Country Reports on Terrorism 2005

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NCTC Statistical Annex
Supplement on Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens
Chapter 1

LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS AND KEY TERMS

This report is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. Statutory excerpts relating to the terms used in this report and a discussion of the interpretation and application of those terms in this report are included below.

Excerpts and Summary of Key Statutory Terms*

Section 2656f(a) of Title 22 of the United States Code states as follows:

(a) ... The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report providing -

(1) (A) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country –
   (i) in which acts of international terrorism occurred which were, in the opinion of the Secretary, of major significance;
   (ii) about which the Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to section 2405(j) of the Appendix to Title 50; and
   (iii) which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;

(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations;

(2) all relevant information about the activities during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and any umbrella group under which such terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of an American citizen during the preceding five years, any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction, any terrorist group known to be financed by countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding year pursuant to section 2405(j) of the Appendix to Title 50, any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), and any other known international terrorist group which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;

* These excerpts and this report reflect amendments to the Act that were contained in legislation passed in December 2004 (P.L. 108-458 and P.L. 108-487). By their terms, those amendments, which did not apply to last year's report, apply to this and subsequent reports under the Act.
(3) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against United States citizens or interests, information on -

(A) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the act; and

(B) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country; and

(4) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism against such citizens or interests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

Section 2656f(b) of Title 22 of the United States Code sets forth certain specific information to be included in the report where feasible, including a newly effective statistical reporting requirement discussed below under “Statistical Information.”

Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section 2656(a) as follows:

(d)...

(1) the term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;

(2) the term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and

(3) the term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

Interpretation and Application of Key Terms

For purposes of this report, the terms “international terrorism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist group” have the definitions assigned to them in 22 USC. 2656f(d) (see above). The term “non-combatant,” which is referred to but not defined in 22 USC. 2656f(d)(2), is interpreted to mean, in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.

It should be noted that 22 USC 2656f(d) is one of many U.S. statutes and international legal instruments that concern terrorism and acts of violence, many of which use definitions for terrorism and related terms that are different from those used in this report. The interpretation
and application of defined and related terms concerning terrorism in this report is therefore specific to the statutory and other requirements of the report, and is not intended to express the views of the U.S. Government on how these terms should be interpreted or applied for any other purpose. Accordingly, there is not necessarily any correlation between the interpretation of terms such as “non-combatant” for purposes of this report and the meanings ascribed to similar terms pursuant to the law of war (which encapsulates the obligations of states and individuals with respect to their activities in situations of armed conflict).

**Statistical Information**

As recently amended, Section 2656f(b) of Title 22 of the United States Code provides that the report must contain "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year." The statistical information included in the statistical annex to this report has been provided by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which has a statutory mission to serve as the U.S. Government's knowledge bank on international terror groups. Statistical information compiled by NCTC with respect to non-combatant targets is included in this annex. NCTC has noted in its foreword that, because of revisions in methodology, the figures in the annex are not directly comparable to statistics reported in previous years. NCTC does not track statistics with respect to combatant casualties (except to the extent that they are incidental to acts of terrorism targeting noncombatants).

The report does not contain statistical information specifically concerning combatants. The focus of the terrorism report, as is clear from the definition of terrorism, is on violence against noncombatant targets. Further, it would not be practicable to provide such statistics, as the government does not maintain -- and would have great difficulty maintaining -- statistics that distinguish between incidents against combatants by terrorist groups and by others, including insurgents, in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Contextual Reporting**

Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national population is not meant to imply that all members of that population are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists rarely represent anything other than a tiny fraction of such larger populations. It is terrorist groups -- and their actions -- that are the focus of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of violence inspired by a cause, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. This report includes some discretionary information in an effort to relate terrorist events to the larger context in which they occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence. Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily international terrorism and therefore are not subject to the statutory reporting requirement.
Chapter 2

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

Introduction

The annual Country Reports on Terrorism is designed to meet a Congressional requirement for a full and complete annual report on terrorism for countries and groups that meet the criteria of Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656(f).

But at a time when our nation is engaged in a global war on terror, the Country Reports also serve a broader purpose -- to summarize key developments in the international campaign against terrorism. This chapter of the Country Reports provides such a summary, and complements the detailed observations contained in other parts of the document.

General Trends in Terrorism

This chapter focuses primarily on al-Qaida (AQ) and associated networks. This is appropriate, given that these networks represent the most prominent current terrorist threat to the United States and our international partners. However, some general trends -- beyond solely al-Qaida and its affiliates -- are relevant in considering the broader phenomenon of terrorism. These include:

- **Micro-actors.** Increasingly, small autonomous cells and individuals drew on advanced technologies and the tools of globalization such as the Internet, satellite communications, and international commerce. When combined with the motivation to commit a terrorist act, these technologically empowered small groups represented “micro-actors” who were extremely difficult to detect or counter.

- **Sophistication.** Many terrorists worldwide moved to improve their sophistication in exploiting the global interchange of information, finance, and ideas. They also improved their technological sophistication across many areas of operational planning, communications, targeting, and propaganda.

- **Overlap with transnational crime.** In some cases, terrorists used the same networks used by transnational criminal groups, exploiting the overlap between these networks to improve mobility, build support for their terrorist agenda, and avoid detection.

Key Judgments

During 2005, evidence began to emerge that, in the face of counterterrorism successes, central al-Qaida (AQ) leaders were seeking new ways to interact with associated networks. By year’s end, it appeared that AQ senior leadership often inspired terrorist activity but could not direct it as fully as in the past.

Although the international community’s actions have degraded the ability of the core AQ leadership group -- Usama bin Ladin and his immediate lieutenants -- to mount global acts of
terrorism, AQ and its affiliates’ political will has not been undermined. Terrorists continued to attempt to adapt to improved countermeasures and evolve new approaches in response to a less permissive operating environment. In 2005, we saw indications of:

- An increasing AQ emphasis on ideological and propaganda activity to help advance its cause. This led to cooperation with al-Qaeda in Iraq, the organization led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and with AQ affiliates around the globe, as well as with a new generation of Sunni extremists;

- The proliferation of smaller, looser terrorist networks that are less capable but also less predictable;

- An increased capacity for acts of terror by local terrorists with foreign ties (demonstrated in the July 7 London bombings);

- An increase in suicide bombings. The July 7 London bombing was the first such attack in Europe (three of the four terrorists were second-generation British citizens of South Asian descent); we also noted a marked increase in suicide bombings in Afghanistan;

- The growth of strategically significant networks that support the flow of foreign terrorists to Iraq.

**AQ Core Leadership: Transition and Regeneration**

Before 9/11, core AQ leaders tended to guide and direct the struggle, as well as provide funds, training, and technical expertise to allied networks. In particular, the core leadership played a key role in transnational “spectacular” attacks like those of September 11, 2001, that required international planning and coordination.

The arrest or death of two key operational planners in the span of half a year during 2005 forced AQ to adapt to broken command-and-control lines and to increased pressure in a region they had previously considered a safe haven. AQ’s leaders are scattered and on the run; its Afghan safe haven is gone; its relationship with the Taliban has diminished; its finances and logistics have been disrupted; and its organizational networks previously centered on Afghanistan are now more decentralized.

AQ’s core leadership continues to influence and provide ideological guidance to followers worldwide. By remaining at large, and intermittently vocal, bin Ladin and Zawahiri symbolize resistance to the international community, demonstrate they retain the capability to influence events, and inspire actual and potential terrorists.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that core leaders including bin Ladin and Zawahiri are somewhat frustrated by their lack of direct control, as demonstrated by the Zawahiri-Zarqawi correspondence of October, in which AQ’s principal ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri, chided Abu Musab al-Zarqawi for his choice of tactics, sought to influence his strategy, and asked for financial support.
**Looser, Local Networks**

Parallel to the changing role of AQ’s core leaders, there is evidence that AQ’s global networks were beginning to disaggregate. What was once a relatively structured network appeared to be a more diffuse worldwide movement of like-minded individuals and small groups, sharing grievances and objectives, but not necessarily organized formally. While AQ-linked trainers or facilitators often acted as catalysts for terrorist activity, this was no longer strictly necessary in functional terms, and self-sufficient cells have begun to emerge.

This new generation of extremists, some of whom are self-selected and self-radicalized, is not easy to categorize. Some cells are composed of individuals from the same ethnic group, often an insular “band of brothers” that is difficult to identify or penetrate.

Others became radicalized “virtually,” meeting in cyberspace and gaining their training and expertise in part from what they glean from the Internet. Just as some groups in the flattened global terrorist movement are ethnically defined, other cells are mixtures, such as the July 7 London bombers, who included a convert along with second-generation British citizens of South Asian descent.

This trend means there could be a larger number of smaller attacks, less meticulously planned, and local rather than transnational in scope. An increasing number of these attacks could fail through lack of skill or equipment, in the same way that the July 21 London attack did.

**The Connection between Iraq and the Broader War on Terrorism**

Iraq remains a key front in the global war on terror. US, Coalition, and Iraqi forces are engaging international terrorists as part of the security mission mandated by UNSCR 1546 and 1637 in support of the democratically-elected Iraqi government.

Terrorist attacks are frequent and are conducted by Islamic extremists, former regime elements, and foreign terrorists. The terrorists share a common opposition to the legitimate Iraqi government and the presence of Coalition forces. Al-Qaida’s senior leaders have fully supported the Iraq terrorist movements and see it both as a means to influence and radicalize Muslim public opinion worldwide and as a magnet to draw in as many recruits as possible.

The two most prominent terrorist groups in Iraq are al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Ansar al-Sunna (AS). Both have strong ties to al-Qaida’s central leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan and are committed to establishing a theocratic state in Iraq ruled under Sharia law. Moreover, they dream of turning Iraq into what Afghanistan was under the Taliban – a safe haven from which to plot and plan new attacks against the United States and its allies.
The enemies of Iraq are determined to prevent the development of a democratic society, to ignite a civil war, and to pit the Iraqi people against one another. As Zarqawi wrote in his 2004 letter to bin Ladin, “If we succeed in dragging the Shia into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger … the only solution for us is to strike the religious, military, and other cadres among the Shia blow after blow.”

The December election in Iraq exposed divisions among the rejectionists and the terrorists over participation in the political process. There were numerous reports in western and north-central Iraq of local Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups engaged in armed disputes (in some cases, deliberate operations) against al-Qaida of Iraq (AQI) over its targeting of Iraqis and opposition to the election.

Threats, plots, and cells linked to the Iraq conflict have been uncovered in several regions of the world. A system of clandestine support networks funneled foreign terrorists to Iraq from the Middle East, Europe, North Africa, South and Central Asia, and the Caucasus. The networks were strategically significant in their own right, because they pose an enduring threat to their parent societies after the immediate conflict in Iraq has diminished.

In 2005 AQI increased its external operations, claiming credit for three attacks. Most significant was the November 9 suicide attack against hotels in Amman, Jordan, carried out by AQI. In August, AQI claimed responsibility for a rocket attack against U.S. Navy ships in the port of Aqaba, which resulted in limited damage in Jordan and Eilat, Israel. In late December, AQI also claimed credit for firing several rockets into Israel from Lebanon. In addition, in August Turkish authorities arrested Luay Sakka, a Syrian national linked to al-Qaida and the Zarqawi network. Sakka is an important international terrorist, connected to the funding of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings and the deaths of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. Sakka was in Turkey allegedly plotting a terrorist attack on Israeli cruise ships in Turkish ports.

As articulated in the 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, there will be a continuing need for concerted action to ensure that Iraq does not become a safe haven for terrorist groups, and to build enduring partnerships with capable institutions in Iraq and the broader region.

Conclusion

Although events of 2005 depict a rapidly changing situation, some conclusions emerge:

- Al-Qaida is not the organization it was four years ago. International efforts have largely succeeded in denying the group its Afghan safe haven, have disrupted its operations, and have killed or captured many of the men in leadership positions.

- The group was adaptive and resilient, however, and important members of its core cadre remained alive and were adjusting to our operational tempo.
Overall, we are still in the first phase of a potentially long war. The enemy’s proven ability to adapt means we will probably go through several more cycles of action/reaction before the war’s outcome is no longer in doubt. It is likely that we will face a resilient enemy for years to come.
Chapter 3

TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

A terrorist safe haven is an area of relative security exploited by terrorists to indoctrinate, recruit, coalesce, train, and regroup, as well as prepare and support their operations. Physical safe havens are often found in under-governed territory or crossing international boundaries. Global communications and financial infrastructure, especially those created by electronic infrastructure such as the Internet, global media, and unregulated economic activity, can allow terrorists to fulfill many of the same functions without the need for a physical sanctuary. These “virtual” havens are highly mobile, difficult to track, and difficult to control.

Physical safe havens provide security for many senior terrorist leaders, allowing them to plan and to inspire acts of terrorism around the world. The presence of terrorist safe havens in a nation or region is not necessarily related to state sponsorship of terrorism. In most instances cited in this chapter, areas or communities serve as terrorist safe havens despite the government’s best efforts to prevent this.

Denying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists’ capacity to operate effectively, and thus forms a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as the cornerstone of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that was adopted in September 2001. UNSCR 1373 specifically targets terrorists’ ability to move across international borders and find safe haven, to solicit and move funds, and to acquire weapons; it also calls on states that do not have laws criminalizing terrorist activity and support to enact such laws.

Key Judgments:

- The most intractable safe havens worldwide tend to exist astride international borders or in regions where ineffective governance allows their presence. Examples are: the Afghanistan border, the Triborder region of South America, the Celebes Sea in Southeast Asia, and Somalia.

- Denying safe haven to terrorists requires a regional approach based on coordinated action by partner governments working with the United States as well as with each other, and by regional and multilateral institutions.

- Corruption, poverty, a lack of civic institutions and social services, and the perception that law enforcement and legal systems are biased or brutal are conditions that terrorists exploit to create allies or to generate a permissive operating environment.

- Efforts to build partner capacity and encourage partner states to cooperate more effectively with each other at the regional level are key to denying terrorists safe haven.
“Virtual” Safe Haven

Terrorists exploit electronic infrastructure such as the Internet, global media, and satellite communications for recruitment, training, planning, resource transfer, and intelligence collection between and among terrorists and terrorist groups. Like many others, terrorists view the Internet as the most powerful and inexpensive form of communication yet developed. Harnessing the Internet's potential for speed, security, and global linkage gives terrorists the ability to conduct many of the activities that once required physical haven, yet without the associated security risks. With the ability to communicate, recruit, train, and prepare for attacks, any computer may function essentially as a “virtual” safe haven. Closing these havens demands concerted action at the global and regional levels.

The Internet also has empowered the enemy with the ability to produce and sustain its own public media outlets and to present its own distorted view of the world to further its agenda. Terrorists are placing encrypted messages in electronic files to hide photos, maps, and messages on innocent third-party websites, chat rooms, and bulletin boards.

There are several thousand radical or extremist websites worldwide, many of which disseminate a mixture of fact and propaganda designed to challenge information gleaned from other sources. Traditions of tolerance, political asylum, and multiculturalism are key elements of open societies. The enemy has been savvy in exploiting this and in having a consistent message easily heard in the cacophony of the global media and the Internet. Countering the messages that terrorists propagate cannot be done quickly or easily; it must become part of a long-term strategy.

Physical Safe Haven

The remainder of this chapter provides a survey of the status of selected potential and physical safe havens worldwide.

AFRICA

The Trans-Sahara

The sparsely inhabited Trans-Sahara region provides safe haven for terrorist groups operating in North and Northwest Africa.

- Mali. The Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) maintains a regular but small-scale presence in Mali's northern desert, where it is engaged in recruiting, training, and smuggling activities. GSPC members have been able to move without hindrance in northern Mali; the government has maintained a limited military presence in the north since the negotiated end of a rebellion by elements of the Tuareg population in 1996. The size of the country and the limited resources of the Malian Government hamper the effectiveness of military patrols and border control measures. There have been no confrontations between the military and the GSPC in 2005, and the government has not taken any steps to modify its military force posture in the
region or directly confront GSPC elements in the north because of the perceived potential to create unrest. The Malian Government did cooperate fully with neighboring countries in June and July to try to isolate and capture GSPC cells in its territory, including those responsible for an attack in el-Mreiti, Mauritania.

- **Mauritania.** The GSPC and the Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ) have conducted supply, smuggling, fundraising, and recruiting operations in Mauritania and the region.

**Somalia**

Parts of Somalia, which has no functioning central government, have become havens for terrorist and other illicit activities, threatening the security of the whole region.

- A small number of al-Qaida (AQ) terrorists, responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, continue to operate in Somalia and are assisted by elements within the complicated Somali clan structure.

- Members of the Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) have committed terrorist acts in the past, primarily in Ethiopia. AIAI rose to prominence in the early 1990s with the goal of creating a pan-Somali Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. Presently, AIAI is highly factionalized and diffuse, and its membership is difficult to define.

- Other groups have appeared in Somalia that are suspected to have committed terrorist acts against Western interests in the region, or to be capable of doing so. Little is known about movements such as al-Takfir wal-Hijra ("al-Takfir"), but the extremist ideology and the violent character of takfiri groups elsewhere suggests that the movement merits close monitoring. (Takfiri ideology is an inflexible interpretation of Islam that labels those who do not share the same interpretation as "infidels." ) Some individuals and groups with past AIAI association and/or current takfiri leanings are sympathetic to and maintain ties with al-Qaida.

**EAST ASIA**

**The Sulawesi/Celebes Sea**

East Asia includes a maritime safe haven area composed of the Sulawesi/Celebes Sea and Sulu Archipelago, which sit astride the maritime boundary between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The physical geography of the thousands of islands in the region makes them very difficult for authorities to monitor. Thus, they are well suited to terrorist operations and activities, such as movement of personnel, equipment, and funds. This area represents a safe haven for the AQ-linked Jemaah Islamiya (JI) group.

- **The southern Philippines and Sabah, Malaysia.** The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), responsible for multiple bombings and kidnappings throughout the southern Philippines in recent years, remains active despite the loss of key leaders and
Philippine military operations against the group. In addition, some JI members have obtained safe haven in Mindanao in areas under the control of elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) is addressing the JI presence through military operations and ongoing peace talks with the MILF. The Government of Malaysia is mediating the GRP-MILF peace talks. The U.S. Institute for Peace is supporting the process by facilitating dialogue on contentious issues such as control of territory. The GRP-MILF talks have made progress, and could lead to a formal peace agreement that would be crucial in addressing the issue of safe haven in the long term. Two specific mechanisms have grown out of the peace process to increase cooperation between the Philippine Government and the MILF. The Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) allows Philippine Government and MILF representatives to broker cease-fire violations. The Ad Hoc Joint Action Group provides a framework for Philippine Government and MILF representatives to cooperate against terrorists and criminals in MILF areas, and has operated with some success over the last year.

- **Indonesia.** JI has had links to al-Qaida and was responsible for the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and the bombing outside the Australian Embassy in September 2004. While Indonesia has significantly improved its efforts to control the maritime boundary area with the Philippines, the area remains difficult to control, surveillance is partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups provide an effective cover for terrorist activities in the area.

**EUROPE**

Although most of Europe is not a physical safe haven in a literal sense, domestic terrorist groups, as well as AQ and its associated terrorist cells, remain the principal groups of concern in Europe. North African Salafist groups are especially active, such as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Armed Islamic Group, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. Moreover, extremist groups recruit and proselytize heavily in some major European cities. The presence and activity of such terrorist cells was dramatically highlighted by the London bombings in July. In addition, terrorist groups opposed to the Middle East peace process such as HAMAS and Hizballah have active propaganda, fundraising, and other support activities in Europe.

**Mediterranean**

Smuggling, illegal immigration, and narcotics trafficking networks traverse the Mediterranean Sea between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, providing opportunities for potential terrorist movement and support.

Cyprus forms a transit and support hub for various organizations operating in the Eastern Mediterranean and Levant. The Kongra-Gel/PKK has an active presence in Cyprus on both sides of the buffer zone, which it reportedly uses as both a fundraising and transit point. The Kurdish community in the south of Cyprus is estimated at approximately 1,500.
The Caucasus

Over the past decade, insurgent activities in Chechnya, Daghestan, North Ossetia, and surrounding areas have created opportunities for establishing a terrorist safe haven in the north Caucasus. The Pankisi Gorge area of Georgia was previously noted as a safe haven; however, Georgian authorities were largely successful in eliminating it. Georgian internal troops continued to carry out operations to rid the Pankisi Gorge of terrorists. The identification and safe removal of hidden weapons caches in the Pankisi area enabled Georgian security forces to secure and protect it from terrorist acts or transit. Although border guard and customs reform continued, Georgia was still used to a limited degree as a transit state for weapons and money. Georgia made efforts to close its borders to those who wished to smuggle money, weapons, and supplies, but was hindered in particular by corruption at border checkpoints, as well as by lack of territorial integrity in the separatist areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

SOUTH & CENTRAL ASIA

Afghan-Pakistan Border

For decades, the mountainous and sparsely populated Afghan-Pakistani border has been an autonomous area, with little control by Islamabad or Kabul. The Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have been a safe haven for AQ fighters since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001. The FATA also includes Islamist groups and local tribesmen who continue to resist the government’s efforts to improve governance and administrative control at the expense of longstanding local autonomy. Bringing government services to this region, and turning an AQ safe haven into a regularly administered province of Pakistan, remains an important objective in the global war on terror.

Through substantial efforts since 2004, the Government of Pakistan has deployed more than 80,000 security forces into the FATA and made some improvements in health care, education, and social services. These operations have disrupted the terrorists but also affected tribal institutions in the area, requiring efforts to build new political and economic institutions. Meanwhile, the Afghan Government, in concert with U.S. forces and the international community, continues efforts to build security on the Afghan side of the border. The border areas remain a contested region, however, with ongoing insurgent and terrorist attacks and AQ-linked propaganda activity.
Iraq

Iraq is not currently a terrorist safe haven, but terrorists, including Sunni groups like al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), Ansar al-Islam (AI), and Ansar al-Sunna (AS), as well as Shia extremists and other groups, view Iraq as a potential safe haven and are attempting to make it a reality.

Terrorist groups coordinated and conducted attacks on Iraq’s utility infrastructure and claimed responsibility for kidnappings and attacks on Iraqi personnel working at refineries and electrical stations. Terrorists’ efforts to disrupt and destroy Iraq’s energy infrastructure not only made the Iraqi Government appear incapable of providing essential services, but hindered economic development. These attacks also sought to undercut public and international support for Iraq.

Efforts by the Iraqi Government, the United States, Coalition partners, and the international community are helping to thwart AQI’s ambitions, but the battle is far from over. Not all of Iraq’s neighbors have supported the international community in this effort. In particular:

- **Syria.** Designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terror, Syria was used as a facilitation hub for terrorist groups operating in Iraq, as well as for traditional tribal groups, smugglers, and border-crossers exploiting a porous border with Iraq and lax immigration controls. Foreign terrorists constituted a small percentage of insurgent forces, but their impact was dramatic. Although Coalition and Iraqi commanders consistently reported that most of the enemy killed or captured were Iraqi citizens, the foreign terrorist cells continued to move and kept a low profile while training, equipping, and supporting other terrorist groups. In addition, HAMAS, Hizballah, and several other Palestinian terrorist organizations operate offices in Damascus, and the Syrian Government has taken little effective action to curb this activity.

- **Iran.** Also designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terror, Iran has provided political and ideological support for several terrorist and militant groups active in Iraq. Attractive to terrorists in part because of the limited presence of the United States and other Western governments there, Iran is also a safe haven in that known terrorists, extremists, and sympathizers are able to transit its territory and cross the long and porous border into Iraq. Iran also equips terrorists with technology and provides training in extremist ideology and militant techniques.
• **Northern Iraq/Southeastern Turkey.** The Kongra-Gel/PKK maintains an active presence in the predominantly ethnic Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. The Kongra-Gel/PKK operates several base camps along the border in northern Iraq from which it provides logistical support to forces that launch attacks into Turkey, primarily against Turkish security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization.

**Lebanon**

The Lebanese Government recognizes several terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, which holds several seats in Parliament, as "legitimate resistance groups" and permits them to maintain offices in Beirut and elsewhere around the country. The Lebanese Government recently agreed to work to control the weapons of Palestinian militias outside the refugee camps within six months and, for the first time, is discussing possible limits to Hizballah’s arms. Although Syria withdrew its military forces in April 2005, it maintains an intelligence presence in Lebanon and continues to offer support and facilitate arms smuggling to Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups. Because the Government of Lebanon does not exercise effective control over areas in the south and inside the Palestinian refugee camps, terrorists can operate relatively freely in those areas.

**Yemen**

Several terrorist organizations continued to maintain a presence in Yemen throughout 2005. The Government of Yemen recognizes HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) as legal organizations. HAMAS conducted extensive fundraising through mosques and other charitable organizations and maintains offices. In December, HAMAS leader Khaled Mishal visited Sanaa and met publicly with President Saleh. Al-Qaida’s operational structure in Yemen has been weakened and dispersed, but concerns remain about the organization's attempts to reconstitute operational cells there. Yemen continues to increase its maritime security capabilities, but land border security along the extensive frontier with Saudi Arabia remains a problem, despite increased Yemeni-Saudi cooperation on bilateral security issues.

**THE AMERICAS**

**Colombia Border Region**

This region includes the borders between Colombia on one side, and Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil on the other. Rough terrain, dense forest cover, and lack of government authority and presence in this area create a safe haven for insurgent and terrorist groups, including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama have adopted an unstated policy mix of containment and non-confrontation with Colombian narcoterrorist groups, while Peru pursues the domestic terrorist group Sendero Luminoso (SL). FARC used remote areas to house prisoners and hostages and to stage and train for terrorist attacks in cities.
The Triborder Area

Suspected supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah and HAMAS, take advantage of loosely regulated territory and proximity to Muslim communities in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, to engage in illegal activity and illicit fundraising.

Venezuela

Venezuelan President Chavez has an ideological affinity with two Colombian terrorist organizations, the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN), which in turn limits Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism. The FARC and ELN regard Venezuelan territory near the border as a safe haven and often use the area for cross-border incursions. In addition, splinter groups of the FARC and another designated terrorist organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), operate in various parts of Venezuela and are involved in drug trafficking.
Chapter 4

BUILDING INTERNATIONAL WILL AND CAPACITY TO COUNTER TERRORISM

As set forth in the President’s February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the Department of State is responsible for developing coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad. These strategies recognize that in today’s increasingly interconnected world, it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between security interests, development efforts, and U.S. support for democracy. The United States must use all of the instruments of statecraft to integrate and advance these goals. Regional and international cooperation and coordination are essential. Through regional partnerships, the United States is building trusted networks that undermine, marginalize, and isolate the enemy, discredit the terrorist ideology of hate and violence, and empower legitimate alternatives to extremism. In order to address underlying conditions, the United States must work with its many partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA)

The Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) provides partner countries the training, equipment, and technology they need to improve their ability to combat terrorism. ATA programs seek to address specific needs of partner nations, such as increasing capabilities to find and arrest terrorists, and to build the kind of cooperation and interactivity between law enforcement officers that has a lasting impact.

In the area of cyber security, ATA works with two to three countries per year to provide training and equipment grants. The program offers a series of courses focusing on computer forensics, Internet intercepts, uncovering on-line communications operations, link analysis, e-mail tracing, cyber prosecutions, and other topics that assist foreign law enforcement organizations in identifying, investigating, and preventing terrorist acts. Most of the countries receiving this program start with the Executive Seminar on Cyber Terrorism, a three-day event that attempts to educate senior level police, prosecutorial, and IT executives on cyber terrorism issues. To date, ATA has worked with the Philippines, Thailand, Greece, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Morocco. Projected partners include India, Indonesia, Jordan, and possibly Egypt.

ATA sponsored 217 courses and technical consultations and trained approximately 4,300 students from 78 countries in 2005. In its two-decade long existence, ATA has trained more than 52,300 students from 146 countries, providing programs tailored to the needs of each partner nation and to local conditions. Such training included crisis management and response, cyber terrorism, dignitary protection, bomb detection, airport security, border control, kidnap intervention and hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, countering terrorist finance, and interdiction of terrorist organizations. All courses emphasize law enforcement under the rule of law and respect for human rights.

**ATA Success Stories**

ATA alumni have served as the lead investigators for a number of recent terrorist attacks:

- In May, when an assailant tossed a hand grenade toward President Bush’s podium during his speech in Tbilisi’s Freedom Square, ATA-trained Georgian bomb forensic and explosive disposal experts assisted U.S. investigators in their investigation. Their work and technical expertise helped lay the foundation for an ultimately successful criminal investigation against the alleged assailant.

- In October, the State Department conducted a cyber investigations course in Colombia. Participants in the course included computer forensics investigators from the Colombian National Police Detective Division (DIJIN), Colombian National Police Intelligence Directorate (DIPOL), and the Money Laundering Unit of the Colombian Ministry of Finance (UIF). This training enabled DIJIN investigators to access vital electronic information for an ongoing investigation against Colombian paramilitaries. UIF officers were able to analyze hackers attempting to break into the Colombian financial institutions’ database, and DIPOL officers accessed e-mail accounts related to drug trafficking and guerilla activity.

- In October, multiple bomb attacks took place throughout New Delhi, India. Two ATA-trained investigators were immediately assigned to important law enforcement roles, acting as the lead investigators in the case and identifying the explosives and methods used in the attacks.

- In November, the Indonesian National Police’s elite antiterrorist unit (Task Force 88), trained and equipped by ATA, located Indonesia’s most wanted terrorist, Azahari bin Husin, who was linked to bombings in Bali and at the Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. Once Azahari was located, Task Force 88 planned and executed a successful assault on Azahari’s stronghold, killing him and securing valuable intelligence from the enemy safe site.
• In Afghanistan, the State Department trained more than 300 Afghan nationals to serve in the Afghan Presidential Protective Service (PPS), with the ultimate goal of creating an effective, self-sustainable security organization capable of protecting Afghanistan’s national leadership. As of September, Afghan PPS agents staff all positions within the protective detail and provide logistical and specialty support for the protective operation.

The Middle East Partnership Initiative

As President Bush noted, when an “entire region sees the promise of freedom in its midst, the terrorist ideology will become more and more irrelevant, until that day when it is viewed with contempt or ignored altogether.” Systems characterized by an absence of political choice, transparent governance, economic opportunities, and personal freedoms can become incubators for extremism, hate, and violence.

The State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a presidential initiative launched in 2002 so that democracy can spread, education can thrive, economies can grow, and women can be empowered in the Middle East. It has funded more than 350 programs in 14 countries and the Palestinian territories, ranging from support for election monitoring to improvements in the quality of education and to efforts seeking a greater role for women in society.

The Initiative is a partnership that works closely with academic institutions, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations in the Arab world with the goal of building a vibrant civil society so reform can flourish.

