Chapter 2. Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
August 5, 2010

“The challenge of terrorism demands the broadest possible coalition of nations to put an end to it — not only through sheer force of arms but mainly through a dialogue of faiths, cultures and civilizations that will put the merchants of hate out of business.”

--N. Hassan Wirajuda, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia,
Statement to the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly
September 29, 2009

East Asia and Pacific Overview

By 2009, Asia’s combination of multilateral cooperation, capacity building, popular support, and political will had resulted in significant progress in countering terrorism and in developing the institutions necessary to deprive violent extremists of exploitable grievances. Despite that on July 17, suicide bombers affiliated with the remnants of the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI) struck two hotels in downtown Jakarta within five minutes, killing nine and injuring sixty more, ending a four year period without a major terrorist attack in Indonesia. The attack was a reminder of the difficulty in eradicating the use of terrorism by those who are committed to violence. The Indonesian government’s counterterrorism efforts led to the arrests of 14 key operatives and the deaths of nine, including Noordin Muhammad Top, the Malaysian leader of a splinter JI group based in Indonesia. Top was number one on Indonesia’s most wanted list for several years and believed to have overseen the 2003 Jakarta J. W. Marriott bombing, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy, the 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2009 Jakarta bombings.

Similarly, in 2009 the international community worked with the Philippines to find a peaceful resolution to the long-running insurgency in the Southern Philippines. The insurgency contributed to the conditions of conflict and instability that provided both physical and ideological space to groups of violent extremists, including JI fugitives and Abu Sayyaf Group members. Philippines security forces continued to make headway against extremist groups, killing 45 and arresting 18 individuals in the first half of the year.

The United States continued to work in partnership with countries in the region through diplomacy, bilateral security cooperation, multilateral organizations, and capacity building to support counterterrorism efforts. The United States and China held bilateral counterterrorism consultations in September, and the annual Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Counterterrorism Consultations with the U.S., Australia, and Japan, were held in Tokyo in December. Also in December, South Korea hosted the Counterproliferation Working Group plenary, a U.S.-South Korea forum to discuss ways to build cooperative capacity to deter Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks and manage consequences of a CBRN event. The same month, South Korea hosted the second round of bilateral counterterrorism consultations.

Australia maintained its position as a regional leader in the fight against terrorism and worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region’s counterterrorism capacity through a range of bilateral and regional initiatives in fora such as Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum. Japan also continued to assist counterterrorism capacity building in developing countries through seminars, workshops, and training.


Australia continued to play a leadership role in the fight against international terrorism through multilateral and bilateral fora, including the annual Trilateral Security Dialogue with Japan and the United States, and the Lombok Treaty with Indonesia that enhanced bilateral counterterrorism cooperation.


The Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) assessed that terrorism remained a serious and immediate threat to Australia; that extremist organizations in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa were the primary sources of inspiration and capabilities for extremists in Australia; and that the number of Islamist extremists willing to use violence in the country was very small and did not change substantially between July 2008 and June 2009. The most serious terrorism case was the arrest of five men, some with alleged links to the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab, for allegedly planning a suicide attack on an Australian military base. The Australian National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC) alert level remained at medium.


On August 12, the government announced proposed reforms to counterterrorism legislation, including expanding the definition of a “terrorist act” in the Criminal Code to include psychological, as well as physical harm; extending the expiration period of regulations proscribing a terrorist organization from two to three years; extending parliamentary oversight of the Australian Federal Police (AFP); and providing further limits on the period a suspect can be held without charge.


The government directed intelligence agencies – including the Australian Transaction and Reports Analysis Centre, which monitors financial transactions – to increase monitoring of small transactions sent abroad.


Eighteen groups were included on Australia’s Listing of Terrorist Organizations. In 2009, 10 groups were re-listed, including the Kurdistan Workers Party, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. On August 21, al-Shabaab was listed as a terrorist organization.


Several other terrorism-related arrests or convictions occurred in 2009:


  • In February, seven men from Melbourne were sentenced to jail terms, ranging from four and a half to 15 years, for their involvement in planning terrorist activities. They were arrested in November 2005, during concerted actions on suspected terrorist groups in Melbourne and Sydney. An eighth, who trained in Afghanistan, was sentenced to five years in September.


  • In October, five Sydney men, arrested as part of a series of raids in 2005, were found guilty of plotting terrorist attacks. Sentencing hearings began in December 2009. Soon after, it was revealed that four other men involved in the plot had pled guilty and had been sentenced to jail terms. Two of them were eventually freed in exchange for cooperation with authorities.


  • In September, a Lebanese-born Sydney man, Bilal Khazal, was sentenced to 12 years in jail for posting a terrorism handbook titled “Provisions on the Rules of Jihad” on the Internet. In December 2003, Khazal and his brother were sentenced in absentia by a Lebanese military tribunal for financing an Islamist extremist group, which bombed U.S. businesses.



Australia assisted Indonesia in the investigation of the July hotel bombings in Jakarta.


Australian multilateral engagement continued in forums such as the United Nations, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Pacific Island Forum, and G8 Counterterrorism Action Group, as well as in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Australia has counterterrorism memoranda of understanding with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Brunei, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, East Timor, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Bangladesh. Australia continued to provide legal drafting assistance to regional states seeking to adopt international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and to bring their law codes into conformity with these conventions. Australia continued to lead efforts within the Civil International Civil Aviation Organization to update two counterterrorism conventions on civil aviation.


In October, Australia participated in the Fifth Regional Interfaith Dialogue in Perth, Australia, sponsored by Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. It aimed to promote peace and understanding through interfaith links. Within Australia, the government funded projects encouraging tolerance of religious diversity, particularly focusing on strengthening goodwill between Muslims and non-Muslims.


Australia and the United States exchanged information using APEC’s Regional Movement Alert System.


The Australian Defense Force boosted its contribution in Afghanistan to approximately 1550 personnel.


The Government of Burma defined almost all anti-regime activities as “acts of terrorism,” making little distinction between peaceful political dissent and violent attacks by insurgents or criminals. The government characterized dissident groups as aligned with terrorist organizations and has used this as justification to scrutinize and disrupt dissident activities. In December 2009, bombs exploded in Rangoon and other parts of Burma. The government attributed the bombings to subversives or insurgents intent on disturbing the stability of the state. Authorities have not made public any evidence of a genuine investigation nor have they identified the specific perpetrator(s). Requests by the U.S. Embassy to view either specific bomb scenes or remaining fragments of explosive devices were consistently denied.

In October, a Government of Burma liaison informed U.S. officials that its Special Branch police had arrested three members of an anti-Burma group that was planning to set off explosives in Rangoon, including targeting the U.S. Embassy. The Burmese liaison advised that the arrested persons were not members of a terrorist organization as defined by the U.S. government. This was a departure from past practice, in which, as noted, the Government of Burma defined all groups allegedly engaged in bombings as terrorists.


Cambodia’s political leadership demonstrated a strong commitment to legal action against terrorists and the Government of Cambodia remained committed to strengthening its counterterrorism capability through training and international cooperation.

In Cambodia, terrorists could attempt to exploit various local conditions – including endemic corruption, poverty, high unemployment, a poor education system, porous borders, and disaffection within the Cham Muslim population, which makes up approximately five percent of the population – to gain recruits, resources, and lines of operation. Although the Cham are not generally politically active, the Cambodian government is aware that foreign terrorists might use Cham areas as safe havens. For example, Hambali, a senior Jemaah Islamiya operative accused of involvement in the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings, took refuge in a Muslim school in Cambodia in 2002-2003.

