Part 1

Political and Security Affairs

Regional Issues
Middle East

Situation in the Middle East

The 54th General Assembly, like its two predecessors, failed to adopt a positive resolution expressing support for the achievements of the peace process and calling for international support for the economic and social development of the Palestinian people. The draft resolution was withdrawn by the cosponsors after agreement could not be reached on acceptable language.

The United States continued to oppose a number of perennial resolutions on the Middle East (Syrian Golan, Question of Palestine, Israeli Settlements, Palestinian Right to Self-Determination, Israeli Practices). The United States opposes these resolutions because they address permanent status issues that are the subject of negotiations between the parties; they advocate activities or language incompatible with basic principles of the Middle East peace process; and/or they expend resources that could be used in more productive ways to improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

UN Interim Force in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by Security Council Resolution 425 in March 1978 in response to an Israeli operation in Lebanon which, in turn, had followed an attack inside Israel by the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The mandate calls for confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, restoring international peace and security, and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. UNIFIL currently has six battalions deployed in southern Lebanon and, at the end of the year, had a troop strength of 4,495. The Security Council extended the UNIFIL mandate for six–month periods twice in 1999, most recently on July 30, by Security Council Resolution 1254.

UN Disengagement Observer Force

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by Security Council Resolution 350 in May 1974, after the

**UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)**

The General Assembly adopted a group of seven resolutions on the UNRWA. Voting on the resolutions was as follows: Resolution 54/69 “Assistance to Palestinian Refugees” was adopted by a vote of 155 to 1, with 2 (U.S.) abstentions; Resolution 54/70 “Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” was adopted by consensus; Resolution 54/71 “Persons Displaced as a Result of the June 1967 and Subsequent Hostilities” was adopted by a vote of 154 to 2 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions; Resolution 54/72 “Offers by Member States of Grants and Scholarships for Higher Education, Including Vocational Training, for Palestine Refugees” was adopted by a vote of 158 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention; Resolution 54/73 “Operation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East” was adopted by a vote of 154 to 2 (U.S.), with 1 abstention; Resolution 54/74 “Palestine Refugees’ Properties and Their Revenues” was adopted by a vote of 154 to 2 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions; and Resolution 54/75 “University of Jerusalem ‘Al–Quds’ for Palestine Refugees” was adopted by a vote of 155 to 2 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions.

In its explanation of vote, the U.S. delegation underscored its long–standing commitment to the work of UNRWA, noting that the United States was the largest contributor to UNRWA and would continue to support UNRWA’s important educational, health, social, and humanitarian relief programs. The U.S. delegation expressed criticism for the inclusion of politicized language in several of the resolutions, and urged that narrow political agendas be set aside so that UNRWA could receive the whole–hearted support it deserves.

**Iraq**

Iraq’s record of compliance with Security Council resolutions was again poor in 1999. Throughout the year, the Iraqi government barred the return of UN–mandated weapons inspectors and failed to meet its obligation, under Resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions, to disclose and relinquish all capabilities and programs pertaining to weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, UN sanctions on Iraq (in accordance with Resolutions 661, 670, and others) remained in effect through 1999.

Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully with UN–mandated weapons inspection teams led to four days of coalition air strikes, known as Operation Desert Fox, in late December 1998. In January 1999, the Security Council decided to reevaluate the situation in light of Iraq’s continuing noncompli-
The Council established expert panels recommend actions to the Council in three areas: disarmament, humanitarian issues, and matters pertaining to Kuwait. The three panels, all chaired by Brazilian UN Ambassador Celso Amorim, submitted reports and recommendations to the Council in late March.

Taking the panel reports as a point of reference, Council members began work on a new comprehensive resolution addressing all three areas. A draft resolution put forward by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom became the basis for Council discussions, which continued throughout the year. Those discussions culminated in the adoption of Resolution 1284 on December 17. The four countries which abstained in the vote (China, France, Malaysia, and Russia) subsequently called upon Iraq to comply with the resolution.

Resolution 1284 contained many important provisions. In disarmament, it established the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission to continue the mandate of the UN Special Commission created by Resolution 687. It also defined numerous steps to increase the effectiveness of UN humanitarian assistance programs to the Iraqi people. In particular, Resolution 1284 allowed Iraq to sell an unlimited amount of oil for the purpose of meeting its humanitarian needs. To expedite the procedure for delivery of humanitarian goods to the Iraqi population, Resolution 1284 also created new categories of pre–approved goods and set a shortened target turn around time of two days for the categories of goods which still need to go through the approval process. Finally, it asked the Secretary General to appoint a high–level coordinator to intensify the UN focus on missing persons and other unresolved matters from Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in 1990–1991. Iraq declared its rejection of the resolution, as the United Nations proceeded with implementation of those provisions not requiring Iraqi cooperation.

Also on December 17, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 54/178, which strongly condemned the widespread and extremely grave human rights violations occurring in Iraq. The resolution denounced Iraq’s continuing noncooperation with the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and cited numerous abuses, including summary and arbitrary execution, systematic torture and mutilation, and suppression of freedoms.

In addition to the significant changes introduced in Resolution 1284 and noted above, the United States continued its strong support for the UN’s oil–for–food program, under which Iraqi oil export revenues are used to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraq’s civilian population. The Security Council adopted several resolutions during the year pertaining to the program, including: Resolution 1242 (May 21), which extended the program for a sixth period of 180 days; Resolution 1266 (October 4), which authorized the export of additional Iraqi petroleum to cover the shortfall in revenues authorized but not generated in previous phases; and Resolution 1281 (December 10), which extended the program for a sev-
enth period of 180 days. Two additional Resolutions, 1275 and 1280, extended the sixth phase for two weeks and one week, respectively, to allow the Council to complete discussion of the comprehensive resolution (1284).

**Africa**

**Working Group on Reduction of Conflict**


Efforts inspired by the Secretary General’s report on Africa continued in 1999. Canada, which held the Security Council presidency in February 1999, took particular interest in protection of civilians in armed conflict, and pursued that theme throughout the year. In a Presidential Statement of February 12 (S/PRST/1999/6), the Security Council condemned the deliberate targeting of civilians and asked the Secretary General to submit a report containing concrete recommendations on ways the Council could improve the protection of civilians in situations of armed conflict. After receiving the Secretary General’s report (S/1999/957 of September 8), the Security Council adopted Resolution 1265 (1999) of September 17, on protection of civilians in armed conflict.

In a Presidential Statement of July 8 (S/PRST/1999/21), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex–combatants, including child soldiers, and in a Presidential Statement of November 30 (S/PRST/1999/34), the Council addressed its role in the prevention of armed conflict.

General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/234 of December 22 called for establishment of a working group to monitor implementation of the Secretary General’s report on the causes of conflict and recommendations on the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, to prepare for discussions at the 55th session of the General Assembly in 2000.

**Angola**

The UN has been involved in Angola since 1988 when it established the UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) to monitor Cuban troop withdrawal. In May 1991, UNAVEM II was created to help monitor
compliance with the Bicesse peace accords, and prepare for elections the following year. In early 1995, following two years of brutal conflict and the subsequent negotiation and signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the UN Security Council established UNAVEM III, which, by 1996, had about 7,300 members. UNAVEM III and the follow-up UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) were composed of military observers, political officers, civilian police, and human rights monitors. After its 1997 creation, MONUA was extended in 1997 and 1998 by the Security Council. Finally, the resumption of full-scale fighting triggered MONUA’s termination, which was completed by Resolution 1229 of February 26, 1999.

In Resolution 1268 of October 15, the UN Security Council approved, with the general concurrence of the Government of Angola, a 30-person UN Office in Angola (UNOA), designed to keep the international community engaged despite the continued fighting. The term of UNOA’s mandate was set for six months, until April 15, 2000. UNOA was intended to allow the international community to continue to explore possible openings for a peaceful end to the current military stalemate. This mission was also authorized to work with the military, political, and other civilian authorities to explore ways to restore humanitarian assistance and promote human rights. By the end of 1999, however, UNOA had not yet been deployed, as the United Nations and the Angolan government had been unable to reach agreement on deployment modalities.

Beginning in 1993, the UN Security Council imposed three sets of sanctions against the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in an attempt to deny Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA, the ability to perpetuate the conflict. These sanctions were targeted to prevent the sale of arms, petroleum products, and mining and transportation equipment to UNITA; prohibit the import by other states of diamonds mined by UNITA; and block UNITA’s access to its financial assets abroad. In Resolution 1237 of May 7, the Security Council took steps to reinforce implementation of these sanctions, including creation of an experts panel to investigate violations.

Burundi

Since 1993, when President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated, about 200,000 Burundians have died in violence between Hutu and Tutsi factions; an additional 320,000 have become refugees, most in Tanzania. Current President Pierre Buyoya, who was returned to power following a military coup in 1996, has pursued counterinsurgency operations, including “regroupment” of rural civilians into camps to hinder rebel infiltration; an external peace process in Arusha, Tanzania; and an internal peace process involving the unarmed Burundian opposition, including members of parliament. The United Nations has not had peacekeepers in Burundi.

The year began positively. The fourth round of peace talks in Arusha (January 18–23, 1999) went well, and on January 23, East African leaders lifted sanctions imposed in 1996. On February 17, the Security Council welcomed these developments and expressed continuing support for the

Arusha process, calling for the participation of all Burundian parties in the peace talks, and reiterating concern over the violence and loss of civilian life still occurring in Burundi.

Fighting between the Army and rebel groups continued, however. In the second half of the year, rebels stepped up attacks on the capital, Bujumbura. Hard-liners opposed to the peace process gained influence in the government. In September, the Army interned about 330,000 inhabitants of Bujumbura Rurale Province (about 73 percent of the province’s population) in some 54 regroupment camps. Ostensibly to protect civilians from rebel attacks, the camps are also intended to deny the rebels a base of support. Conditions in the camps varied, but at year’s end substantial numbers of displaced people still lacked water, food, basic sanitation, shelter, and medical care. The total of internally displaced persons in Burundi stood at 800,000. Beginning in September, in response to the renewed insecurity, about 50,000 Burundians fled to Tanzania.

On October 12, the head of the UN Children’s Fund–Burundi and a World Food Program officer were murdered by rebels, leading the United Nations to draw down staff and suspend field operations. On October 14, former President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, the facilitator of the Burundi peace process, died of leukemia. The guerrilla war, regroupment, the killing of UN workers, and the death of Nyerere combined to produce a crisis. Appointment of a new facilitator for the Arusha process became an urgent priority.

In a November 12 open meeting, the Security Council reiterated its support for the Arusha process and called for the states of the region to appoint a new mediation team acceptable to the Burundian parties. It condemned the murder of UN personnel in Burundi; called for the perpetrators to be brought to justice; urged all parties to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of UN and humanitarian personnel; called on the Government to halt forced regroupment; and condemned attacks by armed groups against civilians (Presidential Statement S/PRST/1999/32). In December, regional leaders selected former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa as the new facilitator of the peace process. The United States welcomed the appointment, noting that Mandela possessed unparalleled moral authority conducive to stabilizing the situation and reinvigorating the Arusha process.

