Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Country Reports on Terrorism 2012

Report

May 30, 2013

Country Reports on Terrorism

Various terrorist groups continued to plot against European targets and interests in 2012, and the year was marked by several high-profile attacks. European security services continued their effective efforts to counter terrorism through close cooperation among countries and with the United States, and through the use of the sophisticated technical capabilities available to most partner states. Nonetheless, in March, before he was killed by police, “lone wolf” violent extremist gunman Mohammed Merah killed seven persons, including three children, in Toulouse and Mantauban, France before he was killed by police.

In July, a terrorist attack carried out on a passenger bus in Bulgaria killed five Israelis and a Bulgarian citizen. During the same month Cypriot authorities arrested an individual suspected of plotting a similar attack in that country. On February 5, 2013, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Tsvetan Tsevtanov, publically linked Hizballah to the Burgas bombing. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found a Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets.

A wide range of violent extremist ideologies remained a threat: anarchists in Greece continued to launch low-level attacks against government offices, private businesses, and symbols of the state, and long-active radical ethno-nationalist groups like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey continued their campaigns of violence. Of these groups, the deadliest was the PKK. According to the NATO Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, there were 226 terrorist incidents reported through November.

Transatlantic cooperation on counterterrorism, including the sharing of intelligence and judicial information, capacity building in non-European countries, extradition of terrorist suspects, and efforts to counter violent extremism remained excellent, though differing perspectives on issues like data privacy and long-term detention sometimes complicated efforts. A number of European countries signed or ratified agreements with the United States on preventing and combating serious crime. The EU and a number of European countries continued to play leading roles in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

Counterterrorism cooperation with the Russian Federation continued bilaterally and in various multilateral fora, including the GCTF. The activities of two joint counterterrorism working groups supported these efforts, one led by diplomatic counterparts under the auspices of the Bilateral Presidential Commission, and the other bringing together law enforcement and intelligence professionals of the two countries.

Prosecutions of suspected terrorists continued apace, with significant trials and/or convictions taking place in several countries. In Norway, violent nationalist extremist Anders Breivik was convicted of murder in August for his 2011 attacks on government offices and a political party youth camp that killed a total of 77 people. A German court sentenced to life imprisonment Arid Uka, who was responsible for shooting U.S. airmen at Frankfurt Airport in 2011.

Overview: Austria maintained its diligence in its counterterrorism efforts and U.S.-Austrian law enforcement cooperation was generally strong. Austria's Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT), the key counterterrorism agency within the Ministry of the Interior, noted that while the number of violent extremists has been growing in Austria, their overall number remained small, and it did not see a climate fostering terrorist attacks within Austria. The pace of approving and implementing counterterrorism legislation was often slowed by concerns over data privacy protections. Counterterrorism efforts were further complicated by a general public perception that Austria is safe from terrorism. The BVT said the threat from transnational violent extremism remained a concern, and estimated the number of radicalized individuals among second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants and among converts to Islam in the country at approximately 500. The BVT remained concerned by individuals who seek training in terrorist camps abroad.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Parliament approved the bilateral U.S.-Austrian Preventing and Combating Serious Crime agreement, and it came into force in May. As of year’s end, the agreement had not been implemented.

Austria implemented a 2006 EU counterterrorism directive on data retention on April 1. In an effort to accommodate widespread public skepticism of the directive, the Austrian parliament’s justice committee heard concerns over the directive in November. Intelligence and law enforcement officials also responded to public concerns about the use of expanded legislative tools enacted in 2011 to monitor terrorism.

In July, an Austrian court sentenced an Austrian citizen to three years in prison for membership in a terrorist organization. The accused had planned a trip to Somalia in 2009 to receive terrorist training from al-Shabaab.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Austria is an active member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA) regularly updates a regulation issued January 1, 2012, which mandates banks and insurance companies to apply additional special due diligence in doing business with designated countries. The FMA regulation currently includes 21 jurisdictions. This regulation implements Austria's new anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime requiring banks to exercise enhanced customer due diligence, and is based on the Austrian Banking Act, the Insurance Supervision Act, and FATF statements on jurisdictions with AML/CFT deficiencies. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Austria maintains security partnerships with several countries in the region and the Ministry of the Interior has counterterrorism liaison officers in a number of Austria’s embassies in southeastern Europe. Austria participated in various regional security platforms, including the OSCE, the Central European Initiative, and the Salzburg Forum. In November, Austria announced it planned to intensify cooperation with source-countries of illegal migration in a preventive effort against terrorism and human trafficking.

Austrian Finance Ministry officials conducted customs administration training courses for Afghan and other customs officials at an OSCE training facility in Dushanbe.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The State Secretary for Integration visited the United States and Canada in August to meet with relevant officials, and to learn about best practices from successful integration projects in both countries. The Ministry of Interior’s “National Action Plan for Integration” seeks to address social, cultural, and economic issues affecting immigrants and is headed by the State Secretary. The State Secretary also initiated the “Dialogue Forum Islam” to institutionalize communication with Austria’s Muslim community. Establishment of a program focused on countering violent extremism and countering Islamophobia was under consideration at the end of 2012.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On January 19, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of National Security announced that it had arrested two Azerbaijani citizens, and was pursuing a third Azerbaijani citizen living in Iran, for planning to assassinate two foreign rabbis teaching at a Jewish school in Baku. Authorities presented evidence, including seized weapons and cash, connecting Iranian intelligence services to these individuals and the terrorist plot.

In March, Azerbaijani security services reported the arrest of 22 individuals, all Azerbaijani citizens, accused of working with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to carry out terrorist attacks against Western embassies and other groups with Western ties.

On April 6, security services conducted a raid on a suspected violent extremist group in Ganja, resulting in a standoff in which one militant and one law enforcement officer were killed. The raid was part of a sweep throughout the country that resulted in the arrest of 17 individuals and the confiscation of assault rifles, ammunition, hand grenades, remote controlled explosives, and communication equipment, among other items.

In May, Azerbaijan’s security service reported it had arrested 40 terrorist suspects and thwarted planned terrorist attacks during the May Eurovision Song Contest held in Baku. Planned targets during the event included major hotels frequented by foreigners as well as the song contest venue.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Azerbaijan is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In order to bring Azerbaijan’s legislative framework into conformity with international standards and requirements, including those of the EU and FATF, a significant number of legislative acts – four codes, 15 laws, and six presidential decrees covering more than 100 articles – have been amended but the Financial Monitoring Service (FMS), Azerbaijan’s Financial Intelligence Unit, since 2009. Azerbaijan continued to work with Moneyval to address the full range of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) issues identified in its Mutual Evaluation Report. The U.S. government, primarily USAID and Treasury, has been one of the leading partners of the FMS since its formation in 2009, working with it along with the Prosecutors office and others to provide technical assistance and training to upgrade enforcement capabilities, which included four distinct training sessions on AML/CTF issues in FY 2012.

The Government of Azerbaijan has legislation in place that permits the freezing of assets without delay, and has presented a draft law to Parliament that proposes additional measures to streamline and simplify the confiscation and release of frozen assets. UN lists are updated and submitted to reporting institutions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: In 2012, Azerbaijan began a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, supporting various terrorism-related UNSCRs. In May, Azerbaijan held the presidency of the UNSC, which focused on strengthening international cooperation in the implementation of counterterrorism obligations. Azerbaijan also participated in the Istanbul Process and supported counterterrorism confidence building measures referred to in the June 14 Heart of Asia Ministerial Conference Declaration. Azerbaijan also took part in working group meetings of Caspian Sea littoral states to coordinate law enforcement efforts aimed at countering terrorism as well as smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime on the Caspian.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Government of Azerbaijan restricts religious activity, including television broadcasts and the sale of religious literature at metro stations. Only imams trained and licensed in Azerbaijan were permitted to give religious sermons and to lead Muslim religious ceremonies. Critics claimed that by driving the practice of religion underground, these governmental policies could ultimately contribute to the growth of violent extremism. We refer you to the Department of State’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom (//2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

Overview: Belgian authorities continued to maintain an effective counterterrorism apparatus overseen by the Ministries of Interior and Justice. The primary actors in this apparatus are the Belgian Federal Police, State Security Service, Office of the Federal Prosecutor, and the inter-ministerial Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis. In addition, the Belgian Financial Intelligence Unit oversees an efficient and comprehensive inter-agency effort to prevent terrorist financing. Belgium continued to investigate, arrest, and prosecute terrorist suspects and worked closely with U.S. authorities on counterterrorism matters. A series of public reports and statements by the Belgian Civilian Intelligence Service (BCIS) highlighted the increased threat posed by violent extremism in Belgium. The small but vocal violent extremist group Sharia4Belgium, which disbanded in September but whose members continued to be active, was cited by BCIS as a movement of particular concern.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: On March 12, a Sunni Muslim Moroccan immigrant broke into a Shia mosque in Brussels, threatened worshippers with an axe, poured gasoline on the premises, and set fire to the mosque. The imam of the mosque, Abdallah Dadou, died of smoke inhalation. The alleged perpetrator told police he attacked the mosque in retaliation against Shia-led repression of Sunnis in Syria. On June 8, Brahim Bahrir, a 34-year-old French violent extremist, stabbed and seriously wounded two Belgian police officers in a subway station in the Brussels neighborhood of Molenbeek. He was subsequently arrested. He traveled from Paris to Brussels that morning with the intent of retaliating against Belgian authorities for their handling of a June 1 incident in which a niqab-wearing woman got into a violent altercation with police officers in Molenbeek.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Belgian government has been moving slowly to implement the U.S.-Belgium Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Agreement, signed in 2011. The agreement was approved by the cabinet in December 2012, and at year’s end was pending review by the Council of State before being presented to Parliament.

The Belgian order to extradite convicted terrorist Nizar Trabelsi to the United States, signed in 2011, was held up pending an appeal by Trabelsi’s lawyers before the European Court of Human Rights. Trabelsi, a Tunisian national, was arrested in Belgium on September 13, 2001 and later convicted for plotting an attack on the Belgian Air Force base at Kleine Brogel, where U.S. military personnel are stationed. He remains in Belgian custody.

Other Belgian judicial actions included:

• On February 10 and May 3, in two separate decisions, Antwerp-based judges sentenced the spokesman of the violent extremist movement Sharia4Belgium, Fouad Belkacem (alias Abu Imran), of incitement to violence and hatred for video clips in which he threatened various political figures and called on Belgian Muslims to reject democracy. On June 7, he was arrested as a result of statements he made in the wake of the June 1 altercation between police and a niqab-clad woman in Brussels that led to violent demonstrations. In the statements he called for Muslims to defend their honor and resort to violence, if necessary. On November 29 an Antwerp court sentenced him to six months imprisonment for these statements.

• On June 25, six members of the so-called Ayachi cell were sentenced for recruiting militants to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan in the mid-2000s. Their sentences ranged from three to 11 years. Their case was under appeal at year’s end.

• On October 10, police arrested seven members of a cell suspected of recruiting violent extremists to fight in Somalia.

• On December 5, a Belgian court sentenced Hassan Hamdaoui, the figure at the center of the so-called Hamdaoui cell of 14 suspected terrorists arrested in November 2010, to five years imprisonment for attempting to participate in terrorist activities. The other 13 were acquitted for lack of evidence. Hamdaoui, a Belgian citizen of Moroccan origin, was accused of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium and seeking to fight in Chechnya.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Belgium is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. Belgium’s banking industry is medium sized, with assets of over $1.5 trillion dollars in 2011. According to Belgium’s Financial Intelligence Unit, the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financieres (CTIF), most of the criminal proceeds laundered in Belgium are derived from foreign criminal activity. Belgium generally has very little public corruption that contributes to money laundering and none known related to terrorist financing. According to the 2011 CTIF annual report, contraband smuggling represented 10.1 percent of all cases, while terrorist financing represented only 1.63 percent.

In 2012, there were credible reports in the Belgian media of possible ties between Hizballah and individuals under investigation in Belgium for money laundering, drug trafficking, and other activities involving the Port of Antwerp and the Antwerp diamond trade. These investigations were ongoing at year’s end.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Belgium participated in EU, UN, and Council of Europe counterterrorism efforts. In addition, Belgium joined the advisory board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Center in 2012. As an EU member state, Belgium has contributed trainers and capacity-building expertise to EU counterterrorism assistance programs in Sahel countries, including the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité; and the Belgian Federal Police have provided training to counterparts in the Maghreb.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis and other Belgian governmental partners took further steps to develop the “Action Plan Radicalism.” One of the goals of the Action Plan is to develop measures to limit the impact of violent extremist messaging. The Ministry of Interior continued to coordinate Belgium’s effort to develop a government-wide strategy to counter radicalization and violent extremism.

Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) increased its counterterrorism capacity in 2012 and remained a cooperative partner on international counterterrorism issues. BiH’s Joint Terrorism Task Force continued to work toward improving coordination between its many security and police agencies to better counter potential terrorist threats and to better respond to acts of terrorism. However, the task force faced budgetary challenges and a fragmented security and law enforcement sector that made coordination among different agencies difficult. External violent Islamic extremist ideological influences and the presence of regional nationalist violent extremist groups found in the former Yugoslavia represented sources of potential terrorist threats in BiH.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Following the October 28, 2011 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, the Ministry of Security established a working group to evaluate methods to improve the coordination of police and security agencies charged with responding to terrorist incidents. To date, the working group has yielded no concrete results. The challenge in coordination stems primarily from overlapping jurisdictions, particularly in Sarajevo, where at least three distinct police forces have a role in responding to terrorist incidents: the State Investigative and Protective Agency (SIPA) – BiH’s state-level police authority, Sarajevo cantonal police, and Federation entity police. In addition, the state-level Directorate for the Coordination of Police Bodies (DCPB) is charged with the protection of diplomatic and certain other public facilities. While state-level laws give DCPB the authority to coordinate the responses of all state-level police agencies, this organization remained underfunded and under-supported by government authorities. In practice, SIPA generally takes a lead role in responding to attacks and the Prosecutor’s Office has the authority to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism. The Ministry of Security consulted with state, entity, district, and cantonal police and security agencies to evaluate whether an improved legal framework could be established to enhance security cooperation to counter terrorism.