With U.S. assistance, Cambodian authorities monitored computerized border control systems at Phnom Penh and Siem Reap airports, and at the land border crossings of Poipet and Koh Kong. International ports employed the use of this computerized system, as well as E-passport for Cambodian nationals and VISPEC, which was provided, installed, and trained to Cambodia’s immigration police by the United Kingdom. Although biometric systems were not available in Cambodia, various officials received biometrics training from Singapore. U.S. officials also provided training to Cambodian authorities on financial investigation, methods for countering money laundering and terrorist financing, hostage release negotiations, and terrorist incident management.

In 2009, 70 Cambodian government officials participated in 17 separate Cambodia-based training and workshop sessions hosted by the Australian, German, Russian, and U.S. Embassies. Twenty officials participated in 15 separate overseas training and workshop sessions in the United States, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, Vietnam, Philippines, India, and Thailand, which covered a range of topics, including security, counterterrorism, and investigation of fraudulent documents.

In November, a counterterrorism exercise on Southeast Asian-Japan Maritime Security was conducted in Preah Sihanouk Province under the auspices of Australia, the United States, and the secretariat of the National Counterterrorism Committee.

The Cambodian government continued to make progress in strengthening its counterterrorist finance regime. The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which operated within the framework of the National Bank of Cambodia, conducted on-site examinations of banks and financial institutions and signed Memorandums of Agreements on information exchanges concerning money laundering and terrorist financing with the Bank Nagara Malaysia FIU, the FIU of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, and the Anti Money-Laundering Department of the Bangladesh Bank on information exchange concerning money laundering and terrorist financing.


China continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other nations throughout the year. In September, the United States and China held bilateral counterterrorism talks in Washington, DC. In June, China and Singapore conducted joint counterterrorism exercises in Guilin. Then in July, China held a joint Sino-Russian counterterrorism exercise in Jilin Province. Finally, in November, representatives from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization attended an international counterterrorism conference in Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, the implementation of the Yangshan Deep Water Megaports project was resumed on July 2.

China’s anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism (AML/CTF) system was significantly strengthened during 2009, although several key deficiencies have yet to be addressed. In July, at the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue held in Washington, DC, the United States and China agreed to strengthen their cooperation on AML/CTF, including counterfeiting. In August, the Securities Association of China provided AML/CTF guidelines to securities firms in China, in an effort to cut off possible sources of funding to terrorists. In November, the Supreme People’s Court released a judicial interpretation that further expands application of the law to specific non-banking/financial institutions and more widely covers terrorist financing activities.

Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in China. However, the government has yet to develop an asset freezing and confiscation regime that meets international standards or that adequately implements UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, according to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). In addition, China’s cross-border declaration and disclosure system needs strengthening to better prevent terrorist financing activity. China’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), housed within the People’s Bank of China, worked closely with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network in the United States to develop its capabilities. In addition to its domestic collection and analysis activities, the FIU exchanged information with foreign FIUs.

China expanded its role in international efforts to combat terrorist finance and money laundering by becoming a full member of the FATF in June 2007. Since 2004, China has also been a member of the Eurasian Group (EAG), a FATF-style regional body that includes China, Russia, and most Central Asian countries. In December, China hosted the EAG’s bi-annual plenary, providing China an opportunity to enhance its leadership role in AML/CFT issues. Coordination in countering terrorist finance could be further enhanced through China’s membership in the Egmont Group, an umbrella body that coordinates the activities of over 100 FIUs worldwide. Though China has applied for membership in the Egmont Group, political concerns about Taiwan’s participation in the organization have hampered membership discussions.

The East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP), also known as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), was added to the UN Security Council al-Qa’ida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban in 2002. In April 2009, the Sanctions Committee added ETIP leader Abdul Haq to the Consolidated List.

Human rights organizations have accused China of using counterterrorism as a pretext to suppress Uighurs, a predominantly Muslim ethnic group that makes up a large percentage of the population within the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of western China. After widespread rioting in urban areas of Xinjiang in July and September, police moved in and arrested more than 200 people according to official estimates, at least 26 of whom have been sentenced to death. The Chinese government claimed that the riots were orchestrated from abroad and therefore terrorist attacks on China.

Formally established in 2002, the FBI Legal Attaché’s Office in Beijing bolsters U.S.-China cooperation on counterterrorism investigations. In 2009, FBI Counterterrorism Division personnel participated in a round table discussion on terrorism issues with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. FBI personnel also provided a general overview to Ministry of Public Security Terrorism Department personnel on counterterrorism investigations.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s position as a major transit point for cargo, international finance, and people, coupled with its open trade and financial regime, make it a potential site for money laundering and terrorist financing activities. Hong Kong is a close partner with the United States in the fight against terrorism. The Hong Kong government successfully participated in the Secure Freight Initiative pilot project through its conclusion on April 30. The Container Security Initiative in Hong Kong remained effective, and cooperation with Hong Kong customs officials received continued praise from visiting U.S. government delegations.

Hong Kong law enforcement agencies provided full support and cooperation to their overseas counterparts in tracing financial transactions suspected of links to terrorist activities, and participated in U.S. government-sponsored training on financial crimes and strategic commodity identification, among other topics.

In October, Hong Kong’s police, fire, health, and other government services held emergency response drills simulating chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. During the Hong Kong-hosted East Asia Games in December, Hong Kong deployed its newly established police Counter Terrorist Readiness Unit (CTRU). In addition to providing a counterterrorist deterrent presence, the CTRU assisted police districts with counterterrorism strategy implementation and provided tactical and professional support to existing specialist units, such as the Special Duties Unit and its VIP Protection Unit.

Hong Kong actively participated in various anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing initiatives, including the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering. Hong Kong is a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, reporting through its Joint Financial Intelligence Unit operated by the Hong Kong Police and the Customs and Excise Department.

In response to recommendations stemming from the 2007 FATF and APG mutual evaluation of Hong Kong, authorities are drafting legislation to increase supervision of money changers and remittance agents; create statutory requirements for customer due diligence and record-keeping in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors; and establish civil penalties for these infractions. Legislation to establish government oversight for non-financial professions and to create a cross-border currency reporting mechanism is needed to address additional FATF recommendations.


Macau’s position as a major international gambling center makes it a potential site for money laundering and terrorist financing activities. Macau’s financial regulatory authorities directed banks and other financial institutions to search continuously for terrorist financing networks and accounts using lists of individuals and entities designated by the United States under relevant authorities, as well as the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee’s consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and Usama bin Ladin.

Macau is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering. In response to recommendations of the APG evaluation, Macau authorities have taken steps to improve compliance with suspicious transactions reporting requirements in banks, casinos, and professional associations, but the threshold reporting limits remain well above international norms. Macau does not have reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements.

In May, Macau joined the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units through its Financial Intelligence Office (FIO), an independent government unit under Macau’s Secretary for Economy and Finance. The FIO played an essential role in Macau’s Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regime by collecting and analyzing suspicious transactions, providing AML assistance to local authorities, raising the public’s AML awareness, and sharing information with overseas counterparts.

In September, the Macau Monetary Authority (AMCM) strengthened its AML guidelines for financial institutions, money changers, and remittance agents by mandating enhanced customer due diligence measures and the compulsory employment of AMCM-approved AML compliance officers.