Central African Republic

The Security Council first established the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) in March 1998, with a mandate to maintain security in the capital city, Bangui. Its intent was to enable the government of the Central African Republic (CAR) to implement reforms that could improve internal stability and prevent a return to the conditions that provoked the armed forces mutinies of 1996. MINURCA succeeded the Inter–African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Accords (MISAB), a French–led and financed African multinational force. Many of the original troop contingents in MINURCA had previ-
ously participated in MISAB. In voting to establish MINURCA, the United States sought to provide the Central African Government a temporary window of opportunity to implement stabilizing reforms. The Government implemented many, but not all, of these reforms in 1998. Throughout 1999, the United States sought to close out MINURCA and foster a smooth transition from peacekeeping to post–conflict peace–building.

On February 26, 1999, the United States joined the Security Council in a unanimous vote for Resolution 1230, which extended MINURCA’s mandate through November 15, and modified the mandate to permit MINURCA to provide assistance to the 1999 presidential elections at the same level that the operation had provided to the legislative elections the previous year. Resolution 1230 also urged the government of the CAR to implement reforms, to make progress on holding the 1999 Presidential election, and to move ahead on restructuring its defense force.

The United States was instrumental in including language in Resolution 1230 requesting that the Secretary General make recommendations on the role for the United Nations in facilitating the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding after the termination of MINURCA, then set for November 15. Resolution 1230 called for an initial report in May 1999, but this deadline was missed. The Council anticipated that in the first weeks of 2000, the Secretary General would make recommendations for the establishment of the “BONUCA”, the UN Peace–Building Support Office in the Central African Republic.

MINURCA continued to maintain security throughout 1999 and helped the government conduct successful presidential elections. On October 22, the Council approved Resolution 1271, which extended MINURCA for three more months, through February 15, 2000, to permit more time to plan a follow–up peace–building office. A third of MINURCA’s troops withdrew December 15, with the remaining troops slated to leave by mid–February of the next year.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)**

Throughout 1999, the United States and the United Nations supported regional efforts to resolve the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which erupted in August 1998 and has pitted the DRC and its allies, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad (briefly), and Sudan, against rebels supported by Rwanda and Uganda (which briefly fought each other) and Burundi. The former Rwandan army (ex–FAR) and Interahamwe militia linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide are fighting alongside DRC forces.

Regional leaders immediately began efforts to end the conflict. There have been numerous meetings under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), France, and Libya. SADC has been the accepted umbrella for the peace talks, with Zambian President Frederick Chiluba assuming the leading role.
Presidents Laurent Kabila (DRC), Pasteur Bizimungu (Rwanda), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), and Sam Nujoma (Namibia), and the Angolan defense minister signed a cease–fire agreement in Lusaka on July 10. The rebel groups, Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC), signed in August.

In support of the Lusaka Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1258 of August 6 provided for deployment of up to 90 military liaison officers to the region for up to 90 days. Resolution 1273 of November 5 extended that mandate to January 15, 2000; Resolution 1279 of November 30 extended it to March 1, 2000, and asked the Secretary General to take administrative steps for equipping up to 500 UN military observers.

In December, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke visited Kinshasa and other capitals, stressing to the belligerents that they must adhere to the Lusaka Agreement and provide guarantees of security if the United Nations was to increase its involvement. Ambassador Holbrooke announced that January 2000, when the United States was president of the Security Council, would be “the Month of Africa” in the Council, with a special focus on the Congo and on advancing the peace process.

The beginning of 1999 saw continued fighting, inconclusive mediation efforts, de facto partition of the DRC, and continued reports of massacres. Congolese rebels and their Rwandan and Ugandan allies controlled most of eastern Congo. President Chiluba of Zambia continued regional efforts to resolve the conflict. The United Nations supported this effort, as did the United States, which engaged in extensive shuttle diplomacy, pressing the warring parties to reach a negotiated settlement and encouraging President Kabila to undertake democratic reforms. Chiluba’s plans for a summit to sign a cease–fire were postponed repeatedly because the fighting continued.

In early January, in response to reports that Congolese rebels had possibly killed hundreds of civilians in eastern DRC, the Department of State issued a statement condemning all human rights violations, regardless of who committed them, and reiterating calls on all parties to the conflict to ensure the safety and protection of the human rights and lives of all non-combatants, regardless of ethnicity. On January 13, Security Council members expressed outrage at reports of the massacre of hundreds of civilians in South Kivu and called for an investigation. Roberto Garretón (Chile), the UN Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur on the Congo, returned briefly to the DRC in February, at the invitation of the DRC Government, to investigate alleged massacres and other abuses.

On April 1, the Secretary General appointed the former foreign minister of Senegal, Moustapha Niassé, as his Special Envoy for the Congo peace process. On April 9, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1234 (1999), welcoming the Secretary General’s appointment of a Special Envoy. It also deplored the continuing fighting and “the presence of
forces of foreign states in the DRC in a manner inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations”; called for an immediate
cease–fire agreement allowing the orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces
and the disarmament of nongovernmental armed groups; stressed the need
for an all–inclusive process of political dialogue in the Congo; condemned
the continuing activity of and support to the ex–FAR, Interahamwe, and
other armed groups; expressed its support for the regional mediation pro-
cess; and reaffirmed its readiness to consider the active involvement of the
United Nations to assist in the implementation of an effective cease–fire
agreement and political process.

On April 18 in Sirte, Libya, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, Presi-
dents Kabila (DRC), Museveni (Uganda), Idriss Deby (Chad), and Isaias
Afworki (Eritrea—not a party to the conflict) signed an agreement pur-
porting to end the Congo conflict. Although superficial, the Sirte Agree-
ment served as political cover for Chad, which withdrew its contingent
from northern Congo and ceased to play a role in the conflict.

With strengthened assurances of UN support, the Lusaka process
began to make progress. Foreign and defense ministers of the belligerents,
and representatives of the RCD and MLC rebels, as well as of the OAU,
SADC, and the United Nations met in Lusaka from June 29 to July 7.
After intensive negotiations the parties concluded the Lusaka Cease–Fire
Agreement (see document S/1999/815). On July 10, the heads of state
of the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and the minister of
defense of Angola signed the agreement. The representatives of the RCD
and MLC rebels declined to sign.

A key element of the Agreement was to constitute a Joint Military
Commission (JMC) responsible for peacekeeping operations until the
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force. The Agreement contemplates
that once a UN peacekeeping force deploys, the JMC will report to the
United Nations through an “agreed chain of command.” The Agreement
also tasks the JMC to work out “a mechanism for disarming militias and
armed groups, including the genocidal forces” and calls on the United
Nations to deploy a peacekeeping force with a mandate to “track down all
armed groups in the DRC.”

The parties—including the Government of the DRC—recognized that
the conflict has internal dimensions that require intra–Congolese political
negotiations for national reconciliation and “a new political dispensation”
in the DRC. These negotiations would be under the aegis of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese parties. Upon conclusion
of the negotiations, state administration would “be reestablished through-
out the national territory of the DRC” and a “national, restructured, and
integrated army” would be formed.

On July 15, the Secretary General reported to the Council (see docu-
ment S/1999/790) on preliminary steps the United Nations could take to
support implementation of the Agreement. He also dispatched an advance
civilian and military team to establish contacts with the Government of Zambia and other peace process participants.

In response to the Secretary General’s recommendations, on August 6 the Security Council approved Resolution 1258, which authorized the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel, together with necessary civilian, political, humanitarian, and administrative staff; to assist the JMC and the parties in developing plans to implement the Agreement; to provide information on the situation on the ground; and to assist in refining a concept of operations for a possible further role of the United Nations.

By mid–1999, the RCD rebels had split into two factions, one backed by Uganda, the other by Rwanda. In early August, fighting broke out in Kisangani between these factions and between troops of Rwanda and Uganda. Dozens of civilians were killed and wounded and a polio immunization program was disrupted. (Three million doses of polio vaccine were stored in Kisangani, largely supplied by the United States, which provided $8 million of the $13 million nationwide program of the UN Children’s Fund and World Health Organization.) Shortly thereafter, Uganda and Rwanda agreed to a cease–fire between their forces. Following intense efforts by President Chiluba of Zambia and others, 50 founders of the RCD signed the Agreement on August 31. The ministerial–level Political Committee, established to coordinate political aspects of implementing the Agreement, then met on September 3 for the first time.

The JMC met for the first time on October 11 and 12, in Kampala, Uganda, with all states and rebel movements that had signed the Agreement participating. All the parties, with the exception of the DRC, guaranteed in writing to safeguard the personal security of UN military and civilian personnel. In October, the United States pledged $1 million in support of the JMC. Several other governments made similar pledges. After detailed discussions with the Government of the DRC, the United Nations established an advance military headquarters and a liaison presence in Kinshasa. However, when the United Nations sought to dispatch a technical survey team to assess security in 13 proposed deployment locations, the Government of the DRC refused to allow the team to visit any sites within DRC–controlled territory. Meanwhile, there were accusations and counter–accusations of cease–fire violations and troop movements.

Insecurity remained a major obstacle to humanitarian operations and hampered access to an estimated 800,000 displaced persons. In almost all parts of the DRC, large numbers of civilians continued to be exposed to violence, looting, and the destruction of property, including agricultural resources. Human Rights Rapporteur Garreton told a General Assembly panel on November 5 that human rights violations showed no signs of abating, with continuing reports of arbitrary arrests and executions, and an intolerance for dissent. Garreton said some of the worst abuses, including rape, mutilation, and massacres, were committed by the rebels.

Although the UN technical survey team had not been able to report as planned, the Secretary General argued in a report of November 1 (see doc-
ument S/1999/1116) that because of the urgency of the situation and the
need to lend momentum to the peace process, it was “advisable to proceed
further to the extent possible.” The Secretary General also said he would
therefore seek from the Security Council prior authorization to deploy up
to 500 military observers, with the necessary support and protection, to be
led by a Special Representative. The deployment of military observers
would constitute the second phase, “security and other conditions permit-
ting.” A third phase would be the eventual deployment of a peacekeeping
operation with formed units to assist the parties in the implementation of
the Lusaka Cease–Fire Agreement and in strengthening the peace process
in general.

In Resolution 1273 of November 5, the Security Council extended the
mandate of the UN military liaison personnel deployed in the DRC until
January 15, 2000, but it withheld action on the Secretary General’s request
for standby authorization to deploy up to 500 military observers. The
Security Council continued to consider that issue and on November 30
adopted Resolution 1279, which named the liaison mission “MONUC”
(French acronym for “United Nations Organization Mission in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo”), extended its mandate through March 1,
2000, and described its military and civilian liaison mandate in greater
detail. The Resolution also called on the parties to respect the cease–fire;
refer all disputes to the JMC; and allow UN personnel the access, freedom
of movement, and security needed to plan and conduct any subsequent UN
deployments. The Council asked the Secretary General to begin adminis-
trative preparations to equip up to 500 military observers for possible
future deployment. Any observer mission in the Congo, however, would
require further Council authorization.