Bosnia’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, led by BiH’s Chief Prosecutor, began operations in January 2011. It includes members from BiH’s state law enforcement agencies and Brcko District Police. The BiH Ministry of Security funds the Joint Task Force, which operates out of SIPA Headquarters. The Task Force remained in the formative stages, nearly two years after its establishment. The Ministry of Security continued to work toward implementing its 2010-2013 strategy on preventing and combating terrorism, which was adopted in 2010.

To help improve the tracking of entries into Bosnia, the BiH Border Police (BP) installed a new computerized database/software system to support immigration and passenger information collection. The new system, in place since March 2012, links all 55 border crossings and all four airports (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and Banja Luka) via the State Police Information Network, a network developed and donated by the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. The new system provides the BP with immediate access to other supporting databases, including the Agency for Identification Documents, Registers, and Data Exchange, the Ministry of Security, the Foreigner Affairs Service, and Interpol, to run appropriate checks and cross-checks.

BiH saw several terrorism-related prosecutions in 2012. These included:

• On September 6, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Court of BiH) Appellate Chamber upheld the November 11, 2011 first instance ruling that found Rijad Rustempasic, Abdulah Handzic, and Edis Velic guilty of planning to carry out a terrorist attack and sentenced them to terms ranging from three to four-and-a-half years.

• On November 20, the Court of BiH issued a first-instance ruling that found Zijad Dervisevic, Amel Sefer, and Sasa Bonic guilty of charges of terrorism and illegal possession of weapons. They were sentenced to eight, seven, and six years imprisonment, respectively.

• On December 6, the Court of BiH found Mevlid Jasarevic, a Serbian citizen, guilty of terrorism for his October 28, 2011 shooting attack targeting the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. He was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment, the longest terrorism-related sentence ever handed down in Bosnia. Two other defendants, Emrah Fojnica and Munib Ahmetspahic, were found not guilty of supporting the attack and for being members of a terrorist organization responsible for the attack.

• The trial of Haris Causevic and five other defendants accused of carrying out the terrorist bombing of the Bugojno police station on June 27, 2010, that killed one police officer and injured six others, began on March 22, 2011 and remained ongoing at year’s end.

BiH continued its participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program.

Countering Terrorist Finance: BiH is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: BiH’s criminal code and related legal framework is harmonized with UN and EU standards related to combating terrorism. BiH law enforcement agencies regularly interacted with their U.S. and European counterparts on counterterrorism investigations. Regional cooperation at the professional law enforcement level with Croatia and Serbia is improving.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The main religious communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish – worked together, through the Interreligious Council, to promote tolerance and to confront violent extremism within their ranks. As part of their efforts, they conducted mutual exchange programs of young theologians from three major theological educational institutions (Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) and offered workshops for high school students to promote inter-religious dialogue and tolerance.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: On July 18, a terrorist attack was carried out on a passenger bus transporting Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport. The bus was carrying 42 Israelis who had arrived on a flight from Tel Aviv. The explosion killed five Israelis, as well as a Bulgarian citizen, and injured 32 Israelis. While no organization publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, the plot bears the hallmark of Hizballah. On February 5, 2013, following a lengthy investigation, the Bulgarian government publically implicated Hizballah in the Burgas bombing.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: A revision to Bulgaria’s penal code (enacted in 1968) has been drafted, which includes strengthened and improved definitions for terrorism and organized crime, but it had not been enacted by year’s end.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Bulgaria is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Bulgaria participated in several bilateral and multilateral fora regarding security and assistance, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative.

Overview: Despite limited resources, Cyprus took a clear stand against terrorism, particularly with its arrest, investigation, and prosecution of a Lebanese Hizballah suspect. The Republic of Cyprus government was responsive to efforts to block and freeze terrorist assets, sought to implement Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and made significant efforts to conform to EU counterterrorism directives. The Government of Cyprus viewed counterterrorism as a foreign policy priority and partnered with other governments, bilaterally and multilaterally, to fight terrorism. Cyprus' counterterrorism partnership with the United States included regular, routine protection for transiting U.S. military personnel, aircraft and naval vessels throughout 2012, and participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance and Regional Security Initiative programs, which strengthened the government's capacity to counter terrorism.

Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the Republic of Cyprus-controlled area, composed of the southern two-thirds of the island, and a northern third, administered by the Turkish Cypriots; the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control over the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part an independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC). The United States does not recognize the “TRNC,” nor does any country other than Turkey. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus patrols the buffer zone separating the two sides, but people, narcotics, and other illicit goods routinely cross uncontrolled.

The division of the island has obstructed counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities' law enforcement authorities, and between Cyprus and Turkey. In the Turkish Cypriot-administered area, issues of status and recognition inevitably restricted the ability of authorities to cooperate on counterterrorism with international organizations and countries other than Turkey. Turkish Cypriots cannot sign treaties, UN conventions, or other international agreements; and lacked the legal and institutional framework necessary to counter money laundering and terrorist financing effectively. Within these limitations, however, Turkish Cypriots cooperated in pursuing specific counterterrorism objectives.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Cypriot government remained committed to conforming to all European Council guidelines for countering terrorism. The Cypriot government invoked its Counter Terrorism Act of 2010 for the first time with the case of a suspected Hizballah operative detained by the Cypriot authorities in July for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists in Cyprus. The prosecution subsequently dropped the terrorism-related charges, in part since Hizballah is not currently listed within the EU as a terrorist organization, to pursue conviction under the penal code for eight other charges, including: conspiracy, consent to commit a criminal offense, and participation in a criminal organization. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found the Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets.

In 2012, Cyprus' National Counterterrorism Coordinator led an ongoing interagency process to develop a new National Counterterrorism Strategy for Cyprus. The strategy is reportedly based on the four EU counterterrorism pillars of "Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond." Security measures were put in place for the protection of western interests and soft targets, especially during Cyprus's Presidency of the Council of the EU.

Authorities issued a number of search warrants in response to suspected terrorist activity but found no evidence of terrorism. Although there were anecdotal reports of a low-level Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) presence, there was no noticeable activity in 2012. Cyprus maintained it was fulfilling all responsibilities with respect to the EU designation of the PKK as a terrorist organization.

Cypriot Police created and put into practice a screening watchlist mechanism. The Police's Counterterrorism Office is watchlisting, among others, all the persons subject to travel bans and asset freezing sanctions by UNSCRs and EU decisions concerning terrorism.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Cyprus is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and its Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. The United States and Cyprus cooperated closely on anti-money laundering/ combating the financing of terrorism. Cypriot authorities have taken legislative steps to counter and suppress such activities. The Cypriot Anti-Money Laundering Authority implemented new UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 listings immediately and informally tracked suspect names listed under U.S. E.O.s. The Cypriot government maintained a “Prevention and Suppression of Money-Laundering Activities Law” that contained provisions on tracing and confiscating assets. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Cyprus participated in counterterrorism initiatives by regional and multilateral organizations, including the UN, the OSCE, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. During the Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU, from July to December 2012, Cyprus chaired the Working Party on International Aspects of Terrorism (COTER) and the Terrorism Working Party (TWP).

The Cyprus COTER chair focused discussions on cooperation in capacity building, intelligence and threat analysis briefings; developments in the Global Counterterrorism Forum; and promotion of human rights while countering terrorism. Other priorities of Cyprus' presidency included exchanging views on international developments, such as the outcome of the Third Review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the prospect of creating a single UN Counterterrorism Coordinator position. Progress was made towards finalizing the EU Counterterrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen. As COTER chair, Cyprus also participated in EU political dialogues held under the European External Action Service Chairmanship, including: individual counterterrorism dialogues with Russia, the United States, and the UN; and the counterterrorist finance dialogue with the United States.

Cyprus' Presidency Program for the TWP led to approval by the EU Council of Ministers of updated EU implementation plans and documents in a number of areas, including protection of soft targets, countering violent extremism, and aviation security. Cyprus' TWP Chair organized an EU conference in Nicosia on October 31, to raise awareness about the importance of protecting aviation from terrorist attacks, and to strengthen cooperation between all public and private services to collectively address this risk. The Cypriot Police's Counterterrorism Office also participated in the EU Police Working Group on Terrorism.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: One of the initiatives of Cyprus' EU presidency in the TWP was revising the EU implementation plan for its Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan and assessing implementation by each member state. Cypriot Police (CNP) started to implement the different measures of the Action Plan, and also focused on educating police officers about violent extremism. The Counterterrorism Office participated as a partner to the Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (COPPRA) project that was initiated by the Belgian presidency of the European Council; the COPPRA training manuals were fully incorporated into the training programs on violent extremism that were created and implemented by the CNP’s Counterterrorism Office.

The CNP Counterterrorism Office provided training programs to prison staff to identify violent extremism in prisons. Under the Radicalization and Awareness Network, the European Commission also provided special training programs and seminars to social workers, health care officials, and other service providers.

Overview: The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) has developed both short-term and long-term counterterrorism strategies and continued to cooperate closely with the United States on potential terrorist threats. Denmark remained a target of terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida, due to cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed published in September 2005 and reprinted in 2008. In May, the Danish government released the Government Report on Counter-Terrorism Efforts, which concluded, “The Danish police and justice system carry out law enforcement measures against attempts to commit terrorism, and the legislation in this area is continuously evaluated. In addition, Denmark maintains a counterterrorism emergency and response capability that can be activated in the event of a crisis. Prevention constitutes a key element of the Government’s approach, which is why the Government, through an inter-ministerial approach, regularly develops and implements initiatives aimed at reducing radicalization.”

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups in 2012, including arrests and prosecutions, follow:

• On January 10, Copenhagen City Court sentenced ROJ-TV and its parent company Mesopotamia Broadcast A/S METV under Article 1114E of the Fight Against Terrorism Act for promoting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and spreading propaganda in programs that incite terrorism during the period February 2008 to September 2010. Each was sentenced to pay fines of $450,000. In its ruling, the court emphasized that ROJ-TV received funding from the PKK. The court sent to the Danish Radio and Television Council (Council) the question of whether the station’s license should be revoked. In September, the Council ordered ROJ-TV to cease broadcasting for two months for failure to maintain archives of programs.

• On April 27, police arrested three men in Copenhagen on suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack against Danish soldiers returning from Afghanistan. The men, a 22-year-old citizen of Jordan, a 23-year-old Turkish man, and a 21-year-old Danish national from Egypt, were arrested in possession of illegal automatic weapons and ammunition at two separate sites in Copenhagen. The individuals were ultimately charged with weapons possession, and, in November, each received a sentence of three-and-a-half years in prison.

• On May 3, the Danish Supreme Court upheld the sentence of Mohamed Geele to nine years in prison to be followed by expulsion from Denmark. Geele was convicted of attempted commission of an act of terrorism, attempted murder, and aggravated assault of a police officer. The conviction resulted from Geele’s January 1, 2010 attack with an axe on cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, one of the creators of the Mohammed cartoons.

• On May 28, Danish officials arrested a 23-year-old Danish national originally from Somalia, and his brother, age 18, and charged them with receiving terrorism training.

• On June 4, a Danish court sentenced four men, one Tunisian national and three Swedish citizens of Middle Eastern origin, each to 12 years in prison for planning a gun attack in 2010 intended to kill as many people as possible at Jyllands-Posten, a major Danish newspaper that previously published cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed. The court also ordered the men to be expelled from Denmark after serving their sentences and to pay the trial costs. The men were arrested in Denmark in December 2010 after they arrived from Sweden, before the planned attack.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Denmark is one of the 36 member nations of the Financial Action Task Force. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Denmark held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU from January 1 – June 30 and had, as one of its four priorities, “A Safe Europe,” an initiative “to enhance European police cooperation in the fight against human trafficking, terrorism, and economic crime.” One of the key accomplishments during the Danish EU Presidency was achieving European Council support for the creation of a European Passenger Name Record system to ensure law enforcement has the most current tools in the fight against terrorism and other serious crime. Denmark is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and is an active member of the UN, NATO, and the OSCE, as well as Interpol, Europol, Middle Europe Conference, the Bern Club, and the EU Counterterrorism Group.

Denmark continued its capacity building engagement in Afghanistan, particularly with Afghan police forces, and also with anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. Den­mark has actively supported activities in East Africa and the Horn of Africa, including technical assistance to the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Center and other African financial bodies. Denmark supported the First Annual Convention of Counterterrorism Practitioners in Eastern Africa and the Horn, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May, and published a report titled ISSP-CGCC Joint Baseline Study on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa Subregion.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Counter-radicalization programs were first implemented in 2009, empowering local governments to implement initiatives aimed at building tolerance, supporting democracy, and undertaking targeted interventions with radicalized persons. In 2012, the national plan retained the targeted interventions, administered through the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), and local governments implemented their own individual programs. Denmark continued to base its local counter-radicalization programs on a previously existing, nationwide crime-prevention program of cooperation between schools, social services, and police.

Danish communications efforts to mitigate or counter terrorist propaganda were in the nascent stages. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration funded small grants to two immigrant-focused community groups to train employees on how to post positive messages on the groups’ websites and how to counter violent extremist postings.

PET is establishing “Dialogue Forum” as a series of meetings attended by approximately 50 people twice a year in three major Danish cities (Copenhagen, Aarhus, and Vejle). The meetings will afford invited members of the Muslim community the opportunity to meet and discuss issues with PET officials.

The Danish government is continuing two projects previously funded by the EU: “De-radicalization – Targeted Intervention,” to create mentoring programs and exit interviews for those desiring to leave terrorist organizations; and “De-radicalization – Back on Track” with the aim of developing methods for helping inmates affiliated with terrorist organizations re-integrate into society after serving a prison sentence. Mentoring programs are continuing at the local level; PET now funds and implements exit interviews. The inmate program continued to be funded through the EU and administered by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration; 12 mentors have been trained, but mentoring of selected prison inmates was just beginning at year’s end.

