BMA. However, the BMA has not provided guidance to Bahraini banks on how to identify suspicious transactions.

Bahrain is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which represents it before the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In June 2000, Bahrain underwent a FATF mutual evaluation. Bahrain is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors and has agreed to undergo a mutual evaluation by this body. Bahrain is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Bahrain should ensure that its offshore sector is subject to adequate supervision.

Bangladesh (Other). Bangladesh is not an important financial center. Money laundering in Bangladesh is primarily related to income tax evasion and the illegal importation of consumer goods. There is no evidence that the proceeds of drug trafficking are laundered in Bangladesh. However, Bangladesh has not criminalized money laundering and banking regulation is weak and sporadic. Corruption among officials is believed to be high.

Bangladesh is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

Barbados (Concern). The Government of Barbados (GOB) has taken several steps in recent years to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime.

The Money Laundering (Prevention and Control) Act (MLPCA) 1998 criminalizes transactions that involve the proceeds of unlawful activities that are punishable by at least one-year imprisonment. The legislation also authorized creation of the Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA) to supervise financial institutions' compliance with the Act. However, the AMLA was not established until 1 August 2000, and its financial intelligence unit (FIU) was not established until 1 September 2000. The FIU is now fully staffed and operating. The AMLA also may issue training requirements and regulations for financial institutions. Money laundering is punishable in Barbados by a maximum of 25 years in prison and a maximum fine of Barbadian (BB) $2 million, (approximately US $1 million). The law also contains asset seizure and forfeiture provisions.

The MLPCA applies to a wide range of institutions, including domestic and offshore banks, international business companies (IBCs), and insurance companies. These institutions are required to identify their customers, to cooperate with domestic law enforcement investigations, to maintain records of all transactions exceeding BB $10,000, and to report suspicious transactions to the AMLA. The AMLA forwards this information to the Commissioner of Police if it has reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering.

The GOB initially criminalized money laundering in 1990 through the Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 13. This law also authorizes asset confiscation and forfeiture and provides a disclosure protection safe harbor for individuals reporting suspicious activities. In 1997, the central bank issued Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Licensed Financial Institutions.

Barbados is an offshore center and offers offshore banking, international trusts, exempt insurance companies, IBCs, and foreign sales corporations (FSCs)-specialized companies that permit persons to engage in foreign trade transactions from within Barbados. Unofficial sources report Barbados has approximately 51 offshore banks, 376 exempt insurance companies, 3,855 IBCs and 2,975 foreign sales corporations.

The Offshore Banking Act (1980) gives the central bank authority to supervise and regulate offshore banks, in addition to Barbados's nine domestic commercial banks. Barbadian, Canadian-parent, and United Kingdom-parent banks operate on equal terms in Barbados. The Ministry of Finance issues licenses after the central bank receives and reviews applications, and recommends applicants for licensing. Offshore banks must submit quarterly statements of assets and liabilities and annual balance sheets to the central bank. Profits from offshore banks are subject to a 2.5 percent tax rate for profits of BB $10 million or less, and not less than 1 percent for profits exceeding BB $10 million.

The International Business Companies Act (1992) provides for general administration of IBCs. The Ministry of International Trade and Business vets and grants licenses to IBCs after applicants register with the Registrar of Corporate Affairs. Barbadian IBC's must pay a 2.5 percent tax on profits up to BB $20 million, with decreasing tax rates on additional profits. Bearer shares are not allowed, and financial statements of IBCs are audited if total assets exceed BB $1 million. Barbados has bilateral tax treaties that eliminate or reduce double taxation with the UK, Canada, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Canada's treaty allows IBC and offshore banking profits to be repatriated to Canada tax-free after paying the 2.5 percent tax in Barbados.

In 1996, the United States and Barbados signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty. Both treaties were brought into force in 2000 by an exchange of instruments of ratification. Barbados is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Barbados is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOB needs to maintain strict control over vetting and licensing of offshore entities. The establishment of the AMLA should provide Barbados the necessary resources to enforce compliance by financial and commercial sectors, and enable it to fully cooperate with foreign authorities to investigate and prosecute money laundering and other financial crimes.

Belarus (Other). Money laundering does not seem to be a major problem in Belarus. However, Belarus has no anti-money laundering laws, and does not have in place significant laws, regulations, or other procedures to detect it. Banks are more inclined to focus on protecting the secrecy of their clients than on discovering and reporting irregular or unaccounted-for deposits. The growing number of casinos also could become venues for money laundering.

Belarus faces problems with organized crime that plague other countries of the former Soviet Union. The lack of anti-money laundering laws could lead organized crime to engage in more substantial money laundering in Belarus.

Belgium (Concern). Belgium's financial system is vulnerable to money laundering; approximately 60 percent of the suspicious transactions reports filed by Belgian financial institutions are related to drug trafficking. Illicit funds are laundered in Belgium through the diamond industry, real estate, front companies, gambling or amusement halls, currency exchange bureaus, international wire transfers, and banks. Belgium has a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime.

The Government of Belgium (GOB) in 1990 criminalized money laundering related to all crimes, and in 1993, passed additional legislation that mandated reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions and created a financial intelligence unit (FIU), Financial Information Processing Center (CTIF-CFI), to analyze them. As of June 2000, the CTIF-CFI had created 8,094 distinct case files since becoming operational in 1993, and 2,020 between July 1999 and June 2000. The CTIF-CFI is member of the Egmont Group.

Belgian financial institutions are required to maintain records on the identities of clients engaged in transactions that are considered suspicious, or that involve an amount equal to or greater than EUR 10,000 (approximately US $9,400). Financial institutions also are required to train their personnel in the detection and handling of suspicious transactions that could be linked to money laundering. No civil, penal, or disciplinary actions can be taken against institutions or individuals for reporting such transactions in good faith.

In 1998 and 1999, the GOB adopted legislation that mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions by notaries, accountants, bailiffs, real estate agents, casinos, cash transporters, external tax consultants, certified accountants, and certified accountant-tax experts. Casinos also are required to report certain other transactions.

The Judicial Police have primary responsibility for investigating money laundering in Belgium. However, the Gendarmerie also can investigate money laundering if the predicate offense is one over which the Gendarmerie has jurisdiction.

Belgium is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the European Union. Belgium is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Belgium has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States, which entered into force on January 1, 2000. The GOB exchanges information with other countries through international treaties and with foreign FIUs that have secrecy obligations similar to those of CTIF/CFI.

Belize (Concern). Belize is vulnerable to money laundering because of its growing offshore sector, which has two banks, an unknown number of international trusts, and over 16,000 international business companies (IBCs). Belize also has one Internet gaming site.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Belize's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Belize was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Belize's anti-money laundering regime:

Since criminalizing money laundering in 1996, Belize has generally pursued policies in law and regulation aimed at fostering a sound anti-money laundering regime. Belize has, nonetheless, certain deficiencies with regard to IBCs, particularly in the identification of beneficial owners and in ascertaining other information that could prove useful in protecting against criminal abuse of its offshore sector.

The International Business Companies Act of 1990 (Amended 1995) established a licensing system and a regulatory body, the International Financial Services Commission (IFSC), for Belize's offshore sector. The IFSC is comprised primarily of individuals with ties to the offshore industry. IBCs can no longer issue bearer shares, and the Government of Belize (GOB) reportedly is considering ways to abolish or immobilize bearer shares that are already in existence. IBC records are maintained by the Belize International Services Limited, a subsidiary of CHI Corporation, a company traded on the NASDAQ and formerly known as BHI Corporation. Offshore trusts are prevalent in Belize because they do not have to be registered with any regulatory body.

Belize's Offshore Banking Act (OBA), which regulates offshore banks, and the Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) have been in force since 1996. The MLPA criminalizes money laundering related to many serious crimes; mandates reporting of suspicious transactions by banks and non-bank financial institutions; specifies penalties for banks, non-bank financial institutions, and intermediaries who assist and collaborate in money laundering; and authorizes international cooperation in money laundering cases. The OBA and the Financial Institutions Act require financial institutions to report the identities of customers who engage in currency transactions of a large, complex, or unusual nature.

The Ministry of Finance has the authority to examine financial institutions' records. Financial institutions are required to retain records for a minimum of five years, and can lose their licenses and face a maximum fine of US $50,000 for failing to do so. Individual bankers can be held responsible if their institutions are caught laundering money. However, bankers can be protected from prosecution if they cooperate with law enforcement.

In 2000, the GOB reportedly issued the International Financial Services Commission (Licensing) Regulations 2000, which specifies licensing requirements for Belize's offshore financial services providers. Under the regulations, only lawyers, accountants, and companies registered under the Company Act as financial institutions would be eligible for such a license. The GOB has proposed draft legislation, the Customs Regulation Act, which would require individuals to declare cross-border movements of currency that exceed US $5,000.

The GOB has not prosecuted a single money laundering case under the MLPA, and in 2000, made no money laundering arrests. The GOB has an investigative unit within the National Criminal Investigation Branch that works with the central bank on financial cases.

Belize is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Belize is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. In August 2000, the GOB made a ministerial-level commitment to adhere to the minimum performance standards agreed to at the March 2000 UN Global Program Against Money Laundering. The United States and Belize have signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), but it is not yet in force.

The GOB should pass legislation that requires offshore trusts to be registered with a central authority. Moreover, the GOB should take appropriate steps to ensure that its oversight of IBCs is conducted free of undue influence from the industry.

Benin (Other). Benin is not a major financial center. However, Beninese officials believe their country is being used by narcotics traffickers to launder profits. Although the exact nature of money laundering is unknown, Beninese officials suspect that the primary method is through the purchase of assets such as real estate, the wholesale shipment of vehicles or items for resale, and front companies. In addition, some laundering seems to occur through the banking system.

A 1997 anti-narcotics law criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering, and provides penalties of up to 20 years in prison as well as substantial fines. The law requires that all financial institutions report transactions they believe may be narcotics-related; they enjoy safe harbor protection if they do so. Financial institutions that fail to comply are subject to prison terms for their officials and fines. However, the government has not taken any significant steps to address the problem of money laundering not related to narcotics trafficking.

Benin is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Bermuda (Other). Bermuda has a large offshore financial services sector that may be attractive to money laundering. However, the Government of Bermuda has taken a number of measures to aid in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of financial crimes. As with the other British Caribbean Overseas Territories, Bermuda underwent a thorough evaluation of its financial regulation in 2000, co-sponsored by the local and British governments.

Bermuda's offshore financial sector is dominated by its nearly 1,300 insurance (mainly captive and reinsurance) companies. The sector also has approximately 11,000 "exempt companies" (international business companies). The Bermuda Monetary Authority (BMA) is the main regulator and requires disclosure and vetting of proposed beneficial owners before registering exempt companies.

The Proceeds of Crime Act 1997 criminalizes money laundering related to all "relevant offenses," including drug trafficking, corruption, counterfeiting, and fraud. The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Regulations 1998 contain a number of obligations for regulated institutions, including customer identification, record keeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions. The government also issued guidance notes in 1998 to assist financial institutions to recognize suspicious transactions and comply with their obligations.

The Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), within the Bermuda Police Service, serves as Bermuda's financial intelligence unit. It receives, analyzes, and investigates suspicious activity report (SARs). Through the end of 1999, the unit had received approximately 2,400 SARs. The FIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

Bermuda is subject to the US/UK MLAT and the US/UK extradition treaty. Bermuda is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and through the UK, is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Bermuda is also a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS).

Continued supervision and enforcement of regulations in the financial sector are necessary to discourage infiltration by organized crime and money launderers. Bermuda should also consider devoting additional resources toward investigative efforts to combat money laundering to more thoroughly deter international criminals.

Bolivia (Concern). Bolivia is not major financial center, and does not have an offshore sector. However, Bolivia has had a long tradition of banking secrecy that has facilitated money laundering, particularly the profits of contraband smuggling, organized crime, and drug trafficking.

The Government of Bolivia (GOB) criminalized money laundering related to organized criminal activities and public corruption through the 1988 Controlled Substances Law (No. 1008) and Law 1768 of March 1997, which amended Bolivia's Penal Code. Law 1768 also authorized creation of the Financial Investigations Unit (FIU) within the Office of the Superintendent of Banks and Financial Institutions to be responsible for implementing anti-money laundering controls. Decree 24771 of July 1997 requires banks, brokerages, and insurance companies to identify their customers, retain records of transactions for a minimum of 10 years, and report unusual and suspicious financial transactions to the FIU. The FIU has established mechanisms for sharing information with Bolivia's Public Ministry and the Special Counter-Narcotics Force (FELCN). However, personnel shortages within the Public Ministry, law enforcement, and the FIU, as well as the FIU's inability to monitor the activities of certain financial institutions, have hindered full implementation and enforcement of Bolivia's anti-money laundering controls.

The FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Bolivia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Bolivia is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and is a member of the South America Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). The GOB and the United States in 1995 signed an extradition treaty, which entered into force in 1996.

The GOB is urged to extend provisions of its anti-money laundering legislation to cover all financial institutions and to ensure that anti-money laundering bodies are sufficiently staffed.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (Other). Bosnia and Herzegovina is neither a financial center nor a money-laundering center. Laundering the proceeds of criminal activity through financial institutions is widespread, although narcotics proceeds tend to be diverted outside Bosnia. Neither US currency nor proceeds of drug sales in the US are significantly involved. Bosnia is a significant consumer of and transit point for a variety of illegal goods traded on the black market and has experienced an alarming increase in alien smuggling, which is conservatively estimated to amount to US $50 million per year. Money laundering has not been criminalized, but is now prohibited in the civil code.

Regulatory supervision of the banking sector is largely vested at the local rather than the federal level through two separate but roughly parallel banking agencies. Although legislation generally reflects the Basle Committee's core principles, including suspicious transaction reporting and due diligence requirements, in practice banking standards do not conform to international norms, as recent bank failures have demonstrated. Some safe harbor protection has now been afforded to banking officials for actions taken in the course of their professional duties. However, Bosnia's laws remain an unwieldy combination of communist-era statutes and internationally imposed reforms. Enforcement is tenuous at best in this cash-based, largely unregulated economy, thereby creating widespread potential for financial crime.

In addition, ambiguous lines of responsibility among investigative and regulatory agencies have aggravated already rampant political interference in investigations and direct intimidation of officials.

Bosnia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Botswana (Other). Botswana is neither a major financial center nor a money-laundering center; it is, however, an offshore financial center. The Government of Botswana has enacted strict legislation against drug production and trafficking, as well as narcotics-related money laundering. The Bank of Botswana has the discretion to provide information on large currency transactions to law enforcement agencies.

Because of concerns that Botswana's status as an offshore financial center could increase its vulnerability to money laundering, regulations reportedly have been drafted that would regulate Botswana's International Financial Services Center (IFSC).

Botswanan officials have expressed interest in obtaining training to combat bank fraud and money laundering.

Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and is expected to sign the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group's Memorandum of Understanding in 2001.

Brazil (Primary). Money laundering that is related to drug trafficking and white-collar crime continues to occur in Brazil despite the Government of Brazil's (GOB) efforts to introduce regulatory and investigative measures to address the problem. A highly developed financial sector and an increasing problem with local drug consumption and trafficking have made Brazil a money-laundering center. In December 2000, a Brazilian Congressional Investigative Committee (CPI) probing narcotics trafficking released a 1,200-page report that detailed a vast network of drug-related organized crime, corruption, and money laundering. The report implicated over 800 people, including two federal congressmen, former state governors and other officials. The CPI estimates that approximately $50 billion is laundered in Brazil annually.

The GOB has a comprehensive anti-money laundering regulatory regime in place. Law 9613 of March 3, 1998 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking and other offenses, and penalizes offenders with a maximum of 16 years in prison. The law expanded the GOB's asset seizure and forfeiture provisions and exempts "good faith" compliance from criminal or civil prosecution.

The law also created the GOB's financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Council for the Control of Financial Activities (COAF), which is housed within the Ministry of Finance. The COAF includes representatives from regulatory and law enforcement agencies-including the central bank and Federal Police-and has a staff of 16 people with plans to expand to 22 in 2001. The COAF regulates those financial sectors not already under the jurisdiction of another supervising entity. In 1999, the COAF issued regulations that addressed real estate, factoring companies, gaming and lotteries, dealers in jewelry and precious metals, bingo, credit cards, commodities trading, and dealers in art and antiques. The regulations require customer identification, record keeping, and reporting of suspicious transactions directly to the COAF. In 2000 the COAF issued regulations slightly amending the bingo, lotteries, and gaming regulations.

As of October 2000, the COAF indicated that it had received, since its inception, 5,208 suspicious transactions reports (STRs), involving approximately 5 million reais (approximately US $2.5 million). Nearly 1000 of these reports were generated from bingo, leading the COAF to speculate that this sector may be experiencing the largest expansion in money-laundering activity. By the end of 2000, the COAF reported that it had received 6,673 STRs, leading to over 130 ongoing investigations and 100 prosecutions.

In 1999, the GOB's other regulatory bodies, the central bank, the Securities Commission (CVM), the Examiner of Private Insurance Companies (SUSEP), and the Office of Supplemental Pension Plans (PC), issued parallel regulations to covered institutions that spell out requirements for customer identification and reporting of suspicious transactions. All of these regulations include a list of guidelines that help institutions identify suspicious transactions. The central bank also established the DECIF (Departamento de Combate a Il�citos Cambiais e Financeiros) to implement anti-money laundering policy, receive suspicious activity reports from financial institutions, and forward information to the COAF. Current bank secrecy provisions, however, protect specific account information, and thus the COAF receives only partial information from the central bank. All other government agencies-except for congressional investigative committees-must get a court order to access detailed bank account and subject information. International requestors may only obtain this information through a letter rogatory. In early January 2001, however, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed into law a measure that will give all regulatory bodies direct access to complete banking information without court approval. However, some Brazilian legal scholars and legislators predict that the legislation will face judicial review that is likely to render it unconstitutional.

Regulations issued in 1998 require that individuals transporting more than 10,000 reais (approximately US $5,000) in cash, checks or traveler's checks across the Brazilian border must fill out a customs declaration that is sent to the central bank. Financial institutions remitting more than 10,000 reais (approximately US $5,000) also must make a declaration to the central bank.

In August 2000, Brazil hosted a summit of South American presidents; the agenda of which included signing a memorandum of understanding creating the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). In December 2000, Brazil and the other member countries of MERCOSUR signed an agreement outlining cooperation among central banks in money laundering investigations.

The GOB continues to investigate and prosecute large money laundering operations. A joint investigation by the Federal Police, the central bank, the Federal Revenue Office, and the COAF uncovered a network that allegedly laundered 30 billion reais (approximately US $15 billion) between 1998 and 1999. Most of the laundered funds were the proceeds of drug trafficking, and trafficking in weapons and goods. Illicit funds from several Brazilian states were sent primarily to Foz de Igua�u, a city near the border with Paraguay, where the launderers used exchange houses, more than 100 large companies, 300 "laranjas," (individuals who allow their names to be used for a fee), and special non-resident "CC-5" accounts to transfer the money abroad. The Federal Police-who are cooperating with international authorities to track down the funds-have made several arrests and secured over 300 indictments in the case.

The Brazilian press has reported extensively on the investigation of Judge Nicolau dos Santos Neto, who is accused of embezzling 169 million reais (approximately $85 million) in funds earmarked for construction of a city courthouse. Nicolau allegedly used a system of front companies in offshore havens to transfer money and buy property abroad, including the United States. Brazilian authorities have been working with foreign authorities to track down these assets, and thus far, have identified bank accounts in the United States and Switzerland-the latter totaling approximately $4 million-and an apartment in Miami worth approximately $1 million. In December, Judge Nicolau turned himself in to authorities and now awaits trial on charges of embezzlement, corruption, tax evasion, and money laundering.

The COAF has been a member of the Egmont Group since May 1999. In June 2000, Brazil became a full member of FATF. The GOB and the United States signed a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in October 1997. The Brazilian Congress approved this treaty in December 2000, and the treaty will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification. Brazil is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Brazil is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The GOB has bilateral information exchange agreements with Belgium, France, Paraguay, Portugal, Paraguay, and Spain.

Although the laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking and other crimes remains a major problem in Brazil, the GOB has taken important regulatory and investigative steps to address the problem. However, the GOB should ensure that all regulatory bodies have appropriate access to financial disclosure information. This would facilitate analysis, coordination, and cooperation among domestic and international authorities in their efforts to investigate and prosecute money laundering and other financial crimes.

British Virgin Islands (Concern). The British Virgin Islands (BVI) is a Caribbean Overseas Territory (COT) of the United Kingdom (UK). The BVI is vulnerable to money laundering because of an offshore sector that is one of the largest in the Caribbean. Financial services and tourism account for approximately 50 percent of the BVI's economy. The BVI's offshore sector offers incorporation and management of offshore companies, and provision of offshore financial and corporate services. The BVI has 13 banks (four of which are commercial), and approximately 1800 mutual funds, 140 captive insurance companies, 900 registered vessels, 90 licensed trust companies, and 360,000 international business companies (IBCs). Approximately 40 percent of the IBCs are resident in Hong Kong.

According to the International Business Companies Act of 1984, BVI-registered IBCs cannot engage in business with BVI residents, provide registered offices or agent facilities for BVI-incorporated companies, or own an interest in real property located in BVI, except for office leases. BVI's 90 registered agents are licensed by the Financial Services Unit (FSU), and are required to complete certification programs. Registered agents must verify the identities of their clients. The process for registering banks, trust companies, and insurers is governed by legislation that requires more detailed documentation such as a business plan and approval of the appropriate supervisor within the Financial Services Inspectorate.

The BVI criminalized drug money laundering through the Drug Trafficking Offences Act, 1987, amended 1990, and the Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act, 1993. The Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Act, 1997 expanded predicate offenses for money laundering to all criminal conduct, and created a financial intelligence unit, the Reporting Authority-BVI (RA-BVI), which is a member of the Egmont Group. The Financial Investigations Unit (FIU) is responsible for investigating fraud and money laundering cases, and is comprised of three police officers. Most of its investigations have involved IBCs and other offshore entities.

The Anti-Money Laundering Code of Practice (AMLCP), 1999 establishes procedures to identify and report suspicious transactions. The AMLCP requires covered entities to create a clearly defined reporting chain for employees to follow when reporting suspicious transactions, and to appoint a reporting officer to receive these reports. The reporting officer must conduct an initial inquiry into the suspicious transaction and report it to the authorities if sufficient suspicion remains. Failure to report could result in criminal liability. The FIU reportedly reviews approximately 30 suspicious transaction report (STRs) annually. In 1999, the FIU conducted 278 company inquiries, and in 2000, conducted approximately 1200. None of these queries has resulted in prosecutions. To date, the BVI has prosecuted only one money laundering case.

The Joint Anti-Money Laundering Coordinating Committee (JAMLCC) was established in 1999 to coordinate all the BVI's anti-money laundering initiatives. It is a broad-based, multi-disciplinary body comprised of private and public sector representatives. The JAMLCC has drafted Guidance Notes based on those of the UK and Guernsey.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed BVI's anti-money laundering regime against 25 criteria. The FATF did not identify the BVI as a noncooperative jurisdiction in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF raised certain issues in its June 2000 report:

The BVI allows certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identify of the customer. In addition, the BVI allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the customer. The banks and the financial institutions are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution.

The BVI also has a large number of IBCs, the formation of which by intermediaries is subject to fewer identification requirements than applied to the company sector as a whole.

In 2000, the BVI passed the Criminal Justice (International Cooperation) (Amendment) Act, 2000, criminalizing the act of acquiring, using, or possessing drug proceeds, and "tipping off" individuals under investigation. The BVI also has proposed the Code of Conduct (Service Providers) Act (CCSPA) and the Information Assistance (Financial Services) Act (IAFSA). The CCSPA would encourage professionalism, enhance measures to deter criminal activity, promote ethical conduct, and encourage greater self-regulation in the financial sector. The CCSPA also would establish the Council of Service Providers, a body that would regulate the conduct of individuals within the financial services industry. The Council also would formulate policy, procedures, and other measures to regulate the industry, advise the government on legislation and policy matters, and monitor compliance within the industry. The IAFSA would increase the scope of cooperation between BVI's regulators and regulators from other countries.

The BVI is a member of Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and, through the UK, is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The BVI is subject to the US/UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.

The BVI should fully implement and enforce all provisions of its recently passed legislation. The BVI also is urged to eliminate any legal and regulatory impediments to international cooperation and exchange of information.

Brunei (Other). Brunei is not known to be a money-laundering center. It is however, an offshore financial center. The Government of Brunei has drafted anti-money laundering legislation and has evinced a strong interest in learning about methods to combat money laundering. Although Brunei has asset forfeiture laws they have not yet been applied to narcotics-related cases. Brunei's Narcotics Control Board has taken part in courses offered by ILEA in Bangkok, and recently attended a money-laundering seminar hosted by DEA in Singapore.

Earlier this year, the Sultanate of Brunei brought into effect a series of laws that established the International Financial Center: the International Business Companies Order 2000; the International Banking Order 2000; the Registered Agents and Trustees Licensing Order 2000; the International Trusts Order 2000; and the International Limited Partnerships Order.

This new offshore financial services center will offer banking services, provide for the formation of IBCs, trusts and limited partnerships. Supervisory authority is reportedly vested in a separate unit of the Ministry of Finance-referred to simply as the "Authority." Reports indicate that this entity, however, will combine both regulatory and marketing responsibilities.

Brunei is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Brunei is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

Bulgaria (Concern). Bulgaria, particularly its financial system, is vulnerable to money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and financial crimes such as bank and corporate fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, tax fraud, and the illegal conversion of state-owned property. The proceeds of drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, vehicle theft, alien smuggling, prostitution, and extortion also are laundered in Bulgaria. The source and destination for much of the illicit funds include Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Turkey, and the Middle East. The presence of organized criminal groups and official corruption contribute to Bulgaria's money laundering problem. Small-scale change bureaus also may play a role. The Government of Bulgaria (GOB) has declared the eradication of organized crime, corruption, and money laundering a national priority.

Bulgaria's anti-money laundering legislation, the Law on Measures Against Money Laundering, entered into force in July 1998. Money laundering is criminalized by Articles 253 and 253a of the Bulgarian Criminal Code; the law applies to the proceeds of all serious crimes. Anti-money laundering measures include customer identification and record keeping requirements, suspicious transaction reporting, and internal rules for financial institutions on implementation of an anti-money laundering program. Banks, securities brokers, auditors, accountants, insurance companies, investment companies, and other businesses are subject to these reporting requirements. Bank information can be obtained by law enforcement through a court order and an instruction from the prosecutor general. The money laundering legislation does not apply to casinos, which are an increasingly important mechanism for laundering money in Bulgaria.

The Ministry of Finance's Bureau of Financial Intelligence (BFI) is Bulgaria's financial intelligence unit. Since its establishment, the BFI has suspended 21 suspicious funds transfers to foreign banks, and has opened seven money-laundering investigations.

The GOB is considering legislation that would address forfeiture and seizure of criminal assets, allow indictment of legal persons on money laundering charges, and prohibit funds of dubious or criminal origin from being used in the acquisition of banks and businesses through the privatization process.

Bulgaria is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the COE's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In November 1999, Bulgaria underwent a mutual evaluation by the PC-R-EV, and has been implementing changes to its anti-money laundering regime based on recommendations in the group's report. Bulgaria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Bulgaria has no bilateral agreements on money laundering.

The GOB is urged to further strengthen its anti-money laundering regime through approval and full implementation of proposed measures that would address seizure and forfeiture of criminal assets; allow indictment of legal persons on money laundering charges; and prohibit funds of dubious or criminal origin from being used in the acquisition of banks and businesses through the privatization process.

Burma (Primary). Burma's economy continues to be vulnerable to drug money laundering because of its under-regulated financial system, weak anti-money laundering regime, and policies that facilitate the funneling of drug money into commercial enterprises and infrastructure investment.

Political and economic constraints on the flow of legitimate capital into Burma have increased the importance of narcotics-derived funds to the Burmese economy. As a result of cease-fire agreements, the Government of Burma (GOB) has encouraged former insurgent groups to invest money into legitimate commercial ventures. This policy has the effect of facilitating the laundering of illegal drug proceeds by some of the former insurgent groups through investments in banks, hotels, and construction companies. Businesses owned by family members of former or present drug traffickers also have invested heavily in infrastructure projects such as roads and port facilities, banks, hotels, casinos, and other real estate development projects.

In 1993, the GOB adopted the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Law. This law criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering and allows for seizure of assets that are derived from the drug trade. The GOB has been slow to implement provisions of this law, and has targeted few, if any, traffickers or their assets. GOB officials admit to having difficulty in implementing provisions related to money laundering because of their lack of expertise in money laundering and financial crimes investigations. The GOB reportedly is drafting new anti-money laundering legislation that would address deficiencies in its present legislation.

Burma does not have a financial intelligence unit, and is not active in international or regional anti-money laundering fora. Burma is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Burma is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GOB has bilateral drug control agreements with India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Russia, Laos, and the Philippines. It is not known whether these agreements cover cooperation on money laundering issues.

Burma must increase the regulation and oversight of its banking system, and end policies that facilitate the investment of drug money into the legitimate economy. Burma also should step up efforts to enforce existing money laundering legislation by investigating and prosecuting money launderers. Moreover, Burma is urged to pass new legislation that would expand predicate crimes for money laundering and provide additional tools to authorities for the detection and prosecution of money laundering.

Cambodia (Concern). Cambodia is not a major financial center, and does not have an offshore sector. Cambodia is vulnerable to money laundering because it is a transit country for heroin trafficking from the Golden Triangle. Crime, corruption, and money laundering reportedly are on the increase in Cambodia.

Cambodia in 1996 criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking through the Law on Drug Control. The law includes provisions for customer identification, suspicious transaction reporting, and the creation of the Anti-Money Laundering Commission (AMLC) under the Prime Minister's Office. The composition and functions of the AMLC were to be promulgated through a separate decree. The provisions of this law have yet to be fully implemented and enforced.

In December 1999, Cambodia passed legislation, "The Law on Banking and Financial Institutions," that imposed capital and prudential requirements on financial institutions. Capital requirements for commercial banks will increase from US $5 million to US $13.5 million. Commercial banks also must maintain 20 percent of their capital on deposit with the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) as reserves. The law required the NBC to review all banking licenses within one year. Only four banks-all foreign-owned-have received licenses under the new law. An additional 15 banks will have a one-year grace period to meet licensing requirements.

Money laundering offenses are investigated by the same entities that have jurisdiction over the underlying predicate crimes. However, these entities are not trained to detect, investigate, and prosecute money laundering cases.

Cambodia has assisted neighboring countries with money laundering investigations. Cambodia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The Government of Cambodia (GOC) should fully implement and enforce its anti-money laundering legislation. Moreover, the GOC should better educate officials and financial institutions about anti-money laundering methods.

Cameroon (Other). Cameroon is not a regional financial center. Although illicit drugs transit Cameroon, there is no information indicating significant money-laundering activity. Cameroon's banking system is supervised by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC), a regional central bank that serves six countries of Central Africa.

In November 2000, Cameroon and the BEAC hosted a conference for BEAC member countries to devise joint structures and legal strategies for fighting money laundering.

Cameroon has not criminalized money laundering.

Cameroon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Canada (Primary). Canada is neither a regional nor an offshore financial center. However, Canada remains vulnerable to money laundering because of its advanced financial services sector and heavy cross-border flow of currency and monetary instruments. Canada has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. Canada's financial institutions have been used to launder the proceeds of Latin American and Asian drug trafficking, and Asian organized crime. As a result of the common border between our two countries, strong and effective anti-money laundering enforcement is essential. The US Government is particularly concerned about the cross-border movements of currency.

The Government of Canada (GOC) continues to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime. In July 2000, the GOC passed the Proceeds of Money Laundering Control Act (PMLCA), which adopted enhancements recommended by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1999. The full effectiveness of this new legislation will not be known, however, until strong implementing regulations are put into place and enforced.

The PMLCA established the Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis Center (FinTRAC) on July 5, 2000. Under implementing regulations, FinTRAC will collect and analyze suspicious activities reports (SARs) from financial institutions and financial intermediaries, and determine which suspicious transactions merit further investigation. In addition, money service businesses, casinos, lawyers, and accountants handling third-party transactions are required to file SARs. The GOC expects that FinTRAC will be fully operational by mid-2001. The GOC presently is identifying managers and other staff for FinTRAC, and purchasing computer hardware and software. The GOC intends to have FinTRAC recognized by the Egmont Group as a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). FinTRAC will have the authority to negotiate and set guidelines for sharing information with foreign counterparts. US law enforcement has expressed concerns that there may be legal impediments restricting FinTRAC's ability to share information. The PMLCA also mandates reporting of cross-border movements of currency or monetary instruments as will be defined in implementing regulations.

Canada is a member of the FATF, and underwent a second FATF mutual evaluation in May 1997. Canada is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Canada also participates in the CFATF as a Cooperating and Supporting Nation. Canada is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Canada has long-standing agreements with the United States on law enforcement cooperation, including treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. Canada is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOC should ensure that the FinTRAC meets Egmont standards for FIUs, especially with regard to sharing information with other FIUs. The GOC also is urged to adopt and fully implement regulations that define cross-border currency reporting requirements.

Cayman Islands (Primary). The Cayman Islands, a United Kingdom (UK) Caribbean Overseas Territory (COT), remains vulnerable to money laundering because of its significant offshore sector that provides a wide range of services such as private banking, brokerage services, mutual funds, various types of trusts as well as company formation and company management. In March 2000, Cayman Islands authorities reported that approximately 570 banks and trust companies, 2,238 mutual funds, and 499 captive insurance companies were licensed in the Cayman Islands.

In addition, approximately 45,000 offshore companies are registered in the Cayman Islands.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified the Cayman Islands as non-cooperative in international efforts to fight money laundering. The FATF in its report cited several concerns:

The Cayman Islands does not have any legal requirements for customer identification and record keeping. Even if in the absence of a mandatory requirement, financial institutions were to identify their customers, supervisory authorities cannot, as a matter of law, readily access information regarding the identity of customers. Moreover, the supervisory authority places too much reliance on home country supervisors' assessment of management of bank branches.

Although the Cayman Islands has criminalized the laundering of the proceeds of all serious crimes and its system encourages reporting of suspicious transactions (by providing a safe harbor from criminal liability for those who report), it lacks a mandatory regime for the reporting of suspicious transactions. Moreover, a large class of management companies-including those providing nominee shareholders for the purpose of formation of a company or holding the issued capital of a company-is unregulated.

At the same time, the Cayman Islands has been a leader in developing anti-money laundering programs throughout the Caribbean region. It has served as president of CFATF, and it has provided substantial assistance to neighboring states in the region. It has demonstrated co-operation on criminal law enforcement matters, and uncovered several serious cases of fraud and money laundering otherwise unknown to authorities in FATF member states. In addition, it has closed several financial institutions on the basis of concerns about money laundering.

In July 2000, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them to pay special attention to give "enhanced scrutiny for certain transactions or banking relationships" involving the Cayman Islands.

In 1999, the Cayman Islands and the other UK COTs agreed to undergo a comprehensive review of their financial regulation, and implement recommended changes. The results of this review were published in October 2000 and indicate that although the Cayman Islands has made progress, its current regulatory structure was still not fully in accordance with international standards. The primary recommendations of the report were:

* Full operational independence for the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority.

* Improved supervision of the Cayman Islands Stock Exchange.

* Increased on-site visits by banking regulators.

* Improved supervisory process of company service and trust service providers.

* Strengthened regulation of partnerships.

* Improved international cooperation.

* Enhancements to the Misuse of Drugs Law.

* A review of the Code of Practice to ensure that it takes account of the Money Laundering Regulations 2000.

The report also stressed the importance of addressing bearer shares, and noted that the Cayman Islands in 2001 plans to introduce legislation that would immobilize bearer shares. The report lauded the Cayman Islands' efforts to date in strengthening its anti-money laundering regime.

In 2000, the Cayman Islands approved regulations and legislation that were intended to address deficiencies in it anti-money laundering regime. Regulations that entered into force in September 2000 specified record keeping and customer identification requirements for financial institutions. The regulations specifically cover individuals who establish a new business relationship, engage in a one-time transaction over Cayman Islands (CI) $15,000, or may be engaging in money laundering. The customer identification requirements do not apply to existing accounts with financial intermediaries.

Amendments to the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (PCCL) make failure to report a suspicious transaction a criminal offense that could result in fines or imprisonment. The law does not specify a time frame in which suspicious transaction reports must be made, but instead, states that the transaction should be reported within a "reasonably practicable" timeframe once it comes to the person's attention.

Amendments to the Monetary Authority Law (MAL) grant the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority (CIMA) the power to obtain information from a person regulated under the laws of the Cayman Islands, a connected person, or a person reasonably believed to have information relevant to an inquiry by CIMA. The amendment includes provisions for identification of account holders and beneficial owners. However, CIMA can only obtain information about the identity of a client through a court order, which hinders CIMA's ability to detect, investigate, and take action against money laundering and the underlying offense. Further amendments to the MAL grant CIMA the authority to assist certain overseas regulators by sharing information in its files and obtaining client and other information from regulated and unregulated persons. CIMA's assistance is limited to overseas regulatory authorities that have the same functions as CIMA or those authorities "as may be specified in regulations" that have yet to be promulgated.

Also in 2000, the Cayman Islands passed the Banks and Trust Companies (Amendment) (Access to Information) Law, 2000, and the Companies Management (Amendment) (Access to Information) Law, 2000.

The Cayman Islands published a non-binding money laundering Code of Practice pursuant to Section 20 of the Proceeds of Criminal Conduct Law (1999 Revision) to coincide with its hosting of the UN Offshore Plenary Forum of International Money Laundering. The Code of Practice is intended to give Cayman Islands financial service providers guidance about preventing and detecting money laundering. The code outlines procedures for identifying clients, training staff, documenting evidence, and maintaining records consistent with international standards. However, the Code does not create a legal obligation; therefore, failure to comply with its provisions does not constitute a legal offense.

The Cayman Islands cooperates with US law enforcement in money laundering cases. In 1999, the Cayman Islands did not prosecute anyone for money laundering; however, it did arrest several individuals on suspicion of money laundering.

The Cayman Islands, through the UK, is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The Cayman Islands is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS). In addition, there is a 1986 US-UK Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) covering the Cayman Islands.

The Cayman Islands has made progress toward strengthening its anti-money laundering regime, and is urged to fully address all deficiencies that have been identified in its anti-money laundering regime. In particular, the Cayman Islands should follow through on its stated plans to immobilize bearer shares.

Chile (Concern). Chile has a well-developed financial sector, but is not considered a major regional financial center. Chile does not have an offshore sector. Chile continues to be vulnerable to money laundering because it lacks key legal provisions that aid in the prevention and detection of money laundering. According to press reports in April 2000, a Chilean Senate Finance Committee estimated that approximately US $10 billion is laundered annually through Chile. Money launderers reportedly exploit Chilean banks, commodities brokerages, and currency exchange businesses. Moreover, large real estate projects and casinos also are vulnerable to money laundering.

In 1995, Chile criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking through the Counternarcotics Law. The law allows banks to voluntarily report suspicious or unusual financial transactions. However, the legislation has no "safe harbor" provisions that protect banks from potential civil or criminal liability. As a result, reporting of such transactions has been extremely low. Moreover, the legislation does not require reporting of large currency transactions. In December 1999, the Government of Chile (GOC) proposed legislation that would amend the Counternarcotics Law by mandating reporting of suspicious financial transactions, and creating a new financial intelligence unit to replace the existing FIU. However, the proposed legislation would not expand predicate crimes for money laundering. The Chilean Congress has not approved the legislation.

Chile's Judicial Reform Law of 1997 gives both the Council for the Defence of the State (CDE) and the Public Ministry responsibility for investigating money laundering cases. This joint arrangement will continue for at least two years. The pending amendments to the Counternarcotics Law would give the Public Ministry sole responsibility for implementing the new law when it is promulgated.

Chile is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Chile is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the newly created South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD). Chile's current financial intelligence unit, the Departmento de Control de Trafico Ilicito de Estupefacientes, is a member of the Egmont Group.

In August 2000, Chile and the United States signed an agreement for cooperation and mutual assistance in narcotics-related matters. Chile has similar agreements in force with the United Kingdom, Spain, and the Czech Republic. Bilateral agreement negotiations are underway with France, Germany, Russia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, Turkey, Tunisia, Guatemala, and Honduras.

The GOC is urged to pass anti-money laundering legislation that would mandate reporting of both suspicious and large currency transactions by financial institutions, provide "safe harbor" protections to entities that report such transactions, and expand predicate offenses for money laundering to include all serious crimes. Moreover, the COG should ensure that its FIU has the authority and resources necessary to make it an effective force against money laundering, and that it can readily share information with international counterparts.

China, People's Republic of (Primary). In response to the growing threat of money laundering, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has begun to focus greater attention on improving the country's anti-money laundering regime. The State Council (Cabinet) has directed various government agencies to examine their current anti-money laundering measures and to draft new regulations for the commercial banking, regulatory, and enforcement sectors. The government views an enhanced anti-money laundering regime as a means to stem the rise in financial crime and corruption. Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, extortion, alien smuggling, and the counterfeiting of currency and goods remain major sources of illegal proceeds in the PRC. Foreign and domestic organized criminal activity, endemic corruption at the provincial and local levels, and the continued presence of anonymous bank accounts contribute to the PRC's money-laundering problem.

The PRC's efforts to address money laundering began in 1990, when the National People's Congress (NPC) adopted the country's first law criminalizing narcotics-related money laundering and allowed the confiscation of narcotics proceeds. In 1997, the NPC adopted the PRC's current Criminal Code, Article 191, which makes it a crime to launder the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, organized criminal activity, and smuggling. Efforts are underway to draft amendments to the Code that would expand the definition of predicate offenses for money laundering to include the proceeds of all criminal activity. In addition to Article 191, Article 312 of the Criminal Code criminalizes complicity in concealing the proceeds of criminal activity.

As in many civil law-based countries, the PRC charges each offense separately, and defendants who have laundered the proceeds of a predicate crime usually are prosecuted for the predicate offense rather than money laundering because the predicate offense generally carries a heavier penalty and is easier to prove. The sentences handed down by tribunals in 2000 illustrate the severity of punishment. Several dozen senior officials at both the national and provincial levels were sentenced to death for corruption and smuggling.

The PRC took additional steps in 2000 to combat money laundering. In April 2000, the PRC passed a statute that requires anyone opening a new bank account to do so in his or her true name. When opening or depositing money into a new account, the customer must produce an identification card to verify his or her identity. Existing anonymous accounts may remain open for five years from the time of the account's establishment. After five years, the account holder must re-register the account in his or her true name only. Anonymous accounts will be phased out in 2005.

The People's Bank of China (PBOC)--China's central bank--has issued internal regulations that require currency transaction reports for all transactions involving Renminbi (RMB) 50,000 (US $6,000) or more. The PBOC also has issued rules concerning the recording and reporting of currency transactions at the county level, as well as a circular to Chinese banks regarding the reporting of suspicious transactions. Withdrawals of RMB 200,000 (US $24,000), deposits of RMB one million (US $120,000), or a series of aggregate transactions totaling RMB one million must be reported to the PBOC. At the county level, withdrawals of RMB 50,000 (US $6,000) require picture identification. However, central bank supervisors do not verify compliance with these rules.

In addition, the PRC has foreign currency exchange controls. Commercial banks require PRC citizens to justify the exchange of RMB into a foreign currency. The maximum amount of foreign currency that a PRC citizen may take out of the PRC is US $2,000. For foreigners, the threshold is US $5,000. Requests for exchanges of currency above these thresholds require advance certification through documentation of the need for the foreign currency, such as for foreign travel or commerce.

The United States and the PRC continue to discuss cooperation on money laundering and other law enforcement topics under the auspices of the US-PRC Joint Liaison Group (JLG) on law enforcement cooperation. The last JLG meeting took place in June 2000 in Beijing. In 2000, US enforcement and regulatory agencies hosted several law enforcement delegations from China to discuss money laundering and financial crimes. In addition, the US Departments of Treasury and Justice conducted various training seminars in the PRC featuring the enforcement and prosecutorial aspects of money laundering.

In October 2000, an interagency US Government team visited the PRC to assess the need for training to help PRC authorities combat money laundering. The team will make recommendations on future training.