U.S. Permanent Representative Holbrooke traveled to Africa Decem-
ber 1–12 and conferred with several of the leaders of the Lusaka process,
including President Kabila of the DRC. In Pretoria on December 6, he
announced that January 2000, when the United States assumed the presi-
dency of the Security Council, would be the “Month of Africa” in the
Council. “Preparing for a peacekeeping mission in the Congo, getting it
right, is our main focus,” Holbrooke said. He warned, however: “The par-
ties to the Lusaka Agreement must respect their commitments if peace is
to return to the troubled Congo....What most stands in the way of interna-
tional efforts to assist the Congo right now is...the actions of some of the
parties themselves. The UN cannot alone bring peace to this troubled
nation...” Holbrooke urged the parties to choose a neutral facilitator for
the intra–Congolese political negotiations: “Without even this basic
requirement fulfilled, the United States will be unable to support moving
to the next stage of peacekeeping.”

The parties to the Agreement agreed on December 14 that the former
president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, should assume the role of
facilitator.
Ethiopia/Eritrea

As 1999 began, full-scale war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was becoming increasingly likely, despite international efforts to prevent it. Both sides had been steadily building up their forces, importing tanks, artillery, jet fighters, helicopters, and munitions; and recruiting, training and deploying tens of thousands of soldiers.

In December 1998, OAU Central Organ Heads of States had endorsed a proposed Framework Agreement (S/1998/1223, annex), involving redeployment of forces, deployment of OAU military observers, and delimitation and demarcation of the common border by experts of the UN Cartographic Unit. Ethiopia accepted the OAU Framework Agreement; Eritrea requested clarifications; tensions increased. U.S. Special Envoy Lake visited Eritrea and Ethiopia in mid-January (his fourth trip since October 1998), to urge again a peaceful resolution of the dispute.

On January 29, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1226 (1999), calling on Ethiopia and Eritrea in the strongest terms to exercise maximum restraint and to refrain from military action. The Council also expressed strong support for the OAU Framework Agreement.

Nevertheless, on February 6, Ethiopian forces attacked the Badme salient that Eritrea had seized in May 1998. On February 10 the Security Council (Resolution 1227 (1999)), condemned the use of force by Ethiopia and Eritrea, demanded that Ethiopia and Eritrea resume diplomatic efforts, and strongly urged all states to end immediately all sales of arms and munitions to Ethiopia and Eritrea.

In late February, after heavy combat, Ethiopian forces dislodged Eritrean forces from the key disputed area of Badme, southwest of Asmara. On February 27, Eritrean President Isaias Afworki declared in letters to the Security Council President and to President Clinton that Eritrea accepted the OAU Framework Agreement. That same day, the Security Council demanded in a Presidential statement (S/PRST/1999/9) an immediate halt to all hostilities and welcomed Eritrea’s acceptance of the Framework Agreement.

Nonetheless, the war continued. On June 23, Council members were briefed on the political and humanitarian aspects of the conflict, which risked spreading into the wider region of the Horn of Africa. The Council was informed of the serious humanitarian crisis developing in both countries as a consequence of the conflict and a new drought. There were some 500,000 internally displaced persons and several million people facing serious drought conditions in both countries. A statement to the press by the President of the Council expressed concern that Eritrea and Ethiopia continued to purchase weapons when large numbers of their populations were facing famine.

Meanwhile, the OAU remained in the lead in crafting new modalities for implementing the Framework Agreement. The United States worked closely with the OAU, the UN, the European Union, and several African governments, including the parties themselves, in support of this initiative.
At the annual OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (OAU Summit) in Algiers, July 12-14, the leaders of Algeria, Burkina Faso and Zimbabwe presented proposed “Modalities for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement” to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Isaias, who both accepted in principle. The United States welcomed these initial positive responses and commended the OAU for its persistence in identifying an equitable formula acceptable to the two parties.

Algerian President Bouteflika, the new chairman of the OAU, and his personal envoy, Algerian former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, took charge of the peace efforts and pursued them with vigor. Negotiations progressed to a finer level of detail: Technical Arrangements for the Implementation of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities. Presented to both sides in early August, the Technical Arrangements outlined responsibilities and scheduled steps for implementation. They were prepared by a team of experts from Algeria and the OAU Secretariat, in cooperation with UN and U.S. experts who met in Algiers. Eritrea announced its acceptance of the technical arrangements, while Ethiopia asked for clarifications. In the final months of the year, Ouyahia continued discussions in Addis Ababa and Asmara, which offered new possibilities for a successful conclusion of the peace process, but which moved slowly.

On November 11, Assistant Secretary-General Ibrahima Fall briefed members of the Security Council on the status of progress toward a negotiated settlement. A statement to the press by the President of the Council commended the OAU, President Bouteflika and Personal Envoy Ouyahia, and concerned member states, for their energetic and persistent efforts to secure an agreement. Council members also urged both Ethiopia and Eritrea to exercise maximum restraint.

Guinea–Bissau

In 1999, the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) helped bring an end to Guinea–Bissau’s year-long civil conflict. Despite fighting in January and a violent coup d’état in May, elections were held on November 28, in an open, fair, and transparent manner, an important step forward for peace and democracy. Political and economic institutions remained fragile, however, and success depended on whether the military would keep its promise to stay out of politics.

On January 31, fighting again broke out in the capital, Bissau. Intensive ECOWAS efforts restored the cease-fire on February 3, and on February 20, the Government of National Unity was inaugurated. The promised elections were postponed because of accumulated delays in the peace process.

At UN Headquarters, the United States participated in meetings of the Group of Friends of Guinea–Bissau, which drafted Security Council Resolution 1233 (1999), adopted on April 6. Welcoming ECOMOG’s deployment, the Council supported the Secretary General’s decision to establish a United Nations Peace–building Support Office in Guinea–Bissau (UNOGBIS) (S/1999/232 and S/1999/233). The Secretary General then appointed Samuel C. Nana–Sinkam (Cameroon) as his Representative in Guinea–Bissau and head of UNOGBIS (Press Release SG/A/693 BIO/3227, April 30).

On May 4 and 5, donors in Geneva pledged $200 million to consolidate peace and democracy in Guinea–Bissau. Fighting almost immediately broke out in Bissau, however, and on May 7, General Mane’s forces ousted President Vieira, who fled to Portugal. Following the coup d’etat, Prime Minister Francisco Fadul affirmed that legislative and presidential elections would proceed in November. Condemning the coup, ECOWAS foreign ministers decided to withdraw the ECOMOG Interposition Force.

A small UN political mission visited Guinea–Bissau in June to assess the situation and to define the role that the United Nations should play. Based on its report, the Secretary General recommended, and the Security Council approved, expansion of the mandate of UNOGBIS to include greater efforts at national reconciliation and at building friendly relations between Guinea–Bissau and its neighbors (S/1999/737).

Special Representative Nana–Sinkam cooperated with the transitional authorities to ensure that the elections were held as scheduled and the UN Development Program provided technical assistance. A general census was completed in September, and 502,678 potential voters were registered, representing 91 percent of the voting population. The military authorities withdrew from overt participation in the political process and pledged to transform the armed forces into a more professional organization subordinate to civilian authorities. Newspapers resumed publication and private radio stations began broadcasting again. Security Council members took note of the positive developments, in particular the stabilized political climate and the peaceful move toward legislative and presidential elections. They called upon the transitional government and all political forces in the country to proceed in good faith with reconciliation and reconstruction. They commended the work of Special Representative Nana–Sinkam and the UNOGBIS staff.

The situation remained fragile, however. Small arms circulated widely and banditry increased. There was no functioning police force; law and order tasks fell to the military, which was an obtrusive presence in the provinces. Disarmament and demobilization suffered setbacks when
ECOMOG withdrew. The border with Senegal remained tense and armed supporters of former President Vieira concentrated across the border in Guinea–Conakry, prompting the Interim Government to ask the United Nations to deploy international military observers. Secretary General Annan recommended instead that Special Representative Nana–Sinkam and his military adviser visit Senegal, Guinea–Conakry, and The Gambia to encourage Senegal and Guinea to set up, with Guinea–Bissau, joint monitoring mechanisms along their common borders. The Security Council supported this plan of action.

UNOGBIS coordinated international observation of the elections, with 88 observers drawn from 19 countries, including the United States. On November 28, over 80 percent of eligible voters participated in the elections, in a “climate of civility, serenity, transparency, and sincerity,” according to the international observers (S/1999/1276). In the presidential elections, Kumba Yala, the leader of the Party for Social Renewal, obtained almost 39 percent of the vote. Because none of the 12 candidates received the required majority, however, a second round of voting was scheduled for January 16, 2000.

In consultation with members of the Security Council, the Secretary General requested that the mandate of UNOGBIS be extended for three months, until March 31, 2000, in order to assist Guinea–Bissau in the fragile post–electoral period. Many obstacles lay ahead in building a strong foundation for peace. The challenge was to ensure that, in a fragile subregion with interlocking crises, Guinea–Bissau did not erupt again.

Libya

The first quarter of the year witnessed intensive efforts by the UN Secretary General to obtain full Libyan compliance with Resolution 1192 (adopted August 27, 1998). The Secretary General responded to Libyan requests for clarification of arrangements for transfer and trial of the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt conducted a separate diplomatic effort to persuade the Libyan leadership to comply.

On April 5, the two Libyan suspects arrived in the Netherlands accompanied by the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, and were turned over to Dutch custody and then to Scottish custody for trial. On April 8, the Security Council President issued a statement welcoming that development and noting the immediate suspension of UN sanctions on Libya. Sanctions had been applied in accordance with Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993), and were immediately suspended, pursuant to Resolution 1192 (1998) when the Secretary General informed the Council that Libya had surrendered the suspects for trial.

Resolution 883 (1993) asked the Secretary General to report to the Security Council, within 90 days of the suspects’ handover, on Libyan compliance with remaining requirements bearing upon Libya under Security Council resolutions. The Secretary General presented his report to the Council on June 30. The report noted France’s satisfaction that provisions
relating to the 1989 bombing of UTA flight 772 had been met, but con-
cluded that Libya had not satisfied requirements relating to the Pan Am
103 bombing—including cooperation with the Scottish court sitting in the
Netherlands, acceptance of responsibility for the actions of Libyan offi-
cials, payment of appropriate compensation, and renunciation of terrorism.

Accordingly, the President of the Security Council issued a statement
on July 9 that acknowledged Libya’s progress toward compliance and
reaffirmed the Council’s intention to lift sanctions permanently as soon as
full Libyan compliance made that possible. At year’s end, UN sanctions
remained suspended but not permanently lifted. The trial in the Nether-
lands was expected to begin in mid–2000.

Rwanda

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda continued to reverberate within the
United Nations and the international community. In May 1999, Secretary
General Annan appointed an independent inquiry into UN actions during
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, to establish the facts regarding the response
of the United Nations before and during the genocide, and to make recom-
mendations to the Secretary General. All UN officials involved in deci-
sion–making in 1994, including Annan himself, who then headed the UN
Department for Peacekeeping Operations, were interviewed or responded
to the inquiry’s requests for assistance.