Since its launch in 2002, MEPI has received $293 million to fund initiatives leading to democratic and other reforms. Congress has appropriated an additional $99 million for the current fiscal year for this successful transformational diplomacy initiative.

In 2005, MEPI reported the following success stories:

Political

• Increased the transparency of Lebanon's historic elections in 2005 through support to domestic monitoring organizations, voter education, journalists, and candidates.

• Provided support to more than 2,000 domestic election monitors for Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election.

• Supported the only live satellite broadcasts of Arab parliamentary sessions.

• Supported national and local political party organizations and their members in countries that will have new rounds of municipal and parliamentary elections between 2005 and 2007.

• Strengthened the role of civil society in the democratic process by facilitating dialogue among activists, NGOs, and foreign ministers at G8/BMENA (Broader Middle East
and North Africa Initiative) meetings, and by awarding direct grants to more than 70 indigenous civil society organizations.

Economic
- Provided entrepreneurial training for more than 180 participants, almost half of them women, from 16 Middle Eastern and North African countries. Twenty alumni have started or expanded businesses. At least 150 new jobs have been created.
- Extended credit and services to small and medium-sized businesses through peer consultation and training for regional banks and financial organizations.
- Established self-sustaining Junior Achievement chapters in 12 countries throughout the Middle East; more than 10,000 students have participated. Created public-private partnerships that assisted in the sustainability of Junior Achievement chapters.
- Expanded trade capacity of Arab countries with training and technical assistance; a number of Gulf countries are drafting new labor laws and updating agricultural import/export standards.

Education
- Provided English language study to more than 1,500 underserved youth from 13 countries in the Middle East through a micro-scholarship program. Because of the program's initial success, the program size is being increased to reach a total of 13,000 people, with an added focus on civic responsibility.
- Empowered young, highly motivated Arab men and women with leadership, problem-solving, and entrepreneurial skills through intensive five-week institutes. More than 135 students have participated, and many started their own projects back home.
- Supported a regional civic-education network that promotes youth civic awareness and involvement. Examples of youth-led projects include starting after-school classes for poor students and improving health services at local hospitals.
- Promoted literacy with an initiative to provide more than 80 titles of high-quality American children’s books to more than 3,000 schools in three Middle Eastern countries.

Women's Empowerment
- More than 300 women from the Middle East and North Africa participated in innovative three-week programs that taught political campaign skills.
- Provided entrepreneurial skills to women through regional micro-enterprise and business internships that include a one-month executive MBA program and a three-month internship at Fortune 500 businesses. The participants included 42 women from 16 countries.
- Built a professional network for Arab women legal professionals that offers professional development training programs, policy roundtables, mentoring, and a resource directory.
- Provided training for judges and legal professionals on issues ranging from the family code to domestic violence and honor killings.

**Multilateral and Regional Cooperation**

**The UN Role in Fighting Terrorism**

The United Nations continues to provide focus and energy to the international community in its collective fight against terrorism.


The **Counterterrorism Committee (CTC)** was established by Security Council Resolution 1373 after September 11, 2001, with the goal of raising the performance level of the governments of all 191 member states in the fight against terrorism. The Counterterrorism Committee’s Executive Directorate (CTED), established by Resolution 1535 in 2004, became fully operational in December 2005. CTED’s mandate is to enhance the Committee’s ability to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 and to continue its capacity-building work by facilitating technical assistance to member states and promoting closer cooperation and coordination with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations. It is also undertaking visits to certain nations to assess their implementation of obligations under Resolution 1373.

The **1267 Sanctions Committee**, also established by the Security Council, maintains a list of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and/or Usama bin Ladin that are subject to international sanctions -- assets freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo -- that member states are obligated to implement. The Committee entered into an agreement to exchange information with Interpol with the goal of better enforcing the sanctions.

The **Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)**, established at the G7 Economic Summit in Paris in 1989, is an inter-governmental body tasked with developing international standards and promoting policies initially aimed at combating money laundering and, following 9/11, the financing of terrorism. Its recommendations are now acknowledged as the international standards in both these areas and serve as the basis of regular mutual evaluations of its members' financial sectors, as well as evaluations by the IMF and World Bank.

In 1990, the FATF first issued its 40 recommendations on money laundering. These recommendations were designed to prevent the proceeds of crime from being used both in
future criminal activities and in legitimate economic activity. They were revised in 1996 and 2003 to reflect changes in money laundering patterns.

In 2002, the FATF adopted eight (later nine) special recommendations on terrorist financing. While focused principally on safeguarding the integrity of the international financial systems, these recommendations also provide governments with guidance on combating terrorist misuse of cash couriers, wire transfers, and non-profit organizations.

The **UN General Assembly** took several important steps on the counterterrorism front. The Outcome Document issued at the high-level plenary meeting held at the United Nations on September 14-16 contains a clear and unqualified condemnation of terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever, and for whatever purposes,” and sets objectives for UN actions to counter terrorism. It also calls for the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent responses at the national, regional, and international level. The General Assembly also negotiated and adopted four antiterrorism resolutions, 60/43, 60/73, 60/78, and 60/158, and continued work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. The General Assembly concluded the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in April. By December 16, 94 states had signed this important new instrument.

The **UN Secretary General**, Kofi Annan, continued to use his office to focus the international community on terrorism. In a March 10 speech, he announced the elements of the counterterrorism strategy produced by the high-level panel he had established to study global threats. He described terrorism as “a direct attack on the core values the United Nations stands for: the rule of law; the protection of civilians; mutual respect between people of different faiths and cultures; and peaceful resolution of conflicts.” The Secretary-General’s Task Force on Terrorism continued its work in response to the request of the General Assembly President to provide recommendations on ways to strengthen the capacity of the UN system to assist states in combating terrorism, and to enhance the coordination of the United Nations’ activities in this regard.

**UN Secretariat** staff of the Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna, Austria, continued to help countries build the legal framework necessary to become party to and implement the international counterterrorism conventions and protocols.

**UN Specialized Agencies** are also involved in the work of fighting terrorism. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization adopted passport security standards, and the International Maritime Organization engaged in security-related activities designed to make it harder for terrorists to operate in the commercial shipping arena. In October, the International Maritime Organization convened a diplomatic conference that concluded a new protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and a new protocol to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Fixed Platforms on the Continental Shelf. The International Atomic Energy Agency launched a nuclear security action plan to combat the threat of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. In July, the IAEA concluded amendments to the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which will enter into force once two-thirds of the state parties to the Convention ratify, accept, or approve the amendments.

G8 Counterterrorism Actions

The Group of Eight (G8) -- the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom -- was instrumental in developing cutting-edge counterterrorism standards and practices. These included enhanced travel document security standards, as well as strengthened controls over exports and stockpile security to mitigate the threat to airports from illicit acquisition of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (man portable air defense systems, or MANPADS).

G8 counterterrorism initiatives often have an impact well beyond the borders of G8 member states, since the group actively seeks to promulgate the standards and practices it develops to international standard-setting organizations. G8 travel document security standards, for example, were adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization for all its members. A port and maritime security assessment guide created by the G8 was adopted by the International Maritime Organization in December 2004.

Secure and Facilitated International Travel Security Initiative

At the June 2004 Sea Island Summit, President Bush and the other G8 leaders made a commitment to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation by launching the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI). This initiative was designed to increase passenger confidence in the security of international transportation, speed the processing of travelers by border authorities, promote international commerce, and reduce the threat of MANPADS to civil aviation. The G8 partners agreed to shared principles, including commitments to:

- Maximize effective information exchange among partner states as a key element of strengthening international border security;
- Work cooperatively to improve screening methods for international travelers, crews, and cargo for known or emerging threats as far in advance as possible; and
- Make all possible efforts to ensure that travel documents are secure, resistant to fraud, and globally interoperable.

As part of the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Security Initiative, G8 leaders adopted a 28-point action plan committing members to implement security-enhancing projects in a variety of transportation security fields, including:
• Strengthening international standards for passport issuance;
• Developing new measures to defend against the threat of MANPADS;
• Establishing a Point-of-Contact network to deal with aviation threat emergencies; and
• Expanding training and assistance on transportation security to third-party states.

Virtually all outstanding project tasks were completed by the end of 2005.

**Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG)**

At the June 2003 Evian Summit, G8 leaders adopted a plan to build political will and capacity to combat terrorism globally, establishing the Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) to implement this plan. CTAG supports the UN Counterterrorism Committee’s efforts to oversee implementation of UNSCR 1373 by developing an active forum for donors to coordinate counterterrorism cooperation with, and assistance to, third countries. CTAG promotes counterterrorism by prioritizing needs and targeting assistance to expand counterterrorism capacity in recipient countries. CTAG also encourages all countries to meet their obligations under Resolution 1373 of the United Nations Security Council and the 13 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols.

Under the leadership of the rotating G-8 presidency, CTAG meets three times per year with the active participation of G8 member states, the European Commission, the UN Counterterrorism Committee, and other countries and organizations. Coordination meetings hosted by the local embassy of the G8 presidency were also held among CTAG members’ diplomatic missions in recipient countries.

CTAG coordinated diplomatic, donor cooperation, and donor assistance efforts, such as:

• Facilitated universal adherence to the 13 international counterterrorism conventions and protocols by encouraging more than 100 countries to approve unratified instruments;

• Worked with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to assess the potential technical assistance needs of key countries to help them comply with the eight special FATF recommendations on terrorist financing;

• Focused counterterrorism donor assistance on needs in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) region, especially port and maritime security gaps, in concert with APEC’s Counterterrorism Task Force;

• Coordinated donor assistance to help countries in the western Balkans assess and improve airport security; and

• Promoted and assisting implementation of travel security and facilitation standards and practices being developed by the G8 under its Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI).
CTAG’s standing members include the G8 member states, the European Commission, and the UN Counterterrorism Committee. They were joined at one or more meetings by Australia, Spain, Switzerland, the Asian Development Bank, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

(See Chapter 5 for information on regional groups such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative, the European Union, and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).)

**Public Diplomacy**

Public diplomacy is essential to a successful foreign policy and to America’s national security. The United States recognizes that the global and generational challenge of countering terrorism is, at its heart, a contest of ideas and values, and that America is more secure when people around the world share the same hopes and freedoms.

The State Department’s public diplomacy work is guided by three strategic imperatives. First and foremost, it continues to offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity rooted in the enduring U.S. commitment to freedom. It promotes the fundamental and universal rights of free speech and assembly, the freedom to worship, the rule of law, and rights for women and minorities. It strives to isolate and marginalize violent extremists and undermine their efforts to exploit religion to rationalize their acts of terror. Finally, it fosters a sense of common interests and common values between Americans and people around the world.

The United States advances these strategic objectives by vigorously engaging foreign publics to explain and advocate American policies. Reaching foreign audiences with core policy messages on democracy, tolerance, and the universal values of liberty, justice, and respect are at the center of U.S. efforts to counter extremist rhetoric and disinformation coming from hostile groups.

The United States is promoting increased exchanges, which exemplify the transformative power of American global engagement. The significance of people-to-people exchanges has never been more clear or compelling. The 9/11 Commission Report recognizes the essential contribution exchanges make to national security. The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 reaffirms the importance of America’s commitment to exchanges.
The United States is expanding educational opportunities as the path to hope and opportunity. English language programs not only provide crucial skills but also open a window to information about the United States, its people, and its values. Americans must also better educate themselves about the world; the President’s National Strategic Languages Initiative will encourage more American students to study critical languages such as Chinese and Arabic.

Responding to and quickly debunking misinformation, conspiracy theories, and urban legends is crucial for success in the war of ideas. The State Department maintains a public “Identifying Misinformation” website, in English and Arabic, devoted to countering false stories that appear in extremist and other web sources. The site focuses on disinformation likely to end up in the mainstream media. Embassies have used information from this site to counter disinformation in extremist print publications in Pakistan and other countries. One article, “A Trio of Disinformers,” was the subject of a 1,100-word front-page article in an issue of the influential pan-Arab newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat. “Identifying Misinformation” is featured on the usinfo.state.gov website, and is listed first of 17.6 million sites in a Google search for the term “misinformation.” At least 49 websites have direct links to it.

The Internet, radio, television, and video products remain powerful tools for bringing America’s foreign policy message to worldwide audiences. The State Department produces a wide array of print and electronic materials describing for foreign audiences, in their own languages, the need to counter those who have committed or wish to commit terrorist acts, as well as the achievements made in that struggle.

The State Department’s premier web page to explain U.S. counterterrorism policy is "Response to Terrorism," created more than seven years ago and featured on usinfo.state.gov. The site is listed third out of 241 million sites in a Google search for the terms “terrorism U.S.” At least 133 websites link directly to it.

In addition to featuring articles, texts, and transcripts from key policymakers, this site provides valuable links to the Electronic Journals series, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the designated Foreign Terrorist Organization list, and the State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism. "Response to Terrorism" is located on the Internet at: http://usinfo.state.gov/is/international_security/terrorism.html.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) carries out foreign assistance programs that support key U.S. foreign policy interests and have a positive public diplomacy impact for many people in the developing world. USAID’s humanitarian aid programs and its activities in the areas of economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, and conflict prevention help reduce the risk of countries becoming breeding grounds for terrorism. In Afghanistan, USAID is helping to build a safe, stable society that meets the needs of its people and eliminates an environment in which terrorist groups have flourished. USAID has been on the front lines of support to tsunami-affected countries in South and Southeast Asia, garnering goodwill toward the United States among people in the hardest-hit areas.
Support for and understanding of the United States go hand-in-hand with strengthening and empowering the voices most credible to speak out in favor of tolerance and rule of law to counter the violent extremists’ message of hate and terror. One of public diplomacy’s greatest assets is the American people. Empowerment of individuals and groups -- from all walks of life -- is a key aspect of the Department’s public diplomacy efforts.

**Countering Terrorism on the Economic Front**

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has acted to block funding of terrorists and their supporters and to promote international cooperation against them.

On September 23, 2001, the President signed Executive Order (EO) 13224, giving the U.S. Government a powerful tool to impede terrorist funding. This executive order provides a means to disrupt the financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations by authorizing the U.S. Government to designate and block assets of foreign individuals and entities that commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism. In addition, because of the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial base of foreign terrorists, the order authorizes the U.S. Government to block the assets of individuals and entities that provide support, offer assistance to, or otherwise associate with designated terrorists and terrorist organizations. The order also covers their subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates.

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, continues to designate Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended. These designations play a critical role in the U.S. fight against terrorism, and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business. Among other consequences of such a designation, it is unlawful for U.S. citizens or any persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to provide funds or material support to a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. U.S. financial institutions are also required to freeze the funds of designated FTOs.

Executive Order and Foreign Terrorist Organization designations support U.S. efforts to curb the financing of terrorism and encourage other nations to do the same. They internationally stigmatize and isolate designated terrorist entities and individuals. They also deter donations or contributions to, and economic transactions with, named entities and individuals. In addition, they heighten public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations and signal to other governments U.S. concerns about named entities and individuals.

International cooperation remains fundamental to our common endeavors for the simple reason that most of the funds used to support terrorism are located outside the jurisdiction of the United States. International cooperation is essential to initiatives in fields ranging from intelligence and law enforcement coordination to targeted financial sanctions to norms and standards of financial regulation.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 and successor resolutions require states to impose financial and other sanctions on groups and individuals of those associated with Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban, or al-Qaida. In 2005, UNSCR 1617 was passed, clarifying what constitutes association with al-Qaida. UNSCR 1617 also "strongly urges all member states to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the FATF 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing."

UNSCR 1624, a resolution calling on states to take certain measures relating to the incitement of terrorist acts, was adopted unanimously in September 2005 at a Security Council summit as part of the UN’s response to terrorism. We are currently discussing the implementation of this resolution internationally.

In 2005, the United States and other UN members designated a number of individuals and entities:

- On January 25, the United States designated Sulayman Khalid Darwish under EO 13224. His name was added, at the request of the U.S. and Iraqi governments, to the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list of individuals and entities with links to al-Qaida that same day.

- On February 15, the U.S. Government designated Muhsin Fadhli under EO 13224. His name was added, at the request of the U.S., French, and Iraqi governments, to the 1267 Sanctions Committees' consolidated list of individuals and entities with links to al-Qaida that same day.

- On April 11, the U.S. Government submitted the name of Ibrahim Buisir to the 1267 Sanctions Committee for his support of al-Qaida. The United States had designated Buisir under EO 13224 on October 13, 2004.

- On April 13, the U.S. Government designated Bilal al-Hiyari under EO 13224. At the request of the U.S. and Iraqi governments, his name was added to the 1267 Sanctions Committee’s consolidated list of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida that same day.

- On May 4, the United States designated the Elehssan Society, the fundraising arm of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a designated entity, under EO 13224.

- The United States designated three leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) on May 12 under EO 13224. At the request of the United States and Australia, these individuals were also listed by the Sanctions Committee on May 16.

- The United States designated the Islamic Jihad Group on May 25 under EO 13224 for links to al-Qaida. At the request of the United States and Kazakhstan, this group was also listed by the Sanctions Committee on June 3.
• On July 14, the USG designated the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). On July 15, the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee added MIRA to its list for its ties to al-Qaeda.

• On September 16, the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee approved the addition of Dr. Abdul Latif Saleh to its list of individuals and entities associated with Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban, or al-Qaida. The United States domestically designated Dr. Saleh on September 19.

• On September 30, seven individuals who were acting on behalf of Egyptian Islamic Jihad were added to the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee list. The United States designated the seven individuals under EO 13224 on October 3.

• On December 6, the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee approved the request from Australia and the United States that three leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group be added to its list of individuals and entities associated with Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban, or al-Qaida. The United States domestically designated the three, Jainal Antel Sali Jr., Radulan Sahiron, and Isnilon Hapilon, on November 30.

• On December 6, the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee approved adding Lokman Amin Mohammed, Dieman Abdulkadir Izzat, Kawa Hamawandi, Ata Abdoulaziz Rashid, Rafik Mohamad Yousef, Mazen Ali Hussein, Ibrahim Mohamed Khalil, and Yasser Abu Shaweesh to its list of individuals and entities associated with Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban, or al-Qaida. The United States designated these individuals on December 5 under EO 13224.

As of December 31, 2005, the United States has designated since 2001 a total of 424 individuals and entities as terrorists, their financiers, or facilitators; the global community has frozen more than $150 million in terrorist-related assets.

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering

Throughout the year, the United States also continued to work closely with multilateral partners in numerous counterterrorist financing tracks, including the Counterterrorism Committee of the United Nations, the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and the Counterterrorism Assistance Group (CTAG), as well as in international financial institutions. In addition, the United States agreed with the European Union in June on a Declaration on Combating Terrorism that ratified a wide-ranging set of counterterrorism initiatives, including a commitment to establish a regular dialogue on terrorism finance between the European Union and the United States. Since its launch in September 2004, the dialogue has served as the framework for ongoing exchanges to promote information sharing and cooperation on FATF and on technical assistance issues.

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund have also pledged to provide countries with training to increase their capacity to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.
Key to our success in tackling terrorism finance is effective U.S. interagency coordination. This strong interagency teamwork involves the intelligence agencies and the law enforcement community, led by the FBI, as well as State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Justice, and Defense collectively pursuing an understanding of the system of financial backers, facilitators and intermediaries that play a role in this shadowy financial world. As appropriate, interagency members also draw on the expertise of financial regulators.

Interagency coordination has also served as the foundation for the international cooperation, which the United States has worked hard to develop in a variety of settings and with a variety of tools. Our efforts encompass building political will of partners, public outreach, sanctions implementation, law enforcement, intelligence-gathering, financial regulation, standard-setting and training and technical assistance.

**Terrorist Finance Working Group**

The Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) is composed of various agencies throughout the U.S. Government, and was convened in October 2001 to develop and provide counterterrorism finance training to countries deemed most vulnerable to terrorist financing. The Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs co-chair the TFWG, which meets on a bi-weekly basis to receive intelligence briefings, schedule assessments, review assessment reports, and discuss the development and implementation of technical assistance and training programs.

**Addressing New Threats and International Requirements**

**Cash Courier Training**

In response to the development of new international standards against the growing threat of illicit cash couriers and bulk cash smuggling, the State Department worked with the interagency Terror Finance Working Group to develop a training course on interdicting bulk cash smuggling. This course provided operational training to foreign customs officers, investigators, and other officials on the detection, interdiction, analysis, investigation, and seizure of illicit cross-border cash used to facilitate terrorism and criminal activities. The training, conducted in three Middle Eastern countries, emphasized the need to investigate the source, destination, and organization behind cash smuggling, and stressed FATF requirements on reporting of outbound/inbound currency and working with Financial Intelligence Units. Based on the vulnerabilities uncovered during this training, one country moved aggressively to implement new laws and regulations. Due to high demand, the State Department is planning to increase the number of courses offered and to provide this training to countries in other geographical regions.
Advanced Financial Crimes Training

In November, the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, and the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training co-sponsored a regional seminar, “Combating Advanced Financial Crimes.” The State Department and the TFWG supported and funded U.S. participation in this event. Two hundred fifty representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council attended the seminar. Participants included representatives from public prosecutors offices, Central Bank authorities, Customs officials, Financial Intelligence Units, and banking sector representatives, as well as officials from the Ministries of State Security, Finance, Justice, Interior, and Commerce. The seminar provided an opportunity for Gulf Cooperation Council countries to share information about how criminals, including terrorists and terrorist organizations, abuse financial systems. The seminar also provided tools to improve the region’s ability to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate these sophisticated financial crimes.

OSCE Conference on Terrorist Financing

The State Department funded an OSCE conference in Vienna designed to share best practices and discuss combating terrorist financing policy. The 180 participants addressed a broad range of terrorist financing topics, including UN Security Council requirements and FATF standards, building effective domestic regimes, developing Financial Intelligence Units, best practices in prosecuting terrorist financing cases, and safeguarding charities from abuse. The conference already has resulted in the development of improved legislation in OSCE member states.

Three Plus One Security Initiative: Conference on the Role of Financial Intelligence Units in Combating Bulk Cash Smuggling and the Illicit Use of Charities

With State Department funding and TFWG support, the United States participated in the “3+1” Security Dialogue with the Triborder Area nations of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Representatives from the 3+1 Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and other related experts shared experiences and discussed the challenges that the FIUs face in combating terrorist financing and money laundering related to bulk cash smuggling and the abuse of charities. Noting the need for strategic regional analysis by FIUs, the participants endorsed and began implementing a Trade Transparency Unit that uses shared regional import and export data to detect anomalies that may indicate illicit financial activity. The sharing of this data began in 2005.

Countering Terrorism on the Consular Front

The State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs continues to play an important role in countering global terrorism by incorporating biometrics, fingerprint matching, and facial recognition software into passport and visa systems. The passport and visa application processes represent choke points where international terrorists encounter U. S. Government
officials in order to travel. Consular processes are potent opportunities to disrupt terrorist travel. Since the beginning of the Biometric Visa Program in 2004, the fingerprints of more than 17,000 visa applicants have been matched negatively against the DHS fingerprint watch list bringing to light derogatory information. In almost all cases, the visas were denied. Moreover, collecting fingerprints at the time of visa issuance and sending the fingerprints to DHS to be used for identity verification when the person presents the visa at the U.S. port of entry has essentially eliminated the problem of imposters entering the United States with visas issued to other persons. The Department has also added significant counterterrorism training and emphasis on fraudulent and interview instruction. The continuing challenges, outlined below, vary in each geographical region.

**Africa:** Consular officers in many African posts regularly see previously denied visa applicants returning with new passports under new identities in an effort to circumvent the name-check system. The ease with which applicants can obtain new identities and passports is alarming. The introduction of fingerprint matching for all visa applicants in 2004 has proven effective in combating this type of identity fraud.

**East Asia and Pacific:** Consular officers in East Asia face challenges related to document and imposter fraud. Document fraud varies from unsophisticated attempts to support visa applications to major fraudulent document production centers, often designed to provide documents to international organized crime, including terrorism and alien smuggling syndicates. The introduction of fingerprint matching technology in the visa process has helped reduce identity fraud.

**Europe and Eurasia:** Consular officers in Western and Central Europe generally do not see many cases of identity fraud. European passports, especially those issued by EU countries, meet the highest security standards. Nonetheless, with much of Europe participating in the Visa Waiver Program, a forged or stolen European passport has great potential value. While identity documents may be illegally obtained in some countries, the level of corruption in most of Europe remains low. In addition, all visa applicants are now subject to biometric fingerprinting, which enables consular officers to catch identity fraud by repeat applicants.

Further east, the risk of fraud is higher, since the passports in this region vary in quality. The Baltic states and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, have produced more secure passport books in the last year. However, older passports from these countries, as well as the rest of the region, can easily be altered. As the newly independent states centralize their passport offices and strengthen their governmental systems, the quality of passports should improve. Fraud identified by consular sections is primarily with the use of civil documents by desperate economic immigrants.

**Near East:** Visa processing at American embassies in the Near East presents a variety of challenges. Similarity in names throughout the region results in the return of large numbers of hits against terrorist watch list databases. In addition, naming conventions vary considerably from traditional Western practices, and the use of actual birth dates has not been given much importance in the region until very recently. Differences in transliteration systems, particularly between English and French systems, result in widely different spellings...
on passports in the Latin alphabet from the original Arabic. Although Near East posts do not see a significant number of passports issued with false identities, it is quite possible for travelers to obtain legitimate passports with considerable differences in names and dates of birth, facilitating ease of travel for criminal applicants, including terrorists. The use of fingerprint matching since 2004 in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security has greatly aided the verification of identity. This process was further boosted with the more recent addition of facial recognition matching.

**South Asia:** Central government control of passports and basic civil documents is weak throughout South Asia. Since most vital statistics and other biographic information are maintained at the provincial level, assuming a fraudulent identity is easily achieved. Advancements in the use of biometrics in the visa process have proved to be the strongest measure to thwart impostor and identity fraud.

**Western Hemisphere:** Consular officers in the Western Hemisphere have always experienced a high level of visa applicants bearing fraudulent documentation. The majority of these cases are from individuals seeking to travel to the United States for economic opportunities; the fraud is often in the supporting documentation rather than the actual identity or passport. Biometric collection for visa applicants first started in 1998 with the introduction of the border-crossing card in Mexico; therefore, consular officers in Mexico are able to compare fingerprints for visa applicants going back almost eight years. There are indications that some countries in the region are working to improve their passport security and visa systems, including Mexico’s new biometric visas and an Argentine initiative to install facial recognition for its passport program and at all ports of entry. Regardless, corruption at various levels throughout the region could lead to compromised integrity of the passport issuing process.

**The Rewards for Justice Program**

Under the Rewards for Justice Program, the Secretary of State may offer rewards of up to $25 million for information that prevents or favorably resolves acts of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or property worldwide. Rewards of up to $25 million have been authorized for information leading to the capture of Usama bin Ladin and other key al-Qaida leaders. Rewards also may be paid for information leading to the arrest or conviction of terrorists attempting, committing, conspiring to commit, or aiding and abetting in the commission of acts of international terrorism.

Since the program's inception in 1984, the United States has paid more than $62 million to more than 40 people who provided credible information that put terrorists behind bars or prevented acts of international terrorism worldwide.

In August, a $5 million Rewards for Justice payment, authorized by Secretary Rice, was made to a source that provided assistance in the arrest and conviction of several leaders of a major terrorist group. It resulted in the significant disruption of the group's activities and
capabilities. Two additional rewards, totaling more than a half million dollars, were also approved for payment in 2005.

Anyone with information on any past or planned act of international terrorism against the United States anywhere in the world is urged to contact the nearest FBI office or the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security by any of the following means:

Internet: www.rewardsforjustice.net
Telephone: 1-800-877-3927 (works from some overseas locations)
Mail: Rewards for Justice
       Washington, DC 20522-0303

Persons located overseas may also contact the Regional Security Officer at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate.

**The Container Security Initiative (CSI)**

The Container Security Initiative (CSI) aims to ensure that maritime cargo containers posing a terrorism risk are identified and examined at foreign ports before they are shipped to the United States. About 90 percent of the world’s trade is transported in such cargo containers; in the United States, almost half of incoming trade (by value) arrives by containers onboard ships. More than nine million cargo containers arrive by sea and are offloaded at U.S. seaports each year.

The Container Security Initiative was founded on four core elements:

- Using intelligence and automated information to identify and target containers that pose a risk for terrorism;
- Pre-screening those containers that pose a risk at the port of departure before they arrive at U.S. ports;
- Using detection technology to quickly pre-screen containers that pose a risk; and
- Using smarter, tamper-evident containers.

Under the CSI program, U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers are deployed to work with host nation counterparts to target all containers that pose a potential threat for terrorism. As of December, 26 customs administrations have agreed to participate in CSI, and it is now operational in 42 ports worldwide. Approximately 75 percent of cargo containers headed to the United States originate in or are transshipped from CSI ports. At that point, approximately 90 percent of all trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific cargo imported into the United States will be subjected to pre-screening.
In a reciprocal program, CSI offers participating customs authorities the opportunity to send their own customs officers to major U.S. ports to target ocean-going containerized cargo destined for their ports. Likewise, the United States shares information on a bilateral basis with its CSI partners. As part of reciprocal CSI agreements, Japan and Canada currently station customs personnel in U.S. ports.

Currently Operational CSI Ports:

In the Americas:
- Montreal, Vancouver, and Halifax, Canada
- Santos, Brazil
- Buenos Aires, Argentina

In Europe:
- Rotterdam, The Netherlands
- Bremerhaven and Hamburg, Germany
- Antwerp and Zeebrugge, Belgium
- Le Havre and Marseille, France
- Gothenburg, Sweden
- La Spezia, Genoa, Naples, Gioia Tauro, and Livorno, Italy
- Felixstowe, Liverpool, Thamesport, Tilbury, and Southampton, United Kingdom
- Piraeus, Greece
- Algeciras, Spain
- Lisbon, Portugal

In Asia:
- Singapore
- Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kobe, Japan
- Hong Kong
- Pusan, South Korea
- Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia
- Laem Chabang, Thailand
- Shanghai and Shenzen, China
- Kaohsiung, Taiwan
- Colombo, Sri Lanka

In Africa and the Middle East:
- Durban, South Africa
- Dubai, United Arab Emirates

International Conventions and Protocols

1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft
   Signed in Tokyo on September 14, 1963.
Convention entered into force on December 4, 1969.
Status: 180 Parties

2. **Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft**
   Convention entered into force on October 14, 1971.
   Status: 181 Parties

3. **Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation**
   Signed in Montreal on September 23, 1971.
   Status: 183 Parties

4. **Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents**
   Convention entered into force on February 20, 1977.
   Status: 159 Parties

5. **International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages**
   Adopted in New York on December 17, 1979.
   Convention entered into force on June 3, 1983.
   Status: 153 Parties

6. **Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material**
   Signed in Vienna on October 26, 1979.
   Status: 116 Parties

   Done in Montreal on September 23, 1971.
   Signed in Montreal on February 24, 1988.
   Status: 156 Parties

8. **Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation**
   Done in Rome on March 10, 1988.
   Status: 134 Parties
9. **Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf**
   Done in Rome on March 10, 1988.
   Status: 123 Parties

10. **Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection**
    Done in Montreal on March 1, 1991.
    Status: 123 Parties

11. **International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings**
    Status: 145 Parties

12. **International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism**
    Adopted in New York on December 9, 1999.
    Convention entered into force on April 10, 2002.
    Status: 150 Parties

    Not yet entered into force (open for signatures from September 14, 2005 until December 31, 2006).
    Status: 100 signatories, no ratifications
(r) – date of deposit of instrument of ratification;
(A) – date of deposit of instrument of approval;
(AA) – date of deposit of instrument of ratification;
(a) – date of deposit of instrument of accession;
(s) – date of deposit of instrument of succession;
(sign.) – State has signed, but not yet ratified the instrument;
* – declaration/reservation/statement (upon signature or ratification; simple notifications, declarations with character of notification, withdrawn reservations and objections to reservations were not included in this table);
--- – no action

**International Conventions And Protocols On Terrorism**

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The information in this document is drawn exclusively from information compiled by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, based on information made available by the depositaries. The dates refer to the deposit of the respective instrument.