Macau cooperated internationally in counterterrorism efforts through INTERPOL and other security-focused organizations within the Asia Pacific Region. Macau’s law enforcement and customs agencies participated in U.S. government-sponsored training in bulk cash smuggling detection, weapons of mass destruction proliferation awareness workshops, and complex financial investigation techniques.


The Government of Indonesia reacted decisively to the July 17, 2009 bombings of the Jakarta Ritz Carlton and J.W. Marriott hotels, which killed nine people, including the two bombers, and injured more than 50 in the first attacks in Indonesia in almost four years.

The Indonesian government’s counterterrorism efforts led to the arrests of 14 operatives and the deaths of nine, including Noordin Muhammad Top, the Malaysian leader of a splinter Jemaah Islamiya (JI) group based in Indonesia. Top was number one on Indonesia’s most wanted list for several years and is believed to have overseen the 2003 Jakarta J. W. Marriott bombing, the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy, and the 2005 Bali bombings.

The Marriott suicide bomber entered a private dining room where a breakfast meeting of prominent business community representatives, primarily expatriates, was being held. The bomber set off an improvised explosive device (IED) that killed six people. Approximately five minutes later, a second bomber set off an IED in the Ritz Carlton restaurant, killing himself and two others. An undetonated bomb was later discovered in a J.W. Marriott guest room where one of the bombers stayed during the two days before the attacks.

The level of planning for the attacks, including the planting of a JI operative in the hotels and floral shops for at least two years prior to the bombings, indicated that Top’s network had grown in sophistication. As the investigation developed, it became apparent the network was larger in number and geographical reach than previously thought. The ages of the Marriott bomber and other operatives indicate Top and his associates successfully recruited youths with no previous criminal records. Family links between operatives, including by marriage, were evident throughout the network.

Regarding terrorism legislation, the Parliamentary Commission on Security and Defense proposed revisions to the 2003 Terrorism Law. By the end of 2009, Parliament had not yet begun to review the revisions. It was not clear when they would begin to do so.

One proposed revision to the law would allow a suspect to be detained for two years without trial should his/her activities be deemed an endangerment to Indonesia’s security. Under the current law, the Indonesian police must formally name a subject as a terrorism defendant within seven days after arrest and can then detain them for up to four months without charges.

Another proposed revision to the law would allow the police to crack down on individuals and groups that glorify terrorism and openly preach hatred against those of a different faith. This particular law would target radical clerics who support radical jihad, or war, in their religious lectures.

An additional proposed revision to the law would create a Counterterrorism Coordination Agency composed of governmental and social components, including representatives of most of the Ministries, the Attorney General’s Office, the National Police, the State Intelligence Agency, and the Armed Forces.

The Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Social Affairs would head the body and answer directly to the President. The agency would coordinate counterterrorism policy and activities, and serve as a central crisis center in the event of a terrorist attack. It has not yet been determined whether the agency would have operational capacities. Elements of the agency would also coordinate with the Religious, Education, and Information Affairs Ministries to implement counter- and de-radicalization programs.

A final proposed revision to the law would allow the Indonesian military (TNI) and the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to work more closely with the police, directed by the Counterterrorism Coordination Agency, to counter terrorist acts.

Regarding developments in terrorist financing legislation, the Indonesian government made substantial efforts to draft effective terrorist financing legislation that meets FATF standards and creates an effective mechanism to freeze terrorist assets pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373.

An Indonesian interagency team headed by PPATK, the Indonesian Financial Intelligence Unit, drafted new terrorist financing legislation. This draft law addresses criticisms raised in the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering 2008 evaluation of Indonesia, which noted significant deficiencies in Indonesia’s statutory and regulatory framework to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

The draft legislation is a significant improvement over previous terrorist financing legislation, as it creates a mechanism to trace, freeze, seize, and confiscate terrorist assets pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, and clarified and broadened the definition of support to a terrorist organization. The draft legislation does not specifically address the use of non-profit organizations (NPOs) and non-governmental organizations to finance terrorism, a sensitive topic. Although PPATK interlocutors assert the draft legislation will apply to non-profits, it is unclear whether there would be political will to apply the legislation to non-profits. The Government of Indonesia initiated a review of its domestic NPO sector in July 2009, as requested by the APG. The review is a key part of the government’s effort to improve regulation and oversight of the NPO sector. To date, there has been only one successful terrorist financing prosecution in Indonesia, a function of poorly drafted legislation and a lack of training for police and prosecutors.

The Victim and Witness Protection Agency LPSK is in the process of developing procedures to assist victims of crime, including terrorist activities, and to shelter witnesses from criminals including terrorist organizations.

The Indonesian government continued programs to counter violent extremism, but concrete, systemic information as to the effectiveness of the programs was not available. The National Police and the Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs offered counter-violence programs to youth across the country, including sports events, television programs, and traditional puppet shows (a popular cultural practice in Indonesia).

The Indonesian National Police continued its prisoner assistance program to de-radicalize convicted terrorists, primarily with the assistance of two former terrorists, Ali Imron and Nasir Abas, who were convicted for their participation in the 2002 Bali bombings. The program identified individuals who might be open to more moderate teachings and focused on providing spiritual support to the men and modest financial support to their families.

The United States and Indonesia continued to enjoy excellent cooperation on issues related to international terrorism. The Indonesian government has worked closely with the United States on terrorism cases and indicated its interest in ongoing assistance and cooperation. The Attorney General’s Office of Terrorism and Transnational Crime Task Force, which the United States helps support, has successfully convicted more than 60 Indonesian terrorists to date, including more than 40 JI members. Although there is no mutual legal assistance treaty in place, there is considerable sharing of information between Indonesia and the United States, and mechanisms exist for the formal transfer of evidence, with the first two mutual legal assistance requests being executed between Indonesia and the United States in 2009.


Japan bolstered border security and enhanced national counterterrorism measures in coordination with the United States. Japanese immigration officials continued to strengthen their capability to identify suspicious travelers upon entry into Japan’s international airports through fingerprinting and facial image technology. Since the introduction of the Biometric Immigration Control System in November 2007 until October 31, 2009, officials denied entry to 1,465 foreign nationals who attempted to enter Japan using forged or altered passports or re-enter after being previously deported from Japan. Japan’s Immigration Bureau, National Police Agency (NPA), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Tourism, and Travel coordinated with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on preventing terrorists and other high-risk travelers from boarding commercial aircraft bound for the United States. Japanese officials see the program as a valuable tool to secure travel between Japan and the United States and as an effective way to share information and prevent suspected terrorists and improperly documented air passengers from boarding U.S.-bound flights. During December 2009, DHS and the Japan Immigration Bureau agreed to begin negotiations on an Immigration Mutual Assistance Agreement that would facilitate immigration cooperation between Japan and the United States.

Japan also took steps to strengthen port and shipping security. Under DHS’ Container Security Initiative, Japanese authorities worked with U.S. officials to review ship manifests and to screen suspicious containers bound for the United States. In March, Japan installed radiation portal monitors and began screening containers for the presence of radiological material under the pilot Megaports Initiative Program. In June, Japan and the United States signed a Mutual Recognition Arrangement in Brussels, aligning security standards in both countries’ trade partnership programs. Japan also continued collaboration with the United States on science and technology for homeland security through the U.S.-Japan Framework Initiative for a Safe and Secure Society.