Ingvar Carlsson, former prime minister of Sweden (1986–1991 and
1994–1995), chaired the inquiry. Senior U.S. officials who were well–
versed in the issues gave a briefing to the members of the inquiry. Issued
on December 15, the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of
the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda concluded, inter
alia, that:

The failure by the United Nations to prevent, and subsequently, to
stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the United Nations sys-
tem as a whole. The fundamental failure was the lack of resources
and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and to
the United Nations presence there. There was a persistent lack of
political will by Member States to act, or to act with enough assertive-
ness....

This international responsibility... warrants a clear apology by the
Organization and by Member States concerned to the Rwandese peo-
ple.

In 1999, efforts continued to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda. (See section on War Crimes
Tribunals.)

Sierra Leone

At the beginning of 1999, an offensive by the Revolutionary United
Front (RUF) insurgency threatened the capital, Freetown, necessitating the
temporary evacuation of UN military observers from the UN Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) peacekeeping operation. At mid-

year, the Government of Sierra Leone began to negotiate a peace settlement with the rebels, signing the Lome Agreement on July 7.

U.S. efforts in the United Nations during 1999 focused on establishing peacekeeping operations of an appropriate size and structure to support Sierra Leone’s peace process in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), a regional multinational force.

In August, the United States joined with the Security Council to expand the UNOMSIL observer mission to 270 observers, to help ECOMOG implement the Lome Agreement. In October, in consideration of ECOMOG’s imminent drawdown, the Council unanimously approved Resolution 1270, establishing the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeeping operation, which was authorized up to 6,000 troops and 260 military observers.

The original UNOMSIL observer mission was authorized up to 70 observers, although only a dozen were in the field during the insurgents’ January offensive on Freetown. The Security Council, which first established UNOMSIL by unanimous vote in 1998, approved Resolution 1220 on January 12, 1999, to extend the operation for three months, ending March 13, then followed up with Resolution 1231, extending UNOMSIL through June 13, and Resolution 1245, which welcomed the ongoing peace negotiations and extended the mission through December. UNOMSIL had a mandate to monitor the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program (DDR) for surrendered ex-combatants, to monitor respect for humanitarian law, and to report on security conditions. The pro-government ECOMOG force was expected to conduct the DDR program, under UNOMSIL oversight. UNOMSIL turned its attention toward cease-fire monitoring as the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF negotiated a cease-fire on May 24, then signed the Lome Agreement on July 7. The Lome Agreement called for ECOMOG and the United Nations to help monitor the cease-fire and implement the DDR program for all former combatants.

On August 20, the United States joined the Security Council in approving Resolution 1260, which authorized the expansion of UNOMSIL to 210 observers, to help ECOMOG implement the terms of the Lome Agreement. Shortly after, ECOMOG’s principal troop contributor, Nigeria, indicated that it would withdraw its ECOMOG troop contingent in Sierra Leone by the end of 1999, to permit it to focus efforts on its domestic democratization process. Reacting to the likelihood that UN peacekeeping troops would soon have to assume responsibility for implementing the DDR program in the interior, even if a residual ECOMOG force remained to safeguard key installations in and near Freetown, the Security Council established the UNAMSIL mission with Resolution 1270. UNAMSIL’s mandate was to assist the Sierra Leone Government in implementing the Lome Agreement, to conduct the DDR program and
protect DDR program sites, and to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

**Western Sahara**

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 690 of April 29, 1991, to assist in the implementation of the Settlement Plan agreed to in 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el–Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO). The plan called for a cease–fire and the holding of a referendum on whether the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara should become independent or be integrated with Morocco. In essence, the plan required the identification of eligible voters, the return of refugees to the territory, and a vote under the auspices of the United Nations.

Since 1991, the implementation of the Settlement Plan has been repeatedly stymied by disagreement over the disposition of the 65,000 members of the so–called “contested” tribal subfactions. The core of the dispute has been that most of the members of this group are long–term residents of Morocco and do not appear on the Spanish Sahara census of 1974. The POLISARIO claimed that they were therefore ineligible, while Morocco insisted that as Sahrawi, they should be included in the voter identification process. In 1998, the implementation of the Settlement Plan stalled over this issue, and finally resumed in May 1999 after the parties accepted a series of protocols on procedures to be followed in the voter identification and appeals processes. By the end of December, MINURSO had succeeded in identifying a total of more than 190,000 eligible voters from both the so–called “contested” and “non-contested” Sahrawi tribal groups.

A new dispute arose in 1999 over the interpretation of the protocols on procedures regarding what constitutes valid grounds for appeal. According to the Secretary General’s December 6 report, nearly 80,000 appeals have been filed since the publication, on July 15, of the first part of the provisional voter list. This list contains the names of eligible applicants interviewed by MINURSO during the identification of the “non–contested” tribesmen carried out in 1994–1995 and 1997–1998. Most of those who were found ineligible to vote in the referendum have filed appeals.

MINURSO anticipates that this will happen again when the second provisional list of voters is published in mid–January 2000. This list will be made up of eligible applicants from the approximately 65,000 members of the “contested tribal groups” whose identification MINURSO completed in December. Since only a small percentage of the applicants from these tribal groups were determined to be eligible, MINURSO could face a doubling of the total number of appeals if all those excluded choose to file. If MINURSO were to accept the bulk of the appeals, it would be forced to conduct what essentially would be a new round of voter identification, a process that would delay the referendum to 2002 or beyond.
Not surprisingly, the parties disagreed on the admissibility of the appeals. The Frente POLISARIO maintained that a large number of the appeals could be eliminated if MINURSO adhered strictly to agreed-upon procedures. Morocco, for its part, argued that all applicants have the right to appeal and that the appeals fulfill the requirements of admissibility. In light of this impasse, the Secretary General recommended the extension of MINURSO’s mandate until February 29, 2000, to allow time to complete the voter identification process, publish the second provisional list of eligible voters, and assess the situation regarding appeals. There is little likelihood the referendum will take place in July 2000 as currently scheduled.

There was little progress during 1999 on the issue of refugee repatriation. The parties have not yet agreed to the draft refugee repatriation protocol presented to them by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in early 1999. Similarly, they have not yet implemented the draft plan of action for confidence-building measures the UNHCR submitted to them in August 1999 despite their agreement in principle to do so.

**Western Hemisphere**

**Cuba**

On April 23, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted the resolution cosponsored by Poland and the Czech Republic (Resolution 1999/8) on the human rights situation in Cuba by a vote of 21(U.S.)–20, with 12 abstentions. This represented a welcome reversal from 1998, when the Human Rights Commission failed to adopt a resolution on human rights in Cuba by a vote of 16(U.S.)–19, with 18 abstentions.

On November 9, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 54/21 by a vote of 155–2(U.S.), with 8 abstentions. The Cuba-sponsored resolution calls on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws “such as…the ‘Helms–Burton Act,’” the extraterritorial effects of which affect the sovereignty of other states and urges states that have such laws to repeal them. A number of countries voted in favor of the resolution but expressed concerns over Cuba’s poor human rights record in their explanations of vote. Finland, speaking on behalf of the European Union, also made clear that full cooperation with Cuba depended on an improvement in human rights and political freedom.

**Guatemala**

The United States strongly supports efforts to assist the Guatemalan Government in implementing the peace agreement signed on December 29, 1996, ending that country’s 36-year internal struggle.

The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to verify compliance with the agreements signed between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca. On December 8, the General Assembly acted by consensus to extend MINUGUA’s mandate until December 31, 2000. (Resolution 54/99.)
MINUGUA maintained eight regional offices and six subregional offices, providing it with a presence throughout the country. MINUGUA conducted prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into alleged human rights abuses; worked to improve the administration of justice; and aided in opening access to the government for indigenous people. Human rights abuses have continued to decline, but common crime and violence remain problems.

Haiti

On November 23, the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) as the follow-on UN presence to both the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) and the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). In November 1999, the Security Council extended the mandate of MIPONUH until March 15, 2000, to ensure a smooth transition to MICAH. The United States was a sponsor and supporter of those actions.

MICAH’s initial mandate expires February 1, 2001. The purpose of MICAH is to consolidate the gains achieved by MIPONUH and earlier UN peacekeeping missions, and by the human rights-oriented MICIVIH. MICAH will be a special political mission with substantial technical cooperation elements focusing on police training, administration of justice, and human rights. The mission will be headed by a Representative of the Secretary General, who will have authority over all UN activities in Haiti. MICAH will be supported by the UN regular budget and through voluntary contributions from donor nations, including the United States and Canada.

Other Areas

Afghanistan

In 1999, the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSSMA) and UN Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi continued to be primary players in international efforts to end the civil war in Afghanistan. Representatives of the Taliban and the United Front met under UN auspices in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, in February and March. Shortly after the conclusion of the second round of meetings, however, the Taliban announced that they had suspended their participation in the talks. Despite repeated efforts, UNSMA and Brahimi were unable to convince the Taliban to resume UN-hosted negotiations by year’s end. The Secretary General announced in November that Brahimi’s activities would be “frozen” until circumstances warranted his renewed intervention, but pledged that UNSMA would redouble its efforts to seek a peaceful and durable solution to the Afghan conflict. In March 1999, the United Nations began a limited and gradual return of international staff to Afghanistan after winning security guarantees from the Taliban.

The Group of Six plus Two (Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors plus the United States and Russia), organized by Special Envoy Brahimi in October 1997, continued to be a major vehicle for international involvement in Afghanistan in 1999. At a July high-level meeting in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan, all Group members except Tajikistan signed a declaration pledging to stop arms shipments to Afghan factions. The meeting also brought together the Taliban and the United Front, although no breakthroughs were made and a new Taliban offensive began soon after the meeting ended. The Six plus Two Group met again in New York on September 22 on the margins of the UN General Assembly. The United Nations and several members of the Group, discouraged by the lack of progress, speculated that the Group might no longer have any utility. The United States pointed out that Afghanistan had become the world’s largest producer of opium and suggested that the Group could serve to coordinate anti-narcotics efforts. At year’s end, plans were under way to develop a framework for such cooperation.

The Security Council continued to be actively involved in Afghanistan in 1999. At an August 27 open Security Council meeting, the United States and other delegations expressed alarm at the Taliban offensive launched in late July, urged the factions to return to the negotiating table and outside parties to cease interference, underscored that the Taliban and other factions must respect human rights, and insisted that Afghan territory no longer be used for sheltering terrorists. A Presidential Statement (S/PRST/1999/29) adopted by the Security Council on October 22 called for a withdrawal of foreign combatants and military personnel, encouraged UN efforts to promote a peaceful settlement, and reiterated the Council’s concerns about narcotics and terrorism in Afghanistan.