Overview: The United States and France maintained a strong relationship in the fight against terrorism in 2012. U.S. government agencies worked closely with their French counterparts for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information, and partnered in fostering closer regional and international cooperation. France’s security apparatus and legislation afford broad powers to security services for the prevention of terrorist attacks. France was subjected to lone wolf attacks in March in Toulouse and Mantauban. The French government was concerned about the possibility of attacks against its interests inside and outside of Syria, Mali, and Mali’s neighbors. Also, instability in Mali and the Sahel heightened French concerns about the ability of terrorists to operate in and recruit from northern Africa.

2012 Terrorist Incidents:

• On March 11 and 15, Mohamed Merah, killed three French soldiers and critically injured another, in Montauban and Toulouse.

• On March 19, Merah killed a teacher and three children at a private Jewish school in Toulouse. Merah was killed by police on March 22, after a 32-hour siege at his apartment.

• On March 21, a package bomb exploded outside the Indonesian Embassy in Paris. The building sustained damage, but no injuries were reported. French militant Frederic C. Jean Salvi, who has been on Indonesia’s wanted list since 2010 for allegedly planning a car bombing with other members of a terrorist cell, was suspected by Indonesia’s anti-terrorism agency of having carried out the attack.

• On September 19, an individual threw a Molotov cocktail into a kosher supermarket in Sarcelles, injuring one person. An investigation into the attack led to the October 6 dismantling of a suspected Islamic terrorist cell located in several French cities.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On December 12, the French government adopted new counterterrorism legislation. The new law allows authorities to prosecute French citizens who return to the country after having committed an act of terrorism abroad, or after training in terrorist camps (notably in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region) with the intention of returning to France to commit terrorist attacks.

France works diligently to maintain strong border security and implements national and EU border security legislation. On June 29, Marseille-Provence airport implemented the Automated Fast Track Crossing at External Borders (PARAFE) system, which, combined with biometric authentication technology, simplifies border crossing and results in an average crossing time of 20 seconds. Paris’ Charles de Gaulle and Orly airports use the PARAFE system. In 2012, French customs actively participated in the National Targeting Center (NTC) activities. The NTC, located in Washington, DC, allows for real-time information sharing as it relates to passenger and cargo targeting. On December 20, the French government adopted new legislation that increases the length of time illegal immigrants may be detained for not having a residency permit to 16 hours. The law responds to criticism that the previous length of detention, four hours, mandated by the French Supreme Court, allowed criminal networks to traffic immigrants to another country before police could complete their checks.

On March 19, following the attacks by Mohamed Merah, France raised its Vigipirate national security alert system to scarlet (the highest) for the first time since the creation of the system. The alert notified the public “of a risk of major attacks, simultaneous or otherwise, using non-conventional means and causing major devastation; preparing appropriate means of rescues and response, measures that are highly disruptive to public life are authorized.” The alert was lowered back to level red (“high chance of threat”) on March 24.

On May 4, a French court sentenced Algerian-born particle physicist, Adlene Hicheur, 35, to five years in prison for “criminal association with the intent to prepare terrorist acts.” While Hicheur studied and was employed in France, he exchanged 35 emails, some of them encrypted, with a representative of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria in 2009.

The following high profile arrests took place in 2012:

• On January 25, French Police arrested Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) member Ernesto Prat Urzainqui, one of Spain’s most wanted terrorists.

• On March 19, the brother of violent extremist Mohamed Merah, Abdelkader Merah, was arrested, and on March 25 was charged with criminal conspiracy for planning terrorist acts, and of complicity in murder and gang robbery.

• On March 30, police conducted raids targeting suspected terrorists in Toulouse, Nantes, Le Mans, Lyon, Nice, and in the Paris region, arresting 17. On April 3, 13 of the suspects were placed under formal investigation, one remained in pre-trial detention, and four were released. Several of the suspects were accused of planning the kidnapping of Albert Levy, a Jewish magistrate from Lyon.

• On April 4, police conducted raids targeting suspected terrorists in Marseille, Roubaix, Trappes, Carpentras, Valence, and Pau, arresting 10. The suspects reportedly visited websites that expressed violent extremist views, and some were suspected of traveling to Afghanistan and Pakistan to train in terrorist camps.

• On May 27, the military leader of ETA, Oroitz Gurruchaga Gorgorza, and his deputy, Xabier Aramburu, were arrested in the southwestern French village of Cuana following a joint operation conducted by the French Internal Security Service, the Spanish Civil Guard, and the Spanish intelligence services.

• On October 6, police conducted raids targeting suspected terrorists in Cannes, Strasbourg, and the Paris suburb of Torcy, killing one suspect and arresting 12 others. Five of the 12 suspects were released on October 10 without charges.

• On October 27, French authorities, as the result of a joint investigation by the Spanish Civil Guard and French police, arrested ETA members Izaskun Lesaka Arguelles and Joseba Iturbide Ochoteco. Lesaka was one of the three members of ETA’s leadership (ETA’s “Holy Trinity,” as they are referred to in press). Lesaka read many of the group’s communiqués in televised statements.

• On December 17, French intelligence services arrested three individuals suspected of violent extremism in the neighborhoods of Bon-Voyage and les Moulins in Nice. The three men were accused of training in terrorist training camps in Jakarta, Indonesia.

Other actions in 2012 included:

• On April 2, violent Islamic extremist Ali Belhadad (Algerian), and Imam Almany Baradji (Malian), were deported from France. The Ministry of Interior also announced that Imam Saad Nasser Alchatry (Saudi Arabian) would not be allowed back into France; while Imam Yusuf Yuksel (Turkish) and violent extremist Malek Drine (Tunisian) would also be deported at a later date. According to the Ministry, the imams made anti-Semitic statements in their sermons and called for Muslims to reject Western values.

• On November 21, Paris’ Sentence Enforcement Court granted parole to Georges Ibrahim Abdullah, on the condition that he immediately be deported to Lebanon. Abdallah, the convicted terrorist and Lebanese national sentenced to life in prison for his involvement in the 1982 murders of a U.S. military attaché and an Israeli diplomat in Paris, and the attempted murder of a U.S. consul in Strasbourg, is one of Europe’s longest serving prisoners. The French government immediately appealed the decision. The appellate court was scheduled to consider the appeal in early 2013.

Countering Terrorist Finance: France is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and underwent a mutual evaluation in February 2011. France belongs to the following FATF-related bodies: Cooperating and Supporting Nation to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Observer to the Financial Action Task Force of South America, Observer to the Asia Pacific Group, Observer to the Eurasia Group, Observer to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force, member of the Egmont Group, and member of the Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee of the Franc Zone. The FATF also designated France as a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, for a period of two years beginning in the fall of 2012. The Government of France began implementing FATF’s April 2012 recommendations to detect, prevent, and suppress the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts.

• On January 31, five people were arrested in the Paris region by the sub-Directorate of the Anti-Terrorism unit of the Ministry of Interior for channeling funds through restaurants to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

• On February 16, Taoufik Boussedra, a member of the Cherifi group, was deported to Tunisia for financing al-Qa’ida (AQ). Boussedra was one of eight men convicted of financing terrorism in January 2011. The other seven men received from 15 years imprisonment to a one-year suspended sentence. The men were found to be funneling funds through shops they opened in several Paris suburbs.

• On June 29, Nabil Amdouni, a 34-year-old Tunisian citizen, was arrested in Toulon and placed under formal investigation for allegedly funding AQIM.

• On July 15, the Ministry of Economy and Finance froze the assets of “Emily K” who actively supported the violent extremist organization, Forsane Alizza.

• On October 6 and 7, three members of the PKK in Europe were arrested outside of Paris and Mayenne for trying to provide 1.2 million euros (US $1.56 million) in arms to the Iraqi wing of the PKK.

• During the last week of October, the Ministry of Economy and Finance froze the assets of Imam Mohamed Hammami, and expelled him to Tunisia, for calling for a “violent jihad” and violence against women during his sermons at the Omar Mosque in Paris. The funds of the Association of Faith and Practice, which Hammami chaired, were also frozen.

• On November 28, 15 people were charged with illegally financing the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front (DHKP-C), a Turkish revolutionary organization designated as a terrorist organization by the EU and United States, and banned in Turkey. The individuals are accused of channeling money made through the sale of a Turkish magazine to the DHKP-C through the Anatolia’s Cultural and Solidarity Association in Paris. Prosecutors are seeking jail terms of up to eight years.

• On December 17, 10 people went on trial in Paris for allegedly raising 300,000 euros (approximately US $395,000) for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which the UN lists as associated with AQ. The trial is occurring four years after the suspects, most of whom are of Turkish origin, were arrested in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: France is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. France is actively engaged with the UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) and also played a strong role on the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 Sanctions Committees. France participated in the drafting of the European Council’s Counterterrorism Strategy action plan. France helped create and implement NATO’s new Strategic Concept and the Lisbon Summit Declaration, both of which include major counterterrorism measures for member states. Through the OSCE, France engaged in new measures to counter transnational threats, including terrorism. The French government undertook joint counterterrorism operations with countries including the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

France also plays an active role in efforts to support counterterrorism capacity building in other countries both bilaterally and within the EU.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The French government does not have a program in place that specifically addresses countering violent extremism, but considers its integration programs for all French citizens and residents a major tool in countering radicalization and violent extremism in France. Many of these programs target disenfranchised communities and new immigrants. For example, the Ministry of Education works to instill "universal values" in all French pupils, regardless of ethnic origin or country of birth. Ministry regulations mandate that all French public schools teach civic education, and that all students attend school until age 16. The government also offers adult vocational training for older immigrants and/or minorities who never attended French schools. The Ministry of Interior plays a significant role in countering radicalization by targeting areas, neighborhoods, and regions with high criminality and juvenile delinquency rates.

The Ministry of Justice implements rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former criminals. To help curb radicalization, the penitentiary system announced in 2012 that it would increase the number of Muslim chaplains in French prisons in 2013 to 166 (from 151) to help curb radicalization. In 2012, there were an estimated 200 violent Islamist extremists in the French prison system, 60 to 70 of whom were strongly suspected of belonging to a terrorist network. The majority of these prisoners were located in prisons in northern France, the Paris region, and Marseille.

Overview: In 2012, Georgia continued its close cooperation with U.S. government agencies on a wide-range of counterterrorism-related issues. Specifically, the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Export Control and Border Security, Department of Justice Resident Legal Advisor, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement officers all provided significant training and equipment to relevant agencies in the Georgian government. The Georgian government’s lack of control of the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia limited its ability to counter terrorism in these regions and to secure its border with Russia.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: The year was marked by the discovery of an improvised explosive device (IED) attached to the car of a locally employed staff member of the Israeli Embassy in Tbilisi on February 13. No injuries were reported, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs was able to successfully neutralize the IED. The discovery of the IED coincided with similar incidents, on the same day, in which Israeli diplomats were targeted in Thailand and India. While the Iranian government denied responsibility for the attack, media reported that the bomb plot was likely supported and implemented by the Iranian Republic Guard Corps (IRGC).

In August, an armed confrontation with suspected violent Islamist extremists from Chechnya occurred in the Lopota Gorge region of Georgia. The Georgian government initially did not classify the confrontation as a terrorist incident, but in November, the newly-elected government reopened an investigation into the events surrounding the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Georgia amended legislation on technological terrorism and cyber terrorism. The United States, Georgia, and Armenia participated in cross-border exercises that successfully demonstrated the Governments of Georgia and Armenia’s internal, bilateral, and international notification and response procedures in the detection and interdiction of illicit trans-border movements of weapons of mass destruction materials.

In early 2012, Georgia arrested and convicted two individuals in two separate instances attempting to place IEDs in the Samegrelo region of Georgia. The bombings allegedly originated in Abkhazia, and the bombers were apprehended before they could detonate the IEDs.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Georgia is a member of Moneyval, the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, and saw improved scores in 2012. Georgia amended its criminal code in 2012, adding two articles. The first classifies the financing of actions that pose a danger to the navigation of an aircraft as terrorist financing, and the other classifies and defines the financing of an action that leads to an explosion as terrorist financing.

In January, the Permanent National Interagency Antiterrorist Commission (PNIAC) was established. The PNIAC, which is chaired by the Minister of Justice, significantly expedites the court order process for freezing assets of individuals or entities on the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 consolidated lists. If an entity or individual is on any of the lists, the PNIAC passes the names to the National Bank for dissemination to privately registered banks in Georgia.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: On the regional level, Georgia is an active member of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. Bilaterally, Georgia concluded a counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation agreement with Hungary and Turkey in 2012, bringing the number of bilateral counterterrorism and law enforcement agreements Georgia has signed to 21. Georgia is in the process of concluding these bilateral agreements with every European country.

Overview: The threat from violent extremism remained elevated in 2012. Germany investigated, arrested, and prosecuted numerous terrorist suspects and disrupted terrorist-related groups within its borders with connections to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other violent Islamist extremist, Kurdish nationalist, and Nazi terrorist organizations.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: Authorities are investigating a suspected attempted terrorist attack after a bomb was discovered in a gym bag December 10 at the Bonn train station. It apparently did not explode because of poor workmanship.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In January, the Federal Cabinet decided to create a central database of violent neo-Nazis and those who call for the use of violence. The database became operational in late September. In June, Interior Minister Friedrich banned the Solingen-based violent extremist group Millatu Ibrahim. In November, Germany launched its Joint Terrorism and Defense Center. Modeled after existing centers against violent extremism and right-wing radicalism, the new center addresses politically motivated crime.

Arrests and prosecutions:

• In February, Arid Uka was sentenced to life in prison for shooting U.S. airmen at Frankfurt Airport in 2011.

• In February, a Düsseldorf court sentenced Sadi Naci Ö. to six years and Ünalkaplan D. to four years in prison for membership in the Turkish terrorist group Revolutionary People’s Freedom Party/Front.

• In March, the trial against Afghan-born German citizen Ahmad Wali Sidiqi began in Koblenz. German authorities had arrested him at Ramstein airbase upon his release from U.S. custody in April 2011. Sidiqi allegedly received instructions from Sheik Younis to carry out attacks in Europe.

• In May, a German engineer who was kidnapped in northern Nigeria was killed. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb had demanded in March that Germany free convicted terrorist supporter Filiz Gelowicz in exchange for the engineer.

• In May, the trial against an AQ terror cell began in Düsseldorf. The defendants were accused of conspiring to set off explosives in crowded areas.