Countries which accessed or ratified 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7 & 6 or less conventions:
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Chapter 5

COUNTRY REPORTS

Africa Overview

“We, the African leaders attending the meeting between the G8 and Africa, are deeply distressed by the terrorist attacks that occurred in London yesterday, 7 July 2005. We are particularly saddened by the loss of life and seize this opportunity to condemn in no uncertain terms such mindless acts of terrorism. We are pleased that our interlocutors have affirmed their resolve not to be diverted by these terrorist acts. We join them in that resolve. We convey our heartfelt sympathy to the bereaved families and the government of the United Kingdom, and we reaffirm our solidarity in the fight against terrorism.”

Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria
G8 Summit, Gleneagles
July 8, 2005

A small number of al-Qaida operatives in East Africa, particularly Somalia, continued to pose the most serious threat to American and allied interests in the region. Though it is unclear to what extent terrorist groups were present and operating in west and central Africa, the fundraising, terrorist recruiting, and other support activities of al-Qaida and affiliated persons and groups in South Africa, Nigeria, and across the Trans-Sahara region remained a serious concern. Terrorist recruitment within the Trans-Sahara, and increasing signs of cooperation between terrorist organizations and al-Qaida, was another disturbing trend. Hizballah continued to engage in fundraising activities in Africa, particularly in West Africa, but did not engage in any terrorist attacks within the region. Anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric from Islamic radicals grew in Africa in 2005. Many African governments improved their cooperation and strengthened their efforts in the war on terrorism. Both the African Union (AU) and African regional organizations undertook initiatives to improve counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing.

There were few significant international terrorist incidents in Africa, but civil conflict and ethnic violence continued in a number of countries. On June 4, members of the Sahel faction of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) attacked the remote Mauritanian military outpost at el-Mreiti, killing at least 15 Mauritanian soldiers and wounding at least an equal number. The Mauritanian Government launched military operations, in cooperation with Algeria and Mali, against the GSPC terrorists. Those operations resulted in several clashes with the GSPC and inflicted an unknown number of casualties on the terrorist organization.

Members of the GSPC continued to operate in the Sahel region, crossing difficult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and Chad to recruit extremists within the region for training and terrorist operations in the Trans-Sahara, and possibly for operations
outside the region. With the help of USG-funded training, these countries have increasingly cooperated against the GSPC.

The situation in Somalia remained a concern, as the country’s unsecured borders and political instability provided a potential transit point and safe haven for terrorists.

**The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative**

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) is a multi-faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at defeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region’s security forces, promoting democratic governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinforcing bilateral military ties with the United States. The overall goals are to enhance the indigenous capacities of governments in the pan-Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to confront the challenge posed by terrorist organizations in the region, and to facilitate cooperation between those countries and our Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in the global war on terror.

The need for TSCTI stemmed from concern over the potential for expansion of operations by Islamic terrorist organizations in the Sahel. TSCTI was developed as a follow-on to the very successful Pan-Sahel Initiative, which focused solely on the states of the Sahel. Ongoing concern that Islamist terrorists continue to seek to create safe havens and support networks in the remote expanses of the Sahel, as well as the public affiliation of some terrorist groups with al-Qaida, led to its formal approval by the U.S. Government in early 2005.

TSCTI was originally envisioned as a five-year program based on counterterrorism, democratic governance assistance, a public diplomacy component, and military assistance.

TSCTI’s main elements include:

- **Counterterrorism (CT) programs** to create a new regional focus for trans-Saharan cooperation, including use of established regional organizations like the African Union and its new Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. These programs include training to improve border and aviation security and overall CT readiness;
- **Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) activities** in the trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs;
- **Public diplomacy programs** that expand outreach efforts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, Nigeria, and Senegal and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse region. Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most African Muslim communities and countering the development of extremism, particularly in youth and rural populations;
- **Democratic governance programs** that strive, in particular, to provide adequate levels of USG support for democratic and economic development in the Sahel, strengthening those states to withstand internal threats; and
Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence sharing.

African Union

The African Union (AU) has several counterterrorism legal instruments, including a Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), a 2002 Protocol to the Convention, and a 2004 Plan of Action. The Addis Ababa-based AU Commission provided guidance to its 53 member states' ratification and implementation of continental and international counterterrorism commitments; it also coordinated assistance to cover member states' counterterrorism gaps.

AU member state and regional "focal points" for counterterrorism approved the AU's African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism's (ACSRT) program of action in June. The Algiers-based ACSRT was inaugurated in October 2004 to serve as a think tank, an information collection and dissemination center, and a regional training center. The AU is working with member states to eliminate redundancies between the ACSRT and the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA), which was established at the January AU Summit in Abuja. The Department of State and the National Defense University's Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) collaborated with the AU to run counterterrorism workshops.

With Danish funding, the AU recently hired a consultant to draft a counterterrorism Model Law to serve as a template. This would assist member states in drafting legislation to implement counterterrorism commitments. The Model Law will also address money laundering and other terrorism-related topics.

The AU maintained that Africa's colonial legacy made it difficult to accept a definition of terrorism that excluded an exception for "freedom fighters." Still, the AU is on record strongly condemning acts of terrorism, such as those that occurred in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, and London.

Although AU Commission political will to act as an effective counterterrorism partner is strong, capacity remains relatively weak. The AU seeks to create a counterterrorism unit at its headquarters to promote member state counterterrorism efforts more effectively. The AU welcomes technical and financial assistance from international partners/donors to bolster both AU headquarters and ACSRT activities approved by member states. AU counterterrorism websites are www.africa-union.org/terrorism/terrorism2.html and www.caert.org.dz.
Comoros

International terrorism concerns in Comoros focused upon Comorian national Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun Fazul), suspected of involvement in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa. His whereabouts are unknown, but he may have continued contacts in and/or travel to Comoros.

It is possible that terrorist suspects transited or sought safe haven in Comoros, as Comorian security forces had limited resources and training in counterterrorism and maritime security. The government has shown a consistent effort to improve its counterterrorism measures, including participation in U.S. training programs and cooperation with the Rewards for Justice Program.

The Comorian Government and local religious leaders disapprove of Islamic extremism and have stopped taking money from suspect Islamic charities. In an effort to discourage students from attending radical schools abroad, the government established the University of Comoros in 2003.

Djibouti

Djibouti hosted the only U.S. military base in Sub-Saharan Africa, along with forces from other Coalition nations, and remained a staunch supporter of U.S. and Coalition counterterrorism efforts. Djibouti was one of the most forward-leaning Arab League members supporting ongoing efforts against terrorism.

President Ismail Omar Guelleh and many top leaders in Djibouti repeatedly expressed their country's full and unqualified support for the global war on terror. Djibouti was one of the very first Arab League nations to do so, even in the face of adversity and criticism from its neighbors. President Guelleh publicly expressed his support and was responsive to all U.S. requests.

U.S. security personnel continued to work closely with Djiboutian counterparts to monitor intelligence and follow up prospective terrorism-related leads. This close relationship developed into a network of information with immediate and positive results. While their capabilities were limited, Djiboutian counterparts were very proactive, and were highly receptive and responsive to U.S. requests for cooperation.

The Djiboutian National Security Services took extraordinary measures with its limited resources to ensure the safety and security of American citizens, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonier.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia devoted high-level attention to the fight against terrorism and continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. As evidence of its political will to fight
terrorism, the Government of Ethiopia agreed to a number of new initiatives and continued to cooperate in efforts to collect and share intelligence on terrorist groups. As a developing nation with constrained resources in a volatile region, Ethiopia has limited, but increasing, capabilities to address terrorism threats. Draft counterterrorism legislation is currently before Parliament for approval.

Ethiopia did not provide sanctuary or offer political or financial support to any terrorist groups, and there were no significant terrorist incidents directed against U.S. citizens in Ethiopia. Ethiopia made a concerted effort to eliminate the ability of any terrorist groups to operate in the country. U.S. Army Special Forces and the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) continued to provide training to enhance Ethiopian border patrol and security skills. The Ethiopian Government enhanced physical security, conducted investigations, and provided protective surveillance in response to threat information directed at U.S. citizens.

Ethiopia accommodated requests for arrest warrants on terrorist suspects if local evidence of wrongdoing existed. The country has a good record of cooperation on extradition requests. Ethiopia is expanding the modern immigration security system installed with USG assistance at Addis Ababa Bole International Airport.

The highest levels of the Ethiopian Government displayed increased recognition of Ethiopia's vulnerability to financial crimes, including terrorist financing and counterfeiting. The penal code passed in 2005 criminalized money laundering and a number of other financial crimes for the first time. Officials from the Ethiopian Department of Justice attended a Department of Treasury and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) anti-money laundering (AML) seminar in Addis Ababa. The Central Bank (National Bank of Ethiopia) drafted specific AML legislation that included establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit. Ethiopian PM Meles declared hawalas, an informal money-transfer system, illegal following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, and Ethiopia continued to take action aimed at eliminating the ability of hawalas to function as terrorist financing centers.

Ethiopia's recently renamed National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS, formerly known as SIRA) combined the duties of counterparts to the CIA, FBI, DHS, BICE, State/Consular Affairs, and the Secret Service. NISS was responsible for overall counterterrorism management. Federal and local police counterterrorism capabilities were primarily focused on response to terrorist incidents.

Ethiopia actively participated in African Union (AU) counterterrorism efforts, nominated a focal point for the AU's Center for Study and Research on Terrorism, and participated in
meetings of the new Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa. Ethiopia ratified AU counterterrorism conventions and protocols. In addition, Ethiopia was active in Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) counterterrorism efforts.

Kenya

The Government of Kenya continued to cooperate with the United States in identifying terrorist groups operating within Kenya. However, more work remains to be done in domestic areas such as law enforcement, enacting counterterrorism legislation, and prosecution of alleged terror suspects.

Kenya registered little to no progress toward the overall strengthening of its capabilities to combat terrorism, prosecute terror suspects, or respond to emergencies. The Government of Kenya disbanded the U.S.-supported Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), set up in 2004 to improve police and prosecutors’ ability to cooperate on counterterrorism issues. The Government of Kenya did not engage in a national discussion to sensitize the public to terrorism issues, nor did it finalize a national counterterrorism strategy.

The Kenyan Government did arrest terrorist suspects and disrupt terrorist operations. In November, four men were arrested in October for allegedly funding terror activities; and one man was arrested in December in Northeastern Province for possession of a rocket launcher and rocket-propelled grenades, with the alleged intent of smuggling them to Mombasa.

In a setback to counterterrorist efforts, however, seven terror suspects -- arrested in November 2003 on charges related to the Kikambala hotel bombing and attempted shooting-down of an Israeli airplane in November 2002, the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, and a 2003 plot to attack the new U.S. Embassy -- were acquitted in June 2005. No one was successfully prosecuted for these terrorist acts in 2005.

There was insufficient coordination among police, prosecutors, and other relevant government ministries that deal with terrorism issues. The U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Officer, in conjunction with the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program, continued to focus on increasing the Kenyan Government's capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism.

Kenya lacked counterterrorism legislation, and its current laws made it difficult to prosecute terror suspects. For example, the Evidence Act of 2002 said that any confessions not made before a magistrate are inadmissible. The government passed a “Miscellaneous Bill” that amended the Evidence Act. The new law stated that a confession could be made in front of a judge, magistrate, or senior police officer. The government redrafted the Suppression of Terrorism Bill after a two-year hiatus, but did not table the new bill in Parliament.

In April 2003, Kenya published a draft "Suppression of Terrorism Bill,” only to withdraw it after harsh criticism from human rights groups and Kenyan Muslim communities. The Kenyan Government wrote a new draft but did not officially publish the document or submit it to Parliament. In a similar fashion, Kenya drafted but has not yet submitted to Parliament
the anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance legislation needed to bring the
country into compliance with relevant UN resolutions.

The Kenyan Government continued to improve aviation security through the Kenya Airport
Authority (KAA) and the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA). The FAA and TSA
trained managers and inspectors to better oversee and maintain security procedures and
planning. However, consistent enforcement of security procedures and planning remained a
challenge. Under the Safe Skies program, the FAA helped Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania
update and harmonize safety regulations to create a regional civil aviation safety structure and
a regional civil aviation security structure. The World Bank is also moving forward on
projects to improve airport access controls, perimeter fencing, and the terminal building
structure.

Madagascar

President Ravalomanana reaffirmed Madagascar’s support for the global war on terror in
speeches at the UN General Assembly, other international events, and domestic events.
International terrorism is a concern in all Indian Ocean nations because of the proximity of the
Republic of Comoros, where terrorist suspects may transit or seek safe haven. Madagascar's
3,000-mile coastline is inadequately monitored. Limited equipment, personnel, and training
for border control increased the risks of penetration. The Ministry of Defense, with President
Ravalomanana's support, is trying to take the lead on regional security in the Indian Ocean
and has already made efforts to improve information sharing with its neighbors.

Malagasy police, military, intelligence, and security forces have little background and training
in counterterrorism and maritime surveillance. Despite limited resources, government
officials were willing to cooperate with the United States; one example was the successful
launch of the Rewards for Justice Program. At the main port in Tamatave, which handles 80
percent of Madagascar’s maritime traffic, steps were taken to improve access control and
overall security.

The Ministry of Justice, with UN support, organized a three-day workshop in August to draft
an action plan for the implementation of UN counterterrorism conventions and additional
antiterrorism legislation to reinforce laws already in place.

Mali

Mali worked to combat terrorism and was responsive on terrorist finance issues. The
government regularly distributed terrorist finance watch lists to the banking system, but has
not discovered or frozen any terrorist assets to date.

The Malian Government was receptive to U.S. assistance in strengthening control of its
borders and countering the presence of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
in northern Mali. The country was a principal recipient of Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) training
and support. Mali will continue to receive assistance through the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Initiative.
Mali

Mali is a landlocked country located in West Africa with a population of approximately 15 million people. It is bordered by 12 countries and has a diverse geography ranging from deserts in the north to rainforests in the south. The capital city, Bamako, is located in the central part of the country. The Malian economy is largely dependent on agriculture, mining, and tourism, with cotton being the major export. The country faces significant challenges including poverty, unemployment, and political instability.

French is the official language of Mali, but Arabic and Wolof are also widely spoken. The majority of the population follows the Islamic faith, although traditional animist practices also exist.

Mali has a complex history marked by colonialism, independence, and regional conflicts. It has experienced several coup d'états and transitions to democracy, with the current president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, having been in power since 2013. The country faces ongoing challenges related to terrorism and extremism, which have led to a significant presence of Islamic fundamentalist groups.

The Malian government has taken steps to address these challenges, including the establishment of the National Committee for the Fight against Terrorism (CNCT) in 2015. The CNCT is responsible for coordinating efforts against terrorism, extremism, and organized crime.

In conclusion, Mali’s geography, economy, and history provide a complex backdrop for understanding its current challenges and priorities. The country’s success in addressing these issues will be crucial for its future stability and development.
States and Mauritania, it is likely that the present transitional government would facilitate any U.S. requests for assistance.

Mauritania's transitional government faced terrorist threats from two groups: the GSPC and the Mauritanian Group for Preaching and Jihad (GMPJ). The GSPC presented a heightened threat to the Government of Mauritania and an emerging threat to the limited U.S. interests in the region because of its possible cooperation with al-Qaida through Zarqawi and other terrorist groups in the trans-Sahara region.

The GMPJ is a newer terrorist organization that was founded in 2000 by Ahmed Ould el-Khory. The exact size and areas of operation for the GMPJ are unknown, but its focus appears to be Mauritania. Several of the 19 Islamists currently in prison in Nouakchott are purportedly members of the GSPC or the GMPJ and are accused of direct or indirect association with terrorist activities.

**Nigeria**

Nigeria has taken a leading counterterrorism role in West Africa, the sub-region where its diplomatic and political influence is most pronounced. Nigeria took the lead in the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) and the African Union in sponsoring joint intelligence and security conferences on counterterrorism. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), an organization founded by President Obasanjo and other African heads of state, condemned terrorism and called for African nations to take concrete measures to combat it.

Nigerian security services were particularly cooperative and proactive when asked to investigate potential terrorist threats to U.S. interests. Nigerian intelligence and security services worked hard to improve intelligence sharing on counterterrorism issues, and the Nigerian military worked to establish units with counterterrorism capability.

Nigeria consistently lent diplomatic support to Coalition efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaida, despite the domestic political ramifications in a country that is home to Africa's largest Muslim population.

Nigeria backed UN Resolutions 1267, 1333, and 1368. It also initiated legislative and regulatory steps to shore up its anti-money laundering regime to fight terrorism.

While current criminal law does not contain specific counterterrorism provisions, the penal code proscribed acts of violence that include terrorism. In August, the Nigerian cabinet approved a draft counterterrorism bill and sent it to the National Assembly for consideration. Under the new legislation, anyone convicted of a terrorist offense could be sentenced up to 35 years in prison. However, the National Assembly had not acted on the bill by the end of 2005.

There was no special examining magistrate with specific powers in the counterterrorism area. In Nigeria, suspects by law must be charged within 48 hours, but in practice can be held as
long as deemed necessary. Most criminals are photographed and fingerprinted by security elements, but DNA samples are not taken due to resource constraints and a lack of scientific knowledge.

While the Nigerian Government does not support international terrorism or terrorists, there are some individuals and private groups in Nigeria with ties to terrorist sources in Sudan, Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. Members of terrorist groups, including al-Qaida and the GSPC, have operated and recruited in Nigeria.

Rwanda

The Rwandan Government made efforts to combat terrorism financing and continued to increase its border control measures to identify potential terrorists. Rwanda has an intergovernmental counterterrorism committee and a counterterrorism reaction team in its police intelligence unit. Central Bank and Ministry of Finance officials continued to provide outstanding cooperation on terrorist financing issues. Rwanda participated in regional initiatives on international counterterrorism cooperation, including active participation in the East African Stand-by Brigade.

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR, known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda, ALIR, until 2001) -- an armed rebel force, including former soldiers and supporters of the previous government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide -- continued to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwanda pressed for international action to pursue the FDLR. An ALIR unit was responsible for the kidnapping and murder of nine persons, including two U.S. tourists, in Bwindi Park in 1999. The Rwandan Government continued to assist U.S. law enforcement officials seeking to prosecute three suspects in the attack who were transferred to the United States for prosecution in 2003. The Rwandan Government provided original documents requested by the U.S. Justice Department and allowed two Rwandan officials to travel to the United States to testify at the trial of the suspects. The suspects await trial.

Senegal

The Government of Senegal’s law enforcement and intelligence entities responded appropriately to all perceived terrorism threats, and shared information with U.S. counterparts. Senegal’s continued support of the global war on terror has furthered Senegal's reputation as an example of political and religious moderation in the Muslim world.

As beneficiaries of the TSCTI, Senegalese officials received training from the U.S. ATA program, hosted the command post portion of U.S. European Command (EUCOM)–sponsored Operation Flintlock, and participated in a EUCOM-sponsored seminar in Ghana on conflict prevention and combating terrorism.
President Abdoulaye Wade met several times with Imam Mamour Fall, a Senegalese cleric deported from Italy in 2003 for publicly praising Bin Ladin and terrorism, to firmly counsel “moderation.” President Wade also criticized members of the Senegalese press for inaccurately exaggerating the level of public support for extremism.

The Government of Senegal affirmed its commitment to USG-assisted efforts to augment its border security. However, lack of computer literacy within the police forces and problems with local technical support posed obstacles. Senegal's borders remained porous and ill-equipped to prevent cross-border traffic for illicit purposes.

The Government of Senegal eschewed law enforcement and/or military action that it perceived might renew conflict with Movement of Democratic Forces of the Casamance (MFDC) rebels in the Casamance region of southern Senegal.

**Sierra Leone**

Sierra Leone’s armed forces focused on border control, as incursions resulting from potential unrest in neighboring countries remained a threat. Sierra Leone did not identify any terrorist organizations within its borders.

**Somalia**

Somalia’s lack of a functioning central government, protracted state of violent instability, long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula made it a potential location for international terrorists seeking a transit or launching point to conduct operations elsewhere.

Regional efforts to bring about national reconciliation and establish peace and stability in Somalia are ongoing. Although the ability of Somali local and regional authorities to carry out counterterrorism activities is constrained, some have taken limited actions in this direction.

While numerous Islamist groups engaged in a broad range of activities operate inside Somalia, few of these organizations have any known links to terrorist activities. Movements such as Harakat al-Islah (al-Islah), Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa (ASWJ), and Majma Ulimadda Islaamka ee Soomaaliya (Majma') sought power by political rather than violent means and pursued political action via missionary or charity work. Missionary Islamists, such as followers of the Tablighi sect and the “New Salafis” generally renounce explicit political activism. Other Islamist organizations became providers of basic health, education, and commercial services, and were perceived by some as pursuing a strategy to take political power.

In the 1990s, members of the Somalia-based al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) periodically committed terrorist acts, primarily in Ethiopia. AIAI rose to prominence following the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, with the goal of creating a pan-Somali
Islamic state in the Horn of Africa. In recent years the existence of a coherent entity operating as AIAI has become difficult to prove. At most, AIAI was highly factionalized and diffuse, and its membership difficult to define. Some elements associated with the former AIAI are sympathetic to al-Qaida and maintained ties with it, and may continue to pose a threat to U.S. and Western interests in the region.

Other shadowy groups that have appeared in Somalia are suspected of having committed terrorist acts against Western interests in the region, or considered capable of doing so. Very little is known about movements such as al-Takfir wal-Hijra (al-Takfīr), but the extremist ideology and violent character of takfiri groups elsewhere suggest that the movement merits close monitoring.

South Africa

South Africa publicly continued to support the global war on terror, and shared financial, law enforcement, and limited intelligence information with the United States. President Mbeki on several occasions voiced his opinion that "no circumstances whatsoever can ever justify resorting to terrorism." Members of Parliament from all political parties, including Muslim legislators, have echoed Mbeki's sentiments. South Africa, however, has resource constraints that limited the extent of its ability to fund its counterterrorist initiatives.

The South African Parliament adopted broad counterterrorism legislation under the title "Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Bill" on November 12, 2004. President Mbeki signed the legislation in April and put it into effect May 2. Both the ruling ANC and opposition parties in both chambers of South Africa's bicameral legislature supported the final version of the bill. The Act clearly defined terrorism and specifically criminalized terrorist activities in application of South Africa’s international obligations. It also prescribed penalties of up to 15 years in prison or a fine up to R100 million ($18 million) for those convicted. Small revisions protecting the rights of strikers and protesters were inserted during final deliberation on the bill, which was regarded as a strong step forward in South Africa's counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, the government's Financial Intelligence Center, established in 2003, received 15,757 suspicious transaction reports between April 1, 2004, and March 31, 2005.

Fraudulent documents remained a significant problem for South African authorities. Although South African documents often contain good security measures, efforts to limit the accessibility of passports and identity documents to potential terrorists are limited by resources and corruption in the Department of Home Affairs.

The South African Government distinguishes between "terrorist organizations" and "liberation movements," as the ruling African National Congress was long branded a terrorist group during the struggle against apartheid. Popular attitudes generally reflect that distinction.

It is unclear to what extent terrorist groups were present in South Africa. Many analysts believed al-Qaida and other extremist groups have a presence within South Africa's generally moderate Muslim community for fundraising and other support activities. The South African
Government did not extend diplomatic recognition or provide any material assistance to terrorists.

**Tanzania**

Tanzania took significant steps to establish a National Counterterrorism Center. The purpose of this Center was to build Tanzania's capacity to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. The Center included members of the police and military.

Tanzania continued to work closely with the United States to disrupt terrorist networks and prevent further acts of terrorism. Tanzanian law enforcement cooperated with the United States to exchange evidence and testimony on cases related to the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy.

Tanzania continued to participate in several multi-year programs to strengthen its law enforcement and military capacity, improve aviation and border security, and combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Tanzania's police force continued to participate in numerous training courses as part of a long-term effort to build Tanzania's law enforcement capacity. Through the ATA program and the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), more than 100 police officers trained in courses including criminal investigation, crisis response, and combating transnational terrorism and small arms trafficking.

Tanzania's military increased its participation in the Department of Defense-sponsored Counterterrorism Fellowship Program. Participation in the program will enable Tanzania to develop a cadre of military officers trained in combating terrorism.

The Tanzanian Government’s Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania showed ongoing willingness to combat terrorist financing. Tanzania cooperated with the United States and complied with its obligations under UNSC resolutions.

From January through May, Tanzania's national multi-disciplinary committee on anti-money laundering finalized the draft Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Bill, and then presented the bill to the Cabinet in May. Because of short timelines and scheduled elections, the Cabinet delayed approval and tabling of the AML legislation in Parliament.

Tanzanian law enforcement and security forces attempted to identify and monitor terrorist activities and deny use of Tanzanian territory as a safe haven for terrorists. The government is aware that terrorists may use Tanzania's territory for transit purposes.

**Uganda**

Uganda had a strong regional voice in opposing international terrorism and supported U.S. counterterrorism initiatives.

Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, has waged an insurgency in northern Uganda, using camps in southern Sudan as bases for attacks on
government forces and civilians. In 2005, a significant LRA force moved from southern Sudan to the Democratic Republic of Congo, where it remains. The LRA’s tactics include murder, looting, burning houses, torture, mutilation, and abduction of children for the purposes of forced conscription, labor, and sexual servitude. The LRA is on the U.S. Terrorist Exclusion List.

Between October 25 and November 8, the LRA attacked six NGO or expatriate vehicles. Until then, the LRA had rarely attacked expatriates or international aid agency personnel.

There were concerns in Uganda that these attacks represented the deliberate targeting of international interests, possibly in response to the indictment of Kony and three others by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The Government of Uganda deployed an estimated 45,000 troops in northern Uganda to protect civilians and combat the LRA. Uganda and Sudan also expanded an agreement that permitted the Ugandan military to attack LRA units operating in southern Sudan.

For the past several years, technical advisors from the U.S. Department of Treasury have worked with the Bank of Uganda to draft anti-money laundering legislation. The legislation was written but has not passed. The Bank of Uganda has the power to freeze the assets of specific terrorist entities designated as terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act of 2002. Uganda is also a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), a FATF-style regional body of 14 countries that holds periodic anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing strategy workshops at the ministerial level.

Zimbabwe

Despite the strained bilateral relationship with the United States and the Government of Zimbabwe’s self-imposed isolation on most diplomatic issues, local intelligence and criminal investigative agencies to date have been very responsive to USG needs and concerns on terrorism issues. At the U.S. Embassy’s request, these agencies have routinely provided assistance by conducting investigative inquiries, traces, and border checks of individuals considered threats to USG facilities or personnel.
East Asia and Pacific Overview

“From the murder of 88 Australians in Bali in October 2002 and the attack on our Jakarta Embassy last September, we know that the threat to our country is very real. Australia’s national security depends upon a collective response to this terrorist threat. Strong links with our partners in Asia form a vital part of this response. The war on terror is a different kind of war. It is a war against loose networks, neither dependent on nation-state sponsors, nor responsive to conventional deterrents.

John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia
Address to the Lowy Institute for International Policy
March 31, 2005

East Asian countries made significant progress in 2005 creating a regional environment inhospitable to terrorists. Despite these steps forward, however, the October 1 triple suicide bombing attack on the Indonesian resort island of Bali demonstrated that the terrorist threat persists in Asia. In February, the Philippines suffered when three bombs went off almost simultaneously in different cities -- Manila, Davao, and General Santos City.

Southeast Asia remained a major front in the global war on terror, and continued to be an attractive theater of operations for regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI). A clearer picture of the linkages between JI cells and some indigenous Islamic extremist groups emerged during the last year as a result of testimony in terrorist court cases and investigations by authorities.

The governments in Southeast Asia were reliable partners in the global war on terror but face challenges. Geography makes effective border control problematic for archipelagic states like Indonesia and the Philippines. Terrorists continued to adapt their tactics as well. Because terrorism in Southeast Asia is a transnational problem, capacity building in a regional context emerged as a priority, in addition to the need for national capacity building. Institutes like the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia and the U.S.-Thailand Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok continued to expand their activities to provide effective counterterrorism training to law enforcement officers throughout the region. Likewise, the Australian-Indonesian Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) is a promising additional regional center for capacity building. Multilateral fora, including the United Nations Security Council’s Counterterrorism Committee (UNCTC), the G8’s Roma-Lyon and Counterterrorism Action Groups (CTAG), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), continued their important roles as key organizations for regional and transnational counterterrorism cooperation.

Australia remained a key counterterrorism partner. Besides providing critical assistance to others in the region, it maintained a vigorous domestic counterterrorism posture. On the domestic front, Australian police arrested 18 suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne in November, thus disrupting a potential terrorist attack on Australian soil. Australia enacted
comprehensive counterterrorism legislation in December, enhancing the ability of law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect, detain, and prosecute suspected terrorists.
The Australian Ambassador for Counterterrorism continued to play a key role in
strengthening the Australian Government’s engagement with regional partners and allies on
counterterrorism. Australia worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region’s counterterrorism
capacity through a range of initiatives, both bilaterally and in regional groupings such as Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Pacific
Island Forum (PIF). Australia participated in a Trilateral Counterterrorism Dialogue with the
United States and Japan. In May, Australia announced a substantial four-year regional
counterterrorism assistance package aimed at countering terrorist links and movements among
the countries of maritime Southeast Asia. In partnership with the United States, Australia
continued to play a leading role in implementing the Regional Movement Alert List (RMAL)
to strengthen the ability of countries to monitor the movement of people across borders.