On October 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1267, which imposed an assets freeze and flight ban on the Taliban until they turn over international terrorist Usama bin Laden to authorities in a country where he would be brought to justice. The United States, which introduced the resolution, stated that its unanimous adoption sent a clear message from the international community to the Taliban that the harboring of international terrorists in Afghanistan must cease. As the Taliban failed to comply with the demands of the resolution by the November 14 deadline, UN sanctions went into effect on November 15. Although it had not yet identified a chairman for the Taliban sanctions committee by year’s end, the Council acted on requests for humanitarian exemptions from the sanctions and otherwise began to implement sanctions.

The United States once again drafted a resolution on the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, which was adopted without a vote during the March 1–12 session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women. The resolution focused on the denial of equal access to health care to women and girls, but also condemned Taliban restrictions on access to education and employment, and on freedom of movement.

A resolution adopted without a vote by the UN Commission on Human Rights on April 23 (Resolution 1999/9) also decried the severe situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, particularly in areas under Taliban control. The resolution cited the continuing pattern of human rights violations in the country and urged all Afghan parties to protect civilians, fulfill their
obligations to ensure the safety of diplomatic and other international personnel, and allow access to all prisoners.

A similar resolution (Resolution 54/185) on human rights in Afghanistan was adopted without a vote by the UN General Assembly on December 17. Resolution 54/189 on the situation in Afghanistan, cosponsored by the United States, was also adopted without a vote by the General Assembly on December 17. The resolution chastised the Taliban for their treatment of minorities and women, expressed deep concern about the lack of progress in Taliban investigations of attacks on international personnel, demanded that the Afghan factions refrain from providing sanctuary or training for international terrorists and halt all illegal drug activities, and called attention to the continuing need for international humanitarian assistance.

The UN Credentials Committee again deferred consideration of the competing claims of the Taliban and the former Afghan government to represent Afghanistan, leaving the former government in the UN seat as its last legitimate holder.

**Bougainville**

The Security Council, in a Presidential Statement issued on April 22, 1998, expressed strong support for the Agreement on Peace, Security, and Development on Bougainville, signed at Lincoln University, New Zealand, in January 1998 (the Lincoln Agreement). It commended the efforts of countries in the region and welcomed the establishment of a peace monitoring group (PMG) composed of civilian and military personnel from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu. Noting that the Lincoln Agreement called for the United Nations to play a role, the Security Council asked the Secretary General to consider the composition and financial modalities of such involvement. The UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) was subsequently established by the United Nations with a mandate to work with the PMG through the end of 1998 to monitor implementation of the Lincoln and other peace agreements. In December 1998, the UN Secretariat, with the support of the Security Council, extended UNPOB’s mandate for one year.

The United Nations provided regular briefings to the Security Council during 1999 on the situation in Bougainville and the activities of the UNPOB. Over the course of the year, UNPOB, which completed its staffing in February with the arrival of Director Noel Sinclair, has assumed a leadership role in the weapons disposal process and been active in negotiations toward a political agreement. The United States and other Council members have expressed their admiration for UNPOB’s achievements, given its small size, but called for further progress in disarmament and stressed that UNPOB’s mission should not be open-ended.

The Secretary General on October 28 informed the Security Council of his intention to extend the UNPOB mission for another year so that it “may continue to perform the functions spelled out in the Lincoln Agreement and assist in the promotion of political dialogue among the parties to
the Agreement.” The United States and other Council members again supported the extension, but also made it clear they looked forward to the successful termination of UNPOB.

**Burma**

The United States worked actively in 1999 to promote international pressure on the Burmese regime (State Peace and Development Council or SPDC) for a meaningful dialogue on a democratic transition and an improved human rights climate in Burma. The United States again cosponsored the annual resolution (1999/17) on Burma at the UN Commission on Human Rights. The resolution, adopted without a vote on April 23, contained the strongest language to date and extended for one year the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Burma.

In June, the International Labor Organization (ILO), with U.S. support, adopted a resolution that deplored Burmese government inaction in abolishing the practice of forced labor. It also took the unprecedented step of banning Burma from attending ILO meetings and receiving technical assistance. A report issued by the ILO Director General in 1999 cited flagrant and persistent human rights violations, and urged the ILO to take definite steps. It also called for continued pressure for change in Burma until the people had a right to shape their own destiny.

The United States cosponsored the annual resolution (A/RES/54/186) on Burma at the 54th UN General Assembly. The resolution, adopted by consensus on December 17, decried continuing violations of human rights in Burma, expressed grave concern about the increased repression of any form of public political activity and persecution of the democratic opposition, urged the SPDC to release detained political prisoners, and encouraged the regime to engage in a substantive dialogue with political leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi. The United States was active in seeking to broaden cosponsorship of the resolution, which it considered one of the international community’s primary means of voicing disapproval of the dismal human rights situation in Burma and the refusal of the SPDC to enter into a dialogue with the democratically elected opposition.

The United States in 1999 continued to support UN Special Envoy to Burma Alvaro de Soto and the UN’s “good offices” mission. After a delay of many months, the SPDC allowed de Soto to visit Burma in October. The regime continued, however, to be totally unresponsive to De Soto’s attempt to link international assistance with political reforms. Despite the lack of progress, the United States and key members of the international community affirmed that the United Nations should continue to play a role in Burma and agreed on several steps, including UN consultations in key Asian countries in December, a January 2000 “brainstorming” session with Burma scholars in New York, and an informal meeting of interested countries in Seoul in March 2000. De Soto ended his personal involvement in Burma in late 1999 and took up other responsibilities.
within the United Nations. His replacement had not been named by year’s end.

Restrictions on U.S. contributions to UN Development Program (UNDP) programs in Burma continued in 1999. Under U.S. law, a sum equal to the amount that UNDP would spend in Burma must be withheld from U.S. voluntary contributions to UNDP in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 unless the Secretary of State submitted to Congress a certification that UNDP programs and activities in Burma met certain criteria. On August 30, the Department of State certified for the first time that all UNDP programs and activities met these requirements, namely that they: “(1) are focused on eliminating human suffering and addressing the needs of the poor, (2) are undertaken only through international or private voluntary organizations that have been deemed independent of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), after consultation with the leadership of the National League for Democracy and the leadership of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, (3) provide no financial, political, or military benefit to the SLORC, and (4) are carried out only after consultation with the leadership of the National League for Democracy and the leadership of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma.”

Cambodia

Efforts continued in 1999 to bring to justice those responsible for atrocities committed in Cambodia during 1975–1979. The report of the UN Groups of Experts for Cambodia, publicly released in March, recommended the establishment of a tribunal by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, along the lines of international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Cambodian Government rejected that recommendation, stating its intention to pursue domestic trials of former Khmer Rouge leaders. Throughout the year, the United States urged the United Nations and the Government of Cambodia to develop a framework for a judicial process that would meet international standards of justice, but permit trials in Cambodia.

A resolution on human rights in Cambodia, drafted by Japan and cosponsored by the United States, was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly on December 17 (A/RES/54/171). The resolution expressed grave concern about numerous violations of human rights, including extrajudicial executions, torture, illegal arrest and detention, and violence related to political activities, but noted that the Government of Cambodia had made some progress in addressing these issues. It urged the Government to create a functioning and impartial system of justice and to ensure that those responsible for the most serious violations of human rights during the Khmer Rouge period were brought to account in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of law.

The Cambodian Government agreed in late 1999 to extend the mandate of the UN Center for Human Rights in Cambodia, which had been
due to expire in March 2000, for an additional two years. The Center, which opened in 1993, performs a wide variety of training, monitoring, and investigation functions in all human rights areas. The UN Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Ambassador Thomas Hammarberg, made his sixteenth and last visit to Cambodia in October. His replacement had not been named by year’s end.

Cyprus

The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created in March 1964 to help end violence between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities. Since the de facto division of the island in 1974, UNFICYP has served as a buffer force between Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot forces on one side and the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek troops on the other.

With strong U.S. support, the United Nations intensified diplomatic efforts in 1999 to start talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

On June 20, with U.S. support, the G–8 leaders (heads of state or government of the major industrial democracies—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States—plus the Russian Federation), meeting in Cologne, Germany, issued a statement on Cyprus that called upon the UN Secretary General “to invite the leaders of the two parties to negotiations in the fall of 1999.” To that end, the G–8 leaders also urged “the two leaders to give their full support to such a comprehensive negotiation, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.” On June 23, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued a report on the UN “Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus.” The report reviewed UN activities over the previous six months, including the meetings the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Cyprus had held with the leaders of both sides. The report also expressed the willingness of the Secretary General to invite President of Cyprus Glafcos Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to “enter into a process of comprehensive negotiations without preconditions, in a spirit of compromise and cooperation.”

On June 29, the Security Council adopted two resolutions on Cyprus. UN Security Council Resolution 1250 endorsed the June 20 G–8 Summit statement. UN Security Council Resolution 1251 renewed UNFICYP until December 15.

On November 14, Secretary General Annan announced that “the parties have agreed to start proximity talks in New York on December 3 to prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement.” President Clinton welcomed the start of the UN–sponsored proximity talks, noting that they “can bring us one step closer to a lasting peace.”

Proximity talks between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were held in New York under the Good Offices of the Secretary General of the United Nations on December 3–14. UN Secretary General Annan, and subsequently his Special Advisor on Cyprus Alvaro de Soto, discussed the key issues that divide the parties with the leaders of each side.
U.S. Special Presidential Emissary for Cyprus Alfred H. Moses, Special Coordinator for Cyprus Thomas G. Weston, and U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Donald K. Bandler provided diplomatic support. Mr. de Soto, in announcing that discussions would resume with both parties at the end of January 2000, said “the Secretary General expressed hope that we could begin a continuous and predictable process and also that the core issues would be discussed, and feels that just such a process has begun here.”

On December 15, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1283, which renewed the UNFICYP mandate until June 15, 2000.

**East Timor**

The Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) with the adoption of Resolution 1246 (1999) on June 11. The purpose of UNAMET was to conduct a popular consultation (direct vote) in the former Portuguese colony for the purpose of determining whether the East Timorese would accept or reject a special autonomy arrangement for the territory within the unitary Republic of Indonesia.

The impetus for establishing UNAMET had come initially from UN–mediated discussions during 1998 over autonomy for East Timor between Portugal and Indonesia, which had invaded East Timor in 1975. In January 1999, Indonesian President B. J. Habibie unexpectedly announced that his cabinet would recommend independence for East Timor if the East Timorese rejected autonomy within Indonesia. This decision led in turn to the Security Agreement between the governments of Indonesia and Portugal and the United Nations reached on May 5, which called on the United Nations to organize the ballot and laid out the broad outlines of the UN role in implementing the result. If the East Timorese accepted autonomy, the United Nations would help create the necessary political institutions and hold elections. If they rejected autonomy, the United Nations would administer the transition of East Timor to independence.

On May 7, the Security Council authorized the establishment of UNAMET, which was to consist of political, electoral, and information components, and civilian police, as well as a small component to monitor humanitarian issues. At full deployment, UNAMET numbered approximately 240 international staff members, 420 UN volunteers, 250 civilian police, and 4,000 local staff.