The United States and the PRC in June 2000 signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA), which contains general obligations to cooperate in criminal matters. The agreement is not yet in force. The PRC is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The PRC is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

As the PRC examines ways to enhance its anti-money laundering regime, consideration should be given to criminalizing money laundering for all serious crimes, and abolishing anonymous accounts prior to 2005. The PRC also should adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that establishes appropriate mechanisms for prevention, detection, and enforcement.

Colombia (Primary). Colombia has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. As the world's largest production and distribution source for cocaine and a significant supplier of heroin to the United States, Colombia has a natural vulnerability to drug money laundering. Pervasive commercial smuggling for tax and import duty avoidance, arms trafficking related to violent paramilitary groups and guerrilla organizations, along with continued capital flight from Colombia's fragile economy, are among additional factors that exacerbate the money laundering threat in Colombia. Trade-based money laundering, such as the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), through which money launderers furnish narcotics-generated dollars in the United States to commercial smugglers, travel agents, investors and others in exchange for Colombian Pesos in Colombia, is a prominent method for laundering narcotics proceeds. Colombia also appears to be a significant destination and transit location for bulk shipment of narcotics-related United States currency, while the use of wire remitters and transactions involving precious metals and stones are believed to play significant roles in drug money laundering through Colombia. Smart cards and other financial sector technology represent growing challenges to money laundering enforcement in Colombia.

Although important reforms are needed to enhance law enforcement efforts, Colombia has significant legal authority to combat money laundering. Colombia has criminalized the laundering of the proceeds of extortion, illicit enrichment, rebellion, and drug trafficking. Colombia's 1996 extinction of domain forfeiture legislation provides for criminal forfeiture of drug money laundering proceeds, in rem forfeiture when assets are held in the name of a nominee or have been transferred, and forfeiture of substitute assets. Originally created by executive decree in 1998, Colombia formally adopted legislation in 1999 to establish a unified central Financial Information and Analysis Unit (UIAF) within the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit with broad authority to access and analyze financial information from public and private entities in Colombia. Additional forfeiture authority in criminal prosecutions is more generally available elsewhere in the Colombian criminal code.

In addition, the Superintendency of Banks has instituted "know your customer" regulations for the entities it regulates, including banks, insurance companies, trust companies, insurance agents and brokers, and leasing companies. Among other things, the Superintendency of Banks also has authority to rescind licenses for wire remitters. As a result of regulations issued in 2000, the Superintendency of Securities, which oversees Colombia's three stock exchanges, also will soon begin instituting anti-money laundering compliance procedures. However, the Colombian central bank's new External Resolution No. 8 issued in May 2000 relaxed certain requirements on individuals conducting currency exchange services, enabling them simply to identify this service when registering their business but eliminating the need for them to become fully licensed. Financial institutions and wire remitters are required to file suspicious activity reports, while currency transactions and cross-border movements of currency in excess of US $10,000 must also be reported. In addition, casas de cambio must file currency reports for transactions involving US $700 or more, while wire remitters must pay withdrawals over US $3000 by check.

The Prosecutor General's office established a specialized task force unit of agents and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute money laundering cases and forfeiture actions under the 1996 Extinction of Domain statute. Recent reductions in the rate of turnover among members of the unit may bring some stability to the office and increase its effectiveness. Including convictions under prior offenses of criminal reception and illicit enrichment, this unit has obtained criminal sentences in 33 money laundering related cases and has more than 200 active cases pending. Colombian authorities have seized more than 10,000 properties in more than 250 forfeiture actions, although Colombia has obtained forfeiture judgments in just twelve cases.

The UIAF receives an average of 500 suspicious activity reports (SARs) per month, totaling nearly 15,000 received since December of 1998. However, only thirteen of these SARs have been forwarded to the Prosecutor General's office for enforcement and only a handful of those forwarded have been accepted for further investigation or prosecution.

Colombia played a significant role in multilateral efforts to combat money laundering in 2000. In December, Colombia was the host of the inaugural meeting of GAFISUD, a South American regional anti-money laundering organization modeled after the Financial Action Task Force. Colombia also participated in a multilateral initiative with the Governments of the United States, Venezuela, Panama, and Aruba designed to address the problem of trade-based money laundering through the BMPE among the participating countries. In addition, in 2000 Colombia's UIAF became a new member of the Egmont Group.

During 2000, the United States and Colombia have continued to expand bilateral cooperation against money laundering. Among the eleven Colombian citizens extradited to the United States in 2000 were two wanted on money laundering charges. An additional seven persons indicted on money laundering charges were provisionally arrested in Colombia pursuant to United States requests for extradition. Colombia has also provided important continuing assistance to United States civil forfeiture actions against accounts in Colombia restrained in 1998 and 1999 in response to United States formal requests for assistance in Operations Juno and Casablanca. Colombia's Tax and Customs Directorate (DIAN) also provided valuable case-related assistance and training to United States prosecutors and agents in 2000.

In 2000, Colombia adopted a new criminal and criminal procedure code. These measures expand money laundering predicates to include conspiracy and corruption. However, this legislation, which does not come into effect until June of 2001, is under constitutional challenge. Additional legislation still pending would permit the disclosure of tax information to law enforcement for criminal investigation purposes.

The United States' July, 2000 appropriations in support of Plan Colombia are anticipated to provide meaningful assistance for money laundering and forfeiture prosecutions in 2001. These funds are expected to provide significant training and equipment investments for the Office of the Prosecutor General, the UIAF, the asset management program of the National Drug Directorate (DNE), and DIAN, among other things.

Colombia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Colombia is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The United States and Colombia have signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty but it is not yet in force.

Colombia has established a comprehensive legal and regulatory program and has demonstrated an international commitment to combat money laundering. The Government of Colombia (GOC) should ensure that judges and prosecutors are adequately trained in order to fully enforce Colombia's anti-money laundering laws. The GOC also is urged to improve coordination among its law enforcement agencies by clarifying ambiguous lines of authority with respect to the sharing of information. The GOC should also undertake measures to improve its ability to successfully prosecute the predicate offenses for money laundering.

Cook Islands (Concern). The Cook Islands is a self-governing group of islands in the South Pacific that maintains a free association with New Zealand. Cook Islanders are citizens of New Zealand and are part of the British Commonwealth. The Cook Islands is vulnerable to money laundering because of an offshore sector that offers banking, insurance, international trusts, and formation of international companies, (the equivalent of international business companies, IBCs ). Marketers of offshore services on the Internet promote the Cook Islands as a favored jurisdiction for establishing asset protection trusts.

The International Companies Act of 1981 (amended 1982) allows formation of IBCs. It permits issuance of bearer shares, marketing of shelf companies, and prohibits public access to registers of corporate directors or managers or the disclosure of beneficial owners. This legislation is substantially similar to legislation that was enacted by Samoa and is based on a British Commonwealth and South Pacific Forum model. A corporation must grant prior approval before its records in the Companies Office Registry can be examined. Corporate entities may be listed as officers and shareholders of companies-except for companies engaged in banking and insurance, unless specifically licensed to do so-because corporations have the legal powers of a natural person. Corporate directors are not required to be residents. However, companies must maintain in the Cook Islands a registered office and company secretary. Companies must file annual returns, but are not required to have their accounts audited.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) listed the Cook Islands as a non-cooperative jurisdiction in the international fight against money laundering. FATF in its report noted:

In particular, the government has no relevant information on approximately 1,200 international companies that it has registered. The country has also licensed seven offshore banks that can take deposits from the public but are not required to identify customers and keep their records. Its excessive secrecy provisions guard against the disclosure of relevant information on those international companies as well as bank records.

During the FATF review process, the government expressed its intention to propose to the Parliament, before October 2000, two bills which would criminalize money laundering and establish a suspicious transaction reporting system with a financial intelligence unit (FIU). However, the authorities indicated that those bills would not likely introduce a customer identification requirement, nor would they relax the excessive secrecy provisions.

Following the FATF non-cooperative countries and territories exercise, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving the Cook Islands.

In August 2000, the Government of the Cook Islands (GOCI) passed legislation, the Money Laundering Prevention Act 2000 (MLPA), that criminalizes all money laundering; creates an FIU; mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions; and defines records retention and customer identification requirements for financial institutions. Money laundering is defined by the Act as engaging directly or indirectly in a transaction that involves the proceeds of crime; or receiving proceeds of a crime, including property that may be co-mingled with the proceeds of crime. Penalties for money laundering include a maximum fine of New Zealand $20,000 (approximately US $8,600) and maximum prison sentence of five years.

The MLPA imposes certain reporting obligations on financial institutions such as banks, offshore banking businesses, offshore insurance businesses, casinos, and gambling services. Financial institutions are required to report transactions if there is reasonable cause to suspect that the transaction involves the proceeds of a crime. Financial institutions are required to maintain for a minimum of five years all records that are related to the opening of accounts, and business transactions that exceed NZ $30,000 (approximately US $12,900). The records must include sufficient documentary evidence to prove the identity of the customer. Financial institutions are required to develop procedures to audit their compliance with these provisions.

The MLPA establishes a Money Laundering Authority (MLA) that is comprised of the financial secretary, the commissioner for offshore financial services, and the commissioner of the police. The MLA currently constitutes the financial intelligence unit. The MLA receives suspicious transactions reports; sends reports to the solicitor general when money laundering is suspected; instructs financial institutions to cooperate with investigations; compiles statistics and records for use by domestic and international regulatory and law enforcement; issues guidelines to financial institutions; and creates and provides to financial institutions training on record keeping and reporting requirements. The MLPA also requires that individuals declare cross-border movements of currency or negotiable securities greater than the equivalent of NZ $10,000 (approximately US $4,300) to a police, customs, or immigration officer. Failure to declare cross-border movements of currency or negotiable instruments can result in a maximum fine of NZ $1,000 (approximately US $430) and a maximum prison sentence of one year.

The Cooks Islands has also drafted regulations (The Money Laundering Prevention Regulations 2000) which specify the documentation required for satisfactory customer identification, details to be included in suspicious transaction reports (STRs) and time lines for filing STRs. These had yet to come into legal effect by year's end.

The Offshore Industry (Criminal Provisions) Act 1995-96 requires officers and employees of the Cook Islands' six trustee companies to report to the Cook Islands Commissioner for Offshore Financial Services (COFS) suspicious activities related to narcotics trafficking or transactions where there is actual knowledge that a serious crime has been committed. Trustee companies must provide information to the COFS to substantiate their suspicions. The COFS can petition the High Court to rescind the license of or strike from the corporate register offshore entities found to be involved in such crimes. Moreover, the High Court also may dispose of the assets of the business entity.

The MLPA authorizes the MLA to cooperate with foreign governments that have entered into bilateral or multilateral mutual assistance arrangements with the GOCI. However, Section 21 of the MLPA makes provision for ad hoc requests, granting the Minister of Finance the power to approve cooperation with a foreign government without an agreement in place. Money laundering is an extraditable offense.

The Cook Islands is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. The Cook Islands is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOCI should fully implement and enforce the provisions of the recently passed MLPA. Moreover, the GOCI should eliminate excessive bank and corporate secrecy provisions, and expand oversight of the offshore sector.

Costa Rica (Concern). Costa Rica is vulnerable to money laundering because of increased drug trafficking in the region and a lack of stringent regulatory and supervisory controls for its offshore sector. Anecdotal information suggests that Costa Rica's financial institutions, currency-exchange businesses, casinos, and real estate market have been used to launder money.

Costa Rica's domestic banking sector is comprised of approximately 25 banks, 15 finance companies, and 27 savings and loan institutions, and is supervised by the General Superintendent of Financial Entities (SUGEF). Low taxes and strong secrecy laws have created in recent years a growing offshore sector that offers banking services, and corporate and trust formation. The central bank must approve applications for offshore banks. Costa Rica has approximately 20 foreign financial institutions and 24 offshore branches of domestic financial institutions. Foreign banks must adhere to regulations established by their parent banks, but are not subject to effective local supervision. Foreign offshore banks are required only to provide monthly balance statements and year-end audited statements to the SUGEF. Nonresidents can hold US dollar bank accounts. Although Costa Rica does not allow bearer shares, secrecy provisions can prevent access to ownership information of corporations. Trusts also can be shareholders of corporations. This arrangement provides tax advantages and additional secrecy.

Costa Rica's telecommunications system, lax regulatory regime, and an abundance of English speakers have made it a haven for Internet gaming companies. The number of Internet gaming licenses issued by Costa Rica has increased from three to 70 in the span of three years.

Law No. 7786 on Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances of May 1998 reformed a previous drug law and criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking. Drug money laundering is punishable by eight to 20 years in prison. However, Costa Rica has not successfully prosecuted anyone under its current anti-money laundering laws.

Costa Rican law also obligates all financial institutions to identify their clients, record and report currency transactions that exceed US $10,000 to regulators, report suspicious transactions, and maintain records for a minimum of five years. Covered financial institutions include those supervised by SUGEF, the General Superintendent of Securities, and the Superintendent of Pensions, money exchangers and remitters, and dealers in traveler's checks and money orders. Other businesses such as dealers in jewelry and consumer goods, casinos, and credit card companies must report cash transactions that exceed US $10,000 to the Joint Counternarcotics Intelligence Center (CICAD). These businesses also must report suspicious transactions. Individuals are required to report cross-border movements of currency that exceed US $10,000. The law exempts good faith compliance from criminal, civil, or administrative liability.

The law also created the Unidad de Analisis Financiero (UAF), Costa Rica's financial intelligence unit, to receive and analyze suspicious financial transaction reports and investigate cases of money laundering. Financial institutions are required to report suspicious financial transactions to SUGEF, which forwards disclosures to the UAF. In June 1999, the UAF joined the Egmont Group. The UAF exchanges information with its counterparts.

Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly is considering legislation that would extend the predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking.

Costa Rica is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuste Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Costa Rica is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. An extradition treaty is in force between the United States and Costa Rica. US law enforcement agencies work effectively with Costa Rican public security forces in counternarcotics and money laundering investigations.

The growth of Costa Rica's offshore sector-especially the rapid expansion of Internet gaming operations-and the absence of an effective regulatory and supervisory regime for it are causes for concern. The Government of Costa Rica (GOCR) should increase the resources necessary to implement its current anti-money laundering legislation. The GOCR also should increase its oversight of non-bank financial institutions. Moreover, the GOCR is urged to pass comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that would expand the predicate offenses for money laundering to include all serious crimes. These measures would help Costa Rica protect its financial and offshore sectors from being abused by money launderers and other international criminals.

C�te d'Ivoire (Other). C�te d'Ivoire is an important regional financial center in West Africa. To the extent money laundering occurs, a significant portion relates to the proceeds of trafficking in narcotics, particularly heroin and cocaine. Money laundering is concentrated in the banking system and is controlled by organizations other than local traffickers.

Financial fraud is mostly limited to Nigerian-operated scams aimed at foreigners. Endemic smuggling of contraband does not generate funds sufficiently large enough to require laundering. C�te d'Ivoire is not an offshore financial center.

Laundering of money related to any criminal activity is a criminal offense. Banks are required to maintain records of large currency transactions and to report this data to the government. Banks are required to maintain the records necessary to reconstruct significant transactions through financial institutions. The government requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. Bankers' protection under the law is contingent on their cooperation with law enforcement entities. Money laundering controls are not applied to non-banking institutions.

C�te d'Ivoire has not addressed the problem of international transportation of illegal-source currency and monetary instruments although there are controls on the amount of currency that can be brought in and taken out. There were no arrests or prosecutions reported for money laundering in 2000.

Cote d'Ivoire's asset seizure and forfeiture law applies to both mobile and immobile property, including bank accounts and businesses used as conduits for money laundering. The Ivoirian Government is the designated recipient of any narcotics-related asset seizures and forfeitures. It is not known whether legal loopholes exist to permit traffickers and others to shield assets. The law does not allow for civil forfeiture or for the sharing of assets with other governments. No recent changes have been made to the law and no new legislation is being considered.

C�te d'Ivoire does not take part in any international anti-money laundering fora. It is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Croatia (Other). Croatia is not a regional financial or money laundering center. Much of the money laundering that does occur is related to financial crimes such as tax evasion and business-related fraud. The proceeds of narcotics trafficking tend to be laundered through the purchase of real estate, luxury goods, and automobiles.

In 1997, Croatia criminalized money laundering related to serious crimes. The legislation established reporting requirements for banks and non-bank financial institutions for transactions that exceed US $17,500. It also authorized establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) within the Ministry of Finance. Croatia's FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. In 2000, Croatia's Parliament strengthened the country's penal code to ensure that all those indicted can be charged with the money laundering offense where applicable. Prior to this change, a person could not be charged with money laundering if the predicate offense carried a maximum penalty of fewer than five years in prison. The Government of Croatia (GOC) plans to introduce legislation in 2001 that will require banks to transmit data to supervising agencies electronically instead of by mail. The GOC also plans to establish a National Center for the Prevention of Corruption and Organized Crime within the State Prosecutor's Office.

Croatia does not have limitations on providing and exchanging information with international law enforcement on money laundering investigations. Croatia's anti-money laundering efforts are hindered by weak enforcement and a lack of adherence to the law.

Croatia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cuba (Other). Cuba is not an important regional financial center. The Government of Cuba (GOC) controls all financial institutions, and the Cuban peso is not a freely convertible currency. The GOC has not prosecuted any money-laundering cases since the National Assembly passed legislation in 1999 that criminalized money laundering related to trafficking in drugs, arms, or persons. The Cuban central bank has issued regulations that encourage banks to identify their customers, investigate unusual transactions, and identify the source of funds for large transactions. Cuba also has cross-border currency reporting requirements. Cuba has solicited anti-money laundering training assistance from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Spain.

Cuba is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cyprus (Primary). Cyprus is a major regional financial center, and as such remains vulnerable to international money laundering activities. Russian organized crime, fraud, burglary and theft, are the major sources of illicit proceeds that are laundered in Cyprus. Credit card and bank card fraud also pose major problems for Cyprus. In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Cyprus's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Cyprus was not identified by the FATF as a non-cooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report raised a concern regarding customer identification in respect to all forms of trusts.

In 1996, the Government of Cyprus (GOC) passed the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering Activities Law. This law criminalized non-drug related money laundering; provided for the confiscation of proceeds from serious crimes; codified actions that banks and non-bank financial institutions must take, including customer identification; and mandated the establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU). Previously enacted legislation criminalized drug-related money laundering. A 1998 amendment to the 1996 anti-money laundering legislation extended the list of predicate offenses to include trafficking in women, terrorism, trafficking in human organs, attempted murder, and nuclear proliferation. The amendment also addressed government corruption, and facilitated the exchange of financial information with other FIUs, as well as the sharing of assets with other governments.

A law passed in 1999 criminalized the counterfeiting of bank instruments such as certificates of deposit and notes. In November 2000, the GOC further amended its 1996 money laundering law by eliminating the separate list of predicate offenses. This amendment, coupled with the central bank's guidance note to commercial banks reminding them of the importance of reporting any suspicious transaction to the FIU, may enable the Attorney General's office to increase the number of successful prosecutions for money laundering.

The GOC in January 1997 established its FIU, the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (UCML). The 14-member UCML is comprised of representatives from the Attorney General's Office, Customs, law enforcement, and support staff. The UCML's statutory authority directs it to evaluate evidence generated by its member organizations and other sources to determine if an investigation is necessary. The UCML also conducts anti-money laundering training for Cypriot police officers, bankers, accountants, and other financial professionals. In 2000, the UCML opened 123 cases and closed 142. The Unit issued 90 Information Disclosure Orders and froze $3 million in assets. During 2000, recorded two convictions under the 1996 Anti-Money Laundering law, while five cases were pending at the end of the year.

The GOC places restrictions on foreign ownership of property and transportation of currency and bullion. Cypriot law requires that all cash entering or leaving Cyprus in the amount of US $1,000 or greater must be declared. Declarations over US $10,000 are sent directly to the Investigations Section of Cypriot Customs. All banks and non-bank financial institutions-insurance companies, stock exchange, cooperative banks, lawyers, accountants and other financial intermediaries-must report suspicious transactions to UCML. Banks are required to report cash deposits in excess of US $10,000 to the central bank. A declaration form must accompany all foreign currency deposits. In 1998, the central bank instructed banks and financial institutions to pay special attention to complex, unusually large transactions, and to report cumulative electronic funds transfers that exceed of US $500,000 per month for a single customer. There are no statistics available on compliance with these regulations.

Cyprus's offshore sector includes 29 banks, 116 financial services companies, 20 companies that manage collective investment schemes, and 15 offshore trustee companies. The central bank has in place a strict regulatory framework aimed at preventing abuses within the offshore sector. Offshore banks are required to adhere to the same legal, administrative, and reporting requirements as domestic banks. The central bank requires that prospective offshore banks face a detailed vetting procedure to ensure that only banks from jurisdictions with proper supervision are allowed to operate in Cyprus. Offshore banks must have a physical presence in Cyprus and can not be brass plate operations. Once an offshore bank has registered in Cyprus, it is subject to a yearly on-site inspection by the central bank. Offshore banks in Cyprus may accept deposits and make foreign-currency denominated loans to residents of Cyprus if the resident has obtained an exchange control permit from the central bank.

There are approximately 47,000 international business companies (IBCs) registered in Cyprus; however, the central bank reported in June 1999 that only 12,000-14,000 of these companies filed mandatory annual reports. Only 1,057 have a physical presence in Cyprus. According to post reporting, Russian IBCs constitute a "significant" share of the total number of IBCs. The names of beneficial owners of IBCs can be released to law enforcement by court order and Cyprus does not permit bearer shares. The popularity of the offshore sector can be explained in part by the GOC's dual-tax treaties with 26 nations, including Russia. Profits of Cypriot offshore companies are taxed at a rate of only 4.25 percent. Moreover, there is no tax on dividends and foreign employees are required to pay only half the normal Cypriot income tax rate. IBCs may keep freely transferable currency accounts both abroad and in Cyprus. If an IBC is registered as an offshore partnership, profits are not taxed.

Cyprus is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Cyprus is a member of the Council of Europe's PC-R-EV, and is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. The UCML is a member of the Egmont Group. Cyprus and the United States have signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, but it is not yet in force. In 1997, the GOC entered into a bilateral agreement with Belgium for the exchange of information on money laundering.

In light of the GOC's stated commitment to combat money laundering, the central bank needs to continue to focus on meeting the increasing supervisory challenges of the offshore sector and on increasing the offshore sector's transparency. In particular, it should ensure that the identities of beneficial owners are easily accessible by law enforcement. In addition, the central bank should change its guidance note, which allows banks to open accounts for all forms of trusts without identifying the beneficial owner of the trust. The GOC should also take steps to ensure that all financial and non-financial institutions and entities report all suspicious transactions to the FIU, and thereby overcome commercial banks' reluctance to share information with the central bank.

(Cyprus has been divided since the Turkish military intervention of 1974, following a coup d'etat directed from Greece. Since then, the southern part of the country has been under the control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The northern part is controlled by a Turkish Cypriot administration that in 1983 proclaimed itself the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" The US government recognizes only the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.)

It is more difficult to evaluate anti-money laundering efforts in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") but there continues to be strong evidence of a growing trade in narcotics between the "TRNC" and Turkey and Britain, as well as significant money laundering activities.

"TRNC" authorities have enacted a money laundering law for northern Cyprus, which went into effect in November 1999. The main thrust of the law was to reduce the amount of cash transactions in the "TRNC" as well as to improve the tracking of any transactions above US $10,000. The law also provides for the creation of an experts committee to advise "TRNC" authorities on combating money laundering as well as for the seizure of assets.

The law is an adjunct to the "TRNC's" existing Exchange Control Law of 1997, which requires banks to report to the "Central Bank" any movement of funds in excess of $100,000. Such reports must include information identifying the person transferring the money, the source of the money, and its destination. The law also proscribes individuals entering or leaving the "TRNC" from transporting more than US $10,000 in currency. Under the new law, banks, non-bank financial institutions, and foreign exchange dealers must report all currency transactions over $20,000 and suspicious transactions in any amount. Banks must follow a know-your-customer policy and require customer identification. Banks must also submit suspicious transactions to a central multi-agency committee that will function as an FIU and have investigative powers.

"TRNC" officials believe that its 24 essentially unregulated casinos are the primary vehicles through which money laundering occurs. There is also an offshore sector, consisting of 40 banks and 12 IBCs. The offshore banks may not conduct business with "TRNC" residents and may not deal in cash. However, these banks are not audited and their records are not publicly available. Reportedly, a new law will restrict the granting of new bank licensees only to those banks already having licensees in an OECD country.

In spite of a growing awareness in the "TRNC" of the danger represented by money laundering, it is clear that "TRNC" regulations are far less stringent than those in the Republic of Cyprus are. The new law of the "TRNC" provides better banking regulations than were previously in force. The major weakness continues to be the "TRNC's" many casinos, where a lack of resources and expertise leave that area, for all intended purposes, unregulated, and therefore, especially vulnerable to money laundering abuse.

Czech Republic (Concern). The Czech Republic is vulnerable to money laundering because of geographic and economic factors. Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, auto theft, arms trafficking, tax fraud, embezzlement, racketeering, prostitution, and trafficking in illegal aliens are the major sources of funds that are laundered in the Czech Republic. Domestic and foreign organized crime groups target Czech financial institutions for laundering activity; banks, currency exchanges, casinos and other gaming establishments, investment companies, and real estate agencies have all been used to launder criminal proceeds.

Money laundering was criminalized in September 1995 through the addition of Articles 251 and 251a to the Czech Criminal Code. Although the Criminal Code does not explicitly mention money laundering, the criminal provisions apply to financial transactions involving the proceeds of all serious crimes. The Czech Republic's anti-money laundering legislation, Act N�61/1996 Concerning Some Measures Against Legalization of Proceeds of Criminal Activity and Amending Legislation Thereto, became effective on July 1996.

Ministry of Finance Decree N�183 formally established the Czech Republic's financial intelligence unit, the Financial Analysis Unit (FAU), and outlines how financial institutions are to comply with the reporting of unusual transactions. The FAU is a member of the Egmont Group.

The Czech Parliament has failed to pass legislation that completely eliminates anonymous passbook accounts. However, establishment of new anonymous accounts was prohibited beginning in mid-2000. Czech officials argue that the existing accounts are of limited use for money laundering because customer identification is required for deposits and withdrawals that exceed 100,000 Czech crowns (approximately US $2,700).

The Czech Republic participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and in 1998, underwent a mutual evaluation by the Committee. The Czech Republic plans to implement changes to its anti-money laundering regime based on the results of the mutual evaluation. The United States and the Czech Republic have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which entered into force in May 2000. The Czech Republic is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Czech Republic is encouraged to pass legislation to adopt the suggestions of the PC-R-EV mutual evaluation report and to eliminate all anonymous passbook accounts.

Denmark (Other). Banking procedures in Denmark are transparent and are subject to government review, which discourages prospective money launderers and minimizes the likelihood of improper use of the banking system. Despite this, in response to a growing concern surrounding economic crimes in general, Denmark created the Serious Economic Crime Unit in 2000. The unit reports to the National Police Commissioner and consists of public prosecutors and police officers specifically trained in fighting economic crimes.

Money laundering is a criminal offense in Denmark. This applies to any type of money laundering, not just narcotics-related. Banks and other financial institutions are required to know, record and report the identity of customers engaging in significant transactions and maintain those records for an adequate amount of time. There are no secrecy laws in Denmark that prevent disclosure of financial information to competent authorities, and there are laws that protect bankers and others who cooperate with law enforcement authorities. Denmark has cooperated fully with US authorities with regards to money laundering investigations.

Denmark has regulations in place that ensure the availability of adequate records in connection with narcotics investigations. Denmark is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It participates in European Union anti-money laundering efforts, and its financial intelligence unit (FIU) takes part in the Egmont Group of FIUs. Denmark has endorsed the 1997 Basle Committee Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. Denmark is also a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

Dominica (Primary). Like many Caribbean jurisdictions, Dominica has sought to attract offshore dollars by offering a wide range of financial services and promises of confidentiality, low fees, and minimal government oversight. A rapid expansion of this sector without proper supervision has made Dominica attractive to international criminals, and has prompted public criticism from international organizations.

Dominica has greatly expanded its offshore services in the past several years, and offers offshore banks, international business companies (IBCs), exempt insurance, and exempt trusts. The International Exempt Trust Act 1997 allows establishment of Asset Protection Trusts that greatly restrict seizure, expropriation, or confiscation of assets by foreign authorities. Dominica also offers Internet gaming and rapid processing of Internet gaming license applications. IBCs can be registered on-line within 24 hours and using bearer shares, providing complete anonymity for the beneficial owners. In 1999, Dominica's Ministry of Finance (MOF) reported that since the establishment of its offshore sector, Dominica had incorporated 5,800 IBCs, six offshore banks, six exempt trusts, and 20 Internet gaming companies. By December 2000, Dominica's successful marketing of IBCs had increased the number to approximately 6,600. In addition to its marketing duties, the MOF's International Business Unit grants licenses and supervises the offshore sector, thereby violating the Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.

For the past several years, as part of its offshore services, Dominica has offered economic citizenship, a program that enables individuals to acquire Dominican citizenship, a passport, and possibly a new name in exchange for a direct payment of US $50,000 or government bonds worth US $75,000. This process has been loosely regulated, and Government of Dominica (GOD) officials appear not to have maintained adequate control of the program. Between 1996 and 2000, the GOD issued approximately 500 economic citizenships. The program has come under fire as a means for individuals from the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) and other foreign countries to become Dominican citizens and enter the United States via Canada without visas. One widely reported case involved a group of 11 PRC nationals who tried to enter Canada on Dominican passports after spending only one month in Dominica. Upon taking office in January 2000, Prime Minister (PM) Roosevelt Douglas suspended passport sales, but in April 2000, reversed his decision. In August 2000, the GOD claimed to have suspended the program in the face of international pressure-in particular, the Government of Canada threatened to impose visa requirements on Dominican passport holders. The GOD indicated that in the first quarter of 2000 it had earned approximately US $1.9 million from sales of passports. The future of this program remains in question following the recent death of PM Douglas.

The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises Dominica's five domestic banks, and has issued guidance notes against money laundering. However, these guidance notes do not have the force of law. In February 2000, the GOD announced that supervision of the offshore sector also would be transferred to the ECCB. However, it is unclear how this supervisory arrangement will function.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Dominica as noncooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF in its report noted:

Dominica has outdated proceeds of crime legislation, which lacks many features now expected, and very mixed financial services legislation currently on the books. In addition, company law provisions create additional obstacles to the identification of ownership. The offshore sector in Dominica appears to be largely unregulated although it is understood that responsibility for its regulation is to be transferred to the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.

The US Department of Treasury has also issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to financial transactions involving Dominica.

In response to the FATF report, the GOD has taken a number of steps to improve its anti-money laundering regime. In July 2000, the Finance Minister announced a comprehensive review of all offshore banks and the establishment of an Offshore Financial Services Council (OFSC). In December 2000, the OFSC issued guidelines for processing offshore banking licenses and administrative procedures for supervising offshore bank and trust companies.

In January 2001, the Dominican Government brought into force new legislation to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime: The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act of 2000, The International Business Corporation (Amendment) Act of 2000, The International Exempt Trust (Amendment) Act of 2000, The Exempt Insurance (Amendment) Act of 2000, and The Offshore Banking (Amendment) Act of 2000.

The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act (MLPA) of 2000 expands the predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking and allows regulators to inspect the financial transactions of offshore entities. The MLPA establishes a Money Laundering Supervisory Authority (MLSA) that will issue guidelines to financial institutions and scheduled activities under the Act. The MLPA also requires a wide range of financial institutions-including offshore institutions-to report suspicious transactions to the MLSA, which will then send the reports to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Moreover, the MLPA requires persons to report and cross-border movements of currency that exceed US $10,000 to the FIU. The FIU will analyze these reports, forward appropriate information to the Director of Public Prosecutions, and liaison with other jurisdictions on financial crimes cases.

In addition, the other legislative changes should strengthen the GOD's regulation of its offshore sector. The International Business Corporation (Amendment) Act of 2000 reportedly requires accountants and financial institutions to maintain the names and addresses of the owners of bearer shares and track subsequent transfers of ownership. The Offshore Banking (Amendment) Act of 2000 reportedly requires banks to know the beneficial owners of all accounts.

Dominica criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) of 1993. The POCA required financial institutions to maintain records related to the opening and closing of accounts, and of all transactions equal to or greater than Eastern Caribbean (EC) $5,000 (approximately US $1,900) for a minimum of seven years. The POCA also authorized banks to report transactions to the police or the Director of Public Prosecutions if the bank had reasonable grounds to suspect that the transaction was related to an offense. The POCA, however, did not mandate suspicious transactions reporting, and its provisions applied only to domestic institutions. The GOD has not prosecuted anyone for money laundering.

Dominica is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Dominica is also a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In May 2000, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States entered into force. Dominica is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOD should fully implement and enforce the provisions of the MLPA and other recently enacted legislation; provide additional resources for regulating offshore entities; and establish the FIU in order to coordinate its own anti-money laundering efforts, as well as cooperate with foreign authorities. Such measures will help protect Dominica's financial system from further abuse by international criminals, and help avoid possible additional sanctions by the international community.

Dominican Republic (Primary). The Dominican Republic has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. The Dominican Republic is a burgeoning commercial exporter, and in 2000, remittances to the Dominican Republic from abroad were approximately US $1.7 billion. The Dominican Republic is a transshipment point for narcotics destined for the United States and Europe, and is vulnerable to narcotics-related money laundering. The primary methods for moving illicit funds from the United States to the Dominican Republic include smuggling bulk cash by couriers and wire transfer remittances. Dominican banks and casinos also are used to launder funds. However, currency exchange houses and money remitters remain the primary mechanisms for laundering money.

The Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) has taken steps to address money laundering. The GODR has enacted laws that criminalize money laundering related to narcotics trafficking, and allows preventative seizures and criminal forfeiture of drug-related assets. The legislation also authorizes international cooperation in forfeiture cases.

In 1996, the GODR issued Decree No. 288-96, which requires financial institutions such as banks, currency exchange houses, casinos, and stock brokers to record currency transactions equal to or greater than the equivalent of US $10,000 in either domestic or foreign currency. Financial institutions are required to make this information available to law enforcement upon request. The Decree also obligates financial institutions to identify customers and report suspicious financial transactions (STRs), and designates the Superintendency of Banks as the recipient of STRs.

In 1997, the GODR established the Financial Analysis Unit (FAU) within the Superintendency of Banks. The FAU analyzes and disseminates STRs to the Financial Investigative Unit (FIU) within the National Drug Control Directorate (DNCD). The FAU has supervisory and information gathering authority over all financial institutions. The FIU investigates narcotics-related money laundering, and has authority to compel cooperation from other GODR agencies. In 1998, the GODR passed legislation that allows extradition of Dominican nationals on money laundering charges.

During 2000, the GODR authorities confiscated $82,749 in US currency, $88,632 in Dominican currency, ninety-six vehicles, and twenty residential and business properties linked to narcotics trafficking. However, there has never been a successful money laundering prosecution. In 2000, the GODR proposed legislation that would expand the predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking to other serious crimes such as arms trafficking; trafficking in humans or human organs; kidnapping; extortion; car theft; forgery of currency, bills, or securities; illicit enrichment; embezzlement; and bribery. The legislation also would require financial institutions to report to the FAU cash transactions that are greater than or equal to the equivalent of US $10,000 in domestic or foreign currency. Moreover, the legislation will require individuals to declare cross-border movements of currency that are greater than or equal to the equivalent of US $10,000 in domestic or foreign currency. The Dominican Republic's legislature is expected to pass this legislation in early 2001.

The FAU is a member of the Egmont Group, and is authorized to exchange information with other financial intelligence units. The GODR is an active member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The Dominican Republic is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The GODR cooperates with the US Government on counternarcotics and fugitive matters.

The GODR should quickly enact its proposed anti-money laundering legislation, and continue to develop a financial regulatory system that is consistent with international standards. Moreover, the Superintendency of Banks and the DNCD are encouraged to improve the flow of information between their organizations.

Ecuador (Concern). Ecuador is vulnerable to money laundering because of its proximity to drug-producing countries, its adoption of the US dollar as legal tender, and its ineffective oversight of the banking system. The GOE has no controls on cross-border movements of currency, and regulation of currency exchange businesses is weak. These factors most likely will make Ecuador an increasingly attractive venue for placing illicit currency into the international financial system. Several Ecuadorian banks also maintain offshore offices. Although these institutions have come under tighter control as a result of banking legislation passed in 1994, they continue to be used to channel funds through Ecuador.

Narcotics-related money laundering was criminalized through the 1990 Narcotics and Psychotropic Substance Act (No. 108). The Act requires financial institutions to report to the National Drug Council (CONSEP) large transactions in cash or stocks. The Government of Ecuador (GOE) in 1999 implemented electronic reporting of this information. However, a contradictory legal framework continues to place severe constraints on the information that financial institutions can release to law enforcement. The Banking Procedures Law limits the release of information on private bank accounts to the Superintendency of Banks, and the Criminal Defamation Law imposes sanctions on banks and other financial institutions that provide account information to law enforcement or advise law enforcement of suspicious transactions.

As a result of these conflicting laws, the Ecuadorian National Police (ENP) must obtain a court order to search for and obtain financial information from banks. However, banks, as a matter of practice, do not honor such orders, and claim that banking regulations make them answerable only to the Superintendency of Banks (SOB). Furthermore, the SOB will not accept requests for information directly from the ENP, but instead requires the request be handled through the CONSEP. Similarly, the ENP is not able to obtain information on private corporations from the Superintendency of Companies or information on stock market transactions from the Ministry of Finance. The GOE has not yet taken forceful efforts to remedy such limitations on the sharing of information, and as a consequence, has not conducted a serious money laundering investigation in the past five years.

The ENP has a financial investigation unit that recently received additional personnel and US-sponsored financial investigation training. The CONSEP also has a financial unit, and the SOB is considering establishment of one.

Ecuador is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Ecuador is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD).

The GOE must revise its financial secrecy laws to encourage reporting by financial institutions, and eliminate any conflicts that prevent the sharing of information between financial institutions and law enforcement. Moreover, the GOE should take immediate steps to improve bank oversight in the wake of dollarization, and pass legislation establishing cross-border currency reporting requirements. The GOE also is encouraged to establish a joint financial-investigative task force in order to foster better interagency working relationships.

Egypt (Concern). Egypt is not considered a major financial center, and does not have an offshore sector. Moreover, Egypt does not have a significant black market. Most of the illicit funds that are laundered in Egypt are the proceeds of drug trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism. Narcotics-related money laundering usually involves investment in real estate or business ventures. In a typical scheme, a money launderer will invest through an intermediary, usually a relative or a trusted friend. Egyptian money launderers rarely use the banking system because of their cultural mistrust of banks and fears that banking records-despite Egypt's secrecy laws-could provide authorities with incriminating information.

Egypt does not have customer identification requirements or reporting requirements for financial institutions. Presidential Decree Law No. 205 of 1990, concerning the secrecy of bank accounts, states that "all accounts, deposits, trusts, and safes" in banks are to be "maintained secret." No access is to be allowed, or any information to be divulged, except with the written permission of the account's owner or agent. This prohibition remains in force after the banking relationship is terminated. The identities of account owners are known only to bank officials; the only exception is that the Egyptian Attorney General may seek from the Cairo Court of Appeal access to account information when there is "serious" proof that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed. The Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Authority (ANGA), which maintains a unit that investigates financial crimes related to narcotics trafficking, states that bank authorities cooperate fully with law enforcement when such a court order is obtained, and that the records are adequate for a thorough investigation.

The Egyptian Parliament continues to consider passage of anti-money laundering legislation. However, the specifics of this legislation are not known at this time. Absent anti-money laundering laws, prosecutors have made use of a 1971 law, the Law of the Socialist Prosecutor, that targets individuals who have made money through any illegal activity. The law enables prosecutors to impound for a maximum of five years cash and property that belongs to the accused and the accused's immediate family. The highest Egyptian criminal court, the Court of Ethics, determines whether the impounded property was obtained as a result of illegal activity and should be forfeited. Forfeited assets go directly to the Egyptian treasury.

The United States and Egypt signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in May 1998, which is expected to enter into force in 2001. Egypt is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Crime.

Egypt should move swiftly to pass, implement, and enforce comprehensive new anti-money laundering legislation that is consistent with international standards in order to protect its growing economy from abuse by criminals.

El Salvador (Concern). El Salvador has one of the largest banking systems in Central America; its banks maintain important financial contacts with those of neighboring countries, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the United States. El Salvador does not have an offshore sector. The growth of El Salvador's financial sector and the increase in narcotics trafficking in the region continue to make it vulnerable to money laundering. In addition, the Government of El Salvador's (GOES) decision in November 2000 to dollarize its economy-dollars will be permitted to freely circulate beginning in January 2001-increases the risk of money laundering.

The GOES in 2000 made considerable progress in implementing its 1998 "Law Against Laundering of Money and Assets." The Unidad de Investigaci�n Financiera (UIF), the financial investigation unit within the Attorney General's Office, and separate anti-money laundering units within the Polic�a Nacional Civil (PNC) and the central bank enforce the law's provisions. The legislation criminalizes money laundering related to drug trafficking and any other criminal activity. Financial institutions such as banks, exchange companies, stock exchanges, insurance companies, credit card companies, casinos, and real estate companies must identify their customers, maintain records for a minimum of five years, train personnel in money and asset laundering, and establish internal auditing procedures. Covered institutions also must report suspicious transactions and transactions that exceed 500,000 colones (approximately US $57,000) to the UIF. Although a provision of this law provides for asset identification and seizure, asset sharing with non-Salvadoran agencies has not yet been approved.

In 2000, the GOES-in particular, the office of the Attorney General-worked closely with US Government agencies such as the Department of Treasury to develop and implement the UIF. The UIF has been operational since January 2000, and officially opened its new, modernized facilities in December 2000. The UIF currently is comprised of six individuals-three prosecutors (fiscales), one analyst, one computer technician and one secretary. The UIF has received approximately 100 reports of suspicious activities; opened 48 investigations that have resulted in two asset seizure actions; and begun judicial proceedings in three cases. The GOES has arrested several persons on charges of money laundering and counterfeiting.

The UIF has prepared draft regulations that would lower the threshold for filing currency transactions reports to US $20,000, and is seeking ways to tighten regulation of casinos and exchange houses. The US Government is working with the GOES to establish a Money Laundering Working Group that will improve information sharing, and in light of the GOES' decision to dollarize, will seek to provide specialized money laundering training to a broader spectrum of Salvadoran law enforcement and banking officials.

The UIF has applied for membership in the Egmont Group, and in January 2001, will participate in the Egmont Group's first training course. El Salvador is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. El Salvador is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.

The GOES is encouraged to continue building upon the progress that it has made in implementing its anti-money laundering measures, and demonstrate that it is a regional leader in the fight against money laundering and financial crime. In particular, the GOES is urged to implement draft regulations that would lower the threshold for reporting currency transactions.

Eritrea (Other). Eritrea has a poorly developed financial system; there are no reports of money laundering. Eritrea is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Estonia (Other). Estonia has one of the most developed banking systems of the former Soviet Union. Estonia permits credit institutions to participate in a variety of activities such as leasing, insurance, and securities. Russian organized crime groups are suspected of using financial institutions in the Baltic countries to launder money.

In 1999, Estonia implemented anti-money laundering legislation, and established the Information Bureau (IB) and a separate police unit to fight money laundering. Estonia's legislation requires financial institutions to report suspicious or unusual transactions to the IB. The reporting thresholds are: the equivalent of approximately US $11,000 for non-currency transactions; and the equivalent of approximately US $5,500 for currency transactions. However, Estonia has no formal system for ensuring that financial institutions comply with the reporting requirements. Moreover, the IB lacks authority to compel banks to disclose additional information.

More than 50 investigations have been opened based on reports of suspicious or unusual transactions. The anti-money laundering police unit recently initiated its first criminal anti-money laundering case against an employee of a credit institution who did not comply with reporting requirements. In November 2000, Estonia, along with other Baltic countries, signed a protocol that places special emphasis on the exchange of information related to organized crime, drug trafficking, and smuggling.

Estonia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). A COE delegation in 2000 visited Estonia to review its anti-money laundering regime. The IB is a member of the Egmont Group. Estonia became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in July 2000, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and Estonia entered into force in October 2000.