Cambodia demonstrated effective measures to counter the threat of terrorism, despite
legislative limitations. The government cooperated with U.S. antiterrorist efforts on many
levels. In November, with U.S. assistance, Cambodia destroyed 36 SA-3 air defense missiles,
thus removing the possibility of terrorists acquiring such weapons. In close coordination with
the United States, the government installed computerized border control systems at
Cambodia’s international airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap and at its land border
crossing points at Poipet and Koh Kong. There were no terrorist incidents or known terrorist
activities in 2005.

China supported several operational and logistical aspects of the global war on terror,
including signing a memorandum of understanding on the Department of Energy’s Megaports
initiative to detect radiological materials and continuing its support for the Container Security
Initiative. Beijing also played an instrumental role in getting the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization to issue a joint statement in 2005 on increasing regional cooperation to fight
terrorism. Outside China, Chinese citizens were victims of terrorist acts in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iraq, and Jordan. China increased its efforts to build its domestic counterterrorism
capabilities with a focus on improving security for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Beijing
continued to express concern that terrorists operate on Chinese territory, and has said that
some members of the Uighur minority in Xingjiang Province pose a threat to China’s
domestic stability.

The Indonesian Government continued to take strong steps to counter the threat posed by the
regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which has ties to al-Qaida. In March,
Indonesian courts sentenced JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba’asyir to 30 months in prison for
involvement in a “sinister conspiracy” to carry out the 2002 Bali attacks, but failed to convict
him on any terrorist charges. In August, the government granted Ba’asyir a four and a half-
month reduction in sentence for good behavior in celebration of the 60th anniversary of
Indonesian independence, but denied a further reduction in sentence in November at the end
of the Muslim holiday of Ramadan. The case is currently under judicial review. The October
1 attacks on the resort island of Bali by three suicide bombers killed 20 people and injured
more than 120, including six U.S. citizens, representing the worst terrorist bombing in
Indonesia since the 2002 Bali bombings. Assisted by the United States and other friendly
countries, the ongoing Indonesian police investigation into the attacks led to the November 9 police raid on a terrorist safe house and the death of Malaysian bomb maker Azahari bin Husin in the ensuing shootout. Azahari’s death ended a three-year manhunt and marked a victory for Indonesian counterterrorism efforts.

Japan strengthened its own counterterrorism measures by contributing to counterterrorism capacity-building among Asian countries and by participating in a trilateral counterterrorism dialogue with the United States and Australia. Japan continues to reach outside the region in its fight against terrorism. In October, the Japanese Diet (Parliament) extended for one year the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law that allows for Japan’s Self Defense Force (JSDF) to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

The Malaysian Government strengthened border controls to ensure that separatist violence in southern Thailand does not spill over into Malaysia. Leaders of both countries have stressed the importance of resolving the matter peacefully. Malaysia also renewed 29 two-year detention orders of suspected terrorists, while nine such detainees were granted conditional release.

Thailand’s unwavering commitment to domestic and international counterterrorism efforts continued in 2005. However, ongoing violence, fueled by a renewed separatist insurgency in southern Thailand, remains a concern. The violence has been primarily focused in the three southernmost Muslim-majority provinces located along the Thai-Malaysian border. There is no evidence of a direct connection between militants in southern Thailand and international terrorist organizations such as JI and al-Qaida. There is concern, however, that these groups may attempt to capitalize on the increasingly violent situation for their own purposes.

Australia

Australia launched substantial initiatives and worked with its regional neighbors to assist in building their resolve and capacity to confront terrorism. In November, Australian police arrested 18 suspected terrorists in Sydney and Melbourne, disrupting a potential terrorist attack on Australian soil. Australia enacted comprehensive counterterrorism legislation in December, enhancing the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect, detain, and prosecute suspected terrorists. The legislation featured new regimes for "preventative detention" of persons to prevent an imminent terrorist act as well as preserve evidence of a terrorist attack, and "control orders" that would allow the close monitoring of persons believed to pose a risk to the community. It also strengthened offenses for financing terrorism, increased police investigative powers, and modernized and further defined the sedition offenses to cover those who urge the use of force or violence against other groups in the community.
Australia announced funds for other new security measures to enhance its ability to manage mass casualty incidents, including establishing unified policing at Australia's major airports. It also created a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat research facility and a chemical warfare agents laboratory network.

After the September release of the Wheeler Report on aviation security and policing at Australian airports, Australia announced substantial measures to tighten airport security, including establishing joint investigation teams, increasing Customs patrols, and strengthening air cargo security arrangements. In December, Australia announced that it would establish a new division in the Attorney General's Department to coordinate background checks on people working in the secure areas of airports and seaports. The new division will begin operation in July 2007. Bolstering identity verification and security for Australian travelers, the government began issuing a new security-enhanced "e-passport" in October that includes a microchip with a digital picture and personal details of the passport holder. In September, Australian federal and state governments also initiated a national action plan for counterterrorism that focused on combating extremism.

As a major component of protecting its national infrastructure, Australia opened the Joint Offshore Protection Command (JOPC) in March and began expanded security patrols of offshore areas, particularly oil and gas installations, which will detect threats to Australia's maritime assets and coastline.

Australia designated two additional terrorist organizations under its domestic criminal code, raising the total to 19. The Australian Government has domestic counterterrorism forums, such as the National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC). The NCTC national exercise program tests, maintains, and strengthens Australia's counterterrorism and consequence management capabilities, command and control arrangements, and interoperability. Australia has been a major partner of the United States in combating terrorist financing. In 2005, the two nations jointly and successfully requested UN sanctions, including an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo, for three leaders of JI and three leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Australia worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region's counterterrorism capacity through a range of initiatives in both bilateral and region groupings, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Australia was one of the first countries to sign the new Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism when it opened for signature in September at the United Nations Leaders' Summit. Consistent with its international obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373, Australia had listed 550 terrorist-related individuals, entities, and organizations by the end of 2005.

The Australian Ambassador for Counterterrorism chairs the International Counterterrorism Coordination Group (ICTCG), Australia's interagency counterterrorism working group. In May, Australia announced a four-year regional counterterrorism assistance package aimed at countering terrorist links and movements among the countries of maritime Southeast Asia, notably the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The package included new measures that built on successful regional cooperation in law enforcement, border and transport security,
intelligence, and legal affairs. Key elements were developing effective counterterrorism legal frameworks in Southeast Asia, assisting the region with border control, strengthening fraud detection and immigration intelligence capabilities, enhancing law enforcement and intelligence cooperation capabilities, and bolstering transport security.

Australia took the lead in law enforcement and legal issues working groups that developed practical measures to strengthen regional counterterrorism cooperation following the Bali Regional Ministerial meeting in 2004. Australia also provided legal drafting assistance to regional states, including the South Pacific islands, seeking to adopt international conventions and protocols against terrorism and to bring their domestic laws into conformity with these conventions. Australian law enforcement agencies also continued to build practical working-level relationships with their regional counterparts, particularly through the joint Australian-Indonesian Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) located in Semarang, Indonesia. JCLEC is now fully operational as a counterterrorism training resource for the region, having offered more than 20 courses and trained more than 500 officers. Twenty-eight countries have been involved with JCLEC.

Australia signed three additional bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on counterterrorism in 2005 with Brunei, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, raising the total to 12. Other counterterrorism partners include Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Fiji, Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, India, and East Timor. This extensive network of bilateral MOUs supports practical and operational-level cooperation, and has proved beneficial. For example, Australia's MOU with Indonesia provided the basis for cooperation between the Australian and Indonesian police in investigating the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005, the Marriott hotel bombing of 2003, the Australian Embassy bombing of 2004.

Australia contributed an additional 450 troops to Iraq and 190 Special Forces personnel to Afghanistan in 2005.

Prime Minister Howard led efforts to engage Australia's Muslim community to work together to combat extremism, holding a summit with prominent Muslim leaders in August. PM Howard designated his Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs to continue a dialogue with the Muslim community, including Muslim youth.

**Burma**

Bilateral relations between Burma and the United States remain strained. The Government of Burma’s willingness to cooperate and coordinate on antiterrorist activities within the country and throughout the region is minimal. The government does not openly share information on state security issues and takes every precaution to project an image that it is exerting full authority over Burmese territory. Sponsorship of terrorist organizations would be counterproductive to that goal. Burmese Special Branch police recently created a new counterterrorism unit headquartered in Rangoon. The United States relays to the government information from the United Nations on terrorist financing, which Burmese authorities then disseminate throughout the banking sector with instructions to report suspicious transactions.
Indigenous violence in Burma generally is targeted against the ruling regime rather than against U.S. citizens and facilities. Various insurgent groups in ethnic minority areas near the borders with China, India, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand conduct small-scale actions against the Burmese authorities. The government has attributed several bombings in the capital and elsewhere in recent years to domestic and exiled anti-regime elements.

The Burmese judicial system is corrupt and lacks transparency. The government defines almost all anti-regime activities as "acts of terrorism" and makes little distinction between peaceful political dissent and violent attacks by insurgents or criminals. Suspected perpetrators of any acts that oppose the regime are subject to lengthy detention without trial or due process.

Some observers posit possible links between known terrorist organizations and two local insurgent groups, the Rohingya Solidarity Organization and the Arakan Rohingya National Organization. There are few signs that either group remains active, although the Burmese regime's severe repression of the Rohingya Muslim population inside Burma could foster sympathy with extremist methods and objectives.

On April 26, a bomb exploded in Mandalay's central market, Ze Gyo, killing two persons and injuring more than a dozen; no foreigners were among the casualties. The Government of Burma claimed that the incident was a subversive act "committed by a group of insurgent destructive elements who wanted to disturb and destroy the stability of the state." Authorities have not made public, however, any evidence of a genuine investigation or identified the specific perpetrators.

On the afternoon of May 7, three devices exploded nearly simultaneously in downtown Rangoon at two busy shopping centers and at an official trade fair sponsored by the Government of Thailand. The bombings were unprecedented in their scope and coordination killing over 25 people and injuring at least 200. The Burmese Government again blamed the bombings on "anti-regime groups," individuals either domestically-based or living in exile. It also accused the United States of secret involvement. One of the Rangoon bombings occurred close to U.S. Embassy residences; two of the three bombs exploded at public supermarkets frequented by Americans, other expatriates, and middle-class Burmese. There is no evidence indicating that the Rangoon bombings were directed against Americans or American interests; no Americans were injured or killed in the explosions.

Despite the spate of bombings, in October, the Burmese Government unilaterally reduced security coverage at all foreign missions in Rangoon. In some cases, including in front of the U.S. Embassy, the government re-opened roads and lanes that had previously been closed to provide added protection against terrorist attacks.

**Cambodia**

Cambodia's ability to investigate independently potential terrorist activities is limited to an extent by a lack of training and resources. An absence of comprehensive domestic legislation to combat terrorism also hinders the ability to arrest and prosecute terrorists. That said, Cambodia's political leadership demonstrated a strong commitment to take aggressive legal
action against terrorists. The government also has made effective use of its existing one-page law on terrorism, as evidenced by the conviction in late December 2004 of six Jemaah Islamiya (JI) terrorists, each of whom was sentenced to life in prison.

To help bolster its counterterrorism capabilities, the Cambodian Government established the National Counterterrorism Committee (NCTC), a policy-level decision-making body chaired by the Prime Minister that directly addresses the government's domestic and international counterterrorism responsibilities. The NCTC held its first session in August. While the NCTC is a new entity that is still developing its operational capabilities, it is a strong indicator that the Cambodian Government takes counterterrorism seriously and is attempting to coordinate its efforts.

The government signed a bilateral agreement with India to enhance cooperation in combating the trafficking of drugs and arms, terrorism, and transnational crime. The agreement, which came into force in December, provides for cooperation in fighting terrorism, exchanging information and intelligence on the activities of any terrorist group and its associates, and identifying and exchanging information on terrorist financing sources. As ASEAN Chair from July 2002 to June 2003, Cambodia took the lead in coordinating ASEAN statements on terrorism, such as the Joint ASEAN-EU Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and the relevant text in the Chairman's Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum.

Conditions in Cambodia, such as massive poverty, high unemployment, a poor education system, and disaffected elements within the Cham Muslim population, could make the country vulnerable to terrorists and terrorist influence in the future. There are no indications that specific terrorist groups currently operate in Cambodia; however, porous borders and endemic corruption could make the country vulnerable to a terrorist presence.

The Cambodian Government fully cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts on many levels, despite its limited resources. In April, the government participated in the first-ever U.S. Pacific Command-led multinational interagency counterterrorism survey. The survey was conducted to develop methods to assist the Cambodian authorities in improving their overall counterterrorism capacity. The team made recommendations to various elements responsible for counterterrorism at the tactical, operational, and national levels.

In November, the Ministry of Defense, with U.S. assistance, destroyed 36 SA-3 air defense missiles to remove the possibility of these weapons being acquired by terrorist elements. That same month, Cambodian authorities collected and dismantled two HNU-5 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) from a police outpost. These two MANPADS are scheduled for future destruction.

The government installed, with U.S. assistance, computerized border control systems at Cambodia's international airports in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap and at its land border crossing points at Poipet and Koh Kong. The Cambodian Government cooperated fully with U.S. requests to monitor terrorists and terrorist entities listed as supporters of terrorist financing.
In impromptu remarks to the Cambodian Government-private sector forum on October 14, Prime Minister Hun Sen acknowledged that weapons from Cambodia have been transported to insurgent/terrorist groups in Sri Lanka and the Philippines, and to the ethnic Karen people in Burma. The Prime Minister noted that a trial project to x-ray all incoming and outgoing containers at the port of Sihanoukville had met with difficulties and led to substantial delays in processing shipments, largely because the port's x-ray machine was too small. Consequently, he requested foreign assistance to upgrade the port's x-ray facilities and said that in the interim manual inspections of containers would be conducted.

**China**

Although there were no acts of terrorism committed in China in 2005, Chinese citizens were victims of terrorist acts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Thailand, and Jordan.

The United States and China held regular counterterrorism consultations; the most recent talks were in November. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs described U.S.-Chinese cooperation on counterterrorism as a key partnership promoting international stability and as a pillar of the bilateral relationship. In January, China signed a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Energy to participate in the Megaports initiative on the detection of nuclear and radiological materials. After signing the Container Security Initiative in 2003, the Chinese Government launched CSI programs in the ports of Shanghai and Shenzhen this year. The program still faces challenges, but inspections have begun at the two ports.

Chinese officials signed statements with counterterrorism components in regional fora such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN plus 3, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

China agreed to participate in APEC inspections of civilian airports to assess vulnerabilities, although it continues to raise objections to Taiwan’s participation in the initiative. China has expressed concern, however, that APEC not expand beyond what Beijing considers to be the forum’s primary mandate of economic issues and trade liberalization. China’s objections to Taiwan’s participation have impeded broader cooperation on APEC counterterrorism and nonproliferation initiatives. China hosted an ARF Security Policy Conference and an ARF Seminar, where participants addressed non-traditional security threats, including counterterrorism issues. As a founding member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China played an instrumental role in getting the SCO to issue a Joint Statement on increasing regional cooperation to fight terrorism, extremism, and separatism.

Although the Ministry of Public Security is responsible for criminal investigations, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) was designated the lead agency for all anti-money laundering activities in China. China has taken steps to strengthen regulatory measures to combat money laundering, and is finalizing money laundering legislation designed to broaden the scope of existing anti-money laundering regulations and to establish more firmly the PBOC’s authority over national anti-money laundering operations. Under the authority of the PBOC, China established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in 2004 to track suspicious
transactions and is working closely with FINCEN in the United States to develop its capabilities. Additional measures are needed to ensure that China’s FIU is an independent, centralized body with adequate collection, analysis, and disseminating authority, including the ability to share information with FIUs in other jurisdictions. The State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), an organization also under the authority of the PBOC, is the primary agency for countering illicit foreign exchange transactions.

Joining the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) remains an important priority for China. After joining the Eurasia FATF-style regional group (EAG) in late 2004, China was granted FATF observer status in 2005. China’s money laundering legislation, when completed, will go a long way toward satisfying FATF’s criteria for membership. However, China’s refusal to recognize the Egmont Group, an umbrella body coordinating the activities of over 100 FIUs worldwide, because the Group includes an FIU from Taiwan, remains a substantial obstacle to joining FATF.

In December 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security published a list of organizations and individuals that it claims have ties to terrorism. One of the groups, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), was designated as an al-Qaida-affiliated terrorist organization under UNSCR 1267; the United States also designated the group under Executive Order 13224. At a UNSC meeting in 2005, China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations called on UN members to adopt measures to crack down on "East Turkistan" terrorist forces.

There were several reports during the year of bombings and bomb threats in various parts of China. It is unclear, however, whether these were politically motivated acts of terrorism or criminal attacks. Although they did not publicly attribute any 2005 incident to terrorism, Chinese authorities asserted that terrorists, primarily based in Xinjiang Province, continued to operate clandestinely on Chinese territory. The Chinese Government attempted to restrict foreign support for insurgent groups and increased the number of deployed security personnel in response to perceived terrorist activities in Xinjiang.

Formally established in 2004, the FBI Legal Attaché Office in Beijing bolstered U.S.-Chinese cooperation on counterterrorism investigations. Chinese law enforcement responsiveness to terrorism investigation requests still needs improvement, but substantive intelligence has been obtained in some cases. Chinese authorities actively participated in the investigation of the 2003 "Portland Six" case, providing hotel records and other information that proved instrumental in obtaining guilty pleas from the defendants in the case. The United States does not have an extradition treaty with China.

China sent several officers to Greece for counterterrorism and Olympic security training; it also sent police chiefs to observe the 25th ASEAN Chief of National Police (APOL) Conference in Indonesia. China continued to participate in training programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, Thailand. In 2005, China staged antiterror exercises in major cities throughout the country and implemented new antiterrorism training programs at several major police academies.
Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s implementation of the Container Security Initiative was transparent and cooperative. The high level of cooperation and the successful implementation of CSI by Hong Kong Customs officials received praise from a congressional staff delegation, which described it as a model for CSI implementation.

Hong Kong's Joint Financial Intelligence Unit (JFIU), operated by the Hong Kong Police and the Customs and Excise Department, is a member of the Egmont Group (a prominent body of FIUs that fosters international cooperation) and continued to process reports on suspicious financial transactions. Hong Kong law enforcement agencies provided full support and cooperation to their overseas counterparts in tracing financial transactions suspected of being linked to terrorist activities. Hong Kong actively participated in various anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing initiatives in 2005, including the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

As the primary reviewer of Indonesia's anti-money laundering and counterterrorism finance regime within the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering within the Asia Pacific/Group on Money Laundering, Hong Kong took the lead in co-coordinating the review group's on-site visit to Indonesia in January to examine its anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime. Hong Kong also participated in the FATF's mutual evaluation of Ireland in June.

To further promote international and regional understanding and cooperation on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing issues, Hong Kong hosted the International Conference on Combating Money Laundering in February 2005, as well as several international anti-money laundering and terrorist financing seminars and workshops. These forums provided a good opportunity for representatives from government and other sectors to review progress and to share experience in tackling money laundering and terrorist financing challenges.

Macau

In October, Macau submitted to its Legislative Assembly a new counterterrorism bill aimed at strengthening counterterrorist financing measures. The bill, drafted to implement the provisions of UNSCR 1373, would make it illegal to conceal or handle finances on behalf of terrorist organizations. Individuals would be liable even if they were not members of designated terrorist organizations themselves. The legislation would also allow prosecution of persons who commit terrorist acts outside of Macau and mandate stiffer penalties.

The government also submitted a money laundering bill to the Legislative Assembly that, if passed and enforced, would strengthen its oversight. Macau's financial system is governed by the 1993 Financial System Act and amendments, which lay out regulations to prevent use of the banking system for money laundering. The new bill imposes requirements for the mandatory identification and registration of financial institution shareholders, customer identification, and external audits that include reviews of compliance with anti-money laundering statutes.
Financial regulatory authorities continued to direct financial institutions to conduct searches for terrorist assets using U.S. and UN lists. Bank examiners reviewed customer profiles, large cash transaction records, and suspicious bank reports. They also interviewed frontline staff, senior management, and money laundering compliance officers.

Indonesia

Following deadly terrorist bombings this year, the Indonesian Government, led by the country's first directly elected president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, demonstrated a new urgency on counterterrorism that could spawn needed institutional changes and a more comprehensive counterterrorism policy. The Indonesian Government actively pursues the perpetrators of terrorist attacks.

President Yudhoyono's July appointment of a new National Police Chief, General Sutanto, led to strengthened support for needed police reform, anti-corruption steps, and focused counterterrorism measures. Reform efforts included the December appointment of 13 new regional police chiefs. In order to better track the use of cell phones, the government announced the mandatory registration of anonymous cell phone numbers effective in 2006. Cell phone providers were reportedly drafting implementation plans at year's end.

Links among violent Islamic radicals and extremist organizations, including the regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and its associates, remain a serious security threat to both Western and domestic targets in Indonesia. These networks launched several terrorist attacks using connections often based on radical school ties and shared training experiences in Afghanistan, the southern Philippines, and Indonesia's Muslim-Christian violence in the former conflict areas of Maluku and central Sulawesi. Indonesia joined other countries in co-sponsoring JI for UNSCR 1267 designation in 2002.

The Sulawesi and Maluku regions were the scene of continued attempts apparently aiming to reignite inter-religious violence. In May, violent extremists brutally attacked a remote police outpost on the island of Seram, killing five policemen and their cook. Later that month, two bombs exploded in a market near Poso in central Sulawesi. This largely Christian area experienced a grisly attack in late October when six masked men beheaded three teenage Christian schoolgirls and seriously injured a fourth. In early November, two teenage schoolgirls, one Muslim and the other Christian, were critically wounded in the same region after being shot in the head by gunmen at a bus stop. In late November, masked gunmen in Poso shot and wounded a Christian university professor and his wife as they returned home from church. Although police investigations into all the Sulawesi incidents remain ongoing, by year's end no perpetrators had been charged by police in any of these incidents.

The simultaneous October 1 attacks on the resort island of Bali by three suicide bombers, which killed more than 20 and injured more than 120, including six Americans, represented the worst terrorist bombing in Indonesia since the 2002 Bali attacks. The ongoing Indonesian police investigation into the attacks led to the November 9 police raid on a terrorist safe house in Malang, East Java, and the death of Malaysian bomb maker Azahari bin Husin in the ensuing shootout. Azahari's death ended a three-year manhunt and marked a major victory.
for Indonesian counterterrorism efforts. Azahari and JI recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top, a Malaysian, are suspected in nearly every major terrorist attack in Indonesia in the last five years, including the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2003 J.W. Marriott hotel bombing, and the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing. Indonesian police continued an intense manhunt for Noordin Top, who remains at large.

Building upon the death of Azahari and the discovery of 35 bombs ready for use, Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla has recruited prominent Muslim leaders to work in concert with the government to discourage youth from joining terrorist groups. The Vice President has spoken publicly of the need for the government to monitor institutions closely associated with radicalism. A number of Muslim leaders have publicly acknowledged that the bombings in Indonesia could not be justified on religious grounds. Indonesian authorities remained committed to investigating terrorist networks and prosecuting those suspected of terrorist acts.

Special counterterrorism units within the police still played the lead role in conducting counterterrorism investigations, though the previously power-wielding Indonesian military and intelligence apparatus indicated eagerness to find new relevance by joining in the counterterrorism fight.

Since President Yudhoyono assumed office in October 2004, the police have arrested more than 50 suspected terrorists, including six key individuals and the field lieutenant of the Australian Embassy bombing. In June and July, police arrested approximately 20 members of the JI-linked Islamic NGO Kompak, including terrorist financier Abdullah Sunata. Within two months of the October suicide bombings in Bali, police had tracked down Azahari, identified the three suicide bombers, and arrested several other associates of Noordin and Azahari's network. Despite major successes on the JI front, police and prosecutors had relatively little success in the arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators of terrorist violence in central Sulawesi and Maluku.

The Indonesian Attorney General's office initiated 17 new cases under the 2003 antiterrorism law and won convictions in all 17 trials. Among the 17 convicted were Iwan Dharmawan Mutho (alias Rois) and Achmad Hasan (alias Purnomo), both sentenced to death for their roles in the Australian Embassy bombing, and Agung Abdul Hamid, who received life in prison for his role in the December 2002 McDonald's restaurant bombing in Makassar in southern Sulawesi. In 2005, for the first time ever, convicted terrorists had their sentences increased upon appeal under the antiterrorism law, signaling a firmer law enforcement approach by judges.

In March, Indonesian courts sentenced JI Emir Abu Bakar Ba'asyir to 30 months in prison for his involvement in a "sinister conspiracy" to carry out the 2002 Bali attacks, but failed to convict him on any terrorism charges. In August, the government granted Ba'asyir a 4 1/2-month sentence reduction for good behavior in a routine step in celebration of Indonesia's 60th anniversary of independence. However, the government denied Ba'asyir an additional one-month sentence remission in November, traditionally given at the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. In December, defense attorneys for Ba'asyir requested a judicial review of the case, citing new evidence as well as judicial error in the March conviction. The new
evidence behind the judicial review request centers on a written statement by convicted 2002 Bali bomber Amrozi that denies he requested and received Ba'asyir's approval for those attacks.

In September, Indonesia's Attorney General established a long-awaited terrorism and transnational crime task force designed to oversee counterterrorism trials nationwide through a cadre of special terrorism prosecutors, though he has yet to assign personnel to the new task force. The United States agreed to provide $750,000 to help implement the creation of the task force.

Over the past year, the Indonesian Government continued to make progress toward developing an effective anti-money laundering regime, although more effort is needed in the areas of investigations, prosecutions, and bank and financial institution compliance. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) removed Indonesia from its Non-Complying Countries and Territories (NCCT) list on February 11. Indonesian police have frozen terrorist financial assets uncovered during investigations, but the government's implementation of the sanctions regime established pursuant to UNSCR 1267 remains weak and is hampered by poor interagency coordination, as well as by human and technical capacity issues in both the government and financial institutions. The USAID Financial Crimes Prevention Project is a multi-year effort that provides technical advisors and support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and credible anti-money laundering/counterterrorism finance (AML/CTF) regime.

Indonesian counterterrorism efforts remain hampered by weak rule of law, serious internal coordination problems, and systemic corruption that further limits already strained government resources. Lawmakers and other senior elected officials continue their slow pace toward needed legal reforms that could strengthen the country's counterterrorism posture. The much-anticipated establishment of an official counterterrorism coordinating agency and of an independent police commission to guide police reform awaits final presidential approval. The government has not yet submitted a revision of the 2003 Counterterrorism Law to the House of Representatives. Indonesian authorities recognize a need to revise the law to include updated standards for introducing evidence in terror cases, and to add comprehensive conspiracy articles to more effectively prosecute terrorism cases.

Japan

In 2005, Japan made valuable contributions to building counterterrorism capacity among Asian countries. In September, it participated in a trilateral strategic dialogue on counterterrorism issues with the United States and Australia to better synchronize regional activities. In July, Japan held a training course with the Government of Malaysia and the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism on prevention and crisis management of biological terrorism. About 50 participants from ASEAN member countries, China, and South Korea attended the seminar.

In January, Japan introduced a voluntary Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) that tightens control on suspicious travelers to prevent terrorists' entry into Japan.
In October, the Japanese Diet extended for one year the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law that allows Japan’s Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As of December 3, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) had provided approximately 7.3 million gallons of fuel to U.S. and allied naval vessels engaged in OEF in 2005. In December, the Koizumi cabinet extended the Basic Plan for one year to allow continued JSDF reconstruction and humanitarian activities in Iraq.

In 2005, the Foreign Ministry granted long-term diplomatic status to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers working on the Container Security Initiative in Japan. The Japanese Customs Bureau was reorganized to facilitate cooperation between Japanese CSI teams and U.S. CBP officers. Japan formally accepted the U.S. air marshal program, and started its own air marshal program on flights to and from the United States. After substantially rewriting its immigration legislation to improve enforcement capabilities, Japan agreed in principal to participate in the Immigration Advisory Program; coordination is ongoing. Japan is an advocate and active participant in the International Port Security Program. Widely considered a leader in the region in maritime security collaboration, the Government of Japan hosted a number of bilateral and multilateral maritime security events. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport's Maritime Bureau established the Port State Control Officer exchange program with the U.S. Coast Guard to share best practices in implementing international ship security requirements while boarding foreign flag ships in Japan.

The National Police Agency (NPA) and the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) continued to monitor the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, renamed Aleph. According to the PSIA, at the end of 2004 Aleph had about 650 live-in followers and about 1,000 other followers with 26 facilities in 17 prefectures. The cult also has about 300 followers in Russia. In May, the Tokyo police raided 22 facilities and arrested several Aleph members for working without a government license. The PSIA continued surveillance of the group through 2005, and in November requested Public Security Commission permission to continue surveillance for three more years through January 2009.

The Tokyo District Court sentenced Haruo Wako, a former Japanese Red Army (JRA) member, to life in prison in March. Wako and other members of the JRA are responsible for seizing the French Embassy in The Hague in 1974 and the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in 1975. Wako is appealing the sentence. Prosecutors in September also asked for a life sentence for Fusako Shigenobu, the alleged mastermind of The Hague incident.

In June, the Diet (Parliament) amended Japanese immigration law to allow the sharing of information with foreign immigration officials. The Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice completed the implementing guidelines and is ready to commence detailed discussions on the logistics of sharing information. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also ready to move forward on the sharing of lost and stolen passport data.
Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea (ROK) boasts the third-largest troop presence in Iraq, demonstrates excellent law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, and provides terrorism-related training to law enforcement officials from various developing countries. Traditionally focused on potential terrorism from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, “North Korea,”) the ROK is slowly shifting its attention to possible acts of terror from beyond the Korean Peninsula, especially from al-Qaida and other groups that oppose the ROK’s military presence in Iraq.

Seoul has supported U.S. goals in both Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003, despite political pressure from a skeptical Korean public. One of the early contributors to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Republic of Korea maintains 3,200 troops in Iraq, making it the third-largest foreign troop contingent in Iraq; it also has committed $200 million in assistance to Iraq between 2004 and 2007.

The Republic of Korea has highly trained and capable intelligence and law enforcement agencies, as well as other government entities that monitor information on potential acts of terror and react in the event of a terrorist incident. The ROK Government and public traditionally have focused on acts of terror by the DPRK but recently have begun to recognize terrorism as a global problem that could affect its citizens and interests beyond the Korean Peninsula.