On August 30, the East Timorese courageously ignored the intimidation by the military–backed pro–integration militias and voted in a UNAMET–organized popular consultation. More than 98 percent of the 450,000 registered voters cast ballots, and over 78 percent rejected autonomy with Indonesia in favor of independence for East Timor. Pro–integration militias reacted violently, and with support from the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of violence, looting, and arson that devastated much of East Timor and especially Dili, the capital of the territory. In addition to the destruction of property throughout East Timor, unknown numbers of East Timorese were killed and four local employees of UNAMET lost their lives. Also, an estimated 350,000 East Timorese
were displaced from their homes due to the violence, including perhaps as many as 250,000 who fled or were forced to relocate to West Timor.

On September 15, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted Resolution 1264 authorizing the establishment of a multinational force “to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks, and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.”

The Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) began deployment on September 20 in cooperation with the Indonesian military, which had agreed to withdraw all but a token number of troops from East Timor. At the end of the year, INTERFET consisted of 16 countries, including the United States, with a total troop strength of 9,300.

In October, the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly recognized the results of the referendum and voted to rescind the annexation of East Timor. On October 25, the Security Council adopted a resolution creating the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) as a replacement for UNAMET to guide the East Timorese in their transition to independence. Specifically, UNTAET is charged with creating a new civil administration as well as institutions of self-govern-ment, coordinating humanitarian and development assistance, and maintaining the security of the territory. At full deployment, UNTAET is expected to consist of approximately 8,300 troops, 1,640 civilian police, 200 military observers, and an international staff of 350. The civilian component of UNTAET has begun its effort to create new governmental institutions, while the military component is scheduled to take over from INTERFET in February 2000.

Although INTERFET successfully ended militia violence in East Timor, only 135,000 of those driven into exile had returned by the end of the year. Despite intense pressure from the U.S. Government and the international community, Indonesia failed to establish control over the camps housing an estimated 100,000 refugees in West Timor and to halt definitively harassment by militia groups there.

In September, the United Nations and the Government of Indonesia launched separate investigations of human rights violations and abuses committed in East Timor during 1999. Although the reports had not been released by the end of the year, the Indonesia Commission of Inquiry reportedly detailed many brutal acts and identified specific individuals who should be held accountable.

**Georgia**

First established in 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 858, the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) monitored compliance with a cease-fire agreement reached between Georgia and Abkhaz separatists. A resumption of fighting, followed by a second cease-fire agreement in mid-1994, led to the expansion of UNOMIG’s size (to 136 military observers) and scope of operations, to include both monitoring the cease-fire and observing the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States
peacekeeping force. The Security Council has renewed UNOMIG at six-month intervals. During 1999, it was renewed by UN Security Council Resolution 1225 on January 28 and by UN Security Council Resolution 1255 on July 30, extending the mission until January 31, 2000. In the latter instance, the United States and other members of the “Friends of Georgia” and of the Security Council issued formal explanations of their votes, pressing the parties to move the peace process forward.

UNOMIG provides an international and Western presence in a part of the world important to such U.S. interests as the stability and territorial integrity of the New Independent States and the East–West transport corridor, including both the proposed Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline and the trans–Caspian gas pipeline. UNOMIG provides a measure of stability and international scrutiny in the zone of conflict, fulfilling its mandate through patrolling, albeit limited due to security considerations.

The parties continued to hold discussions, both bilateral and UN–sponsored, but made little progress toward a final settlement. In part, this was due to both sides’ preoccupation with Georgian parliamentary elections and a self–styled Abkhazian constitutional referendum and presidential election in October. The United States backed an October 4 press statement by the President of the Security Council expressing concern about the votes in Abkhazia as detrimental to efforts to settle the conflict.

On November 12, the Security Council agreed to a statement by the Council President, voicing support for the plan of the new Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to make proposals to resolve Abkhazia’s status. Soon thereafter, the new SRSG prepared for discussion a draft document on distribution of constitutional competencies between Tbilisi (the capital of Georgia) and Sukhumi. He also met with the parties and engaged in discussions with a view to convening the Coordinating Council of Georgia and Abkhazia in January 2000, after a nine–month hiatus. Key issues remained the security situation, return of refugees and displaced persons, improving economic conditions, and laying the groundwork for a comprehensive political settlement.

At the end of 1999, UNOMIG consisted of 101 military observers, including two from the United States. The two U.S. observers did not take part in UNOMIG’s limited patrolling because of U.S. concerns about security.

**Tajikistan**

UN Security Council Resolution 968 of 1994 established the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) to do the following: monitor implementation of the September 1994 temporary cease–fire agreement between the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO); investigate allegations of cease–fire violations; and maintain close contact with both parties. UNMOT subsequently participated actively in peace negotiations that led to the 1997 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. With UN Security Council Resolution 1138 of 1997, the Security Council expanded
UNMOT’s size and scope of operations, allowing UNMOT to assist in implementation of the Agreement. The Council has renewed UNMOT at six–month intervals. During 1999, UNMOT was renewed by UN Security Council Resolution 1240 on May 15 and by UN Security Council Resolution 1274 on November 12, extending the mission until May 15, 2000.

There was measurable progress in achieving the goals of the 1997 peace accord and, on August 19, the Security Council agreed to a statement by the Council President welcoming progress to date and urging further measures. During 1999, the Majlis Oli (Parliament) issued a general amnesty for over 5,000 UTO fighters, and a compromise was reached on the key appointment of a UTO member to head the ministry–level Committee on Extraordinary Situations and Civil Defense. A September referendum approved all constitutional amendments proposed by the Commission on National Reconciliation, including a clause allowing the functioning of political parties based on religion. Though flawed, the referendum itself was significant in that it opened the way to parliamentary elections mandated by the peace accords.

The government announced a plan to lift the ban on certain political parties outlawed since 1993. This action allowed the Democratic Party, the Islamic Revival Party, and the Badakhshan Movement to participate in presidential elections and to anticipate participating in parliamentary elections in early 2000. The Presidential elections (not addressed in the peace accords) were held November 6, marred by irregularities in candidate registration, widespread reports of multiple voting, lack of transparency in the balloting process, a media blackout, and a near–boycott by opposition leaders. Subsequent parliamentary elections, if successful, would constitute the last major event of the transitional period under the General Agreement.

On the military front, the parties refrained from fighting each other. The UTO declared in August that it had completely disarmed, but there has been little confirmation. Tensions persisted and sporadic armed clashes occurred along the Tajik–Uzbek border, and the overall security environment remained unstable.

UNMOT’s mandate allows for 120 military observers. Due to security concerns and staff reductions after the 1998 murders of UNMOT personnel, there were only 30–40 military observers and two civilian police officers in the country during 1999 (no Americans). In addition to UNMOT, an estimated 20,000 Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States border guards and peacekeeping forces were in Tajikistan with the consent of the Tajik government.

The Former Yugoslavia

During 1999, issues related to the former Yugoslavia remained a top priority of the United States in the Security Council. The United States promoted measures supporting UN objectives of democratization and stabilization in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) (FRY). Several of the Council’s actions furthered implementation of the U.S.–sponsored General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, a significant share of the Council’s work responded to the crisis in Kosovo, including setting up of a UN administrative authority in Kosovo following conclusion of NATO’s Operation Allied Force, conducted to halt the displacement and mass killings of Kosovar Albanians by the Belgrade regime of President Slobodan Milosevic.

UN Preventive Deployment Force. Early in the year, China prevented the United Nations from renewing the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), originally set up in 1995 as a successor to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). UNPREDEP was intended to monitor the borders of the FYROM and to prevent the spread of regional conflict embroiling the former Yugoslavia. UN Security Council Resolution 1186 of July 21, 1998, had expanded the size of UNPREDEP and extended its mandate to February 28, 1999. This proved to be the last renewal. On February 25, China severed diplomatic relations with the FYROM and vetoed a proposed extension after the Macedonian government established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in January. The Council voted 13 (U.S.) to 1, with 1 abstention. Russia explained its abstention as a response to the failure of the Council to adopt Russian amendments strengthening UNPREDEP’s role in monitoring the arms embargo against the FRY. The United States expressed regret over the outcome of the vote and stated its intention to work with Council members to find a way to fulfill UNPREDEP’s function.

UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka. Since 1992, the United Nations has maintained a security regime to monitor the demilitarization of the strategic Prevlaka peninsula overlooking the Bay of Kotor. Croatia and the FRY, with competing claims to the territory, agreed to the demilitarization in September 1992 to keep conflict from spreading in the Balkan region. The United Nations established a 14–person military observer mission (UN Security Council Resolution 779 of October 6, 1992) under UNPROFOR to monitor the demilitarization effort. UN Security Council Resolution 1038 of January 15, 1996, established an independent mission to carry out this effort, increased the size of the mission to 28 observers, and renamed it the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). Since then, the Council has renewed UNMOP for six–month intervals. In 1999, UNMOP was renewed by UN Security Council Resolution 1222 on January 15 and by UN Security Council Resolution 1252 on July 15, which extended the mission to January 15, 2000.

Discussions between Croatia and the FRY regarding Prevlaka yielded little in 1999. The parties held a fourth round of bilateral talks on March 9 without substantial progress. Although no further talks were scheduled, both sides have reiterated their preferences for a peaceful settlement. The United States supports a peaceful settlement with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including Montenegro, and, in the interim, enhanced freedom of movement for civilians in the UNMOP area.
Bosnia–Herzegovina. In Annex 11 of the 1995 Dayton Accords (the “Agreement on International Police Task Force”), the parties called for a UN civilian police operation to assist in creating a safe and secure environment. On December 21, 1995, UN Security Council Resolution 1035 established a UN civilian office (UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or UNMIBH) and an International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia for a one-year period. Both were subsequently renewed. The Judicial System Assessment Program (JSAP) was added to UNMIBH by UN Security Council Resolution 1184. The JSAP was to monitor and assess the court system as part of the judicial reform program as outlined by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which monitors civilian implementation of the Dayton Accords. On June 18, 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1247 renewed the UNMIBH/IPTF mandate until June 21, 2000.

The unarmed IPTF is authorized to monitor law enforcement activities and facilities, including associated judicial organizations; to advise and train law enforcement personnel; to provide advice on the organization of law enforcement agencies; and, where appropriate, to accompany law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities. Initially, the United Nations authorized 1,721 police monitors. UN Security Council Resolution 1168 (May 21, 1998) increased the total to 2,057. Several hundred police redeployed to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) following the end of Operation Allied Force in June. At year’s end, there were 1,795 police in Bosnia, including 141 Americans.

In July, the UN Secretary General appointed Jacques Klein (United States) as Special Representative to lead the UNMIBH mission, replacing Elizabeth Rehn (Finland).

On November 15, the fourth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Accords, all three members of the Joint Presidency of Bosnia–Herzegovina agreed to the “New York Declaration.” This statement, reaffirming their commitment to implement fully the Dayton Peace Accords, contained a provision for the creation of a State Border Service, intended to be the first national multiethnic armed law enforcement body. Establishment of the service was pending parliamentary approval at year’s end.