The NPA and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) continued to monitor the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, renamed Aleph, and splinter group Hikari no Wa, or "Circle of Light." In January, PSIA successfully filed a request to maintain surveillance of Aleph and Hikari no Wa for an additional three years. PSIA has monitored Aum since 2000 under the Organization Control Law, a measure that allows the Agency to conduct on-site facility inspection and to obtain quarterly operational reports from the cult.

Japan reached beyond its borders to fight terrorism as well. Japan is the second largest contributor to Iraq reconstruction with US$ 1.7 billion in grants, US$ 3.5 billion in concessionary loans, and US$ 6.9 billion in debt relief. Japan remained an active partner in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and a key international contributor to Afghan stabilization and reconstruction. Japan has pledged more than US$ 2 billion in reconstruction aid since 2002 and continued construction on the 114 kilometer stretch of the southern ring road between Kandahar and Herat. In November, Japan announced a new five-year, US$ 5 billion assistance package that included, among other items, continued funding of Afghan National Police salaries, job training initiatives, and employment programs for former lower-echelon insurgents. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force continued to conduct refueling operations in support of OEF in the Indian Ocean. In April, Tokyo pledged US$ 1 billion for a wide-range of assistance to Pakistan over the next two years.

In December, Japan hosted the fifth annual U.S.-Japan-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) Counterterrorism Consultations, as part of the broader TSD, which aimed to coordinate regional activities. Japanese officials chaired a specialist working group on border security and counter-radicalization and took part in discussions on law enforcement capacity building and on ways to prevent chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks. The TSD Consultations followed a TSD Counter-radicalization Workshop Japan hosted in July.

Japan continued to assist counterterrorism capacity building in neighboring countries through dialogue, seminars, workshops, and training. In July, Japanese officials took part in the third Japan-South Korea Counterterrorism Consultations. In August, Japan co-chaired the Fourth Japan-ASEAN Counterterrorism Dialogue in Vietnam. In December, Japanese officials took part in the first Japan-Singapore Counterterrorism Dialogue. The Japanese Counterterrorism Ambassador reaffirmed the necessity of enhancing capacity building assistance to developing countries, strengthening counter-radicalization efforts, and promoting secure trade in the APEC region. In March, Japan hosted the Seminar on Promotion of Accession to International Counterterrorism Conventions and Protocols for the sixth consecutive year. Tokyo promoted information sharing and provided implementation guidance to participants including Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and several members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, among others.

Japan supported regional projects, such as counterterrorism research in Malaysia and terrorist rehabilitation programs in Indonesia, through the Japan-ASEAN Integrated Fund. Over the past few years, Japan has invited roughly 60 teachers from 17 Indonesian provinces and 43 madrassas for the purpose of fostering “cultural understanding” and opening inter-faith dialogue. Japan has expanded the pool of visitors to include Yemen and the Philippines.

Japan assisted third-country law enforcement personnel by dispatching experts and accepting trainees. The Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), for example, provided capacity building services and training seminars to authorities from states that border the Straits of Malacca. Since 2002, Japan has provided training to Coast Guard counterparts from the Philippines and has offered technical assistance to support local police in Indonesia by, in part, introducing the Japanese police box, or koban[1] system.

Japan contributed to counterterrorism capacity building through membership in multilateral fora. In July, Japan joined G8 counterparts in calls to bolster the role of the United Nations; improve information sharing; strengthen the security of land, sea, and air transportation; and support the G8 Counterterrorism Action Group.

Japan undertook measures to combat terrorist financing. Japan cooperated on freezing assets of individuals and entities listed under UN Security Council resolutions to help stem the flow of terrorist financing to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. Japan expanded the scope of business practices and professions under the Law for Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds, which requires specified business operators, including financial institutions, to conduct customer identification and submit suspicious transaction reports. Under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law, Japanese financial institutions must confirm the identity of customers sending 100,000 yen or more overseas. For domestic remittances, financial institutions must identify originators of wire transfers over 100,000 yen (US$ 1,000). Japan’s Banking Law also levies administrative sanctions on financial institutions that fail to comply with anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing measures. In addition, the Financial Services Agency and the NPA’s Financial Intelligence Unit inspect financial institutions for compliance with counterterrorist financing laws and regulations.

In June, the Japanese Diet passed the Payment Services Act, which addresses October 2008 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation recommendations pertaining to customer due diligence and money transfer services. The evaluation had noted several deficiencies, including the low number of money laundering prosecutions, the absence of an established mechanism for freezing terrorist assets that covered domestic funds, and the absence of a requirement for financial institutions to establish and maintain procedures, policies, and internal controls to prevent illicit finance. Japan’s Financial Services Agency must still adopt implementing rules. The Diet also amended Customs Act secondary legislation, which addressed in part the FATF recommendation pertaining to cross-border currency declaration and disclosure.

Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) demonstrated excellent law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to combat terrorism. South Korean immigration and law enforcement agencies had a strong record of tracking suspicious individuals entering their territory and reacting quickly to thwart potential terrorist acts. Seoul also reviewed and strengthened its emergency response plan and, in accordance with UNSCR 1267 and 1373, further tightened its legislative framework and administrative procedures to combat terrorist financing. For example, the Prohibition of Financing for Offenses of Public Intimidation Act took effect in December 2008 and was intended to implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, to which the South Korea has been a party since 2004. Under the Act, funds for public intimidation offenses are identified as “any funds or assets collected, provided, delivered, or kept for use in any of the following acts committed with the intention to intimidate the public or to interfere with the exercise of rights of a national, local, or foreign government.” An amendment expanding the government’s ability to confiscate funds related to terrorism was enacted in March, enabling the government to confiscate not only the direct proceeds of terrorism, but also funds and assets derived from those proceeds. In October, South Korea became a full member of FATF. The accession to FATF will allow Korea, an observer since 2006, to actively participate in the process of setting and revising global Anti-Money Laundering and Counterterrorismm Financing Terrorism (AML/CTF) standards and increase international cooperation.

South Korea supported U.S. counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan by announcing the establishment of a Provincial Reconstruction Team. In addition, South Korea worked closely with other foreign partners and played a constructive role in improving regional counterterrorism capabilities. South Korea continued to participate in the counterterrorism activities of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Europe Meeting. The Korea Overseas International Cooperation Agency hosted counterterrorism training and capacity-building programs for regional partners in forensic science, prevention of money laundering, and cyber security.

In March, the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate of the United Nations visited South Korea to monitor its efforts to combat terrorism in accordance with UNSCR 1373. The team found that Korea had made good progress with respect to AML/CFT laws and mechanisms to criminalize terrorist financing and freeze funds and assets. In October, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses hosted the ninth Biannual Symposium of the Council for Asian Terrorism Research, with the theme “Korean Peninsula WMD Threats: Regional and Global Implications.” In November, South Korea hosted the second APEC Cybersecurity Seminar on “Protection of Cyberspace from Terrorist Attacks and Use,” which brought 13 countries together to discuss recent cyber attacks and ways to deal with the challenges of cyber terrorism. In December, the Ambassador for International Counterterrorism Cooperation hosted the second round of South Korea-U.S. bilateral counterterrorism consultations, attended on the U.S. side by the Deputy Coordinator for Regional Affairs of the Bureau of Counterterrorism. Korea also held bilateral counterterrorism meetings with Indonesia, Japan, France, and Germany during the year.