The June 2004 murder of Korean citizen Kim Sun-il by Iraqi insurgents with al-Qaida ties was a critical wake-up call, because it was the first time that a ROK citizen had been targeted by an entity other than North Korea. The incident galvanized both the government and National Assembly to push for comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. The draft bills for the counterterrorism legislation have not yet passed the National Assembly; however, in March the ROK Government as an interim step revised its National Antiterror Action Directive (Presidential Directive 47).

The ROK Customs Service began the Container Security Initiative program with the United States in the port city of Pusan in August 2003. U.S. and ROK intelligence, defense, and law enforcement agencies worked together successfully to prevent the outbreak of any terrorist incidents during the November 2005 APEC Leaders Meeting, hosted by the ROK in Pusan.

The government consistently supported greater regional cooperation in combating terrorism in various international fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In recent years, the ROK has taken a leading role in joint counterterrorism projects with other members of the Asia-Pacific region. It hosted the Third Conference on Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR III) in February, focusing on aviation and maritime security. The government also dispatched expert speakers from the Korean National Police Agency to the Southeast Asia Regional Cooperation on Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) Cyber-terrorism Seminar, hosted in May by Malaysia.
In June, Seoul hosted a workshop on cybersecurity for the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The ROK and the Philippines co-chaired the Second ARF Seminar on Cyberterrorism, which was held in October in Manila. The Korean National Police Agency and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) co-hosted a two-week training workshop in September, inviting 30 law enforcement officials from Russia and Southeast Asia to participate in training sessions on international cooperative investigation and cyber crime investigation. They also invited 10 Thai law enforcement officials to a two-week forensic science program in November that provided training on responding to acts of terrorism.

In 2005, the government mandated through a revised National Antiterror Action Directive (Presidential Directive 47) the institutionalization of interagency committees on counterterrorism, including a ministerial-level standing committee, a weekly working group meeting, and a counterterrorism council chaired by the Prime Minister. The directive also established a Terrorism Information Integration Center at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), with responsibility for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of potential intelligence on terrorist activities targeting ROK interests.

The Korean authorities increased their vigilance in the months following the June 2004 murder in Iraq of Kim Sun-il, reacting to threats from groups affiliated with al-Qaida to launch attacks in retaliation for Seoul's decision to dispatch additional troops to Iraq. South Korea also increased security precautions in the months leading up to the November 2005 APEC Leaders Meeting in Pusan. The government's stringent immigration policies and practices, and its generally homogeneous population, prevent the country from being a terrorist sanctuary. Korean immigration and law enforcement agencies have an excellent record of tracking suspicious individuals entering their territory and react quickly to potential acts.

The Republic of Korea is a valued international partner in the fight against terror financing and other financial crimes such as money laundering, and it is pursuing international agreements in this regard. The government hopes to sign an agreement with the United States to form a Financial Crime Enforcement Network to provide a more effective exchange of information on money laundering. The National Assembly passed the Financial Transaction Reports Act, a major anti-money laundering law that mandates a currency transaction reporting system and enhanced due diligence requirements for financial institutions.

Laos

Although the Government of Laos has positive intentions regarding counterterrorism, weak enforcement procedures and inefficient security organizations hamper the implementation of multilateral agreements. Border security is poor, and Laos unwittingly could be used as a safe haven for terrorists. Since 2002, Laos consistently has denounced international terrorism and expressed a willingness to cooperate with the international community on counterterrorism. Its actions, however, have mostly been disappointing, due to both a lack of resources and skill and an attitude among Lao officials that Laos could not become a target of international terrorism. In spite of the presence of a domestic insurgency that has employed terrorist tactics, such as ambushing civilian buses and bombing civilian targets, Lao officials at many
levels see terrorism as an issue of only marginal relevance to Laos; they believe that Laos, as a small and neutral country, would not be targeted by international terrorists.

Laos experienced a handful of bombings conducted by suspected anti-government groups in 2005, but no injuries or deaths were reported. The Bank of Laos vetted government and commercial bank holdings for possible terrorist assets, as identified by U.S.-provided lists of terrorist organizations and individuals, and has issued freeze orders for assets of organizations and individuals named on these lists. However, the Bank has yet to take steps to report on its implementation of the provisions of UNSCR 1373 (Laos is late in submitting its third report to the CTC) or to require the freezing of assets of individuals and entities included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list.

At UN and U.S. request, Laos continued efforts to identify assets of terrorists and sponsors of terrorism. The Bank of Lao issued freeze orders for assets of organizations and individuals named in lists provided by the United States. Lao authorities issued orders limiting the amount of cash that can be withdrawn from local banks and strengthened reporting requirements of state and privately owned commercial banks. Banking regulation remains extremely weak, however, and the banking system is vulnerable to money laundering and other illegal transactions.

Laos does not have a separate counterterrorism law. The Lao judicial system, however, is prepared to prosecute acts of terrorism as serious crimes under the Lao criminal code, and recent amendments to the criminal code have strengthened counterterrorism sanctions.

Laos’ border security is weak; border officials cannot effectively control access to the country. Since 9/11, Lao authorities have strengthened airport security, but security procedures at both airport and land immigration points remain lax compared with most other countries in the region. In addition, official Lao identity documents, including passports and ID cards, can be purchased from corrupt officials.

There are no areas of the country where terrorists are relatively free to operate. Laos does have a small insurgency numbering perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 persons, including women and children, that is based in very remote areas of the north. Insurgents were responsible for a series of attacks against passenger vehicles along Route 13 in northern Laos in early 2003. These attacks led to the deaths of approximately two dozen civilians.

Malaysia

Malaysian authorities have detained more than 110 suspected terrorists since May 2001 under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which allows for detention without trial on renewable two-
year terms. According to public sources, Malaysia renewed 29 two-year detention orders for terrorist suspects, while nine such detainees were granted conditional release. Malaysia has a bilateral extradition treaty with the United States and is in the process of negotiating a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT), both of which have the potential to aid in counterterrorism cooperation.

Malaysia facilitated regional counterterrorism training and cooperated in efforts to catch terror suspects. The Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counterterrorism (SEARCCT), established in 2003 under Malaysia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continued training Malaysian and regional authorities in law enforcement, banking, and other sectors. Trainers from the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Britain, France, Russia, and Canada participated in regional counterterrorism courses, lectures, and workshops.

Concerns remain over separatist violence in southern Thailand. People along both sides of the porous border share Malay ethnicity and the Islamic faith, and their families and business interests often straddle the boundary. While Malaysian tourists have been injured by bombings in southern Thailand, the violence has not spread across the border.

Mongolia

There are no known terrorist groups operating in Mongolia and no known bases of support. However, government officials cite more than 6,000 kilometers of porous borders, easy entry for foreign travelers, and poverty as contributing conditions that could lead to terrorism within Mongolia. The Government of Mongolia moved to increase awareness of the possibility of terrorism and to consider new laws. In December, a law to combat money laundering and terrorist financing offenses was approved by the Cabinet for submission to the Parliament.

The Mongolian police, Ministry of Justice, and the General Intelligence Agency's counterterrorism branch all cooperated with the U.S. Embassy and willingly provided any requested support, most notably during the November visit to Mongolia by President and Mrs. Bush and Secretary of State Rice. Due to resource and technical limitations, however, law enforcement capacities, including those related to counterterrorism, remain modest at best.

Mongolia deployed a fifth rotation of 150 Mongolian soldiers to Iraq in September in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In October, 13 Mongolian soldiers were deployed to Afghanistan, the country's fifth rotation in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

New Zealand

New Zealand further strengthened its domestic counterterrorism legislation in 2005. In December 2004, the government introduced a bill into Parliament to extend until 2007 New Zealand's UN Security Council-related designations of terrorist organizations. In June, Parliament passed the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act 2005, which expanded criminalization of terrorist financing to include the intentional financing of non-designated organizations that engage in terrorism. The amendment also extends until 2007 New Zealand's UN Security Council-related designations of terrorist organizations. By year’s end,
New Zealand had designated 420 terrorist organizations. To date, no funds belonging to these organizations have been found in New Zealand.

In April, Parliament passed the Charities Act, which established a Charities Commission to regulate and monitor charitable entities. Charities will be obliged to register with the Commission in order to gain tax exempt status. A charity will not be able to register if it is a designated terrorist entity or convicted of any offense under the Terrorism Suppression Act.

New Zealand continued cooperative efforts to enhance counterterrorism capacity both in the Pacific region and beyond. It played a leading role organizing and funding through the Pacific Security Fund the first Pacific Islands Forum-wide counterterrorism contingency planning exercise, Exercise Ready Pasifika, which took place in Suva, Fiji, in November. The exercise brought together senior counterterrorism officials from all Pacific Islands Forum countries to assess their capacity to plan for, and respond to, a developing terrorist incident. Exercise Ready Pasifika focused on four specific themes: internal cooperation and coordination, legal frameworks (with a particular focus on terrorist financing measures), border security (especially port and immigration security), and regional cooperation.

In June, New Zealand hosted the inaugural Pacific Working Group on Counterterrorism (WGCT) in Auckland. The Working Group brought together counterterrorism officials from Pacific Islands Forum member countries, Forum observer countries, and relevant regional organizations to discuss the region's priorities, challenges, and progress in implementing the international counterterrorism agenda.

New Zealand offered assistance to Pacific Islands Forum member countries to help them submit reports pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1373, and 1540. Seven Pacific Island countries responded positively to this offer, and New Zealand assistance is being provided to them.

In June, New Zealand concluded a bilateral MOU on enhanced counterterrorism cooperation with Fiji. New Zealand signed a Joint Declaration to Combat International Terrorism with ASEAN in July. The New Zealand Police continued its relationship with the Indonesian National Police under a bilateral MOU on cooperation in countering terrorism. The New Zealand Police provided practical assistance to Indonesia following the series of bomb attacks in Bali in October.

New Zealand has been a strong supporter of the Australia and Indonesia Interfaith Dialogue Initiative (IFD).

**Philippines**

The major, and disturbing, trend in the Philippines has been the growing cooperation among the Islamist terrorist organizations operating in the country: Jemaah Islamiya (JI); the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM). The near-simultaneous Valentine's Day bombings in Manila, Davao, and General Santos City involved operatives from all three entities and resulted in eight deaths and 150 injuries.
These bombings also used more technically sophisticated explosive devices, another cause for concern. The RSM, composed of Christian converts to Islam, has the ability to blend in and move freely about Luzon and other urban areas of the Philippines. The Philippines experienced another domestic terrorist attack in August when a bomb exploded aboard the Dona Rosa passenger ferry in Basilan, injuring 30 people, four of whom subsequently died.

Philippine authorities had a number of successes against terrorists in 2005. The government's most recent successes were the arrest in October of several members of the ASG-affiliated Rajah Sulaiman Movement, including RSM leader Ahmad Santos, and the arrest in December of RSM's alleged second-in-command and operations chief, Pio de Vera. The Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF) arrested, captured, or killed 83 suspected terrorists. In March, it coordinated operations that led to the seizure of 600 kilos of ammonium nitrate and other bomb making materials stored in an apartment in Quezon City in the metropolitan Manila area.

Several terrorists were convicted in Philippine courts. In June, a Philippine court convicted seven members of the Abu Sayyaf Group responsible for the Dos Palmas kidnapping, the Lamitan siege, the Golden Harvest massacre, and the Balobo massacre, which all took place in the Southern Philippines in 2001. In October, a court convicted RSM operative Angelo Trinidad, JI operative Rohmat (aka Zaki), and ASG operative Gamal Baharan for their roles in the February 14 triple-city bombings.

Several key ASG figures were also killed during armed encounters with the Philippine armed forces. Wedjimeh Sayad and Ahmad Sabudin, operatives serving under ASG sub-leader Jundam Jamalul, were killed in an encounter in Sulu on September 5. Jainal Usman, a senior ASG lieutenant who was behind the abduction of six Malaysian resort workers in 2003, was killed in fighting in Tawi-Tawi on November 17 along with two subordinates, Faizal Mohammad and Pula Ali.

The Philippines made some progress in tracking, blocking, and seizing terrorist assets. The main body tasked with investigating terrorist finance cases, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), completed the first phase of its information technology upgrades in 2004. From January to October 2005, AMLC received 1,760 suspicious transaction reports involving 8144 suspicious transactions, as well as covered transaction reports involving 44 million covered transactions. Because of the significant improvements in the government’s anti-money laundering capacity and efforts, and the AMLC's accomplishments and efforts in addressing remaining vulnerabilities, the OECD's Financial Action Task Force removed the Philippines from the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list in February. Subsequently, AMLC was accepted as a member of the Egmont Group, a prominent body of financial intelligence units that fosters international cooperation.
The government continued to imprison Juanito Itaas, convicted by Philippine courts in connection with the 1989 murder of Colonel James Rowe, the deputy commander of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group. Donato Continente, also convicted as an accessory to the murder, was released in June after serving his full term. Both Itaas and Continente were associated with the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) terrorist group at the time of the murder.

The absence of a law defining and codifying terrorist acts, combined with restrictions on gathering of evidence, continues to hinder the building of effective terrorism cases in the Philippines. These problems include rampant corruption, low morale, inadequate salaries, recruitment and retention difficulties, lack of information technology upgrades, and lack of cooperation between police and prosecutors.

A large and growing case backlog and the absence of continuous trials for terrorism cases are major impediments to the Philippines' prosecution of suspected terrorists. After four successive years of trying, the Philippines came closer to enacting new counterterrorism legislation in 2005. A counterterrorism bill passed its second out of three readings in the House of Representatives in December. The bill remains stalled in the Senate, which is seeking assurances that provisions of the legislation could not be used by the government against political opponents as well as against terrorists.

The Philippines issued arrest warrants for all Filipino nationals sought by the United States on terrorism charges. The United States and the Philippines signed a bilateral extradition treaty in 1996. The treaty gave precedence to the Philippine Government for the prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment of Filipino criminals apprehended in the Philippines.

Philippine military and law enforcement at the regional and provincial level worked closely with U.S. Embassy counterparts and visiting military personnel to ensure antiterrorism force protection to more than 25 annual U.S.-Philippine bilateral military events conducted throughout the country.

The State Department is in the process of establishing an in-country Antiterrorism Assistance Program to improve the capability of government agencies to respond to terrorist threats. The Australian-funded Bomb Data Center for the Philippine National Police also provided a new and important resource for investigating terrorist attacks.

U.S. and Philippine authorities worked closely to continue the Rewards for Justice programs targeting terrorist groups. Using its Rewards Program, the USG made a number of payments ranging from $2,500 to $50,000 to informants who played critical roles in the capture of JI and ASG terrorists. The U.S. Department of Defense also made two in-kind payouts under the rewards program in July, valued at $1,000 and $2,500, respectively.

Under USAID's multi-year LEAP (Livelihood Enhancement and Peace) program, 28,000 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants were successfully integrated into the economic mainstream.
Border management in the Philippines struggles under the pressures of poor physical and information technology infrastructure, and insufficient capital and human resources. Increased traffic and antiquated facilities overburden airports and seaports. Understaffed customs and immigration offices, manned by undertrained and underpaid officials, are extremely vulnerable to corruption. The United States has made some headway in assisting the Philippines in improving border management systems.

Despite plans dating back to 2001, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs has not yet introduced a digitized machine-readable passport. However, the Philippine Government did complete a review process.

The Philippine government cooperated on regional counterterrorism efforts through its membership in APEC and in ASEAN. The Philippines unanimously was elected chair of APEC's Counterterrorism Task Force in November 2004, and held this post throughout 2005. At the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime in November, ASEAN nations, including the Philippines, called for the establishment of an ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism.

**Singapore**

During 2005, Singapore continued its intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with a variety of governments, including the United States, to investigate terrorist groups, especially Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Singapore requested that Indonesia extradite several JI members to face trial for engaging in a conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in Singapore.

In 2005, Singapore detained three members of the regional terrorist group JI under the Internal Security Act (ISA). As of November, 36 people with links to terrorist groups were in detention. Detainees included members of JI who plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Under their orders of detention, the detainees were required to undergo a program of religious counseling with a group of volunteer religious counselors. Singapore enlisted the support of religious teachers and scholars to provide counseling, study JI's ideology, and develop teachings to counter the group’s spread within Singapore's Muslim community.

In February, Singapore announced it would spend $23 million over three years to enhance computer security and combat cyberterrorism. Singapore's Parliament amended the Moneychanging and Remittance Businesses Act in August to strengthen the government's ability to combat money laundering and terrorist finance-related activities in the moneychanging and remittance sector.

Singaporean officials have taken strong measures to enhance maritime security in nearby waters, especially the Strait of Malacca. These measures are focused on addressing terrorist threats as well as piracy and other criminal attacks. In August, Singapore hosted Exercise Deep Sabre, a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) maritime interdiction and port search exercise that was the first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia, with participants from 13 nations. Singapore and the United States agreed in August to launch Operation Safe Commerce.
Singapore Phase Three, a program that evaluates vulnerabilities in maritime trade lanes that could allow entry of weapons of mass destruction, contraband, or illegal immigrants into U.S. ports. In September, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia launched an "Eyes in the Sky" initiative, whereby the three nations will conduct combined maritime air patrols over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

Singapore actively participated in counterterrorism efforts through various international fora, including the ASEAN Regional Forum. In March, Singapore and the United States co-hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum confidence-building measure conference on maritime security. In June, Singapore hosted the first Asia-Middle East Dialogue, with government and non-government representatives from 50 countries. Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed the dialogue as a "platform for progressive Muslim voices."

Taiwan

In January, Taiwan established a cabinet-level Counterterrorism Office (CTO) to oversee and coordinate an interagency response to terrorist activities in Taiwan and in the region. The CTO is comprised of representatives from ten agencies, including the National Security Bureau, the National Police Administration, the Department of Health, and the Atomic Energy Council. Since its inauguration, the CTO has conducted two large-scale training exercises. The first, held in April, tested responses to a terrorist attack against critical infrastructure as well as responses to a toxic spill, while the most recent exercise in December focused on chemical and biological threats. The CTO's primary mission remains counterterrorism, but there are plans to broaden its focus by incorporating crisis management and disaster preparedness to create a new Ministry of Interior and Homeland Affairs in a proposed governmental reorganization.

In September, the Container Security Initiative began operations in Kaohsiung, identifying and targeting shipping containers that pose a terrorist risk. Preliminary discussions are underway to expand the Initiative to the northern port of Keelung. Taiwanese authorities expressed a willingness to join the U.S. Department of Energy's Megaports program to help restrict trafficking in radioactive materials.

Taiwan was elected to the Steering Committee of the Asia Pacific Group on money laundering. Taiwan continued to provide rapid and thorough responses on terrorist finance issues and brought to U.S. attention a number of suspect transactions. The Ministry of Justice drafted a new, detailed "Antiterrorist Action" law modeled after the U.S. Patriot Act. The draft bill is being reviewed by the Executive Yuan.
Thailand

Thailand continues to support domestic and international counterterrorism efforts. The country is a major beneficiary of U.S. antiterrorism assistance; numerous Thai police and security officials participated in U.S. Government training programs.

Thailand's biggest domestic security challenge is the ongoing insurgency in the far south of the country. This region, bordering Malaysia, has experienced episodic separatist-related violence for decades. Since January 2004, however, violence has increased dramatically and has continued throughout 2005. There are no indications that transnational terrorist groups are directly involved in the violence, and there is no current evidence of direct operational links between southern Thai separatist groups and regional terror networks. Overall, the Royal Thai Government maintains that the situation remains a domestic issue.

Elements of the government expressed public concern, however, that militants involved in the violence may have received funding and training from outside Thailand. Relations between Thailand and Malaysia were strained as the violence continued in Thai territory near their common border. The ongoing unrest attracted increased international attention and the concern of international Islamic organizations. In March, in response to the violence, the Indonesian-based Nahdlatul Ulama Islamic organization sent a delegation to Thailand. In June, the Organization of Islamic Conferences sent a fact-finding delegation to study the underlying causes of the violence.

Police forensics and ballistics work often failed to produce evidence that led to arrests following insurgent attacks, and government prosecutors struggled to develop cases that could stand up in court. In June, four southern Thai Muslims, accused of having links with Jemaah Islamiya (JI), were acquitted by a Bangkok court because of a lack of evidence.

No current direct evidence exists that regional or transnational terror groups such as Jemaah Islamiya or al-Qaida are operating in Thailand. Several Thai JI associates who provided financial and logistics support to JI fugitive leaders and operatives remain in Thailand. Since Hambali's capture in 2003, there has been no indication that these Thai nationals had any form of contact with JI. Thailand does not have any indigenous terrorist groups, but there are several militant domestic separatist groups implicated in the ongoing unrest in the far southern Muslim-majority provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani and in several districts of Songkhla Province. These organizations include the Pattani United Liberation Organization, Barasi Revolusi Nasional, and Pattani Islamic Mujahedin Movement.

Some of these separatist groups may share the basic ideology and general rejection of Western influence held by international Islamic terrorists, but by all indications they remain primarily focused on seeking autonomy or independence for the far southern provinces. During 2005, separatist militants conducted attacks that included coordinated bombing attacks using improvised explosive devices (usually triggered with a cell phone), shootings, and
beheadings. There is no evidence that foreign governments provided financial, military, or diplomatic support for Thai separatist groups.

The U.S. and Thai militaries conducted a large number of joint exercises and training programs that supported counterterrorism objectives. The United States and Thailand have undertaken a joint effort to create a national training facility that will provide field training for Thai military and police units involved in counterterrorism operations. Bangkok's International Law Enforcement Academy is a center for law enforcement skills training that is useful to counterterrorism efforts. Under the auspices of the Container Security Initiative, Thailand is engaged in a range of port security programs. Thailand is working with its international partners to eliminate financial support networks for terrorists.

The government participated actively in international counterterrorism efforts, but areas of concern remain. Thailand has not endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative, a key objective given Thailand's regional leadership role and strategic location. Because Thailand is an international center for document fraud, the Thai Government has engaged with the G8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) on increasing penalties for document fraud, but proposed legislation has not yet been passed.

Europe and Eurasia Overview

“It is important . . . that those engaged in terrorism realize that our determination to defend our values and our way of life is greater than their determination to cause death and destruction to innocent people in a desire to impose extremism on the world. It is our determination that they will never succeed in destroying what we hold dear in this country and in other civilized nations throughout the world.”

Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
BBC News
July 8, 2005

Two terrorist attacks in London on July 7 and July 21 further focused European countries on the terrorist threat and prompted increased cooperation and efforts to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. The year was also marked by successes as terrorist networks were broken up by arrests in countries ranging from Denmark to Italy. European nations continued to work in close partnership with the United States in the global counterterrorism campaign and continued to enhance their abilities, both individually and collectively, to deal with a terrorist threat increasingly seen as an internal one. The contributions of European countries in sharing intelligence, arresting members of terrorist cells, and interdicting terrorist financing and logistics were vital elements in the war on terrorism.

European Union (EU) member states remained strong and reliable partners. International judicial cooperation advanced as EU members continued to enact and implement legislation for U.S.-EU Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties. The United
States and EU states developed more comprehensive, efficient border security processes to ensure close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and to improve information-sharing capabilities. Progress has been slower as the United States and European Union worked through regular counterterrorism and terrorist financing engagements to develop mechanisms to implement the 2004 U.S.-EU Summit Declaration on Combating Terrorism. A contributing factor has been member states' reluctance to grant more than token responsibilities to the EU counterterrorism coordinator's office or other Community institutions. Following months of analyzing member states’ national counterterrorism systems, member state leaders agreed in December to revise the EU counterterrorism action plan, which is designed to disrupt terrorist networks and address conditions terrorists exploit to recruit new members, but does not have effective coordinating mechanisms at the EU level.

European nations are active participants in a variety of multilateral organizations that contributed to counterterrorist efforts, including the G8, NATO, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The United States and its partners worked through all of these organizations to establish and implement best practices, build the counterterrorism capabilities of “weak but willing” states, and institutionalize the war against terrorism globally. OSCE members committed themselves to becoming parties to the 13 UN terrorism conventions and protocols, to work together to modernize travel documents and shipping container security, and to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist organizations. The OSCE held two workshops in 2005 on ICAO's minimum security standards for handling and issuance of passports, sponsored visits by ICAO and other experts to provide technical advice to requesting countries on new travel document security features, and increased OSCE countries' cooperation with Interpol in reporting lost or stolen passports.

Terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support networks in Europe remains a source of concern. Efforts to combat the threat in Europe were sometimes hampered by legal protections that made it difficult to take firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, asylum laws that afforded loopholes, inadequate legislation, or standards of evidence that limited the use of classified information in holding terrorist suspects. The new EU arrest warrant encountered legal difficulties in some countries that forbid extradition of their own citizens. Germany found it difficult to convict members of the Hamburg cell of suspected terrorists allegedly linked to the September 11 attacks. Terrorists are also able to take advantage of ease of travel within Schengen visa countries. Some European states have at times not been able to prosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected terrorists brought before their courts. The EU as a whole remains reluctant to take steps to block the assets of charities associated with HAMAS and Hizballah.

On July 7, four suicide bombers -- all British citizens -- detonated themselves on three London subway trains and one bus, killing 56 persons and injuring more than 700. Two weeks later, another group of terrorists tried unsuccessfully to set off bombs in the London Underground. The attacks in London prompted the British Government to seek tougher
counterterrorism legislation that would allow for proscribing groups and individuals glorifying or inciting terrorism.

In July, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) declared an end to its decades-long armed struggle. In September, an independent commission on decommissioning announced that PIRA had put all its weapons "beyond use."

Concerned about the implication of the London attacks for homegrown terrorism in Europe, countries across the continent moved to enact legislation to strengthen their counterterrorism capabilities and to crack down on resident terrorist suspects.

Italy continued to arrest and deport terrorist suspects throughout the year; after the London bombings, it passed legislation to increase the government’s ability to expel extremists.

In September, the Spanish High Court sent al-Qaida cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and 17 members of his cell to prison for terms ranging from six to 27 years for membership in a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts.

In October, 200 to 300 gunmen attacked police and military facilities in the city of Nalchik in the north Caucasus region of Russia, killing dozens before the authorities re-established control.

In October, cooperation among European law enforcement Agencies was important to counterterrorism successes. In the first use of the EU arrest warrant for terrorism, French authorities in February extradited a senior ETA suspect to Spain. In April, Switzerland extradited to Spain the alleged leader of a 2004 conspiracy to bomb Spain's High Court and other Madrid landmarks.

In November, the United States and the OSCE hosted a conference on combating terrorist finance for counterterrorism officials from the 55 member states. The seventh in a series designed to disseminate best practices and build capacity in Europe and Eurasia, the conference struck a balance between policy (building political commitment and implementing international legal obligations) and technical support (how to build a financial intelligence unit and how to prosecute terrorist financing cases).

Uzbekistan’s support for the global war on terror has eroded significantly due to the downturn in U.S.-Uzbek relations. While Uzbek authorities continued to stress the importance of counterterrorism cooperation, the government limited its participation in U.S. Government-sponsored counterterrorism programs, and in July terminated an agreement allowing U.S. access to the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. The Uzbek Government increased security forces to prevent terrorist attacks, but failed to address the conditions terrorists exploit to gain popular support and recruits for their cause.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played a key role in combating terrorism at the regional level in Europe. First and foremost, NATO continues Operation Active Endeavor (OAE), a naval operation that aims to combat terrorism by monitoring maritime traffic in the Mediterranean. Thus far, NATO forces have monitored more than 75,000 vessels, boarding some 100 suspect ships. In addition, over 480 ships have taken advantage of NATO escorts.

**Albania**

The Albanian Government continued its efforts to improve its law enforcement and border control security by participating in U.S. Government-sponsored training and technical assistance programs. The Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) continued to implement the Total Information Management System (TIMS). In 2005, TIMS was expanded to cover all ten of Albania's major border crossings with its four neighboring countries (Italy, Greece, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro) and Kosovo. During the first nine months of 2005, the system helped officials detain 145 wanted persons.

Albania continued to implement provisions of anti-money laundering legislation, with a focus on curtailing the activities of organizations suspected of having links to identified terrorist organizations. Although progress was made in this area, the effectiveness of the government's counterterrorist efforts were hampered by inadequate financial resources, corruption, a lack of fully trained officers responsible for borders and ports, and poor communications and data processing infrastructure.

The International Maritime Organization and U.S. Coast Guard have determined that Albania adequately reported required information and maintained adequate counterterrorism measures for port security and complied with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS).

The government continued to implement its Terrorism Financing Freeze (TFF) law enacted in 2004. Since December 2004, the Albanian Government has frozen the assets of four organizations (Taibah, International Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, Al Haramein, and Global Relief Foundation) and four individuals (Nabil Abdul Saydi, Patricia Rosa Vinck, Yasin Al-Kadi, and Abdul Latif Saleh), all identified by the United Nations as suspected of supporting or funding extremist groups or organizations.

Albania is committed to maintaining its presence in Iraq as long as required. In Afghanistan, Albania deployed 26 troops to ISAF, including four new members of a joint medical unit.

**Armenia**

With substantial U.S. assistance, Armenia continues to strengthen its capacity to counter the country's few perceived terrorist threats. While no known terrorist groups operate domestically, Armenia's geographic location, porous borders, and loose visa regime present growing opportunities for traffickers of illicit materials, persons, and finances.
The government’s deepening political and economic ties with neighboring Iran have, however, limited Armenian criticism of Iranian extremism and heralded closer diplomatic relations between the two countries. Armenia also has normal diplomatic and economic relations with Syria. Both Iran and Syria have large ethnic Armenian populations.

In February, the government established the Financial Monitoring Center (FMC), a U.S.-supported financial intelligence unit within the Central Bank that is designed to consolidate reporting requirements for large or otherwise suspicious money transfers. The FMC, established by legislation passed in late 2004, complements new laws that impose financial reporting requirements designed to reduce money laundering and limit terrorist access to financing. There were no reported incidents involving the transfer of funds in support of terrorism in Armenia, but the heavy flow of remittances suggests that this would be difficult to detect. The FMC, still in its infancy, is not yet an effective investigatory agency. It spent most of the year testing reporting requirements, developing forms and instructions, and training bank regulators, examiners, and financial analysts.

Armenia continued efforts to increase the security of its vital documents such as birth certificates, introduced additional security features into the production of passports, and began installing passport readers at border posts. The National Security Service and police continued to share information with the U.S. Embassy when they discovered fraudulent U.S. visas or other documents.

On August 17, the government passed legislation establishing the National Control List, a schedule of controlled commodities that either cannot be exported or that require an export license because of the potential for misuse. The Armenian National Control List is adapted from the European Union's dual-use list. It complements legislation the government adopted in late 2004 that required licensing exports and imports of radioactive sources.