• In October, a judge sentenced Murat K. to six years in prison and more than US $12,000 in damages for a knife attack against two police officers during a demonstration.

• In November, charges were filed against alleged National Socialist Underground (NSU) member Beate Zschäpe and four accomplices. The NSU terror cell is suspected of murdering nine people with immigrant backgrounds for racist/xenophobic reasons and one policewoman between 2000 and 2007.

• In December, a Berlin court sentenced German national Thomas U. (a.k.a. Hamsa al-Majaari) to four years and three months imprisonment for membership in the German Taliban mujahedin, training to commit terrorist acts, and uploading violent extremist propaganda to the internet.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and an observer to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering, all FATF-style regional bodies. Germany’s Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. German agencies filed 12,868 suspicious transaction reports in 2011 (2012 figures were not available), designating 194 for suspected terrorist financing. Germany remained a strong advocate of the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 Taliban and AQ sanctions regimes.

In April, Filiz Gelowicz, wife of Fritz Gelowicz – who is serving time for planning attacks against U.S. interests in Germany in 2007 – was released from prison. She had been convicted of financially supporting the German Taliban Mujahedin and the Islamic Jihad Union. In March, a trial began against Ömer C., who is charged with membership in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Turgay C., who is charged with providing US $52,000 to the IMU.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Germany is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and continued to participate in various multilateral counterterrorism initiatives.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Germany has numerous programs to counter violent extremism, at the state and federal levels. In North-Rhine Westphalia alone, there is the “Ibrahim Meets Abraham” community relations initiative; the Information and Education Center against Right-Wing Extremism; the former National-Socialistic Center Vogelsang, which is now used for cultural and civic education; the “No Racism in Schools” and “Prevention of Extremism in Sports” efforts; as well as city programs. Dortmund has a “Prevention of Extremism in the City of Dortmund” program. The German Soccer Federation awards a prize to organizations and persons who use their positions to work for freedom, tolerance, and humanity; and against intolerance, racism, and hatred. Other cities, such as Cologne, host street soccer tournaments to bring together NGOs and at-risk youths. In Berlin, the Violence Prevention Network runs a training program that serves – both during and after detention – ideologically motivated perpetrators.

In January, the Federal Ministry of the Interior established a radicalization help center for parents and friends of violent Islamist extremists. The Interior Ministry started a promotion campaign that included posting simulated missing person notices for fictitious violent extremists who have cut off contact with their friends and families; the notices feature contact information for the radicalization help center. Four Muslim organizations were offended by the campaign and have discontinued their cooperation with the Interior Ministry’s Security Partnership Initiative (SPI), in protest against the Countering Violent Extremism poster project. The Muslim organizations complained that the posters linked Islam to violence. The Interior Ministry plans to continue the SPI.

Germany continued its HATIF (the Arabic word for telephone) program to assist violent Islamist extremists with reintegration. The Interior Ministry also continued a project, first launched in 2001, to stop radicalization among young right-wing offenders. The Ministry expanded the program in 2007 to function in eight states. In 2012, the Interior Ministry also continued a project in three states to counter radicalization of young delinquents influenced by violent extremist ideology.

Overview: In 2012, Greece continued to experience small-scale attacks like targeted arson and improvised explosive device detonation by domestic anarchist groups. Generally, such attacks did not aim to inflict bodily harm but rather sought to make a political statement. Many members of the two most active domestic terrorist groups, Revolutionary Struggle and Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, have been imprisoned since 2011. Overall, Greek government cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism and the physical security of American interests in Greece was strong.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: On February 25, a group under the name “February 12 Movement” claimed responsibility for a failed bomb attack at the Egaleo subway station where an improvised incendiary device (IID) was placed inside an Athens subway car. The device was placed next to a seat and consisted of a plastic container with flammable liquid, a small quantity of an explosive substance, a timer, wires, and batteries. The bomb did not explode, most likely due to faulty construction.

Greece’s two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, experienced frequent, relatively small-scale anarchist attacks that used inexpensive and unsophisticated incendiary devices against the properties of political figures, party offices, private bank ATMs, ministries and tax offices, and privately-owned vehicles.

One incident was reported against U.S. interests. On June 27, a group calling itself “Deviant Behaviors for the Proliferation of Revolutionary Terrorism – International Revolutionary Front” claimed responsibility for an attack in which a van full of IIDs was driven through the front of the Microsoft headquarters building in an Athens suburb. The IIDs were subsequently detonated, causing a high intensity explosion. No casualties or injuries were reported.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Seven members of Revolutionary Struggle were released from pretrial detention in October 2011 (due to a Greek law that allows a maximum of 18 months of imprisonment without trial proceedings beginning). The Greek Counterterrorism Unit was not informed by the local police precinct that two of the lead members failed to show up for their required check-in (also October 2011) at the precinct until July 2012. Police have not been able to locate the two, and Greek authorities had not prosecuted the case by year’s end.

The trial of 17 suspected members of Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, which began in 2011, was repeatedly postponed due to work stoppages by judges and judicial postponements in 2012.

The porous nature of Greece’s borders is of concern. While Greek border authorities try to stem the flow of illegal migration, its ability to control large-scale illegal migration via its land and sea borders with Turkey is limited. The recent political upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East have intensified illegal migration to and through Greece via the Greece-Turkey border and the Greek Aegean islands.

DHS/ICE provided training to Hellenic National Police and Coast Guard in Athens, Crete, Patras, and Thessaloniki to advance knowledge of border security agents. The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center facilitated a multi-day tabletop exercise in Athens in an effort to prepare Hellenic Police Forces for a large-scale terrorist incident. Participation on the part of the Greek government was broad-based and comprehensive.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. The Foreign Ministry’s Sanctions Monitoring Unit is tasked with ensuring that Greece meets its commitments to enforce international sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions. The Financial Intelligence unit inspected 3,586 suspicious transactions in 2012, but did not discover evidence of terrorist financing in Greece. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Greece is a member of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. Overall, Greece engaged constructively on counterterrorism initiatives in international fora. Greece regularly participated in regional information exchange and seminars through such bodies as the EU, the OSCE, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

Overview: The United States and Ireland collaborated closely on counterterrorism, law enforcement, and information-sharing. An Garda Siochana (Irish Police at both the national and local level) has comprehensive law enforcement, immigration, investigative, and counterterrorism responsibilities, and continued to work closely with American counterparts. In 2012, as was the case in 2010 and 2011, there were incidents by dissident republican groups in Ireland, generally targeting other republican factions and often involving criminal activity. Some violent actions committed in neighboring Northern Ireland by members of dissident groups were traced back to support provided by persons living in Ireland. The immediate targets of violence were law enforcement personnel and the security structures of Northern Ireland in an attempt to disrupt the ongoing post-peace process community rehabilitation efforts. Irish authorities handle these legacy issues stemming from “The Troubles,” and are actively involved in dealing with transnational terrorism issues.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: The list below details terrorism-related incidents reported in the public domain. As of December 31, 96 viable improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were disarmed and analyzed by Ireland’s Army bomb disposal teams. Incidents included:

• On January 5, five pipe bombs were found in County Clare. Army bomb disposal teams secured the devices.

• On February 16, Garda recovered a handgun and three IEDs. The items were found in County Kildare during ongoing investigations into the activities of dissident republicans.

• On May 1, Garda and Army bomb disposal experts neutralized a live 45-pound IED found in Phoenix Park near the residences of the U.S. Ambassador and the Irish President. The location of the IED was only one mile from Garda headquarters.

• On June 23, Garda discovered eight pipe bombs in a housing estate in Limerick City.

• On August 11, a device wrapped in plastic was discovered in Limerick. An army explosive ordnance disposal unit carried out a controlled explosion to destroy the device.

• On August 21, Army bomb disposal teams dealt with four separate incidents in Dublin, two of which involved viable explosive devices.

• On September 3, RIRA leader Alan Ryan was killed in north Dublin.

• On September 17, a petrol bomb did considerable structural damage to Sinn Fein Irish Member of Parliament Aengus O Snodaigh’s constituency office in Dublin. No one was injured.

• On October 5, Garda uncovered what they believe to be a pipe bomb-making facility in north Dublin. Garda later arrested the man suspected of directing the facility.

• On November 1, David Black, a prison officer from Northern Ireland, was murdered on his way to work; an investigation is underway. A Dublin-based alliance of dissident republican splinter groups claimed responsibility for his murder.

• On December 4, Eamon Kelly, an alleged criminal gang leader and dissident republican, was shot in north Dublin.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On November 9, the Irish government approved the drafting of the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) (Amendment) Bill 2012. This bill, if enacted, would amend the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 and create three new offences of: (1) public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, (2) recruitment for terrorism, and (3) training for terrorism.

A series of investigations into historical cases from “The Troubles” related to the Smithwick Tribunal were ongoing at year’s end. The Smithwick Tribunal, begun in 2006, is reviewing the events surrounding the murders of Chief Superintendent Harry Breen and Superintendent Robert Buchanan of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the predecessor to the present day Police Services of Northern Ireland. Public hearings for the tribunal began in July 2011.

The Irish government has a good track record in responding positively and thoroughly to U.S. requests for cooperation on all law enforcement issues.

2012 arrests related to terrorist activity included:

• On February 7, Garda arrested two men as part of an ongoing investigation into dissident republican activity.

• On June 11, Garda arrested two men for dissident republican activity.

• On July 3, Garda arrested a man and seized a gun during an investigation into dissident republican paramilitary activity.

• On September 15, three men were charged by the Special Criminal Court in Dublin with membership in the RIRA. They were among 17 people who were detained during Operation Ambience, a Garda investigation into a paramilitary display that transpired at the funeral of RIRA boss Alan Ryan.

• On September 27, police in Dublin investigating dissident republican activities arrested two men after surveillance equipment was found in a hotel room overlooking a Garda station.

2012 prosecutions related to terrorist activity included:

• On January 24, an individual was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Special Criminal Court in Dublin for the 2008 murder of a man in County Donegal. The murder was linked to the dissident republican group, Oglaigh na hEireann.

• On February 24, two men were found guilty of possessing explosive substances by an Irish court following a 2010 Garda raid on a suspected dissident republican bomb-making facility in Dundalk.

• On March 31, a man was sentenced to four years imprisonment after he admitted to a 2010 charge of gun and ammunition possessing.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Ireland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Bill of 2010 enacted the EU’s third money-laundering directive into Irish law, giving effect to several FATF recommendations. The act consolidated Ireland’s existing Anti-Money Laundering/ Counterterrorist Finance Laws and increased the obligations on a wide range of individuals and organizations to disclose information related to money laundering and terrorist financing.

Ireland implements all EU Council Regulations on financial sanctions against listed terrorists and related directives. The government continues to amend its primary 2010 legislation to strengthen it and implement FATF recommendations.

Law enforcement authorities monitor non-profit organizations for breaches of criminal law, but the Charities Act has yet to be fully implemented. Ireland is on the regular follow-up FATF list and is not yet eligible to be placed on the biennial review list. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Ireland is a member of all relevant regional and international bodies to combat terrorism. This includes the Council of Europe, the OECD, the OSCE, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Ireland has held the Chairmanship of the OSCE for the duration of the 2012 calendar year and hosted the 19^th OSCE Ministerial Council in Dublin on December 6-7.

U.S. government officials worked with the Irish government on security efforts surrounding the 2012 Olympics in London.

In addition to counterterrorism capacity building in foreign states, it is important to mention the counterterrorism efforts in a regional context with Northern Ireland. The Irish Defense Forces provided a robust explosive ordnance disposal capability to the civil authority, routinely deploying to investigate and disarm ordnance around the country. The 2nd Eastern Brigade, which is responsible for the Dublin area and a significant portion of the territory along the border with Northern Ireland, responded to over 100 reports of explosive devices in 2012.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Government of Ireland continued its significant efforts to assist in the integration process of minority groups in Ireland. These measures included providing social benefits, language training, and the proactive advocacy work of an ombudsman’s office.

2012 Terrorist Incidents:

• On January 16, three explosive devices exploded outside the Naples office of the national tax agency. No information was available about the attackers.

• On May 7, two men shot and wounded Roberto Adinolfi, chief executive officer of a nuclear engineering company, Ansaldo, in Genoa. The Informal Anarchist Federation claimed responsibility for the attack on May 11. On September 13, police arrested two members of the group accused of being the attackers.

• On May 12, two Molotov cocktails were thrown against the entrance of the Livorno office of the national tax agency. On July 10, Livorno prosecutors announced that nine anarchists were under investigation for the episode.

• On August 30, three broadcasting repeaters were set afire near Parma by a group of anarchists who demanded the release from a Swiss prison of a Swiss environmentalist arrested in Italy in 1991.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Italian government continued to make use of reinforced counterterrorism legislation enacted in 2005 that facilitates detention of suspects, mandates arrest for crimes involving terrorism, and expedites procedures for expelling persons suspected of terrorist activities.

The Italian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Ministry of Interior continued improvements to aviation security. In May, the CAA and the Transportation Security Administration signed an Annex to a Memorandum of Cooperation setting the framework for future collaboration. The CAA purchased additional Advanced Image Technology units (otherwise known as body scanners) for use at the Rome and Milan international airports.

Law enforcement actions included:

• On February 6, former Guantanamo detainee Riadh Ben Mohamed Nasri was cleared of charges of international terrorism by a Milan appeals court. Nasri, who was detained for eight years at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and was subsequently confined for two years and two months in an Italian jail, had been accused of supporting a terrorist group that recruited volunteers who had joined insurgents abroad between 1997 and 2001. In January 2011, an Italian court had sentenced Nasri to six years of imprisonment.

• On February 21, police arrested nine alleged members of Turkish Hizballah (unrelated to the similarly-named Hizballah that operates in Lebanon) who were accused of abetting illegal immigration and assisting fake asylum seekers in Terni.

• On March 15, authorities arrested Mohamed Jarmoune, a Moroccan national who had lived in Italy for 16 years, on suspicion of providing online training in arms and explosives to supporters in Brescia and planning a violent attack against a synagogue in Milan.