The South Korean government has recently been concerned over the growing number of South Korean citizens abroad who have been victims of terrorist attacks. In March, four South Korean tourists were killed and five were wounded in a suicide bombing in Yemen, for which al-Qa’ida later claimed responsibility. In June, another South Korean civilian working for a medical NGO in Yemen was kidnapped and killed. Although the Yemeni government did not find a conclusive connection to an established terrorist group in that incident, the South Korean government was put on alert and is now exploring various possibilities to prevent future attacks on its citizens. 

North Korea (DPRK)

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. On October 11, 2008, the United States removed the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the government of the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

In May, the United States re-certified North Korea as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. Pursuant to this certification, defense articles and services may not be sold or licensed for export to North Korea from October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010. This certification will lapse unless it is renewed by the Secretary of State by May 15, 2010.

Four Japanese Red Army (JRA) members who participated in a jet hijacking in 1970 continued to live in the DPRK. On June 13, 2008, the government of Japan announced that the DPRK had agreed to cooperate in handing over the remaining members of the JRA involved in the hijacking. However, the DPRK has not yet fulfilled this commitment.

The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. The DPRK admitted to abducting eight of these individuals, but claimed that they have since died; the DPRK has denied having abducted the other four individuals. On August 12, 2008, Japan and the DPRK agreed on steps towards the eventual resolution to this issue. However, the DPRK has not yet fulfilled its commitment to reopen its investigations into the abductions. Since 2002, five other abductees have been repatriated to Japan.


Since 2002, the Government of Laos has consistently denounced international terrorism and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the international community on counterterrorism. While domestic opposition elements have in the past employed terrorist tactics, such as ambushing civilian buses in 2003 and bombing civilian targets in 2004, Lao officials at many levels saw international terrorism as an issue of only marginal relevance to Laos. They believed that Laos, as a small and neutral country, would not be targeted or exploited by international terrorists.

Laos does not have a separate counterterrorism law, but the Lao judicial system allows for the prosecution of acts of terrorism as crimes under the Lao criminal code, and Lao officials have amended the criminal code to strengthen counterterrorism sanctions. Laos’ border security was weak; border officials could not effectively control access to the country at any of the country’s border checkpoints. Crossing the border along the Mekong River into Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia could be accomplished easily and without detection. Border delineation remained poor in more remote sections of the country, especially along its land borders with Vietnam and China. It was likely that unmonitored border crossings by locals occurred on a daily basis. Since September 11, 2001, Lao authorities have strengthened airport security, and airport security forces have participated in U.S.-supported security seminars to raise their standards, but security procedures at land immigration points remained lax compared with those of most other countries in the region. In addition, official Lao identity documents, including passports and ID cards, were easy to obtain.

Lao authorities have issued orders limiting the amount of cash that could be withdrawn from local banks or carried into or out of the country and strengthened reporting requirements of state and privately owned commercial banks. Banking regulation remained extremely weak, however, and the banking system was vulnerable to money laundering and other illegal transactions.


The police forces in Malaysia, which fall under the authority of the Home Ministry, continued to conduct all counterterrorism investigations and operations in the country. In 2009, the Prime Minister’s Office created a new office, the Special Task Force (Operations/Counterterrorism), within the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) to handle counterterrorism-related investigations, a function previously conducted by the RMP Special Branch. By year’s end, Malaysia had not initiated prosecution of any terrorist suspects using legislation amended in 2007 in order to accede to the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, but continued to rely on the Internal Security Act (ISA) to detain terrorist suspects. Under the ISA, the authorities can detain suspects without trial for up to two years, a period the Home Minister can extend in two-year increments.

At year’s end, five terrorist suspects linked to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) were held in ISA detention. This included one well-known JI operative, Mas Selamat bin Kastari, whom the Malaysian authorities detained in April. Kastari had been on the run in Malaysia after escaping from prison in Singapore in February 2008. The Malaysian government has held suspected terrorists and suspected terrorist supporters in ISA detention from one to six years. While imprisoned, these terrorist suspects receive de-radicalization training from Malaysian authorities, and are only released after the government believes they are no longer a threat to society. The authorities continued to monitor terrorist suspects after their release, and imposed restrictions on their activities and their travel. Because of growing domestic and international pressure, the Malaysian government has become more cautious about employing the ISA to detain persons it suspects of terrorist activities, and has been slowly reducing the number of those detained under the ISA. In 2009, the authorities released 39 ISA detainees, 29 of whom were alleged members of terrorist organizations JI or Darul Islam.

The Malaysian government allows travelers from many nations to enter the country without visas, to promote trade and tourism. Persons from most Islamic countries can enter Malaysia without visas, although immigration authorities do scrutinize these travelers and screen for known terrorists. Malaysian authorities will detain terrorist suspects if they become aware of their presence in the country, and have actively cooperated with other countries to deport these suspects.

The Malaysian government engaged with its neighbors, both bilaterally and in international fora such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, on issues related to counterterrorism and transnational crime. It continued to operate the Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counterterrorism. The Center has served to facilitate the training of Malaysian front-line officials, but has done less to identify forward-looking or regional counterterrorism priorities. The organization largely depends on initiatives from donor countries, including the U.S., Japan, Australia, and Canada, to sponsor its training program.

Malaysian mediators continued to work in the southern Philippines to help end the conflict between the Government of Philippines and the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Malaysia played an active role in mediating negotiations between the two sides. A Malaysian official served as a mediator between the Government of Philippines and the MILF, and Kuala Lumpur played host to meetings between the two sides as well as to the International Contact Group – a group of four countries, seen by both parties as neutral, which lend their weight to the negotiations. Malaysia, along with Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, conducts the “Eyes in the Sky” program designed to provide enhanced security to the Strait of Malacca, the world’s busiest shipping lane. Malaysian authorities also cooperate with their Thai counterparts along the border to prevent insurgents from Southern Thailand from using Malaysia as a safe haven.

Malaysia’s central bank has signed memoranda of understanding on the sharing of financial intelligence with the Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) of many countries in the region. Malaysia is an active member of the Asia/Pacific Group Donor & Provider Group for Technical Assistance and has worked with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Asian Development Bank, United Nation Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Malaysia is working with the United States to help develop an effective FIU in Afghanistan.

Micronesia, Federated States of

The Micronesian Criminal Code contains no counterterrorism statutes. Should the government ever prosecute someone for terrorist activity it would undoubtedly invoke its laws against murder, attempted murder, and destruction of property. The country’s statutes do not outlaw terrorist financing. Law enforcement efforts against terrorism, limited as they are given the region’s lack of capacity, fell within the purview of the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU). Reliant on American funding and Australian supervision since its opening in April 2008, the TCU brought officers from other Pacific island nations to Palikir, the Micronesian capital, to share information on such issues as narcotics, human trafficking, and terrorism. The TCU also exchanged information with the FBI and the Australian Federal Police, making it the recipient of relevant terrorist-related intelligence.


Although there were no known terrorist groups operating in Mongolia and no known bases of support, Mongolian government officials cited more than 6,000 kilometers of porous borders and easy entry for foreign travelers as conditions that terrorists could exploit, and moved to increase awareness of terrorism and to consider new laws. Throughout the year, eight senior personnel attended counterterrorism-related training at the Asian Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu and at the Marshall Center in Germany.


The Mongolian police, the Ministry of Justice, and the General Intelligence Agency’s counterterrorism branch cooperated with their U.S. counterparts on counterterrorism issues. As a result of resource and technical limitations, however, Mongolian counterterrorism law enforcement capacities remained modest.