Ethiopia (Other). Money laundering is not considered to be a problem in Ethiopia. Its underdeveloped financial infrastructure and lack of economic development make it unlikely that it will become a financial center of any type in the foreseeable future. The banking sector is small and has no links to the international financial community.

Ethiopia has no anti-money laundering legislation in place. It is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized crime.

Fiji (Other). There are no reports of money laundering in Fiji. Money laundering is criminalized under the Proceeds of Crime Act, 1997. In addition, the Reserve Bank of Fiji has issued anti-money laundering guidelines to licensed financial institutions that require them to develop programs and procedures for customer identification, record-keeping, and the monitoring and reporting of suspicious financial transactions. These guidelines are to come into effect 1 January 2001.

There is no formal agreement between Fiji and the United States for cooperation on law enforcement matters or mutual legal assistance; however, Fiji has responded positively to all such requests from the United States.

Fiji is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Fiji is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a regional FATF-style anti-money laundering body.

Finland (Other). Finland is not a regional financial or money laundering center. However, Finnish authorities are concerned about possible money laundering by Russian organized crime, and money laundering arising from fraud and other economic crimes.

In 1994, Finland enacted legislation criminalizing money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and other serious crimes. Legislation enacted in 1998 compels financial institutions and most non-bank financial institutions-excluding accountants and lawyers-to report suspicious transactions. The number of suspicious transactions reports (STRs) appear to be on the rise: the Finnish police in 1999 investigated 348 STRs, but reported 255 investigations in the first six months of 2000 alone. (Final statistics for 2000 were unavailable for inclusion in this report.) In 1999, narcotics-trafficking was the predicate offense for 13 percent of money laundering convictions.

Finland in 1998 established a financial intelligence unit, the Money Laundering Clearing House (MLCH), to receive STRs from financial institutions. The MLCH is a member of the Egmont Group.

Finland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and the Council of Europe. Finland is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

France (Primary). France remains an attractive venue for money laundering because of its large economy, strong currency, political stability, central location, and sophisticated financial system. Common methods of laundering money in France include the use of bank deposits, foreign currency and gold bullion transactions, corporate transactions, and purchases of real estate, hotels, and works of art. France has enacted legislation that codifies the FATF Forty Recommendations concerning customer identification, record keeping requirements, suspicious transaction reporting, internal anti-money laundering procedures, and training for financial institutions.

France criminalized money laundering related to all crimes with the adoption of Act N� 93-392 of 13 May 1996, "On the Fight against Money Laundering, Drug Trafficking and International Cooperation in Respect of Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime." Prior to passage of this Act, the French Penal Code and the French Customs Code only criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and other serious crimes. Even though Act No. 93-392 made money laundering in itself a general offense, some French courts do not allow joint prosecution of individuals on both money laundering charges and the underlying predicate offense because judges in those courts consider money laundering and the predicate crime to be the same offense.

France's financial intelligence unit, the Treatment of Information and Action Against Clandestine Financial Circuits (TRACFIN), is responsible for analyzing suspicious transaction reports (STRs) that are filed by French financial institutions. TRACFIN is a member of the Egmont Group, and may exchange information with foreign counterparts that observe similar rules regarding confidentiality of information. TRACFIN is establishing and leading France's Liaison Committee against the Laundering of the Proceeds of Crime. This committee will be comprised of representatives from reporting professions and institutions, regulators, and law enforcement authorities. In September 2000, TRACFIN hosted a regional workshop on Money Laundering and the Euro Changeover.

In 2000, the Government of France (GOF) proposed additional anti-money laundering measures:

* Casino directors and managers, high-value goods dealers, and eventually, gatekeepers such as accountants and independent legal professions would have to report suspicious transactions directly to TRACFIN.

* Financial institutions would automatically report to TRACFIN certain financial transactions such as those involving jurisdictions identified as noncooperative in the international fight against money laundering by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

* Public authorities at the state and local level would be able to send money laundering related information directly to TRACFIN.

France is a member of the FATF and the European Union, and a Cooperating and Supporting Nation to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. France is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. France and the United States in December 1998 signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which is expected to enter into force in 2001. TRACFIN has information-sharing agreements with Austria, Italy, the United States, Belgium, Monaco, Spain, the United Kingdom, Argentina, Mexico, the Czech Republic, and Portugal.

France has established a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. The GOF should further enhance it by adopting pending legislation that would expand suspicious transaction reporting requirements.

Georgia (Other). Georgia is not an important regional financial center, and its economy is too small to cover large flows of illicit foreign funds. Commercial banks are small but capable of clearing and transferring funds electronically. Small-scale money laundering schemes involve funds generated domestically through illegal activities, most of which are not connected with narcotics. Reportedly, some commercial banks have become involved in laundering funds generated by the smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes, but these proceeds are generally held in dollars outside the banking system. Although corruption is an issue in Georgia, no government official has been publicly linked to money laundering. The National Bank of Georgia (the central bank) plays a growing role in regulating the banking industry.

Georgia's new criminal code became effective in June 2000. Although it does not criminalize money laundering, it does make it a crime to "transform illegal money into legal income" or to conceal the source, location or owner of property acquired illegally. Violators are subject to imprisonment. No requirement exists to report suspicious transactions, and there are no legal safeguards to protect banks and other financial institutions that cooperate with law enforcement agencies. Georgian law enforcement agencies have not investigated commercial banks or other businesses for possible involvement in money laundering. There are no controls on the amount of money that may be brought into the country. The money-laundering controls that do exist are not applied to non-bank financial institutions. Most financial transactions in Georgia are conducted in cash.

USAID provides both technical assistance and training to the Georgian tax inspectorate in support of improvements in tax policy and regulation, such as the ability to identify underreporting of income, including questionable gains from illegal sources. The Constitutional Court, however, has declared asset forfeiture and seizure legislation to be unconstitutional.

Georgia is a party to the UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Germany (Primary). Germany has the largest economy in Europe and a well-developed financial services industry. Russian organized crime groups, the Italian Mafia, and Albanian and Kurdish drug trafficking groups continue to launder money through German banks, currency exchange houses, business investments, and real estate.

The Government of Germany (GOG) in 1992 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, fraud, forgery, and embezzlement. In November 1993, the GOG enacted the Money Laundering Act. This legislation imposes due diligence and reporting requirements on financial institutions, such as obtaining customer identification for transactions exceeding deutsche marks (DM) 30,000 (approximately US $14,500) that are conducted in cash or precious metals, and maintaining records necessary to reconstruct transactions of DM 30,000 or more. In addition, German banks are legally obligated to report suspicious transactions to state authorities. To assist in this process, the GOG established a central database to record these suspicious transactions. The database became operational in June 2000. Each state is responsible for ensuring that suspicious transactions reports (STRs) are entered into the database.

Since 1998, money transmitters have been required to be licensed and supervised by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office, which has issued anti-money laundering guidelines to the industry. Germany also has a law, which entered into force in 1998, that gives border officials the authority to compel individuals to declare imported currency of DM 30,000 or more.

The GOG has 12 Joint Financial Investigations Groups (JFIGs), comprised of customs and police officials, that are located in 11 cities throughout Germany. The JFIGs analyze and investigate STRs that have been filed by German banks. The US Customs Service maintains a liaison relationship with several of these units, and initiates joint investigations when suspicious financial transactions involving the United States are identified. These investigations often are related to fraud rather than narcotics trafficking. Although one of the JFIGs has participated in Egmont Group activities, the JFIGs are not considered FIUs and are not members of the Egmont Group.

The GOG has established procedures to effectively enforce its asset seizure and forfeiture law. The number of asset seizures and forfeitures remains low because of the high burden of proof that prosecutors must overcome in such cases. German law requires a direct link to drug trafficking before seizures are allowed. German authorities cooperate with US efforts to trace and seize assets to the extent that German law allows, and the GOG investigates leads from other nations. However, German law does not allow for sharing forfeited assets with other countries.

The GOG cooperates fully with the United States on anti-money laundering initiatives, even though it does not have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States. The GOG exchanges information through bilateral law enforcement agreements such as the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement.

Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Germany is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOG has taken an important step in developing a centralized database for recording suspicious transactions. However, Germany is encouraged to develop a centralized reporting unit that would further enhance the effectiveness of this system.

Ghana (Other). Ghana is not a regional financial center. However, non-bank financial institutions such as foreign exchange bureaus are suspected of being used to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking, and the illegal trade in diamonds and gold. In addition, donations to religious institutions allegedly have been used as a vehicle to launder money.

Ghana has criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking and other serious crimes. However, financial institutions are not required to report large cash transactions. Law enforcement can compel disclosure of bank records for drug-related offenses, and bank officials are given protection from liability when they cooperate with law enforcement investigations. Ghana has cross-border currency reporting requirements. Moreover, the attorney general may require disclosure of assets sent out of the country.

The Government of Ghana in 2000 made no arrests or prosecutions related to money laundering. In April 2000, the US Government organized and financed a two-week anti-money laundering seminar in Accra. The seminar was organized in cooperation with the West African Institute for Financial and Economic Management (WAIFEM), and bankers from Ghana and four other West African countries were in attendance.

Ghana took part in the formation of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering (GIABA) at the November 2000 meeting of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Dakar. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Ghana has bilateral agreements for the exchange of money laundering-related information with the United Kingdom, Germany, Brazil, and Italy.

Gibraltar (Concern). Gibraltar is a largely self-governing, dependent territory of the United Kingdom, which assumes responsibility for Gibraltar's defence and international affairs. Gibraltar's offshore sector remains vulnerable to money laundering.

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is responsible for regulating and supervising Gibraltar's financial services industry. It is obliged statutorily under its founding ordinance to match UK supervisory standards. Both onshore and offshore banks have the same legal and supervisory requirements. Gibraltar has 21 banks-11 of which are incorporated in Gibraltar-and all except for one are subsidiaries of major international financial institutions. The FSC also is responsible for overseeing the activities of the GOG offshore sector in the areas of trust and company management companies, insurance companies, collective investment schemes, and the formation of IBCs (of which there were 8300 registered by June 2000). Internet gaming is permitted by the GOG.

The Drug Offences Ordinance (DOO) of 1995 and Criminal Justice Ordinance of 1995 criminalize money laundering related to all crimes and mandate reporting of suspicious transactions by entities such as banks, mutual savings companies, insurance companies, financial consultants, postal services, exchange bureaus, attorneys, accountants, financial regulatory agencies, unions, casinos, charities, lotteries, car dealerships, yacht brokers, company formation agents, dealers in gold bullion, charities, and political parties.

In 1996, Gibraltar established its financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Gibraltar Coordinating Centre for Criminal Intelligence and Drugs (GCID). The GCID is comprised primarily of police and customs officers, but is independent of law enforcement. The GCID receives, analyzes, and disseminates information on financial disclosures filed by institutions covered by the provisions of Gibraltar's anti-money laundering legislation. The GCID has applied to join the Egmont Group.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Gibraltar's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Gibraltar was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report raised certain concerns about Gibraltar's anti-money laundering regime:

Gibraltar...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge...

Gibraltar...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdiction allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in Gibraltar...are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution...

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in Gibraltar in 1995...

In response to the issues raised by the FATF in its June 2000 report, the GOG issued revised Guidance Notes pertaining to eligible introducers and anti-money laundering.

The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom has not been extended to Gibraltar. However, the DOO of 1995 provides for mutual legal assistance with foreign jurisdictions on matters related to drug trafficking and related proceeds. Gibraltar has indicated its commitment, as part of the EU decision on its participation in certain parts of the Schengen acquis, to update mutual legal assistance arrangements with the EU and Council of Europe partners. Gibraltar has adopted EU Money Laundering Directive 91/308. The United Kingdom has not extended the application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Gibraltar is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors.

The GOG took an important step in developing a centralized database for recording STRs. However, the GOG should develop a centralized reporting unit to further enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their system. The GOG is urged to fully address the issues raised by the FATF in the June 2000 report.

Greece (Primary). The economy of Greece is vulnerable to money laundering related to drug trafficking, prostitution, arms smuggling, blackmail, and illicit gambling activities that are conducted by Russian and Albanian criminal groups. There have been reports in the Greek press of substantial money-laundering activity in Greece. Casinos are particularly susceptible to money laundering because of weak requirements for disclosing sources of foreign capital. Greece has five private and two state-owned casinos. Moreover, Greek authorities report that the cross-border movement of illicit currency and monetary instruments remains a problem.

In 1995, the Government of Greece (GOG) enacted anti-money laundering legislation, Prevention and Combating the Legalization of Income Derived from Criminal Activities, which criminalizes money laundering related to all crimes. The Bank of Greece is authorized to cooperate fully with EU central banks in matters relating to money laundering. The legislation also requires that banks and non-bank financial institutions file suspicious transaction reports (STRs) with Greece's financial intelligence unit, the Competent Committee (CC). The CC is a member of the Egmont Group, and is chaired by a senior judge with representatives from various government ministries, the central bank, and the stock exchange. STRs that merit further investigation are forwarded to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Unit (SDOE), a multi-agency group that functions as the CC's investigative arm. The CC is responsible for preparing money-laundering cases on behalf of the public prosecutor's office. The CC works with Interpol on investigations outside Greece. Greek law enforcement reportedly is investigating several money laundering cases. However, few of the cases have reached the public prosecutor's office.

Banks and brokerage firms must require identification from customers-internal identification documents or passports-when opening accounts or conducting transactions that exceed EUR 15,000 (approximately US $16,000). Greek citizens must provide a tax registration number in order to conduct exchanges of foreign currency that are equal to or greater than EUR 1,000 (approximately US $950), and proof of compliance with tax laws in order to conduct exchanges of foreign currency that are equal to or greater than EUR 10,000 (US $9,400).

Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Greece is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOG should extend and implement suspicious transaction reporting requirements for gaming and stock market transactions, and is urged to adopt more rigorous standards for casino ownership or investments.

Grenada (Primary). Money laundering and other financial crimes are concerns in Grenada because of the Government of Grenada's (GOG's) rapid and relatively unsupervised venture into providing offshore services. Although the GOG has taken some legislative steps toward building a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime, the measures thus far have proved inadequate as evidenced by the scandal surrounding the collapse in 2000 of the First International Bank of Grenada, a licensed offshore bank.

Like many other Caribbean jurisdictions, the GOG has tried to raise revenue by luring offshore dollars through promises of low fees, banking and corporate secrecy, and minimal supervision. Since 1996, the GOG has raised approximately US $6 million through its offshore sector. In 1996, the GOG enacted the Offshore Banking Act, the Offshore Insurance Act, and the Company Management Act. The Minister of Finance reviews applications and issues licenses for offshore banks. Grenada amended its International Companies Act in 1996 to permit issuance of bearer shares. Through the International Trust Act 1996, Grenada allows formation of asset protection trusts, which hinder seizure of assets by foreign authorities. Grenada's International Betting Act 1998 provides for licensing of international gaming companies. As of 1999, the GOG had granted licenses for 16 offshore banks and six Internet gaming companies. Press reports indicate that approximately 2,200 International Business Companies (IBCs) have been formed in Grenada.

The Grenada Citizenship Amendment Act of 1997 enables foreign nationals to purchase citizenship for a family of five for approximately US $40,000. The Act does not impose a residency requirement. Moreover, new citizens can legally change their names, which increases the possibility that international criminals will take advantage of the program. Grenada has issued approximately 300 economic citizenships, and claims that proper background checks are made.

The GOG has enacted some anti-money laundering legislation and regulations for its offshore sector. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1992 criminalizes drug-related money laundering and establishes asset forfeiture provisions. However, no prosecutions have taken place under this Act. The Money Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) of 1999, which came into force in 2000, additionally criminalizes money laundering related to any other crime that, had it been committed in Grenada, would have been punishable by at least five years in prison. Violators face maximum fines of US $1 million and prison sentences not to exceed 27 years. Individuals who "tip off" or aid and abet money launderers may be punished by a maximum fine of US $500,000 and five years in prison.

The MLPA imposes reporting responsibilities on financial institutions such as onshore and offshore banks, money transmitters and exchanges, issuers of credit cards and traveler's checks, insurance businesses and trust businesses. The MLPA established the Supervisory Authority (SA) to supervise financial institutions' compliance with the Act. Covered institutions must identify customers; maintain transaction records for a minimum of seven years; permit on-site inspections; report transactions to the SA if money laundering is suspected; and comply with regulations issued by the SA. The SA may forward information received from financial institutions to the Director of Public Prosecutions if there are reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering. Individuals leaving Grenada with more that EC $100,000 (approximately US $37,000) in currency must file a declaration form with the SA. The SA has the authority to establish training requirements and guidelines for financial institutions, and disseminate information internationally. The Ministry of Finance has the authority to issue a code of practice that would help covered institutions comply with provisions of the MLPA. Other provisions of the MLPA exempt good faith compliance with the Act from criminal or civil liability, and override bank secrecy in money laundering investigations. The GOG has not yet implemented certain provisions of the MLPA, including establishment of the SA and issuance of guidelines and a code of practice.

The GOG in 2000 restructured the Offshore Services Registry to create a semi-autonomous Financial Services Authority (FSA) with a staff of 13 personnel, including clerical and administrative personnel, to monitor and regulate the offshore sector. The FSA also is responsible for "promoting" Grenada's sector.

The GOG's anti-money laundering measures have thus far proven inadequate, as evidenced by the apparent fraudulent operation and ultimate collapse of the offshore First International Bank of Grenada (FIBG). The FIBG was founded in 1998 by US citizen Van A. Brink, who had declared bankruptcy in the United States, changed his name, and purchased a Grenadian passport. The FIBG lured investors with promises of 250 percent returns. Investigators allege Brink used new depositors' money to pay previous investors the impossibly high rate of return. In its first year, the bank claimed to have acquired assets of approximately US $26 billion.

In March 1999, an independent auditor of the FIBG warned the GOG of serious irregularities such as a lack of real assets and Brink's obstruction of the audit. Brink subsequently moved to Uganda and began to conduct business with rebel leaders in Congo. In January 2000, the FIBG hosted a conference of 60 Congolese rebel leaders and signed a deal promising them millions in aid.

In August 2000, the GOG stepped in to take control of the bank. Auditors claim that millions of dollars were transferred to international accounts belonging to officers of the bank, including Van Brink in Uganda. Later that month, local police arrested and charged two bank officers with fraud, attempting to defraud, and aiding and abetting. In October, the GOG reinstated FIBG as the First International Bank of Grenada 2000 on the condition that it would be properly supervised and reimburse depositors. The bank reportedly owes its approximately 6,000 depositors nearly US $150 million.

In the wake of international criticism surrounding the failure of FIBG, and at the time several other eastern Caribbean nations were determined by the FATF to be non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering, the GOG initiated efforts to overhaul offshore legislation and regulations. In September 2000, the GOG named a new chairman for the FSA, sought international assistance, and announced plans to create a new financial crimes unit (FCU) within its police force. The FCU has not yet been established.

Since 2000, the GOG has had in force mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties with the United States. Grenada is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and in November 1999, underwent a CFATF mutual evaluation. Grenada is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOG is urged to implement more stringent oversight of the offshore sector, in particular the economic citizenship program, and bring all provisions of the MLPA into full force. The GOG also should establish, fully staff, train, and fund the SA to operate as a financial intelligence unit. In addition, supervision should be strengthened by removing the marketing function from the FSA. Such measures will enable the GOG to better detect and investigate financial crime locally and cooperate with international law enforcement to prevent additional abuse of its financial sector by international criminals and fraud schemes.

Guatemala (Concern). Guatemala's geographic location and absence of comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation continues to make it vulnerable drug money laundering. Moreover, money laundering related to kidnapping, tax evasion, vehicle theft, and corruption is believed to be on the rise. Real estate transactions and the financing of large commercial development projects are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. Guatemala does not have an offshore sector. Ineffectiveness, intimidation, and corruption within Guatemala's judiciary and law enforcement agencies continue to be serious problems and hinder the government of Guatemala's (GOG) ability to control money laundering.

In January 2001, the GOG published legislation, the Law for the Free Use of Currency, which allows foreign currency such as the US dollar to become legal tender in Guatemala. Free circulation of the dollar will make Guatemala's financial institutions even more vulnerable to the placement of drug-derived currency.

The GOG in November 2000 ratified the Central American Convention for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Related Crimes. However, the GOG needs to strengthen its anti-money laundering legislation in order to implement its obligations under the Convention. Article 45 of Guatemala's 1992 Narcotics Law makes it illegal to participate in any transaction known to involve the proceeds of drug trafficking. The GOG also has issued regulations that require banks to record certain information regarding the origin of currency transactions that exceed US $5,000. The GOG has not made serious efforts to enact more stringent anti-money laundering controls because of the banking sector's resistance. Guatemala has strict bank secrecy laws, and its corporate code also offers considerable secrecy to the owners of corporations.

In 1999, the Secretariat for the Commission Against Addictions and Illicit Drug Trafficking (SECCATID) drafted legislation that would require reporting of suspicious or unusual financial transactions and declaration of cross-border currency movements; prohibit the use of anonymous bank accounts; and create a Financial Investigative Department (FID) that would investigate money laundering cases. The legislation has not yet been passed.

In April 2000, the GOG's Public Ministry, with US Government assistance, opened a new anti-corruption prosecutor's office. The office to date has initiated approximately 1,000 cases against government officials.

Guatemala is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Guatemala is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.

The GOG must adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards, implement such legislation, and develop effective enforcement mechanisms so that it can protect its economy and financial system from financial crimes.

Guernsey (Primary). The Bailiwick of Guernsey (BOG) covers a number of the Channel Islands (Guernsey, Herm, Alderney, and Sark being the largest). Guernsey is a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom. Its sophisticated offshore center continues to be vulnerable to money laundering, particularly at the layering and integration stages.

The Financial Services Commission (FSC) is responsible for regulating the BOG's offshore industry. The FSC conducts on-site visits and analyzes assessments by auditors. There are approximately 79 offshore banks that offer deposit taking and custodial, trust, company, and fiduciary services. The BOG also has 413 registered offshore insurance companies, approximately 15,450 IBCs, and 15 bureaux de change.

In January 2000, the Proceeds of Crime Law and Regulations 1999 (All-Crimes Legislation) came into force, along with the corresponding regulations, the Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Regulations 1999. The legislation extends predicate offenses for money laundering to all serious crimes and creates a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Suspicious transactions reports are filed with the Joint Police and Customs Financial Investigation Unit (JPCFIU). The JPCFIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Guernsey's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Guernsey was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Guernsey's anti-money laundering regime:

...Guernsey...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge....

...Guernsey...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdiction allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in ...Guernsey...are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution.

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in...Guernsey in 1999....

Proposed drug trafficking legislation would consolidate legislation passed in 1988 and 1992, and also would include a new offense of acquiring, possessing, or using the proceeds of drug trafficking. Moreover, this legislation would introduce an offense of failing to disclose the knowledge or suspicion of drug money laundering. Passage of this legislation reportedly would be an important step towards putting the UK in a position to extend the application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention to the BOG.

The BOG also is considering legislation that would regulate bureaux de change and cheque cashers to ensure that these entities are formally identified and comply with BOG Guidance Notes.

The BOG cooperates with international law enforcement on money laundering cases. The BOG is a member of the Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors.

The BOG has made strides toward developing a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. The BOG should further strengthen its anti-money laundering program by approving and implementing pending legislation that would consolidate the drug trafficking law, regulate bureaux de change and cheque cashers, and expand regulation of trust companies.

Guyana (other). Guyana is not an important regional financial and offshore banking is not permitted. Nevertheless, there is concern that both narcotics and non-narcotics related money laundering takes place. A largely unregulated banking sector, several independent currency exchanges and growing illicit trade in licit goods (particularly gold and diamonds) facilitate money laundering activities.

Guyanese law requires that funds over US $10,000 imported into or exported out of Guyana be reported, but mechanisms have not yet been put into place to facilitate such reporting. The Financial Institutions Act of March 1995 designated the Bank of Guyana, the central bank, as the sole financial regulator and extended the coverage of legislation, regulations and penalties to all deposit-taking institutions. However, there are no laws in force at this time that require financial institutions to know, record, or report the identities of customers engaging in large currency transactions, suspicious transactions or to maintain transaction records.

Although a money laundering prevention bill was passed by the Guyanese National Assembly in February 2000, the legislation is not yet in force. The new law will criminalize money laundering related to narcotics and other serious crimes and will allow for the expansion of predicate offenses. The legislation also will establish requirements for reporting suspicious transactions by banks and non-bank financial institutions, and cross-border currency transactions. Moreover, other provisions of the legislation will require confidentiality in the reporting process, provide for good faith reporting, and contain provisions for asset forfeiture, international cooperation, and extradition for money laundering. The legislation authorizes creation of a supervisory authority to receive financial disclosure information and supervise financial institutions' activities to prevent and detect money laundering. However, the legislation appears to fall short of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty Recommendations and the revised Organization of American States (OAS) Model Regulations on Money Laundering.

Guyana is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Guyana has not joined the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) by signing the CFATF Memorandum of Understanding. It would benefit by doing so and by actively participating in CFATF activities, including undergoing a mutual evaluation.

Guyana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention

Haiti (Concern). Haiti is vulnerable to money laundering because of a dramatic rise in drug trafficking, official corruption, and ineffective bank supervision. Drug traffickers use Haiti as a transit country for moving bulk currency. Moreover, criminals launder funds through Haiti's exchange houses, and via wire transfers through banks and money remitters.

In August 2000, the Central Bank of Haiti (BRH) issued Circular 95, which requires banks, exchange brokers, and transfer bureaus to obtain declarations identifying the source of funds for transactions exceeding 200,000 gourdes (approximately US $ 9,600) or the equivalent in foreign currency. Covered entities must report to the competent authorities such transactions on a quarterly basis. Failure to comply can result in fines of 100,000 gourdes (approximately US $4,800). The BRH also can revoke the license of banks that fail to comply. The Ministry of Justice reported in August 2000 that it had created a body to receive and analyze financial disclosures. However, no additional details were provided. Several Haitian banks have organized anti-money laundering seminars to increase awareness.

In January 2001, Haiti reportedly passed anti-money laundering legislation. However, at this time, the specifics of the legislation have not been provided.

Haiti is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Haiti is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The GOH in September 2000 began the process of applying for membership in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In December 2000, a CFATF team traveled to Haiti for a preliminary visit and evaluation.

The new GOH, which will be seated in February 2001, should build upon previous efforts and ensure that it enacts and fully enforces anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards such as criminalizing the laundering of proceeds related to all serious crimes, including corruption, and requiring suspicious transactions and cross-border currency reporting. The GOH also is urged to establish, train, and adequately fund and staff a financial intelligence unit that would coordinate the GOH's anti-money laundering efforts and work with foreign governments to help protect the Haitian economy from criminal abuse. Moreover, the GOH is urged to continue its efforts to join and work more closely with the CFATF, which will help provide additional regional guidance, support, and coordination in the fight against money laundering.

Honduras (Concern). Honduras is not a major regional financial center, and does not offer offshore financial services. However, Honduras is vulnerable to drug money laundering because of increased drug-trafficking activity throughout the region. The illicit proceeds of auto theft, kidnappings, bank fraud, alien smuggling, and corruption also are believed to be laundered in Honduras. Money launderers use Honduran banks, casinos, exchange firms, and front companies.

Honduras's anti-money laundering regime is inadequate, and there have been no successful money laundering prosecutions under its present legislation. Law No. 27-98 of December 1997 criminalized narcotics-related money laundering, and requires banks and non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious financial transactions (STRs) to the National Banking and Insurance Commission (NBIC). The NBIC analyzes STRs and forwards those that it suspects are linked to narcotics trafficking to the Public Ministry. Even though financial institutions and their employees are protected from civil and criminal liability when filing STRs, compliance remains low. In 2000, a joint commission of the Public Ministry, NBIC, and other Government of Honduras (GOH) institutions drafted new legislation that would expand predicate crimes for money laundering to include all criminal activity, and promote more effective investigation of STRs. The National Congress has not yet approved this legislation.

Corruption is a serious impediment to implementing more effective anti-money laundering controls in Honduras. The Ministry of Security has proposed a series of measures that would target corruption in the judiciary and law enforcement, but the National Congress has yet to enact these measures.

Honduras is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Honduras is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Honduras cooperates with the US Government in narcotics-related investigations.

Honduras is urged to pass comprehensive anti-money legislation that would expand the predicate crimes for money laundering to include all serious crimes.

Hong Kong (Primary). Hong Kong is an important international financial center and is vulnerable to money laundering through its traditional banking, remittance, and money transfer networks, as well as through the offshore financial services it offers and its extensive underground banking system. Narcotics trafficking, fraud, illegal gambling and bookmaking, alien smuggling, and tax evasion generate much of the illicit proceeds that are laundered in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has developed a strong anti-money laundering regime and is a regional leader in the area of financial regulation and supervision.

Hong Kong's banking system is a three-tier system of deposit-taking institutions: licensed banks, restricted license banks, and deposit-taking companies. As of October 2000, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) regulated 267 financial institutions. The Insurance Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission regulate the insurance and securities industries, respectively. All three groups impose licensing requirements and conduct background checks on applicants.

Hong Kong's offshore services include exempt companies in the form of registered, private, limited companies (PLCs). These companies can be formed using nominee shareholders and directors, but cannot issue bearer shares. Hong Kong allows public access to registers of corporate directors, managers, and members, but does not require disclosure of beneficial owners of the more than 470,000 such companies. PLCs generally are not taxed or required to file tax returns because Hong Kong taxes only income earned in Hong Kong. The HKMA requires authorized financial institutions to obtain written statements from company formation agents certifying that they have recorded and retained information that identifies the source of funds.

In 1989, Hong Kong criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking through the Drug Trafficking (Recovery of Proceeds) Ordinance (DTROP), and in 1994, criminalized money laundering related to indictable offenses through the Organized and Serious Crime Ordinance (OSCO). In 1995, the GOHK passed amendments to the OSCO and the DTRPO that require banks, non-bank financial institutions, and financial intermediaries, such as lawyers and accountants, to file suspicious transactions reports (STRs). New legislation came into force in 2000 that requires remittance and money transfers agents to maintain records and identify customers for cash transactions equal to or greater than US $2,500.

Hong Kong also has implemented regulations that require financial institutions to record the identities of customers, or the identities of the customers' legal nominee, and to release this information to authorities upon request. Financial institutions are required to maintain these records for a minimum of five to seven years and to report suspicious transactions to the Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU) for review and possible investigation. The JFIU is a member of the Egmont Group and is able to share information with its international counterparts. Hong Kong law provides that the filing of an STR shall not be regarded as a breach of restrictions imposed by contract or law on the disclosure of information. The JFIU provides periodic feedback to financial institutions on STRs that they have filed and also makes available to financial institutions trend reports and sanitized case histories.

In the first ten months of 2000, the banking sector filed 4,969 suspicious transactions reports, the securities sector filed 24, and the insurance sector filed 11. Through November 2000, Hong Kong had prosecuted 13 money-laundering cases. Hong Kong reports that it has not detected an increase in financial crimes over the past year and has found no indications of narcotics proceeds funding smuggling activities.

In November 2000, Hong Kong reintroduced to the legislature amendments to the DTROP and the OSCO that would reduce the threshold for filing STRs. Under current law, financial institutions must file an STR if there are reasonable grounds to believe that money laundering is taking place. The proposed amendment to the DTROP, however, would require banks to file an STR when there are reasonable grounds to suspect money laundering. The amendment also would increase the maximum penalties for money laundering from 14 to 20 years in prison and for failure to report suspicious transaction from 3 to 12 months in prison. Bankers and accountants have expressed some reservations about this legislation, but its prospects for passage without major change reportedly are good.

Hong Kong is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group against Money Laundering (APG) and the FATF. Honk Kong will assume the FATF's presidency in 2001. Hong Kong also is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. In January 2000, Hong Kong's treaty on mutual legal assistance with the United States came into force. Hong Kong has signed similar agreements with Australia, France, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Italy, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland. Hong Kong has initialed agreements on mutual legal assistance with Portugal, Canada, the Philippines, Israel, and India that will provide for the exchange of information for all serious crimes, including money laundering.

Hong Kong could further strengthen its anti-money-laundering regime by requiring financial institutions to report transactions that exceed specified large amounts and by putting into place measures that would help prevent structuring of deposits. Hong Kong also should establish cross-border currency reporting requirements and encourage increased suspicious transaction reporting in the securities and futures industry. Moreover, Hong Kong should tighten offshore company registration procedures to discourage formation of shell companies.

Hungary (Primary). Hungary is vulnerable to money laundering because of its strategic location, modern financial services industry, and the presence of organized criminal groups in the country. In particular, organized crime groups from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have established a strong presence in Hungary and use Hungarian financial institutions such as banks, casinos, and currency exchange businesses to launder their illicit proceeds. Hungarian banks may be particularly vulnerable to money laundering because of their issuance of anonymous bearer passbook accounts. These passbooks can be used to make cash deposits and withdrawals that do not exceed 200,000 Hungarian forints (approximately US $700). All currency transactions that exceed two million forints require some form of customer identification. Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, arms trafficking, auto theft, tax evasion, financial fraud, bribery, alien smuggling, and racketeering are the major sources of criminal proceeds laundered in Hungary.

In 1994, the Government of Hungary (GOH) criminalized money laundering related to all crimes through an amendment to Section 303 "Money Laundering" of the 1978 Hungarian Criminal Code. Other money laundering legislation became effective at the same time, notably Act XXIV of 1994 on the Prevention and Impeding of Money Laundering. Hungarian financial institutions such as banks, insurance companies, securities brokers/dealers, investment fund management companies, currency exchange houses, and casinos are required to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs). Real estate agencies are not subject to STR reporting requirements, but have been used to launder money. The GOH limits the import and export of the forint to 200,000 forints (approximately US $700). There are no limitations on the amount of foreign currency that can be imported; however, amounts exceeding 50,000 forints (approximately US $170) must be declared. Exports of foreign currency cannot exceed the amount of currency that was brought into the country.

Hungary's legislature in May 2000 began consideration of a proposal that would require executives, attorneys, and accountants of insurance companies to file STRs.

Hungary's financial intelligence unit is the Anti-Money Laundering Section (AMLS) of Hungary's National Police. The AMLS receives STRs from financial institutions, and is a member of the Egmont Group. Hungary in 2000 established a criminal investigation bureau within the Tax and Financial Inspection Service to investigate tax evasion and money laundering.

Hungary has recently entered the offshore financial services market and has licensed 300 international business companies (IBCs). It does not provide offshore banking.

Hungary has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States. Hungary also has information sharing agreements with Austria, Slovakia, and Cyprus for the exchange of information related to money laundering. In January 2000, Hungary and the United States signed a non-binding information-sharing agreement that enables US and Hungarian law enforcement to work together more closely on organized crime and related illicit transnational activities. Hungary has signed similar cooperation agreements with 22 other countries. In May 2000, Hungary and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation established a joint task force to combat Russian organized crime groups.

Hungary is a member of the Council of Europe's (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and underwent a mutual evaluation by this group that was published in June 1999. Hungary is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Government of Hungary (GOH) has initiated only four major money laundering investigations in the last several years, and has not yet had a successful prosecution. The GOH is urged to remove any legal and institutional impediments that prevent it from bringing money-laundering investigations to a successful conclusion. Moreover, the GOH should approve and fully implement legislation that requires executives, attorneys, and accountants of insurance companies to file STRs. The GOH also should eliminate anonymous bearer passbooks. However, none of these measures will be effective until the GOH devotes more resources to investigate money-laundering allegations and to tighten oversight of organizations that are required to file STRs.

India (Primary). Money laundering is a growing concern in India because of its large population and emergence as a regional financial center. The hawala (or hundi) alternative remittance system reportedly is used by criminals to launder money generated from drug trafficking, alien smuggling, corruption, and financial fraud.

The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPSA) of 1985, amended in 1988, calls for the tracing and forfeiture of assets that have been acquired through narcotics trafficking, and prohibits attempts to transfer and conceal those assets. This legislation seems to have the effect of criminalizing drug money laundering. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Chapter XXXIV (sections 451-459) establishes India's basic framework for confiscating the proceeds of crime. The Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance (CLAO) of 1944 allows for the attachment and forfeiture of money or property obtained through bribery, corruption, criminal breach of trust, or theft, and of assets that are disproportionate to an individual's known sources of income.

The Indian Parliament continues to consider draft legislation that would explicitly criminalize money laundering, impose reporting requirements on financial institutions and intermediaries, and provide for seizure and confiscation of assets related to the proceeds of crime. The bill was referred to a select committee of the upper house of India's parliament, which has made certain recommendations. These are currently under review by the executive branch.

The GOI does not have a financial intelligence unit (FIU); and legislation currently before the parliament does not call for the establishment of an FIU. The Central Economic Intelligence Unit (CEIB) is the Government of India's (GOI) lead organization for fighting financial crime. Other organizations such as the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Customs and Excise, and the Reserve Bank of India also play a role in the enforcement of India's anti-money laundering laws.

India is a party to the UN 1988 Drug Convention, and is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

The GOI should adopt comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation, and create an FIU that would analyze suspicious transactions reports and cooperate with FIUs from other countries.

Indonesia (Primary). Indonesia's strategic geographic location, strict bank secrecy, and inadequate legislation against money laundering and corruption have made its economy vulnerable to money laundering. Indonesia is not an offshore center. Most money laundering in Indonesia is believed to be related to domestic narcotics trafficking, fraud, and corruption. In recent years, several Indonesian banks have become the targets of fraud schemes and corruption that may have been prevented if adequate safeguards had been in place, indicating that the country's financial regulatory system also is inadequate.

In July 2000, Indonesian police officials at a cyber crime conference described recent cases that have involved credit card fraud, computer hacking, and other financial crimes. Despite their ongoing efforts, the Indonesian National Police still lack the appropriate resources, training, and expertise to mount complex investigations. In August 2000, the US Government provided anti-money laundering training to representatives of Indonesian law enforcement.

Draft legislation that is the subject of discussion between the administration and parliament, the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Money Laundering (ECAML), would criminalize money laundering and establish suspicious transactions reporting for financial institutions, currency transactions reporting, and cross-border currency reporting. ECAML also would establish the Commission for the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Money Laundering (CECAML). CECAML would receive and analyze currency and suspicious transactions reports, and offer assistance in criminal money laundering investigations.

Indonesia is a member of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Indonesia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The lack of an adequate anti-money laundering and enforcement regime will continue to put Indonesia's financial system at risk to financial crime. Indonesia should pass comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation and enact bank supervisory practices that are consistent with accepted international standards. In addition, the GOI should investigate the use of non-bank facilities that are frequently used to launder money.

Iran (Other). Iran is not a regional financial center. Iranian law enforcement officials reportedly carry out financial investigations in the context of drug crimes. Iran does not have legislation that criminalizes money laundering.

Iran's real estate market is widely used as an alternative remittance system. For example, real estate transactions take place in Iran, but no funds change hands there; rather, payment is made overseas. This typically is done because of the difficulty in transferring funds out of Iran and the weakness of Iran's currency, the rial. The real estate market, in at least one instance, has been used to launder narcotics-related funds.

Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Ireland (Concern). The primary sources of funds laundered in Ireland are derived from tax offenses, fraud, and drug trafficking. Money laundering occurs in financial institutions and bureaux de change, the latter of which are not regulated. Additionally, investigations in Ireland indicate the continued use of professionals specializing in the creation of legal entities as a means for laundering money. Trusts are also established as a means of transferring funds from Ireland to offshore locations. It is difficult to establish the true beneficiary of the funds, which makes it difficult to follow the money trail and establish a link between the funds and the criminal.

Ireland's offshore banking is concentrated in Dublin's International Financial Services Centre (IFSC). The IFSC has a preferential 10-percent corporate tax rate. Approximately 400 international financial institutions and companies operate in the IFSC. Services offered include fiscal management, re-insurance, fund administration and foreign exchange dealing. The IFSC companies are regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland.

The Criminal Justice Act 1994 criminalized money laundering relating to drug trafficking and other offenses. It also required financial institutions to report suspicious transactions and currency transactions exceeding approximately US $15,000, implement customer identification procedures and retain records of financial transactions. Subsequent legislation added requirements for the implementation of anti-money laundering programs and for training in the identification of suspicious transactions.

A number of the suspicious transaction reports, as well as requests for assistance from Financial Action Task Force (FATF) members, have cited the use of solicitors, accountants and company formation agencies in Ireland to create shell companies. Investigations have disclosed that these companies are used to provide a series of transactions connected to money laundering, tax offenses, and other fraudulent activity. The difficulties in establishing the beneficial owner of such a company are complicated by the fact that the directors are usually nominees and are often principals of a solicitors' firm or of a company formation agency.

Ireland has recently proposed a new Finance Act and a new Company Law Act to address these concerns. The new Company Act will require all newly registered Irish companies to engage, at least in part, in business dealings within the State. It also contains a general requirement that at least one director reside in Ireland.

New legislation has recently been introduced to combat money laundering by terrorist organizations. This legislation contains provisions addressing the forfeiture of property when it is used by or connected with a terrorist organization.

The Bureau of Fraud Investigation serves as Ireland's financial intelligence unit. The Bureau analyzes financial disclosures and is a member of the Egmont Group.

To date, 30 individuals have been charged with money laundering in Ireland, and 17 have been convicted in Irish courts.

Ireland is a member of the European Union (EU), Council of Europe and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Ireland is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Isle of Man, The (Primary). The Isle of Man (IOM) is a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom. Its sophisticated offshore center continues to be vulnerable to money laundering, particularly at the layering and integration stages.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of the IOM's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. The IOM was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report raised certain concerns about the IOM's anti-money laundering regime:

...the Isle of Man...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge....

...the Isle of Man ...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdictions allow certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in the ...Isle of Man ... are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution...

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in ...the Isle of Man in 1998....

Much of the IOM's offshore financial services industry consists of "exempt companies" that are not permitted to conduct business on the island and are generally owned by individuals who are not residents of the island. These companies are not required to disclose the identities of beneficial owners, and can issue bearer shares. In the IOM, bearer shares are registered with the name and address of the initial holder. There are approximately 24,300 exempt companies registered in the IOM.

The IOM in 1987 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, and in 1990, added terrorism as a predicate offense. The Criminal Justice (Money Laundering Offenses) Act 1990 extended the government's confiscation powers to all crimes, and was amended in 1998 to criminalize money laundering related to all serious crimes. In addition, this legislation contains a requirement for reporting suspicious transactions related to drugs or terrorism. The IOM also has enacted the Anti-Money Laundering Code 1998, which (as amended in 1999) imposes reporting and "know your customer" obligations on financial businesses such as lawyers, registered legal practitioners, and accountants holding accounts on clients' behalf; company service providers; and trust service providers. However, there is an exemption from the identification of customers requirement for business relationships that were formed prior to December 1998. The Code is supplemented by Guidance Notes that define the obligations of the institutions under the revised Code. The insurance sector also has issued Guidance Notes.

Suspicious transactions reports are reported to the Fraud & Financial Investigation Unit (FFIU), the IOM's financial intelligence unit. The FFIU belongs to the Egmont Group.

The IOM has announced its intention to end the use of bearer shares, and to require companies to certify to the Financial Services Commission (FSC)-the entity that regulates the IOM's financial institutions-that they have created accounts. However, companies will not be required to reveal actual figures to the FSC.

The IOM is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors. The IOM cooperates with international anti-money laundering authorities on regulatory and criminal matters. Application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention was extended to the IOM in 1993.

The IOM has made progress toward developing a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. The IOM should consider further strengthening its anti-money laundering program by making its customer identification rules retroactive.

Israel (Primary). Israel is not considered a regional financial center, offshore center, or tax haven. In the past, Israel's banking system had been vulnerable to money laundering because of its bank secrecy laws. Israeli law enforcement officials report that it has no information that confirms the existence of organized criminal groups laundering money in Israel. However, foreign law enforcement reports indicate that organized crime groups launder money in Israel. Moreover, US law enforcement has seen the use of Israeli-based or linked accounts or targets in a variety of money laundering undercover operations.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Israel as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. The FATF in its report cited:

The absence of anti-money laundering legislation causes Israel to fall short of FATF standards in the areas of mandatory suspicious transactions reporting, criminalization of money laundering arising from serious crimes and establishment of a financial intelligence unit. Israel also is partially deficient in the area of record keeping, since this requirement does not apply to all transactions. However, Israel already meets FATF standards in the areas of regulation of financial institutions, licensing, and screening procedures for banking corporations, and the international cooperation in regulatory investigations. Israeli banking regulations address the issue of customer identification.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Israel.