• On March 27, Venice prosecutors ordered the arrest of five members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) accused of extortion. They allegedly had forced several Turkish nationals to regularly pay up to US $6,783 as contribution for the operations of the PKK.

• On June 13, police arrested eight members of the Informal Anarchist Federation (IAF), a network that claimed responsibility for letter bombs sent to: the director of a center for migrants in Gradisca d’Isonzo; Bocconi University in Milan; a Deutsche Bank office in Frankfurt; an office of the national tax agency in Rome; and the Greek ambassador in Paris. The group reportedly cooperated with the Swiss and Spanish anarchists, Marco Camenisch and Gabriel Pombo de Silva.

• On September 11, the Cassation Court confirmed the May 24 ruling of a Milan appeals court that had sentenced11 members of the Red Brigades to prison terms between 14 months and 11 years and six months for two attacks against offices of political parties and for a conspiracy against a senator and a senior labor expert. Another defendant was acquitted.

• On September 13, Genoa police arrested Nicola Gai and Alfredo Cospito, members of IAF, accused of the May 7 terrorist attack against Roberto Adinolfi.

• On September 25, the Ministry of Interior announced the arrest and expulsion of two Libyans suspected of violent extremist proselytism and planning a violent attack. The two were injured during the conflict in Libya and had traveled to Rome for medical treatment.

• On October 4, Italy extradited an al-Qa’ida (AQ) member to the United States who is charged with conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals, conspiracy to bomb a government facility, conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, and use of firearms and explosives. He travelled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan in 2001, where he attended AQ training camps and later fought in tribal areas of Pakistan against U.S. and Coalition Forces.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Italy worked closely with the United States on anti-money laundering and information sharing, and cooperated with other foreign governments as an active member of the Financial Action Task Force and the Egmont Group. Italy also participated in the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 designation process, both as a sponsoring and co-sponsoring nation. As of October, the Italian Guardia di Finanza and Anti-Mafia Investigative Unit had carried out more than 500 money-laundering investigations and seized more than 120 million euros (US $162,800,000) in laundered money. In 2012, the Italian Treasury’s Financial Information Unit upgraded its technology resources and training it provides to financial entities to improve the rate and quality of suspicious transaction reports. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Italy is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Italy also supported counterterrorism efforts through the G-8 Roma-Lyon Group (including capacity building through the Counterterrorism Action Group), the OSCE, NATO, the UN, and the EU.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism The Ministry of Justice Penitentiary Police continued financing an NGO-administered counter-radicalization program to place imams in the three prisons where Muslims convicted of terrorism were incarcerated. To counter potential radicalization, the Ministry of Interior conducted training in September for more than 1,000 law enforcement officers in Milan, Turin, and Venice on how to engage more effectively with immigrant communities.

Overview: The Government of Kosovo continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism-related issues in 2012, with progress made along numerous fronts. The security and political situation in northern Kosovo continued to limit the government’s ability to exercise its authority in that region, where the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) are responsible for maintaining a safe and secure environment and strengthening the rule of law, including at the borders. While Kosovo and neighboring Serbia did not directly cooperate on counterterrorism issues, both governments worked to implement an Integrated Border Management (IBM) plan with joint checkpoints in December.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Kosovo Assembly approved a new criminal code (CC) and criminal procedure code (CPC) in December, both of which came into force on January 1, 2013. The new laws preserve the UN model on counterterrorism criminal legislation, which was also the basis of the previous code. The CC raises the punishment for terrorism-related crimes, and provides a greater range of criminal offenses to charge against putative terrorists, such as weapons offenses or intrusion into computer systems. In addition, the new CC permits the prosecution of terrorists even if a planned terrorist act is not executed. The new CPC grants Kosovo authorities a greater flexibility to investigate criminal acts in the planning stages to prevent crimes and terrorist acts. Furthermore, the CPC has an integrated confiscation process to ensure that assets related to the execution of criminal acts, both funds and weapons, are confiscated. Evidence from other countries will also be able to be used more easily in Kosovo courts, thus allowing the conduct of international counterterrorism investigations in Kosovo.

U.S. training programs, supplemented by donations of equipment through the Export and Border-Related Security Program, continued to improve the ability of the Kosovo Customs Authority and the Kosovo Border Police to control Kosovo’s borders and detect and interdict weapons and other contraband at border crossing points.

In December, the Government of Kosovo began implementing the IBM agreement reached in February with Serbia and brokered by the EU. Kosovo and Serbia opened four jointly managed crossing points by the end of 2012, with support from EULEX officials. The IBM agreement stipulates that Kosovo and Serbia will establish mechanisms for exchanging information and other data from the areas which are or may be of relevance to, the prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal activities. Implementation of the agreement is anticipated to strengthen Kosovo’s border security.

Despite implementation of the IBM agreement and the establishment of the four jointly administered crossing points, much of the traffic into northern Kosovo uses bypass roads that circumvent the official checkpoints. KFOR and EULEX are limited in their ability to shut down the illegal crossings into Kosovo, which allow traffic and goods to avoid Kosovo border and customs controls. As a consequence, the border remains porous and trafficking of goods and people is widespread.

In December, the Supreme Court of Kosovo upheld the guilty verdict of Amir Sopa, who was sentenced in 2011 to 10 years’ imprisonment on two charges of terrorism. Sopa was found guilty of firing a rocket-propelled grenade at the office of the District Court of Pristina in 2003 and sending death threats to the former mayor of Pristina on behalf of the Albanian National Army, a violent extremist organization.

Also in December, the Government of Kosovo extradited Shukri Aliu to Macedonia, where he was in pretrial detention on terrorism-related charges at year’s end. (Aliu was born in Kosovo and also holds Macedonian citizenship.) In 2011, Macedonia convicted Aliu in absentia of aggravated theft, but he is also believed to have been involved in other criminal acts in Macedonia and to have ties to terrorist organizations.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Kosovo is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In December, the Kosovo Assembly considered revisions to the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which would strengthen legislation passed in 2010. The amendments, if passed, would help Kosovo fully implement international anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance standards, create enforcement mechanisms for the examination of reporting entities, and more narrowly define terrorist financing.

In order to prevent money laundering, terrorist financing, and fraud, the Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) would benefit greatly from obtaining a code from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). This code would facilitate the CBK’s monitoring of cross-border banking operations and adherence to international oversight requirements. Without this SWIFT code, Kosovo’s access to information about the nature of cross-border financial transactions is limited, and thus Kosovo is seriously hampered in its efforts to prevent terrorist financing, money laundering, and other types of fraud and corruption. The Central Bank of Kosovo has sought to join the SWIFT system since 2004.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Overview: The Netherlands continued to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in the areas of border and transportation security, terrorist financing, and bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Cooperation with U.S. law enforcement remained excellent. In its December quarterly terrorism threat analysis, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) maintained the national threat level at “limited,” meaning chances of an attack in the Netherlands or against Dutch interests were relatively small but could not be ruled out entirely. The threat against the Netherlands is mainly from violent Islamist extremists, though the attention of the fragmented and leaderless network is mostly focused on overseas conflict areas. Individuals traveling to those areas to fight are the main focus for Dutch authorities, but domestic lone wolves also appeared on the radar. Resilience by the Dutch population to terrorism continued to be high and there was a trend towards less radicalization and alienation.

In 2012, the NCTV completed its two year internal reorganization process; national security, counterterrorism, and cyber security are now under the NCTV umbrella.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2011, the government published the first comprehensive assessment of Dutch counterterrorist measures over the past decade. The study, which had been commissioned to the Nijmegen Radboud University, concluded that post-9/11 Dutch counterterrorism policy was solid and reliable and the measures taken were not contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Dutch police were reorganized into a new national police service, scheduled to become operational in 2013. The multi-year, country-wide reorganization effort is expected to improve investigation and public order capabilities.

The Netherlands continued to improve its border security. Cameras were installed at the border, primarily focused on illegal immigration and organized crime, and the government established an interagency coordination center to share this information and provide for a more effective and efficient response. Dutch ports of entry have biographic and biometric screening capabilities.

The Netherlands remained strongly committed to effective cooperation with the United States on border security. The Port of Rotterdam was the first European port to participate in the Container Security Initiative. The Netherlands had high-level discussions with the United States through the annual Agreed Steps program, and exchanged information on security measures for airports, ports, and critical infrastructure. In addition, agreements have been made on dealing with forged documents. In February, the Netherlands signed a Letter of Intent with the United States on cyber-security cooperation and in November, the Netherlands and the United States signed an agreement on cooperation in science and technology concerning homeland and civil security matters.

Significant law enforcement actions included:

• On July 3, the Dutch Supreme Court directed the re-trial of two members of the Hofstad Group, an identified terrorist organization, due to insufficient evidence. In 2010, both men were sentenced to 15 months in prison.

• On September 20, Samir Azzouz was arrested in prison for attempting to recruit fellow inmates and planning an attack. He was imprisoned in 2008, and was serving a nine-year sentence for a terrorist plot.

• On October 18, Mahamud Said Omar of Somalia was convicted by a court in Minneapolis, Minnesota, for sending money and recruiting fighters from the United States to Somalia. Omar was arrested in the Netherlands in 2009 and extradited to the United States in 2011. Dutch authorities and witnesses contributed significantly to the success of the investigation and prosecution. No sentencing date was set as of year’s end.

• On December 3, police arrested 55 people at an alleged meeting of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization by both the Netherlands and the EU. Those arrested came from Turkey, France, Germany, Syria, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Authorities viewed this as a training meeting and nine suspects will face trial. The others were released, with a handful handed over to immigration.

• In 2011, at the request of U.S. authorities, the Dutch police arrested Dutch terrorist suspect Sabir Ali Khan at Schiphol airport. Khan was suspected of fighting against ISAF troops in Afghanistan. The district court of Rotterdam declared Khan's extradition to the United States admissible, which was upheld by the Supreme Court in April. After an independent investigation into Khan’s mental health delayed the process, the Justice Minister decided December 20 to approve the extradition. Khan has appealed the decision to the European Court of Human Rights.

• In 2011, an Iraqi national was released while awaiting trial by the Rotterdam district court, pending the investigation. He was suspected by the General Intelligence Service of intending to travel to Syria to join al-Qa'ida. While awaiting continuation of his trial, the man traveled abroad. His whereabouts were unknown at year’s end.

Countering Terrorist Finance: The Netherlands has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1990, and is one of the cooperating and supporting nations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. The European Commission sets many rules for countering terrorist finance in directives that EU member states (including the Netherlands) implement themselves. Dutch officials cooperated with the United States in designating terrorist organizations and interdicting and freezing their assets.

The Cabinet has submitted to the Council of State, the government’s highest advisory body, a proposal to amend current legislation on economic crimes, including changing sentences for terrorist financing. This legislation is in line with FATF recommendations and EU directives. The Netherlands is working to resolve legal issues that affect it when challenged at court, and is enhancing its due process rules.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: The Netherlands is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and contributed to the creation of Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism. The Dutch are also planning to contribute to the curriculum development of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, to be established in Tunisia. The Netherlands contributed to the counterterrorism work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

The Netherlands continued to chair the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism's Nuclear Detection Working Group. In November, the Netherlands hosted a table top exercise to improve cooperation in preventing a nuclear or radiological terrorist event. This exercise was in preparation of the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit to be held in The Hague. In 2011, the International Centre for Counterterrorism – an independent body established in The Hague in 2010 – and the Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute organized an international conference on prison radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, which contributed to the adoption in 2012 of a document on rehabilitation and reintegration at the Global Counterterrorism Forum ministerial meeting in Istanbul. The Dutch also cooperate on EU and OSCE counterterrorism efforts.

The Netherlands was a strong voice on Lebanese Hizballah; the Dutch Foreign Minister publicly highlighted the dangers the group posed and called on the EU to designate it as a terrorist organization.

The Netherlands is implementing counterterrorism capacity building projects in Pakistan, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Kenya, and Indonesia.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The resilience of the Dutch population to violent extremism is high. Radical efforts by political and religious leaders seemed to have little effect on immigrant communities or on the general population as a whole. After completing the 2007-2011 Action Plan: Polarization and Radicalization, the Netherlands has shifted from a broad, general, catch-all effort to a more narrowly focused, more localized approach.

Countering violent extremism is locally organized, instead of relying on national programs. There have been no major communication efforts or public awareness campaigns, because of this emphasis on specific locales. There is a view that national campaigns on violent extremism may actually promote or attract extremism.

The national government serves in advisory and capacity-building roles. Local partners are expected to build upon the knowledge and experiences generated in the past. National support of the local approach is focused on identifying high-priority areas that are of interest to or might host radicalized individuals, and developing specific plans and approaches. The NCTV develops tools and training and offers them to local police departments, social workers, and other stakeholders, both directly and through an online database.

Another focus for countering violent extremism is on lone actors and persons who travel to combat zones. Systems are being built by local governments around these individuals. The NCTV invests in information systems that combine reports and red flags from different parties in order to distill signals about potential actions by violent extremists and to develop a tailored approach. There are a handful of programs, administered to individuals, which focus on disengagement and rehabilitation.

The Netherlands participates in the European Policy Planners Network on Countering Polarization and Radicalization, which is occasionally attended by the United States.

Overview: Although the Norwegian Police Security Service considers violent Islamist extremism the biggest threat to Norway, the July 2011 attacks in Oslo and Utoya, conducted by a Norwegian violent extremist, have heavily influenced the Government of Norway’s approach to countering terrorism. The report of the independent July 22 commission that was formed to evaluate Norway’s handling of the attacks was issued in August and detailed a number of preparedness and response failings. Partially in response to this, authorities have continued focusing on new terrorism prosecutions, expanding efforts to counter violent extremism, strengthening cyber security measures, and proposing legislative changes to penalize individual terrorists (those not affiliated with groups). The government is also focusing on efforts to criminalize terrorist training, to criminalize the possession of certain materials that may be used by terrorists, and to increase surveillance tools for the Police Security Service. In the wake of these attacks, the government has also continued to increase security measures at government buildings and security for government officials.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The government is currently in the process of crafting legislation to strengthen its counterterrorism laws. Following a lengthy public discussion period, the Ministry of Justice is writing new legislation that will be presented to Parliament for approval in 2013. The law is expected to include provisions to close the “lone wolf” loophole (which requires proof of a large conspiracy for a terrorist conviction) and to criminalize the receipt of terrorist training.