Armenia supported U.S. efforts in Iraq with troops on the ground and provided overflight authorization in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

**Austria**

Austria has made efforts to tighten controls on suspected terrorism financing and fulfilled its obligations to asset freeze decisions pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions and EU Clearinghouse designations. However, it failed to initiate any freezing actions independently. Austria's legal and institutional framework include comprehensive money laundering and terrorist financing legislation consistent with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations.

Through November, the Austrian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) received 24 reports on suspected terrorism financing transactions. This was a significant increase over 2004, and was largely due to improved banking control mechanisms and better international cooperation.
A legislative package introduced in July earmarked 105 million euros for terrorism prevention measures and related research through the year 2013; five million euros were earmarked for the year 2005.

Austria amended its immigration laws to have more restrictive legal tools against foreign visa holders suspected of terrorist links and extremist preaching and incitement. Austria began an investigation into potential terrorist recruitment in prisons and refugee camps, a concern that followed a 2004 surge of Chechen asylum seekers.

In the wake of the London bombings, the Interior Ministry's intelligence arm, the Federal Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT), stepped up surveillance of suspected Islamic extremists. The BVT singled out a handful of suspected extremist mosques in Vienna for increased monitoring. It continued surveillance of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad movement and of suspected Afghan extremists entering Austria as asylum seekers.

Austria maintained four police instructors at the Iraqi Police Academy in Jordan to help train Iraqi police. In Afghanistan, Austria temporarily deployed 93 soldiers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help provide security for the September elections. Additionally, Austria committed four liaison officers to the ISAF headquarters in Kabul and two advisors to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

Together with the United States and the EU, Austria operated two counterterrorism-related training programs for countries in Central Asia: the Central Asian Border Initiative (CABSI) and the Vienna Central Asia Initiative (VICA).

Austria pledged a total of US $1 million for the period between 2002 and 2006 to the UN program to combat terrorism. It is a major donor country to the United Nations’ Vienna-based counterterrorism and anti-drug office, the UN Drug Control Program (UNDCP).

**Azerbaijan**

Since 2001, Azerbaijan has aggressively apprehended and tried members of suspected terrorist groups and closed Islamic organizations operating in Azerbaijan that are suspected of supporting terrorist groups. Azerbaijan has taken steps to combat terrorist financing and identified possible terrorist-related funding by distributing lists of suspected terrorist groups and individuals to local banks. In 2003, the government established an inter-ministerial experts group responsible for drafting anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance legislation. In December, an experts group, led by the National Bank of Azerbaijan, finalized its proposed anti-money laundering legislation to include establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and expansion of the predicate crimes for money laundering beyond narcotics trafficking.

In February, the Azerbaijani Court of Grave Offenses convicted a group of six men that called themselves "al-Qaida Caucasus" for planning terrorist attacks in Baku. The group was found with TNT, hand grenades, other armaments, and propaganda materials; it attempted to recruit female suicide bombers. Members of the group received sentences ranging from three to 14
years. In July, the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security arrested a group of armed
Islamic extremists and confiscated a large quantity of explosives, chemicals, and plans for the
production of explosive devices. In December, the government extradited two members of
the Kongra-Gel/PKK to Turkey.
Azerbaijan served as a conduit for individuals with ties to terrorist organizations seeking to
move men, money, and material throughout the region. Accordingly, Azerbaijan stepped up
its interdiction efforts and had some success reducing terrorist transit.

Azerbaijan granted blanket overflight clearance, engaged in information sharing and law
enforcement cooperation, and approved numerous landings and refueling operations at its
civilian airport in support of U.S. military operations in Afghanistan.

Since August 2003, Azerbaijan has supported the Coalition effort in Iraq with an infantry
company of 151 soldiers stationed at the Haditha dam. Since November 2002, a platoon of
Azerbaijani soldiers has worked with the Turkish peacekeeping contingent in Afghanistan.

Belgium

Overall awareness of the terrorist threat to Belgium increased this past
year, partly in reaction to the London bombings, but also in response to
home-grown threats to Belgian security. The London bombings
intensified Belgium's continuing effort to improve cooperation with
foreign security agencies. Belgian police continue to work directly
with such agencies both in neighboring and more distant countries. In
addition to long-standing arrangements with police in Germany,
France, and the other two Benelux nations, Belgium now has
cooperation agreements with Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
Cooperation with the United States also continued to improve under
the efforts of Belgian Interior Minister Dewael. Belgian authorities
stressed the need for more information sharing in order to move legally
against suspected terrorists.

Consequently, the government was active on a number of fronts,
including enforcement, internal coordination, development of
legislation, and consequence management. Belgian authorities
responded more aggressively to activities inside the country’s borders with investigations,
raids, arrests, and use of new counterterrorism legislation. Prosecutors are also seeking
lengthier sentences in ongoing trials under the counterterrorism law.

Belgium is an active partner in the Department of Homeland Security’s Container Security
Initiative for the ports of Antwerp and Zeebrugge, and on port security in general.

Belgian authorities remained concerned about potential terrorist activities by groups from
Algeria and North Africa. The government targeted investigations against the Moroccan
Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front
(DHKP/C), and a nebulous Islamic extremist network operating out of several provinces,
including Charleroi, that is suspected of connections with the November 9 suicide attack in Iraq by a Belgian woman. Two leading Kongra-Gel (KGK)-affiliated media production studios, BRD Corporation Media Production Company and Roj-NV, are co-located in Belgium.

On November 9, Belgium began the trial of 13 defendants linked to the GICM, using for the first time its 2003 counterterrorism law criminalizing terrorist acts and membership in terrorist groups. The trial, expected to last several months, is the result of arrests made in 2004 by Belgian counterterrorism police. This series of raids throughout Belgium dismantled a network that is believed to have supported the 2004 bombings in Casablanca and Madrid and that also is suspected of attempting to recruit fighters to support attacks against American interests in Iraq.

Belgian judicial authorities continued prosecution of a case against 11 DHKP/C members charged with belonging to a criminal organization, arms possession, forgery, and use of forged documents. Turkish authorities alleged that one of the suspects, Fehriye Erdal, was involved in the 1996 murder of Ozdemir Sabanci, an influential business executive in Turkey. The chairman and the secretary of the then-DHKP/C headquarters in Belgium were charged under the 2003 counterterrorism legislation with belonging to a terrorist organization.

On November 30, Belgian federal police made 14 additional arrests on terrorism charges in the aftermath of a November 9 suicide attack by a Belgian woman against American forces in Iraq. Police conducted numerous searches in Brussels, Charleroi, Tongeren, and Antwerp, and seized large quantities of documents, computers, and other material. Six of those arrested were held and charged under the 2003 counterterrorism legislation for providing support to a terrorist organization.

Belgian authorities alleged that those arrested in connection with the attack in Iraq were using Belgium as a platform for recruiting and transporting volunteer fighters to Iraq. According to Federal Prosecutor Daniel Bernard, the suicide attack inside Iraq prompted authorities to speed up what had been an investigation lasting more than four months and involving several Belgian and foreign security services. Public awareness of the presence of terrorist-affiliated support networks on Belgian soil has grown. The Belgian Government has moved energetically against these networks, including the investigation and prosecution noted above. It also has disrupted untraced money flows through such alternative remittance systems as phone shops.

Belgium continued to respond fully to EU and UN Security Council actions to freeze suspected terrorist assets. The burden of proof on judges is relatively high, however. In order to constitute a criminal offense, authorities must demonstrate that the support was given with the knowledge that it would contribute to the commission of a crime by the terrorist group. Further, an FATF mutual evaluation found that Belgian law was out of compliance with FATF standards on asset freezing and does not establish a national capacity for designating foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs). Belgian authorities must demonstrate in each case that the group given support actually constitutes a terrorist group.
Belgium's greatest contribution in military terms to the global war on terror was to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, with a troop presence of 300 in 2005. Belgium planned to expand its technical assistance efforts in Iraq, and began implementing Iraqi debt forgiveness within the framework of Paris Club agreements.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) counterterrorism cooperation with the United States on the law enforcement side was good, within the limits of its current institutional capacity. Bosnia remains a weak state, however, with multiple semi-autonomous centers of power. It therefore could present an attractive environment for those seeking a locale to facilitate terrorist activities.

Under new amendments, an interagency Citizenship Review Commission was able to strip BiH citizenship from naturalized citizens who fraudulently obtained their citizenship, have no substantial ties to Bosnia at present, or obtained their citizenship because of government error or misconduct. These changes corrected defects in the 1997 Law on Citizenship that hindered previous efforts to strip the citizenship of such individuals, and now enables Bosnia to deport them. The commission reviews the citizenship status of mujahedin fighters and withdraws citizenship, where appropriate, on a case-by-case basis. The legislation instructs the Citizenship Review Commission to complete its work within two years.

In October, Federation police and law enforcement authorities raided a safe house in a suburb of Sarajevo and arrested two terrorist suspects with links to terrorist networks in Western Europe. The police confiscated weapons and explosive material. Pursuant to the ongoing investigation, police arrested in late November both the person who supplied the explosives and two other individuals who served as the conduit between the supplier and the recipients. The investigation is ongoing, and cooperation with U.S. and other foreign law enforcement agencies remains excellent.

Although there are specific counterterrorism laws in the Criminal Procedure Code, prosecutors found it difficult to link illegal activities to specific terrorism charges. Terrorist-related cases proceeded under conventional criminal statutes, such as illegal arms possession, arms smuggling, and conspiracy, which all carry fairly light penalties by American standards. Prosecutions were conducted under counterterrorism statutes in 2005.

In September, the Sarajevo Cantonal Prosecutor’s Office dropped terrorism charges against six former Federation officials suspected of cooperating with Iran to operate a terrorist training camp in Bosnia. Although the statute of limitations on the terrorism charges ran out, the trial is proceeding under charges of conspiracy to commit attempted murder. In October, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) hard-liner Hasan Cengic, a Bosniak, was acquitted of charges that he facilitated arms trading and arms production during the 1992-95 war. Cengic is known for his hard-line role within the SDA and for his continued business association with foreign extremist groups. In September, in cooperation with the Regional Security Officer at the American Embassy in Sarajevo, police apprehended a man who had phoned in a bomb
threat to the Embassy. In December, the man pleaded guilty to endangering internationally protected persons, which is not a terrorism charge.

Six new state-level institutions with counterterrorism responsibilities have been developed since 2000. Some of these are operational, while others remained nascent, with more authority on paper than actual capacity. The six are:

- The State Border Service (SBS);
- The State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA);
- The Ministry of Security (MoS);
- The BiH State Court and State Prosecutor's Office;
- The Foreign Affairs Service (FAS); and
- The Bosnian State Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA).

The State Border Service was the most fully operational. It is responsible for controlling the country's four international airports and 55 international border crossings that are spread across 1,551 kilometers. The SBS is considered one of the better border services in Southeast Europe and is one of the few truly multiethnic institutions in Bosnia. However, a number of illegal crossing points remain that the SBS does not control, including dirt paths and river fords. Many official checkpoints remain understaffed.

In February, Bosnian authorities from the State, the Republika Srpska, the Federation, and the Brcko District agreed to form a single joint registry of all NGOs and associations in Bosnia. All parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create a single registry database at the Ministry of Justice. The government remained vigilant against previously shut NGOs renewing their activities. Authorities continued to investigate other organizations, private companies, and individuals for links to terrorist financing.

Aktivna Islamska Omladina (Active Islamic Youth, or AIO) is a Bosnian-bred non-governmental organization whose stated goal is to establish an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran. Individuals with ties to the so-called "El Mujahid Brigade," a wartime unit comprised mainly of foreign extremists, founded AIO in the city of Zenica in 1995. The group advocates religious intolerance and openly labels Christianity and Judaism enemies of Islam. Its activists teach young Bosniaks a strict literal form of Islam under the guise of operating youth centers, summer camps, Internet cafes, and other outreach activities. AIO has branch offices throughout Bosnia, and a growing presence of active members in Western Europe and the United States. AIO sponsors SAFF magazine, a weekly print and on-line publication notable for its anti-Semitic and anti-Western rhetoric, interviews, and exposes. Although not circulated widely, SAFF is the AIO’s most important instrument in spreading its message to the Bosniak population.

Bosnia and Herzegovina sent a 36-member explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) unit to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; this unit began its second rotation in Iraq in November.
**Bulgaria**

Bulgarian responses to terrorism included numerous official public statements, efforts to assist with international terrorism investigations, and participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Bulgaria's support consisted of 75 military personnel, including staff officers, a mechanized infantry platoon, and military instructors. In addition, one Bulgarian battalion with 386 personnel served in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Financial Intelligence Agency (FIA) was charged with inspecting financial institutions and investigating transactions valued at or above 30,000 Bulgarian lev (approximately U.S.$ 18,750). It remained vigilant against terrorist financing and continued to cooperate with the U.S. Government in identifying terrorist assets. The FIA distributed lists of individuals and organizations linked to terrorism to all banks in Bulgaria, the Ministry of Interior, Customs, and the Border Police. The FIA coordinated information received on searches for persons and entities named in Executive Order 13224 lists. It also provided feedback, including information on the response level of Bulgarian banks, to the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN), as well as to the U.S. Embassy. In addition, the FIA provided statistics to the United States on suspicious transactions that were referred to the Prosecutor General for further action.

In February, Bulgarian security services and their Irish counterparts uncovered a plan by individuals reportedly linked to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) to move money through a Bulgarian bank, allegedly for money laundering purposes.

**Croatia**

Croatia backed up its stated commitment to the global war on terror with concrete contributions. It deployed to Afghanistan the sixth rotation of a 50-person military contingent, attached to the ISAF, that included 43 Military Police personnel assigned to a multinational MP company. In addition, Croatia deployed a three-person team of one diplomat and two civilian police to the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Feyzabad, and a four-person team to a combined medical unit.

**Cyprus**

Cyprus generally supported international efforts to block and freeze terrorist assets, implemented Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and conformed to EU directives on counterterrorism. The Cypriot Government drafted legislation to restructure, modernize, and strengthen Cyprus' Central Intelligence Service (KYP) for the first time since the Republic was founded.

Cyprus’ legal framework for investigating and prosecuting terrorist-related activity remained weak. There was some debate about possible amendments to the Cypriot constitution, but no political consensus has yet developed.
Although Cypriot law enforcement and intelligence services were generally cooperative on counterterrorism, legal and constitutional restrictions made it difficult for Cyprus to investigate and prosecute terrorism-related activities effectively. A recent change to evidentiary law allows the introduction of hearsay evidence in court proceedings, but information obtained through wiretaps and direct surveillance is prohibited. Further changes to strengthen the laws of evidence would make a real difference, but this likely would require amending the constitution. Meanwhile, Cyprus is working on a number of laws that could strengthen counterterrorism capabilities. These include new legislation aimed at modernizing and restructurign the Cypriot Central Intelligence Service (KYP) and a new law on arms brokering intended to bring Cypriot practices in line with an EU common position.

In July, the Government of Cyprus and the United States signed a ship boarding agreement under the auspices of the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Cypriot Parliament ratified the agreement in November. This was the United States’ first such agreement with an EU member state. With the world's ninth largest commercial fleet, Cyprus is a strong ally in U.S. efforts to regulate international maritime traffic to reduce the risk of both WMD proliferation and terrorism. Cypriot Government officials made significant improvements to Cyprus' offshore industry regulation as a result of efforts to bring Cypriot law and practice into accordance with EU requirements. Cyprus was also an advocate for the completion of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) and followed the EU position on the text.

The United States and Cyprus cooperated closely on issues related to terrorist finance and money laundering. The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Cypriot Financial Intelligence Unit (MOKAS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding designed to formalize and enhance their historically excellent relations.

Although Cyprus established an effective legal framework with regard to export controls -- with Cyprus Customs as the lead enforcement entity -- it did not establish a cohesive export control system. Police and customs officers need additional training in areas of basic inspection, equipment utilization, and familiarization.

“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,”

The United States does not recognize the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” nor does any other country except Turkey. That entity cannot sign treaties, international conventions and protocols, or other international agreements. Moreover, the area administered by Turkish Cypriots lacked the legal and institutional framework necessary to combat money laundering and terrorist financing effectively. Within these limitations, authorities in the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north cooperated with the United States in pursuing specific counterterrorism-related objectives.

The “Green Line” between northern and southern Cyprus is relatively porous. Turkish Cypriot authorities recently adopted new "legislation" strengthening controls against illegal immigration and tightening "citizenship" requirements. The large Turkish troop presence in the north acted as a deterrent to open Kongra-Gel/PKK activity.
In the north, Turkish Cypriot authorities lacked the legal and institutional framework to meet minimum international standards on combating money laundering and terrorist finance. Nevertheless, the Turkish Cypriot community took some steps to prevent terrorist financing within its banking institutions. The Turkish Cypriot "Central Bank," for example, regularly asked financial institutions to search for any assets linked to individuals or entities designated as terrorists by the United States and/or the UN 1267 Committee. Turkish Cypriot authorities also committed to prepare and implement new legislation to prevent money laundering and improve oversight of casinos, offshore banks, and currency exchange points.

**Czech Republic**

Whether providing military assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan or assisting the United States in routine investigations, the Czech Republic proved itself a reliable partner in preventing possible terrorist activity.

In October, the Czech Parliament ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. This action marked the final step in providing the Czech Government the appropriate legal, regulatory, and statutory mechanisms to combat terrorist financiers more effectively.

Pursuant to a U.S. arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice, Czech authorities in December arrested Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese-born Swedish national, while he was in transit from Stockholm to Lebanon. Kassir was wanted in the United States on allegations that he had conspired to provide material support to terrorists in the planned establishment of a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon. At the end of 2005, Kassir remained in Czech custody pending extradition to the United States.

**Denmark**

Acting under provisions of its 2002 counterterrorism law, Danish authorities made several arrests on terrorism-related charges. In the fall, Danish police arrested seven persons on suspicion of planning a suicide attack in Europe. At year's end, Danish prosecutors were still holding and considering whether to press charges against five of the detainees. The Danish Government's actions were related to the Bosnian police's arrests of a Swede and a Danish citizen of Turkish origin. Both were accused of possessing a significant quantity of explosives.

In September, Danish police also arrested Said Mansour, a Danish citizen originally from Morocco, on charges of distributing terrorist recruiting materials. At year's end, police were also reportedly investigating possible links between Mansour and the five persons still detained on suspicion of planning a suicide attack in Europe. He remained in police custody at the end of the year, pending trial. Mansour previously served a 90-day sentence from December 2004 on weapons possession charges.
Danish prosecutors pressed charges against the Danish NGO "Revolt" (Opror) after the group's spokesman, Patrick MacManus, informed local media that the group had raised and transferred funds to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). In December, the Danish Justice Minister announced that Danish prosecutors would press charges against the Danish chapter of al-Aqsa for raising funds for HAMAS.

The Danish Government cooperated with regional and international terrorist fora. Within the European Union, it implemented the designation of terrorist organizations through its obligations under the EU's terrorism finance, UNSCR 1267, and Clearinghouse mechanisms. Denmark continued to deploy more than 500 military personnel in southern Iraq to assist with security and reconstruction efforts, and contributed more than 170 military personnel to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Denmark also chaired the UN Security Council's Counterterrorism Committee in 2005.

**Estonia**

Numerous Estonian police, security, rescue, and emergency response agencies participated in a large U.S.-funded (International Counterproliferation Program) two-week counterterrorism/non-proliferation exercise from October 27 to November 4. The exercise was showcased to representatives and observers from Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, France, Britain, and Sweden.

Estonia contributed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan operating in Kabul. In December, Parliament renewed the Afghanistan troop mandate for up to two years and increased the limit on Estonian participation by 150 troops to support a UK-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in southern Afghanistan. In Iraq, the Estonian infantry platoon ESTPLA-11 was stationed in Baghdad under the command of the 1st Armored Division of the U.S. Army. In December, Parliament renewed the mandate of Estonian troops in Iraq for 12 months. Estonia contributed to the NATO training mission in Iraq, donated 50,000 euros to the NATO Iraq Fund, and had two constitutional experts on call to support the drafting of Iraq’s constitution.

**Finland**

Finland remained strongly committed to Afghan reconstruction; the government aimed to provide 10 million euros in development and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan on an annual basis. Approximately 100 Finnish troops were deployed in Afghanistan in support of ongoing ISAF operations, and a number of Finnish civilian crisis management experts were working in Afghanistan as well.

Interior Minister Rajamaki visited Washington in July for discussions with Justice and Homeland Security officials, and other Finnish officials participated in training courses in the United States. Finland actively supported and took part in European Union counterterrorism efforts, and participated in a number of EU and OSCE-sponsored events.
New regulations entered into force on October 1, requiring ships to submit security-related information prior to entry into port. Finland signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States in late 2004. The treaty is awaiting ratification by the Finnish Parliament.

Finnish security police maintained a dedicated counterterrorism unit. Finland has national authority to freeze terrorist assets. The Money Laundering Clearinghouse performed investigations on all individuals suspected of financing terrorist acts, including all individuals and entities on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. In the event that such assets are identified, they can be immediately frozen while a criminal investigation occurs either in Finland or abroad.

In cases when another government presented a legal request for action or when an individual or organization was suspected of having committed an offense within Finland's borders, Finland implemented regulations that allowed it to freeze assets without EU or UN approval. Finland amended its criminal code to make it possible to sentence leaders of terrorist groups to 15 years in jail, although the group has to have actually committed an act of terrorism in Finland before investigation or prosecution can begin. If the charge includes murder, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.

France

France continued to uncover and dismantle terror networks present on its soil, including several that recruited terrorists to Iraq. Following the London bombings, French officials worked closely with their British counterparts. Perceiving a number of deficiencies in their counterterrorism capabilities, France proposed legislation to remedy these deficiencies. Since March, the French Government has been drafting a white book on terrorism.

At the political and diplomatic level, France continued its engagement within the UNSC Counterterrorism Committee and the G8’s Counterterrorism Action Group. On the military front, its Special Forces participated in counterterrorist operations in Afghanistan and as a part of Task Force 150, a multinational naval force that patrolled the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected terrorists between Afghanistan and the Arabian Peninsula. In Afghanistan, French Mirage-2000 fighters flew with USAF fighters to assist American and Afghan ground troops.

France continued to develop the competencies and capabilities of TRACFIN, the Ministry of Finance’s terrorism financing coordination and investigation unit. Within the European Union, France played an active role in the Clearinghouse, the EU process for designating terrorist organizations under UNSCR 1373. France has not designated HAMAS-affiliated charities, such as the French-based Comite de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens, arguing that they have no proven links to terrorism. France also opposed EU designation of Lebanese Hizballah as a terrorist organization, although it supported Hizballah's eventual disarmament, which it maintained would result in Hizballah’s gradual integration into Lebanese politics.
France cooperated closely with the United States in pressing for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559. This resolution reaffirmed a call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; it also called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

French and Spanish authorities jointly made significant progress in combating Basque separatist groups, including Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). In the first use of the EU arrest warrant for terrorism, French authorities extradited ETA suspect Unai Berrosteguieta Eguiara to Spain on February 18.

The counterterrorism section of the Paris prosecutor’s office usually led the French Government’s terrorism investigations. Investigative judges, who in the French system combine prosecutorial and judicial powers, concentrated on Islamic/international terrorism, Basque/ETA terrorism, and terrorism linked to Corsican separatist groups. Their mandate was extensive and included terrorist acts on French soil and acts abroad that affected French citizens. In March, then-Justice Minister Dominique Perben announced the hiring of four additional judges to investigate terrorism, along with additional support staff, bringing the number of specialized terrorism investigation judges to nine.

The government continued its policy of expulsion for non-French citizens engaged in activities that promoted hate. Interior Minister Sarkozy announced October 4 that 19 Islamic extremists had been expelled from France since the beginning of the year; 102 have been expelled since 2002. In March, the CSA, France’s equivalent of the FCC, ordered the Eutelsat satellite company to cease transmitting Sahar 1, an Iranian television station, because of its anti-Semitic and hate-filled broadcasting. Following the CSA’s banning of Hizballah-affiliated al-Manar satellite television, Hizballah deputies lobbied the French Government in 2005 to lift the ban. Separately, the Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, reviewed an appeal by al-Manar to reinstate its broadcasting license.

French officials were concerned about the role of prisons in converting petty criminals into terrorists. Prisons served as a center of recruitment for the Safe Bourrada terror network that was dismantled in late September. According to statistics provided by the Ministry of Justice in September, 358 people are imprisoned for terrorism; of these, 159 are Basque-related, 94 are Islamic extremists, and 76 are Corsica-related.

Under French law, terrorism suspects may be detained for up to 96 hours before charges are filed. The new bill proposed extending the 96-hour period an additional 48 hours, for a maximum total detention of six days. Suspects can be held for up to three and a half years in pretrial detention while the investigation against them continues. Other measures in the bill included increasing the maximum penalty for association with a terrorist enterprise from ten to 20 years in prison, and increasing the maximum penalty for terrorist enterprise organizers from 20 to 30 years in prison. The National Assembly approved the bill in late November.

On January 26, French police arrested 11 people, three of whom eventually were charged with terrorism conspiracy, in Paris’ 19th arrondissement for reportedly recruiting young French
residents to launch terrorist attacks in Iraq. It was the first arrest since the opening in September 2004 of an investigation by the Paris prosecutor’s office into "Jihadists to Iraq." French intelligence, security, and judicial authorities consistently identified the conflict in Iraq as an attractive force for French extremists and made a number of arrests in 2005. French officials stated in November that 22 young people had left for Iraq, and at least seven were killed there, including two suicide bombers.

Djamel Beghal, the ringleader of a group arrested in 2001 on suspicion of planning to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Paris, was convicted March 15 for terrorist conspiracy. Beghal received the maximum ten-year sentence; his five accomplices were also found guilty and received sentences ranging from one to nine years in prison.

The last three French nationals detained at Guantanamo were transferred to French custody on March 7, following the transfer of four other nationals in 2004. France released Mustaq Ali Patel in March and Imad Kanouni in July. The other five remain in pretrial detention and could be charged with terrorist conspiracy. The former Guantanamo detainees’ detention has withstood multiple appeals by defense lawyers.

On April 24, French police in Paris arrested Said al-Maghrebi, an Afghanistan training camp veteran, on suspicion of organizing potential terrorists to fight in Iraq. Four others reportedly belonging to al-Maghrebi’s network were arrested in Paris and Marseilles. Two were later released.

A French court on May 16 declared five people guilty of organizing logistic support for the suicide bombers who assassinated Afghan commander Ahmed Shah Massoud on September 9, 2001. The five were sentenced to between two and nine years’ imprisonment.

On May 20, a Paris court condemned Corsican nationalist Charles Pieri to ten years in prison for terrorism finance conspiracy and extortion.

French police arrested nine people in late September on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist group. According to press reports, the group, reportedly led by GSPC sympathizer and convicted terrorist Safe Bourrada, was in the initial phases of planning terrorist attacks against targets in France, including the Paris Metro, Orly Airport, and the headquarters of the DST, France’s internal security service. Four more suspected members of the Bourrada network were arrested in early October.

British authorities transferred Rashid Ramda to French custody on December 1. Ramda is the suspected financier of the 1995 GIA attacks in the Saint-Michel RER train station, the Musee d'Orsay RER train station, and the Maison-Blanche Metro station. Ramda had been in British custody for the last ten years; his extradition to France removed a major irritant in French-British relations.

On December 12, French police arrested approximately 25 people on charges of support for terrorism. The alleged ringleader is Ouassini Cherifi, a French-Algerian who spent time in prison for passport fraud.
The judicial investigation into the activities of six suspected members of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) arrested in 2004 continued. The six suspects were held in pretrial detention and are alleged to have provided logistical support to those who committed the March 2004 Madrid bombings.

Judicial investigations continued following the 2003 arrests of German national Christian Ganczarski and Moroccan national Karim Mehdi, who are suspected of ties to al-Qa'ida. Both remained in pretrial detention in France.

Investigations into the "Chechen network," a loose grouping reported to have links with the Beghal network and the Frankfurt network (which attempted in 2000 to attack cultural sites in Strasbourg, including the cathedral) concluded, although a trial date for those arrested was not set. Several suspected members of the “Chechen network” were arrested in France; members of that network allegedly were interested in using chemical agents to commit terrorist attacks.

Georgia

More than 90 Georgian Government officials participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs. These graduates provided valuable criminal investigative assistance to a number of high-profile criminal incidents, including a car bomb explosion in Gori, Georgia, and an incident in May in Tbilisi’s Freedom Square in which a deranged individual threw a grenade at President George W. Bush during his public address. The United States began a new military training program in Georgia aimed at supporting Georgia's efforts to assist in the stabilization of Iraq, where Georgia currently has 850 troops.

Georgian internal troops continued to carry out operations to rid the Pankisi Gorge of terrorists. The identification and safe removal of hidden weapon caches in the Pankisi area enabled Georgian security forces to better secure it and to protect against terrorist acts or transit. Although border guard and customs reform continued, Georgia was still used to a limited degree as a transit state for weapons and money. Georgia made efforts to close its borders to those who wished to smuggle money, weapons, and supplies, but was hindered in particular by corruption at border checkpoints.

Germany

German cooperation with the United States on the counterterrorism front remained strong, although sometimes limited by German laws and procedures. Throughout the year, German law enforcement authorities conducted numerous actions against individuals, organizations, and mosques suspected of involvement in terrorism. In some cases, German authorities charged individuals with membership in terrorist organizations, specifically al-Qa'ida, Ansar al-Islam, or the Kongra-Gel/PKK. In other instances, German officials took action against crimes such as document fraud, illegal residency, or weapons law violations.
As of the end of the year, German authorities were investigating 186 cases of terrorism-related crimes nationwide; there were a few high profile cases where German courts did not convict suspects accused of terrorism and related crimes.

German laws and traditional procedures, as well as the courts’ long-standing and expansive view of civil liberties, sometimes limited the success of cases prosecutors brought to trial. On August 19, a Hamburg court convicted Moroccan citizen Mounir el Motassadeq in a retrial for his membership in a terrorist organization and sentenced him to seven years in prison. A Hamburg court released another "Hamburg cell" suspect, Moroccan citizen Abdelghani Mzoudi, in February 2004, based on the claim that prosecutors were unable to obtain potentially exculpatory evidence presumably held by the United States. Prosecutors appealed, but on June 9 a federal court upheld the acquittal. German officials had already begun the process to expel Mzoudi when he voluntarily departed Germany for Morocco on June 21, on the eve of his deportation.

On December 15, a German panel of three judges released Mohammed Ali Hamadi, convicted by a German court in 1989 for the 1985 killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert D. Stethem and the hijacking of a TWA flight. Although sentenced to life in prison, according to German law Hamadi was eligible for parole after 15 years’ imprisonment. The judicial panel rejected Hamadi's release when they first considered it in late 2001. When he was released, Hamadi had served 19 years in jail. Senior USG officials had strongly urged German authorities not to release Hamadi.