In August 2000, Israel enacted legislation, the Prohibition on Money Laundering Law (PMLL), 5760-2000, that criminalizes money laundering, and imposes on financial services providers the obligation to identify, report, and keep records of specified transactions. The law establishes possession of unlawful property, publication of pornography, public corruption, copyright violation, counterfeiting, gambling, trafficking in persons, fraud, drug smuggling, and auto theft as predicate offenses for money laundering. The PMLL also prescribes an obligation on persons entering or leaving Israel to report monies brought into or taken out of the country. These obligations will come into effect on a date to be set by the Minister of Justice, but not later than 18 months after the law's enactment. The full effect and value of these legislative changes cannot be determined, however, until the implementing regulations are fully in place and enforced.

In November 2000, Israeli police issued the Reporting to Police Regulation, which establishes mechanisms for reporting transactions that involve prohibited property.

In early January 2001, the Israeli Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee approved regulations that address customer identification, transactions reporting requirements, and records retention. The regulations will become effective one year from the date they are signed into law. Under these new regulations, Israeli banks must report the following transactions:

* Deposits and withdrawals of currency equal to or greater than Israeli New Shekel (NIS) 200,000 (approximately US $49,500).

* Cash transactions equal to or greater than NIS 200,000 that are not conducted via the customer's account.

* Exchange of currency equal to or greater than NIS 50,000 (approximately US $12,400).

* Issuance of bank checks equal to or greater than NIS 200,000. Checks issued against a home loan of NIS 1 million (approximately US $247,500) or less are exempted.

* Purchase of travelers' checks equal to or greater than NIS 200,000.

* Deposit of foreign-currency checks equal to NIS 1 million.

* Transfers to and from Israel equal to or greater than NIS 1 million.

Banks will not be required to report such transactions that are conducted by public institutions, banks, credit card companies, insurance companies, or similar entities.

Israel also is in the process of establishing a Money Laundering Authority that will include a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and will coordinate information and activities with Israeli law enforcement, customs, banks, and other relevant entities.

Israel and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Israel does not have bilateral agreements with other countries concerning money laundering. Israel has signed the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has not yet become a party to it. In December 2000, Israel signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Effective implementation and enforcement of anti-money laundering legislation is critical to protecting Israel's financial system from continued abuse by criminals and criminal organizations. In particular, the GOI should establish its FIU as quickly as possible, and ensure that it has the necessary equipment and personnel to operate effectively.

Italy (Primary). Italy's large financial sector is vulnerable to money laundering; in 1997, money laundering in Italy was estimated to exceed US $50 billion. Italy is a drug consumption country and a transshipment point for moving illicit narcotics into western Europe. Italian organized criminal groups-particularly those in the southern part of the country-continue to engage in narcotics and alien smuggling, contraband cigarettes smuggling, extortion, usury, and kidnapping, and launder the proceeds of these activities through Italian banks, casinos, real estate, and the gold market. For example, Italian, Albanian and Montenegrin criminal organizations form offshore companies to purchase bulk cigarettes that are marked for export, and smuggle them into Italy where they are sold tax-free throughout the European Union. This highly lucrative trade is made more attractive by relatively light penalties-a maximum of five years in prison. In 1999, actual seizures of contraband merchandise by the Government of Italy (GOI) indicate that Italy lost more than US $1 billion in tax revenue.

In May 2000, Swiss police arrested alleged organized crime kingpin Gerardo Cuomo in a joint operation with Italian anti-Mafia police. The Government of Switzerland in November 2000 approved Cuomo's extradition to Italy where he will face charges of smuggling, criminal conspiracy, and money laundering.

Italian law criminalizes money laundering related to any crime. A wide range of financial institutions-including stock brokerages, exchange houses, and insurance companies-must identify their customers, record and report transactions above 20 million lire (approximately US $9,800), and report suspicious transactions. In addition, institutions and individuals must report cross-border movements of currency that exceed 20 million lire. The GOI also has in place a system for tracing, freezing, seizing, and confiscating assets. In accordance with Council of Europe procedures, the GOI is committed to sharing these assets with cooperating countries.

Decree No. 153/97 designates the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi (UIC) as the recipient of suspicious transactions reports (STRs); provides a "safe harbor" provision for individuals who report suspicious transactions; and creates an inter-ministerial commission to coordinate anti-money laundering among Italian law enforcement and regulatory agencies. The decree also establishes organizational links among agencies that are involved in the fight against organized crime, and encourages international cooperation against money laundering.

Italy's financial intelligence unit, the UIC, is a member of the Egmont Group. The UIC receives and analyzes financial disclosures, and forwards them to the appropriate law enforcement agency-the Anti-Mafia Directorate or the Guardia di Finanza-for further investigation when deemed necessary. The UIC also performs supervisory and regulatory functions such as issuing decrees, regulations, and circulars.

Italy is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and held its presidency from 1997 to 1998. In 1997, Italy underwent a second-round FATF mutual evaluation. Italy also is a member of the European Union (EU). Italy is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Italy and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty in place, and cooperate on money laundering cases. Italy has information sharing agreements with other countries for the exchange of information related to money-laundering cases. Moreover, the GOI has a number of bilateral agreements with foreign governments in the area of investigative cooperation on drug trafficking and organized crime.

Although the GOI has comprehensive internal auditing and training requirements for its financial sector, implementation of these measures by non-bank financial institutions still lags behind that of banks, as evidenced by the relatively low number of suspicious transactions reports that have been filed by non-bank financial institutions. The GOI should therefore increase its training efforts and supervision in the area of non-bank financial institutions to decrease their vulnerability to money laundering.

Jamaica (Concern). Jamaica has not developed into a significant regional financial center or offshore banking center. However, money laundering does occur, primarily through the purchase of assets such as cars and real estate. The laundering of proceeds through Jamaican banks and financial institutions does not appear to be prevalent.

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) passed the Money Laundering Act (MLA) in December 1996, but it was not implemented until January 5, 1998. The financial sector complained that the process of reporting threshold transactions-involving US $10,000 or more in cash-was an onerous burden. In March 1999, an amendment raised the reporting threshold to US $50,000 for all financial institutions except persons licensed to operate an exchange bureau (or cambio), who have a reporting threshold of US $8,000. In addition, the amendment introduced suspicious transaction reporting. In February 2000, the Act was further amended to expand the predicate offenses to include fraud, firearms trafficking, and corruption.

In accordance with powers contained in the MLA, the Director of Public Prosecutions sent a letter to local banks, cambios, and building societies, requesting implementation of a new suspicious transaction reporting form that details why a transaction is considered suspicious. The form, which was distributed to the local financial sector in October 2000, will help investigators in analyzing whether a reported transaction is the result of money laundering.

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) recently submitted to Parliament a package of bills intended to strengthen regulation of the country's financial sector. The bills include amendments to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) Act that are designed to strengthen the authority of the BOJ's financial institutions supervisory division. Other proposed legislation would establish an independent, non-bank supervisory agency-the Financial Services Commission (FSC)-which would become operational on April 1, 2001 (the beginning of the next fiscal year). FSC would regulate financial markets, insurance companies, pension funds, and financial advisors.

In addition to the proposed legislation, the GOJ is taking administrative steps to establish a regulatory policy council that would coordinate the regulatory functions of the BOJ, FSC, and the Jamaica Deposit Insurance Company. The GOJ also plans to establish a commercial court and a financial crimes investigation unit. These steps are part of the GOJ program to rehabilitate the Jamaican financial sector after its 1996-1997 collapse and to prevent future banking crises.

Jamaica has established a Financial Analysis Unit (FAU) to assist in the implementation of its anti-money laundering program. The unit is responsible for receiving, analyzing, and developing information from suspicious activity reports. At the request of the US Embassy in Jamaica and the GOJ, FinCEN visited the FAU on September 5, 2000 to determine its training and technical assistance needs. The unit is in its initial stage of development; however, it is expected to be operational in early 2001. The unit has been collecting threshold reports since 1998. The total number of reports received is unknown because they are too numerous to count easily, although they have received at least 5,000 reports from one bank. The unit has been collecting Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) since 1999, and has received 22 SARs to date.

Two data entry clerks will be detailed to the FAU from the Organized Crime Unit to enter the collected threshold reports and SARs once the FAU receives a software package for the collection and analysis of SARs. After the financial data has been entered, two analysts from the Organized Crime Unit will also be detailed to the FAU for a period of six months. The analysts will be responsible for analyzing the data and forwarding financial reports to the financial crimes investigation unit for a more thorough investigation.

Jamaica is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Jamaica is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. Jamaica and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1995.

The GOJ continues to make progress in bringing its anti-money laundering regime in line with international standards. There is a genuine commitment on the part of the GOJ and the Public Prosecutors Office to combat money laundering and to cooperate with regional and international governments. The GOJ should take steps to further strengthen its money laundering law by extending it to cover the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes and require declarations of large cross-border movements of currency or monetary instruments. The GOJ should also ensure that the FAU is sufficiently staffed and resourced and is brought into operation as soon as possible.

Japan (Primary). Japan is an important world financial center and is believed to be a major money laundering center. The principal sources of laundered funds are drug trafficking and financial crimes (illicit gambling, extortion, abuse of legitimate corporate activities, and all types of property related crimes) as well as the proceeds from violent crimes, mostly linked to Japan's criminal organizations, e.g., the boryokudan. The Japanese National Policy Agency estimates that the boryokudan's illegal activities generate annually several billion dollars in proceeds. US law enforcement reports that drug-related money laundering investigations initiated in the US periodically show a link between drug-related money laundering activities in the U.S and bank accounts in Japan.

Prior to 1999, Japanese law only criminalized narcotics-related money laundering. The Anti-Drug Special Law, enacted in 1991, criminalized drug-related money laundering, mandated suspicious transaction reports for the illicit proceeds of drug offenses, and authorized controlled drug deliveries. This legislation also created a system to confiscate illegal profits gained through drug crimes. The seizure provisions apply to tangible and intangible assets, direct illegal profit, substitute assets, and criminally derived property that has been commingled with legitimate assets. The limited scope of the law and the burden required of law enforcement to prove a direct link between money and assets to specific drug activity severely limited the law's effectiveness. As a result, Japanese police and prosecutors have undertaken few investigations and prosecutions into suspected money laundering.

Pursuant to the 1999 Anti-Organized Crime Law, which came into effect in February 2000, Japan expanded its money laundering law beyond drug trafficking to include money-laundering predicates such as murder, aggravated assault, extortion, theft, fraud, and kidnapping. The new law also extended the confiscation laws to include the additional money laundering predicate offenses and to include value-based forfeitures, and authorized electronic surveillance of organized crime members.

To facilitate exchange of information related to suspected money laundering activity, the law established the Japan Financial Intelligence Office (JAFIO) as Japan's financial intelligence unit. Financial institutions in Japan report suspicious transactions to the JAFIO as instances of suspicious transactions are discovered. The number of suspicious transaction reports continued to increase during the first eleven months of 2000, rising from 900 in 1999 to over 4,000 in 2000.

Japanese banks and financial institutions are required by national laws to record and report the identity of customers engaged in large currency transactions. There are no secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of client and ownership information to bank supervisors and law enforcement authorities. Under the 1998 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, banks and other financial institutions must report transfers abroad of five million yen (approximately US $44,579) or more. Domestic laws also require banks and financial institutions to maintain records for an adequate period of time should they be needed to reconstruct significant transactions. This requirement is not specifically narcotics-related.

Japanese financial institutions have cooperated, when requested, with law enforcement agencies, including US and other foreign government agencies investigating financial crimes related to narcotics. Japan has not adopted "due diligence" or "banker negligence" laws that make individual bankers responsible if their institutions launder money, but there are administrative guidelines in existence that require due diligence. The law does, however, protect bankers and other financial institution employees who cooperate with law enforcement entities.

The 1998 Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law required travelers entering and departing Japan to report physically transported currency and monetary instruments exceeding one million yen (approximately US $8,916) or its equivalent in any other foreign currency to customs authorities. The reporting requirement is virtually ignored by travelers, however, because there is no meaningful penalty (i.e. seizure of currency) for failure to report.

Japan is a party to the 1988 UN Convention and has adopted formal articles of ratification. In December 2000 Japan signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Japan is a member of and also chaired the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) from June 1998 to June 1999. The JAFIO joined the Egmont Group of FIUs in 2000. Japan is also a member of the Asia/Pacific Group against Money Laundering (APG). Japan has endorsed the September 1997 Basle committee's "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision."

Japan has not enacted laws that allow for sharing of seized narcotics assets with other countries. However, the Japanese Government cooperates with efforts by the US and other countries to trace and seize assets, and makes use of tips on the flow of drug-derived assets from foreign law enforcement efforts to trace funds and seize bank accounts.

The government of Japan should stringently enforce the Anti-Organized Crime Law, which will enhance Japan's ability to combat a wide range of money laundering activities. The Government of Japan has many legal tools and agencies in place to successfully detect, investigate and combat money laundering. Japan could strengthen its anti-money laundering regime by enacting penalties for non-compliance with the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, adopting measures to share seized assets with foreign governments, and strongly enforcing banker "due diligence" provisions.

Jersey (Primary). The Bailiwick of Jersey, one of the Channel Islands, is a Crown Dependency of the United Kingdom. Jersey's sophisticated offshore services industry continues to be vulnerable to money laundering at the layering and integration stages. Jersey's financial sector is regulated by the Jersey Financial Services Commission (FSC), which has responsibility for Jersey's banks, building societies, insurance companies, and collective investment schemes. The Company Registry also falls under the purview of the FSC.

The Drug Trafficking Offenses Law of 1988 criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, and the Prevention of Terrorism Law of 1996 did the same for money laundering related to terrorist activity. The Investment Business (Jersey) Law 1998 brings investment advice, management, and dealing into regulation. The FSC is authorized to issue Codes of Practice, and to inspect institutions to ensure that businesses are in compliance. The reporting of suspicious transactions is mandatory under the drug trafficking and terrorism anti-money laundering laws. The Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 extended the predicate offenses for money laundering to all offenses that are punishable by at least one year in prison. Offenses committed abroad are covered in cases where the conduct, if it had occurred in Jersey, would have constituted a predicate offense. There is no exception for fiscal offenses.

In August 2000, the FSC issued an Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Update that provides guidance to the financial services industry, particularly in doing business with sensitive sources. The Guidance instructs Jersey financial institutions to familiarize themselves with each advisory issued by the US Department of Treasury. The Guidance also advises financial services businesses to exercise a higher degree of awareness of the potential problems associated with taking on politically sensitive clients from jurisdictions where bribery and corruption is widely considered to be prevalent.

In May 2000, Jersey approved the Financial Services (Extension) (Jersey) Law 2000. This legislation amended the Investment Business (Jersey) Law by extending Jersey's financial regulations to Jersey's approximately 300 trust and company services providers. Businesses that provide company administration, trustee, or fiduciary services are subject to the law. Secondly, in the course of providing such services, the person must provide any one of a number of services, such as being a company formation agent, a director, a secretary, the provider of registered office, or the provider of accommodation address or acting as trustee. Under the new law, the FSC can visit businesses to ensure they are fully compliant with the law's standards.

The proposed International Co-operation (Jersey) Law would follow the Financial Services (Extension) (Jersey) Law, and provide Jersey with additional authority to assist other law enforcement agencies in pursuing criminals where an offense has been identified and is being investigated.

The Joint Police and Customs Financial Investigation Unit (JPCFIU) is responsible for receiving, investigating and disseminating suspicious transaction reports (STRs). The Unit includes Jersey Police and Customs officers, as well as a financial crime analyst. The JCPFIU is a member of the Egmont Group.

Jersey's large offshore industry includes approximately 20,000 "exempt companies," many of which act solely as asset holding companies; all are limited to transacting business outside Jersey. Exempt companies pay no Jersey taxes. The offshore industry also consists of bank deposits of US $150 billion, mutual funds of US $100 billion, insurance companies (which are largely captive companies), investment advice, dealing and management companies (US $30 billion under management); and trust and company administration companies. The total value of funds administered in Jersey exceeds US $300 billion. These services and facilities combine to offer other services such as private banking for high net worth individuals and corporate services, such as share option schemes and securitizations. Jersey does not distinguish between offshore and onshore banks. Its 74 banks are supervised by the FSC and can be accessed by both residents and non-residents alike.

The FIU recently redesigned the format of Jersey's STRs; filers may select from a broad list of suspected crimes such as drugs, terrorism, fraud, tax fraud, revenue fraud, insider dealing, corruption, unknown/undetermined, regulatory matters, and "other."

The Offshore Group of Bank Supervisors (of which Jersey has been a member since its formation in 1979) carried out a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style mutual evaluation of Jersey. The final report, approved in September 2000, concluded that Jersey was "close to complete adherence" to the FATF 40 Recommendations.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Jersey's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Jersey was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Jersey's anti-money laundering regime:

...Jersey...[has] in place a system for reporting suspicious transactions. Where the underlying criminal conduct is drug trafficking or terrorism, the obligation to report is a direct one. Where the underlying criminal conduct is another predicate offence, the reporting is an "indirect obligation"-failure to make a report potentially leaves one open to a charge of money laundering; making a report is a defence against such a charge....

...Jersey...[allows] certain intermediaries, and individuals, which are subject to the same anti-money laundering standards and supervision as financial institutions, to introduce business to banks and financial institutions on the basis that the introducers themselves verify the identity of the customer. In addition, the jurisdiction allows certain institutions based in certain overseas countries, subject to equivalent anti-money laundering systems, to introduce business, without separately verifying the identity of the client. Banks and other financial institutions in ...Jersey...are only required to know the name of the client but not to verify the identity separately. There is concern as to whether such a system is consistent with FATF Recommendations and provides sufficiently rigorous checks on the identity of clients of banks and financial institutions, especially in cases where the introducer is not a financial institution.

The lack of a stringent scheme to apply the new rules of customer identification for accounts opened prior to their entry into force is also a source of concern. The new rules for customer identification verification were introduced in...Jersey in 1999...

Application of the 1988 UN Drug Convention was extended to the Bailiwick of Jersey on July 7, 1997. Jersey formally endorsed the FATF recommendations on July 21, 1997.

Jersey has established a comprehensive anti-money laundering program, and has demonstrated its commitment to fighting financial crime. Jersey officials cooperate with international anti-money laundering authorities. Jersey should ensure full and timely implementation of its anti-money laundering legislation, and continue to monitor its anti-money laundering program, in order to deter criminals from using the island to launder money.

Jordan (Other). Jordan is not a regional financial center, and the Government of Jordan (GOJ) regulates foreign exchange transactions.

The GOJ has not yet criminalized any form of money laundering. Jordanian law enforcement officials report that some financial institutions cooperate with prosecutors' requests for information related to drug trafficking cases. Jordan's central bank has instructed financial institutions to be on the lookout for customers engaging in "dubious" transfers, and to be particularly careful when handling foreign currency transactions, especially if the amounts involved are large or if the source of funds is in question. Depositors are not required to disclose the origin of large currency deposits or transactions.

Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Kazakhstan (Other). Kazakhstan's relatively advanced financial infrastructure, combined with a significant organized crime presence, puts it at risk for money laundering. More than 200 organized crime groups with ties to similar groups in the United States and Europe are believed to exist in the country.

Kazakhstan has criminalized money laundering for narcotics and other serious crimes. However, inadequate financial controls make detection of money laundering difficult. Bank examiners are not trained to look for evidence of money laundering, but rather focus on traditional safety and soundness concerns. Furthermore, new banking laws went into effect in 2000 that require tax police and investigators to go through local prosecutors in order to obtain bank records. Records may be released only if the prosecutor deems an investigation is warranted.

The United States intends to continue to work closely with local authorities to provide Kazakhstani financial institutions with money laundering and fraud related training and assistance. The US will also continue to consider the government's request for a memorandum of cooperation in fighting economic crimes and fiscal offenses.

Kazakhstan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000, it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Kenya (Other). Kenya's capital, Nairobi, has approximately 50 banks and is a regional financial center for East Africa. Kenya does not have an offshore sector.

The Government of Kenya (GOK) criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking through Section 49 of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Control) Act, 1994. Narcotics-related money laundering is punishable by a maximum prison sentence of 14 years. The GOK has not made any arrests for money laundering; however, Kenyan authorities in 2000 seized the assets of several individuals implicated in a drug trafficking scheme.

The GOK requires banks to maintain records on customers who conduct large transactions. In 1999, the President of Kenya issued a statement denouncing money laundering and granted the Central Bank of Kenya authority to supervise all Kenyan banks. Kenya does not have in place strong cross-border currency controls.

Kenya is expected to sign the memorandum of understanding for the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). In November 2000, GOK officials attended an anti-money laundering conference that was co-sponsored by the Government of Tanzania and the East Africa Community Secretariat. The conference's objectives were to help government officials identify different types of money laundering, and the threat that they pose to their country's financial institutions and economies.

Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea) (Concern). The exact money-laundering situation within North Korea is unknown. What little that is known of North Korea's money laundering operations is that it continues to use Macau as a base of operation for money laundering and other criminal activities. The link with Macau provides international access to financial systems for individuals within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). North Korea's state-owned mint is also alleged to print counterfeit US dollars for laundering in Macau.

Korea (Republic of Korea) (Concern). The Republic of Korea (South Korea) has been used as a transit country for international narcotics trafficking. The Republic of Korea's domestic consumption of narcotics is also on the rise. Organized crime is beginning to gain a hold in the business sector due to corruption and cronyism. Estimates of the amount of money laundered vary. According to the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) study, some 48-147 trillion won (US $8-33 billion) in funds were illegally laundered in 1998 (11-33% of GDP), although other figures set it between 54-169 trillion won (25 % of GDP). Another 25-50 trillion won in illegal capital offshore transfers are expected once the foreign exchange liberalization goes into effect in January 2001.

In 1995, the Republic of Korea criminalized the laundering of narcotics proceeds with the adoption of the Act against Illicit Trafficking in Drugs. An amendment made to this act in 1997 requires financial institutions to report transactions known to be connected to narcotics trafficking to the Prosecutor's Office. Two other pieces of legislation address money laundering in the Republic of Korea. The Act on Real Name Financial Transaction and Guarantee of Secrecy, enacted in late 1997, banned all financial transactions using anonymous, fictitious, and nominee names. The Anti-Public Corruption Forfeiture Act of 1994 provided for the forfeiture of the proceeds of assets derived from corruption.

The government's financial investigations continue to focus on preventing the illegal transfer of funds out of the country. On January 1, 2001, the Korean government implemented the second phase of foreign exchange liberalization. In conjunction with this, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) launched a preparatory organization for a financial intelligence unit (FIU) on April 2000 and drafted two related laws. They are the so-called "Law for Reporting and Using Information of Specific Financial Transactions" and "Law for Prohibition and Punishment of Hiding Criminal Gains." These bills contain various anti-money laundering provisions; however, no action was taken on these measures in 2000.

The Republic of Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Republic of Korea is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. In 1998, the United States and the Republic of Korea signed an extradition treaty, which entered into force in December 1999. The United States and the Republic of Korea cooperate in judicial matters under a 1993 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which entered into force in 1997.

The Republic of Korea needs to enact and enforce legislation that will criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes, require the reporting of all suspicious transactions, and establish a financial intelligence unit to work with domestic and international authorities to combat the threat of money laundering.

Kuwait (Other). Kuwait is not a major regional banking sector; it has six commercial banks, two specialized banks, one Islamic bank, and a branch of a Bahrain-based bank. Kuwait does not have anti-money laundering legislation. Kuwait's central bank in June 1997 ordered domestic banks to take measures to prevent money laundering such as checking clients' identities and the nature of their business. Banks also are to inform the central bank of all cash deposits that exceed the equivalent of US $33,000, and funds transfers that are "irregular." In 1999, the Government of Kuwait (GOK) proposed anti-money laundering legislation that has not yet been approved by Kuwait's National Assembly.

Kuwait is represented before the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Kuwait in December 2000 became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The GOK should develop and implement anti-money laundering legislation that meets accepted international standards.

Kyrgyzstan (Other). Kyrgyzstan is not a financial center, and money laundering is not considered a major problem. However, Kyrgyzstan has not criminalized money laundering and has no anti-money laundering legislation. The central bank has provisions that require customer identification procedures and make an exception to bank secrecy rules for suspicious transaction reporting, but these provisions are believed to be generally ignored by the commercial banks. Oversight of the banking sector remains weak and Kyrgyzstan's law enforcement agencies do not have the resources to conduct effective financial investigations.

The major sources of illegal proceeds remain narcotics trafficking, embezzlement of foreign aid by government officials, smuggling of consumer goods, official corruption and tax evasion.

Kyrgyzstan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000, it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Laos (Other). Laos is not a regional financial center and has no anti-money laundering legislation. Effective anti-money laundering legislation will first require an underlying body of banking law and regulation, most of which currently does not exist. The country does have strict laws on the export of its currency, the Lao kip. The proceeds of drug trafficking most likely are sent to other countries in the region through alternative remittance systems.

The Government of Laos (GOL) is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and has stated its goal to become a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The GOL is working with the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and other foreign consultants to develop the fundamental regulatory framework necessary to bring Laos into compliance with the 1988 Convention. In the interim, the GOL sends its officials to relevant Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) conferences on regional anti-money laundering practices. In addition, GOL officials have participated in anti-money laundering and white-collar crime training at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok.

Latvia (Concern). Money laundering continues to be a major concern in Latvia, largely because Russian organized crime groups use Latvian banks to launder money. Internet gambling may also increase the risk for money laundering.

Money laundering was criminalized for all serious crimes in 1998. There are requirements for customer identification, the maintenance of records on all transactions, and the reporting of large cash transactions (40,000 lats, or approximately US $64,600) and suspicious transactions to the Control Service, which is Latvia's financial intelligence unit. Between June 1998 and January 2000, the Control Service received 1,438 disclosures.

In May 2000, a European Union (EU) inspection team visited Latvia and conducted a study of their money laundering situation. The team's report is said to be very positive, although the results cannot be disclosed until the report is final. The final report is expected early in 2001.

On November 7, 2000, the President of Latvia promulgated a law for a public regulator. Previously, the central bank regulated banks, with separate regulators for the Securities & Exchange Commission and insurance companies. The new law establishes one, united regulator, which will bring Latvia in line with the British/Swedish model. This change will take effect in July 2001.

This year, a World Bank report rated all Eastern European countries for corruption. Latvia was rated positively in terms of administrative corruption, but negatively regarding state capture (because of conflict of interest of high level officials.) Latvia is establishing an independent anticorruption unit to deal with corruption among high level officials. They are working with OECD on a joint antibribery convention.

Latvia's financial intelligence unit (FIU) is the Office for the Prevention of the Laundering of Proceeds Derived from Criminal Activity (Control Service). The Control Service is a member of the Egmont Group. In addition to its existing software, the Latvian FIU has created new software that collates the data from the internal Control Service database containing information on customers who have conducted unusual or suspicious transactions.

Interagency cooperation between Latvian law enforcement agencies tends to be best at the highest governmental levels, but weaker at the working level. Much of the problem stems from lack of financial, material, and human resources.

Latvia is a member of the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV) and, as a member, underwent a mutual evaluation in March 2000. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty has been in effect between the US and Latvia since 1999. Latvia is a party to the UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 Latvia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Government of Latvia should research ways to improve cooperation between Latvian law enforcement agencies at the working level. The key to Latvia's success in combating money laundering will be based on the swiftness and forcefulness with which they continue to strengthen their anti-money laundering program.

Lebanon (Primary). The current legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems of Lebanon create significant opportunities for the laundering and protection of the proceeds of crime. Weaknesses in these systems allow criminals to evade effective investigation and punishment. Sources of laundered funds include narcotics, counterfeiting and smuggling. Laundering in Lebanon takes place through the layering of transactions in banks and through the purchase of property and businesses. The Lebanese banking system is frequently used by Syrians who find it difficult to conduct transactions in their own country because of heavy government restrictions. Lebanon's commitment to bank secrecy and the absence of certain key supervisory and enforcement mechanisms aimed at preventing and detecting money laundering increase the possibility that transactions involving Lebanese entities and accounts will be used for illegal purposes. Lebanon has not to date prosecuted or investigated any cases of money laundering.

An antinarcotics law that came into effect in 1998 criminalized drug-related money laundering, but it is considered inadequate since it does not require the reporting of suspicious or large transactions. It does provide for asset seizure and for piercing bank secrecy in very limited circumstances.

The Banking Control Commission (BCC) supervises and examines commercial banks. BCC examiners may not review individual deposit accounts, and have no access to depositors' names. They are to report any "unusual" activity to the central bank. A customer may waive bank secrecy by giving permission for a third party to review account information. International firms, as required by law, audit ninety percent of commercial banks. Non-bank financial institutions such as exchange houses, stock brokerages, money couriers and insurance companies are not required to report unusual activity, but the amount of money they handle is not significant.

Citing the lack of a legal anti-money laundering framework to combat money laundering, in June 2000 the Financial Action Force (FATF) named Lebanon among its list of 15 jurisdictions that were non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The report criticized Lebanon's strict bank secrecy that restricts access to relevant information, both by administrative and investigative authorities, and also compromises international cooperation.

The United States (US) Treasury has issued an advisory to US financial institutions, indicating they "should give enhanced scrutiny to any transaction originating in or routed to or through Lebanon, or involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts in Lebanon." In addition to the concerns outlined in the FATF report, the advisory also noted the fact that money laundering is only a crime in Lebanon with respect to narcotics and public corruption, and that financial institutions operating in Lebanon are not required to report suspicious transactions.

Lebanese officials have indicated an awareness of deficiencies in Lebanon's anti-money laundering systems, while maintaining that Lebanon is not a significant venue for such illicit activity. The Lebanese cabinet approved a draft law in December 2000 addressing some of the deficiencies outlined in the advisory. The draft law broadens the definition of money laundering to include proceeds obtained from organized crime, illegal arms trafficking, embezzlement of public funds, and counterfeiting of currencies and official documents. If passed by parliament and implemented effectively, the law would significantly strengthen Lebanon's ability to combat money laundering by:

* Requiring banks, financial institutions, and non-banking financial institutions-such as exchange houses, insurance and leasing companies, mutual funds, real estate developers, and merchants of high-value commodities-to (a) ascertain through official documents the identity and address of their clients and (b) maintain official records of clients and transactions for a period of no less than five years.

* Permitting the government to confiscate the proceeds derived from illegal arms trafficking, embezzlement of public funds and counterfeiting of currencies and official documents.

* Imposing prison terms and cash penalties on persons who disguise, conceal, or participate in money laundering operations or fail to report suspicious transactions.

* Establishing an independent "Special Investigation Commission" and "Financial Investigation Unit" to investigate money laundering operations. The Special Investigation Commission would have the power to lift Lebanon's stringent bank secrecy laws in order to find the source of illicit proceeds.

In 2000, the Lebanese Bankers Association also made mandatory its formerly voluntary system for self-regulation, the Due Diligence Convention, a set of requirements designed to combat the laundering of money obtained from illegal drug trade. The Convention addresses such issues as customer identification and record keeping. According to the Lebanese Minister of Finance, the Banking Control Commission has formed an anti-money laundering unit, but it is still not operational and it is unclear what its function will be.

In 2000 Lebanese authorities also repealed a law authorizing offshore banking and required all banks to establish internal audit units and procedures. Lebanon has informed the United States that it will officially terminate its membership in the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors in 2001.

Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, the Lebanese government expressed reservations over the sections of the Convention pertaining to bank secrecy. Lebanon has endorsed the Basle Core Principles and is in the process of implementing them.

Lebanon should enact comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards. Specifically, Lebanon should criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes, and require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to a central authority that will act on these reports and share this information with foreign governments.

Liberia (Other). Liberia is not a major financial center. However, the country increasingly has become a transshipment point for illicit drugs, diamonds, and other commodities. Liberia's offshore activity is concentrated in the ship registry business. Offshore companies are permitted to issue bearer shares. Liberia reportedly has 16 banks, but only a small number are open to the public.

In November 2000, Liberia was one of 14 West African countries that created the Intergovernmental Group of Action against Money Laundering (GIABA).

Liberia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Liechtenstein (Primary). The Principality of Liechtenstein is an important financial center, primarily because of its well-developed offshore financial services sector. The country's low tax rate, loose incorporation and corporate governance rules, and traditions of strict bank secrecy have contributed significantly to the ability of financial intermediaries in Liechtenstein to attract funds from outside the country's borders. The same factors have made the country attractive, and vulnerable, to money launderers.

Liechtenstein has chartered 15 banks, three non-bank financial companies, and 16 public investment companies, as well as insurance and reinsurance companies. Its 230 licensed fiduciary companies and 60 lawyers serve as nominees for, or manage, more than 75,000 entities (primarily corporations, anstalts, or trusts), most for non-Liechtenstein residents; approximately one-third of these entities hold the controlling interest in other entities, chartered in countries other than Liechtenstein. The Principality's laws permit the corporations it charters to issue bearer shares, and until recently at least, the Principality's banking laws permitted banks to issue numbered accounts (about whose true ownership only at most a handful of banking officials know).

Fees paid to Liechtenstein by the corporations and other entities it charters for non-residents account for at least 35 per cent of the Principality's revenues. Liechtenstein does not tax funds earned by its domiciliary corporations from sources outside of Liechtenstein (a fact that increases its attractiveness to offshore customers for financial services), and the revenue flow from corporation fees allows Liechtenstein's taxes on income earned within the country to be relatively low by developed country standards.

Banks, finance companies, and investment businesses chartered or licensed to do business in Liechtenstein are supervised by the Principality's Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA is responsible for supervising all banks and fiduciaries licensed to operate in Liechtenstein and has the authority to conduct on-site spot checks and request information as required; however, reliance is placed on a financial institution or intermediary's approved external auditors for regular compliance examinations and for monitoring implementation of anti-money laundering controls (for example, with respect to an institution's observance of its due diligence obligations).

Drug-related money laundering has been a criminal offense in Liechtenstein since 1993, but the first general anti-money laundering legislation was added to Liechtenstein's laws in 1996. Although the 1996 legislation sought to apply some money laundering controls to financial institutions and intermediaries operating in Liechtenstein, the anti-money laundering regime embodied in the legal, supervisory, and regulatory system of Liechtenstein at that time suffered from serious systemic problems and deficiencies.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named Liechtenstein as one of the 15 countries that had inadequate anti-money laundering regimes and failed to cooperate in international efforts to fight money laundering. The FATF report noted a number of deficiencies in the Principality's anti-money laundering regime, including: inadequate customer identification rules; a limited and inadequate suspicious transaction reporting system; the absence of a financial intelligence unit; inadequate and ineffective laws and procedures governing international cooperation and the exchange of information to assist in criminal investigations by officials of other countries; and an inadequate dedication of resources overall to anti-money laundering programs.

In July 2000, the United States Department of the Treasury issued an advisory on "Transactions Involving Liechtenstein." That document advised banks and other financial institutions operating in the United States "to give enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions originating in or routed to or through" Liechtenstein, or "involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in Liechtenstein." Other countries that participate in the FATF issued similar advisories concerning Liechtenstein.

After the FATF issued its report, the Government of Liechtenstein (GOL) took important legislative and administrative action to improve its anti-money laundering regime. The Principality amended its Due Diligence Act, and enacted a new law governing Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, on September 15, 2000. It also issued an Executive Order, on December 5, 2000, concerning implementation of the changes in the Due Diligence Act, as well as an Ordinance to establish a financial intelligence unit, and it has revised relevant portions of its Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes, and its Narcotics Act (1993).

The latest legislative and regulatory changes became effective January 1, 2001. They affect the range of Liechtenstein's law criminalizing money laundering and the obligations of financial institutions to identify customers, to establish due diligence procedures relating to potentially questionable customer activity, and to report suspicious activity. The FSA issued a Directive 2001/1, "Concerning Indication of Money Laundering," in January 2001, which is intended "to sensitize financial intermediaries" to the need to recognize situations that call for further inquiry by intermediaries under the changes in Liechtenstein's due diligence legislation.

The changes to Liechtenstein's Criminal Code add a wide range of predicate crimes to the definition of money laundering and make other improvements to the Code's provisions. Of particular importance is a provision enacted in December 2000 that broadens Art. 165 of the Criminal Code to cover "own funds" money laundering offenses in non-narcotics offenses. However, Liechtenstein also added language to Art. 165 prohibiting punishment for money laundering of an individual who had already been punished for committing the relevant predicate offense. The latter provision is an unnecessary restriction that weakens the government's anti-money laundering enforcement powers. It is important that Liechtenstein fully apply its anti-money laundering efforts to own funds (as well as other forms of) money laundering.

The amendments to the Due Diligence Act eliminate a provision that allowed banks to rely on lawyers and trustees for identifying their clients and now requires banks and all other financial intermediaries to identify their clients and the beneficial owners of accounts. (Transactions of non-clients involving CHF 25,000 are exempted by statute from the requirement.) These "know your customer" provisions are effective January 1, 2001, although financial intermediaries are provided with a two year grace period to bring existing accounts into compliance. Liechtenstein's Banker's Association, however, requires that its members comply with the new rules within one year.

Under Liechtenstein's former law, financial institutions did not have to report suspicious transactions unless they had "a strong suspicion" of money laundering and a basis for believing that the funds were derived from narcotics trafficking. The new law permits financial institutions to report suspicious transactions for a broad range of offenses and based on a suspicion. The new provisions are potentially weakened, however, by the fact that before filing a suspicious transactions report (STR), the financial institution must clarify the economic background and purpose of the transaction as well as the origin of the assets, and then file the report only if the suspicion cannot be eliminated. Another perceived weakness in the law is a limitation on the "no tipping off" period that follows the filing of a report, so that financial institutions are permitted eventually to advise customers that they were the subject of a STR. A great deal will thus depend upon the manner in which the new suspicious transaction reporting rules are administered and enforced by Liechtenstein authorities.

The new laws also address the independence of accountants reporting to the FSA on anti-money laundering compliance. Future audits of compliance will cover both systems and individual transactions; individual transactions were not previously included in the permissible scope of compliance audits. The audits must now be conducted by independent accountants who are not the normal external auditors of the company, in contrast to the previous practice (under which the same auditors were routinely engaged). Furthermore, the results of the audits will be provided to the FSA for review.

In December 2000, Liechtenstein created a financial intelligence unit (FIU) within the FSA, and formed a state police unit, in May 2000, to combat white-collar crime. The FIU is scheduled to become an independent Liechtenstein agency later this year and plans to apply to join the Egmont Group. The Austrian Federal Police are currently training and assisting the Liechtenstein state police in connection with the work of the special police unit focusing on financial crime. The government has also hired additional prosecutors and judges.

The new law on mutual legal assistance took effect on November 6, 2000. The law streamlines the procedure for dealing with foreign requests for legal assistance and reduces from 12 to three the number of permitted appeals from decisions by the Liechtenstein authorities. Liechtenstein has recently appointed three new prosecutors and four new investigating judges who will concentrate initially on dealing with the backlog of cases where legal assistance requests have not yet been executed. Parliament has also approved the appointment of four new judges to process extradition cases through the courts.

The GOL appointed a special prosecutor, in early 2000, to investigate allegations of government collusion in money laundering. In a report in August 2000, the special prosecutor cited serious shortcomings in Liechtenstein's legislation. He noted that Liechtenstein courts had failed to bring money laundering cases to trial and had been extremely slow in responding to mutual legal assistance requests from other governments. However, the report did not substantiate any allegations of government collusion. The investigations led by the special prosecutor did, however, result in criminal charges being brought against several individuals. In May 2000, six officers and employees of fiduciary firms suspected of money laundering, including an opposition member of Liechtenstein's parliament, were arrested.

Liechtenstein has in place legislation to seize, forfeit, and share forfeited assets with cooperating countries. During 2000, Liechtenstein authorities blocked more than US $120 million smuggled out of Nigeria by former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha. The final figures are expected to exceed US $150 million in frozen assets.

Liechtenstein is a member of the Council of Europe Select Committee on Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and has signed the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search and Confiscation of Proceeds from Crime. (A September 1999 mutual evaluation of Liechtenstein's anti-money laundering programs by the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures in September 1999 reflected many of the same criticisms voiced nine months later by the FATF.) In December 2001, Liechtenstein signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Liechtenstein has endorsed the Basle Committee Core Principles for effective banking supervision. In April 2000, Liechtenstein and the United States agreed to begin negotiation of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT); those negotiations are expected to begin in 2001.

The GOL has adopted a number of new anti-money laundering measures in 2000 that could dramatically enhance the effectiveness of the country's anti-money laundering program. The GOL's success in combating money laundering will be contingent on its political will and on how forcefully and effectively the Principality implements its anti-money laundering program.

Lithuania (Other). Lithuania is vulnerable to money laundering; smuggling, narcotics trafficking, capital flight, profit concealment, and tax evasion most likely are the major sources of illicit funds flowing through Lithuania's financial system. Russian organized crime groups reportedly have used financial institutions in the Baltics to launder money.

Lithuania amended its criminal code in 1997 to criminalize money laundering related to all crimes. The Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering (LPML), which entered into force in January 1998, requires covered financial institutions to report suspicious transactions; identify customers whose transactions exceed litas (LTL) 50,000 (approximately US $12,500) or equivalent in foreign currency; maintain a register of customers who engage in transactions that exceed LTL 50,000 or equivalent in foreign currency; and retain certain documents for a minimum of 10 years. The LPML also specifies information that must be reported to the tax police. The Bank of Lithuania (BOL) issues currency transaction reporting requirements and regulations, and is required to share money-laundering violation information with law enforcement and other state institutions upon request. Non-bank financial institutions operate under guidelines similar to banks. The BOL has the authority to examine the books, records, and other documents of all financial institutions.

The Money Laundering Prevention Division (MLPD) of the Tax Police is Lithuania's financial intelligence unit. In 2000, the MLPD initiated three investigations. The United States provides anti-money laundering training to Lithuanian authorities.

Lithuania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. There is a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) between the United States and Lithuania, which entered into force in 1999. Lithuania is a member of the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and the MLPD is a member of the Egmont Group.

Luxembourg (Primary). Luxembourg is a major world financial center, with over 200 international financial institutions that benefit from the country's strict bank secrecy laws and operate an unrestricted range of services and activities. The existence of bank secrecy laws, and the size and sophistication of Luxembourg's financial center, pose major risks for money laundering through Luxembourg's banks and offshore financial industry. Nevertheless, the Government of Luxembourg (GOL) plays an active role in the European Union (EU) efforts to combat money laundering.

Two laws, the Law of 7 July 1989, updated in 1998, and the Law of 18 December 1993, criminalize the laundering of proceeds for all offenses. These anti-money laundering laws also implement the customer identification, record keeping, and suspicious transaction reporting requirements mandated by the EU anti-money laundering directive.

The Parquet de Luxembourg/Service Anti-Blanchiment, which reports to the Public Prosecutor, serves as Luxembourg's financial intelligence unit (FIU), receiving and analyzing financial disclosures. The FIU is a member of the Egmont Group and has information sharing agreements with Belgium and France.

The Government of Luxembourg licenses offshore banks, non-bank financial institutions and international business companies (IBCs). Approximately 200 banks operate as "universal banks," with an unrestricted range of services. Foreign institutions seeking to become established in Luxembourg must demonstrate prior establishment in a foreign country, and meet stringent minimum capital requirements. Banks must undergo annual audits, but only the Commissioner of Bank Control can gain access to the identity of beneficial owners of accounts. In 1999 Luxembourg had 1,650 offshore investment funds, 118 insurance companies , 279 reinsurance companies and approximately 68,000 IBCs. Companies must maintain a registered office in Luxembourg and a government registry lists company directors. However, there is no requirement to identify the beneficial owner of the business and bearer shares are allowed.

Luxembourg is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 Luxembourg signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Luxembourg is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Luxembourg and the United States exchanged instruments of ratification for a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) on December 20, 2000. The MLAT entered into force in February 2001.

The GOL has enacted laws and adopted practices that help to prevent the abuse of its bank secrecy laws, which are consistent with those of other EU members. However, legal provisions continue to limit or prevent access to information about beneficial ownership of accounts and businesses, which may hinder efforts to combat money laundering. The GOL should address these issues, and strengthen enforcement to prevent international criminals from abusing Luxembourg's financial sector.