Norway is a party to EU border control data sharing arrangements. Norwegian immigration authorities obtained biometric equipment for the fingerprinting of arrivals from outside the Schengen area, though they have not yet implemented this program. Immigration to Norway is facilitated and regulated by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI), which processes all applications for asylum, visas, family immigration, work and study permits, citizenship, permanent residence, and travel documents. In 2012, UDI took steps to improve border control with the introduction of a new Norwegian permanent residency permit card. Introduced as a part of the Schengen Agreement, the new card is tied to fingerprint and facial biometrics, has numerous security features, is required to be renewed regularly, and the bearer is charged approximately US $50 for replacing a lost or stolen card.

Anders Behring Breivik was found guilty of murder and assault as a result of his 2011 attacks in Oslo and on the island of Utoya. The trial began in April 2012 and concluded in August. The court found him competent to stand trial, sane at the time of the acts, and gave him the maximum possible sentence of 21 years. This sentence can be reviewed by a court and extended by up to five years at a time, as many times as the government seeks court review and applies for extension.

An Iraqi citizen, Mullah Krekar (aka Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad), the founder of Ansar al-Islam, continued to reside in Norway on a long-term residence permit. In March, a trial court convicted Krekar of issuing threats and inciting terrorism, and sentenced him to six years in prison. Krekar appealed, and in December an appeals court affirmed his convictions for issuing threats and intimidating witnesses, but reversed his conviction for "inciting terrorism." The appeals court reduced his sentence to two years and 10 months in prison.

On September 20, a court of appeals upheld terrorist charges against Mikael Davud and Shawan Bujak. They and a third Norwegian long-term resident, David Jakobsen, were charged with plotting an attack on a Danish newspaper that published cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammed. The court of appeals increased Davud’s sentence from six to seven years, and reduced Bujak’s from four years to three-and-a-half years. The appeals court overturned Jacobsen’s conviction on terrorist charges but confirmed his conviction for purchasing bomb ingredients. Davud and Bujak have indicated that they will appeal to the Supreme Court; that hearing date was pending at year’s end. These were the first terrorism convictions in Norway’s courts.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Norway is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and held the FATF presidency in 2012. The Government of Norway adopted and incorporated FATF standards and recommendations, including the special recommendations on terrorist financing, into Norwegian law. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Norway continued its support for the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) with a contribution of US $446,000 to a project designed to facilitate counterterrorism technical assistance in two pilot countries (Nigeria and Burkina Faso), and a contribution of US $80,300 to a CTITF project on implementing the regional counterterrorism strategy for Central Asia. Norway has also provided US $80,300 to a joint project led by the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation to promote regional counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia. Furthermore, Norway has provided US $375,000 to the University of Pretoria’s Institute for Strategic Studies to build counterterrorism capacity in the police and judiciary systems of African countries. Norway remains a member of the EU's Radicalization Awareness Network, an umbrella network of practitioners and local actors involved in countering violent extremism that is designed to enable the members to share and discuss best practices in spotting and addressing radicalization and recruitment leading to acts of terrorism.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Norwegian government continues to implement its plan to counter radicalization and violent extremism. The plan covers 2010 to 2013 and focuses on four priority areas: increased knowledge and information; strengthened government cooperation; strengthened dialogue and involvement; and support for vulnerable and disadvantaged people.

On November 8, the Police Security Services and the Oslo Police announced a plan to address radicalization in Oslo. The plan will be modeled on previous initiatives to de-radicalize members of violent right-wing extremist groups.

Under the framework of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC), the U.S. and Russian Chairmen of the Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) met in February 2012 to discuss U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation. The Chairmen discussed cooperation in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), countering violent extremism, countering terrorist threats to the tourism industry, terrorist designations, and preparations for the Sochi Olympics. Additional BPC activity in counterterrorism included several joint military exercises that dealt explicitly with terrorism-related scenarios, collaboration on nuclear and transportation security, and joint programs on financial monitoring.

Russia also continued to participate in the yearly Four-Party Counterterrorism Working Group, which includes the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Operational and intelligence information regarding terrorism-related threats was shared among these four agencies, with senior leaders meeting in Moscow and in Washington. FBI-FSB relationships at the working level showed improvement during the year.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: The North Caucasus region remained Russia’s primary area of terrorist activity. Separatists seeking an Islamic caliphate within the Caucasus reportedly claimed responsibility for bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and extortion in Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, and Chechnya. Federal and local security organizations conducted counterterrorism operations throughout the Caucasus, including raids, roadblocks, and larger-scale military-style operations in rural areas. Media and eyewitness reports suggested that separatism is not the only factor driving violence in the Caucasus, and that motives such as inter-ethnic rivalry, business arguments, and revenge were factors involved.

In 2012, almost half of terrorist attacks targeted law enforcement, security services, and emergency responders, using increasingly sophisticated tactics. For example, in a May 3 attack, a suicide bomber exploded a vehicle near a police station in Makhachkala, Dagestan. When the Emergency Ministry and police units arrived, a second bomb exploded in a nearby vehicle. About 100 people were injured. Thirty-seven police officers were injured and seven died. Two rescuers were also injured. In 2012, Dagestani authorities approved the creation of ethnic-based internal security units and have agreed to host additional federal police and regular army units to combat terrorism.

Across Russia, the press reported 659 killed and 490 wounded in 182 terrorist attacks in 2012. Of the casualty totals for Russia, 325 of those killed and 365 of those injured were security personnel. Official terrorism statistics are similar to those found in open press. In December, Viktor Orlov, the head of the National Counterterrorism Committee, said over 260 acts of terrorism were committed in Russia in 2012. Additionally, Alesksandr Bortnikov, Director of the Federal Security Service, announced that the special services prevented 92 terrorist-related crimes in 2012. In October, President Putin spoke about Russia’s fight against terrorism saying that within Russia during the past several months, 479 militants were detained, and 313 terrorists who refused to surrender were killed, including 43 leaders.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The National Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee, organized in 2006, is the main government body coordinating the Russian government’s response to the terrorist threat.

The Russian Federation uses a machine-readable passport for foreign travel, and citizens have the option of purchasing a more expensive biometric passport. The biometric passports contain robust security features and are gaining in popularity. The latest version of the Russian passport is valid for 10 years. Among Russian applicants for American visas this year, the majority used the new Russian biometric passport.

Cooperative efforts are also underway on a project to identify high-risk shipping containers entering Russia. The goal of the project is to consolidate efforts of U.S.-based field offices with Russian law enforcement in a cooperative effort to share law enforcement intelligence and ultimately interdict contraband that could be used in terrorist acts. The primary focus is the interdiction of smuggling in weapons of mass destruction, dual use materials, small arms, narcotics, bulk cash, and human trafficking.

Russia was also in the process of implementing a major program to introduce paperless entrance and clearance systems for cargo. This system, currently operational in one port of entry (Kashirsky), implements automated risk management and cargo selectivity procedures. The Russian Federation is expanding this system nationally.

Cooperative relationships continued to develop between the heads of the State Border Guard Service of the FSB and the U.S. Border Patrol. Similarly the U.S. Coast Guard enjoyed a close working relationship with the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Guard Service.

Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups included:

• On May 17, a court in Vladikavkaz sentenced two men for the 2010 suicide bombing that killed 19 and injured 230 people at a market.

• On November 28, a man was convicted of plotting a terrorist attack on Red Square on New Year’s Eve 2010. Four of his associates were previously convicted, and six more were standing trial at year’s end.

• On December 10, four Russian men from the Caucasus Emirate were sentenced to 15 to18 years in prison for plotting a 2011 bombing of the high-speed Sapsan train running between Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Russia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). It is also a leading member, chair, and primary funding source of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a FATF-style regional body. Through the EAG, Russia provided technical assistance and other resources towards improving legislative and regulatory frameworks and operational capabilities. Russia is also a member of the Egmont Group, as well as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Moneyval, the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, both FATF-style regional bodies.

Russian banks must report suspicious transactions to the Financial Monitoring Federal Service (Rosfinmonitoring), a Financial Intelligence Unit whose head reports directly to the President (in 2011 Rosfinmonitoring reported to the Prime Minister). The Central Bank and the markets regulator (the Financial Markets Federal Service) can access these transaction reports after requesting them from Rosfinmonitoring. In the first quarter of 2012, Rosfinmonitoring seized US $334 in alleged terrorist funds, a reduction from US $16,805 during the same quarter in 2011.

In July 2012, the Duma adopted a new law, N 121-FZ, intended to increase scrutiny and oversight of non-commercial organizations that receive foreign funding. Provisions in this law require Rosfinmonitoring to report to the relevant non-profit registration body if an organization is found to be non-compliant with Russian Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations. This new legislation also amends Russia’s AML/CFT law by requiring monitoring of any foreign donations over 200,000 rubles (approximately US $6,000).

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Russia is a founding member of the GCTF and is an active member of the NATO-Russia Council Counterterrorism Working Group. Russia continued to work with other regional and multilateral groups to address terrorism, including counterterrorism groups in the EU, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT), the G-8 Counterterrorism Action Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the OSCE, and engaged actively with the “Istanbul Process” working group on combating terrorism in Afghanistan, as well as chairing the Istanbul Process counter-narcotics working group.

In September, Russia’s FSB hosted the “Guardian-2012” demonstration and detection-related exercise. Held under the auspices of the GICNT, the event brought together representatives of approximately 45 of its member states and international organizations. In addition to plenary and panel discussions, the event featured a day-long demonstration of Russian technology and procedures to detect and prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Russia is also a member of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), and will chair the initiative in 2013. The underlying goal of the GP is to fund programs and activities that combat WMD terrorism.

Within ASEAN, Russia was important in advancing the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and is actively advocating progress towards a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. In addition to the annual Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercise, Russia also participated in CSTO exercises in Kazakhstan simulating a domestic terrorism situation.

The Russian security services have begun to implement a security plan to protect the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games. In October, the Sochi Olympic Organizing Committee held the first briefing for the diplomatic community, and in November held the first session of the Sponsor Security Working Group for the marketing partners of the 2014 Winter Games, which is a smaller multilateral working group that will meet quarterly and continue through the Olympics.

In October, the Russian Federation hosted a high-level gathering of law enforcement and intelligence professionals from many countries. In May, the U.S. Deputy Director of National Intelligence attended a Security Council forum in St. Petersburg, where he discussed cooperation in counterterrorism with senior leaders.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Government of Russia has adopted an overarching plan for the socio-economic development of the North Caucasus through 2025. In December, North Caucasus Presidential Envoy Alexander Khloponin stated that 90 percent of the funding for a 13-year, US $80.9 billion development program will come from private industry, with Rosneft cited as an early contributor. As outlined, the program will improve economic opportunity in the region. In partnership with Russian universities, the government also plans to establish new programs to improve vocational training and education in the region.

Overview: The Government of Serbia sustained its efforts to counter international terrorism in 2012. Serbian and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies collaborated against potential terrorist threats. Serbia's two main specialized police organizations, the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit and the Counter-Terrorist Unit, both operated as counterterrorism tactical response units. Serbia accepted and welcomed U.S.-funded counterterrorism training. Harmonization of law enforcement protocols with EU standards remained a priority for the Serbian government.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Transnational terrorism concerns within Serbia were similar to those in other Balkan states, all of which are collectively located on the historic transit route between the Middle East and Western Europe. Serbian authorities are sensitive to and vigilant against any efforts by violent extremists to establish a presence in or transit the country. The Serbian government continued to participate in the UN Office on Drugs and Crime regional program to promote the rule of law and human security in Southeast Europe, which primarily focuses on increasing member states' counterterrorism capacities.

In line with proposed amendments to the Criminal Code (which were approved by the Government of Serbia in early December and submitted to the National Assembly, and are expected to be passed by the National Assembly by the end of the calendar year), criminal legislation would be harmonized with the 2005 Council of Europe (COE) Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (ratified in 2009) and the EU Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA) of June 13, 2002 (amended in 2008). The existing criminal offense of terrorism would also be expanded to include five new offenses: public instigation of terrorist acts, recruitment and training for terrorist acts, use of deadly devices, damage and destruction of a nuclear facility, and terrorist conspiracy.

The United States provided counterterrorism training and assistance to Serbia through a number of agencies and programs.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Serbia is a member of Moneyval, the COE Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, a Financial Task Force regional-style body. Although the National Assembly did not adopt any new terrorism-related legislation, Serbia's Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML) developed a draft law on restrictions on property disposal, with the aim of preventing terrorist financing. The draft law is intended to rectify existing shortcomings in implementing UNSC resolutions. The law had not been approved by year’s end.

In December, Moneyval adopted a Progress Report on improvements in Serbia's anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism system.

As part of Serbia's efforts to meet EU standards and advance its EU accession effort, several conferences and workshops connected to the Project against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Serbia (MOLI-Serbia Project) took place in Serbia. MOLI-Serbia, which is co-sponsored and funded by the EU and the COE, principally benefits APML, and once it is fully implemented, Serbia will have a more robust legislative and operational capacity to counter money laundering and terrorist finance systems in accordance with EU and international standards.

According to the Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, Serbian police did not arrest anyone involved in terrorist finance activities, nor were any cases related to the financing of terrorism prosecuted in 2012. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Serbia supports the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In October, members of special police units from 14 Southeast European countries completed a counterterrorism exercise at the Special Anti-Terrorism base near Belgrade. The exercise was carried out as part of an international counterterrorism seminar, which featured lectures by two U.S. instructors from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team.

The Office of Defense Cooperation provided approximately US $128,000 worth of counterterrorism-related training for 17 representatives of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), Ministry of Interior, the Security Information Agency, and the National Assembly at the George C. Marshall Center and at the National Defense University (NDU). Two MOD graduates of the NDU's International Counterterrorism Fellows (ICTF) Program attended an NDU Alumni Seminar in April. This close and continuing collaboration supports individual ICTF graduates as they move up to more senior levels of responsibility with the goal of increasing their effectiveness in joint counterterrorism efforts. Two MOD lieutenant colonels completed the International Intelligence Fellows Program (IIFP) at the National Defense Intelligence College (Defense Intelligence Agency) in late April. The theme of the IIFP this year was "Intelligence Support to Combating Terrorism.”