On May 31, a Bavarian court began the trial of Iraqi citizen Lokman Amin Mohammed, accused of logistical, financial, and recruiting support for Ansar al-Islam.

German law enforcement officials arrested three alleged members of Ansar al-Islam in December 2004 on charges of plotting an attack on then-Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi during his visit to Berlin. On November 16, the Federal Prosecutor formally charged them with the planned murder of Allawi, financial crimes, and membership in, financing, and recruiting for a foreign terrorist organization. All three remained in custody with legal proceedings underway.

A Berlin court convicted Tunisian national Ishan Garnaoui on April 6 on charges of tax evasion, illegal possession of weapons, and violation of the immigration law. The court sentenced him to three years and nine months in prison, but acquitted him of the terrorism charges. Prosecutors are appealing the terrorism acquittal. Garnaoui was first arraigned in March 2003 for attempting to form a terrorist organization and planning to attack U.S. and Jewish targets in Germany.

On October 26, a Düsseldorf court convicted four members of the al Tawhid terrorist group on charges of membership in a terrorist organization, forgery, and violations of weapons laws. They were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to eight years. The court established that the group's leader was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and that the defendants had planned terrorist attacks against Jewish and Israeli targets in Berlin and Düsseldorf.
In October 2004, German authorities arrested Syrian-German dual national Mamoun Darkazanli for extradition to Spain, where a 2003 arrest warrant accused him of membership in al-Qaida and providing it logistical and financial support. German authorities used the new EU arrest warrant, which enables swifter German extradition of its own citizens. On July 18, however, the German Constitutional Court voided the German law implementing the EU arrest warrant, criticized its lack of protections for German nationals, and ordered Darkazanli released. The Justice Minister immediately announced she would act to get the provision reinstated. German authorities have not indicted Darkazanli under German law.

The German Interior Ministry used its authority under the Law on Associations to ban organizations that it believed were connected to terrorist groups. Germany has banned a number of such organizations in recent years. On August 30, the Interior Ministry banned Yatim Children's Aid on the grounds of its being a successor organization to al-Aqsa. The Interior Ministry had banned the al-Aqsa Foundation in 2002 on the grounds that it provided financial support to HAMAS; a German court upheld the ban in 2004. The European Union added al-Aqsa to its list of entities subject to asset freezes in 2005, following a German proposal. On February 25, Germany banned the Yeni Akit publishing house in Moerfelden-Walldorf on the grounds of distributing anti-Semitic, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli propaganda.

German authorities issued several indictments and made a number of arrests related to the Turkish terrorist group Kongra-Gel/PKK. The Federal Prosecutor charged some with positions of leadership in Kongra-Gel fundraising. German officials arrested one prominent suspect, but a German court subsequently released him, finding that there was insufficient evidence from Turkey, which had requested his extradition. On September 5 the Interior Ministry banned E. Xani Press and Publishing Company, publisher of the pro Kongra-Gel newspaper "Ozgur Politika", on the grounds of its being its mouthpiece. E. Xani appealed the ban, and at the end of October the courts suspended the ban.

Germany participated in Department of Homeland Security programs to combat terrorism, including the Container Security Initiative in the ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven. The Transportation Security Administration’s presence in Frankfurt, together with U.S. and German air marshals, formed key parts of bilateral efforts to provide air transport security for the six German airports with flights to the United States.

In a German initiative, Germany and five other EU countries signed an agreement on May 27 that deepened law enforcement cooperation. The agreement enabled faster sharing of information, DNA, and fingerprint data.

Germany proposed several names for designation by the UN Security Council 1267 Committee to enable worldwide asset freezes and travel bans. The United Nations added those names to its list of individuals and entities on December 6.
Greece

With improved counterterrorism infrastructure in place following the August 2004 Olympic Games in Athens, Greece continued its work to fight domestic and international terrorism throughout the year. In October, the Greek Government passed a bill aimed at combating money laundering and terror finance, bringing Greek legislation in line with EU directives. Under the new legislation, the Greek Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) enjoyed broadened investigative authority; financing terrorism is defined as a predicate offense and subject to harsh penalties. Greece signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism in November.

Greece sustained its participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan by continuing to provide a unit from the Greek Corps of Engineers and a NATO medical unit in Kabul. In October, Greece took the lead for security at Kabul International Airport.

Appellate courts released Christos Tsigaridas, a convicted terrorist and founding member of the domestic terrorist group People's Revolutionary Struggle (ELA), for a variety of medical conditions. The courts also suspended on medical grounds the sentence of Pavlos Serifis, a convicted member of the leftist terrorist group 17 November (17N). Serifis attracted media attention upon his release by filing a petition with the European Court of Human Rights to protest the "inhumane conditions" of his imprisonment. The Court accepted the petition, and other 17N prisoners have since lodged complaints on similar grounds. In November, another convicted ELA member, Eirini Athanassaki, had her 25-year sentence suspended unanimously by an appellate court so that she could care for her elderly and ailing parents. Despite these releases, a Greek court in October denied the plea for release on medical grounds of 17N prisoner Savvas Xiros, whose botched bombing attempt in June 2002 led to his arrest and the subsequent arrest and trial of several members of the 17N organization.

In July, after a five-month process, a second trial for members of the ELA terrorist organization resulted in acquittals for all six defendants. The court tried the defendants in connection with a 1985-1995 bombing campaign against government buildings and the 1994 bombing of a police bus that resulted in the death of an officer. Three of the six defendants were already serving 25-year sentences for other ELA offenses, which were unaffected by the acquittals. Yannis Serifis, a cousin of Pavlos Serifis and suspected terrorist leader himself who was tried and acquitted in 2003 for his ties to 17N, stood trial for the first time as a member of the ELA. Authorities alleged that Serifis was involved in the 1994 police officer's murder, but the court acquitted him on all charges due to lack of evidence.

A group appeals trial for fifteen 17N convicts and two previously acquitted individuals opened December 2. In December 2003, Greek courts had handed down multiple life sentences to key 17N members who were responsible over the years for hundreds of crimes and the murders of 13 Greeks and five U.S. Government employees. The appeals trials essentially represented a new trial for the convicts, since new facts and evidence can be introduced in the Greek judicial system. Additionally, Constantinos Avramidis, a self-confessed member of anarchist organizations, was arrested and indicted as a member of 17N
in October. His trial still was not scheduled by the end of the year. Top Greek law
enforcement officials maintained that further investigation of 17N suspects and evidence is
ongoing, and that the case is not considered closed.

Similarly, police officials have not closed their investigation of the December 2004 killing of
a Greek Special Guard at his post outside the residence of the British Defense Attaché. Greek
authorities continued to regard this case as a domestic terrorist incident.

Anarchists periodically attacked what they call “imperialist-capitalist targets” with such tools
as firebombs and Molotov cocktails. Since these attacks usually occurred in the middle of the
night, few persons were seriously injured and there were no deaths. The perpetrators were not
captured. Police have made some inroads against the anarchists; after a May incident in which
anarchists threw Molotov cocktails at a police bus and stole police riot gear, police arrested
two suspects in July after observing them attempting to dispose of the gear. The three
suspects (another was arrested shortly thereafter) were charged on several felony counts.
They remained in custody awaiting trial and were the subject of periodic demonstrations of
support by the anarchist community.

**Hungary**

Hungary continued to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and contributed 186 personnel
to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Hungary fields a light
infantry reconnaissance company, a non-combatant medical unit, and a contingent of air
traffic controllers. In addition, 18 Hungarian personnel are assigned to the NATO training
mission in Iraq. Hungary donated to the Iraqi Army 77 T-72 tanks and four support vehicles
that arrived in time for the crucial December parliamentary elections.

U.S.- Hungarian cooperation on export and border controls is outstanding. In September, the
United States and Hungary signed a cooperative agreement for the destruction of Hungary's
stockpile of 1,540 SA-7 man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) missiles and related
equipment. Final destruction and verification were completed later in the year.

**Iceland**

In May, Iceland signed both the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism CETS No. 196 and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search,
Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism
CETS No. 198.

In support of maritime security, the Government of Iceland gave increased attention to
scenarios involving large passenger and cargo vessels. In August, the Icelandic EOD unit
conducted a bomb disposal exercise at Sundahofn port in Reykjavik on an American cruise
liner, the Seven Seas Navigator.
Ireland

There were notable positive developments in Irish counterterrorism cooperation. A remarkable change from 2004 was the September 26 decommissioning of weapons by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). In addition, Ireland passed new counterterrorism legislation, signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) with the United States, and came into compliance with a 2004 UN International Maritime Organization code.

On March 9, the Irish Government made strides in strengthening counterterrorism legislation when President Mary McAleese signed the Criminal Justice (Terrorism Offenses) Bill into law. It enabled Ireland to ratify and accede to four international conventions and protocols on terrorism, and significantly strengthened the government's ability to seize assets and prosecute those suspected of supporting terrorism.

Before this law was passed, authorities could only pursue and prosecute terrorist suspects if they committed criminal offenses in Ireland or were designated by the United Nations or EU. On September 15, Ireland signed, subject to ratification, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

In July, the government completed the installation of new counterterrorist security measures at Irish international seaports, bringing Ireland into compliance with the UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) code established in July 2004. These arrangements are aimed at preventing a terrorist strike on Ireland or the use of Irish ports for an attack on another country. In July, the Irish Justice Minister and the U.S. Ambassador signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) to further increase cooperation in the fight against global crime and terrorism. This agreement allows for more bilateral cooperation in police investigations and updated rules on extraditions. Nonetheless, the Irish courts' restrictive approach to carrying out extraditions continued to be of concern to U.S. officials.

In August, three men who had been found guilty in Colombia of aiding Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists secretly returned to Ireland to escape Colombian prison sentences. They were detained and questioned by the Irish national police but released without charge. The Colombian Government requested their extradition. Ireland does not have an extradition treaty with Colombia, but the case remains under review. The Irish Director of Public Prosecutions is investigating whether charges can be brought against one of the three for traveling on a false passport.

On July 28, a spokesman for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) made a statement calling for an end to the PIRA’s armed campaign and instructed its members to cease all forms of illegal PIRA activity. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning announced on September 26 its judgment that the PIRA had “put beyond use … all the arms in the IRA’s possession.” The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reported that since the September decommissioning, PIRA did not demonstrate any evidence of training and recruitment of terrorists or intent to return to violence.
The IMC released reports on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland. The Seventh Report of the IMC, published in October, analyzed continued activity in the Republic of Ireland by the following terrorist groups:

The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) maintained its terrorist capacity and was capable of effective sporadic attacks. The IMC reported that CIRA intends to continue to engage in terrorism and other crime. In the Republic, two CIRA members were arrested in January in possession of an under-car explosive, and nine members were imprisoned for charges related to 2003 arrests. Two members were also convicted of unlawful possession of firearms. In December, the Special Criminal Court in Dublin charged a man with possession of an improvised explosive device and membership in an unlawful organization styling itself the Irish Republican Army. Police are investigating his links to CIRA. The case was still pending at year's end.

The Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) continued to be a threat. The IMC reported that RIRA is committed to terrorism as a result of its continued efforts to gain and train members in the use of explosives. In the Republic, five people were convicted of membership in RIRA this year.

In the first half of 2005, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) maintained its capacity as a terrorist organization. The IMC reported during this period that PIRA decreased its involvement in violence, but increased its participation in organized criminal activity. It was unclear how active PIRA was in the Irish Republic, but Irish Government officials suspected continued recruitment of members until the July 28 statement ending PIRA’s armed campaign. Prior to this statement, the Justice Minister estimated there were approximately 1,500 active members in PIRA.

Italy

Italy worked to fight terrorism within its borders, cooperated internationally, and participated in Coalition activities with a strong military presence in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Italy’s law enforcement authorities maintained an initiative against locally based terrorist suspects through investigations, detentions, prosecutions, and expulsions. In extensive raids throughout Italy on May 18-19, law enforcement officials arrested 18 individuals associated with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group and Ansar al-Islam. After the July 7 bombings in London, Italian law enforcement officials detained multiple terrorist suspects and quickly passed enhanced counterterrorism legislation that increased the government’s ability to expel extremists considered a threat to national security, authorized improved surveillance techniques, and brought Internet operators under state supervision.

Italy expelled 13 individuals in the interest of national security, including Turin-based Imam Bouchta Bouriki. The closely coordinated investigation, arrest, and extradition of failed London suicide bomber Hamdi Isaac is an example of effective international cooperation. Law enforcement authorities arrested Casablanca bombing suspect El Bahri Abdelouahed on May 9. Italy has submitted more names of suspected terrorist financiers to the UN 1267 Committee than any country other than the United States.
A controversial judicial decision to release three suspected terrorists, on the grounds that their activities to recruit fighters for the insurgency in Iraq did not “necessarily constitute terrorist activity,” complicated the government's aggressive campaign to pursue terrorist suspects and resulted in calls for increased coordination of national terrorism prosecutions.

Domestic anarchist-inspired terrorist groups presented a diminished threat as a result of Italian authorities’ continued efforts to dismantle their organizations. However, the Informal Anarchic Federation claimed responsibility for a series of small package bombs causing minimal damage. Extremist groups protesting a high-speed train line between Turin and Lyon, France, caused considerable disruption and also threatened violence.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan authorities recognized an indigenous extremist problem following the revelation of participation by Kazakhs in the terrorist bombings in neighboring Tashkent, Uzbekistan in 2004. Since then, the government has improved counterterrorist legislation and has stepped up cooperation with the United States.

The trial of 16 individuals accused of participating in the 2004 Tashkent bombings resulted in their conviction in December 2005, with sentences of six to 25 years in prison. At the end of 2005, the Kazakh Parliament was working on a terrorist financing law to make it easier for prosecutors to win convictions.

Kazakhstan had a growing problem with the Islamic extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), an extremist political movement advocating the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state throughout the entire Muslim world. HT walked a fine line between free speech and incitement to terrorism, thus creating a high level of concern among Kazakh authorities. Because existing counterterrorist legislation did not provide legal grounds to designate HT as a terrorist group, the government adopted in February the Law on Extremism creating a new, albeit poorly defined, legal category of banned "extremist" organizations. To date, HT is the only group designated under this new law. The United States has no evidence that HT committed acts of international terrorism, but the group's radical anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies.

The United States added the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), sometimes called the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), to its list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The IJU is a terrorist splinter group from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that appeared in southern Kazakhstan. (See Chapter 8, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information.)

Kazakhstan, along with China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which established a regional antiterrorism center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is also a member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasia Group, a regional anti-money laundering organization, or Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, that includes Belarus, China, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia. Kazakhstani cooperation and timeliness in sharing terror-related
information with the United States improved. In November, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Defense Threat Reduction Organization held a one-week training class in Kazakhstan on combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Kazakhstani participants were drawn from the Committee for National Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

**Kyrgyzstan**

Following the change of government in March, Kyrgyzstan remained a dependable and outspoken ally in the global war on terror, taking political, legislative, and law enforcement initiatives to disrupt and deter terrorism. In August President Bakiyev signed a law on counteracting extremist activities. In September he signed a decree creating a special agency targeting terrorism financing and money laundering. In October, however, the Parliament rejected by one vote a draft law on money laundering that would have increased Kyrgyzstan's efforts in fighting terrorism financing and opened up further international cooperation.

Kyrgyzstan's military and internal forces worked to improve their counterterrorism capabilities and to expand cooperation with regional partners in 2005. Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), which established lists of banned terrorist groups in an effort to streamline cooperation. With U.S. assistance, the Kyrgyz National Guard opened a counterterrorism training center in January.

Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), banned as an extremist group since 2003, is a political movement that advocates the overthrow of existing governments and their replacement by a borderless state throughout the Muslim world. HT is highly secretive and organized on a cell-based structure. It has followers in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and the Middle East. Local specialists estimate that there are more than 5,000 HT members in Kyrgyzstan, located primarily among Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbek population in the south but with growing support in the north as well. Although the government generally does not arrest individuals for being members of HT, police detained 73 individuals this year for distributing HT literature and shut down a HT printing facility in Jalalabad in May.

The United States has no evidence that HT has committed any acts of international terrorism, but the group's radical anti-American and anti-Semitic ideology is sympathetic to acts of violence against the United States and its allies. HT has publicly called on Muslims to travel to Iraq and Afghanistan to fight Coalition forces.

**Latvia**

Latvia contributed troops to Coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cooperated productively with the United States on money laundering and terrorist finance concerns.

Latvia's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) continued to maintain a terrorist financing (OFAC) database that it shared with local banks. Bilateral efforts to combat financial crime
accelerated, and the Latvian Government and Latvian banks continued to take steps to strengthen anti-money laundering and “Know Your Customer” regimes against possible terrorist exploitation. In response to U.S. concerns about financial crime, the Latvian Parliament in May passed an anti-money laundering legislative package that introduced enhanced regulatory and law enforcement measures designed to strengthen the government's ability to combat financial crime.

Latvia contributed a ten-person team to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; in October, the team's mandate was renewed for 12 months. In Iraq, Latvia contributed up to 137 soldiers under Polish command.

**Lithuania**

In January, the Lithuanian Parliament approved a new national security strategy that cited international terrorism as a threat to Lithuania’s security. In September, Lithuania’s State Security Department established an antiterrorism division. Lithuanian law enforcement cooperated fully in monitoring and freezing assets of suspected terrorists.

Lithuania had approximately 55 troops in Iraq, including three trainers in the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). In Afghanistan, Lithuania has committed to deploying 40 Special Operations Force personnel when their current training rotation ends. Lithuania also leads a Provincial Reconstruction Team in western Afghanistan’s remote Ghor Province that undertook water sanitation and bridge-building projects and repaired a community orphanage and mosque.

**Macedonia**

Macedonia was a ready and willing partner in the global war on terror on multiple fronts, increasing its participation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Iraq to 40 officers and Special Forces.

The Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program office conducted six antiterrorism training courses for Macedonia. More than 120 Macedonian officials participated in this training, which was designed to assist Macedonia in countering the threat of terrorism.

**Malta**

Malta made significant progress in the area of customs inspection and border security procedures, helped by extensive U.S. assistance. Improvements included establishment both of the authority for Maltese Customs to inspect goods transiting the container port (Malta Freeport) and the necessary procedures for effectively using the container-scanning the Cargo, Vehicle, and Container Inspection System (VACIS) system to prevent the transshipment of WMD material through the Freeport.
In June, the Maltese Parliament approved an amendment to the criminal code to include provisions on terrorism. The bill defined, for the first time, an "act of terror" and "terrorism," and specifically enumerated actions that constitute the offense. The legal notice making this act law has not yet been issued. Regardless, provisions exist in Maltese law that provide adequate opportunity to prosecute and punish terrorist acts or activities.

U.S. and Maltese authorities reached agreement in November on new extradition and legal assistance agreements following more than a year of negotiations.

Malta criminalized terrorist financing in 2005. In 2002, the criminal code was amended in such a way that terrorist financing would meet the standard for categorization as a serious crime under Malta's Prevention of Money Laundering Act. On June 6, the Act was extensively amended and expanded to include provisions on funding of terrorism.

Moldova

Moldova has deployed to Iraq three separate contingents of servicemen, a total of 55, who specialize in demining, liaison, and convoy security. The separatist-controlled Transnistria region of Moldova remains a potential area for terrorist activity. There have been documented instances of contraband smuggling and suspicions of weapons smuggling remain. Moldova participated in a number of theoretical and practical antiterrorism assistance training events, seminars, exchanges, and conferences organized by the U.S. Embassy.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands continued to respond to the global terrorist threat with leadership and energy in the areas of border and shipping security, terrorist financing, and support of efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Netherlands has 378 personnel deployed to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan’s Baghlan province as part of the NATO ISAF mission, and 254 personnel and Special Forces participating in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan since April 18 on a one-year deployment. Dutch OEF personnel and Special Forces troops (more than 700) supported the Afghan elections in August. The Dutch pledged 75 million euros toward the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund to support the transition from humanitarian to reconstruction assistance between 2004 and 2006.

In July, the Amsterdam District Court sentenced Mohammed Bouyeri to life imprisonment for the murder of film director Theo van Gogh, the attempted murder of eight police officers, and threatening the life of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali. The court found that Bouyeri acted "with terrorist intent" in November 2004 when he murdered Van Gogh, impeded the work of Hirsi Ali, and possessed a firearm. Bouyeri did not appeal the verdict. Bouyeri is also charged, along with 13 other alleged members of the so-called Hofstad group, with membership in a terrorist organization. The trial of these 14 alleged members of the Hofstad terrorist network began on December 5. The 14, including Bouyeri, were charged with participating in a criminal organization "with terrorist intent." Bouyeri was not sentenced because he is already serving a life term. This was the first case tried under the Terrorist Crimes Act that took effect in August 2004. Under the Act, membership in a terrorist group is a crime; ordinary group
members may be sentenced to a maximum jail sentence of eight years, and leaders to 15 years.

A new terror alert system became operational in June. This early warning system was designed to trigger a clear and rapid response to terrorist threats by both the public and private sector. It linked the sector-specific measures to the latest threat information from the National Counterterrorism Coordinator. There are four alert levels: basic, low, moderate, and high threat. Initially, the port of Rotterdam, Schiphol Airport, the petrochemical industry, the railways, and the water supply sector were included; the natural gas, electricity, and nuclear sectors were added in October. By 2007, a total of 14 sectors will be part of the system. The first bi-annual national counterterrorism exercise, "Operation Bonfire," was held in the spring.

Using national sanctions authority, the Dutch blocked the accounts and financial transactions of a HAMAS fundraiser, the al-Aqsa Foundation, and the al-Qaida-affiliated Benevolence International Nederland in 2003. In July 2004, the Netherlands froze all financial assets of the Dutch branch of al-Haramain. The Dutch have been active in seeking support for an EU designation of Hizballah as a terrorist group. They also played a crucial leadership role in establishment of an informal US-EU dialogue on terrorism finance, pursuant to commitments of the June 2004 US-EU Declaration on Combating Terrorism.

Norway

Alleged Ansar al-Islam leader Mullah Krekar continued to reside freely in Norway but was unable to travel abroad, as his travel documents were confiscated, and he remained under a government expulsion order. In September, the Oslo City Court rejected Krekar's suit against the government's expulsion decision. He appealed, and resolution of his case in the Norwegian courts is expected to take months if not years. The new government said that it will continue to pursue Krekar's expulsion, and that he would be returned to Iraq as soon as there is an agreement with the new Iraqi Government on the conditions for his return.

Poland

Poland worked to fight terrorism within its borders, cooperated in international counterterrorism efforts, and participated in Coalition activities with a strong presence in peacekeeping operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In May, Polish border guards conducted a one-week training program in railway inspections for their counterparts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Croatia.

Chechen refugees from Russia continued to enter Poland, with 6,500 arriving in 2004. Most of these refugees simply transited Poland to other EU countries. However, some legitimately sought refuge in Poland. Poland granted refuge to 200 Chechen refugees in 2005, while three others were denied refuge following adverse security checks by Poland’s internal security agency.
Portugal

Indian terrorist Abu Salem Ansari, whom the Portuguese arrested in September 2002, was extradited to India with his wife and codefendant Monica Bedi in November after they exhausted their appeals. Salem was convicted by the Portuguese High Court in November 2004 of using false documents, making false statements, resisting arrest, and bribing a law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to prison for four years and six months; Bedi was sentenced to two years. Salem was wanted in India for suspected involvement in a series of 1993 bomb blasts that left 278 dead in Mumbai, and for more than 20 other high-profile murders, money laundering, and extortion. He was also sought for his criminal association with notorious underworld figure Dawood Ibrahim, who is on New Delhi's list of 20 most wanted criminals.

In July, Portugal formally agreed to join the Container Security Initiative; its office is now staffed and fully functioning. That same month, Portugal and the United States signed bilateral Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance instruments.

Romania

Romania’s President Basescu stressed the importance of a proactive approach to fighting terrorism that involves taking concrete steps beyond Romania's national borders. About 1,400 Romanian troops serve in Iraq and Afghanistan, and President Basescu and other senior leaders said publicly that Romania would maintain its commitment of troops in both countries as long as necessary.

In the fall, Romania deported five students for allegedly having ties to al-Qaida and attempting to recruit supporters. The five had been under surveillance since early 2005. A Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) spokesman stated that "the operation aimed to stop this radical Islamic group in Romania and remove these people from the national territory."

The Romanian Government established internal mechanisms to combat terrorism, including adoption of a national antiterrorism strategy. In February, the government adopted an ordinance, enacted by Parliament in May as Law 162/2005, modifying and strengthening the law regarding the establishment of the Directorate for Terrorism and Organized Crime Investigations.

Bucharest is the site of the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), a regional center that provides law enforcement training and intelligence sharing on transborder criminal activities, including terrorism, for 12 member countries in Southeast and Central Europe.

In July, Romania ratified the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Organization's Additional Protocol to Combat Terrorism, signed in Athens in December 2004. In October, the Romanian Minister of Administration and Interior and his counterparts from 13 other European nations signed an agreement on fighting terrorism, illegal migration, organized crime, and corruption.
Romania adopted adequate legislation to address financial crimes and terrorist financing. Nevertheless, Romania remains vulnerable to money laundering and other financial crimes that potentially finance terrorist organizations. Weaknesses include insufficient resources, both of funding and personnel devoted to prosecuting financial crimes. Romanian financial entities independently identified one case of possible terrorism financing activity in Romania. Information on the case has been forwarded to the United States.

In August, legislation took effect that extended the jurisdiction of the Romanian Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) beyond money laundering offenses to suspected acts of terrorist financing (Law 230/July 2005 amending Law 656/2003 for the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering). The FIU was authorized to conduct proactive investigations. The law extended the reporting requirements applicable to financial institutions, defined to include banks, insurance companies, gambling firms, and pawn companies, for transactions suspected to involve terrorist financing.

Russia

A Russian army armored personnel carrier patrols a street of Grozny in October after a roadside blast targeted their convoy in the center of the Chechen capital. (AFP Photo/Khasan Kaziyev)

In the face of new terrorist attacks on Russian soil, the Russian Government and public continued to view counterterrorism as a top priority. Much of the terrorist activity in the region and elsewhere in Russia was homegrown and linked to the Chechen separatist movement, although there was evidence of a foreign terrorist presence in Chechnya and of international financial and ideological ties with Chechen groups. Russia claimed a success in March with the slaying of Chechen separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov; its assertions that the insurgency was terrorist in nature were bolstered by the addition in August of the terrorist Shamil Basayev to the Chechen separatist leadership structure.

Major terrorist incidents in Russia were centered in the north Caucasus and included:

- On July 19, attackers in the village of Znamenskoye in Chechnya blew up a vehicle and fired on a police vehicle, killing 14 and wounding approximately 34, including civilian bystanders.

- On October 13, 200 to 300 gunmen attacked police and military facilities in the city of Nalchik in Kabardino-Balkaria in the north Caucasus, killing 24 law enforcement officials and 12 civilians. Authorities reported approximately 91 gunmen killed and 39 detained.
All Russian regions passed regulations to strengthen counterterrorism measures in educational, social, and cultural facilities following the 2004 Beslan school siege. A parliamentary commission worked during the year to examine, among other things, the performance of the federal authorities during the Beslan siege, and its preliminary report on December 28 criticized local authorities.

The number of domestic terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions expanded in 2005. One local non-governmental organization reported 28 terrorism-related convictions and 50 pending terrorism trials in Russia by December. Noteworthy cases included:

- In April, a Moscow court found two airport employees guilty of aiding and abetting the terrorists who brought bombs onto the two Russian airplanes downed in August 2004.

- In May, Russian authorities began the trial of Nurpachi Kuliyev, accused of taking part in the 2004 terrorist school seizure in Beslan.

- In September, three people charged with a gas pipeline explosion in Bugulma (two of them former Guantanamo detainees who had been repatriated to Russia) were acquitted by a jury trial in Tatarstan.

The U.S.-Russia Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG), co-chaired by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak, met in May and December. The group fosters cooperation between numerous U.S. agencies and their Russian counterparts on counterterrorism issues. Notable milestones included the February signing of a comprehensive agreement facilitating information sharing on man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and the November signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on counternarcotics that established closer cooperation and exchange of information. The FBI and Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) forged a highly productive joint counterterrorism operational capability that led to several arrests and convictions.

The United States and Russia continued bilateral cooperation to destroy, safeguard, and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. President Bush and President Putin made intensified cooperation on nuclear security a centerpiece of their February summit in Bratislava.

Russia originally proposed and then played a major role in securing consensus in the UN General Assembly to enact on April 13 the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which became the thirteenth UN legal instrument to combat terrorism.

Russia is an increasingly active member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (FATF). After fulfilling its pledge to create a Eurasian FATF-style regional body (FSRB) in 2004, known as the Eurasia Group on Money.
Laundering (EAG), Russia was the group's leading force and remained its chair. The EAG, whose members also include Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, made significant progress toward building Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) and established the necessary legislative and regulatory frameworks in member states to help those states improve their compliance with international standards.

Russia used its position in international fora to build cooperative mechanisms and programs to counter terrorism. For example, Russia led efforts to make counterterrorism cooperation a key element in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

**Serbia and Montenegro**

In June, a Serbian police officer arrested 22-year-old Moroccan Abdelmajid Bouchar while he was traveling by train in Serbia on a false Iraqi passport. In September, Bouchar was extradited to Spain. The Spanish Government had sought Bouchar, a member of al-Qaida, for his suspected role in the 2004 Madrid train bombings.

Serbia and Montenegro created a new directorate, which is still being organized, to coordinate counterterrorism policies and assistance. The Ministry of Defense’s 2005 strategy highlighted the global war on terror as one of the new fundamental organizing principles for the revamped Serbian and Montenegrin armed forces.

**Kosovo**

The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) continued to administer Kosovo pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244. UNMIK's Central Intelligence Unit (CIU) continued to monitor suspected terrorist activity in Kosovo. UNMIK and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) monitored individuals entering Kosovo at official points of entry. This regulation, in force since July 1, required persons who were not employed by an international organization to register with the KPS' Office of Foreign Registration upon entering Kosovo.

UNMIK police froze the assets of 34 individuals and groups on suspicion of links to terrorist activity. Kosovo's Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), in cooperation with UNMIK, increased monitoring of 11 foreign NGOs suspected of extremism and issued regulations restricting their activities, including the appropriation of one mosque. It also required each NGO to submit documentation that explains its projects and shows its bank accounts. The Kosovo Islamic Community (KIC) evaluated foreign NGOs and prohibited them from using public facilities for gatherings if their views were found to be extremist.