Macau (Concern). Macau reverted to Chinese sovereignty in December 1999, and became a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China with substantial autonomy in all areas except defence and foreign affairs. The new Macau SAR government is implementing law enforcement reforms and is expected to restructure the important gambling industry. Macau has passed anti-money laundering legislation, but there is no active enforcement effort in practice. In a positive step, the Macau SAR government stated in December 2000 that it has agreed to a joint review of its anti-money laundering regime by the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). Macau is an observer jurisdiction of the APG.

Macau's free port, offshore financial services, lack of foreign exchange controls, disaggregated law enforcement agencies, problematic (albeit improving) law and order situation, and nascent anticorruption efforts create an environment conducive to money laundering. Macau serves as a gateway to China, and can be used as a transit point to remit funds and criminal proceeds to and from China, Hong Kong, and other Asian countries. Organized crime groups based in Macau are believed to launder their proceeds through joint ventures and real estate purchases in China, or through cross border cash transfers, front companies, real estate purchases, currency exchanges, and alternative remittance systems. Gaming and related services play a critical role in the Macau economy. They account for approximately 40 percent of GDP. Direct taxes from gambling accounted for 43 percent of government revenue in 1999. Organized crime groups are associated with the gambling industry through such activities as racketeering, loan sharking, and prostitution. As a result, it is likely that the casino industry in particular provides an avenue for the laundering of illicit funds.

Macau has enacted three laws that deal with money laundering. These are: the Macau Financial System Act, approved by Decree Law Number 32/93/M on July 5, 1993; the Law on Organized Crime, approved by Decree Law Number 6/97/M on July 30, 1997; and Decree Law Number 24/98/M of June 1, 1998, which established preventive anti-money laundering measures.

The Macau Financial System Act lays out regulations to prevent the use of the banking system for money laundering. It requires the mandatory identification and registration of financial institution shareholders, customer identification requirements, and external auditing. These regulatory measures are applicable to credit institutions and financial companies headquartered in Macau and branches of credit institutions headquartered abroad. In June 1996, the Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority of Macau issued anti-money laundering guidelines for banks. External audits include reviews of compliance with anti-money laundering statutes.

Article 10 of the Law on Organized Crime criminalizes money laundering for the proceeds of all domestic and foreign criminal activities and contains provisions for the freezing of suspect assets and instrumentalities of crime. Although legal entities may be civilly liable for money laundering offenses, their employees may be criminally liable. The preventive measures in Decree Law Number 24/98/M set forth requirements for reporting suspicious transactions to the Judiciary Police and other appropriate supervisory authorities. These reporting requirements apply to all legal entities supervised by the Monetary Authority, the Inspectorate of Gaming, the Department of Finance, and the Inspectorate of Economic Activities. These entities include pawnbrokers, antique dealers, art dealers, jewelers, and real estate agents.

Macau does not have a standard suspicious transactions report form. Only a minimal number of suspicious transactions reports have been filed since the implementation of Decree Law 24/98/M. None has led to prosecution. Concern in the banking industry about possible retribution from criminal elements is apparently one reason for the small number of suspicious transactions reports from this sector. There have been no reports filed on possible suspicious transactions occurring in the casinos. The Inspectorate of Gaming does not play an active role in preventing money laundering in the casinos. Especially removed from official scrutiny are activities and transactions that occur within quasi-private VIP rooms that cater to clients seeking-and willing to pay for-anonymity within Macau's gaming establishments. Given the important economic role of the casino industry, there is a concern in Macau about the economic effects of any efforts to combat money laundering. Macau has no financial intelligence unit.

The Monetary and Foreign Exchange Authority of Macau started participating in meetings of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) five years ago, but Macau is not an official member. Macau is a member of the OGBS.

Macau offers two types of limited liability company formation that have implications for money laundering: public corporations with the suffix designation "SARL" and quota companies with suffix designation "Lda." Quota companies are more popular with foreign investors. Both types of limited liability companies allow for shielding the identity of beneficial owners since shareholders in quota companies may be nominees and SARLs are allowed to issue bearer shares. Although these commercial entities are subject to Macau's anti-money laundering legislation, the characteristics allowing for anonymity are attractive for money laundering activities.

The Macau SAR government should place increased priority on the anti-money laundering issue and increase resources devoted to enforcement. It should also consider adopting more effective anti-money laundering legislation, including measures specifically designed to combat money laundering in the casinos and measures that provide for bulk currency and threshold reporting. It should also review provisions in its company formation statutes that prevent authorities from identifying the beneficial owners of businesses that might serve as conduits for money laundering.

Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of (Other). The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is not a regional financial center. The country's economy is heavily cash-based because of the population's distrust of the banking, financial, and tax systems. Money laundering in the FYROM most likely is connected to financial crimes such as tax evasion, financial and privatization fraud, bribery, and corruption rather than narcotics trafficking.

Article 273 of the FYROM's criminal code, which came into force in 1996, appears to criminalize money laundering related to all crimes. The legislation specifically identifies narcotics and arms trafficking as predicate offenses, and contains an additional provision that covers funds that are acquired from other punishable actions. The Ministry of Finance reportedly has proposed legislation that would require covered financial institutions to identify customers; to retain records for a minimum of five years; and to report suspicious transactions. The legislation also would establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU).

The FYROM is a member of the Council of Europe's (COE) Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), and in October 1999, underwent a mutual evaluation by the group. The US Government has provided anti-money laundering training to FYROM law enforcement authorities. The FYROM is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Madagascar (Other). Madagascar is not a regional financial center. Article 102 of Madagascar's 1997 drug law criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking.

Madagascar is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, it signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Malawi (Other). Malawi has one of the least-developed economies in the world. The country has seven licensed commercial banks (five of which are operational), which are supervised by the Reserve Bank of Malawi, Malawi's central bank. In 1994, the Government of Malawi eliminated its foreign exchange controls.

In 2000 Malawi became a member of the newly formed Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). Malawi is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Malaysia (Concern). Malaysia is not an important regional financial center and the extent of money laundering in Malaysia is unknown. However, Malaysia offers a wide range of financial services (in the traditional financial sector as well as through alternative remittance systems) that are potentially attractive to money launderers. In particular, the country's offshore center, Labaun, has conditions conducive to money laundering and other financial crimes. The Government of Malaysia has indicated its desire to enact comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation in 2001.

The Dangerous Drugs (Forfeiture of Property) Act 1988 (FOPA) and the Anticorruption Act 1998 criminalized the laundering of proceeds from these crimes, however, neither statute has been successfully used in a criminal case. The FOPA also authorizes assistance to foreign countries in relation to matters connected with drug trafficking. The Government of Malaysia (GOM) has a well-developed regulatory framework, including licensing and background checks, to oversee onshore financial institutions. In 1993, the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the Malaysian central bank, issued "Guidelines on Money Laundering and 'Know Your Customer Policy" to educate financial institutions on money laundering issues. Under the guidelines, banks should identify customers, maintain transaction records, train their staffs on money laundering controls, and report suspicious transactions to the BNM. The guidelines also provide a list of suspicious indicators to help banks determine which transactions to report. However, these guidelines do not have the force of law.

Notwithstanding Malaysia's strict bank secrecy laws, Malaysian authorities do have access to banking information when conducting a criminal investigation. However, the lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering statute makes money laundering an area of concern. Malaysia does have an asset forfeiture law that allows seizure of criminal assets. Led by the BNM, Malaysia is now actively engaged in drafting a comprehensive anti-money laundering bill, and has requested technical assistance from the US government.

In 1998, Malaysia imposed foreign exchange controls that restrict the flow of the local currency, the ringgit, to outside Malaysia. Some smugglers of currency have since been arrested. Under these exchange control laws, onshore banks must note cross-border transfers of over 10,000 ringgit (approximately US $2,630).

The potential for money laundering activities at the Malaysian offshore banking facility in Labuan is of particular concern. The Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority (LOFSA, often referred to simply as "Labuan") provides a wide range of financial services such as offshore banking and trust partnerships, which are restricted to the fields of accounting, actuarial science, engineering and law. There are 60 offshore banks (52 foreign-owned), approximately 79 insurance companies, 4 mutual funds, 6 fund managers, and 20 trust companies operating in Labuan. There are no reporting requirements for individual financial transactions. Because there is no requirement to register offshore trusts, their number is not known. Nominee accounts are permitted in Labuan, as are nominee directors of Labuan's approximately 2,574 international business companies equivalents. There is no requirement to disclose the beneficial owner of a corporation. There is, however, a government registry of corporate directors and shareholders, although this information is not available to the public. Malaysia has several pieces of legislation dealing specifically with Labuan.

Malaysia has no bilateral agreements for the sharing of information on money laundering, but does allow foreign countries to check the operations of their banks' branches. Malaysia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In 2000, Malaysia joined the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and agreed to participate in an APG mutual evaluation in July 2001. Malaysia will host the next plenary of the APG in May 2001. Malaysia has endorsed the Basle Committee "core principles" and adheres to them. Malaysia became a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) in 1999.

The Government of Malaysia (GOM) should enact and enforce comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. Further expansion of Malaysia's participation in multinational anti-money laundering organizations would also be helpful in ensuring that money launderers do not abuse Malaysian financial institutions, including those in Labuan.

Maldives (Other). There is no significant financial activity or evidence of money laundering in the Maldives. However, the Maldives does not have in place legislation that specifically addresses money laundering or procedures or policies such as a suspicious transaction reporting system that would detect money laundering.

Although some officials in the Government of the Maldives want to establish an offshore financial center, the Maldives's antiquated banking laws and regulations, and currency controls have hindered progress in this area.

The Maldives became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention in September 2000.

Mali (Other). Mali is one of the world's poorest countries, and has a poorly developed financial infrastructure. In November 2000, Mali was one of 14 West African countries that attended a meeting to establish the Intergovernmental Group of Action Against Money Laundering (GIABA).

Mali is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Malta (Other). Malta does not appear to have a serious money laundering problem. The Maltese Financial Services Center (MFSC), the regulatory agency responsible for licensing new banks and financial institutions, also monitors financial transactions going through Malta.

The GOM criminalized money laundering in 1994. Maltese law imposes a maximum fine of approximately US $2 million and/or 14 years in prison for those convicted. Also in 1994, the Central Bank of Malta issued the Prevention of Money Laundering Regulations, applicable to financial and credit institutions, life insurance companies, and investment and stock firms. These regulations impose requirements for customer identification, record keeping, the reporting of suspicious transactions, and the training of employees in anti-money laundering topics. In 1996,the central bank issued guidance notes to assist the banking sector in implementing the regulations. In accordance with the regulations, suspicious transaction reports are filed with the competent authority that supervises an institution (in the case of banks, the Maltese central bank), which then forwards them to the Economic Crimes Unit of the Maltese Police. The GOM is establishing a financial intelligence unit (FIU) to receive and analyze these reports.

Bank secrecy laws are completely lifted by law in cases of money laundering (or other criminal) investigations. Bearer shares or anonymous accounts are no longer permitted in Malta.

Malta is a member of the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors but has publicly announced that offshore business will completely cease by 2004. No further offshore registration of banks or IBCs has been possible since January 1997. In 2000, four offshore banks continued to operate (two of which are subsidiaries of local banks) and 757 IBCs, which continued to act as nominee companies, were registered. The FATF, which reviewed Malta's financial regime via the FATF Non-cooperative Countries and Territories exercise, did not determine that Malta was a non-cooperative jurisdiction but did urge Malta "to accelerate the phasing-out of the nominee company system."

In July 2000, the FBI gave a formal training course in basic money laundering and asset forfeiture investigations to 40 GOM officers of the Economic Crimes Unit who will be part of the new FIU.

Malta is a member of the Council of Europe' Select Committee of Experts on the Subject of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). Malta is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Marshall Islands (Concern). The Republic of the Marshall Islands, located in the North Pacific Ocean, in a group of atolls, with a population of approximately 65,000, is a constitutional government in free association with the United States. In June 2000, the FATF listed the Marshall Islands as a non-cooperative jurisdiction. In response, the Marshall Islands has adopted comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation to address most of the deficiencies identified by the FATF. However, inadequate commercial law requirements still leave the Marshall Islands vulnerable to financial crime and money launderers.

Marshall Island non-resident corporations (NRCs)-the equivalent of international business companies (IBCs)-are of the greatest concern. The Association Law of the Republic of the Marshall Islands of 1990 is the legislative basis for establishing NRCs, of which, by December 2000, there were reportedly 4000 registered, half of which are companies formed for the purpose of registering ships. NRCs are allowed to offer bearer shares. Corporate officers, directors, and shareholders may be of any nationality and live anywhere, and their names need not be disclosed on incorporation records. Corporate entities may be listed as officers and shareholders and although NRCs must maintain a registered office in the Marshall Islands, the Associations Law of 1990 allows for corporations to transfer domicile into and out of the Marshall Islands with relative ease. Marketers of offshore services via the Internet promote the Marshall Islands as a favored jurisdiction for establishing NRCs. All NRCs are formed and registered by an American company that has the exclusive contract to do so on behalf of the GRMI. In addition to NRCs, the Marshall Islands offers non-resident trusts, partnerships, unincorporated associations, and domestic and foreign limited liability companies. Under the law of the Republic, NRCs are prohibited from engaging in any "financial institutions" type of activities such as those defined in section two of the Banking (Amendment) Act 2000. Offshore banks and insurance companies are not permitted in the Marshall Islands.

Citing many of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering program, the FATF in June 2000 listed the Marshall Islands as one of 15 jurisdictions that were non-cooperative in international anti-money laundering efforts. The report noted:

It lacks a basic set of anti-money laundering regulations, including the criminalization of money laundering, customer identification and a suspicious transaction reporting system. While the size of the financial sector in the Marshall Islands is limited with only three onshore banks and no offshore banks, the jurisdiction has registered about 3,000 IBCs. The relevant information on those international companies is guarded by the excessive secrecy provision and not accessible by financial institutions.

Following the FATF exercise, the US Treasury Department, citing similar concerns, issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving the Marshall Islands.

In response, the Marshall Islands has adopted some important anti-money laundering measures. In October 2000, the Marshall Islands parliament adopted the Banking (Amendment) Act of 2000, which requires customer identification for accounts, mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions to a central authority, and criminalizes money laundering relating to serious offenses. However, the Act contains no additional requirements for NRCs such as annual reports or disclosure of beneficial ownership.

In November 2000, the GRMI approved the establishment of a financial intelligence unit that will be empowered to exchange information with international law enforcement agencies and financial regulators, as well as assist in investigations.

The GRMI needs to draft and issue regulations to implement its new anti-money laundering legislation, and needs to assert supervisory authority over its limited financial services sector with particular emphasis paid to company formation.

Mauritius (Other). Money laundering occurs in Mauritius; however, there is no concrete information as to its amount or origin. Mauritius has an offshore sector.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Mauritius's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Mauritius was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Mauritius's anti-money laundering regime:

Mauritius has a range of legislation governing the domestic and offshore financial services industries. Some concerns have been identified regarding the identity of directors and beneficial owners of offshore trusts but the Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, passed on 13 June 2000, reinforces the existing legislation in the prevention of and fight against money laundering.

The Economic Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Law (ECAMLL) requires financial institutions, cash dealers, and professionals to report suspicious transactions to the country's central bank, the Bank of Mauritius, which forwards the reports to the independent Economic Crimes Office (ECO). The ECO is responsible for investigating suspicious transactions reports (STRs). Members of professions who deal with financial transactions, including notaries and lawyers, are required to file STRs directly with the ECO. By year's end, the ECO had initiated more than 20 investigations based on STRs. The ECAMLL also authorizes international cooperation in money laundering investigations, and requires financial institutions to maintain adequate records of financial transactions.

Since passage of the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Act in 1992, approximately 15,000 offshore businesses have been formed, (of which 10,700 are currently active) and 11 offshore banks have been granted licenses. Applications to form offshore companies are reviewed by the Mauritius Offshore Business Activities Authority (MOBAA), which provides a recommendation to the Ministry of Finance. The Banking Act of 1988 subjects all offshore banking activities to the supervision of the central bank. The central bank's prior approval is required to open foreign currency accounts at offshore banks. Offshore insurance companies and other non-banking businesses fall under the supervisory authority of the MOBAA. The Government of Mauritius (GOM) has announced its intention in 2001 to create a Financial Services Authority that will supervise all of Mauritius's financial services entities.

Mauritius is a signatory to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but has not yet ratified the convention. In December 2000, Mauritius signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Mauritius is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors.

Mexico (Primary). Mexico's financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds that include significant amount of US dollars. Mexican drug trafficking organizations continue to exploit Mexican banks and money exchange institutions by transferring illicit proceeds to financial systems worldwide. The smuggling of bulk shipments of US currency into Mexico and the movement of the cash back into the United States via couriers and armored vehicles, as well as through wire transfers, remain favored methods for laundering drug proceeds. Although drug trafficking continues to be the principal source of the laundered proceeds, other crimes including kidnapping, corruption, firearms trafficking, and immigrant trafficking are also major sources of illegal proceeds. President Fox has publicly pledged to attack government corruption, which in the past has hindered anti-money laundering efforts and compromised criminal investigations and prosecutions.

During 2000, the Government of Mexico (GOM) increased its efforts at combating narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit (Hacienda), the National Banking Commission and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) not only made greater efforts at enforcing the measures available to them under the existing law, but also sought to close loopholes by expanding preventive measures. These included new regulations issued in December 2000 that extended reporting, record keeping, and customer identification requirements to non-bank financial institutions. The regulations entered into force February 1, 2000.

Substantively, the Mexican anti-money laundering system contains the essential elements to meet international standards such as those of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Forty Recommendations. Article 400 bis of the Federal Penal Code (in effect since 1996) extends the money laundering offense to all criminal activity and applies as well to the proceeds of offenses committed in foreign jurisdictions. Official corruption has been addressed with Mexico's anti-money laundering laws; penalties are increased by 50 percent when the crime involves a government official in charge of the prevention, investigation or prosecution of money laundering. Banks and other financial institutions (e.g. mutual savings companies, insurance companies, financial advisers, currency exchange houses, stock market, credit institutions) are required to know and identify customers, and maintain records of transactions. They must report currency transactions over $10,000, and transactions considered suspicious or unusual to Hacienda's Attached General Directorate for Transactions Investigations (DGAIO), Mexico's financial intelligence unit (FIU).

In 2000, the DGAIO began automated filing of transaction reports from the financial sector and instituted a series of checks to ensure integrity. Through the end of the year, the DGAIO processed more than 6.5 million currency transaction reports, nearly 1,500 suspicious activity reports; and opened over 100 new investigations.

The DGAIO and the banking community continue to expand access to the automated filing network and have sponsored seminars and conferences for the entire banking community (bankers, regulators, and examiners). Overall, industry compliance with reporting has improved. At the November 2000 annual meeting of the Mexican Banking Association, self-imposed reporting requirements were promulgated within the banking sector.

In 1998, the PGR established a special prosecutorial unit that continues to develop a staff of in-house expert investigators to strengthen the money laundering cases presented to the judiciary. In 2000, Mexico initiated 27 prosecutions involving some 53 individuals under its money laundering laws. Of these, 31 have been arraigned but none sentenced. In 2000, three convicted individuals were sentenced in cases dating from 1998.

In January 2000, the US Department of the Treasury and the Mexican Hacienda entered into a Memorandum of Understanding for the exchange of information on the cross-border movement of currency and monetary instruments. The responsible authorities for the implementation of this MOU are the US Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the DGAIO. In December 2000, Mexico amended its Customs Law to reduce the threshold for reporting inbound cross border transportation of currency or monetary instruments from $20,000 to $10,000. At the same time, it established a requirement for the reporting of outbound cross-border transportation of currency or monetary instruments of $10,000 or more.

Mexico is a full and active partner in the Money Laundering Group of the US/Mexico High-Level Contact Group. Mexico and the United States continue to implement their bilateral treaties and agreements for cooperation in law enforcement issues, including the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), the Executive Agreement on Asset Sharing, and the Financial Information Exchange Agreement (FIEA). Mexico has also entered into bilateral agreements with other countries that provide for international cooperation on money laundering matters.

In June 2000, Mexico was accepted as a full FATF member, and joined the Caribbean FATF as a cooperating and supporting nation. Through membership and participation in the FATF, the Egmont Group of FIUs and the OAS/CICAD Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, Mexico continues to expand its presence at international anti-money laundering fora. Mexico is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Through workshops with industry representatives, the Mexican Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit has sought to clarify the implementation procedures of the 1998 regulations for transaction reporting. Substantial progress has been made in the past year but there is still misunderstanding throughout the financial sector of what is required to be reported. Mexico is positioning itself to guard against electronic money laundering and the use of "smart cards" by examining domestic industry standards. Although no investigations have been initiated, these new technologies may present the greatest challenge as Mexico integrates into a global economy.

Mexico has established a sound legislative basis for its anti-money laundering policies, and has demonstrated an international commitment to combat money laundering. However, one weak area that remains is that customer identification provisions do not apply to third party beneficiaries, which affects high value transactions made by individuals on behalf of the principal account holders. Identifying the true owners of the bulk cash that transits the US-Mexican border must remain a priority item for both governments to stem transactions involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds.

Mexico also continues to lack sufficient qualified and experienced personnel in the regulatory agencies and within the banking community to implement and enforce oversight and compliance programs. Additional efforts also need to be directed towards developing cooperative relationships among law enforcement, financial regulators and the financial sector to reduce vulnerabilities. Finally, Mexico needs to follow through on recent pledges and efforts to combat corruption to ensure that its anti-money laundering program is successful.

Micronesia (Other). The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is a constitutional government in free association with the United States. It is not a regional financial center. There are four financial institutions in the country-two local banks and two foreign branches. There have been no known money laundering schemes related to narcotics proceeds. Financial crimes, such as bank fraud, do not appear to be increasing in frequency. Contraband smuggling, centered on alcohol and tobacco products, may generate illicit proceeds. The FSM does not permit offshore banking.

Moldova (Other). Moldova is not a significant financial or money laundering center. Awareness of money laundering among government officials and financial institutions has been aided by the assistance of US experts from the Treasury Department, who provided training, advice and consultation related to the prevention of money laundering. In addition, the FBI is presenting an ongoing series of courses on fighting organized crime and corruption in Moldova. Moldova has drafted a statute on money laundering, however, it is currently in the legislative process and has not been approved.

Moldova is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Moldova signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Moldova is a member of the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV), a FATF-style body.

Monaco (Concern). The Principality of Monaco is not a regional financial center. However, it is considered vulnerable to money laundering because of its strict bank secrecy laws and extensive network of casinos. Russian organized crime and the Italian Mafia reportedly have laundered money in Monaco.

Monaco has 70 financial institutions, 37 of which are banks. Most of the banking sector is concentrated in portfolio management and private banking. The subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Monaco can withhold customer information from the parent bank. Monaco also has an offshore sector, and permits the formation of both trust and international business companies (IBCs). Monaco permits the formation of five different types of IBCs: limited liability companies; branches of foreign parent companies; partnerships with limited liability; partnerships with unlimited liability; and sole proprietorships. Ready-made "shelf companies" are not permitted. The incorporation process generally takes 4 to 9 months. Monaco does not maintain a central registry of IBCs, and authorities have no legal basis for seeking information on the activities of offshore companies.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) conducted a review of Monaco's anti-money laundering regime against 25 specified criteria. Monaco was not identified by the FATF as a noncooperative country in the international fight against money laundering. However, the FATF in its June report noted the following about Monaco's anti-money laundering regime:

The anti-money laundering system in Monaco is comprehensive. However, difficulties have been encountered with Monaco by countries in international investigations on serious crimes that appear to be linked also with tax matters. In addition, the FIU of Monaco (SICCFIN) suffers a great lack of adequate resources. The authorities of Monaco have stated that they will provide additional resources to SICCFIN.

Money laundering in Monaco is a criminal offense. Banks, insurance companies, and stockbrokers are required to report suspicious transactions and to disclose the identities of those involved. Casino operators must alert the government to gambling payments suspected to be derived from drug trafficking or organized crime. Another law imposes a 5-10 year jail sentence for anyone convicted of using ill-gotten gains to purchase property (which is itself subject to confiscation).

Monaco established its financial intelligence unit, the Service d'Information et de Controle sur les Services Financiers (SICCFIN), to collect information on suspected money launderers. The SICCFIN is a member of the Egmont Group.

Monaco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Mongolia (Other). Mongolia is not a regional financial center. However, Mongolia's vulnerability to transnational crimes such as money laundering most likely has grown with the country's increased levels of international trade and tourism. Mongolia's long, unprotected borders with Russia and China make it particularly vulnerable to smuggling and narcotics trafficking. Illegal money transfers and public corruption are other sources of illicit funds in Mongolia. In 2000, Mongolian police seized approximately $1 million in counterfeit US currency. Mongolia does not have anti-money laundering legislation. Moreover, Mongolia's ability to fight all forms of transnational crime is hampered by a weak legal system, and an inability to effectively patrol its borders, to detect illegal smuggling, and to conduct transnational criminal investigations.

The Government of Mongolia (GOM) has made protection of its borders a priority. The GOM has increased its participation in regional and international fora that focus on transnational criminal activities. For example, Mongolia is working with other countries in the region to join the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering. US Government assistance to the GOM includes international visitor programs on transnational crime and counter narcotics measures, and joint operations and training by regional representatives of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Secret Service.

Montserrat (Other). Montserrat is a Caribbean Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom. Volcanic activity between 1995 and 1998 greatly reduced the population and business activity on the island, although an offshore financial services sector remains that may attract money launderers. As with the other British Caribbean Overseas Territories, Montserrat underwent a thorough evaluation of its financial regulation in 2000, co-sponsored by the local and British governments.

Montserrat's offshore sector consists of 15 offshore banks and 22 international business companies (IBCs). The Financial Services Centre (FSC) regulates offshore banks, whereas the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank supervises Montserrat's three domestic banks. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares, providing for anonymity of corporate ownership.

The Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 1999 criminalized the laundering of proceeds from any indictable offense and mandated the reporting of suspicious transactions to a Reporting Authority. However, the Reporting Authority has not yet been established. Although the Act directs the Governor to issue a code of practice establishing further regulations for financial institutions, the code of practice has not yet been issued.

US law enforcement cooperation with Montserrat is facilitated by a treaty with the UK that governs mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with several of the UK's overseas territories. Montserrat is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), and through the UK, is subject to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Montserrat should issue regulations to implement the POCA and establish the Reporting Authority to act as a financial intelligence unit. It should enact measures to identify and record the beneficial owners of IBCs. It should also increase resources to financial supervision, especially as it looks to again expand its offshore sector, to help ensure that money launderers do not abuse Montserrat's financial services.

Morocco (Other). Morocco is not a regional financial center and the extent of money laundering in Morocco is unknown. However, Morocco remains an important producer and exporter of cannabis, which generates proceeds that must be laundered in Morocco or abroad. Moroccan government officials have indicated that they believed money was being laundered through bulk smuggling of cash and the purchase of smuggled goods. Banking officials have indicated that the country's system of unregulated money exchanges provides a venue for launderers. Morocco has not criminalized money laundering.

The Moroccan banking system is modeled after the French system and consists of 16 banks, five government-owned specialized financial institutions, approximately 30 credit agencies, and 12 leasing companies. The monetary authorities in Morocco are the Ministry of Finance and the central bank, Bank Al Maghrib, which monitors and regulates the banking system. Bank Al Maghrib has decreed that all financial institutions must institute a customer identification policy and maintain certain transaction records for a certain (unspecified) period of time.

A mutual legal assistance treaty entered into force between the United States and Morocco in 1993. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Morocco signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Mozambique (Other). Mozambique is not a regional financial center and does not have an offshore sector. Although the extent of money laundering in Mozambique is not known, it most likely is limited because of the country's small commercial banking sector. However, lax oversight and weak banking regulations, as demonstrated by recent bank scandals, suggest that Mozambique's financial institutions are vulnerable to money laundering. In particular, there is concern that the proceeds of arms trafficking and stolen vehicles sales may be laundered through Mozambique's financial institutions.

Mozambique criminalized money laundering related to narcotics trafficking through the 1997 antinarcotics law. In a 2000 address to Parliament, the attorney general underscored the importance of passing new anti-money laundering legislation that conforms to the 40 FATF Recommendations. The Parliament reportedly is considering additional anti-money laundering legislation.

Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

Namibia (Other). Namibia is not a financial center. There are indications of drug trafficking and abuse, but no evidence of narcotics-related money laundering. Namibia currently has no laws against money laundering in place, nor does it have the necessary procedures to detect it.

Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Namibia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Namibia is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style regional body.

Nauru (Primary). Nauru is a small central Pacific Island nation with a population of approximately 10,600. It is an independent republic, an associate member of the British Commonwealth, and recently joined the United Nations. The legal, supervisory, and regulatory processes in Nauru present significant opportunities for the laundering of the proceeds of crime, and allow criminals who make use of those systems to increase significantly their chances to evade effective investigation or punishment.

Nauru is an established "zero" tax haven-it does not levy any income, corporation, capital gains, real estate, inheritance, estate, gift, sales, or stamp taxes. It is an offshore banking center with a number of weaknesses in its regulatory structures. The Nauru Agency Corporation (NAC) licenses offshore banks, and in turn, acts as a shareholder or director of the banks it licenses. The government-owned Bank of Nauru acts as the central bank for monetary policy; but it has no regulatory function over offshore banks. Nauruan authorities are unable to verify information provided by applicants for offshore banking licenses or those registering corporations on the island. The required documentation is routinely processed through registered agents. Even though bank applications require a certified police record stating that the applicant has no criminal record, Nauruan authorities do not have the ability to check the bona fides of such documents.

Citing many of these deficiencies, including excessive bank secrecy provisions that guard against the disclosure of the relevant information, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Nauru as a non-cooperative country and territory in its June 2000 report. The FATF report criticized the lack of basic anti-money laundering regulations, including the criminalization of money laundering. The FATF report cited the poor supervision of Nauru's offshore banks. Specifically, the report criticized the fact that Nauru's 400 offshore banks are not required to obtain identification information from its customers, maintain customer identification or transaction records, or report suspicious transactions. Nauru banks are known for dealing in bearer shares, which provide for secrecy of operations and anonymity.

Following the FATF determination, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Nauru.

Russian organized crime has exploited Nauru's offshore financial sector. Nauru gained notoriety in 1999 because of allegations that several billions of dollars of Russian financial transactions had passed through banks chartered in Nauru. Nauru's Russian clientele reportedly use this route to avoid scrutiny by Russian officials. A number of transactions, initiated by Russian and Asian organizations with alleged ties to organized crime, are assumed to be criminally derived. In April 2000, the Government of Nauru asked Russian officials to provide evidence of money flowing from Russia through Nauru and claimed that it would take available steps to prevent Nauru's banking system from being used in money laundering operations, once it received such evidence.

The Bank of New York case illustrates how a bank in Nauru can be used for money laundering purposes. To conceal the true source of the funds, Russian accomplices in this case used a number of offshore banks in the Pacific. In 1996 these individuals acquired control of "Sinex Bank Inc."-a registered offshore bank in Nauru. From 1996 to 1999, Sinex Bank was identified as the ordering party for more than $3 billion in funds transferred from Russian bank correspondent accounts at the Bank of New York to various shell corporation accounts. Although Sinex Bank conducted no actual banking operations in Nauru, it was used as a front to facilitate the illegal transfer of money out of Russia.

Nauru has confirmed its awareness of the impact of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering processes, taken some steps to address these concerns, and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the international efforts to combat money laundering. It has cooperated with officials from the United States and other countries in certain criminal investigations involving Nauruan institutions. It has recently suspended the licenses of a large number of institutions pending a review of their ownership. It has blocked the registration of any new banks on behalf of any Russian individual or entity and cancelled contracts with a number of agents. The Government of Nauru is considering legislative changes that could redress a number of the problems in its banking laws, and has requested relevant technical assistance in order to do so.

The Government of Nauru facilitated on-site inspections of its financial system by US officials in 2000. It is a member of the South Pacific Forum and has participated in its efforts to establish a regional financial intelligence center. However, Nauru has not made any advances toward its commitment to the Honiara Declaration, which calls on Forum countries to implement the FATF 40 Recommendations.

Nauru needs to pass and enforce comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation and enact bank supervisory practices that are in accord with accepted international standards so that it can protect its financial services industry and economy from criminals and criminal organizations. Despite verbal commitments by Nauru to reform its offshore sector, no concrete action has been forthcoming.

Nepal (Other). Nepal is not a regional financial center. Nepal currently does not have an offshore sector. However, the Government of Nepal (GON) has explored the development of an offshore sector. There are no indications that Nepal is used as an international money-laundering center. US Government officials have offered assistance to the GON to help it develop a proper legal framework to deter money laundering.

The GON has not criminalized money laundering, and in 2000, legislative action on money laundering, mutual legal assistance, and witness protection remained stalled.

The GON exchanges information in connection with international narcotics investigations and proceedings. Regulations to ensure the availability of adequate records do not meet international standards.

Nepal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Nepal is an observer jurisdiction to the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

The Netherlands (Primary). The Netherlands is a major regional financial center and, as such, provides opportunities for laundering funds generated from a variety of illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and financial fraud. Narcotics proceeds are often related to the sale of heroin, cocaine or cannabis. Some narcotics proceeds are derived from the local, illegal production and sale of cannabis products or designer drugs such as ecstasy. Money laundering in The Netherlands is believed to occur through the banking system, money exchange houses (bureaux de change), casinos, credit card companies, insurance and securities firms, stockbrokers and money transfer offices. Money laundering in The Netherlands is most likely controlled by major drug cartels and other international criminal organizations.

The Netherlands' anti-money laundering regime is in compliance with FATF and other international standards. Money laundering relating to any crime has been an offense in The Netherlands since 1994, although prosecutors must first prove the underlying offense before prosecuting for money laundering. The Dutch parliament is currently debating draft legislation that would make money laundering a separate offense. This bill also includes provisions that would ease somewhat the government's burden of proof regarding the criminal origins of proceeds, as the government believes the current standard is too high and can adversely affect money laundering prosecutions. Under the new bill, it should be sufficient to prove that the proceeds "apparently" originated from a crime.

Since 1996, organizations providing commercial services, such as accountants, lawyers and notaries, have applied money laundering reporting procedures within their professions. The Money Transfer and Exchange Offices Act will be submitted to Parliament this spring. If passed, it will replace the existing Exchange Offices Act, and as such it will also require money transfer offices, in addition to exchange offices, to obtain a permit to operate.

The Office for the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions (MOT), which was established in 1994, is The Netherlands' financial intelligence unit (FIU). The MOT reviews and analyzes unusual transactions. Because of the conversion of national banknotes and coins into Euro, which will take place between January 1, 2002 and January 28, 2002, the indicators have been adjusted in order to disclose transactions related to the conversion. Suspicious transactions are provided, with preliminary investigative information, to the National Public Prosecutor. The MOT is currently negotiating with notaries to implement suspicious activity indicators for disclosure in connection with the activities of this professional group, in preparation to implement the Second EU Directive on Money Laundering. The MOT is a member of the Egmont Group and has information sharing agreements with eight other countries.

In December 2000, The Netherlands signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Netherlands is also a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the 1990 Strasbourg Convention on Money Laundering and Confiscation. The Dutch participate in the Basle Committee, and have endorsed the Committee's September 1997 "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision." There is a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in effect between The Netherlands and the US, as well as a forfeiture cooperation and asset sharing agreement. The Netherlands is a member of the Financial Action Task Force and participates in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force as a Cooperating and Supporting Nation.

The Netherlands should continue to refine its anti-money laundering regime, particularly with respect to increasing its ability to prosecute money laundering and financial crimes.

Netherlands Antilles, The (Concern). The Netherlands Antilles consists of the Caribbean islands of Curacao, Bonaire, the Dutch part of Sint Maarten/St. Martin, Saba and Sint Eustatius. The growing offshore financial services industry, gaming industry, and lack of border controls between Sint Maarten and St. Martin creates opportunities that could be exploited by money launderers. However, the Netherlands Antilles Government has made it a priority to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering program and continues to strengthen its anti-money laundering legislation.

In 2000 the Government expanded the anti-money laundering law to include suspicious activity reporting requirements for gems and real estate dealers. Also, senior government officials reached agreement on the "underlying crime" portion of the money laundering law. As a result, prosecutors no longer are required to prove that a suspected money launderer also committed an underlying crime (such as theft) in order to obtain a money-laundering conviction. It is now sufficient to establish that a money launderer knew, or should have known, of the money's illegal origin.

Recommendations for more specific indicators of suspicious activity for financial reporting await the Finance Minister's approval. There already has been a substantial increase in the number of unusual transaction reports submitted by the offshore sector, largely because of increased training. A proposal to bring credit card and currency transactions into the reporting system for unusual financial transactions also awaits the Finance Minister's approval.

At the request of the Committee Against Money Laundering, the Gaming Control Board of Curacao is currently reviewing a ministerial proposal to extend suspicious transaction reporting to casinos. If the Board provides no comments within the specified two-month comment period, the Finance Minister will implement this proposal.

The central bank has completed development of guidelines on detecting and deterring money laundering; these will be issued to the banking sector soon.

In 2000, the Association of Public Notaries introduced a list of indicators that will be used to report unusual transactions.

Progress on tightening oversight of trusts has been slowed by complications arising from the new fiscal framework being developed by the Netherlands and Netherlands Antilles. The Netherlands Antilles had proposed legislation that included provisions allowing the establishment of a type of closed corporation, which would be taxed at a zero-rate. The Netherlands has modified the legislation proposed by the Netherlands Antilles and, until a final version is enacted, new regulations cannot be established and enforced.

On August 1, 2000, the Netherlands Antilles Asset Seizure Law became effective. This law allows a public prosecutor to seize the proceeds of any crime once the crime is proven in a court of law.

In July 2000 cross border currency reporting legislation was presented to the Parliament, but it was not enacted by year's end. This legislation is expected to be approved in 2001.

Unusual transactions must by law be reported to the Netherlands Antilles Reporting Center, Meldpunt Ongebruikelijke Transacties (MOT NA), which collects and analyzes them. Some concern has been expressed over the ability of the MOT NA's small staff to handle a large influx of unusual transaction reports. The staff at the MOT NA, however, has worked diligently to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of their reporting system. New software has been developed to enable institutions to send reports to the MOT NA electronically. In addition, legislation providing for the exchange of information between MOT NA and other financial intelligence units is now in the Central Committee of Parliament. The MOT NA is a member of the Egmont Group.

Law enforcement statistics improved in the Netherlands Antilles this year. Where previously there were no prosecutions for money laundering, Antillean courts convicted 14 individuals of money laundering this year and investigations are underway in another 11 cases.

The Netherlands Antilles has a large number of offshore financial service providers, including 42 offshore banks, mutual funds, international finance companies, and trust companies. Nearly 21,000 international business companies (IBCs) are registered in the Netherlands Antilles and may be registered using bearer shares. The law on bank supervision states that offshore banks must have a physical presence on the islands, hold their records there, and not give or receive payments in cash. The central bank supervises offshore banks, and some mutual funds are supervised by other entities. None of the other institutions are supervised by Netherlands Antilles authorities. The central bank also indicates that banks on Curacao usually maintain copies of bearer share certificates for IBCs maintaining accounts, which include information on the beneficial owner.

As part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. It also is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Force. The Netherlands Antilles operates under the Netherlands's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States. Cooperation is excellent. The MOT NA has an information sharing agreement with its counter-part in the Netherlands, the MOT.

The Netherlands Antilles has implemented most of its anti-money laundering legislation. The Netherlands Antilles should move expeditiously to enact new proposals that would further strengthen its anti-money laundering program such as those measures related to casinos, cross-border currency reporting, and extension of unusual transactions reporting to additional types of financial institutions. The Netherlands Antilles must continue to exercise due diligence and supervision over its offshore sector, including identification of the beneficial ownership of business accounts, so that its financial institutions and services industry are not used to launder money. Success for the Netherlands Antilles will be contingent upon continued vigilance and forceful implementation of its anti-money laundering regime.

New Zealand (Other). Evidence exists that money laundering takes place in New Zealand, although not to a significant extent. Narcotics proceeds and commercial crime are the primary sources of illicit funds. International organized criminal elements are also present in New Zealand.

New Zealand has been active in promoting efforts to combat money laundering in the South Pacific region. In September 2000, it hosted a workshop that brought together representatives from Pacific Island Forum nations, the IMF, World Bank and other interested parties to discuss general money laundering issues as well as specific plans to set up a regional financial intelligence unit (FIU). This initiative built on the New Zealand Government's "Forum Islands Road Show" series of visits to 13 South Pacific island nations that took place between May and November 1998 to discuss the regional dimensions and risks of financial crime. The September workshop recommendations were subsequently adopted at the 31st Pacific Islands Forum held in Kiribati in October 2000. Specifically, the Forum recognized the importance of information and intelligence sharing among its members and welcomed the proposal to establish a Project Office within the Forum Secretariat. The main function of the Project Office will be to work on details of a Regional Financial Intelligence Information Sharing Facility, as well as to assist Forum members countries in establishing domestic FIUs.

A 1995 amendment to New Zealand's Crimes Act 1961 criminalized the laundering of proceeds knowingly derived from a serious offense. The Financial Transaction Reporting Act 1996 contains obligations for a wide range of financial institutions, including banks, credit unions, casinos, and real estate agents, lawyers, and accountants. These entities must identify clients, maintain records, and report suspicious transactions. The Act also contains a "safe harbor" provision and requires the reporting of large cross-border currency movements.

New Zealand is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New Zealand is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), and the South Pacific Forum. Its financial intelligence unit is a member of the Egmont Group.

Nicaragua (Concern). Nicaragua is not considered to be a regional financial center, and it does not have an offshore sector. Nicaragua's financial system is particularly vulnerable to drug money laundering because of the drug-trafficking activity in the region.

An area of specific concern is Nicaragua's weak regulation and oversight of its banking system, as highlighted by local media reports that have alleged massive fraud in the recent collapse of Intercontinental Bank (Interbank).

Nicaragua has criminalized money laundering related to drug trafficking, and requires banks to report cash deposits that exceed US $10,000 to the Commission of Financial Analysis (CFA). However, the CFA has not yet been established because the Government of Nicaragua (GON) does not have the resources and technical expertise to do so. Once operational, the CFA will be subordinate to the Ministry of Government, and will be comprised of representatives from various elements within the government, such as law enforcement and the Superintendency of Banks. Nicaragua has not successfully prosecuted a money laundering case.

Nicaragua is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Nicaragua is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.

The GON is urged to allocate the resources necessary for the establishment of the CFA to ensure that the country's financial institutions comply with relevant anti-money laundering controls. Moreover, the GON should create a system for reporting suspicious transactions once the CFA has been established.

Niger (Other). The extent of money laundering in Niger is not known. However, in 2000, officials from the United Nations indicated that the West African region may be fertile ground for money laundering because of drug trafficking, corruption, networks of contraband arms and precious stones, and weak mechanisms of control that can be abused by international criminals. Seven small commercial banks and one modest-sized local bank operate in Niger. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) is the central bank for Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, all of which use the French-backed CFA franc currency.

In November 2000, Niger participated in a meeting of officials from 14 West African countries in Senegal. The group established the Intergovernmental Group for Action Against Money Laundering (GIABA) to coordinate their governments' actions against money laundering and other transnational crime.

Niger is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Nigeria (Primary). The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a hub of money laundering and criminal financial activity, not only for the West African sub-region but also increasingly for the entire continent. It is the most populous Sub Saharan country, dominating the West African sub-region economically and militarily. Nigeria is also Africa's most significant narcotics transshipment point. Nigerian criminal organizations utilize sophisticated global networks to ship narcotics via Nigeria to markets in the United States, Europe, and other African countries. Nigerian money laundering is directly linked to narcotics trafficking as well as corollary activities such as document, immigration, and financial fraud. The proceeds from these illegal activities are repatriated to Nigeria and are often used to fund subsequent criminal operations.

The combination of the narcotics trafficking activity and money laundering, and the fact that Nigeria has failed to adequately address corruption among law enforcement, customs, immigration, other government agencies, and the society at large makes it unusually difficult to have an effective anti-money laundering program.