During its first full year of operation, the JSAP supported the judicial reform efforts of the OHR through baseline assessments of the functioning of the judicial system. JSAP documented the lack of judicial independence, overt political interference, and substantial inefficiencies in Bosnia–Herzegovina. JSAP reports were instrumental in OHR efforts to improve court efficiency and the ethnic composition of courts. Moreover, JSAP analysis of court operations was utilized in the drafting of laws and codes on criminal procedure, courts, and prosecutorial services.

Kosovo. Throughout 1998 and the beginning of 1999, Serbian police, paramilitary, and security forces carried out a policy of forced displacement and mass murder in order to “cleanse” Kosovo of its ethnic minorities. In response to these actions, in March 1998, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1160, which called upon the FRY to take immediate steps to achieve a political solution to the crisis of Kosovo, and also imposed an arms embargo on the FRY. In September 1998, the Council adopted Resolution 1199, endorsing an international diplomatic monitoring presence in Kosovo, and demanding that all parties immediately cease hostilities, enter into meaningful dialogue without preconditions, and facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. Resolution 1199 also required that the FRY authorities institute specific concrete measures toward achieving a political settlement of the Kosovo crisis. In October 1998, following agreement among the FRY Government, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1203, endorsing creation of an OSCE–led Kosovo Verification Mission and a NATO Air Verification Mission.

U.S.–sponsored peace talks opened at Rambouillet, France, on February 6. Kosovar Albanians signed the agreement March 18, but President Milosevic rejected it because it would have allowed NATO troops to enter Kosovo to keep the peace. U.S. envoy (now Permanent Representative to the United Nations) Richard Holbrooke met with President Milosevic March 22–23 to urge adoption of the agreement, but without avail.

NATO undertook Operation Allied Force March 24–June 10, which eventually succeeded in stopping Serbian depredations in Kosovo. Hostilities ceased following the June 3 adoption by the Serbian parliament of the agreement brokered by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

After Operation Allied Force began, the Security Council on March 26 rejected a resolution sponsored by Russia, China, and Namibia criticizing NATO action by a vote of 3 to 12 (U.S.) with 0 abstentions. In Geneva, Switzerland, the UN Commission on Human Rights also rejected a Russian draft resolution that criticized the campaign, and in April adopted a resolution that condemned Serbian aggression in Kosovo. In the Security Council, Bahrain and Malaysia, with the general support of the Islamic group, took the lead in preparing UN Security Council Resolution 1239, adopted on May 14 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions, expressing concern about the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo.

Following completion of Operation Allied Force, the Security Council on June 10 adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1244 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention. The Resolution authorized an international security presence that became the NATO–led Kosovo Force (KFOR), and an international civil presence to establish an interim governing authority, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK is specifically authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 to provide interim administration for Kosovo, under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the FRY, by: performing basic civilian administration of the province, where and as long as required; organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for a demo-
Democratic and autonomous self-government, including the holding of elections; facilitating the political process to determine Kosovo’s future status; supporting economic reconstruction; supporting humanitarian and disaster relief; maintaining law and order, including the protection and promotion of human rights; and returning refugees and displaced persons.

The UN Secretary General named Bernard Kouchner (France) as his Special Representative to head UNMIK, and Jock Covey (United States) as Principal Deputy. To tackle its extensive responsibilities and capitalize on regional expertise, UNMIK was formed as a unique collaboration of the United Nations with other organizations. Each institution manages a specific “pillar” of the UNMIK mandate: the United Nations is responsible for civil administration; the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is responsible for humanitarian affairs; the OSCE is responsible for institution-building; and the European Union is responsible for reconstruction.

By the end of the year, UNMIK had deployed close to 1,900 of the requested 4,718–person UN International Police Force, an armed civilian police force with law enforcement authority. The United States agreed to provide 550 civilian police, of whom about 450 had arrived in Kosovo by year’s end.

The ethnic Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was demilitarized in September as scheduled. UNMIK established the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), a civilian emergency service corps, on September 20. Provisional KPC members assisted in winterization aid projects. Other former KLA members registered with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) employment and education program. A joint UNMIK/Kosovar administering body, the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), was created December 15 with oversight over 19 departments. UNMIK continued to engage with the Serb leadership, which refused to join the IAC in 1999. UNMIK also established the Kosovo Transitional Council as a forum to discuss administrative issues with a broad range of Kosovar representatives. Though episodic problems persisted, in less than six months all hospitals in Kosovo were functioning, over 400 schools had reopened, power lines and Kosovo’s aging electrical plant had been repaired, postal and telecommunications services were established, and UNMIK began issuing vehicle licenses and other administrative documents. At least 810,000 of the estimated 850,000 Kosovo refugees returned to the province, 110,000 of them with the direct assistance of the UNHCR or IOM. Other humanitarian efforts included the distribution of food and agricultural supplies and the provision of winterization or housing.

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Security Council adopted two resolutions in 1999 pertaining to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). As already noted, the Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on June 10, which recalled the jurisdiction and mandate of the ICTY (established
in 1993 by Resolution 827), and demanded full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the tribunal.

UN Security Council Resolution 1259, adopted on August 11, noted with regret the resignation of Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour (Canada), effective September 15. Following the nomination by the Secretary General of Carla del Ponte (Switzerland), the Council appointed her to succeed Arbour as Chief Prosecutor, effective September 15.

On November 11, the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted by a vote of 123 (U.S.) to 0, with 20 abstentions, a resolution entitled “The Situation of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” Introducing this resolution to the General Assembly on November 18, the U.S. delegate noted that, “although serious problems remain with the Republika Srpska, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia have made notable strides in cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and in bringing individuals to justice. We must note that the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) refuses to comply meaningfully with its human rights obligations under Dayton…This country, and the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, continue to harbor indicted war criminals and fail to meet their obligations.”

Special Political Issues

International Peace and Security

In 1999, the U.S. Government continued to use the review process and criteria established in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 for making disciplined and coherent decisions about proposed peacekeeping operations. From voting in the Security Council to judging whether to lend U.S. troop support to the effort, PDD 25 governed the process through a comprehensive review of costs, size, risk, mandate, and exit strategies. UN peacekeeping activity rose in 1999 with new operations initiated in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the end of the year, there were over 18,000 civilian police, military observers, and troops deployed to a total of 18 missions.

In the Balkans, President Slobodan Milosevic defied U.S. and international opinion over Kosovo. After a 78-day NATO air campaign, President Milosevic finally agreed to withdraw Federal Republic of Yugoslavia troops and allow an international presence. In June, the Security Council authorized the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with broad authority to govern the province and facilitate a political process to determine the future status of Kosovo. The UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to promote even-handed security crucial to a self-sustaining peace. Other peacekeeping operations continued in Africa, the Middle East, Haiti, Cyprus, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Jammu and Kashmir.
Indonesian President Habibie’s decision to hold a referendum to determine the future of East Timor put the former Portuguese colony on the road to independence. With the United Nations mediating, Portugal and Indonesia agreed to have the United Nations administer the vote on whether to accept or reject autonomy with Indonesia. In June, the Security Council authorized the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which successfully conducted the balloting on August 30. Following the decisive rejection of autonomy in favor of independence by the East Timorese, pro-autonomy militias, backed by Indonesian military, reacted by launching a campaign of terror that forced 250,000 East Timorese to flee the territory. The international community responded by organizing the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET). Under Australian leadership, INTERFET restored law and order and began the process of returning refugees and displaced persons to their homes in East Timor. In October, the Security Council approved establishment of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to prepare the territory for independence.

The Security Council mandated two new peacekeeping missions for Africa in 1999. Following the resumption of armed conflict by Revolutionary United Front insurgents in Sierra Leone, the government and the rebels negotiated a cease–fire and signed the Lome Peace Agreement. The United Nations initially expanded the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, but a decision by the West African States Military Observer Group to withdraw its peacekeeping troops from Sierra Leone led the United Nations to establish a broader mandate for peacekeeping under the UN Mission in Sierra Leone. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a multi-state war continued, involving troops from at least six countries and Congolese rebel factions. Following a cease–fire agreement signed in Lusaka at mid–year, the Security Council established MONUC, a 90–member military liaison mission seen as the first of a three–phased UN effort to implement the cease–fire and resolve the conflict.

In other African operations, the United Nations continued its mission in Western Sahara, worked toward transitioning from peacekeeping to peace–building in the Central African Republic, and terminated its UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) because of resumed hostilities. MONUA was succeeded by the UN Office in Angola, a small peace–building office established by the Security Council.

Recognition of the important role of civilian police (CIVPOL) in peacekeeping missions led to sharp increases in demand during 1999. The rise was attributable primarily to two of the new missions: UNMIK, with plans for 4,718 CIVPOL, and UNTAET, with a mandate for 1,640 CIVPOL. This sudden and large surge in requirements overwhelmed the capacity of member nations to keep the system supplied; by the end of the year there were only 1,972 CIVPOL operating in support of UNMIK and 370 with UNTAET. The U.S. contribution was 434 and 43, respectively. Accordingly, the United States intensified efforts to increase internal and international capacities for recruiting, training, and deploying CIVPOL to
peacekeeping missions around the world. Between March and December, the United States increased its CIVPOL contribution from 225 to 647, nearly 200 percent. International CIVPOL contributions rose from 2,400 to 4,386 during the same period, an 83 percent increase that was still far short of the nearly 9,000 required. On top of increasing requirements for sheer numbers of police, the changing nature of international policing, from missions requiring “monitors” to situations demanding “armed enforcement,” compounded difficulties in recruiting and training sufficient personnel.

Protection of U.S. forces serving in UN peacekeeping operations remained a top priority for the U.S. Government. In 1999, the United States continued to closely examine force protection aspects of all peacekeeping operations to which its forces were deployed as part of a systematic effort to identify potential threats and implement protection measures. Force protection concerns were paramount in determining the location and scope of activities for military liaison officers and military observers serving with UNAMET and UNTAET in East Timor. In Georgia, the United States continued to restrict the area of operations of its two military observers serving with the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) in light of security considerations. This decision permitted the United States to continue making a valuable contribution to UNOMIG while meeting force protection requirements.

The “Demining 2010 Initiative” was launched in October 1997, with the goal of increasing assistance to victims of landmines and removing all mines that threaten civilians by the year 2010. The United States is working to build effective international coordination and sustainable support—from public and private sources—to reach this goal.

During 1999, the U.S. Government continued to provide support to UN Humanitarian Demining, contributing $5.8 million to various UN demining efforts worldwide such as the Mine Action Program for Afghanistan, run by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. The U.S. Government also expanded its bilateral humanitarian demining program in 1999 from 21 to 33 countries, raising its total humanitarian demining assistance to $383.8 million worldwide.

**Disarmament Issues**

**Disarmament Commission**

As mandated by the UN General Assembly, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) provides a forum for deliberation on disarmament issues when the Assembly is not in session. The UNDC, traditionally operating by consensus, considers and makes recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament, and follows up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the General Assembly and special sessions devoted to disarmament.