Mongolia continued to contribute to international counterterrorism efforts. In support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the 130 member Mongolian Expeditionary Task Force and 23-strong Mongolian Technical Training and Maintenance Team arrived in Afghanistan in November. They will provide fixed site security at Camp Eggers in Kabul and artillery training and maintenance at Camp Phoenix. In addition to supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, Mongolia also supported the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. On November 28, the Mongolian Armed Forces deployed an additional platoon of approximately 40 soldiers to support the German contingent in northern Afghanistan. This brings the total number of Mongolians deployed to Afghanistan to almost 200.

New Zealand


The Government of New Zealand took a leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region in multilateral counterterrorism organization. New Zealand worked closely with other Pacific Island Countries (PIC) to help them to build their capacity in all areas of counterterrorism and nonproliferation activity. Finally, New Zealand expressed its strong desire to work cooperatively with the United States on the bilateral, regional, and global levels to fight terrorism and achieve mutual nonproliferation objectives.


New Zealand places considerable importance on its compliance with international counterterrorism instruments. New Zealand uses the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy as a key reference point and the government of New Zealand is working to ratify the remaining four of 16 international counterterrorism instruments to which New Zealand is not yet party - two of which concern maritime terrorism and two of which pertain to nuclear terrorism.

New Zealand designations of terrorist entities listed by the 1267 Committee occur automatically, by operation of law. The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 as amended provides that all individuals and groups designated by the Security Council under Resolution 1267 are automatically designated domestically in New Zealand. New Zealand has yet to designate any individuals or entities pursuant to UN Security resolution 1373 that do not appear on the 1267 Committee list.

Under the Financial Transaction Reporting Act 1996, financial institutions are required to report transactions suspected of being linked to money laundering or proceeds of crime enforcement to the New Zealand Police Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) based at Police National Headquarters in Wellington. In 2009, the FIU processed 4963 Suspicious Transaction Reports and referred 976 of these to various law enforcement agencies and units for investigations. Over the same period, the FIU filed one Suspicious Property Reports pursuant to the 2002 Terrorism Suppression Act.

New Zealand remained active in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In September, New Zealand deployed 71 Special Air Service (SAS) troops to Afghanistan. This was the first of three six-month rotations scheduled to take place between 2009 and 2011. In addition to the deployment of troops, New Zealand continued to lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan and had some 140 New Zealand Defense Force (NZDF) personnel deployed there. NZDF also maintained personnel with the UN Assistance Mission in Jalabad, ISAF headquarters in Kabul, army training with the UK in Kabul and, until recently when it closed, two surgeons with the Canadian medical centre in Kandahar. Three New Zealand Police officers (NZP) were also deployed to Bamyan, under the auspices of the European Union Police Mission to train and mentor Afghan National Police (ANP). The focus of NZP’s work in Afghanistan was on strengthening the capacity of the ANP. While the focus was on Bamyan Province, two of the three staff worked primarily at the U.S.-funded Regional Training Centre, located within the Bamyan Provincial Reconstruction Team compound, which trained staff for several provinces.

New Zealand development assistance to Afghanistan totaled US$ 6.7 million in 2009. It was delivered in Bamyan primarily through partners including the UN Food and Agricultural Organization, Aga Khan Foundation, and Bamyan University. Supporting delivery of health and education was a key part of New Zealand’s development assistance program, which had a particular focus on women and children.

New Zealand assists Pacific Island Countries’ (PIC) understanding of, and compliance with, the international counterterrorism agenda. Strong focus is given to legislative and operational capacity-building projects many of which are funded through the Pacific Security Fund. In 2009:

  • New Zealand supported the running of a United Nations Workshop on Implementing Security Council Resolution 1540 for Pacific Island Countries in April in Port-Vila, Vanuatu.
  • New Zealand provided funding for the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering’s technical assistance and training program with Pacific island countries.
  • New Zealand and a representative from the Pacific Island Secretariat chaired the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum Working Group on Counterterrorism. Funding for the event was provided by New Zealand drawing on the Pacific Security Fund.

New Zealand also promotes counterterrorism capacity building and a range of regional security initiatives in Southeast Asia through the Asia Security Fund. Key projects over the last year included:


  • A number of training programs for law enforcement officials in the region, including training in terrorism scene investigation for counterparts in Vietnam; a month-long study visit on investigating violent crime for police officers from Aceh; and a one-week workshop on international peacekeeping for police officers from Singapore and the Philippines, based at the New Zealand Police College.
  • Continued support for the Indonesian National Police’s community policing program, including providing country-wide “train the trainers” courses, a community policing study tour to New Zealand for key police officials, and support for the drafting of a community policing handbook.
  • The provision of surveillance equipment to Special Detachment 88, the counterterrorism unit within the Indonesian National Police.



Palau worked closely with the United States on counterterrorism. Local law enforcement officers from the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Public Infrastructure, Industries and Commerce, and the Division of Customs continued to receive training on counterterrorism from U.S. counterparts. In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration and the Transportation Security Administration regularly inspected airport facilities and trained airport officials on security procedures.

Responding to UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the national congress passed a Foreign Evidence Act, a Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Act, a Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, and an Extradition and Transfer Act in 2001. These laws are intended to regulate the banking system, criminalize money laundering, and provide a legal basis for international law enforcement cooperation. A Financial Intelligence Unit was established to detect money laundering and other financial crimes.


Terrorist groups active in the Philippines included the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the New People’s Army (NPA), and the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). Philippine security forces continued to make progress against terrorist groups. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) reported that it killed 10 ASG members and 165 NPA members in 2009. The Philippine National Police (PNP) claimed that its personnel killed 14 NPA members in 2009. Those apprehended included an RSM cofounder and two bomb makers in Mindanao. U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance continued to support AFP operations against terrorist elements in the southern Philippines. Additionally, U.S. Department of Justice criminal investigation, police development, and counterterrorism programs trained approximately 1,600 police, supported professional development efforts of the Philippines National Police at 12 sites throughout the country, and provided opportunities for cooperation between law enforcement officials of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Data on terrorist incidents is limited and incomplete; many kidnappings or other acts of violence that indiscriminately target innocent people go unsolved, and some shootings and bombings occur in the course of criminal activity unrelated to terrorism. The Philippines estimated that the NPA began 2009 with 5,240 members, and the ASG began the year 400-strong. These organizations’ memberships fell to an estimated 4,700 and 390, respectively, by the end of the year. Kidnappings, associated with both criminal and terrorist groups, continued during the year in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. On January 15, ASG members kidnapped three International Committee of the Red Cross workers in Jolo, Sulu. All either escaped or were released. The ASG reportedly abducted numerous other individuals, including an Irish priest.

While the NPA continued to disrupt public security and business operations with intermittent attacks on communication and transportation infrastructure throughout the Philippines, it continued to decline in personnel and effectiveness. However, the NPA remained steadfast in its refusal to accept President Arroyo’s broad amnesty overtures, turning down offers to negotiate unless its U.S. and international designations as a terrorist organization were rescinded. RSM maintained close links to ASG and JI, and was alleged to have participated in several attacks in the Philippines.

During the year the long-running separatist insurgency in Mindanao boiled over in violence, resulting in thousands of internally displaced persons. Subsequently the government and the insurgents agreed to renew negotiations and the violence waned. Late in the year an election-related violent episode involving two rival Mindanao clans resulted in the massacre of over fifty civilians, including a number of journalists. While not the activities of international terrorism, these developments are indicative of the instability and conflict in the southern Philippines that complicated the government’s efforts during 2009 to combat the terrorist groups harboring there.