Nigeria is notorious for the various financial schemes that originate there. Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud, commonly known as "Four-one-nine Scams," (419 is the reference to fraud in Nigeria's criminal code) has become highly lucrative for criminal enterprises. With the help of phone books, business directories, and email lists, Nigerian criminal organizations fax, mail, and email targeted businesses and individuals around the world with enticing "get rich quick" offers. The proposed schemes take various forms, for example, by promising a transfer of funds "from an over-invoiced contract" in Nigeria to a target's bank account. The cash in question might be profit from a crude oil sale that a business person "needs help in transferring out of the country" or the disbursement of funds for a specific charity from the estate of a recently deceased individual. Often, these 419 letters and schemes are written on "official" letterhead stationary. An elaborate system may be utilized to provide bogus references. Advance Fee Fraud perpetrators may request bank account information to gauge the targeted victim's level of trust and provide the impression that a funds transfer is imminent. All 419 Scams eventually request payment of a fee (or fees) so that the alleged transfer of funds can be facilitated. While actual monetary losses by US citizens are difficult to gauge-many victims are reluctant to report such activity to law enforcement agencies-conservative estimates place such losses by American citizens and businesses in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Substantial proof exists that narcotics traffickers have utilized 419 Scams to fund their illicit smuggling efforts.

The current anti-money laundering law, Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995, criminalizes narcotics-based money laundering, but is useful only if the predicate offense is narcotics trafficking. It requires banks to identify customers, maintain records, and report large and suspicious transactions to the central bank. It also provides for the seizure and forfeiture of drug-related assets, although forfeiture requires a conviction and thus is seldom and ineffectively used. Enforcement of the legislation is inconsistent because corruption, bureaucracy, and lack of training in the preparation of money laundering cases slow the enforcement structures.

The National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), through the Money Laundering Surveillance Unit (MLSU) of the Bank Examination Department of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), has the power to demand, and obtain and inspect the books and records of a financial institution to confirm compliance with the provisions of the money laundering decree. Banks are required to make transaction records available for review by NDLEA officials. There have been no money laundering convictions.

In response to international concerns, the GON has taken some steps to combat criminal activity and has become closely involved with US law enforcement agencies in an attempt to address the problem of financial crime and money laundering. In 1998, the GON began cooperating with the US Postal Inspection Service to identify and crack down on fraud operations through the mail. In addition, the US Secret Service has maintained an office in the US Consulate General in Lagos since 1995, and in June 2000, opened a separate office to assist in the effort to combat Advanced Fee Fraud and other illegal operations, including US dollar counterfeiting operations. In May 1999, a decree was issued that, according to the NDLEA, altered the burden of proof in money laundering cases to facilitate prosecution. In October 2000, representatives from Nigeria and two other African countries attended an African Summit on Money Laundering at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). The purpose of the summit was to review and discuss the anti-money laundering legislation of each jurisdiction, the need to establish a financial intelligence unit, and training and technical assistance needs. The DEA is working closely with the NDLEA to develop competencies in drug and drug-related money-laundering investigations.

The CBN has announced that it is upgrading Money Laundering Decree No. 3 of 1995 to expand its scope beyond narcotics-related money laundering. It also has announced plans to supervise enforcement of the additional offenses, leaving the enforcement of narcotics-related money laundering to the NDLEA.

Nigeria is a party the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Nigeria urgently needs to enact and implement changes to its anti-money laundering legislation so that it can meet international standards and protect itself against financial crimes and money laundering. Nigeria also needs to demonstrate its ability to take action against corruption and fraud. In addition, Nigeria should move to quickly create a centralized financial intelligence unit that would receive and analyze information and cooperate with foreign counterparts in money laundering investigations so that Nigeria can protect its financial system from widespread abuse by criminals and criminal organizations.

Niue (Concern). Niue is a self-governing parliamentary democracy in free association with New Zealand. Niue retains jurisdiction over its internal affairs and New Zealand assumes responsibility for Niue's external affairs. Legislation from the mid-1990s created an offshore financial center that is heavily dependent upon international business companies (IBCs). The Proceeds of Crime Act 1998 criminalizes the laundering of proceeds from any offense punishable by at least one year in prison. Niue recently passed new anti-money laundering legislation that, when implemented, should assist the country in its fight against financial crime. Regulatory weaknesses involving banks and IBCs remain, however.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Nuie as non-cooperative in the international fight against money laundering. The FATF in its report cited numerous deficiencies in Niue's anti-money laundering regime:

* Niue has no ongoing process of supervising the licensed banks. The fact that the offshore banks have no physical presence in Niue complicates the regulation of that sector.

* Contrary to international standards, the central bank's Monetary Board has delegated to a foreign private firm the responsibility of issuing banking licenses and conducting due diligence for offshore banks.

* Niue lacks mandatory rules for financial institutions concerning customer identification and the disclosure of beneficial owners of accounts; in addition, Niue allows financial institutions to issue anonymous accounts.

* Niue has no mandatory suspicious transaction reporting system in place.

* Niue's law contains no provisions for the exchange of information between domestic and foreign regulators.

* Niue does not have a financial intelligence unit.

* The International Business Companies Act of 1994, as amended in 1996, which establishes IBCs, contains inadequate requirements for the registration and filing of information with the Registrar of companies.

* Niue has devoted inadequate resources to fight money laundering.

Following the FATF exercise, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Niue.

In July 2000, Niue suspended consideration to register new offshore banks until the new Financial Transactions Reporting Act (FTRA) became effective. Niue passed and immediately enacted the FTRA in November 2000. The FTRA imposes reporting and record-keeping obligations upon banks, insurance companies, securities dealers and futures brokers, money services businesses and persons administering or managing funds on behalf of IBCs. Specifically, the FTRA requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, verify the identity of its customers, and keep records of financial transactions for six years. The FTRA also calls for the establishment of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) within the office of the Attorney General. To date the FIU has not been established. Niuean officials have said that the establishment of the FIU will depend upon the outcome of ongoing discussions among the Pacific Islands Forum of a proposed regional FIU for Forum member countries. Niue supports the establishment of a regional FIU to share information among Pacific Island states.

The International Business Companies Act of 1994 is the legislative basis for establishing IBCs. Marketers of offshore services promote Niue as a favored jurisdiction for establishing IBCs for a variety of reasons. Niue does not require the disclosure of beneficial ownership of IBCs, permits bearer shares, allows the marketing of shelf companies, and does not require IBCs to keep a register of directors. Internet marketers also offer shelf companies complete with associated offshore bank accounts and mail-drop forwarding services. Regardless of how the IBCs are marketed, all are legally formed and registered by a Panamanian law firm on behalf of the GON. Because of strict secrecy laws, Niuean IBCs remain vulnerable to illicit use in international money laundering schemes.

Although IBCs are the most attractive feature of Niue's offshore sector, Niue also offers trusts, partnerships, financial management, and insurance services. Whether Niue has lifted its suspension to register new offshore banks is not known. Niue allows the creation of asset protection trusts that are impervious to many types of legal claims arising in other jurisdictions. In addition, trusts in Niue are exempt from taxation if the parties to the trust are not residents of Niue.

The Niuean Government has expressed a willingness to cooperate with international efforts to combat money laundering. Niue has participated in some international meetings concerning money laundering, including a workshop hosted by New Zealand in September 2000.

In 1998 Niue passed the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, which authorizes the Attorney General of Niue to provide certain types of legal assistance to other countries involved with criminal investigations. Niue has no bilateral cooperation agreements to fight money laundering.

The lack of adequate supervisory and regulatory systems in Niue creates opportunities for the laundering and safe protection of the proceeds of crime. Niue needs to implement its anti-money laundering legislation to protect its financial services industry and economy from abuse by criminals and criminal organizations. Recent reforms address some of the deficiencies in Niue's anti-money laundering regime. Particular emphasis needs to be directed towards regulation of its offshore financial sector.

Norway (Other). Norway is not an important regional financial center; there are only 20 commercial banks in the country and about 130 savings banks. Money laundering in Norway is related mainly to funds generated by the smuggling of liquor and cigarettes. According to OKOKRIM, Norway's special unit on economic fraud, Norway has been experiencing an increase in financial crime such as bank fraud. These types of crimes overshadow narcotics-related money laundering in Norway.

Most money laundering in Norway takes place outside its financial system because financial institutions are obliged by law to report large and suspicious transactions to OKOKRIM. The structuring of deposits appears to be a problem for financial institutions. Large cross-border cash transactions by banks are routinely reported to the central bank and kept on file.

All forms of money laundering are criminal offenses, according to the Norwegian Penal Code. Norway's anti-money laundering legislation has been strengthened in recent years to conform to the FATF Forty Recommendations. OKOKRIM has set up a money laundering unit that receives suspicious transaction reports and serves as Norway's financial intelligence unit. OKOKRIM is a member of the Egmont Group.

Norway is a member of the Council of Europe and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Norway is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Organized Crime.

Oman (Other). Oman is not known to have a significant money laundering problem. Its small banking sector is supervised by the Central Bank of Oman (CBO), which has the authority to suspend or reorganize a bank's operations. In May 2000, the CBO organized and hosted a three-day seminar on the prevention and detection of money laundering.

Large cash transactions must be reported to the CBO and the Police. Oman has not criminalized money laundering. However, in February 2000, Oman announced that it was in the process of drafting comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that would conform to international standards. It is expected that this legislation will be approved sometime in 2001.

Oman is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Oman is scheduled to undergo a FATF mutual evaluation sometime in 2001. In May 2000, GCC members met for a four-day seminar on combating money laundering and pledged to enhance communication and cooperation to fight international crime.

Pakistan (Primary). The three principal sources of illicit funds in Pakistan are narcotics trafficking, corruption and smuggling. There is currently little production of narcotics in Pakistan. However, Pakistani narcotics-trafficking organizations are active in the huge Afghan drug trade and transship drugs through Pakistan. The proceeds are laundered abroad by means of the hawala (also called "hundi") alternative remittance system.

Pakistan has criminalized the laundering of narcotics trafficking proceeds. The Control of Narcotics Substances Act (1996) calls for the reporting of transactions believed to be associated with narcotics trafficking and also contains provisions for the freezing and forfeiture of assets associated with narcotics trafficking. The Musharraf caretaker government has established new ordinances addressing various financial crimes, particularly tax evasion and corruption.

Pakistan does not have a financial intelligence unit. Several agencies-in particular, the Antinarcotics Force and Pakistan Customs-play a major role in the investigation of financial crimes cases in Pakistan.

Pakistan became a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering in 2000. Pakistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

In order to establish an effective anti-money laundering regime, Pakistan needs to enact legislation that criminalizes money laundering beyond drug trafficking. A system of reporting suspicious transactions by all financial institutions operating in Pakistan must also be implemented. Finally, given the significant role that hawala plays in money laundering, Pakistan should develop and implement "anti-hawala" countermeasures.

Palau (Concern). The North Pacific Island of Palau is not a major financial center. However, reports that offshore banks in Palau have carried out large-scale money laundering activities prompted a few international banks to ban financial transactions with Palau in late 1999 and early 2000. In response, Palau established a banking commission that intends to introduce financial control legislation to the National Congress in early 2001. Palau reportedly established two offshore banks in 2000 and enacted legislation that permitted the establishment of two Internet gaming operations.

Palau has sought assistance from US officials, the Pacific community, the United Nations, and the International Monetary Fund in its effort to develop an anti-money laundering regime. In addition, Palau participated in international meetings and conferences on financial crime in 2000, including a US-sponsored conference in Fiji and the UN Offshore Forum conference in the Cayman Islands. Palau has become a signatory to Pacific Island Forum anti-money laundering initiatives and has made significant advances to abide by the Honiara Declaration, which calls for Forum countries to implement the FATF 40 Recommendations.

After a few international banks restricted financial transactions with Palau in late 1999, the Government of Palau began its own investigation into alleged money laundering activities involving Palau-registered offshore banks. Palauan officials discovered that a few shell banks had been established through a mechanism in which entities in Palau applied for certificates of incorporation and business licenses in a local-in lieu of national-level jurisdiction. None of these so-called banks was ever given foreign investment approval or any approval to do business in Palau. Nonetheless, a few of these shell banks reportedly gained access to the international financial community and carried out almost $2 billion in suspicious transactions during the past two years.

The Government of Palau needs to enact and implement comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation that meets international standards and establish a financial intelligence unit to work with foreign counterparts to combat financial crime. It should pay special attention to supervising its offshore financial and gambling sector to prevent abuse by criminal entities.

Panama (Primary). Panama continues to be an attractive venue for laundering drug money because of its proximity to major drug-producing countries; its sophisticated international banking sector; US dollar-based economy; and the Colon Free Zone's (CFZ) role as an originating or transshipment point for goods purchased with narcotics dollars through the Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange. Panama has financial institutions that engage in currency transactions involving international narcotics proceeds that include significant amounts of US dollars. Panamanian press reports also indicate that Panama's National Security Council is concerned that the Russian Mafia may be laundering the proceeds of arms and drugs trafficking through Panamanian bank accounts.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified Panama as noncooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF in its report cited:

Panama has not yet criminalised money laundering for crimes other than drug trafficking. It has an unusual and arguably inefficient mechanism for transmitting suspicious transaction reports to competent authorities. Panama's FIU [financial intelligence unit] is not able to exchange information with other FIUs. In addition, certain outdated civil law provisions impede the identification of the true beneficial owners of trusts.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions advising them to "give enhanced scrutiny" to all financial transactions involving Panama.

In October 2000, the GOP enacted two laws and issued two executive decrees to address FATF's concerns about its anti-money laundering regime:

* Law No. 41 of October 2, 2000, amends the Penal Code by expanding the number of predicate offenses for money laundering beyond drug trafficking to include criminal fraud, arms trafficking, trafficking in humans, kidnapping, extortion, embezzlement, corruption of public officials, terrorism, and international motor vehicle theft or trafficking.

* Law No. 42 of October 2, 2000, expands the types of financial institutions that are required to report currency transactions in excess of US $10,000 and suspicious financial transactions to include banks, trust companies, money exchangers, savings and loans associations, stock exchanges and brokerage firms, and investment administrators. Law 42 also mandates reporting to the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) of currency or quasi-currency transactions that exceed US $10,000 by casinos, CFZ businesses, the national lottery, and insurance/reinsurance companies. Furthermore, Law 42 requires Panamanian trust companies to identify to the Superintendency of Banks the real and ultimate beneficial owners of trusts

* Executive Decree No. 163 of October 3, 2000, amends the June 1995 decree that created the UAF to permit the UAF to share information with FIUs of other countries, subject to entering into Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or other information exchange agreements. The UAF has contacted other members of the Egmont Group seeking to foster information exchange between FIUs. Executive Order No. 163 also allows the UAF to provide information related to possible money laundering directly to the Office of the Attorney General for investigation.

* Executive Order 213 of October 3, 2000, amends Executive Order 16 of 1984 relative to trust operations, and provides for the dissemination of information related to trusts to appropriate administrative and judicial authorities.

Furthermore, in October 2000, Panama's Superintendency of Banks issued a document, Agreement No. 9-2000, that defines requirements that banks must follow for identification of customers, exercise of due diligence, and retention of bank records.

The Government of Panama has not successfully prosecuted a money laundering case. However, in September 2000, US and Panamanian investigations of CFZ jewelry wholesaler "Speed Joyeros" culminated in the first-ever US indictment of a CFZ company. "Speed Joyeros" allegedly was part of an international network that used gold, false invoicing, and electronic transfers to launder drug money.

Panama's large offshore sector is comprised of international business companies (over 370,000 currently registered in Panama), trusts, captive insurance companies (corporate entities created and controlled by a parent company, professional association, or group of businesses), and offshore banks (approximately 34 banks). There are three categories of banking licenses: a general license for local and foreign operations, an international license for offshore banks, and a representation license for establishing representative offices. A large portion of Panama's legal profession subsists on creating and maintaining these diverse offshore products. Panama adopted legislation to regulate captive insurance companies-also called offshore insurance companies-through Law 60 of July 1996. Captive insurance has become one of the most important sectors of Panama's offshore financial industry, and is second only to banking.

Panama participates in the multilateral Black Market Peso Exchange Group (BMPEG) directive. Panama is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, (CFATF), and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS). Panama is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The UAF is a member of the Egmont Group. In May 2000, Panama hosted the Egmont Group's annual meeting. In August 2000, Panama also hosted the Fourth Hemispheric Congress on the Prevention of Money Laundering. Panama and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1995.

Panama has taken meaningful and effective steps forward in 2000 to address deficiencies in its money-laundering regime. Panama should focus on fully implementing and enforcing its new anti-money laundering legislation, and promptly enter into information exchange agreements between the UAF and other FIUs.

Papua New Guinea (Other). Papua New Guinea has no significant exposure to money laundering or other financial crime. Its banking sector is very small, and it has no offshore financial sector. However, there are no laws against money laundering.

Papua New Guinea is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Paraguay (Primary). Paraguay is a transit country for cocaine trafficking, and remains one of Latin America's major money laundering centers. Paraguay is vulnerable to money laundering because of endemic official corruption, weak regulation of its financial sector, and poor implementation of anti-money laundering legislation. The Government of Paraguay's (GOP) implementation of anti-money laundering legislation has been hindered by scarce resources, a lack of political commitment, poor coordination among the various government agencies, and a lack of understanding and reporting by the financial sector.

In 2000, the GOP, for the first time, approved a budget for the country's anti-money laundering secretariat, Secretar�a de Prevenci�n del Lavado de Dinero y Bienes (SEPRELAD), and participated in international efforts to combat money laundering. Although GOP officials believe that as much as 65 percent of Paraguay's money laundering is linked to narcotics trafficking, US Government experts believe that 20 percent probably is a more accurate figure. The multi-billion dollar re-export contraband trade that is centered in Ciudad del Este generates significant illegal proceeds.

Paraguay was in the past considered an important tax haven for residents of Brazil because Paraguay has no personal income tax. Paraguay does not license offshore banks; foreign banks are registered in Paraguay and non-residents are allowed to hold bank accounts. However, current banking regulations forbid banks to advertise or otherwise seek deposits from outside the country, and a string of bank failures between 1995 and 1998 has made Paraguay a less attractive venue for foreign deposits. All banks that operate in Paraguay-both national or foreign-are supervised under the same rules and regulations by the appropriate Paraguayan authorities.

Paraguay's anti-money laundering law 1015/97, "Preventing and Suppressing Illegal Acts Committed for the Purpose of Laundering Money or Assets," was promulgated in January 1997. The legislation criminalizes money laundering related to drug trafficking or a criminal organization, or other offenses that are punishable by an average of at least two years imprisonment. Participation in contraband trafficking and tax evasion is penalized through fines only, and thus proceeds from these offenses are not covered by the law. The law obliges a wide range of financial institutions to identify customers, maintain records, and record transactions exceeding US $10,000. The law also mandates reporting of suspicious transactions, establishes asset forfeiture provisions, and provides for cooperation with domestic and international law enforcement. However, GOP officials estimate that only 10 percent of covered institutions actually report these transactions to the SEPRELAD.

The law established SEPRELAD as an inter-agency secretariat to implement the money laundering legislation, issue regulations, and receive financial disclosures. SEPRELAD is comprised of the Minister of Industry and Commerce-the Ministry of Industry and Commerce is SEPRELAD's parent agency-a member of the Central Bank Directorate, the Superintendent of Banks, the Commissioner of Securities, and the heads of the National Police and the National Anti-Drug Secretariat (SENAD). SEPRELAD also oversees Paraguay's financial analysis unit (UAF), a body that collects, analyzes, and processes financial disclosures. When the UAF determines that there are reasonable grounds to warrant further investigation, SEPRELAD forwards its findings to the Financial Crimes Investigation Unit (UIDF) of the SENAD. However, SEPRELAD rarely meets and is susceptible to influence by political concerns because its members are from various government agencies. This impedes the flow of information from the UAF to investigative authorities.

In the spring of 2000, the UAF received its first budget and acquired a larger, permanent office. The UAF increased its staff from six to 10, and has plans to further expand the staff to 14. In September 2000, the US Government delivered to the UAF more than $50,000 in computer equipment. The new software and databases should help the UAF more thoroughly analyze the suspicious transactions reports-once they have been digitized-it has received thus far. The majority of these reports are large currency transactions that have no other suspicious nature, and have come from only a few banks. In 2000, the GOP produced one money-laundering case for prosecution, and in 1999, did not prosecute any cases.

Paraguay has two laws that authorize asset forfeiture. A 1988 law provides a basic system for forfeiting narcotics-related assets; the more recent anti-money laundering legislation provides a system for forfeiting proceeds that are derived from narcotics trafficking and other serious crimes. Under both laws, instruments of crime and proceeds derived from drug trafficking-including bank accounts-may be seized. However, only the anti-money laundering law allows for seizure of a legitimate business derived from illicit proceeds. If the business was merely used to launder the proceeds, then it is subject to a fine or administrative sanctions. Both laws authorize the sharing of forfeited proceeds with another government. Under the 1988 law, proceeds from the narcotics-related seizures are deposited into an antinarcotics police account; under the anti-money laundering law, the proceeds of seizures are distributed at the discretion of the judge presiding over the case. The use of nominees is legal and widespread, and as a result, judges have returned assets because they were registered in the name of the nominee and not the defendant.

The GOP enforces its existing drug-related asset seizure and forfeiture laws, but its success is consistently minimal. A cumbersome judicial process prevents speedy forfeitures, and a conviction is required before a drug-related asset can be forfeited. Although the GOP is contemplating changes to its antidrug statute, the GOP in years past has given low priority to enacting new counternarcotics legislation.

The GOP continues to be active in international efforts to combat money laundering. Paraguay is a member of the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), and a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. In 2000, Paraguay entered into a bilateral agreement with Brazil for the exchange of information on money laundering, and has begun cooperating with Brazil on a number of cases. Paraguay is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The UAF is a member of the Egmont Group.

Although the GOP appears to be committed to fighting money laundering, as evidenced by its funding and staffing of relevant agencies and its participation in international initiatives, it must address several deficiencies in its anti-money laundering program to produce results. The GOP now has legal and technical tools to fight money laundering, and must now coordinate efforts among its agencies and educate the banking industry on money laundering to increase their compliance with reporting requirements. The GOP also should make legislative or regulatory changes that would allow the UAF to communicate its findings directly to investigative agencies. Finally, the GOP should adequately train prosecutors and judges to effectively deal with financial crimes.

Peru (Concern). Peru is not a regional financial or offshore center; however, money laundering derived from narcotics trafficking and corruption exists. In fact, government of Peru (GOP) officials are currently attempting to recover over US $70 million deposited in Swiss bank accounts that are believed to be the proceeds of money laundering by the former director of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos. The GOP is pursuing possible Montesinos-related accounts elsewhere as well.

Peru's primary anti-money laundering tools are contained in Articles 296-A and B of Law 25428, which criminalize the laundering of proceeds associated with narcotics trafficking (since 1992), and narcoterrorism (since 1993). The law carries a penalty of life imprisonment for bank and finance officials convicted of money laundering. Since 1992, few money laundering cases have been prosecuted and none have yet resulted in a conviction. Additional anti-money laundering provisions were introduced with the passage in December 1996 of the General Law of the Financial and Insurance System and the Organic Law of the Superintendency of Banking and Insurance (No. 26702) and its implementing regulations, which went into effect in July 1998 (Resolution SBS 904-97). This law requires banks and other financial institutions to identify clients and to report unusual and suspicious financial transactions to the Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalia) with a copy provided to the Superintendent of Banks. Compliance by the financial institutions with the requirement to report suspicious transactions is low. The Fiscalia has allowed the Financial Investigations Unit of the Peruvian National Police access to the suspicious transactions reports, for the purpose of determining if the transactions have a connection to narcotics trafficking. The requirement for banks and financial institutions to record certain large cash transactions remains suspended since July 1998 (Resolution SBS 731-98).

During 2000, the GOP made efforts toward implementing an anti-money laundering program that would meet international standards. US Treasury Department officials have assisted in GOP efforts to develop a program that would include new legislation with broader laws and comprehensive regulations for the financial sector. Such a law would provide for the reporting of large currency transactions, and would make the information can be made available to law enforcement authorities upon request. Perhaps spurred by the Montesinos scandal, the new administration has just sent to Congress a bill that would establish a Financial Analysis Unit (FAU). However, this proposed legislation does not appear to address other fundamental deficiencies in Peru's existing anti-money laundering legislation. Absent fundamental reforms in the legal framework, the potential effectiveness of such a unit is questionable. An effort is now underway in the Peruvian executive and legislative branches to draft a more complete reform of Peru's anti-money laundering legislation that would bring it up to international standards.

Peru has been a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention since 1992. In December 2000, Peru signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Peru is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering, and the newly established South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), a regional FATF-style anti-money laundering body.

Peru should adopt legal measures that enhance its anti-money laundering framework to ensure that it meets international standards in order to deter financial crimes and protect the integrity of its financial system.

Philippines (Primary). The Philippines is neither a major financial center nor a major offshore banking center. However, rising crime, the absence of anti-money laundering legislation, and strict bank secrecy have left the Philippines vulnerable to large-scale narcotics trafficking and allow for criminal proceeds to be easily laundered in the Philippines or transferred abroad. It has been reported in the past few years that illegal drug trade in the Philippines has become a billion-dollar industry. Part of the money flows into the pockets of corrupt government officials in the form of bribes, while part is invested in legitimate businesses. The Philippines has experienced an increase in foreign organized criminal activity from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Insurgency groups operating in the Philippines fund their activities through narcotics and arms trafficking, and engage in money laundering through alleged ties to organized crime.

Citing many of the deficiencies in the Philippines' anti-money laundering regime, in June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) named the Philippines among its list of 15 countries that were non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The report noted:

The country lacks a basic set of anti-money laundering regulations such as customer identification and record keeping. Bank records have been under excessive secrecy provisions. It does not have any specific legislation to criminalize money laundering per se. Furthermore, a suspicious transaction reporting system does not exist in the country.

The US Treasury Department has also issued an advisory reflecting many of the concerns noted in the FATF report, advising US financial institutions "to give enhanced scrutiny to transactions or banking relationships that do not involve established, and adequately identified and understood, commercial or investment enterprises" involving the Philippines. The advisory also noted that money laundering is not a crime under the law of the Philippines, and that the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), the Philippines central bank, had not issued any anti-money laundering regulations or guidelines.

The Government of the Philippines has introduced two pieces of legislation that would criminalize money laundering in cases of illegal drug transactions or other organized crime activities. The proposed legislation would allow the limited lifting of bank secrecy laws and allow criminal investigators to examine deposit records in such cases under court order. Separately, the proposed new Central Bank Act, as it currently stands, would lift bank secrecy on accounts with balances over 50 million pesos (US $1 million). However, the prospects for passage of any legislation in the near term are dim; it is also unclear whether the bank secrecy provisions of the new laws would be retained or whether the new law would apply to the fifteen offshore banks operating in the Philippines.

In the absence of new legislation, the BSP in July 2000 issued a series of circulars to entities under its jurisdiction to tighten money-laundering controls. Circular 251 instructed financial institutions to take "reasonable measures" to verify the identity of clients, maintain transaction records for at least five years, and pay special attention to all complex or unusual transactions. If an institution has reason to believe that funds are the proceeds of an illegal activity, it should, when the law permits, report these transactions to the "competent authority." The circular requires all banks to close any questionable deposit accounts believed to be linked to criminal or other illegal activity. General inspections found that the customer identification and record-keeping requirements under this circular are consistent with international standards, although they lack procedural regulations. Circular 253 instructed banks and non-bank financial institutions to report certain suspicious transactions to the BSP. This reporting includes purchases of foreign exchange, renting of safety deposit boxes, and performing remittances, but would not cover bank deposits and investments in government bonds, which are guarded by bank secrecy provisions.

The Philippines has adopted regulations that ensure the availability of records in response to US requests, but the system is untimely and cumbersome. In addition, officials believe there is a proliferation of businesses engaged in money-laundering activities (e.g. bars, pawnshops, foreign exchange dealers and casinos) that are not covered by central bank circulars. Officials are also hampered by a lack of ability to monitor casino payments to gamblers.

The Philippines does not yet have a financial intelligence unit. The National Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (NALECC) serves as an information-sharing network for intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering and is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 the Philippines signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The Philippines and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1996.

The Philippines should enforce recent regulations and enact and enforce other measures to bring the Philippines' anti-money laundering into compliance with international standards. This should include the establishment of a financial intelligence unit with the ability to cooperate internationally and share financial information with foreign counterparts. These measures will assist the Philippines' efforts to combat corruption, organized crime, and financial crime.

Poland (Concern). Poland's efforts to develop an anti-money laundering regime have not kept pace with its rapid political and economic transition since 1989. With Europe's economic expansion and open borders with former socialist countries, transnational crime has seen significant growth. Narcotics trafficking, organized crime activity, auto theft, smuggling, extortion, counterfeiting, burglary, tax fraud, tax evasion, and other crimes generate criminal proceeds in the range of US $2-3 billion annually according to Government of Poland estimates. Polish banks serve as transit points for the transfer of criminal proceeds. Polish currency exchange businesses and casinos also are venues for money laundering.

Various regulations have been enacted since 1992 to combat money laundering in Poland. In 1997, Poland criminalized money laundering with the enactment of Article 299 of the Penal Code. Polish prosecutors have investigated approximately 75 cases involving money laundering in the last five years. To date, none of the cases forwarded to the courts has resulted in a successful prosecution. Poland's current law allows for customer identification, record keeping and suspicious activity reporting. A major weakness of Poland's money laundering regime was that it did not cover many non-bank financial institutions that have been traditionally used for money laundering.

In December 2000, President Kwasniewski signed the "Law on Counteracting the Use of Material Assets from Illegal or Undisclosed Sources in Financial Transactions." Poland's Parliament had approved the bill in November 2000. The main feature of the law is the creation of a financial intelligence unit (General Inspectorate of Financial Information-GIIF) to collect and analyze reports of large and suspicious transactions. The GIIF will be housed within the Ministry of Finance and will become operational in July 2001. By July 2001, financial institutions will be required to report currency transactions, or a series of related transactions, over the equivalent of 10,000 Euros to the GIIF. They will also have to report any suspicious transactions regardless of the amount. The financial institutions subject to the reporting requirements include banks, brokerages, casinos, insurance companies, investment and pension funds, leasing firms, private currency exchange offices, real estate agencies, and notaries public. The GIIF will have the right to suspend a suspicious transaction for 48 hours. The Public Prosecutor will have the right to suspend the suspicious transaction for three months, pending a court decision.

The United States and Poland have signed a treaty on mutual legal assistance that came into force in 1999. Poland is very active in international anti-money laundering fora. Poland is a party to the UN Drug Convention, and signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000. Poland is also a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In May 1999, Poland underwent a mutual evaluation by the PC-R-EV. The evaluation provided detailed suggestions to improve Poland's anti-money laundering program. In 2000, the Government of Poland ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. The Convention will enter into force with respect to Poland in April 2001.

Implementation of the new anti-money laundering law's provisions will give Poland an anti-money laundering regime that appears to meet international standards. Setting up the GIIF and the transaction reporting system are the next steps in 2001 towards creating an operational anti-money laundering regime.

Portugal (Concern). Government of Portugal (GOP) officials indicate that most of the money laundered in Portugal is drug-related. Drug traffickers channel money through bureaux de change, and use Portuguese offshore companies to wire funds to bank accounts in other offshore jurisdictions.

Portugal has a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime. Decree-Laws 15/93, 313/93, and 325/95 (amended by Decree-Law 65/98) criminalize money laundering related to narcotics trafficking and other serious offenses such as terrorism, arms trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, corruption, and serious economic offenses specified in a separate economic crimes law. Decree-Law 170/93 requires declaration of cross-border movements of currency that exceed Esc. 2.5 million (approximately US $12,000). All financial institutions-including insurance companies-must identify their customers, maintain records for a minimum of ten years, and demand written proof from customers regarding the origin and beneficiary of transactions that exceed Esc. 2.5 million (approximately US $12,000). Non-financial institutions such as casinos, property dealers, lotteries, and dealers in high-value assets must also identify customers engaging in large transactions, maintain records, and report suspicious transactions to the Public Prosecutor.

When money laundering is suspected, financial institutions must cease processing the transaction in question and report it to the judicial authority and the Office of the Public Prosecutor. However, Portugal's system for reporting suspicious transactions remains somewhat informal. Bank officials contact the anti-money laundering authorities and file a formal suspicious transaction report (STR) only if those authorities indicate that one is necessary. As a result, a relatively small number of formal reports are filed annually. However, the number of STRs has increased slightly each year.

The Public Prosecutor forwards STRs to the Judicial Police's Brigada de Investiga��o de Branqueamento de Capitais (BIB) for analysis. If further analysis indicates money laundering, the Judicial Police conduct an investigation. The eight-person BIB functions as Portugal's financial intelligence unit (FIU); it centralizes all information related to STRs and shares it with foreign counterparts. The BIB is a member of the Egmont Group.

Portuguese laws also call for the confiscation of property and assets connected to money laundering, and authorize the Portuguese Judicial Police (PJP) to trace illicitly obtained assets-including those passing through casinos and lotteries-even if the predicate crime is committed outside of Portugal.

Public and private sector regulators and organizations play important roles in Portugal's anti-money laundering program. The Bank of Portugal monitors financial institutions' compliance through inspections and annual internal control reports. The Portuguese Banking Association provides regular training courses on money laundering for employees of banks and other financial institutions. The Portuguese Insurance Institute, through Circular No. 27/97, monitors compliance of insurance-related businesses, educates the insurance sector on industry-specific risks, and alerts judicial authorities to evidence of money laundering. The Securities Commission (CMVM) regulates the securities industry; monitors compliance by financial intermediaries; provides training for brokers; and alerts judicial authorities to evidence of money laundering. The CMVM has cooperated with foreign authorities in two major investigations that involved funds laundered in Portugal.

The GOP has comprehensive legal procedures that enable it to cooperate with foreign jurisdictions and share seized assets.

The Portuguese islands of Madeira offer one of the few offshore centers in the European Union (EU). The Madeira International Business Center (MIBC) has a free trade zone, an international shipping register, and offshore banking, trusts, holding companies, stock corporations, and private limited companies. The latter two business entities are similar to international business corporations (IBCs), of which there are a combined total of 4,100 registered in Madeiria. All entities established in the MIBC will remain tax exempt until 2011. Companies also can take advantage of Portugal's double taxation agreements. Decree-Law 10/94 permits existing banks and insurance companies to establish offshore branches. Applications are submitted to the central bank of Portugal for notification, as in the case of EU institutions, or authorization, as in the case of non-EU or new entities. The law allows establishment of "external branches" that conduct operations exclusively with non-residents or other Madeiran offshore entities, and "international branches" that conduct both offshore and domestic business. Although Madeira has some local autonomy, its offshore sector is regulated by Portuguese and EU legislative rules, and is supervised by the competent oversight authorities. Bearer shares are not permitted.

Portugal is a member of the Council of Europe, the EU, and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Portugal held the FATF presidency from 1999 to 2000. Portugal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Portugal has put into place comprehensive and effective measures to combat money laundering. The system for reporting suspicious transactions could be improved, however, by instituting a more formalized system, and by the increased involvement of and training for entities outside the banking sector. The GOP also should continue to exercise due diligence over its offshore sector, and more closely monitor domestic non-bank financial institutions.

Qatar (Other). Qatar is not a regional financial center. Its banking sector is small and primarily geared toward meeting domestic financial needs. It consists of six domestic banks, two Arab banks and six non-Arab foreign banks. The Qatar Monetary Authority (QMA) supervises and coordinates the banking system, and issues directives and regulations to financial institutions. In 1999 the QMA issued a circular directing banking officials to record any transaction exceeding approximately US $8,300 in an effort to address money laundering, even though money laundering is not currently a criminal offense in Qatar. Other regulations require customer identification policies and the maintenance of bank records.

Qatar is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Qatar is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. GCC members met in May 2000 for a four-day seminar on combating money laundering and pledged to enhance communication and cooperation to fight international crime.

Romania (Concern). Romania has only recently begun to develop an anti-money laundering regime. Its geographic location makes it a transit country for trafficking in narcotics, arms, stolen vehicles, and illegal aliens. As in other Central and East European countries, corruption and the presence of organized criminal activity facilitate money laundering. Financial crimes, Internet fraud, and the smuggling of cigarettes, alcohol, coffee, and other dutiable commodities are other common predicate crimes for money laundering in Romania.

Romania criminalized money laundering with the adoption in January 1999 of Law No21/99-On the Prevention and Punishment of Money Laundering. Becoming effective in April 1999, the law mandated provisions for customer identification, record-keeping requirements, reporting transactions of a suspicious or unusual nature, currency transaction reporting over 10,000 Euros, a financial intelligence unit (FIU), and internal anti-money laundering procedures and training for all Romanian financial institutions covered by the law. The list of entities subject to the reporting requirements includes banks, non-bank financial institutions, attorneys, accountants, and notaries. While banking groups have not openly objected to the implementation of reporting requirements, there remains some discomfort on the part of the banking industry regarding requirements to assist law enforcement. In addition, there is mutual suspicion between law enforcement agencies and the banking industry.

The National Office for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering (NOPCML) is Romania's FIU. The NOPCML receives and evaluates suspicious and unusual currency transaction reports. Since its establishment, the NOPCML has forwarded preliminary cases to the Public Prosecutor's Office for investigation. In 2000, Romanian prosecutors brought a complex case to trial, charging violations of the new money laundering law. The case involved an amount in excess of US $30 million.

Romania is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). It underwent a mutual evaluation of this group in April 1999. The PC-R-EV Mutual Evaluation Report pointed out a number of areas that should be addressed, including the high evidentiary threshold for reporting suspicious transactions, a potential conflict with bank secrecy legislation, and the lack of provisions for cases in which the reporting provisions are intentionally ignored.

The NOPCML is a member of the Egmont Group. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty signed in May 1999 between the United States and Romania is not yet in force. Romania has demonstrated its commitment to international anticrime initiatives by actively participating in regional and global anticrime efforts. Romania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

While Romania is still in the implementation phase of its anti-money laundering regime, it appears to be on the right track. By taking into account the recommendations of the COE Evaluators, Romania has a sound guide to improve its anti-money laundering regime and allow it to effectively combat money laundering and its predicate crimes.

Russia (Primary). The absence of a legal and regulatory anti-money laundering framework remains the most serious impediment in Russia's ability to control the laundering of criminal proceeds internally and to cooperate in international anti-money laundering efforts. Although precise figures are not available, the magnitude of money laundering is likely to be large given the scale of contributing factors involved. Russia's wealth in natural resources, the extent of organized crime activity, corruption, and the numerous mechanisms used for capital flight provide a broad scope for laundering of domestically generated criminal proceeds. False invoicing schemes involving the export of oil, precious metals, raw materials and alcohol, and other fictitious trade transactions are used for capital flight and tax evasion, and to mask the laundering of criminal proceeds. According to Russian government officials, about 30-40 percent of the approximately US $20 billion that leaves Russia annually is of questionable origin.

In addition, Russia serves as a major transit route for narcotics trafficking to Europe. Porous borders and insufficient technical and financial support for regulatory and enforcement agencies hamper the government's ability to control conditions favorable to laundering the proceeds of narcotic trafficking and other criminal activity.

In the past, capital flight often has been confusingly associated with money laundering, since many of the same funds transfer methods are used to facilitate illegal laundering schemes and the transfer of capital derived from legal sources. The failure of last year's efforts to adopt anti-money laundering legislation can be attributed in part to the drafters' attempts to incorporate measures for capital flight control into the anti-money laundering legislation. The Russian government has expressed its intention to address the economic conditions that encourage capital flight separately from regulatory and enforcement measures to combat money laundering, which include reforms in Russia's taxation, customs, banking, and foreign exchange systems.

The Government of Russia undertook constructive steps in 2000 to draft anti-money laundering legislation that conform to international standards. The Ministry of Finance has led an interagency process for drafting the legislation. The current draft law addresses the weaknesses of the version vetoed in 1999 and includes strengthened provisions for customer identification, record keeping, and the creation of a financial intelligence unit. Its introduction into the Duma is expected in early 2001. Russia's efforts to draft anti-money laundering legislation have received widespread international support by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Council of Europe, and the member countries of those organizations. Passage of this legislation will provide the legal basis to combat the proceeds of crime and those who assist in laundering them. Rapid implementation of the law will demonstrate Russia's resolve to mitigate its money laundering problems and become and effective partner in anti-money laundering efforts.

In 1999, the Central Bank of Russia instituted regulatory measures to scrutinize offshore financial transactions. In the following six months, wire transfers from Russian banks to offshore financial centers dropped threefold. In July 2000, President Putin vetoed the law "On Free Economic Zones." The law would have granted customs and tax advantages to various regions of the Russian Federation as a means to encourage economic development. A number of Russian businesses had flocked to these free economic zones in anticipation of passage of this and similar regional laws. Putin's veto of the law lays to rest what would have effectively provided offshore status to Russian registered businesses.

Citing the lack of a legal and regulatory framework to combat money laundering, the FATF in June 2000 named Russia among its list of 15 countries that were non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF report noted four major problems. These included: (1) the lack of anti-money laundering laws and regulations, (2) the failure to implement customer identification for many transactions, (3) the lack of suspicious transaction reporting and an operational financial intelligence unit, and (4) ineffective and untimely procedures for providing evidence for foreign money laundering investigations. These deficiencies also prompted the United States Treasury to issue an advisory to US financial institutions, advising them "to give enhanced scrutiny to transactions or banking relationships that do not involve established, and adequately identified and understood, commercial or investment enterprises, as well as to transactions involving the routing of transactions from Russia through third jurisdictions in ways that appear unrelated to commercial necessities." Other FATF member treasuries also issued similar advisories.

Russia submitted the Council of Europe's (COE) Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) to the Duma for ratification and participates in the COE's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In June 2000, Russia underwent a mutual evaluation by the PC-R-EV, which was reported to the plenary in January 2001. The evaluation report made detailed suggestions to improve Russia's anti-money laundering program.

Russia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

US law enforcement and regulatory agencies are engaged in a number of technical assistance projects designed to further Russia's anti-money laundering efforts. Although formal and informal law enforcement cooperation is on the rise, differences in money laundering laws and regulations lead to frequent misunderstandings and misperceptions. This is especially true in the handling of Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) requests, the main tool for providing assistance in recovering laundered funds and criminal proceeds. US technical assistance programs focused on providing law enforcement, regulators, and prosecutors anti-money laundering training to combat financial crimes. In addition, technical teams assisted Russian drafters in developing legislation meeting international standards. The technical assistance teams encouraged the adoption and implementation of money laundering laws and improved methods of mutual cooperation in money laundering investigations, prosecutions and forfeiture actions.

Russia will need to pass and implement comprehensive legislation that will provide the legal basis to attack the proceeds of crime and those who assist in laundering them in order to mitigate successfully its money laundering problems and become an effective partner in global anti-money laundering efforts.

Samoa (Concern). Samoa is an independent country in the South Pacific. Its offshore financial services sector is vulnerable to money laundering. Samoa passed the Money Laundering Prevention Act in June 2000. This law criminalizes money laundering associated with numerous crimes, and sets measures for the prevention of money laundering and related financial supervision. The law compels financial institutions, offshore and onshore, to develop and apply internal policies, procedures, and controls to combat money laundering. It requires financial institutions to record new business transactions exceeding $30,000, to retain records for a minimum of seven years, and to identify all parties to the transactions; and should address previous concerns over the existence of anonymous accounts for onshore and offshore banks. It also requires financial institutions to report transactions considered suspicious to a Money Laundering Authority (MLA) to be appointed by the Minister of Finance. The MLA will receive and analyze these disclosures, and if it establishes reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction involves the proceeds of crime, it will refer the information to the attorney general and the Commissioner of Police. However, there is nothing in the legislation that prohibits financial institutions from carrying out business transactions where the beneficial owner of the transactions is unknown, or represented by an intermediary who will not disclose the identity of the beneficial owner. Section 8 of the Money Laundering Prevention Act states that the new legislation will override all secrecy obligations for the purpose of money laundering prevention and enforcement. The law also requires individuals to report to the MLA if they are carrying with them $10,000 or more in cash or negotiable instrument upon entering or leaving Samoa.

Samoa currently has 10 offshore banks. Section 16 of the Offshore Banking Act does not prohibit persons, who have been sentenced for an offense involving dishonesty, to apply to be employed as a director or manager of any offshore bank. The Act only requires prior approval in writing, of the Minister before doing so without setting any criteria to guide the decision. In addition, there is no provision in the Act that specifies the qualifications for an owner/shareholder of an offshore bank.