Overview: Spain continued to confront the threat posed by the domestic terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), as well as the transnational threat from al-Qa'ida (AQ) and its affiliates. With sustained focused international cooperation, in particular with France, Spain enjoyed such success in countering ETA that the weakened terrorist group announced in October 2011 a “definitive cessation of armed activity,” re-confirmed by ETA in a July 9, 2012 communiqué.

Europol’s annual terrorism report on the EU, released in April and supported by Spanish security services, indicated however, that “ETA continues recruiting members and collecting information about new objectives,” despite having announced the cessation of violence. According to the report, “ETA has not announced either the turning over of the weapons or the dissolution of the terrorist organization. The experience obtained from previous ceasefires indicates that ETA returns to its activity because it does not achieve its political objectives.” According to the report, ETA appears to have ceased its practice of extortion of local businesses, although there are reports of “personal visits, door to door” looking for “voluntary” contributions.

Spain also focused on the continued kidnapping threat presented by al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and increased its cooperation with Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania to combat and contain the group. Spain cooperated closely with the United States to counter terrorism and was a cooperative partner in joint investigations and information sharing.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: No terrorist attacks occurred in Spain in 2012. Nonetheless, two Spanish citizens working with NGO Doctors without Borders kidnapped by al-Shabaab terrorist in Kenya in 2011 remained in captivity at year’s end, and the Spanish government was working with local authorities to ensure their safe release. Two Spaniards and an Italian who were kidnapped in Algeria in 2011 by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, an organization closely linked to AQIM, were released on July 18, 2012.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Spain continued to focus on improved security and the detection of false documents at its borders in 2012. Spain participated in the U.S. Immigration Advisory Program, which maintained staff at Madrid-Barajas International Airport. The program allowed coordination between Customs and Border Protection officers, airline security personnel, and police regarding high risk passengers traveling to the United States. Spain continued to roll out an automated system to read EU passports with biometric data. Explosive trace detection equipment was also deployed at Spain's five largest airports at passenger checkpoints. Spanish Airports and Civil Guard participated in an EU-coordinated Liquids and Gels (LAGs) pilot program to test LAGs explosive detection equipment and work toward the development of implementation metrics. Spain continued to utilize a network of radar stations, known as the Integrated External Surveillance System, along its maritime borders. Spain maintained its participation in the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives. In September, the Civil Guard began integrating Europol information in its fight against terrorism and organized crime. Previously, only the Spanish National Police had access to the Europol data.

As of December, Spanish security forces had arrested a total of five people accused of terrorist ties in 2012:

• On June 26, Spanish National Police in the North African Spanish enclave of Melilla arrested Spanish citizens Rachid Abdellah Mohamed and Nabil Mohamed Chaib, leaders of a violent extremist cell with international connections dedicated to recruiting young Muslims for training in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

• On August 2, in cooperation with international security services, Spanish National Police arrested three suspected AQ activists, Eldar Magomedov, alias “Muslim Dost;” Muhamed Ankari Adamov, a Russian citizen of Chechen origin; and Turkish facilitator Cengiz Yalzin in the largest operation against violent Islamist extremism in Spain in recent years.

In cooperation with international partners, security services also arrested 25 alleged ETA members or associates, including 16 in France and six in other countries. Key raids included:

• On June 28 in London, British Security Forces arrested ETA members Antonio Troitiño Arranz and Ignacio Lerín Sánchez, two of Spain’s most wanted terrorists. Troitiño, alias “Antxon,” was responsible for 22 murders and had direct connections with ETA’s current leadership.

• On July 4, a joint investigation between the Spanish Civil Guard and the French Information Services led to the arrest of Juan María Múgica Dorronsoro, the fourth member of an ETA cell that attempted to assassinate former President José María Aznar in 2001.

• Additional information on arrests of ETA members in 2012 can be found in the report on France in this chapter.

Spanish security forces and Spain's judicial system continued investigations into allegations of ETA training camps in Venezuela and ETA links to Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) terrorists. In June, the Colombia Prosecutor General’s office reported that Colombia had evidence that ETA members trained FARC personnel on the use of sticky bombs to attack former Minister of Justice Fernando Londoño. On October 27, Consuelo Ordóñez, the spokesperson for ETA victims association COVITE, met with Venezuelan retired military official Milton Revilla, who passed her information on links between ETA and the FARC. Spanish National Court prosecutors have asked the investigating judge to demand all documents related to Revilla’s information from the Venezuelan justice system.

Countering Terrorist Finance: A longtime member of the Financial Action Task Force, Spain continued to demonstrate leadership in the area of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism. Spain enacted its current law on Preventing Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism in 2010; the law entered into force immediately. However, implementation of regulations will not be approved until 2013. The regulations will greatly enhance authorities' capacity to counter terrorist financing by placing greater requirements, with stiffer penalties for non-compliance, on financial institutions and other businesses, and by strengthening monitoring and oversight. The government diligently implemented relevant UNSCRs and had the legal authority to impose autonomous designations. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Spain is a founding member of the Global

Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and on July 9-10, hosted the “High Level Conference of Victims of Terrorism.” Spain has worked to advance a number of counterterrorism initiatives through the EU, including work with the G-6 and the United States on cyber-crime and countering online radicalization. Spain continued its leadership role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and served as Coordinator of its Implementation and Assessment Group, a working group of technical experts. On May 24, the Spanish National Police and the Civil Guard were awarded the “Outstanding Achievement in the Prevention of Terrorism” Award from the Terrorism Commission of the International Association of Chiefs of Police for their successes against ETA and international terrorist threats.

Spain signed numerous bilateral agreements on police and security force cooperation, including agreements signed January 31 with Serbia, February 18 with Morocco and Jordan, March 3 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 21 with Mexico, and October 24 with Croatia. On December 3, Spain issued a joint declaration with Israel to increase bilateral cooperation against organized crime and terrorism. In July, Spain joined Belgium, Italy, Austria, and France in capacity building work in the Sahel to train judges, military personnel, and police officers in the fight against AQ and associated groups, creating specialized groups with participation from Mali, Mauritania, and Nigeria. Seven million euros (US $9,240,000) was obligated to the joint effort, which deployed two retired French police officers to Bamako, Mali and Nouakchott, Mauritania; a Spanish Civil Guard trainer is deployed to Niger.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Spain participated in several international meetings focused on countering violent extremism. On July 9-10, Spain hosted a GCTF high-level conference on Victims of Terrorism; attended the December 14 GCTF Ministerial meeting in Abu Dhabi; and committed to send experts to participate in Hedayah, the newly established International Center of Excellence on Countering Violent Extremism. Spain's inter-ministerial CVE working group emphasized the prevention of radicalization and sought to counter radical propaganda both online and in other arenas. In addition to promoting international cooperation on these issues, Spanish efforts to counter radicalization were tied closely to the fight against illegal immigration and the integration of existing immigrant communities. The Spanish government sought the support of civil society and the general public in rejecting violence. In fulfillment of applicable laws, Spanish prisons employed rehabilitation programs designed to achieve the reintegration of inmates into society.

Overview: Violent Islamist extremists in Sweden and abroad have increasingly looked to Sweden as a target for attacks. Perceived insults to Islam and Sweden’s military presence in Afghanistan have, as previously, been used as motives. Individuals within violent extremist groups in Sweden have continued to have contacts with foreign terrorist networks. The contacts include financial and logistical support as well as the recruitment of individuals to travel to conflict areas to attend terrorism-related training and combat. In previous years, Somalia and Pakistan were well established destinations for travelers from Sweden, but in the past year, Yemen and Syria became increasingly popular. Authorities estimated that at least 10 individuals left Sweden for Syria and some of these individuals are frequently using social media to circulate photos and recruitment videos that clearly are targeting a Swedish audience. The travelers who remain abroad and keep in touch with actors in Sweden, as well as returnees who stay in contact with foreign terrorist networks, continued to pose a potential threat to Sweden according to Swedish authorities.

The National Threat Advisory level in Sweden has remained “elevated” since it was first raised in October 2010, due to sustained terrorist-related activities with a connection to Sweden.

On February 14, the government released an updated version of its national counterterrorism strategy. This is the first revision Sweden has done since the original strategy was announced in 2008.

A Swedish citizen who was kidnapped by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), together with two other Westerners when visiting Mali in November 2011, remained in AQIM’s custody at year’s end.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On November 28, the Swedish Parliament approved the government’s bill on changing the current legislation to allow the Swedish Security Service and the National Bureau of Investigation to order specific signal intelligence from the Swedish Radio Defense Establishment. The required legislative changes were scheduled to come into effect on January 1, 2013.

Resolution and continuation of cases from 2010 and 2011:

• Swedish citizen Paul Mardirossian, who was arrested in Panama City in April 2011 for allegedly having agreed to provide weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in exchange for cocaine, pled guilty in U.S. court to charges for conspiracy to engage in narco-terrorism, conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, and money laundering.

• The three men who were arrested and charged for “preparation to murdering” Swedish cartoonist Lars Vilks in September 2011, were acquitted of the attempted murder charges by the district court, which was affirmed on appeal. In the end, the court fined all three for being in possession of knives in public.

• A pre-investigation related to the December 11, 2010 suicide bombing carried out by Taimour Abdulwahab in Stockholm was still being conducted in 2012 by the prosecutor for national security cases. Authorities were investigating whether the perpetrator acted alone.

• On June 4, the four men from Sweden who were arrested in Copenhagen in December 2010 for planning a terrorist attack on Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

• On August 27, the case in Glasgow, where Nasserdine Menni, among other things, was tried for providing funds to Taimour Abdulwahab in 2010, was concluded and Menni was sentenced to seven years in prison for terrorist financing.

Countering Terrorist Finance: Sweden has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1990, but is not a member of any of the regional FATF-style bodies. Sweden provided its latest Mutual Evaluation Report to the FATF in October. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Sweden continued to contribute to counterterrorism capacity-building projects through its development aid work carried out by the Swedish International Development Agency, and also via funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime-Terrorism Prevention Branch and the OSCE. Sweden also supported the EU’s work with capacity-building projects in prioritized countries and regions such as Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, Maghreb, and the Sahel. Sweden provided trainers to the EU’s Training Mission to assist with the training of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government security forces. Sweden was the largest donor to the UN’s Counter-Terrorism International Task Force (CTITF), with special focus on the CTITF workgroup that works on strengthening human rights in counterterrorism work.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: On March 22, the Government of Sweden hosted a conference on Sweden’s national action plan to safeguard democracy against violence-promoting extremism. Since the Swedish government announced its first action plan to counter violent extremism in December 2011, several projects have been initiated as part of the implementation process. An expert group has been established and will conduct a study on how work to prevent violent extremism can be carried out more efficiently. Funds have been distributed to organizations that provide individuals with assistance in leaving violent extremist organizations. The National Media Council is conducting a study on how youth are using the internet and how they are influenced by what they read. The Swedish National Defense College was drafting a report on foreign fighters that will include suggestions on preventive measures.

Under the auspices of the EU’s Community Policing Preventing Radicalization and Terrorism (COPPRA) project, the Swedish National Police continued to work to increase knowledge to detect radicalization and added sessions on the topic on the curricula for National Police Academy students. The education material from COPPRA that was translated into Swedish has been used during training sessions to educate police officers who now will “train the trainers” for a wider distribution throughout Sweden.

Overview: Turkey is a long-standing counterterrorism partner of the United States. It co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with the United States, and received U.S. assistance to address the terrorist threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2012.

The limited definition of terrorism under Turkish law, restricted to activities targeting the Turkish state and its citizens, represented an impediment to effective action by Turkey against global terrorist networks. For example, although Turkish police temporarily detained several al-Qa’ida (AQ)-affiliated operatives attempting to transit through Turkey illegally in 2012, Turkish authorities chose to deport these individuals to their countries of origin quickly rather than pursue domestic legal action against them, at least in part because of the lack of appropriate legal tools.

In 2012, Turkey faced a significant internal terrorist threat and has taken strong action in response. Most prominent among terrorist groups in Turkey is the PKK. Composed primarily of ethnic Kurds with a nationalist agenda, the PKK operates from areas in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq and targets mainly Turkish security forces. Other prominent terrorist groups in Turkey include the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), a militant Marxist-Leninist group with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO views that seeks the violent overthrow of the Turkish state, and Turkish Hizballah (unrelated to the similarly-named Hizballah that operates in Lebanon). Public sources also highlighted detentions of Islamic Jihad Union members as well as supporters of AQ and other groups. The Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army, though largely inactive, was also considered a potential threat by the Turkish government.

2012 Terrorist Incidents: The PKK continued to demonstrate its nation-wide reach. Typical tactics, techniques, and procedures included ambushes of military patrols in the countryside, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along known military or police routes, and bombings of both security and civilian targets in urban areas. According to the NATO Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism in Ankara, there were 226 terrorist incidents reported through November. The following 12 attacks garnered particular attention and condemnation: 

• On March 1, an explosion near the ruling party's headquarters in Istanbul wounded at least 16 people, most of them policemen traveling by bus. No claim of responsibility was issued. 

• On March 5, a small bomb exploded near the Turkish Prime Ministry building in Ankara about an hour before a cabinet meeting was scheduled; one person was injured. 

• On May 25, a policeman was killed and 18 others wounded in a suicide bombing outside a police station in the central Turkish province of Kayseri. 

• On August 4, clashes between Kurdish rebels and the Turkish military near the Iraqi border left 22 people dead, according to reports quoting the area’s governor. Turkish media reported the rebels launched simultaneous attacks on Turkish border posts, causing casualties in the village of Gecimli in Hakkari province.

• On August 9, a vehicle belonging to the Turkish Navy was bombed in Foca, a small coastal resort north-west of Izmir; two navy personnel were killed and another was injured. 

• On August 20, a remote-controlled car bomb exploded outside a police station in Gaziantep, close to the border with Syria. At least nine people were killed and 69 were injured, most of them police officers. Security officials suspected the PKK was behind the attack, although the group later denied this. 