The 1999 UNDC met April 12–30 and formed working groups to consider three agenda items: (1) Establishment of Nuclear–Weapon–Free
Zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned, (2) Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, and (3) Guidelines on Conventional Arms Control/Limitation and Disarmament, with particular emphasis on consolidation of peace in the context of General Assembly Resolution 51/45N of 10 December 1996. The session took place in a generally favorable atmosphere and completed its multi-year consideration of all three items on its agenda. The UNDC approved two consensus documents: Nuclear–Weapon–Free Zones and Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament. India denied consensus on a document regarding the Fourth Special Session on Disarmament, fearing widespread criticism at such a meeting. On the two documents adopted, the United States made formal interpretive statements reemphasizing the U.S. position that the provisions of a nuclear–weapon–free zone treaty cannot affect the right to individual and collective self-defense, as recognized in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, and stressing the importance of a comprehensive and balanced approach to the consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures.

Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the principal global multilateral negotiating forum of the international community. Despite the fact that the CD is financed through the UN scale of assessments and submits a report to the United Nations annually, it is an autonomous organization that makes all of its decisions by consensus. In 1999, the CD expanded its membership from 61 to 66 states with the addition of Ecuador, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Tunisia. Forty–five states were granted observer status; 21 states had membership applications on file. The member states of the CD are divided into three geopolitical groupings—Western Group, Eastern Group, and Non–Aligned Group—with China as an independent member.

The CD met three times in 1999 for a total of 24 weeks. The session ended without agreement on a work program, accomplishment of any substantive work, establishment of negotiating bodies, or the appointment of any special coordinators. U.S. objectives included reestablishing a negotiating committee on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and facilitating negotiations on a transfer–ban on anti–personnel landmines by having a special coordinator appointed. These goals were not achieved because of continued insistence by some members that the CD’s overall work program should also include ambitious work on nuclear disarmament and outer space.

First Committee

The 1999 UN First Committee (UNFC) convened to address disarmament and international security issues from October 11 through November 9. This session considered 49 resolutions and 3 decisions. Seventeen items were introduced on nuclear weapons; four on other weapons of mass destruction; one on outer space; seven on conventional weapons; six on
confidence–building measures; eight on disarmament machinery; and nine on other issues, including science and technology, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) report, and the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. The United States voted “yes” or joined consensus on 35 resolutions/decisions, voted “no” on 11 resolutions, abstained on 5, and did not participate in the vote on disarmament and development. One resolution (Fissile Material Cut–off Treaty) was withdrawn from consideration after it was introduced but before it was due to be voted on.

The United States also cosponsored 10 resolutions. However, it did not independently sponsor any resolutions, nor did it put forward its annual resolution on bilateral nuclear reductions because of a lack of support from Russia, the other primary cosponsor. A biennial U.S. resolution on compliance with arms control agreements was put forward as a procedural decision, which served to keep the item on the General Assembly agenda.

The U.S. Senate’s failure to consent to U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty and U.S. plans for limited missile defense provided the backdrop for UNFC action. Many delegations asserted that these developments damaged prospects for nuclear disarmament and demonstrated that the United States had retreated from its traditional leadership in the field. Russia’s resolution on preservation of and compliance with the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty was a focal point of the session. After a lengthy and comprehensive campaign by cosponsors to win support, it barely passed, garnering more abstentions than “yes” votes. The final tally was 80 to 4 (U.S.), with 68 abstentions (Resolution 54/54A). Many delegations acknowledged the U.S. view that a multilateral forum like the UN General Assembly should not take sides in ongoing negotiations related to a bilateral treaty. However, they also made it clear that they believed that strategic stability and issues related to missile defense were legitimate issues of concern to the international community.

The 1998 resolution on a new agenda for nuclear disarmament was reintroduced with some drafting changes, but with the same substantive thrust. It became the second focal point of the session, but like the ABM treaty, there were a significant number of abstentions. The final vote was 111 to 13 (U.S.), with 39 abstentions (Resolution 54/54G).

Other Issues
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) was formed in 1958 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), which was submitted by the United States and 19 other states. The resolution established the ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and laid the foundation for COPUOS as the only standing body of the General Assembly to consider international cooperation in the explora-
tion of outer space. The Committee has been responsible for the elaboration and adoption by consensus of five multilateral treaties governing space activities, and two sets of nonbinding principles concerning the use of nuclear power sources in outer space and remote sensing of the Earth from space. These treaties form the basis for international law in the use and exploration of outer space.

Resolution 54/67, “International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,” was adopted without a vote by the General Assembly. The resolution renewed the mandate of the COPUOS and set the program of work for the COPUOS and its Legal and Scientific and Technical Subcommittees.

The UN General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the Third UN Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III), held July 19–30, in Vienna, Austria, which focused on the theme, “Space Benefits for Humanity in the 21st Century.” UNISPACE III was the last global UN conference of this century and brought together a unique mix of government and industry representatives to discuss the use of space technology to improve the quality of life and stimulate economic growth around the world. Twenty-five hundred participants from 100 nations attended. The Department of State chaired the interagency working group responsible for U.S. participation in the conference.

By all measures, this conference was a success for the United States. Unprecedented financial and management reform measures were adopted that kept conference expenditures within the UN regular budget. It underscored the significant role the private sector has and will continue to play in the use of outer space, and also highlighted the tremendous potential for international cooperation in the post–Cold War era.

**Non–Self–Governing Territories**

Chapter XI of the UN Charter sets forth responsibilities of states for the “...administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.” These “non–self–governing territories” (NSGTs) are considered annually by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24 or C–24) and by the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the UN General Assembly. The C–24 makes suggestions and recommendations to the Fourth Committee regarding implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), specific issues affecting the decolonization process, and the activities of specialized agencies and other UN bodies in those territories.

An informal dialogue between the United States and the United Kingdom and the Chairman of the Fourth Committee was initiated in 1996 in an effort to arrive at a consensus “omnibus” resolution to address 12 non–self–governing territories, including the three NSGTs of the United States:
American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 1997 and 1998, this process enabled the United States to support “omnibus” resolutions regarding NSGTs.

In 1999, the United States continued its informal consultations with the United Kingdom and the Chairman of the C–24, and also engaged other committee members. The United States again joined consensus on the “omnibus” resolution, “Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the United States Virgin Islands.” Despite a productive dialogue with the C–24, the United States voted against a series of resolutions addressing decolonization issues because of unacceptable references to land tenure, and economic and military activities. The United States voted “no” on Resolutions 54/92, “Dissemination of Information on Decolonization,” (149 to 2 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions); 54/91, “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,” (141 to 2 (U.S.), with 14 abstentions); and 54/84, “Economic and Other Activities which Affect the Interests of the Peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories” (153 to 2 (U.S.), with 5 abstentions).

Year 2000 Computer Problem (Y2K)

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations has been an active member of the UN Informatics Working Group chaired by Ambassador Percy Metsing Mangoaela (Lesotho). Through the Informatics Working Group, the U.S. Mission has assisted in the drafting of resolutions directed at improving information technology at the United Nations, and raising awareness of the Y2K problem on a global level. The U.S. Mission provided extensive support to the United Nations related to the planning and organization of the June 22 National Y2K Coordinators Meeting at UN Headquarters in New York. The meeting focused on regional preparedness, community and contingency planning, and dealing with Y2K failures. Y2K Coordinators from 170 countries participated in the meeting.

In addition, the Working Group on Informatics worked with the UN Secretariat to ensure that the member states that had not addressed the Y2K problem were made aware of the implications for their own systems and those of their counterparts. In order to facilitate the task of the member states, the Working Group on Informatics took a two–fold approach: 1) a letter from the Information Technology Services Division was circulated to all member states, and included references to reading materials and companies dealing with solutions to the problem; and 2) a separate page on the UN’s web site was created to provide all relevant information on the Y2K problem.

Security Council Thematic Debates

The Security Council has shown an increased willingness to discuss general issues related to peace and security concerns inherent in today’s complex humanitarian emergencies. The result was an increased number
of thematic debates during 1999 that frequently allowed non-members of the Council to participate.

The practice of having thematic debates started in 1992 with “An Agenda for Peace,” and continued in 1993 with the Security Council President’s statement on the safety of UN forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife. Thematic debates continued in 1997 with the condemnation of attacks on UN personnel and on the use of force against refugees and civilians in conflict situations. In 1998, there was debate on the protection of humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations.

The United States has supported keeping the Security Council regularly informed on the humanitarian aspects of potential conflicts and has supported review by the Council of ways to strengthen the protection of civilian populations and the early commencement of post-conflict integration, rehabilitation, and peace-building. The United States has called on the Security Council to support initiatives aimed at strengthening capacities for confronting humanitarian and human rights crises.

In a statement to the Security Council on January 21, 1999, Ambassador Burleigh, Charge d’Affaires a.i., said:

The United States believes the Security Council should review ways to ensure a smooth transition from international peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building. We believe it would be desirable for the Secretary General to make recommendations to the appropriate UN agencies to assist in peace-building efforts as peacekeeping operations are drawn down. We stress the importance of a division of labor between peacekeeping activities and longer term peace-building programs. There is a need for closer cooperation and dialogue between the Security Council and various bodies within the UN system. [USUN Press Release #2–(99) 1/21/00]

In this context, the Security Council held eight thematic debates during 1999:

- Promoting Peace and Security: Humanitarian Activities Relevant to the Security Council [Meeting held 1/21/99]
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict [S/PRST/1999/6 (2/12/99)]; [S/RES/1265 (9/17/99)]
- Promoting Peace and Security: Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees in Africa [Meeting held 7/26/99]
- Children in Armed Conflict [S/RES/1261 (8/25/99)]
- Small Arms [S/PRST/1999/28 (9/24/99)]
- Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Terrorism) [S/RES/1269 (10/19/99)]
Admission of New Members

The United Nations admitted the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, and the Kingdom of Tonga as members in 1999. As outlined in Chapter II, Article 4 of the UN Charter, membership is open to “peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” Admission is “effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”

The Security Council considered the applications of Kiribati and Nauru on June 25. It unanimously approved Resolution 1248, which recommended to the General Assembly that Kiribati be admitted to membership. The corresponding resolution on Nauru (Resolution 1249) was also adopted, but by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0. China abstained, arguing that Nauru’s ties to Taiwan demonstrated that it had not complied with General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971), which seated the People’s Republic of China and expelled Taiwan. The Security Council on July 28 approved without a vote Resolution 1253, which recommended the admission of Tonga.

The General Assembly on September 14 approved the admission of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga, adopting Resolutions 54/1, 54/2, and 54/3, respectively, without a vote. The United States, as host country, welcomed the new members and expressed the belief that their participation in the United Nations would benefit all members as the United Nations works to advance the goals of a peaceful and prosperous international community.

The admissions of Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga are the first since December 1994 and bring the number of UN members to 188. With the admission of Tuvalu, whose application is now before the United Nations, Switzerland and the Holy See would be the only states that are not UN members. Both currently hold observer status in the organization.