In addition to offshore banks, Samoa's offshore sector includes insurance companies, trusts, and international business companies (IBCs), of which there are slightly more than 4,085 currently registered. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares and shelf companies that conceal the identity of the beneficial owner and the date of incorporation of these entities. Corporate entities may be listed as officers and shareholders because Samoan IBCs have all the legal powers of a natural person. There are no requirements to file annual statements or annual returns. These provisions make IBCs particularly attractive to money launderers and have not yet been addressed by Samoan authorities.

In 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed Samoa's anti-money laundering regime and did not designate it as a non-cooperative jurisdiction. The FATF report noted that provisions in the recently enacted Money Laundering Prevention Bill addressed many of Samoa's deficiencies, but that others would need further steps. The FATF urged "the Government of Samoa to fully implement the enacted law and to strengthen the bank licensing procedure."

Samoa is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and the South Pacific Forum.

Through the passage of the June 2000 Money Laundering Prevention Act, the Government of Samoa (GOS) has taken positive steps to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime. The GOS needs to move quickly to implement this legislative effort, to appoint the Supervisory Authority that will supervise the financial sector, and to issue guidelines to financial institutions so that they have a clear understanding of their obligations under this new law. Particular emphasis needs to be directed toward regulation of the offshore financial sector. The GOS should enact legislation to identify the beneficial owners of IBCs to help ensure that international criminals do not use them for money laundering or other financial crimes.

Saudi Arabia (Other). Saudi Arabia is not considered to be a major financial center. However, in recognition of world-wide money laundering activities, particularly those involving drugs, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) published in 1995 money laundering control guidelines to assist Saudi banks from being exploited as channels for illegal transactions and other criminal activity. During 1998, SAMA reviewed the FATF 40 Recommendations and agreed they should be implemented. Simultaneously, an inter-ministerial committee reviewed all Saudi laws related to money laundering and prepared amendments to bring them into conformance with the FATF recommendations. The proposed revisions, in the form of new legislation, were approved by the Saudi Council of Ministers in late 1999.

There is relatively strong bank supervision in Saudi Arabia and individuals or banks suspected of money laundering are subject to criminal prosecution under Shari'a (Islamic) law, the Banking Control law, and Saudi Arabian labor law. Money laundering cases are heard in a Shari'a court, which bases its jurisdiction on a Koranic passage which states that "assets arising from illegal acts shall be forbidden and confiscated." Pursuant to the new legislation, relevant Saudi ministries are formulating plans to implement the law. As part of that process, the Ministry of Interior will establish a committee that has the power to refer cases for criminal prosecution to the Saudi Board of Grievances. While Shari'a courts deal harshly with money launderers, the involvement of the Board of Grievances will allow cases to be heard in accordance with guidelines set forth in the new legislation.

SAMA requires that each bank establish internal money laundering control units to review policies, institute necessary investigations, and implement training programs. If money laundering is suspected, banks are required to notify SAMA and the police. SAMA officials and bank compliance officers meet on a monthly basis to share information on money laundering trends. The Ministry of Interior does not publicly disseminate statistics regarding money laundering investigations and prosecutions in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Senegal (Other). The extent of money laundering in Senegal is not known. However, officials from the United Nations in 2000 indicated that the West African region may be fertile ground for money laundering because of drug trafficking, corruption, networks of contraband arms and precious stones, and weak mechanisms of control that can be exploited by international criminals. Article 102 of Senegal's 1997 drug code criminalizes drug laundering by providing punishment of up to 10 years imprisonment. Senegal has also enacted legislation against narcotics-related public corruption, but the law does not specifically address money laundering. The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), based in Dakar, is the central bank for Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, all of which use the French-backed CFA franc currency.

In November 2000 Senegal hosted a meeting of officials from 14 West African countries. The group set up the Intergovernmental Group for Action Against Money Laundering (GIABA) to coordinate their governments' actions against money laundering and other transnational crime.

Senegal is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Senegal signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Seychelles (Concern). Seychelles is a developing offshore financial center and tourist destination. Currently, there is little evidence of money laundering.

The development of the offshore financial sector by the Government of Seychelles (GOS) is an attempt to diversify the economy and increase foreign exchange earnings. The GOS aggressively markets Seychelles as an offshore financial and business center that is capable of providing for the registration of non-resident companies. A major defect of the program is that it still permits the issuance of bearer shares, a feature that can facilitate money laundering by making it extremely difficult to identify the beneficial owners of an international business company (IBC). However, Seychelles officials stated in 2000 that they are reviewing the question of bearer shares and intend to outlaw them. In the interim, the GOS will not approve the issuance of any more bearer shares. The 4800 registered IBCs pay no taxes in Seychelles, and are not subject to foreign exchange controls. Seychelles has also created the Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ) which is managed by the Seychelles International Business Authority (SIBA). SIBA, part of the Ministry of International Trade, acts as the central agency for the registration of IBCs. IBCs are not required to file annual reports. Seychelles also permits offshore trusts (registered through a licensed trustee) and insurance companies.

Seychelles passed anti-money laundering legislation in 1996, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, which criminalized the laundering of funds from all serious crimes; provided for the reporting of suspicious transactions and safe harbor protection for individuals and institutions making the reports; mandated record keeping and "know your customer" requirements; and provided for the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime.

The major area of concern regarding anti-money laundering practices in the Seychelles related to the Economic Development Act (EDA) of 1995. The EDA contained immunity provisions, such as protection from asset seizure and extradition, that could clearly attract international criminal enterprises wishing to shelter themselves and their proceeds from pursuit by legal authorities. While the EDA never came into force, it represented a grave threat to efforts to combat money laundering.

Both the Financial Action task Force (FATF) and the United States reacted to the EDA. The FATF applied its Recommendation 21 on February 1, 1996. That same year, the US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions warning them about the situation in the Seychelles. In February 2000, the FATF selected Seychelles for review as a possible non-cooperative jurisdiction. In its efforts to avoid being so-designated, the GOS, while maintaining that the EDA had never in fact gone into force, nevertheless agreed to officially repeal it, which it did on July 25, 2000. In October 2000 the FATF Plenary decided that Seychelles did not merit being named non-cooperative, and the FATF rescinded its Recommendation 21. The US Treasury has yet to rescind its advisory.

The Seychelles is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Seychelles is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

The GOS should address the issue of bearer shares and require complete identification of beneficial ownership of IBCs. It should also establish a financial intelligence unit to collect, analyze and share financial data with foreign counterparts to effectively combat money laundering and other financial crimes.

Singapore (Primary). As a significant international financial center, Singapore attracts investors from around the world, including money launderers. Bank secrecy laws and the lack of routine currency reporting requirements may make Singapore attractive to drug traffickers seeking to launder and move their money. However, recent legislation and regulations significantly weaken bank secrecy in cases involving most serious criminal activity, including narcotics-related money laundering. To bolster law enforcement cooperation and facilitate information exchange, including information to combat narcotics related money laundering, Singapore and the US signed the Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) in November 2000, after three years of negotiations. It is expected to enter into force in early 2001. The DDA is the first such agreement Singapore has undertaken with another government and is also the first agreement made under the auspices of Singapore's Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act that was enacted early in 2000. The DDA, however, is only limited to narcotics cases and does not apply to non-narcotics related money laundering or financial fraud cases.

Singapore is a major offshore financial center. As of December 2000, there were 83 offshore banks in Singapore, all branches of foreign banks. There are no offshore trusts, although banks may open trust, nominee, and fiduciary accounts. All banks in Singapore, whether domestic or offshore, are subject to the same regulation, record keeping and reporting requirements. There are also hundreds of offshore international and financial service businesses. An offshore company must have a local registered office with a physical address and a minimum of two directors, at least one of whom must be a Singaporean citizen; permanent resident or employment pass holder. Bearer shares are not permitted. A company incorporated in Singapore has the same powers as a natural person.

The Corruption, Drug Trafficking and other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1999 (CDSA) criminalized the laundering of proceeds from narcotics and over 150 other offenses. Financial institutions must report suspicious transactions and positively identify customers engaging in large currency transactions. Banks are required to maintain adequate records to respond quickly to the Government of Singapore's (GOS) inquiries in money laundering cases. However, there are no reporting requirements on amounts of currency that can be brought into or out of Singapore.

The GOS enacted the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MACM) in March 2000. The MACM consolidated the existing mutual assistance provisions of the Drug Trafficking Act (DTA) of 1993 and ensured that the GOS could share records in connection with narcotics investigations and proceedings. The MACM applies to countries that have concluded treaties, memoranda of understanding or other agreements with Singapore.

The MACM paved the way for the signature of the Drug Designation Agreement (DDA) with the United States in November 2000. The DDA will facilitate the exchange of banking and corporate information on drug money laundering suspects and targets to include access to bank records, reciprocal honoring of seizure/forfeiture warrants to include the execution of these warrants and the freezing and/or forfeiture of the proceeds of the drug trafficking, testimony of witnesses, service of process, and the sharing of seized assets. Implementation and use of the DDA is expected to result in significant seizures of narcotics-related proceeds in the years ahead.

In February 2000, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued a series of regulatory guidelines (i.e., "Notices") requiring banks to apply "know your customer" standards, adopt internal policies for staff compliance, and cooperate with enforcement agencies on money laundering cases. Banks must obtain documentation, such as passports or identity cards, from all personal customers so that the bank can verify their names, permanent contact addresses, dates of birth, and nationalities, and conduct inquiries into the bona fides of company customers. The regulations specifically require that banks obtain evidence of the identity of the beneficial owners of shell companies or trusts. The guidelines also mandate specific record keeping and reporting requirements, outline examples of suspicious transactions that should prompt reporting, and establish mandatory intra-company point-of-contact and staff training requirements. MAS Notice 626 applies to banks; Notice 824 applies to Finance Companies; Notice 1014 applies to Merchant Banks; and Notice 314 to Direct Life Insurers and Brokers. MAS issued similar guidelines for securities dealers and investment advisors, and futures brokers and advisors.

The Suspect Transaction Reporting Office (STRO) began operating on 10 January 2000 and receives and analyzes suspicious transaction reports filed by financial institutions. It is also authorized to exchange intelligence derived from these reports with foreign counterparts.

Singapore is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Singapore is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS).

The GOS should continue close monitoring of its domestic and offshore financial sectors. It should also extend the DDA to cover non-narcotics related money laundering and financial fraud cases. As a major financial center, it should also consider measures to monitor large currency movements into and out of the country to ensure that international criminals do not abuse Singapore's financial system.

Slovakia (Concern). The geographic, economic, and legal conditions that shape the money laundering environment in Slovakia are typical of those in other Central European countries. Slovakia's location along the major lines of communication connecting Western, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe make it a transit country for smuggling and the trafficking in narcotics, arms, stolen vehicles, and illegal aliens. Organized crime activity and the opportunities to use gray market channels for laundering also lead to a favorable money laundering environment. Financial crimes such as fraud, tax evasion, embezzlement, and conducting illegal business have been particularly problematic for Slovak authorities. Money laundering schemes carried out in Slovakia are also typical of other countries in transition. These include the use of the financial sector for the movement of criminal proceeds, fictitious companies, false invoicing schemes, and false documentation of imports and exports. Banks, insurance companies, and casinos are employed as money laundering mechanisms. Non-bank financial institutions have been particularly susceptible to laundering because until recently (January 1, 2001) they were not subject to transaction reporting requirements.

Slovakia's anti-money laundering legislation, Act N�249/1994 as amended by Act N� 58/1996 "To Prevent the Laundering of Proceeds of Most Serious Crimes, Particularly of Organized Crime and to Amend Some Other Statutory Provisions Enacted by the Authority of the National Council of the Slovak Republic," became effective on October 1, 1994. Article 252 "Legalization of Proceeds from Criminal Activity" of the Slovak Criminal Code came into force at the same time. These measures criminalize money laundering, require customer identification and record keeping, and require banks to report suspicious transactions.

In October 2000, the Slovak Parliament adopted the law "On Protection Against the Legalization of Proceeds from Criminal Activities." It requires non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious transactions beginning January 1, 2001. Non-bank financial institutions subject to the new law are: casinos, post offices, brokers, stock exchanges, commodity exchanges, asset management companies, insurance companies, tax advisors, auditors, and credit unions. The law also abolishes anonymous passbook savings accounts.

The financial intelligence unit (OFiS) of the Bureau of Financial Police (UFP) has jurisdictional responsibilities for money laundering violations. In its role as Slovakia's financial intelligence unit, the OFiS-UFP receives and evaluates the suspicious transaction reports, and collects additional information to establish the suspicion of money laundering. Once enough information has been obtained to warrant suspicion that a criminal offense has occurred, the OFiS-UFP forwards the case to the State Prosecutor's Office for investigation and prosecution.

Slovakia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) and participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). Slovakia became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in December 2000, which will expand opportunities for multilateral engagement on combating money laundering. Slovakia underwent a mutual evaluation by this group in 1998 and has been implementing changes to its money laundering regime based on the report's recommendations. The OFiS-UFP is a member of the Egmont Group. Slovakia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Slovakia continues to improve its anti-money laundering legislation. Implementation of the provisions of Slovakia's newly passed anti-money laundering legislation will give the Slovak financial system greater protection by helping it prevent and detect money laundering in all financial sectors, not just the banking system.

Slovenia (Other). Slovenia's economic stability and location on the Balkan drug route offer attractive opportunities for money laundering. Major sources of illegal proceeds are auto theft, narcotics trafficking, fraud, tax evasion, and alien smuggling. Organized crime activity is increasing, although it is less of a problem than in neighboring countries. Money laundering occurs through the banking system, currency exchange houses, casinos, real estate transactions, and the physical transport of currency across borders.

Slovenia's 1994 Law on Prevention of Money Laundering criminalized money laundering. It requires all financial institutions, casinos, and legal and natural persons to report suspicious transactions and currency transactions above US $22,000. Customer identification is mandatory for all single transactions, and for series of transactions, exceeding US $13,500. Records must be retained for a minimum of five years.

Slovenia has a financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Office for Money Laundering Prevention, which is a member of the Egmont Group. Slovenia underwent a mutual evaluation by the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). Slovenia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000, Slovenia signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Solomon Islands (Other). Drug trafficking does not occur on a significant scale in the Solomon Islands. The Islands' banking system is small and has no offshore sector. The country has not criminalized money laundering.

The Solomon Islands is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

South Africa (Concern). South Africa's position as the major financial center in the region and its relatively sophisticated and unprotected banking and financial sector make South Africa a very attractive target for the criminal syndicates that have located there. The Russian Mafia, Chinese Triads, and Nigerian drug traffickers have been identified in South Africa, along with native South African criminal groups. Diamonds and weapons smuggling, trade in endangered species, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering are major criminal activities challenging local law enforcement. In late 2000, the Government of South Africa (SAG) sent new legislation, the Financial Intelligence Center Bill, to parliament that when passed and implemented will substantially increase the SAG's ability to combat these crimes.

Money laundering for all serious crimes was criminalized by the Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 76 of 1996. This Act was superceded by the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, No. 121 of 1998 (POCA), which also criminalizes money laundering, mandates the reporting of suspicious transactions, and provides a "safe harbor" for good-faith compliance. Subsequent regulations directed that these reports be sent to the commercial Crime Unit (CCU) of the South African Police. Both of these Acts contain criminal and civil forfeiture provisions. However, South Africa has been unsuccessful in implementing this existing anti-money laundering legislation. The POCA was amended several times, and several challenges to arrests and seizures are pending.

The Financial Intelligence Center Bill (FICB), submitted to Parliament in late 2000, provides for the establishment and staffing of a Financial Intelligence Center (FIC) that would coordinate policy and efforts to counter money laundering activities and act as a centralized repository of information. The bill would require a wide range of financial institutions to identify customers, maintain records of transactions for at least five years, and report transactions of a suspicious nature to the FIC. If it has reasonable grounds to suspect that a transaction involves the proceeds of criminal activities, the FIC will forward this information to the investigative and prosecutorial authorities. The bill would also establish a Money Laundering Advisory Council to advise the Minister of Finance on policies and measures to combat money laundering. The FICB is expected to be enacted in 2001.

South Africa has no offshore financial center.

South Africa is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The United States and South Africa have concluded a bilateral extradition treaty and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, both of which are expected to enter into force in 2001. South Africa is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) and is expected to sign the group's memorandum of understanding in 2001.

Enactment and implementation of the FICB, currently before Parliament, would significantly strengthen South Africa's anti-money laundering regime and help protect South Africa's banking sector from abuse by criminals and criminal organizations.

Spain (Primary). Money laundering occurs primarily in Spain's financial system, although there are indications that funds are also being laundered through the acquisition and sale of real estate. Spanish authorities have noted that traffickers continue to use courier networks to remit large amounts of bulk cash to South America and the Middle East. The one area that drug trafficking organizations may be able to exploit is the stock market because it falls outside of the money laundering legislation.

The Government of Spain (GOS) has been addressing the money-laundering problem through the 1993 Prevention of Money Laundering Act and its corresponding 1995 implementing regulations. The Act criminalizes the laundering of proceeds linked to the illicit drug trade, terrorism and organized crime. Subsequent to the 1993 Act, reforms made to the Penal Code in December 1995 extended the criminalization of money laundering to all serious crimes.

The financial sector, particularly the banking community, continues to respond positively to the requirements of the Act and the regulations that require the reporting of the identities of customers engaging in large currency transactions, the maintenance of records, and the reporting of suspicious financial transactions. These reporting requirements apply to other financial sectors including credit card companies, currency exchange houses, jewelers, dealers in antiques, art stamps and coins, credit unions, and companies dealing in investments, securities, and/or insurance. The Act established the Commission for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Monetary Offenses to coordinate all of Spain's anti-money laundering efforts, and the Executive Service of this Commission (SEPBLAC) functions as Spain's financial intelligence unit (FIU). SEPBLAC receives and analysis the reports of suspicious financial transactions and forwards those indicating money laundering activity to law enforcement. SEPBLAC is a member of the Egmont Group of FIUs.

Spain continues to provide training and promote institution-building programs aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the judicial and law enforcement sectors, particularly in South and Central America. Spain is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and currently holds the presidency until June 2001. Spain is also an observer member of the newly created South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), and a Cooperating and Supporting Nation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Spain is a member of the EU, a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Spain has signed criminal legal assistance agreements with the United States, Australia, Chile, Canada, Argentina, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Morocco. Spain's Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States has been in force since 1993. In addition, a number of Spain's bilateral agreements to fight drug trafficking and organized crime provide for cooperation through information exchange and mutual assistance in combating money laundering. The countries with which Spain has concluded agreements in these areas include France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Italy, Chile, the Russian Federation, Israel, Bolivia, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Malta and Panama.

The GOS should continue its strong enforcement of its anti-money laundering program and international leadership to combat money laundering. It should also consider measures to address possible money laundering in the stock market to ensure that this sector is not used for financial crimes.

Sri Lanka (Other). Sri Lanka is not considered to be money laundering center, and it is not a tax haven, offshore banking facility or important financial center in the region. The government neither facilitates nor encourages money laundering. Sri Lanka maintains strict currency controls that inhibit money laundering activity.

Sri Lanka's Bank Secrecy Act makes financial transactions relating to narcotics trafficking illegal. In 2000, the central bank assisted in formulating a draft anti-money laundering bill that contains know your customer provisions and would hold bank directors liable if their institutions are used for money laundering. This legislation has not yet been presented to Parliament.

Sri Lanka is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money laundering (APG). In December 2000 Sri Lanka signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

St. Kitts and Nevis (Primary). St. Kitts and Nevis is a federation composed of two islands located in the eastern Caribbean Sea. It is at major risk for money laundering mainly because of the high volume of drug trafficking activity through and around the islands, the presence of known traffickers on the islands, and offshore services that protect client secrecy. A number of Russian organized crime figures have taken up residence in St. Kitts.

Although St. Kitts has an offshore sector that includes approximately 500 "exempt companies" (international business companies), most of the financial activity in the Federation is concentrated in Nevis, whose economy has become increasingly dependent upon the fees generated by the registration of offshore entities. One offshore bank and more than 19,000 offshore companies are registered in Nevis. St. Kitts and Nevis also offers offshore trusts, and as of mid-1999 had issued 10 Internet gaming licenses. As elsewhere in the Caribbean, St. Kitts and Nevis also provides an economic citizenship program by which one can buy St. Kitts and Nevis nationality and adopt a new name. St. Kitts and Nevis has the oldest economic citizenship program in the eastern Caribbean under the Citizenship Act of 1984. International law enforcement officials have criticized these programs, as they provide the opportunity for criminals to create new identities that are used to facilitate travel and create offshore companies for money laundering, financial fraud, and other illicit activities.

The anti-money laundering regime embodied in the legal, supervisory, and regulatory systems of St. Kitts and Nevis suffers from serious systemic problems. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1993 criminalized drug-related money laundering, mandated record keeping by financial institutions, and permitted reporting of suspicious transactions. But financial institutions operating in St. Kitts and Nevis are still not required to report suspicious transactions. Moreover, drug money laundering is punishable only by the imposition of fines. The bank secrecy laws of St. Kitts and Nevis also prohibit governmental authorities from obtaining financial information about customer identification and transactions that are collected and maintained by financial institutions. Offshore companies (including those that operate as financial institutions) registered in Nevis are not effectively supervised. Bearer shares allow anonymous corporate ownership, and entities do not require verification of the identity of customers, or maintenance of records relating to the identity of customers.

Citing these deficiencies, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified St. Kitts and Nevis as "non-cooperative" in the fight against money laundering.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory on St. Kitts and Nevis in July 2000 advising banks and other financial institutions operating in the United States "to give enhanced scrutiny to all financial transactions originating in or routed to or through the Federation of St. Kitts and Nevis, or involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts in St. Kitts and Nevis."

St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) and underwent a mutual evaluation in February 1999. After extended delays by the Kittian government, the report was finally discussed and adopted at the October 2000 CFATF Council meeting in Aruba.

In response to findings of the CFATF mutual evaluation, as well as the FATF designation, the Government of St. Kitts and the Nevis Island (GOSKN) established a task force that includes officials from both jurisdictions. The task force is working to revise offshore legislation and regulations as well as to establish a financial intelligence unit.

In November 2000, the GOSKN enacted several new measures to address some of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering regime. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 criminalizes the laundering of proceeds from all serious offenses ("any offense triable on indictment or hybrid offences from which a person has benefited"). The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Act 2000 establishes the legislative basis for an FIU that will be able to cooperate with foreign counterparts, although it appears the unit would not be able to cooperate during the information phase. Rather, it could share information only after criminal proceedings against a subject have already begun. The Financial Services Commission Act 2000 creates the legal basis for the appointment by the Minister of Finance of a commission that will include one regulator for St. Kitts and one for Nevis for the islands' onshore sectors.

St. Kitts and Nevis has signed a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) with the United States, which entered into force in early 2000. St. Kitts and Nevis is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. St. Kitts and Nevis is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The GOSKN needs to build upon its recent efforts to improve its anti-money laundering regime to meet international standards. New laws and regulations should be consistent in both islands of the federation. The GOSKN should enact legal measures to require registration of the beneficial owners of companies and bank accounts and provide adequate resources to enforce compliance by offshore entities. In addition, the GOSKN should quickly establish a financial intelligence unit and provide it the legal authority to share information with foreign counterparts during the information-gathering phase of an investigation. It should also institute better control and due diligence in its economic citizenship program to prevent possible abuse by international criminals.

St. Lucia (Concern). St. Lucia is not a major financial center. However, St. Lucia has recently developed an offshore financial services center that could make the island more vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes.

In November 1999 the Government of St. Lucia (GOSL) enacted the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act, which criminalizes the laundering of proceeds relating to 15 prescribed offenses, including drug trafficking, corruption, fraud, terrorism, gambling, and robbery. It contains know-your-customer provisions, suspicious transaction reporting requirements, and record keeping requirements. These obligations apply to domestic and offshore financial institutions, including credit unions, trust companies, and insurance companies. The Proceeds of Crime Act 1993 requires financial institutions to retain account opening information and details of transactions for seven years. The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act now imposes a duty on financial institutions to take "reasonable measures" to establish the identity of customers, and requires accounts to be maintained in the true name of the holder. In addition, the Act now requires an institution to take reasonable measures to identify the underlying beneficial owner when an agent, trustee, or nominee operates an account. In April 2000, the Financial Services Supervision Unit issued detailed guidance notes, entitled "Minimum Due Diligence Checks, to be Conducted by Registered Agents and Trustees."

The Act also established the Money Laundering (Prevention) Authority in early 2000. This Authority consists of five persons "who have sound knowledge of the law, banking or finance." The Authority's functions include receipt of suspicious transactions reports, the subsequent investigation of the transactions, dissemination of information within or outside of St. Lucia, and the monitoring of compliance with the law. The Money Laundering (Prevention) Act imposes a duty on the Money Laundering (Prevention) Authority to cooperate with foreign competent authorities. Assistance includes the provision of documents, giving of testimony, undertaking of examinations, execution of search and seizure, and the provision of information and evidential items. The legislation is new; therefore, there is no experience of its effectiveness.

In 1999 the GOSL also enacted a comprehensive inventory of offshore legislation, consisting of the International Business Companies (IBC) Act, the Registered Agent and Trustee Licensing Act, the International Trusts Act, the International Insurance Act, the Mutual Funds Act, and the International Banks Act. The sector presently has one offshore bank, three insurance companies, and approximately 100 IBCs.

The IBC Act does not provide for a licensing regime, but allows for a simple registration process, which is automatic upon submission of the correct documents and is controlled by a private sector company that also has responsibility for marketing the OFC. IBCs intending to engage in banking, insurance or mutual funds business may not be registered without the approval of the Minister. An IBC may be struck off the register on the grounds of carrying on business against the public interest.

As a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), St. Lucia underwent a first mutual evaluation in compliance with CFATF requirements. The report on the evaluation, which preceded the establishment of St. Lucia's offshore sector, was reviewed at the July 1999 CFATF Plenary.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed the anti-money laundering regime of St. Lucia in 2000, and although it did not determine St. Lucia to be non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering, the FATF did make the following comments:

Although St. Lucia enacted relatively comprehensive new money laundering legislation early this year, it appears not to have structured its offshore financial services regulatory regime in such a way as to prevent conflicts of interest with the private sector in decision-making and operations. This conflict of interest has the potential of undermining the anti-money laundering system. It also appears as though the regulatory body may not be staffed sufficiently to oversee the rapidly developing offshore services sector. The FATF urges St. Lucia to remedy these deficiencies and will follow up progress in the matter.

St. Lucia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.. In February 2000, St. Lucia and the US brought into force, by an exchange of instruments of ratification, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty and an extradition treaty.

The GOSL should strongly enforce the Money Laundering (Prevention) Act and establish the Money Laundering (Prevention) Authority to act as a financial intelligence unit. It should also move quickly to prevent the intermingling of the government's regulatory role and its responsibilities with respect to commercial marketing of the sector. The GOSL also needs to devote adequate resources toward regulating the new offshore financial sector to ensure that money launderers and other criminals do not abuse it.

St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Primary). St. Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) has a growing offshore sector that is vulnerable to money laundering because of its inadequate regulation and strict secrecy laws. SVG is a transshipment point for cocaine, and marijuana production plays an important role in the local economy. However, the amounts do not reach the major-producer threshold nor do they significantly affect the United States.

SVG's offshore sector offers banks, trusts, insurance companies, international business companies (IBCs), mutual funds, international shipping companies, and Internet gaming licenses. SVG assures individuals who are seeking to protect their assets from civil judgement that SVG will not cooperate with foreign civil courts. Section 39 of the International Trust Act restricts recognition of foreign judgements against asset protection trusts established in SVG. IBCs may register on-line, issue bearer shares, and take advantage of pre-named "shelf-companies" that disguise the true dates of incorporation. IBCs also are not required to file accounts with any authority, and are exempt from taxes for 25 years.

Recently, SVG created the legislative framework for an economic citizenship program-and has publicly projected that it could earn approximately US $4.5 million in 2000 from passport sales.

In 1996, SVG passed legislation that created the Offshore Finance Authority (OFA) as the sole body regulating its offshore sector. The OFA also is engaged in marketing the offshore sector, thereby creating a conflict of interest. The OFA is responsible for appointing an offshore finance inspector, licensing and regulating offshore banks, and overseeing the activities of the Registrar of Companies, the entity responsible for approving IBC licenses. The OFA's staff of 11, which includes clerical staff, must supervise SVG's 28 offshore banks and approximately 11,000 IBCs.

The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) supervises SVG's five domestic banks. In 1995, the ECCB issued Anti-Money Laundering Guidance Notes that follow CFATF recommendations. However, the Guidance Notes apply only to the domestic banking sector and lack enforcement mechanisms. The ECCB Guidance Notes do not apply to SVG's non-bank financial institutions, businesses, or the offshore sector.

The Proceeds of Crime Act (PCA) 1997 criminalizes money laundering related to the proceeds of crime and organized fraud. However, the Act's definition of "proceeds of crime" is not clear. The PCA obliges financial institutions to maintain records related to the opening and closing of accounts and transactions that exceed Eastern Caribbean $5,000 (approximately US $1,800) for a minimum of seven years. The PCA also authorized financial institutions to voluntarily report transactions to a police officer or the Director of Public Prosecutions if the institution had reasonable grounds to believe that the transaction involved the proceeds of crime. According to SVG authorities, the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 1999 makes this reporting system mandatory, and obliges financial institutions to report currency transactions that exceed US $10,000 to the Anti-Money Laundering Committee (AMLC). SVG authorities, however, have not yet produced copies of this amended act. The AMLC is comprised of representatives from law enforcement, Customs, and the Offshore Finance Authority, and is tasked with reviewing reports from financial institutions and recommending further investigation if necessary. To date, the AMLC has not met.

In June 2000, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) identified SVG as one of 15 countries that are non-cooperative in international efforts to combat money laundering. The FATF cited several concerns in its accompanying report:

There are no anti-money laundering regulations or guidelines in place with respect to offshore financial institutions, and thus no customer identification or record-keeping requirements or procedures. Resources devoted to supervision are extremely limited. Licensing and registration requirements for financial institutions are rudimentary. There is no system to require reporting of suspicious transactions. IBC and trust law provisions create additional obstacles, and the Offshore Finance Authority is prohibited by law from providing international cooperation with respect to information related to an application for a license, the affairs of a licensee, or the identity or affairs of a customer of a licensee. International judicial assistance is unduly limited to situations where proceedings have been commenced against a defendant in a foreign jurisdiction.

The US Treasury Department issued an advisory to US financial institutions, indicating that they "should give enhanced scrutiny to any transaction originating in or routed to or through St. Vincent and the Grenadines, or involving entities organized or domiciled, or persons maintaining accounts, in St. Vincent and the Grenadines."

Since issuance of the FATF's report, SVG has addressed some of the deficiencies in its anti-money laundering regime. In July 2000, it revoked the license of six offshore banks for non-compliance with certain provisions of the Offshore Banking Act (OBA), such as refusal to make quarterly statements of accounts and submit audited financial statements. The owner of one of these banks subsequently demanded repayment of alleged loans that he claimed his bank had made to government officials. All the alleged recipients have denied procuring such loans. These loans would have been illegal under the OBA because offshore banks are prohibited from having business dealings with Vincentian citizens.

In August 2000, SVG amended the International Banks Act (IBA) to increase the OFA's oversight of offshore banks, and amended the Confidential Relationships Preservation Act to allow the offshore finance inspector greater access to banking information. However, there continue to be significant restrictions on the sharing of such information with international authorities. In October 2000, SVG again amended the IBA to allow the offshore financial inspector access to the name or title of an account of a customer and any other confidential information about the customer that is in the possession of a license.

SVG is a member of the CFATF and has undergone a mutual evaluation by that body. In addition, SVG is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. SVG is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Current SVG law limits the exchange of financial information, the sharing of assets and the degree of cooperation with foreign authorities on financial investigations. For example, the Confidential Relationships Preservation (International Finance) Act of 1996 could impede international cooperation, although its most restrictive section has been removed. An updated extradition treaty and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the United States and SVG entered into force in September 1999.

SVG must fully implement the recommendations of the CFATF mutual evaluation and address concerns identified by the FATF. SVG also should ensure that it properly supervises the offshore sector and adequately trains regulatory and law enforcement personnel on money laundering operations and investigations. SVG should put into place a mechanism to ensure separation between the offshore sector regulatory and marketing responsibilities. SVG is urged to exercise particular caution in implementing an economic citizenship program, since without proper due diligence, such a program could offer an avenue for international criminals to hide both themselves and their illicit profits.

Suriname (Other). Although money laundering is believed to occur in Suriname-primarily through the sale of gold purchased with illicit funds and manipulation of commercial and state-controlled bank accounts-no data is available for 2000 on its extent. Casinos also may facilitate money laundering. The police have created a financial investigative unit; however, Suriname's overall anti-money laundering regime is considered weak.

In mid-2000, Suriname resumed its participation in the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). In November 2000, the CFATF conducted a mutual evaluation of Suriname's anti-money laundering regime. The results have not yet been presented to the CFATF Plenary. CFATF also has offered to assist the Government of Suriname in drafting new anti-money laundering legislation that would meet international standards.

Suriname is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and is a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering.

Swaziland (Other). International drug trafficking continues to grow in Swaziland, increasing the threat of money laundering. Swaziland's proximity to South Africa, lack of effective antidrug legislation; limited enforcement resources; a relatively open society; and a developed economic infrastructure contribute towards making Swaziland attractive as a regional base or transshipment point for trafficking organizations and increases the risk for money laundering.

Swaziland's 1929 narcotics law does not address conspiracy, asset seizure, or money laundering. However, the Swazi government plans to address these issues. Parliament is expected to review and pass a new Money Laundering Bill in the first quarter of 2001. The Money Laundering Bill outlines penalties for money laundering, designates the Central Bank of Swaziland as the supervisory authority, and provides conditions when assets may be frozen and forfeited. Unfortunately, the bill's penalties for money laundering appear relatively weak: six years imprisonment, a fine amounting to roughly $2,600, or both. Swaziland also has an extradition treaty with South Africa, as well as a protocol and mutual understanding on narcotics with Commonwealth Countries.

Swaziland is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Swaziland signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Swaziland is expected to sign the Memorandum of Understanding of the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style body, in the near future.

Sweden (Other). In 1999, Swedish anti-money laundering legislation was amended to cover all types of proceeds from criminal activity. Previously, money launderers were usually prosecuted for a receiving offense, such as receiving stolen goods. This tightening up of existing money laundering control was intended to allow Sweden to fulfill the recommendations of the Hague Forfeiture Convention.

Swedish law requires financial institutions, insurance companies, and currency exchange houses to verify customer identification, inquire into a transaction's background, and verify identities for each transaction, particularly in the case of new customers involving amounts above SEK 110,000 (US$ 13,250). Any suspicious individuals/transactions are required to be reported to the police financial intelligence unit (FIU). The law was changed in 1999 so that non-complying institutions would be sanctioned, rather than individual officers. Since 1999, the FIU has been entitled to demand customer information from dealers in antiques, jewelry, and art; companies buying and selling new and used vehicles; and firms dealing with gambling and sale of lottery tickets. Starting January 1, 2001, this requirement applies to money transfer companies as well. Swedish law also provides for the seizure of assets derived from drug-related activity.

Sweden has endorsed the September 1997 Basle committee "Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision." Sweden is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, the Council of Europe, and its FIU is a member of the Egmont Group. Sweden is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Switzerland (Primary). Switzerland is a major international financial center. The country is attractive to money launderers because of the strength of the Swiss Franc (SFR) and the sophisticated nature of financial services in Switzerland. Although Swiss bank secrecy rules may appear vulnerable to abuse by those transferring illegally obtained assets, Swiss authorities waive secrecy rules in the prosecution of money laundering and other criminal cases.

Switzerland is a transit point for drugs en route to other European countries, and the destination for narcotics deliveries, especially heroin and cocaine. Reporting indicates that criminals attempt to launder proceeds in Switzerland from a wide range of illegal activities conducted worldwide, particularly narcotics trafficking and corruption. Both Swiss and foreign individuals or entities conduct money laundering activities. However, narcotics-related money laundering proceeds are largely controlled by foreign drug-trafficking organizations.

Money laundering was criminalized by Article 305bis of the Swiss Penal Code. Articles 58 and 305ter of the Swiss Penal Code, CFB (Swiss Federal Banking Commission) Directive 91/3 of 1/7/98, and the Agreement on the Banks' Obligation of Diligence also address money laundering. Switzerland has implemented legislation for identifying, tracing, freezing, seizing and forfeiting narcotics-related assets.

On April 1, 1998, Switzerland enacted the Money Laundering Act (MLA), which extended money laundering regulations to non-bank financial institutions. The MLA mandated that all financial intermediaries join an accredited self-regulating body (SRB), or apply for direct supervision under the Money Laundering Financial Control Authority (MLCA) of the Federal Finance Administration, by April 1, 2000. The SRBs must be independent of the management of the intermediaries they supervise, and enforce compliance with due diligence obligations. Non-compliance can result in a SFR 200,000 fine, or a revoked license. Between 12,000 to 15,000 fiduciaries operate in this previously unregulated arena. Key non-bank intermediaries have failed to comply with the law. Some are challenging the law in court, others are lobbying to have the law weakened. Attorneys in the finance department ruled against prosecution of two precedent cases of non-compliance referred by the MLCA. Another 28 cases are on hold while the finance department decides how to deal with the lack of cooperation from approximately half of the country's financial intermediaries.

In December 1999, the Efficiency Bill was passed by parliament. The purpose of this bill is to make the prosecution of organized crime, money laundering, corruption and other white-collar crime more effective, by increasing personnel and financing of the criminal police section of the Federal police office. The new law gives the Federal police and Attorney General's Office the authority to handle cases with international scope, involve several cantons, or which deal with money laundering, organized crime, corruption, and white-collar crime. The law becomes effective January 1, 2002.

The Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) is Switzerland's financial intelligence unit, and is a member of the Egmont Group. All financial intermediaries (banks, insurers, fund managers, currency exchange houses, securities brokers, etc) are legally obliged to establish customer identity when forming a business relationship. They also must notify the MROS, or a government authorized supervisory body, if a transaction appears suspicious. If financial institutions determine that the assets were derived from criminal activity, the assets must be frozen immediately until a prosecutor decides on further action. In June 2000, the MROS published its second annual report covering April 1999 through March 2000. During this reporting period, the MROS received 370 reports of suspicious activity concerning assets in the amount of US $15,500,000. Of these reports, 55 were for suspected money laundering. MROS reported that 63 percent of the reports forwarded to the prosecuting authorities the previous year actually resulted in criminal proceedings that are still underway.

Credit Suisse was among the Swiss banks to be severely rebuked by the Federal Banking Commission in the money laundering scandal concerning more than US $600 million {$4 billion} that were stolen from Nigeria by General Abacha during his dictatorship. Recently, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission filed a complaint with the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) over the US $214 million that Credit Suisse had accepted from two sons of General Abacha. The SBA is studying whether to levy a fine, which could cost Credit Suisse up to SFR 10 million. In October 2000, eleven international private banks, including the Credit Suisse Group, agreed to voluntary anti-money laundering guidelines (known as the Wolfsberg Principles) for private banking developed in collaboration with the NGO Transparency International. Also, a recent anticorruption law makes bribery of foreign officials a predicate offense under Swiss law for money laundering.

Switzerland's banking industry offers the same account services for both residents and non-residents alike. These can be opened through various intermediaries who advertise their services. As part of Switzerland's international financial services, banks offer certain well-regulated offshore services, including permitting non-residents to form offshore companies to conduct business, which can be used for tax reduction purposes. Swiss law obliges financial intermediaries to verify the identity of customers in all cases.

The Swiss Commercial Law does not recognize any offshore mechanism per se and its provisions apply equally to residents and non-residents. The stock company and the limited liability company are two standard forms of incorporation offered by Swiss Commercial Law. The financial intermediary is required to verify the identity of the beneficial owner of the stock company. The financial intermediaries must also be informed of any change regarding the beneficial owner. The stock company requires that US $64,000 of share capital be deposited prior to formation of the company. From this capital, bearer shares may be issued. The Limited Liability Company requires share capital of US $12,800 to be on deposit before the company can be formed. This type of company cannot issue bearer shares, the identity of the beneficial owner must be disclosed, and is listed in the commercial register.

Switzerland cooperates with the US to trace and seize assets, and has shared a large amount of funds seized with the US government (USG) and other governments. The Government of Switzerland has worked closely with the USG on numerous money laundering cases. The banking community cooperates with enforcement efforts. In addition, new legislation permits "spontaneous transmittal"-allowing the Swiss investigating magistrate to signal to foreign law enforcement authorities the existence of evidence in Switzerland. For example, the Swiss used this provision to signal to Peru regarding accounts linked to former Peruvian presidential advisor Montesinos.

On December 4-5, 2000, the US-Swiss Joint Economic Commission consultations on International Economic Crime were held in Bern, Switzerland. The participants consisted of Swiss officials, US Justice, Treasury, State, Federal Reserve, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives. The purpose of the consultations was to identify steps towards closer cooperation.

In December 2000, Switzerland signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Switzerland has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in place with the US to exchange records and provide information in connection with narcotics investigations and proceedings. Switzerland has ratified the Council of Europe Convention on the laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of proceeds from crime. Switzerland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force on money laundering.

Switzerland has been vigilant in developing anti-money laundering policies, and allocating resources to thwart money laundering. The Government of Switzerland needs to resolve the problem of non-compliance with its MLA, on the part of the non-bank financial intermediaries, in order to more fully implement its anti-money laundering legislation.

Taiwan (Primary). Taiwan's location in Asia and its sizable shipping industry make it a crossroads for commerce throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The involvement of Taiwan-based organized crime groups in international narcotics trafficking exposes Taiwan's financial institutions to the associated threat of money laundering. Criminal proceeds derived from financial crime and corruption as well as from foreign sources are laundered through Taiwan's financial system.

An alarming trend recently identified by Taiwanese authorities is the increasing use of the stock market for money laundering. According to statistics published by Taiwan's financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Money Laundering Prevention Center (MLPC), 40 percent of money laundering cases prosecuted in Taiwan occurred through securities companies. In 50 percent of money laundering cases, criminal proceeds were transferred abroad. The US, Thailand, Hong Kong, and the People's Republic of China were the primary destinations for laundered proceeds, respectively.

The MLPC became operational on April 23, 1997. It processed 436 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) in 1997; 1,218 in 1998; and 1,199 in 1999. SARs reported in 1998 resulted in 210 cases referred for investigation. 1999 SARs resulted in 238 cases referred for investigation. Taiwan has successfully prosecuted several money laundering cases based on SARs. In 2000 there were nine indictments and six convictions for money laundering.

Taiwan's Money Laundering Control Act (MLCA) of April 1997 criminalized money laundering for a wide variety of crimes, referencing specific predicate offenses. However, some concern has arisen because tax evasion and gaming were not among the predicate offenses referenced. The MLCA for the most part meets international standards for money laundering. However, Taiwan continues to consider various possible amendments to improve the effectiveness of the law. Currently, financial institutions are not prohibited from informing their clients about the reporting of client suspicious transactions to the MLPC. Discussions continue within the Taiwanese agencies to amend the MLCA to prohibit client notification of suspicious transactions. Another proposed amendment under consideration would require a number of non-bank financial institutions with known money laundering activity to report suspicious transactions to the MLPC. These include pawnshops, travel bureaus, antique dealers, auto dealers, and real estate businesses.

Taiwan is a founding member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering and actively participates in the Group's meetings. The MLPC is a member of the Egmont Group.

The successful prosecutions of money launderers based on SAR reporting attest to the effectiveness of Taiwan's anti-money laundering regime. Taiwan should pass the proposed amendments to the MLCA, especially in the areas of client non-disclosure of suspicious transaction reporting and the inclusion of tax evasion as a predicate offense. These measures will enhance the admirable progress Taiwan has made thus far in combating money laundering.

Tajikistan (Other). Tajikistan is not a financial center, and its underdeveloped banking sector will likely keep it from being attractive for money laundering in the near future. However, with average monthly income in the country remaining at less than $10, the temptation to become involved in narcotics-related transactions remains high for many segments of the society. Tajikistan has not criminalized money laundering.

Tajikistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It also has a bilateral cooperation agreement with the United States that facilitates the delivery of anti-money laundering training. In December 2000 Tajikistan signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Tanzania (Other). Money laundering is present in Tanzania, a fact confirmed by police and government officials. However, to date there have been no prosecutions for drug-related money laundering. A very weak financial sector and an under-trained, under-funded law enforcement apparatus make such crimes difficult to track and prosecute. Officials believe that real estate and used cars are areas where money laundering is present.

Money laundering is an illegal act under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act 1991. The latter criminalizes drug-related money laundering and obliges financial institutions to maintain records of transactions exceeding 10,000 shillings (approximately US $12) for a period of 10 years. If the institution has reasonable grounds to believe that a transaction relates to money laundering, it may communicate this information to the police for investigation. A "safe harbor" provision protects such disclosure.

In November 2000, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania held a conference on money laundering under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC). Tanzania also hosted an April meeting of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The Government of Tanzania has played a leading role in the creation of this FATF-style regional body, and currently heads the Interim Ministerial Council and hosts the secretariat of the organization. Signatories of the ESAAMLG memorandum of understanding pledged to implement international standards to fight money laundering, including the FATF 40 Recommendations.

Thailand (Primary). Thailand's location makes it a major risk for money laundering, as it is a transit country for Southeast Asian narcotics. Northern Thailand forms part of the Golden Triangle with Burma and Laos. Although Thailand has taken significant steps towards reducing the production of illicit narcotics, its still serves as a major narcotics trafficking route for the Golden Triangle, because of its good transportation infrastructure and international connections. Thailand's banking system is used by drug traffickers to hide and move their proceeds. The underground banking system is also widely in use as a money laundering method. Money is transported in bulk from the United States to other Asian countries, and ultimately moved to Thailand. Gambling dens and underground lotteries account for a significant portion of Thailand's underground economy and are attractive mechanisms for money laundering

Thailand's anti-money laundering legislation, the Money Laundering Control Act B.E. 2542 (1999), came into effect in August 1999 and was implemented in October 2000. The Act criminalized money laundering for the following predicate offenses: narcotics trafficking, prostitution, pandering, arms trafficking, financial institution fraud, embezzlement, public corruption, smuggling, and other customs violations, extortion, and blackmail. Major provisions of the Money Laundering Control Act require customer identification, record keeping, and the reporting of large and suspicious transactions. Reporting requirements for most financial transactions (including purchases of securities and insurance) exceeding 2 million bath (roughly $50, 000) and property transactions exceeding 5 million bath (roughly $125,000) have been in place since October 2000. The Act also created three agencies to handle various aspects of the Money Laundering Control Board, the Business Transactions Committee, and the Money Laundering Control Office. The Money Laundering Control Board advises the Cabinet and formulates government policy on money laundering issues. It also monitors and evaluates the effectiveness of the Money Laundering Control Act and the performance of the Business Transactions Committee and Money Laundering Control Office.

The Business Transactions Committee executes operational aspects of the Act that address suspect transactions and the disposition of proceeds. It may audit and suspend suspect financial transactions related to money laundering for a period of up to ten days. The Committee may compel physical and juridical persons, as well as government agencies and officials, to provide oral or written testimony and documentation in money laundering investigations. It can conduct search and seizure operations for the purpose of investigating, monitoring, and freezing of assets or evidence of money laundering offenses. In addition, the committee may freeze assets related to a money laundering investigation for a period of up to ninety days if there is probable cause that the assets are perishable.

The Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is Thailand's financial intelligence unit (FIU). It receives, analyzes, and processes suspicious and large transaction reports as required by the Act. The Business Transactions Committee tasks the Office with administrative functions such as collecting evidence and identifying witnesses for money laundering investigations. The Office is also tasked with providing training to the public and private sectors concerning the provisions of the Act.

Licenses were first granted to Thai and foreign financial institutions to establish offshore units, known as Bangkok International Banking Facilities (BIBFs) in March 1993. BIBFs may perform a number of financial and investment banking services but can only raise funds offshore (through deposits and borrowing) for onward lending into Thailand or offshore. BIBFs were listed by the United Nations Drug Control Program and by the World Bank as potentially vulnerable to money laundering activities because they serve as transit points for funds. Thailand's 44 BIBFs are now subject to the recently enacted Money Laundering Control Act. Implementation of the Act may discourage the use of BIBFs as money laundering mechanisms.

The US-Thai Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty entered into force in 1993. Thailand is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). It co-chairs the APG's Working Group on Alternative Remittance Systems. The MLPC has applied for membership in the Egmont Group.

In December 2000, the Thailand signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The government of Thailand should continue to implement its strong anti-money laundering program and participation in international efforts. It should also consider additional measures to address underground financial systems to ensure that narcotics traffickers and other international criminals do not abuse these sectors of the economy.

Togo (Other). Togo's poor infrastructure and desperate economic conditions make it an unlikely venue for money laundering. Its porous borders, however, make it a transshipment point in the regional and subregional trade in narcotics. Togo Customs is charged with combating the laundering of narcotics proceeds.

Togo hosted the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) Heads of State and Governments Conference in December 1999, which created an Inter-Governmental Group of Action Against Money-Laundering in West Africa. Togo's 1998 drug law penalizes drug money laundering with up to 20 years in prison.

Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. In December 2000 Togo signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Tonga (Other). Tonga is not a regional financial center. However, Tonga's offshore sector licenses offshore banks. Tonga also sells economic citizenship. Both the banks and the selling of economic citizenship could be used by money launderers. In 2000, Tonga indicated it enacted the Money Laundering Act 2000, Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 2000, and Foreign Evidence Act 2000.

Tonga is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Trinidad and Tobago (Other). Trinidad and Tobago has a well developed and modern banking sector, but it is not an important regional financial center, nor is it a tax haven or offshore center. Nevertheless, the country is experiencing an increase in financial crimes, mostly in the form of counterfeiting and credit card fraud. It is likely that some money laundering takes place in banks, credit unions, stock brokerages, insurance companies, casinos, and some retail and construction businesses.

In 2000, the GOTT enacted the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) that expands money laundering predicate offenses to include all serious crimes and institutes reporting requirements for suspicious transactions. Failure to comply with the Bill's record-keeping and reporting requirements will result in a fine of 250,000 TT (approximately US $40,000) and imprisonment for two years for summary conviction, and a fine of 3,000,000 TT (approximately US $500,000) and seven years of imprisonment for conviction on indictment. Upon summary conviction for money laundering an offender shall be liable for a fine $10 million TT (approximately US $ 1,600,000) and imprisonment for 7 years; and upon conviction on indictment for money laundering an offender shall be liable for a fine of 25,000,000 TT (approximately Us $4,000,0000) and 25 years imprisonment. Furthermore, if an institution commits an offence under the POCA, any officer who aids and abets money laundering activities can be convicted of money laundering even if the institution itself has not been prosecuted or convicted. The POCA also enables the courts to seize the proceeds of all serious crimes.

The GOTT has legislation in place that allows it to trace, freeze, and seize assets, including intangible assets such as bank accounts. Authorities may seize legitimate businesses if they are used to launder drug money. GOTT customs regulations require that any sum above US$5000 (in currency or monetary instruments) entering or leaving the country be declared. Cash above US$10,000 may be seized, with judicial approval, pending determination of its legitimate source. The GOTT does not have legislation that allows the sharing of forfeited assets with other countries, but has done so in the past on a case-by-case basis through bilateral agreements.

The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) approved a UNDCP plan that will draft updated guidelines for anti-money laundering legislation, exchange of information, record keeping, independent regulatory structures, suspicious transaction reporting, know your customer requirements, and international cooperation.

The central bank has set money laundering guidelines, including due diligence provisions, that apply to all financial institutions subject to the Financial Institutions Act of 1993. These include banks, finance companies, leasing corporations, merchant banks, mortgage institutions, unit trusts, credit card businesses, and financial services businesses. Credit unions and exchange houses are not subject to the guidelines.

The GOTT has an inter-ministerial counternarcotics/crime task force that investigates drug trafficking and related money laundering. To date, the GOTT has charged six individuals with money laundering-related offenses

Trinidad and Tobago is a member of the CFATF, which is headquartered in Port of Spain. It underwent a CFATF mutual evaluation in 1997 and the report was endorsed by CFATF's Council of Ministers in 1997. Trinidad and Tobago is also a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Drub Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. In 1999, an MLAT with the United States came into force. In June 2000, during the visit of Attorney General Janet Reno, the US and GOTT signed a joint statement on law enforcement cooperation which pledges in part to expand cooperation on the detection and prosecution of money laundering and related criminal activities.

At the GOTT's invitation, the IRS is providing technical assistance to the Board of Inland Revenue to develop a comprehensive criminal investigations system to reduce corruption enforce the criminal statutes relative to tax administration and related financial crimes. This is being done in order to achieve compliance with the GOTT Income Tax Act. The GOTT's international cooperation record in the area of information exchange on financial crimes has been excellent.

Trinidad and Tobago is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Tunisia (Other). There is little information about possible money laundering in Tunisia. It is not a regional financial center, and the government keeps a close hand on the management of the economy. However, a number of factors make Tunisia vulnerable to money laundering. One is the presence of an offshore banking sector consisting of about 12 banks, reportedly closely regulated by the Tunisian Ministry of Finance and the central bank. There are also approximately 1,200 offshore manufacturing companies (regulated by the Ministries of Commerce and Industry) and 300 offshore trading companies (regulated by the Ministry of Commerce). The trading companies, as a rule, operate by matching up third country supply and demand and brokering trade deals, with no goods ever entering or leaving Tunisia.

There is no limit on the amount of foreign currency which may be brought into the country, but amounts over 1,000 Tunisian dinars (TND) or its equivalent must be declared (the current rate of exchange is approximately 1.4 TND to US$1.

Offshore companies may be 100 percent foreign-owned. Anonymous directors are not permitted, and the names of all directors and companies must be listed in the official government journal when the company is organized or when there is a change in directorship.

Tunisia has no anti-money laundering laws. The only material anti-money laundering legislation is contained in a 1992 counternarcotics law that makes it illegal to assist anyone involved in drug trafficking, including transferring funds for them, offering them services, or procuring facilities for them that enable them to invest or disguise drug trafficking income. The law applies even if the illegal activity takes place in another country.

Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Turkey (Primary). Turkey is an important regional financial center for Central Asia and the Middle East. While narcotics trafficking is a source of illicit proceeds, most money laundering that takes place appears to involve tax evasion rather than narcotics transactions, and local narcotics trafficking organizations are responsible for only a small portion of the total of funds laundered in Turkey. Terrorist financing is also an issue. Money laundering takes place in both banks and non-bank financial institutions. According to information dating from early 1999, major money laundering methods in Turkey involve the cross-border smuggling of currency, bank transfers into and out of the country, and the purchase of high-ticket items such as real estate, gold and luxury automobiles. Illicit funds are also integrated into the economy through the financing of the construction of large apartment complexes and other buildings. Turkey is not an offshore financial center, and has no secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of client and ownership information to bank supervisors and enforcement officials.

The Government of Turkey (GOT) has been active in the fight against money laundering for several years. Turkey criminalized money laundering in 1996 for a wide range of predicate offenses, including narcotics-related crimes, smuggling of arms and antiquities, terrorism, counterfeiting, and trafficking in human organs and in women. The Council of Ministers subsequently passed a set of regulations that mandate the filing of suspicious transaction reports (STRs), and require customer identification and the maintenance of records for five years. These regulations are applicable to banks and a wide range of non-bank financial institutions, including insurance firms and jewelry dealers. The number of STRs being filed is steadily rising, as banks and financial institutions become more aware of what constitutes an STR. Turkey also has in place a system for identifying, tracing, freezing and seizing narcotics-related assets, although Turkish law allows for only criminal forfeiture. There were no major new developments in 2000 in the area of anti-money laundering laws or countermeasures.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), of which Turkey is a member, has conducted two reviews of Turkey's anti-money laundering program. The second review noted that while Turkey was making progress, several areas needed to be addressed. For example, the suspicious transaction reporting system is satisfactory, but the low number of reports being filed is a cause for concern. The report suggested that intensive training for the private banking sector is needed to improve compliance. The report also stated that another area of weakness is the lack of sufficient supervision by the government over financial institutions. In response, Turkey has undertaken intensive training programs to educate the private banking sector in recognizing suspicious transactions and has increased the frequency of banking inspections. The GOT is also working to broaden the definition of money laundering to include the proceeds of all serious crimes.

The 1996 anti-money laundering law established the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (FCIB), which receives and investigates suspicious transaction reports and serves as Turkey's financial intelligence unit (FIU). The GOT strongly supports the FCIB, which has increased its staff and the quality of its computer equipment. The FCIB cooperates closely with the United States in money laundering investigations, and has requested and received US assistance in obtaining information on several cases.

Turkey is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and the FCIB is an active member of the Egmont Group. Turkey has a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in force with the United States. In December 2000 Turkey signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Based on its demonstrated commitment to fighting money laundering, the GOT now needs to maintain the momentum it has generated in setting up its anti-money laundering regime by expanding the definition of money laundering to include all serious crimes, and to continue measures to ensure increased reporting of STRs.

Turkmenistan (Other). Although Turkmenistan has only a few international banks and a small, underdeveloped domestic financial sector, the country's several foreign-owned hotels and casinos could be vulnerable to financial fraud and money laundering by organized criminal groups. In addition, the national currency, the manat, has a black market (but universally accepted) exchange rate that is four times the official rate, thus creating conditions favorable to money laundering. Moreover, the low salaries and broad general powers of Turkmen law enforcement officials raise issues of possible corruption. The Government of Turkmenistan has not reported any suspected cases of money laundering.

Turkmenistan has no specific law addressing money laundering. However, Presidential Resolution 0210/02-2 of 1995 gives the central bank authority over all international financial transactions. Under this resolution, any firm making an electronic transfer of funds to an account abroad must provide documentation that establishes the source of the funds.

Recognizing Turkmenistan's susceptibility to money laundering, the US Secret Service has scheduled a course on financial institution fraud and money laundering that will be held sometime in 2001.

Turkmenistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Turks & Caicos (Concern). The Turks and Caicos Islands (TCI) is a Caribbean Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom (UK). The TCI is vulnerable to money laundering because of a large offshore financial services sector that offers tax advantages, as well as bank and corporate secrecy to conceal beneficial ownership.

The TCI's offshore sector has eight banks (five of which also deal with onshore clientele), approximately 2,000 insurance companies, 27,000 international business companies (IBCs), and 1,000 trusts. The offshore sector offers "shelf company" IBCs and all IBCs are permitted to issue bearer shares. Trust legislation allows establishment of asset protection trusts that protect personal assets from civil adjudication by foreign governments. The Financial Services Commission (FSC), which has a staff of 12, licenses and supervises domestic and offshore finance-related operating entities.

The Proceeds of Crime Ordinance (POCO) 1998 criminalized money laundering related to all crimes, and established extensive asset forfeiture provisions and "safe harbor" protection for good faith compliance with reporting requirements. The POCO also established a Money Laundering Reporting Authority (MLRA) that is to receive, analyze, and disseminate financial disclosures such as suspicious transactions reports (STRs). The MLRA is chaired by the attorney general. Its members also include the following individuals or their designees: Collector of Customs, the Superintendent of the FSC, the Commissioner of Police, and the Superintendent of the Criminal Investigation Department. The MLRA is authorized to disclose information that it receives to domestic law enforcement and foreign governments.

The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Regulations (POCMLR) were issued in 1999 and came into force in 2000. The POCMLR places additional requirements on the financial sector such as identification of customers, retention of records for a minimum of five years, training staff on money laundering prevention and detection, and development of internal procedures to ensure proper reporting of suspicious transactions. The Superintendents of Banking, Insurance, Trustees, and Mutual Funds also must report suspicious transactions (STRs).

Thus far, the MLRA has functioned only through specific actions of its constituent members. In 1999, the FSC issued non-statutory Guidance Notes to the financial sector that are to help educate the industry on money laundering and the TCI's anti-money laundering requirements, and provide practical guidance on recognizing suspicious transactions. The Guidance Notes instruct institutions to send STRs to either the Royal Turks & Caicos Police Force or the FSC. The Financial Crimes Unit of the Police already has received and begun investigating some of the reports.

The TCI and other British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean in 1999 agreed to undergo a comprehensive review of their financial regulations and implement subsequent recommendations. The review was published in October 2000, and indicated that although it has made steady progress, the TCI's current regulatory structure was still not fully in accordance with international standards. The report's primary recommendations included:

* Make the FSC an independent regulatory body and increase its staffing.

* Establish an off-site supervisory program and enhance off-site supervision.

* Allow regulators to have access to records of individual depositors.

* Increase enforcement powers of regulators.

* Create legal measures to identify and access information on the beneficial ownership, both domestically and internationally, of bearer shares.

The TCI is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, and underwent a mutual evaluation in April 1997. The TCI is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United States and the UK was extended to TCI in November 1990.

The TCI cooperates with foreign governments-in particular, the United States and Canada-on law enforcement issues including narcotics-trafficking and money-laundering investigations.

The TCI should implement regulatory changes recommended by the independent review, and address the issue of bearer shares. The MLRA should prepare operating procedures that clarify its roles and functions to ensure that it can be fully staffed and operate as a financial intelligence unit. These measures will help the TCI fully coordinate local initiatives, and cooperate with international authorities to detect and investigate suspected financial crimes, and prevent abuse of its financial sector by international criminals.

Uganda (Other). Although money laundering most likely occurs in Uganda, there are no good estimates of its extent. Ugandan law enforcement agencies suspect that Uganda's banks are used to launder money, but thus far have been unable to prove their suspicions because of the country's inadequate legal framework.

Although money laundering is not currently a criminal offense in Uganda, the Government of Uganda (GOU) in 2000 participated in regional anti-money laundering fora. In November 2000, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania held a conference on money laundering under the auspices of the East African Community (EAC). Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), and in April 2000, representatives of the GOU attended the ESAAMLG's first formal meeting.

Uganda is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Ukraine (Concern). Money laundering plagues Ukraine's financial and commercial sectors and is a symptom of high levels of corruption, organized crime, smuggling and tax evasion. Transparency International, a non-governmental organization that studies corruption, rated Ukraine the third most corrupt country in 2000. It also named Ukraine along with Russia at the top of the list among countries that transfer illicit proceeds abroad. In October 2000, President Kuchma noted that the fuel and energy industry was the most criminalized sector in Ukraine. He also noted that financial crime, tax evasion, and corruption plague the metallurgy and agriculture sectors as well. These factors contribute to make Ukraine vulnerable to large-scale money laundering.

The Ukrainian government has recently begun to take steps to create a legal and regulatory framework to specifically address money laundering. In November 2000, the Ukrainian Cabinet passed a bill "On Prevention and Counteraction of Legalization (Laundering) of the Proceeds of Crime." The bill was drafted on the instructions of President Kuchma to implement provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime. Ukraine became a signatory to the convention in May 1997. The final draft version awaits submission to the Parliament for eventual passage. Article 214 of Ukraine's draft Criminal Code criminalizes all financial transactions involving criminally derived proceeds. Current criminal law provisions address drug-related money laundering offenses and provide for the confiscation of proceeds generated by criminal activities. The Drug Enforcement Department (DED) of the Ministry of the Interior initiated 25 criminal cases connected with drug money laundering in 2000.

Ukraine participates in the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV). In May 2000, Ukraine underwent a mutual evaluation conducted by the PC-R-EV. The final report will provide detailed suggestions to improve Ukraine's anti-money laundering program.

An exchange of diplomatic notes in September 1999 provides for provisional application of the US-Ukraine Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT). The MLAT was signed in July 1999 but is not yet in force. In December 2000, the Ukraine signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Ukraine is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

As a first step, Ukraine should enact its draft anti-money laundering provisions and adopt implementing regulations to establish the a legal, regulatory, and enforcement framework to bring its money laundering problem under control. Ukraine's current laws and regulations applicable to money laundering are ineffective and do not meet international standards. An operative anti-money laundering regime would provide additional tools for Ukrainian authorities to combat crime in general and to more easily share information with international partners on regulatory and enforcement actions concerning money laundering.

United Arab Emirates (Primary). The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) position as a major financial and trading center in the Gulf region of the Middle East suggests it is vulnerable to money laundering. While there is a recognized lack of reporting and specific statistics, evidence developed to date from international financial crimes investigations shows money laundering connections to the UAE, principally to Dubai. Most money laundering activity is believed to involve the proceeds of foreign criminal organizations outside the UAE, with the UAE serving primarily as a conduit to international financial markets. Over two-thirds of the population of the UAE is foreign. The UAE has an open economy with a sophisticated financial sector and business services. There are no foreign exchange controls; no corporate or income taxes; and the UAE has free trade zones. It has developed into the region's transportation hub.

The UAE, like all countries in the region, is a cash-intensive society. Dubai is also the regional gold center, with integrated gold trading ties between Europe and South Asia. Gold is often manipulated by money launderers around the world via trade or as part of alternative remittance systems such as the South Asia based hawala system of transferring funds. In an effort to address these vulnerabilities in the UAE, the central bank recently mandated capital reserve requirements of over US $13 million for prospective currency dealers and money-exchange houses. The net effect of this move will be to ensure that a larger percentage of the remittance business flows through the better-regulated banking system.

There is currently no legislation pertaining to money laundering per se, existing UAE laws on narcotics trafficking are broad and extremely strict; those involved in handling drug money in any way are subject, potentially, to the death penalty. A money laundering law has been in draft form for several years, and UAE authorities believe it will be passed during the first half of 2001. The proposed legislation includes criminal penalties. All sources of "illegal money" will serve as a predicate offenses for money laundering. There are no proposed cross-border currency reporting requirements.

In November 2000 the UAE's Central Bank issued new regulations for all banks, money changers and finance companies in an effort to check money laundering. The regulations took effect December 1, 2000. They require the reporting of all cash transactions exceeding 200,000 dirhams (US $54,500) and all suspicious transactions to the central bank. When suspicious activity is reported from a financial institution, the central bank is able to freeze suspect funds, make appropriate inquiries, and coordinate with law enforcement officials. The central bank has also dramatically increased its examination staff.

The UAE has recently established a unit within the central bank to act as a financial intelligence unit (FIU). It is charged with examining suspicious activity reporting and handling all requests from law enforcement and judicial authorities. The unit is exploring areas of information sharing and coordination with other FIUs.

The UAE is not an offshore center in the traditional sense, and earlier plans to establish an offshore banking center on Abu Dhabi's Saadiyat Island appear to have been shelved. However, many local businessmen do offer services equivalent to those associated with traditional offshore centers, such as nonresident incorporation. Even though there are no corporate registration agents for the UAE, it is possible to obtain essentially the same service. Someone seeking to the use the UAE as a base of operations can pay a local businessman a fee for the use of his business name, or, in a somewhat more formal arrangement, enter into a partnership arrangement. In these partnerships, the local businessman will own at least 51% of the business and the other partners will remain effectively invisible. (The partner may actually fund the entire business to gain access to the UAE as a base of operations). For this reason, it is often difficult to identify beneficial owners or investors of businesses or assets in the UAE.

The UAE is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. The UAE is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The UAE is beginning to take steps to comply with the FATF Forty Recommendations and will undergo a FATF mutual evaluation in 2001. The UAE has been generally receptive to US Government overtures to cooperate on money laundering issues. The US and other countries plan to make training and technical assistance available to the UAE during 2001.

As noted, the UAE is an important regional financial and trading center. Its location, thriving open economy and first-class financial infrastructure suggests money-laundering vulnerabilities. Issues of concern such as the misuse of the international gold trade and the use of hawala to launder funds are not unique to the UAE, and these forms of alternate remittance systems are extremely difficult to identify and combat. UAE authorities have recognized the importance of international cooperation, and as have begun to take concrete steps to enact an anti-money laundering program. The UAE, however, needs to enact anti-money laundering legislation that includes the criminalization of the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes. This needs to be followed by continued training and systematic enforcement of the law.

United Kingdom (Primary). The United Kingdom (UK) plays a leading role in European and world finance and remains attractive to money launderers because of the size, sophistication, and reputation of its financial markets. Although drugs are still the major source of illegal proceeds for money laundering, the proceeds of other offenses such as financial fraud and the smuggling of goods have become increasingly important. The trend over the past few years has witnessed the movement away from High Street banks and mainstream financial institutions for the placement of cash. In laundering funds, criminals continue to use bureaux de change (small, tourist-type, currency exchanges); cash smuggling in and out of the UK; professional money launderers (including solicitors and accountants); and the purchase of high-value assets as disguises for illegally obtained money.

The United Kingdom has implemented the provisions of the EU's Anti-Money Laundering Directive and the FATF Forty Recommendations. Drug-related money laundering has been a criminal offense in the UK since 1986. Subsequent legislation criminalized the laundering of proceeds from all other crimes. The UK has a requirement for the reporting of suspicious transactions that applies to banks and non-bank financial institutions.

Secondary regulations, affecting the financial sector only, require that systems be in place to prevent and detect money laundering.

In 1997, Guidance Notes on best practices were issued by the Money Laundering Steering Group of professional and trade bodies.

The Bank of England Act 1998 transferred responsibility for UK bank supervision from the Bank of England to the newly established Financial Services Authority (FSA). The FSA's primary responsibilities are in areas relating to the safety and soundness of the institutions in its jurisdiction. The FSA plays an important part in the fight against money laundering through its continued involvement in the authorization of banks and investigations of money-laundering activities in banks. Where appropriate, the FSA even assembles small teams of investigators to follow-up leads in newspapers and other public sources.

Once the recent Financial Services and Markets Act is fully implemented (expected in 2001), the FSA will administer a new civil-fines regime and will have new prosecution powers. The FSA will have the power to make regulatory rules in relation to money laundering and enforce those rules with a range of disciplinary measures (including fines).

In 2000 the cabinet reviewed the entire anti-money laundering strategy in the United Kingdom and published its findings in the Recovering the Proceeds of Crime report in June. As a result of the report, the Government of the United Kingdom plans to adopt new legislation that will establish a National Confiscation Agency to have responsibility for the recovery of criminal assets. It will be invested with extensive executive functions in relation to criminal confiscation and civil recovery. It will also have investigative powers, and the ability to raise tax demands in relation to suspected criminal proceeds. In December 2000 the government also proposed legislative changes to allow tax authorities to share information with police in serious criminal cases. The government also plans specific provisions in secondary legislation to extend thorough money-laundering controls to other sectors, including to lawyers, accountants and other professionals.

Suspicious transaction reports are filed with the Economic Crime Unit of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), which serves as the UK's financial intelligence unit. The NCIS analyzes reports, develops intelligence, and passes information to police forces and HM Customs for investigation. NCIS received approximately 14,500 disclosures for 1999. The NCIS is an active member of the Egmont Group and has Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) for sharing intelligence with foreign counterparts. An arrangement is in place with the US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) and Belgium's CTIF.

The UK's banking sector provides accounts to residents and nonresidents, who can open accounts through various intermediaries that often advertise on the Internet and also offer various offshore services, or as a part of private banking activities. Private banking constitutes a significant portion of the British banking industry. Both resident and nonresident accounts are subject to the same reporting and record-keeping requirements. Non-resident accounts are typically opened by individuals for taxation or investment purposes.

The UK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and a member of the Financial Action Task Force and the European Union (EU). The UK signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in December 2000. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) between the UK and the US has been in force since 1996.

The UK should continue the strong enforcement of its comprehensive anti-money laundering program and its active participation in international organizations to combat the domestic and global threat of money laundering.

Uruguay (Primary). Historically, Uruguay has attracted foreign deposits due to its economic and political stability as well as liberal currency exchange and strict bank secrecy laws. As a regional financial center, Uruguay is susceptible to money laundering. Although the extent and exact nature of money laundering in Uruguay is unknown, United States Government (USG) and European law enforcement entities believe that the profits of drug trafficking and contraband smuggling, and other illicit activities are laundered through Uruguayan financial institutions. Except for a few isolated but important cases, there is no solid evidence of widespread money laundering in Uruguay. However, Uruguay, until recently did not have in place effective systems for detecting money laundering such as a system of mandatory suspicious transaction reporting. Moreover, Uruguay does not yet have a financial intelligence unit, which is another critical element in a government's ability to detect money laundering activities. There is a large black market for smuggled goods in Uruguay but it does not appear to be significantly funded by narcotics proceeds.

The Government of Uruguay (GOU) has taken measures to join the international fight against money laundering. Under the October 1998 Anti-Drug Law (No. 17.016), it is a criminal offense to launder funds derived from narcotics trafficking activities. The law gives the courts power to seize and later confiscate property, products or financial instruments in drug-related money laundering activities. In addition, the Anti-Drug Law also facilitates the lifting by the courts of traditionally strong bank secrecy laws to conduct money laundering investigations. If there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal use of the banking system by a specific person, the courts have the power to order access to the individual's bank accounts. However, Uruguay does not have laws allowing for the sharing of seized narcotics assets with other countries. The January 1999 Transparency Law criminalized a broad range of potential abuses of power by Government officials including the laundering of funds related to public corruption cases, and instituted financial disclosure requirements for high-ranking GOU officials.

Uruguay has bank secrecy laws; however, financial institutions must provide certain information upon the request of the central bank. Central bank regulations (91/47, 91/55, 93/68 and 1452) require banks (including offshore banks), currency exchange houses and stockbrokers to record currency transactions over $10,000, and to identify the individuals making such transactions, and make their records available to the central bank. These records must be kept for five years. Analysis and control of financial transactions by the central bank is not as consistent as desired. With USG assistance the central bank is building a computerized information system to efficiently analyze the data and detect possible money laundering activities.

In 2000, The Police Anti-Drug Directorate (DGRTID) established a financial investigations unit in order to present more complete evidence in narcotics-related prosecutions. On December 21, 2000, the central bank issued Circular 1722 requiring all entities under its jurisdiction (banks, currency exchange houses, insurance companies, stockbrokers, financial intermediaries, and investment companies to report suspicious financial transactions to a Financial Information Analysis Unit. This unit is to be created within the Superintendency of Intermediary Financial Institutions, and will be responsible for receiving or requesting and analyzing these disclosures, and forwarding them to the competent investigative authorities.

Many South Americans have traditionally used Uruguay as a tax haven. Uruguayan law permits the operation of offshore banks, mutual funds, offshore financial investment companies (SAFIs), and free trade zone companies (FTZs). Uruguay does not license offshore trusts, insurance companies, or Internet gaming companies. FTZs are used within the nine Uruguayan free trade zones for manufacturing and distribution. SAFIs operate as international business companies, and are most commonly used as holding companies. They may also be used as trading companies, brokerage firms, and import and export companies.

The regulations governing offshore banking are similar to those of regular banks and include the submission of quarterly balances, an annual audit, as well as client identification and maintenance of transaction records. The central bank licenses offshore banks and performs background checks on applicants for banking licenses. Central bank regulations do not allow the use of bearer shares by banks or other financial institutions under its control, and the Bank must authorize the purchase or transfer of shares. The 12 offshore banks operating in Uruguay managed US $1 billion in assets as of March 2000. The central bank does not supervise SAFIs, and although it is believed that a large number of SAFIs operate in Uruguay, there are no records as to the exact number. At least six offshore mutual funds operate in Uruguay.

Uruguay remains active in international anti-money laundering efforts. It is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and a member of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS CICAD) Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. The USG and the GOU have an extradition treaty, which was signed in 1973 and entered into force in 1984, and a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which was signed in 1991 and entered into force in 1994. In December 2000 Uruguay signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Uruguay is also a member of the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional anti-money laundering body established in December 2000.

Uruguay needs to fully establish, staff, and fund the Financial Information Analysis Unit to act as a centralized unit that can coordinate domestic efforts and cooperate internationally to combat financial crimes. Uruguay should also criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes. In addition, Uruguay should take steps to ensure that SAFIs are effectively supervised and regulated to help prevent, detect and investigate abuses of Uruguay's financial sector.

Uzbekistan (Other). Uzbekistan is not a regional financial center or a significant country for narcotics-related money laundering. Uzbekistan is not likely to be used by money launderers because it currency is not freely convertible and banking services are unsophisticated. There is a significant black market for smuggled consumer goods in the country. However, it does not appear that the market is funded by narcotics proceeds.

Article 243 of the Uzbek Criminal Code criminalizes money laundering related to any criminal activity. A decree issued in October 1998 allowed banks to offer anonymous hard currency accounts, but the measure failed to attract significant deposits.

There are strict controls on the amount of currency that can be carried across Uzbekistan's borders. Residents and non-residents may bring the equivalent of US $10,000 into the country tax-free. Amounts in excess of this limit are assessed a 1-percent duty. Non-residents may take out as much currency as they brought in; however, residents are limited to the equivalent of US $1,500.

Uzbekistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Vanuatu (Concern). Vanuatu's offshore sector is vulnerable to money laundering as it historically has maintained strict secrecy provisions that have the effect of preventing law enforcement agencies from identifying the beneficial owners of offshore entities registered in the sector. Because of allegations of money laundering, a few United States-based banks announced that they would no longer process US dollar transactions to/from Vanuatu in late December 1999. The Government of Vanuatu responded to these concerns by introducing reforms designed to strengthen financial regulation both domestically and offshore.

Vanuatu's financial sector includes five licensed banks (that carry on domestic and offshore business) and 60 credit unions, regulated by the Reserve bank of Vanuatu. The Financial Services Commission (FSC) regulates the offshore sector that includes 55 offshore banks and approximately 2500 "international companies" (i.e., international business companies or IBCs), as well as offshore trusts and captive insurance companies. IBCs may be registered using bearer shares, shielding the identity and assets of beneficial owners of these entities. Secrecy provisions protect all information regarding IBCs and provide penal sanctions for unauthorized disclosure of information. These secrecy provisions, along with the ease and low cost of incorporation, make IBCs ideal mechanisms for money laundering and other financial crimes.

The Serious Offences (Confiscation of Proceeds) Act 1989 criminalized the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes and provided for seizure of criminal assets and confiscation after a conviction.

In October 2000 Vanuatu addressed deficiencies in the regulation of the banking sector by passing the Financial Transaction Recording Act. This law requires financial institutions to identify customers and beneficial owners when establishing business relations or account accommodations. Regulatory agencies in Vanuatu have instituted stricter procedures for issuance of offshore banking licenses and continue to review the status of previously issued licenses. This legislation requires all financial institutions, both domestic and offshore, to report suspicious transactions and to maintain records of all transactions for 6 years, including the identities of the parties involved. Safe harbor provisions are provided under this legislation to all suspicious transactions reported in good faith.

The new legislation provides for the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit within the State Law Office. The Financial Intelligence Unit will receive suspicious transaction reports made by financial institutions and may distribute them to the Public Prosecutors Office, the Reserve Bank of Vanuatu, the Vanuatu Police Force, the Vanuatu Financial Services Commission and law enforcement agencies or supervisory bodies outside Vanuatu. The Financial Intelligence Unit will also issue guidelines to, and provide training programs for, financial institutions regarding record keeping for transactions and reporting obligations. The act also regulates how such information can be shared with law enforcement agencies investigating financial crime. The law further states that preventative measures are to be imposed by financial institutions. Financial institutions within Vanuatu must establish and maintain internal procedures and provide a written statement to the Financial Intelligence Unit.

Every financial institution is required to keep records of all transactions. Four key pieces of information are required to be kept for every financial transaction: the nature of the transaction, the amount of the transaction and the currency in which it was denominated, the date the transaction was conducted, and the parties to the transaction. These records must be kept for a period of 6 years after the completion of the transaction.

There are three bases for cooperation in international matters: the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1989, the Serious Offences (Confiscation of Proceeds) Act 1989 and the Extradition Act 1988. The Attorney General, designated as the central authority for requests of mutual assistance, possesses the authority to grant requests for assistance and may require government agencies to assist in the collection of information pursuant to the request. In an effort to strengthen mutual legal assistance, Vanuatu has drafted a Bill to amend the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and a Bill for the Proceeds of Crime Act.

Vanuatu is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS), the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the South Pacific Forum. Vanuatu underwent a mutual evaluation by the APG and OGBS in 2000, and was the first APG member to undergo such a mutual evaluation. Vanuatu is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

The Government of Vanuatu has taken positive steps to strengthen their counter money-laundering program, especially within the banking sector. As a consequence of these reforms, the Financial Action Task Force determined at its October 2000 plenary that Vanuatu should not be included on its list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories with respect to the prevention of money laundering. The GOV should strictly implement its new legislation-with a focus on enforcing new reporting requirements on offshore banks-as well as enacting measures to require complete identification of the beneficial ownership of IBCs to ensure that Vanuatu's offshore sector is not used for money laundering or other financial crimes.

Venezuela (Primary). While Venezuela has considerable international financial links, it does not have an offshore financial industry. The banking sector is modern but relatively small and the country is not considered a regional financial center. However, Venezuela's proximity to drug-source countries, the weaknesses in the anti-money laundering system, and corruption continue to create conditions conducive to money laundering. The laundering primarily involves the proceeds of Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations although proceeds from contraband smuggling are also laundered through Venezuela's banks, currency exchange houses, casinos and the real estate sector.

Venezuela's Organic Drug Law of September 1993 provides the only basis for the investigation and prosecution of money laundering crimes; this law provides that a direct connection between illegal drugs and the proceeds must be proven in order to establish the offense of money laundering. Cases have been brought to trial but none has resulted in a conviction, often because of the ineffective judicial system. The Government of Venezuela (GOV) has carried out initiatives to combat corruption and placed particular emphasis on targeting corruption in the judiciary. During 2000, investigations of public officials involved in financial corruption continued and some cases went to trial. An anti-organized crime bill that would have expanded the definition of money laundering to include numerous other crimes in addition to drug trafficking was not adopted as expected in 2000.

Since 1997, the GOV has improved money laundering controls, including the stricter adoption of preventive measures such as the reporting of large currency transactions (over US $ 10,000); the reporting of suspicious financial activities (SARs); and the creation in 1998 of a National Financial Intelligence Unit (UNIF). The entities subject to these reporting requirements include: all purpose banks, commercial banks, investment banks, mortgage banks, savings and loan institutions, financial rental agencies, bureaux de change, money market funds, capitalization companies, and frontier foreign currency dealers.

The UNIF, located in the Superintendency of Banks and Other Financial Institutions, receives monthly electronic reports of large currency transactions and SARs, and works closely with the financial information units that have been created in each banking organization as required by Banking Resolution 333-97 of July 1997. The UNIF analyzes the SARs and submits a report to the competent authority for criminal investigation, which could be the National Guard, the Technical Judicial Police or the Office of the Public Prosecutor. There appears to be a certain duplication of function among these three entities. This Banking Resolution contains strict customer identification and record-keeping requirements, and provides a safe harbor protection from civil liability to bankers for reporting suspicious financial activities. During 2000, the UNIF expanded reporting requirements for banks to include currency transfers to "banking paradises" and transfers to or from major drug source countries. To further strengthen reporting requirements, the UNIF drafted a new law to replace the existing banking regulation. Venezuela does not have banking secrecy laws, and comprehensive financial and law enforcement information is available to the UNIF.

Venezuela actively participates in multilateral anti-money laundering efforts. The UNIF is a member of the Egmont Group, and has signed bilateral information exchange agreements with several other financial intelligence units. In 2000, Venezuela was elected vice-president of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control (OAS/CICAD) and is a member of the OAS/CICAD Experts Group to Control Money Laundering. It has joined the US-led Black Market Peso Exchange Group along with Colombia, Panama and Aruba. It is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). Venezuela is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 it signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

In 1997, the US and Venezuela signed a bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Although ratified by the US government, it was not acted on by the Venezuela National Assembly in 2000 and accordingly has not yet entered into force. The GOV continued to share money-laundering information with US law enforcement authorities under a 1997 Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, and a 1990 Financial Information Exchange Agreement (FIEA). The information shared has supported domestic operations by DEA that resulted in the seizure of significant amounts of money and several arrests in the United States.

The GOV should adopt the anti-organized crime bill or other appropriate legislation to criminalize the laundering of proceeds from all serious crimes. This will provide the GOV needed tools for effective investigation and prosecution of money laundering and other financial crimes.

Vietnam (Concern). Bordering China, Laos, and Cambodia and having a long coastline make Vietnam a transit country for narcotics trafficked from the Golden Triangle and vulnerable to other forms of transnational crime. There is no indication that extensive money laundering occurs through Vietnam's banking system, but Vietnam has a large shadow economy that may be used to launder money. Vietnamese regularly transfer money through gold shops and other informal mechanisms to remit or receive funds from overseas. Vietnamese use those mechanisms to avoid the official banking system, which they distrust, and to avoid notice by the authorities and tax collectors. Officially, about US $1 billion is recorded each year in overseas remittances, but many estimate that overseas remittances through "gray" channels could be double or even triple that amount. Vietnam has expressed a strong interest in the global fight against money laundering. Vietnam's newly approved legislation criminalizing money laundering is an important step in the direction of creating a legal framework that will help Vietnam deal with money laundering and other forms of financial crime that accompany the implementation of market reforms.

The Vietnamese National Assembly approved Penal Code revisions on December 1, 1999 that included the criminalization of money laundering activity. This new code took effect on July 1, 2000. The newly approved Article 251 of the Vietnamese Penal Code criminalizes the laundering of money or property derived from any crime. Individuals who launder money through financial or banking services or other business transactions are subject to prison sentences of up to five years. If this same activity is committed by an organization, penalties of imprisonment range from 3 to 10 years. "Exceptionally serious" cases may be penalized with 8-10 years in prison.

Article 31 of the new banking law requires financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, although they are only reported to a central authority upon request. Banks are also required to maintain records sufficient to reconstruct significant transactions in order to be able to respond quickly to information requests from appropriate government authorities. The Government of Vietnam has not adopted "due diligence" legislation that make individual bankers or financial institutions responsible if their institutions launder money, however.

Vietnam is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and participates as an observer in the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering. Vietnam cooperates with neighboring and regional countries to combat money laundering and serious crimes. In December 2000 Vietnam signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The Government of Vietnam needs to amend its laws and regulations to require due diligence by bankers and the reporting of all suspicious transactions to a central authority that will analyze and disseminate these reports, set guidelines for financial institutions, and cooperate with foreign counterparts.

Yemen (Other). The extent of money laundering in Yemen is not known. However, Yemen's banking sector is small and rudimentary. It is comprised of 11 commercial banks and two public sector specialized banks. The Central Bank of Yemen supervises the country's banks.

Yemen is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Concern). Narcotics trafficking, smuggling, money laundering, and other criminal activities are occurring at a noticeable level in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Prior to the ouster of the Milosevic regime by pro-democracy forces in September and December 2000 elections, there were indications of money laundering and smuggling by government officials, and media reports indicated that government officials and their cronies controlled state-owned companies, the banking system and the black markets for goods in short supply. Government officials were also reported to be controlling the illicit trade in petroleum products, cigarettes, alcohol, and other similarly oriented consumer products.

The new FRY government, led by President Kostunica, has not yet developed comprehensive plans to confront these problems in the face of more immediate and difficult tasks related to establishing political stability in the country. The FRY has not criminalized money laundering nor enacted any anti-money laundering legislation. The FRY does not belong to any international or regional anti-money laundering organizations. The FRY is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and in December 2000 signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The FRY will need assistance in achieving political stability as a government prior to developing plans to confront its criminal environment and the associated problem of money laundering.

Zambia (Other). Zambia is not a major financial or money laundering center. It does not yet have in place comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. In July 2000, the Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission sponsored a two-day workshop in Lusaka for Members of Parliament and representatives of institutions involved with good governance issues. The theme of the workshop was the effect of drug trafficking and money laundering on the nation. The group unanimously recommended that the executive branch reintroduce the Bill on Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering, which had been withdrawn following its first reading in Parliament.

Article 22 of Zambia's Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1993, criminalizes money laundering related to narcotics trafficking.

Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Zambia is expected to sign the memorandum of understanding for the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

Zimbabwe (Other). Zimbabwe is not a regional financial center and is not considered to be at significant risk to money laundering.

Zimbabwe's Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering. The Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) reportedly drafted legislation prior to 2000 that would have required financial institutions to establish customer identification procedures and to report certain threshold transactions to a financial intelligence unit. However, the GOZ to date has not taken further action on these proposals.

Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in December 2000, signed the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Zimbabwe is expected to sign the memorandum of understanding for the newly formed Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG).

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