• On September 2, around 100 suspected PKK fighters simultaneously attacked four government and security buildings in the small town of Beytüssebap, near the Syrian border, killing at least 10 soldiers and three of the attackers; seven soldiers were injured. 

• On September 11, a policeman was killed and several injured in a suicide bombing at a police station in the Sultangazi district of Istanbul. The DHKP-C claimed responsibility. 

• On September 16, a roadside bombing in Turkey's southeastern Bingol Province killed eight soldiers and injured nine others, less than a day after four officers were killed in an attack near the borders with Iran and Iraq. 

• On September 18, PKK militants killed 10 soldiers and wounded at least 60 when they fired rockets at a military convoy traveling between the provinces of Bingol and Mus in eastern Turkey. 

• On September 25, an IED hidden in a car exploded as an Army patrol was passing by in the eastern Turkish city of Tunceli, killing six soldiers and a civilian. Several others were injured in the blast, which authorities blamed on the PKK. 

• On December 11, one police officer was killed and two civilians were injured in an attack in the Gaziosmanpasa district of Istanbul.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Council of Europe Convention on Prevention of Terrorism entered into force for Turkey on July 1, 2012. Also, Turkey deposited the instrument of ratification for the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on September 24. 

As a result of ongoing military operations targeting PKK forces, 494 insurgents were killed, 21 injured, and 44 arrested, while 155 surrendered themselves to the authorities during the first 10 months of the year. Counterterrorism law enforcement efforts in Turkey remained focused on the domestic threat posed by several terrorist groups, including the PKK. Turkey’s methodology and legislation are geared towards confronting this internal threat. 

Efforts to counter international terrorism are hampered by legislation that defines terrorism narrowly as a crime targeting the Turkish state or Turkish citizens. This definition of terrorism posed concerns for operational and legal cooperation. Several AQ-affiliated operatives were temporarily detained by Turkish National Police (TNP) authorities while transiting Turkey, but were deported to their countries of origin as expeditiously as possible. Also, criminal procedure secrecy rules prevent TNP authorities from sharing investigative information once a prosecutor is assigned to the case. 

In the aftermath of the 2011 TNP arrest of 16 people involved in an AQ cell who were likely targeting the U.S. Embassy in Ankara among other locations, U.S. Embassy officials have been denied any additional information regarding the conduct of the case. 

Article 157 of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code states: “Unless provided otherwise by the code and under the requirement to not harm the defense rights, procedural interactions during the investigation phase shall be kept a secret.” This language has been interpreted by Turkish prosecutors and police to require an investigation to remain secret once a prosecutor becomes involved in a criminal case. After the investigation, the evidence and files are transferred from the prosecutor to the court where they are also sealed. Only parties to a case may access court-held evidence. This legal interpretation has resulted in limited information sharing on criminal cases between U.S. and Turkish law enforcement officials. 

The TNP received training in counterterrorism skills through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. The TNP has highly developed counterterrorism capabilities in a number of areas and is planning to expand its law enforcement training for other countries in the region. 

Countering Terrorist Finance: Turkey is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and an observer of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing, a FATF-style regional group. In February 2010, the FATF publicly identified Turkey for its strategic deficiencies in its counterterrorist financing regime. At that time, Turkey had provided a high-level political commitment to address these deficiencies by December 2010. Due to Turkey’s continued lack of progress in adequately criminalizing terrorist financing and establishing a legal framework to freeze terrorist assets, the FATF downgraded Turkey to its Public Statement in June 2011. In October 2012, FATF issued a Public Statement noting that, “Given Turkey’s continued lack of progress in these two areas, as a counter-measure, the FATF has decided to suspend Turkey’s membership on February 22, 2013 unless the following conditions are met before that date: (1) Turkey adopts legislation to adequately remedy deficiencies in its terrorist financing offence; and (2) Turkey establishes an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets consistent with the FATF Recommendations.”

According to the Turkish Banks Act, Nr: 4389, only banks and special financial establishments are authorized to carry out banking activities, including money remittance or transfers. Informal banking networks are not allowed to operate in Turkey. A duly issued license is required for all kinds of banking activities. As alternative remittance services are illegal in Turkey, there is no regulatory agency that covers their activities.

The nonprofit sector is not audited on a regular basis for counterterrorist finance vulnerabilities and does not receive adequate AML/CFT outreach or guidance from the Turkish government. The General Director of Foundations issues licenses for charitable foundations and oversees them, but there are a limited number of auditors to cover the more than 70,000 institutions.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Turkey is a founding member of the GCTF and is co-chair along with the United States. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu co-chaired the second GCTF Ministerial meeting in Istanbul in June, and the third GCTF Ministerial in Abu Dhabi in December. As co-chair, Turkey has provided extensive secretariat support. Turkey also participates actively in the OSCE. Turkey has taken part in expert meetings on the prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) organized by the OSCE/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Secretariat, including through the participation of the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OSCE, as moderator of one session of the October 23-24 meeting on "Youth Engagement to counter VERLT.”

The TNP also created a new multilateral training organization, the International Association of Police Academies, to increase sharing of policing research and best practices in the field of police education. The TNP offers 18 counterterrorism-related training programs at its Anti-Terrorism Academy that are designed primarily for law enforcement officers from Central Asian countries.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: The Government of Turkey has two significant programs in place to counter radicalization and violent extremism. The first, administered by the TNP, is a broad-based outreach program to affected communities, similar to anti-gang activities in the United States. Police work to reach vulnerable populations (before terrorists do) to alter the prevailing group dynamics and to prevent recruitment. Police use social science research to undertake social projects, activities with parents, and in-service training for officers and teachers. Programs prepare trainers, psychologists, coaches, and religious leaders to intervene to undermine radical messages and prevent recruitment. The second program, administered by the Turkish government’s Religious Affairs Office (Diyanet), works to undercut violent extremist messaging. In Turkey, all Sunni imams are employees of the Diyanet. In support of its message of traditional religious values, more than 66,000 Diyanet imams throughout Turkey conducted individualized outreach to their congregations. Diyanet similarly worked with religious associations among the Turkish diaspora, assisting them to establish umbrella organizations and providing them access to instruction. Diyanet supported in-service training for religious leaders and lay-workers via a network of 19 centers throughout Turkey.

Overview: In 2012, the UK continued to play a leading role in countering international terrorism. The UK government implemented its updated counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, which was released in 2011. This update of CONTEST, the first under the coalition government, set out the UK’s strategic framework for countering the terrorist threat at home and abroad for 2011-2015. The foreword to the updated strategy by UK Home Secretary Theresa May states, “Greater effort will be focused on responding to the ideological challenge and the threat from those who promote it; we will also work harder to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support. CONTEST’s alignment with the U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism will help facilitate continued close counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and the UK.”

The Queen’s Diamond Jubilee and the London 2012 Olympics ensured the world’s attention was on the UK for much of the year and as a result, British security services mobilized forces and resources to successfully host both events. There were terrorist threats against UK interests in 2012, although extensive and collaborative work led to the disruption of known threats. In the lead up and throughout the summer, the UK services conducted arrests and worked to remove violent extremists and obstructionists from the streets.

On October 24, the British Security Service downgraded the threat to Great Britain from dissident Irish republicans from "substantial" to "moderate." The decrease shows the authorities regard an attack on London and other British cities from such groups as possible, but not likely. Previously it was deemed a strong possibility. The threat level in Northern Ireland has not changed. It remained "severe" with an attack still highly likely. On its website, MI5 said: "The threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism is separate from that for international terrorism. It is also set separately for Northern Ireland and Great Britain."

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In October 2011, the UK government published a Green Paper proposing legislation to protect sensitive information from public disclosure in judicial proceedings. The impetus for the Green Paper stems from the civil case brought by former Guantanamo detainee Binyam Mohammed, in which a UK court ruled in 2009 that U.S. intelligence cited in that case must be released into the public domain, over the objections of both the U.S. and UK governments. The Justice and Security bill was introduced to the House of Commons on November 28, 2012. At year’s end it remained in the legislative process.

The Crime and Courts Bill creating the National Crime Agency was introduced on May 10, 2012 in the House of Lords.

A Draft Communications Data Bill proposed by Home Secretary May would require additional data collection and retention of user activity by internet service providers and mobile phone services, recording contact information for each user's webmail, voice calls, social media, internet gaming, and mobile phone contacts and store them for 12 months. Retention of email and telephone contact data for this time is already required.

2012 law enforcement actions included:

• In January, Ryan Lavery, 27, of Ballymote Park, Downpatrick was arrested and accused of possessing or collecting documents that could have been of use to terrorists in Northern Ireland. Police said his computer had photos of vehicles coming in and out of the Ballykinler Army Base, County Down, Northern Ireland. Mr. Lavery also possessed a list of vehicle registration numbers.

• April marked the first time a convicted UK terrorist entered into an agreement with the Crown Prosecution Service to give evidence in a trial against other alleged terrorists. Saajid Badat testified during the trial of Adis Medunjanin, a Bosnian-born U.S. citizen, who denied involvement in a suicide bomb plot on the New York subway in 2009. Zarein Ahmedzay and Najibullah Zazi were both jailed in 2010 after admitting their part in the foiled plot. The trial revealed details of young Western Muslims travelling to South Asia to receive training from al-Qa’ida.

• On April 24, five men, aged between 21 and 35, were arrested on suspicion of the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism. They were arrested at separate addresses in Luton under the Terrorism Act 2000 by unarmed Metropolitan Police officers assisted by Bedfordshire Police in an intelligence-led operation.

• On May 1, seven people were arrested on suspicion of funding overseas terrorism with money linked to smuggling of the stimulant khat. Six men and a woman were arrested in London, Coventry, and Cardiff in early morning raids by counterterrorism officers. The arrests were part of an international probe into alleged terrorist fundraising and money-laundering.

• On May 15, more than 100 Cheltenham residents attended a meeting called by police after two local men were arrested on suspicion of terrorism offenses. The pair, aged 52 and 31, was initially held under the Explosive Substances Act after suspicious items were found in a garage. In a sign of a strong community-oriented policing program, representatives from the police, the fire service, and the Cheltenham Borough Council answered questions to reassure residents. The arrests came after police found suspicious items in a garage in Buttermere Close in the Up Hatherley area of the town. About 100 houses were evacuated but residents were allowed to return to their homes following controlled explosions carried out by a bomb disposal team.

• On June 28, two men were arrested in London on suspicion of terrorist offenses. The men, aged 18 and 32, were held under the Terrorism Act 2000 on suspicion of the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism. Officers searched both of the addresses where the suspects lived.

• On June 29, Minh Quang Pham, who was wanted in the United States for terrorism-related offenses, was arrested in the UK, and was remanded in custody. An indictment released by the U.S. Department of Justice accused Pham of providing material support to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and receiving military-style training while he was in Yemen.

• On June 30, following a routine traffic stop of a vehicle near Sheffield, South Yorkshire, three men from the West Midlands were arrested and charged with terrorist offenses after police found guns, knives, machetes, and a home-made explosive device. Jewel Uddin, 26, Omar Mohammed Khan, 27, and Mohammed Hasseen, 23, all from Sparkhill, Birmingham, appeared at Westminster Magistrates' Court accused of preparing for an act or acts of terrorism with the intention of committing such acts. They were accused of manufacturing an improvised explosive device, as well as acquiring firearms and other weapons, and vehicles connected with their alleged plans to attack the anti-Islamic group, English Defense League, who had held a rally in Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, earlier that day.

• On September 30, four men stabbed a visiting General from India, Lieutenant General Kuldeep Singh Brar. Lieutenant General Brar, who survived the stabbing, led the 1984 raid on Sikhism's holiest shrine. The stabbing is being treated as an attack by violent extremists and there have been at least 11 follow-up arrests in connection with the case.

• On October 4, a brother and sister from Birmingham were arrested under the Terrorism Act, and were freed on police bail. West Midlands Police said the pair, aged 23 and 18, was suspected of possessing documents likely to be of use to someone committing or preparing an act of terrorism. They were arrested at an address in the Small Heath district. Police added the arrests had been pre-planned and not made in response to any threat to public safety. Computers and other electronic devices were seized for forensic examination.

• On October 5, Abu Hamza al Masri, Babar Ahmad, Syed Talha Ahsan, Adel Abdul Bary, and Khaled al-Fawwaz were extradited to the United States to face terrorism charges. Their extradition was upheld following a court decision that stated the prisoners did not show "new and compelling" reasons to stay in the UK. Their appeal came after the European Court of Human Rights backed successive UK courts in ruling for extradition.

• On October 10, two people were arrested at Heathrow Airport on suspicion of committing terrorist offenses. Police said the man and woman were being questioned as part of an investigation into travel to Syria in support of alleged terrorist activity.

Countering Terrorist Finance: The UK has a wide range of anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws. It is a member of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and an active participant in FATF-style regional bodies to meet evolving AML/CFT threats. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2013 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: //2009-2017.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: The UK is a leader in all regional and international fora that it belongs to. It cooperates with other nations and international organizations on counterterrorism, including in the UN and UNSC, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, G-8, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IMF, World Bank, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Interpol. The UK is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and co-chairs its Countering Violent Extremism Working Group.

Countering Radicalization and Violent Extremism: In 2007, the UK launched its Prevent strategy to counter radicalization. Prevent is part of the government’s overall CONTEST counterterrorism strategy. In 2011, Prevent was revised to correct several perceived problems. There had been complaints from members of Muslim organizations that UK government interaction with their communities was focused solely on security concerns. As a result, the UK divided the responsibilities for various strands of Prevent among different government organizations. The Department of Communities and Local Government took over responsibility for “integration” work, designed to ensure that Muslim communities were receiving all the government services to which they were entitled and that immigrants were given assistance to integrate into British society. The Home Office will focus on countering the ideology of violent extremism, including the identification of at-risk youth and their placement in de-radicalization pre-programs. The revised strategy calls for a much more focused effort to target those most at risk of radicalization. Finally, the government has decided that organizations that hold “extremist views,” even those that are non-violent, will not be eligible to receive government funding or participate in Prevent programs.