The U.S. strategy of offering development opportunities in areas at risk for terrorist recruitment continued to isolate the remaining ASG and JI terrorists in the southern Philippines. Philippine military and law enforcement agencies conducted intensive civil-military and internal security operations to eliminate terrorist safe havens in the Sulu Archipelago and central Mindanao.

In the past year, the AFP conducted several key operations that disrupted the ASG and limited its ability to conduct organized attacks. In accordance with Philippine government priorities, the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) provided advice and assistance, including training, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Terrorist groups in the region are also being countered by a robust AFP Information Operations and Civil Military Operations capability that has been bolstered by the JSOTF-P’s Subject Matter Exchanges and training.

Law enforcement authorities continued to make little use of the 2007 Human Security Act, which provided additional counterterrorism tools for law enforcement because of key limitations in its application, including stiff fines levied on law enforcement personnel in cases where the suspect is later acquitted or the case dismissed. The Act also provided for the establishment of an Antiterrorism Council to implement counterterrorism efforts in the country and ensure interagency cooperation. According to experts, the newly established Council was not yet fully effective.

The United States continued to receive excellent cooperation from Philippine law enforcement officials in obtaining access to terrorist suspects and witnesses for FBI interviews, and access to criminal, immigration, financial, and biographic records via the mechanisms established in the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The U.S. Embassy continued to achieve significant progress in supporting the counterterrorism efforts of the Philippine government, including well-coordinated Embassy programs aimed at strengthening security forces and promoting peace and development in Mindanao. The FBI provided host-nation law enforcement and government authorities with vital information for counterterrorism purposes, including investigation of the financing of terrorism. This proactive partnership with the Philippine government has yielded solid results in combating terrorist elements. Two prominent Filipino fugitives indicted by the FBI were deported to the Philippines by Malaysia and Indonesia. The Filipino fugitive from Malaysia was extradited by the Philippines to the United States. The other Filipino fugitive from Indonesia arrived in the Philippines and was undergoing judicial proceedings for extradition to the United States.

The FBI continued to provide host-nation law enforcement and government authorities with vital information for counterterrorism purposes, including investigation of the financing of terrorism. The FBI conducted numerous judicial custodial interviews of counterterrorism subjects and leaders of the JI, ASG, RSM, as well as rogue members of the MILF. All counterterrorism subjects were advised of their international United States Department of Justice advice of rights and afforded host nation Philippine legal counsel representation when requested. Statements were obtained and put on record for inclusion into FBI counterterrorism case files and investigations as appropriate.

The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program sustained its focus on Mindanao, where the terrorist threat and associated problems were most acute. The program continued to provide training in a wide range of counterterrorism skills, including investigating terrorist incidents, vital infrastructure security, critical incident management, surveillance detection, and investigation and seizure of digital evidence. ATA established the first Philippine National Police Cyber Forensic Unit, in Mindanao. ATA also initiated an Antiterrorism Curriculum Development Project for the Philippine National Police Academy to assist in the development of a comprehensive antiterrorism curriculum. In addition to enhanced capacity building efforts, ATA is fostering and enhancing interregional cooperation between the Philippine National Police and law enforcement agencies from Indonesia and Malaysia.

The U.S. Department of Justice/International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP) trained 1,601 police personnel, including training PNP personnel in basic police operations and investigation techniques in Sulu Province. DOJ/ICITAP also continued with implementation of the Maritime Police Project, which will equip maritime police in Palawan Province with special patrol boats to monitor the western Sulu Sea bordering Malaysia.

The FBI organized the visit of five senior Philippine police and prosecutors, along with 10 others from Malaysia and Indonesia, to key locations in the United States through the SE Asia Counterterrorism Regional Strategic Initiative. The FBI sponsored seminars focused on counterterrorism issues, current procedures, and the development of future mutually enhancing law enforcement and judicial cooperation.

Other programs included the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS/ICE) development of the Philippine Biometrics Initiative (PBI), whereby fingerprints, photographs, and other information on suspected terrorists were collected and provided to the appropriate Philippine authorities. The Philippine National Police is now the primary recipient of the Biometric Data Collection Kits and collector of the biometric data. The intent of the PBI is to collect biometric information on individuals incarcerated in the Philippines who are associated with known suspected terrorist (KST) groups and to make this information available to U.S. authorities.

The government initially established its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance regime by passing the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) of 2001. The AMLA established the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) as the country’s financial intelligence unit (FIU). The Council is composed of the Governor of the Central Bank, the Commissioner of Insurance Commission, and the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. By law, the AMLC is an independent agency responsible for receiving, maintaining, analyzing, evaluating covered and suspicious transactions and investigating reports for possible criminal activity. AMLC’s role goes beyond traditional FIU responsibilities and includes the investigation and assisting the Office of the Solicitor General in the handling of civil forfeiture cases.

In 2009, the Philippines’ Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) received 82 official requests for counterterrorism action, many concerning groups on the UNSC Resolution 1267 Sanction Committee’s consolidated list. In nearly all cases, the AMLC’s investigations responding to such requests showed no record of the entities concerned conducting financial transactions in the Philippines.

The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG). The APG conducted a comprehensive peer review of the Philippines AML/CFT regime in September 2008 and subsequently provided 45 pages of recommendations for improvement. The Philippine legislature is now considering an amendment to the AMLA to address these issues.


Singapore continued its strong bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. Since December 2001, more than 50 persons with links to terrorist groups were detained under Singapore’s Internal Security Act (ISA) for involvement in terrorist-related activities. At year’s end, Singapore held in detention 17 persons with links to terrorist groups. Detainees included members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) who had plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Under detention orders, the detainees were required to undergo a program of counseling with a group of volunteer counselors. Singapore enlisted the support of religious teachers and scholars to study JI’s ideology, to develop teachings to counter the group’s spread within Singapore’s Muslim community, and to provide counseling to detainees , which would continue after their release. As of December, a total of 47 persons remained under Restriction Orders (RO). Detainees released on ROs were monitored by the Singapore authorities and required to report to authorities on a regular basis. Singapore authorities determined that all 47 persons released on ROs had cooperated in investigations and responded positively to counseling. Among those having received counseling, there are no reported cases of recidivism to date.

In April, Mas Selamat Kastari, the Singapore leader of JI, was recaptured by Malaysian authorities in Johor, Malaysia. Kastari had been a fugitive since his escape from detention in Singapore in February 2008. Kastari remains in Malaysian custody. In June, Indonesian authorities captured two Singaporean JI fugitives, Husaini Ismail and Samad Subari. Husaini was one of five Singaporean JI members involved in a failed 2002 plot to hijack a commercial airliner and crash it into Singapore’s Changi International Airport. All five JI members involved in the plot are now in custody, with two in Singapore, one in Malaysia and two in Indonesia.

When Singapore held its annual counterterrorism exercise, Northstar VII, in July, the exercise simulated a series of coordinated, simultaneous Mumbai-style terrorist attacks on hotels and infrastructure in multiple locations. More than 2,000 personnel from 15 civilian and military organizations participated in the exercise, including the Special Operations Task Force, the Ministry of Defense, the Singapore Police Force, the Singapore Civil Defense Force, the Maritime and Port Authority, and the Ministry of Transportation.

Singapore hosted the Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Deep Sabre II in October. Approximately 2,000 personnel from 21 countries participated, representing military, diplomatic, legal, customs, immigration, police, and civil defense agencies. The exercise demonstrated Singapore’s multi-layered, multi-agency commitment to deny terrorists the ability to move people or materials in Singapore. Authorities made extensive use of advanced biometrics to verify the identity of all individuals arriving into Singapore.

The Republic of Singapore Navy participated in the annual bilateral exercise “Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training” with the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, and also the multilateral “South East Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism” drill. Singapore also conducted its own internal, annual exercise “APEX,” which tested the government’s multi-agency response to a maritime terrorism incident.

Singapore contributed to the international community’s efforts in Afghanistan, including military personnel supporting a weapons locating radar unit, a medical team, and an engineering team. Singapore was also involved in training Afghan civilians in various capacities, including health care, civil aviation, and water/waste management.


Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and, therefore, is not subject to UNSC Resolutions and cannot join UN counterterrorism conventions and protocols. Nonetheless, Taiwan sought to implement, to the maximum extent possible, all UN resolutions related to combating terrorism and terrorist finance issues. Taiwan continued to provide rapid and thorough responses on terrorist financing issues to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). The “Antiterrorist Action Law” proposed in 2006 by Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, is still awaiting action by the Legislative Yuan. Taiwan revised its Money Laundering Control Act in 2009 to extend the law’s coverage to the financing of crimes that intimidate the public or threaten “the government, a foreign government or institution, or international organization.”

The Taiwan Office of Homeland Security (OHS) coordinated several large-scale training exercises among law enforcement and security agencies. Taiwan sought ways to harden and protect its critical infrastructure, in order to maintain continuity of operations and government in the event of an attack or disaster. OHS also coordinated counterterrorism exercises with Taiwan law enforcement and security agencies prior to the “2009 Kaohsiung World Games” and the “2009 Taipei Deaf Olympics.”


Counterterrorism cooperation with Thailand remained strong despite internal political conflict. While officials have long expressed concern that transnational terrorist groups could establish links with southern Thailand-based separatist groups, there have been no indications that transnational terrorist groups are directly involved in the violence in the south, and there is no evidence of direct operational links between southern Thai insurgent groups and regional terrorist networks.

The ethno-nationalist separatist insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces of Songkhla, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala continued in 2009. Some 4,000 people have been killed in the conflict since the violence escalated in 2004 with a campaign of assassinations, beheadings, and coordinated bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Levels of violence rose in 2009 after a decrease in 2008, with larger explosive devices employed. Thai press reports and security forces attributed nearly all the attacks in the south to insurgents; it is unclear, however, how much of the violence was attributable to crime and other political or business disputes. It was reasonably clear that there were overlaps between the groups conducting criminal activities and those who were manufacturing IEDs.

A range of Thai government agencies, including the Ministries of Interior and of Social Development and Human Security, and the Thai military and police academies continued to organize outreach programs to ethnic Malay-Muslims to counter radicalization and violent extremism.

The porous nature of Thailand’s southern border with Malaysia remained an issue of concern. In April, Thai Supreme Commander Songkitti Jaggabatara and Malaysian defense forces chief Haji Zainal agreed to closer intelligence sharing to improve border security. At the same time, cross-border law enforcement cooperation based on long association between Thai and Malaysian police officers was surprisingly good, even though it was conducted in a very low-tech manner. In a December meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak and Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva agreed to improve security in the border area by linking the Smart Card system of Thailand to MyKad system of Malaysia to prevent border residents from holding dual citizenship. In early 2009, Thailand began conducting joint sea and air patrols of the Malacca Strait with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in a program that includes “Eyes in the Sky” and intelligence exchange programs.

Legal mechanisms to counter the southern Thai insurgency lagged behind security efforts, but showed signs of improvement. Government prosecutors still struggled to develop cases that could stand up in court, relying chiefly on confessions as evidence. Through a U.S. Embassy initiative, the Thai judiciary was soliciting consultations with judges from the U.S., Northern Ireland, and the Middle East, seeking to distill the experiences of judges working in areas of religious and ethnic conflict into new approaches to Thailand’s Muslim population.

Police forensics and ballistics work often failed to produce viable evidence leading to convictions following separatist attacks. There was an 80 percent acquittal rate in insurgency-related indictments in the south, chiefly due to poor evidence. While this may have spoken to the integrity of the judiciary, it also spoke to the low capacity of police and prosecutors. The security environment in the three insurgency-affected provinces in the south has resulted in some innovative police work, including specialized task forces and twice-weekly reviews of the character and quality of evidence in each ongoing terrorism-related case — something the Thai police would do well to emulate nationwide. Because of the difficulties in bringing cases to court, security forces engaging in operations to arrest militants relied on powers under martial law and the 2005 Emergency Decree to detain suspects, who can be held for a total of 37 days without being charged with a crime. There were various legal means available to extend that period.

Thai security forces cooperated with the United States and with other countries to deny safe haven to terrorists. In the past, Thailand has served as a transit point for regional terrorists, as evidenced by the 2003 capture in central Thailand of Nurjaman Riduan bin Isomuddin (a.k.a. Hambali), JI’s operations chief, and the architect behind the 2002 Bali bombings. Thai police, security officials, and court system personnel participated in a series of U.S. training programs sponsored through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the Force Protection Detachment (the criminal justice sector capacity-building programs for police, prosecutors, and judiciary mounted by the Transnational Crime Affairs Section), and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok. Training modules included courses on post-blast investigations, interrogation and interview techniques, forensic science, law enforcement response to terrorism, community policing, humane crowd control, training in SWAT tactics, and the Antiterrorism Executive Forum. The United States and Thai militaries cooperated in a series of training events and exchanges designed to build counterterrorism capacity.

The Thai Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO) is Thailand’s official Financial Intelligence Unit. Thailand has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force’s Egmont Group since June 2001. AMLO, the Bank of Thailand, and the Securities and Exchange Commission are empowered to supervise and examine financial institutions for compliance with anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financial laws and regulations. Capacity-building for this office and the Ministry of Justice’s Department of Special Investigations continued, with training in cyber-crime.

Ministry of Finance regulations governing cross border cash carrying are in line with the Financial Action Task Force Special Recommendation on Terrorist Financing. The Bank of Thailand has issued instructions to financial institutions to comply with FATF recommendations on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism.

The Thai government continued to cooperate on the extradition case involving international arms trafficker Victor Bout, who is under federal indictment in New York for conspiring to kill U.S. nationals and officers; acquire and use anti-aircraft missiles; and provide material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, a designated foreign terrorist organization. Bout was arrested in Bangkok in March 2008, and formal extradition proceedings took place in the Thai Criminal Court from June 2008 until May 2009. In August, the Criminal Court denied the extradition request based primarily on its conclusion that the U.S. indictment charged “political” rather than criminal offenses. The Thai government has appealed this decision. Bout remained in custody at a maximum-security prison in Bangkok.

Thailand participated actively in international counterterrorism efforts through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and other multilateral fora.


The Government of Vietnam, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Counterterrorism Department, assessed that there is no general terrorist threat against Vietnam from indigenous groups and individuals or from abroad. Vietnamese police and security officials participated in a series of U.S. training programs sponsored by the State Department, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok.

[1] Koban are often located near stations and busy entertainment areas and are supposed to act as a community policing center: a deterrent to criminal activity as well as providing a rapid response post in the case of actual wrongdoing. Each koban is usually staffed by a group of 4 police - 3 officers under the command of a sergeant working on 3 shifts of 8 hours under the control of the city or ward police station.