In March, the KPS established an organized crime and terrorist unit, composed of 12 foreign police officers and three KPS officers. UNMIK initiated an ongoing Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) that recognized Kosovo’s need to increase its internal capacity to prevent such future strategic threats as terrorism, inter-ethnic extremism, organized crime, and corruption.
Despite these advances, Kosovo's counterterrorism efforts were hampered by porous boundary lines easily crossed by individuals trafficking in people or goods. An insufficient number of KPS border officials limited the ability to monitor wide expanses of mountainous terrain between crossing points. Underpaid border and customs officials were often easily corrupted.

Domestic extremist groups or individuals continued to commit inter-ethnic violence and violence against UNMIK employees and property. Between March and December, there were approximately 18 attacks on public or UN facilities, such as explosive devices damaging vehicles, shots fired at UNMIK vehicles, and grenades or Molotov cocktails thrown near UN vehicles or UNMIK headquarters. There were no fatalities, although approximately five persons were injured as a result of these attacks.

Slovakia

Slovakia continued to support U.S. counterterrorism initiatives and contributed 57 personnel to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and 112 personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Slovakia fields a team of deminers and construction engineers in Afghanistan and deminers in Iraq. Slovakia also donated materiel to the Afghan National Army.

Slovenia

Slovenia's economic stability and location on the Balkan drug route offered attractive opportunities for money laundering. Slovenia ratified seven Council of Europe conventions relating to counterterrorism. In 2003, Slovenia established an inter-ministerial Working Group for Implementing Sanctions and Activities in the War Against Terrorism, whose powers and competencies were re-established on March 24. In November, Slovenia participated in instructor training on dual-use licensing as part of its ongoing cooperation with the United States under the Export Control and Border Security program. Slovenia continued to provide police instructors in Amman, Jordan, to train Iraqi policemen.

Spain

Spain arrested scores of individuals with possible links to al-Qaida and related extremist organizations; there were 79 detentions. At year’s end, 29 of those 79 detainees remained in custody, while the other 50 were released on bail or cleared of charges. The Minister of Interior reported in October that Spain held a total of 125 Islamist terrorist suspects; that figure rose to 131 total detainees by the end of the year. These detainees included individuals arrested in 2004 for conspiring to bomb Spain's High Court and other Madrid landmarks. In April, Switzerland extradited the alleged leader of this conspiracy, Mohamed Achraf, to Spain where he is awaiting trial. Authorities continued to hold 10 Pakistani nationals arrested in Barcelona in 2004 for allegedly providing logistical support to al-Qaida.

Spain cooperated closely with the United States to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism and to prevent future attacks. Spanish authorities provided extensive information for the trial
in the United States of Zacarias Moussaoui. Spanish officials also provided U.S. investigators substantial information regarding the July 2001 visit to Spain of September 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta and other September 11 plotters.

Spain worked hard to disrupt terrorist acts that possibly were directed against U.S. interests. In June, Spanish police dismantled a network that was facilitating the movement of suicide bombers and other terrorists to Iraq to attack Coalition forces. On March 11, U.S. Attorney General Gonzales and Spanish Minister of Justice Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar announced the formation of the U.S.-Spain Counterterrorism Experts Working Group to increase cooperation in terrorism investigations and prosecutions. This working group brought together prosecutors, investigators, and other experts from both countries; it met twice to discuss terrorism cases of mutual interest.


A Spanish court sentenced 18 members of an al-Qaida cell to between six and 27 years in prison. Separately, authorities continued to investigate the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid that killed 191 people and wounded hundreds of others.

On September 26, Spain's High Court convicted Spain-based al-Qaida cell leader Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas and sentenced him to 27 years in prison for membership in a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Seventeen other members of the Barakat Yarkas cell also were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from six to 11 years; six defendants were acquitted. Barakat Yarkas, a Syrian immigrant to Spain, was detained in November 2001 on charges of having provided support to al-Qaida and of having helped Mohamed Atta organize the September 11 terrorist attacks. Among those convicted was al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony, who was sentenced to seven years in prison for transporting funds from Barakat Yarkas to terrorists in Afghanistan under his cover as a journalist.

Spanish authorities continued their investigation into the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. Police arrested 31 individuals in connection with the investigation, bringing to 110 the total number of suspects detained as part of the investigation; 30 suspects remain jailed awaiting trial or further investigation. In September, Serbian authorities extradited Moroccan national Abdelmajid Bouchar to Spain in response to an international arrest warrant seeking Bouchar for his alleged role in the Madrid train bombings. Bouchar had escaped a Spanish police raid in Madrid in April 2004 and warned his colleagues of the approaching police, allowing the suspects to barricade themselves in their apartment. The seven suspected terrorists detonated explosives in the apartment, killing themselves and one police officer.
In April, Spain joined France, Germany, and Belgium in an agreement to link the criminal record registries of each country to help accelerate background checks on suspected terrorists operating in the region.

The High Court convicted Spanish national Hamed Abderrahman and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment for membership in a terrorist organization. Abderrahman was transferred to Spain from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo in February 2004 at the request of Spanish authorities.

In the Basque region, a Spanish court initiated trial proceedings against 56 individuals charged with providing logistical support to the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorist group. The case encompassed six separate investigations directed by the National Court against ETA between 1998 and 2002.

Though ETA carried out all the terrorist attacks in Spain in 2005, there were important detentions related to other terrorist groups, including:

- On June 1, a UK judge authorized the extradition to Spain of Moroccan national Farid Hilali. Spanish investigators believed Hilali was the person referred to as "Shakur" in multiple conversations intercepted by police as part of the Barakat Yarkas case. In his discussions with Yarkas, "Shakur" indicated significant knowledge of planning for the September 11 attacks in the United States. At year’s end, Hilali had not yet been transferred to Spanish custody.

- On June 15-28, police undertook "Operation Tigris," arresting 11 individuals on charges of working on behalf of Ansar al-Islam to recruit potential suicide bombers in Spain for operations against Coalition and Iraqi Government forces in Iraq.

- On November 23, police arrested 11 Algerian nationals on charges of providing financial and logistical support to the Algerian terrorist group GSPC from the proceeds of narcotics trafficking and credit card fraud. Four of the suspects, Khaled Bakel, Said Bouchema, Salim Zerbouti, and Lyies Sihamida, allegedly sought to purchase explosives and were suspected of having links with extremists in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Denmark. The four were held pending further investigation, while the other seven Algerian nationals were released on bail.

- On December 9, authorities arrested seven more suspected GSPC members in several towns along Spain's Mediterranean coast on charges of raising funds for the GSPC through robbery. According to press reports, this cell was in contact with senior GSPC figures responsible for extending GSPC actions beyond Algeria's borders, and had funded terrorist attacks in North Africa, Afghanistan, and possibly in Pakistan and Chechnya.

- On December 19, police arrested 19 suspected Islamist extremists on charges of recruiting individuals to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. The detainees included
Spain continued to make progress in its decades-old campaign to eliminate ETA. Spanish authorities arrested 71 individuals for membership in or association with ETA and dismantled six ETA operational cells. Spain cooperated with French authorities in this effort, with French police arresting 33 suspected ETA members and extraditing five of them to Spain to stand trial. Spanish authorities charged 41 members of ETA's illegal political front group Batasuna, including senior Batasuna figure Arnaldo Otegi, with membership in a terrorist organization and providing financial support to ETA. As of December 12, ETA had carried out 30 bombings; although there were no deaths as a result of these attacks, there were injuries and significant property damage.

The conviction in September of Imad Eddin Barakat Arkas and 17 associates was believed to have significantly reduced al-Qaida's direct presence in Spain, although al-Qaida affiliates and supporters appeared to remain active.

The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) was believed to be active among extremist elements in Spain's large Moroccan immigrant community. Many of the Madrid train bombing suspects had direct or indirect relationships with the GICM. GICM figure Hassan El Haski and three associates were arrested in Spain in December 2004.

The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) is known to use Spain as a logistical base and transit point. On November 23, authorities arrested 11 Algerian citizens on charges of raising funds for the GSPC through drug trafficking and credit card fraud. Police released seven on bail, but continued to hold four of the suspects on charges that they also sought to obtain explosives. On December 9, police arrested a second group of seven GSPC members on similar charges.

Police believed that the Iraqi terrorist group Ansar al-Islam was the main organizer of a terrorist facilitation network that funneled potential suicide bombers from Spain to Iraq, primarily through Syria. In June, police arrested 11 individuals on charges of recruiting terrorists for Ansar al-Islam.

Authorities believed they had nearly eradicated the extreme leftist First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), but a joint Spanish, French, and Italian police operation in October that resulted in the arrest of two GRAPO members led observers to speculate that the group possibly was reconstituting itself.

Sweden

In June, the Swedish Foreign Minister approved a new counterterrorism strategy for MFA activities. This strategy called for increased multilateral cooperation, increased capacity
building and prevention through foreign assistance, and improved internal analysis and threat assessment.

Sweden contributed US $125,000 to the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation, a collaborative endeavor spearheaded by the Australian and Indonesian governments to increase regional counterterrorism cooperation in Southeast Asia.

In May, the Stockholm District Court convicted two Iraqi citizens living in Sweden of conspiracy to commit terrorist crimes in Iraq. The court found the men guilty of violating Sweden’s 2003 Terrorism Law for having sent money to the terrorist organization Ansar-al Islam. The two men, 25-year-old Fermi Abdullah and 29-year-old Ali Berzenghi, were sentenced to six and seven years in prison, respectively. Both appealed the conviction, which an appeals court subsequently upheld. The appeals court, however, lowered Berzenghi’s sentence to five years in prison and Abdullah's to four years and six months. It additionally found both men guilty of violating the 2002 terrorist financing act and ordered that both be expelled from Sweden upon completion of their sentences. This case marked the first occasion in which Sweden convicted individuals under both the 2003 Terrorism Law and the 2002 Terrorist Financing Act.

In November, Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo arrested Mirsad Bektasevic, an 18-year-old man with Bosnian and Swedish citizenship, on suspicion of conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Swedish police initiated an investigation into this case.

Pursuant to a U.S. arrest warrant and INTERPOL Red Notice, Czech authorities in December arrested Oussama Kassir, a Lebanese-born Swedish national, as he was in transit from Stockholm to Lebanon. Kassir was wanted in the United States on allegations that he had conspired to provide material support to terrorists in the planned establishment of a terrorist training camp in Bly, Oregon. At the end of 2005, Kassir remained in Czech custody pending extradition to the United States.

Sweden endorsed the June 2004 revised EU Plan of Action on combating terrorism, as well as the European Commission's September 2005 communication on terrorist recruitment, which subsequently was approved by the European Council in December. In May, at a summit meeting in Warsaw, Sweden signed the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, an instrument to increase the effectiveness of existing international texts on the fight against terrorism. Sweden is an active participant in EUROPOL and EUROJUST, European law enforcement institutions that coordinate member states' counterterrorism cooperation and activities. Sweden participates in the Nordic Council of Ministers’ Regional Forum for Nordic Governmental Cooperation.

Sweden freezes assets of entities and persons on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee list once the EU takes action. It also acts on entities designated by the UN Clearinghouse process. Sweden has not yet proposed individuals or entities for inclusion on any such lists. Assets of Ahmed Yusuf, one of three Swedes designated on UN and EU lists in 2002 for connections with the al-Barakat terrorist organization, remained frozen by Swedish authorities.
**Tajikistan**

Sharing a 1,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is well aware of the negative effects of state-sponsored terrorism and offered its limited resources to assist the United States unconditionally. Tajikistan allowed its territory and air space to be used for counterterrorist actions. The Tajik Government's main impediment to counterterrorism performance remains its lack of resources.

Within the framework of the war on terrorism, Tajikistan prohibited extremist-oriented activities and closely monitored terrorist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and extremist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). Tajikistan participated in the counterterrorist activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the CIS Counterterrorist Center.

In 2005, approximately 74 members of HT were arrested and 44 HT activists arrested the previous year were convicted and sentenced to prison terms of three to 20 years.

**Turkey**

Domestic and transnational terrorist groups have targeted Turks and foreigners, sometimes including U.S. Government personnel, for more than 40 years. International and domestic terrorist groups operating in Turkey include Marxist-Leninist, radical Islamist, separatist, and pro-Chechen groups.

In August, Turkish authorities arrested Luay Sakka, a Syrian national linked to al-Qaida and the Zarqawi network. Sakka is an important international terrorist, connected to the funding of the November 2003 Istanbul bombings and the deaths of U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. Sakka was in Turkey allegedly plotting a terrorist attack on Israeli cruise ships in Turkish ports.

A criminal trial is underway for dozens of defendants allegedly involved in the November 2003 Istanbul bombings. The lead defendants admitted to contacts with al-Qaida and warned of further attacks if Turkey continues to cooperate with the United States and Israel. Most of the other defendants, however, denied responsibility for or knowledge of the bombings.

In addition to sharing intelligence information on various groups operating in Turkey, the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) conducted an aggressive counterterrorist campaign and detained numerous suspected terrorists in scores of raids, disrupting these groups before terrorist acts could be carried out. Overall, in the last five years the Government of Turkey has worked closely with the United States in the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of those responsible for terrorist attacks in Turkey. However, Turkish law still defines terrorism as attacks against Turkish citizens and the Turkish state. Though the government recognizes the need to align this legal definition with international norms, the old definition has yet to be amended. The TNP continues to provide excellent protection of U.S. diplomatic and military facilities throughout Turkey; its response is always immediate and substantial when alerted to threats or incidents involving U.S.
interests. Similar to the handling of security at high profile events such as the Istanbul NATO Summit in 2004, security at the World University Games that took place in August in Izmir was appropriately proactive and without incident.

Turkey commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan for a second time from February to August, contributing 1,500 troops.

Turkey permitted the transport to Iraq of humanitarian goods, contributed humanitarian goods and services, and helped re-supply Coalition forces in Iraq with the transport and sale of fuel, food, and water. Turkey also allowed Incirlik Air Base to be used as a cargo hub for non-lethal goods transported to support OIF and OEF, and for the outbound rotation of U.S. troops returning from Iraq. Turkey was active in reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity to Iraq. Some 70 Turkish citizens were killed providing logistical support to Coalition forces or performing reconstruction in Iraq. Turkey contributed headquarters personnel to the NATO training mission in Iraq, helped train Iraqi diplomats and political parties, and offered senior military leadership training in Turkey as a further contribution to NATO’s Iraq Training Mission.

Turkey’s ongoing struggle against the Kongra-Gel/PKK was marked by increased violence across Turkey. In the Southeast, Turkish security forces were active in the struggle against the Kongra-Gel/PKK. There were a number of bombings and attempted bombings in resort areas in western Turkey and Istanbul, some of which resulted in civilian casualties. A Kurdish separatist group calling itself the Kurdish Freedom Falcons (TAK), widely believed to be affiliated with the Kongra-Gel/PKK, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks.

Turkey is working to strengthen its counterterrorism finance regime for an upcoming peer review under the auspices of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Pursuant to its obligations under UNSCR 1267 and subsequent resolutions, Turkish officials continue to pass UN and U.S.-designated names of terrorists to all law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as to financial institutions. The Government of Turkey submitted legislation to Parliament that will explicitly criminalize terrorism finance and offer safe harbor protection for filers of suspicious transaction reports (STRs).

**Turkmenistan**

Turkmenistan’s strategic location bordering Iran, Russia, Afghanistan, and the Caspian Sea makes it a possible route for narcotics smuggling and money laundering. Despite a lack of formal cooperation on counterterrorism activities, three government officials participated in the U.S.-OSCE sponsored Conference on Combating Terrorist Financing held in Vienna in November. Since late 2001, Turkmenistan has granted blanket overflight rights for U.S. aircraft supporting Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). CENTCOM is contributing $5 million to build two border crossing stations on Turkmenistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Iran.
United Kingdom

London suffered terrorist attacks on July 7 and July 21. The July 7 attacks were carried out by four suicide bombers who detonated their bombs on the London public transportation system, three in the Underground and one on a city bus. Fifty-six people, including the terrorists, were killed in the July 7 attacks and more than 700 were injured. Three of the bombers were UK-born citizens of Pakistani descent; the other was a British national of Jamaican descent and a convert to Islam. A video of one of the bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan, was released through the media after the attacks, and in that video Khan attributed his act of violence to anger over UK foreign policy.

A separate group of terrorists attempted to detonate bombs in the London Underground on July 21, but those bombs failed to detonate completely and did not cause any casualties. UK authorities have arrested individuals in connection with this attack; the suspected bombers are East and West African in origin.

Government authorities reported that at least two attempted attacks have been thwarted since July. In August, Prime Minister Blair outlined plans to strengthen counterterrorism efforts in the United Kingdom by augmenting government authority to deport and exclude foreigners engaged in extolling extremism and justifying terrorism, increasing powers to arrest and detain suspects, and proscribing groups and individuals glorifying or inciting terrorism. Prime Minister Blair met with senior leaders of the Muslim community in Britain for advice on how to curb radicalization and to solicit support from Muslim communities to do the same.

The United Kingdom has played a leadership role in working to develop an understanding of radicalization and in seeking to identify the structural and motivational factors that may drive the terrorist recruitment process. The British government worked with its European counterparts to stimulate discussion on radicalization and has sought to work with its domestic Muslim populations to identify how this process unfolds and how communities and governments can prevent the spread and appeal of extremist ideology.

The additional measures that the Prime Minister detailed in his August address to the nation have yet to be passed into law, although a draft Terror Bill is making its way through Parliament. The government engaged in a series of bilateral negotiations to allow the return of foreigners to their home countries, with a specific understanding that those individuals will not be subject to human rights abuses.

The July attacks in London pointed to a new phenomena in global terrorism, that of homegrown terrorism in Europe. While the United Kingdom has experienced homegrown terrorism in the past linked to Northern Ireland, the July 7 bombings were the first successful attacks carried out by UK-born Islamic extremists. It is not yet clear if the July 7 and 21 terrorists had any ties to al-Qaida or other international terrorist organizations. The July 7
terrorists traveled out of the United Kingdom to Pakistan prior to the attacks. The Khan video suggests that at a minimum Khan affiliated himself with the goals of al-Qaida.

The United Kingdom simultaneously held the presidency of the European Union and the chairmanship of the G8. The United Kingdom used its leadership of both entities to advance intra-EU cooperation on counterterrorism measures and policy. During the UK presidency of the EU, the EU agreed on a counterterrorism strategy and a review of the problem of radicalization and terrorist recruitment within Europe.


When Prime Minister Blair gave his August 5 address listing his intentions to strengthen UK counterterrorism measures, he said he would seek to designate Hizb-ut Tahir (HT), an international group with operations in Britain. This group was not proscribed, however. Individuals, including prominent Muslim leaders within the United Kingdom, argued that the group, while endorsing violent action elsewhere in the world, does not manifest itself in the same manner in the United Kingdom. On other matters of proscription, the United States and the United Kingdom had regular consultations.

Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, Republican and Loyalist paramilitary organizations increasingly shifted their activity from political actions to criminal racketeering. This shift began with the 1994 ceasefires of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and has accelerated further since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998.

Two relatively small "dissident" Republican paramilitaries, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), continue to advocate the use of armed violence to support their goal of uniting the northern and southern parts of Ireland. Loyalist paramilitaries also have a presence in the Republic of Ireland. In July, the Provisional IRA announced that it was ending its armed campaign and would pursue its goals through exclusively peaceful means. In September, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning announced that the Provisional IRA had put all of its weapons "beyond use."
Uzbekistan

The potential for Islamic extremism and acts of international terrorism remained significant in Uzbekistan. Supporters of terrorist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al-Qaida, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) remained active in the region. Members of these groups expressed anti-U.S. sentiments and have attacked U.S. interests in the past, including a 2004 suicide bombing at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent.

Information continued to suggest that some of these groups might be planning attacks in the region, possibly against U.S. Government facilities, Americans, or American interests. As a result, the Department of State authorized in June the departure of American Embassy Tashkent's non-emergency personnel and family members. The departure status was lifted in July, but U.S. Government personnel and facilities continued to operate at a heightened state of alert.

Uzbekistan was among the first states to support U.S. efforts in the global war on terror. Beginning in 2001, Uzbekistan hosted U.S. military forces within its borders. In July, however, the government formally invoked its right to request termination within 180 days of an agreement allowing U.S. access to the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase and overflight of Uzbekistan. Uzbek authorities continued to stress the importance of the country’s counterterrorism cooperation and said the decision to end access at K2 did not signal Uzbekistan's withdrawal from international counterterrorism efforts. As of December, Uzbekistan continued to permit U.S. overflight of its territory in support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The United States fully vacated the Karshi-Khanabad base on November 21.

Tashkent hosts the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's (SCO) Regional Antiterrorism Center Secretariat (RATS), which remained in the early stages of development. It began to focus on operational activities, such as developing a coordinated list of terrorist groups and facilitating joint counterterrorism exercises among SCO member states. Uzbekistan also participated in UNODC and OSCE programs aimed at ensuring that it enacts appropriate terrorism legislation.
“Jordan does not bow to coercion. We will not be intimidated into altering our position, nor will we abandon our convictions or forfeit our role in the fight against terrorism in all its forms. To the contrary, every act of terrorism strengthens our resolve to adhere to our convictions, and to confront, with all means at our disposal, those who seek to undermine the security and stability of this country.”

King Abdullah II, King of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Address to the Nation
November 10, 2005

Terrorist activities in the Middle East and North Africa continued to be a primary concern in the global war on terror. Active extremist groups in this region include: al-Qaida, the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (Fatah’s militant wing), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), Ansar al-Islam and its offshoot Ansar al-Sunna, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s organization, Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidain, a.k.a. al-Qaida of the Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers (a.k.a. al-Qaida in Iraq). These terrorist groups continued to affiliate themselves with al-Qaida and/or express support for its ideology.

In the past year, major terrorist attacks have occurred in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Morocco. In Egypt and Jordan, attacks targeted tourist destinations. In the case of the hotel bombings in Amman, the Jordanian public showed an erosion of support for both al-Qaida and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Lebanon also witnessed more than a dozen terrorist explosions in 2005, including one that killed former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

Widespread terrorism and violence continue to plague Iraq. Numerous attacks and kidnappings in Iraq targeted foreign aid workers, contractors, and other non-combatants. Staunting the flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq remains a primary area of concern.

Almost all countries in the region continued to cooperate with the United States in counterterrorist activities and undertook efforts to strengthen their capabilities to fight the war on terror, including active participation in USG-sponsored counterterrorism training programs. Many countries continued to provide some form of assistance to Coalition efforts to bring peace and stability to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Several countries made impressive gains against terrorist groups operating in the region. For example, under the leadership of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora (elected in July), the Government of Lebanon has taken small but critical steps to restrict the freedom of several terrorist groups, specifically PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada, to operate in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) strengthened border control posts and increased patrols along the Lebanese-Syrian border in order to prevent the uncontested flow of weaponry to terrorist
groups. The Government of Jordan aggressively pursued the network of fugitive Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab’s al-Zarqawi, who is allegedly responsible for attacks in Jordan and Iraq, including the November 9 hotel bombings in Amman. Saudi Arabia’s security forces carried out numerous operations resulting in the capture or killing of all 26 wanted terrorists publicized in a December 2003 state announcement; many on the list had direct links to al-Qaida.

Algeria

Algeria made impressive gains against terrorist groups operating in the country, particularly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Algerian officials publicly condemn international terrorism but make a distinction between terrorism and what they consider legitimate armed resistance by HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah, in the occupied territories.

According to Algerian authorities, fewer than 800 terrorists remained active in Algeria, down from the estimated 28,000 terrorists in the mid-1990s. The government's success in capturing or killing a number of GSPC terrorists further weakened the effectiveness of this group. Though the remaining GSPC members continued to be quite active and engaged in low-level attacks in several areas across the country, the group has lost considerable public sympathy following its July congratulatory message to al-Qaida on the killing of two abducted Algerian diplomats in Iraq. As a sign of the waning effectiveness of terrorist organizations in Algeria, terrorism analysts from the African Union (AU) Center for Study and Research on Terrorism, based in Algiers, now consider terrorism to be more a threat against public safety than a strategic threat to Algeria’s national security.

President Bouteflika announced a Charter on Peace and National Reconciliation in August and a referendum took place at the end of September. The Charter was designed to serve as a mechanism to heal the nation. It encouraged terrorists and their sympathizers to turn themselves in and, in some cases, reintegrate into society (excluding those involved in rapes, massacres, or public bombings). In reaction to the announcement and ensuing vote, which according to the government passed with 97 percent approval, the GSPC increased attacks in August, September, and October. More than 118 government security personnel and civilians were killed, and 110 terrorists were killed or arrested during these three months. In comparison, 142 government security personnel and civilians were killed, and 285 terrorists were killed or arrested, in the previous seven months. The Algerian Government did not release details on the legal mechanisms for putting the Charter into practice.

During the past year as its base of support shrunk at home, the GSPC sought to align itself with al-Qaida and other extremist groups, adopting some of their tactics and activities. Using lessons from Iraq and wanting to reduce the level of casualties sustained in direct confrontation with Algerian security services, the GSPC carried out attacks using roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In one attack on September 14, GSPC terrorists killed three Algerian soldiers and wounded two others in a military vehicle near Boumerdes by remotely detonating a roadside IED. Some Algerian terrorists became more active internationally. In October, an Algerian wanted in Britain for alleged connections to the July
7 London bombings was jailed for three years in Bangkok for forging passports. In November, Spain approved extradition of two Algerian men for links to terrorism, and Italian police arrested three suspected Algerian Islamic extremists on suspicion of aiding and abetting international terrorism.

The GSPC was active regionally in the Pan-Sahel area. The group conducted smuggling activities between Algeria and neighboring countries, as well as limited attacks. In recognition of this threat, the U.S. Government created the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). This initiative aims to combat terrorism from a regional perspective and to foster cooperation between Maghreb countries. To date, the initiative has helped the U.S. military assess more accurately the terrorist threat within the participating countries and allowed the USG to aid those countries in focusing their efforts on neutralizing those threats. (See the Africa section earlier in this chapter for further information on the TSCTI.)

Algeria's fledgling Financial Investigative Unit (FIU) task force continued to make progress. Various banking institutions sent five reports to the committee for review. To date, no accounts linked to terrorist financing have been discovered in Algeria. Legislation was passed that required all transactions valued at more than 50,000 dinars ($685) to be conducted by check, money order, wire transfer, or other forms of non-cash payment in order to combat money laundering, informal market activities, and terrorist financing.

**Bahrain**

The Government of Bahrain provided important support to U.S. counterterrorism efforts, particularly by continuing to combat terror financing and freezing approximately $18 million in terrorist-linked funds. Bahrain hosted the first Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENA FATF) plenary April 11-14; the second plenary took place in Beirut September 26-27. Throughout the year, the MENA FATF secretariat held a series of evaluation and training sessions for members. In early April, it distributed a questionnaire to identify anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism technical assistance needs.

Bahrain actively monitored terrorist suspects. Domestic legal constraints, including the absence of comprehensive conspiracy legislation, at times have hamstrung its ability to detain and prosecute suspects. The legal case of four Bahrainis arrested in mid-2004 on suspicion of plotting terrorist attacks remained active before the Constitutional Court. Lawyers for the accused filed a motion in December 2004 contesting the constitutionality of the charges against the suspects. The Court has not yet ruled in the matter.

The Government of Bahrain submitted counterterrorism legislation to Parliament for consideration. If passed, the draft law would criminalize conspiracy and expand the scope of the predicate offenses of terrorism already contained in the Bahrain Penal Code. The law remained under discussion between the government and lawmakers. Parliament did not pass a law that criminalized terrorist financing or issue new regulations concerning the FATF Special Recommendation IX on cash couriers.
Bahrain is party to the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. In late December, it joined the GCC Agreement to Combat Terrorism. Bahrain participated in an international counterterrorism conference in Saudi Arabia in February; because of its participation, the Bahraini cabinet formally supported a Saudi proposal to establish an international institution for combating terror.

Egypt

Egypt experienced several terrorist attacks. In April, there were three attacks on crowded tourist destinations in Cairo. On April 7, a lone suicide bomber killed three foreigners, including an American, at the Khan el-Khalili market; several other Americans were seriously injured in this incident.

On July 23, three bombs exploded in Sharm el-Sheikh, at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula, killing 67, including one American. Hundreds of Egyptians and a number of foreign tourists were also injured as a result of the blasts. One vehicle penetrated security positions along the driveway of a hotel and detonated in the lobby area. Another vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) exploded on a street in the old section of Sharm el-Sheikh. A third bomb was concealed in a bag that exploded in a pedestrian area frequented by tourists. There was no evidence these attacks were directed at Americans, but they were widely regarded as targeting the Egyptian tourism industry.

On August 15, near the Rafah border crossing into the Gaza Strip, a small improvised explosive device (IED) detonated near a Multinational Force and Observers vehicle, causing minor injuries to its occupants. This incident was preceded by the discovery of a one-ton cache of explosives in El Arish, on the Mediterranean coast of the Sinai. Separately, on August 13, an intercity bus was shot at on a road crossing the Sinai.

Counterterrorism success stories included two related but unsuccessful attempts to target tourists near the Citadel and the Egyptian Museum that were thwarted by Egyptian authorities. Only the perpetrators of the incidents were killed in the failed attempts; the government described both as the remaining members of the terrorist cell responsible for the April 7 bombing.

Between August and late November, the Egyptian Government conducted an intensive security operation in Jebel Helal, a remote region in northeast Sinai, in pursuit of fugitives from a Salafist-Bedouin group suspected of links to the terrorist incidents cited above and to other crimes. During the course of this operation, several Egyptian security personnel, including two high-ranking police officers, were killed. In separate skirmishes, several of the fugitives were shot and killed, including Salim Khadr Al-Shanoub and Khalid Musa'id, whom the government identified as key planners of the July Sharm el-Sheikh attacks and three 2004 attacks in Taba involving tourism interests. The Egyptian Government maintained that all of the terrorist incidents that occurred in 2004-05 were conducted by small domestic groups.
During his campaign for the September 7 presidential elections, President Mubarak called for new “anti-terrorism” legislation to replace the decades-old Emergency Law, emphasizing that constitutional and legislative reforms were needed to eliminate terrorism. In explaining his proposal, Mubarak said, "the time has come to create a decisive mechanism to fight terrorism." While defending the use of the Emergency Law, President Mubarak said Egypt should follow the example of other countries that recently passed comprehensive laws to combat terrorism. The Egyptian judicial system does not allow plea bargaining, and historically terrorists have been prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Terrorism defendants may be tried in military tribunals or emergency courts.

Egypt continued to enforce an enhanced security posture for its airports, seaports, and the Suez Canal.

Iraq

Iraq remains a key front in the global war on terror; US, Coalition, and Iraqi forces are engaging international terrorists as part of the security mission mandated by UNSCR 1546 and 1637 in support of the democratically-elected Iraqi government. Terrorist attacks are frequent and are conducted by Islamic extremists, former regime elements, and foreign terrorists. Attacks and kidnappings in Iraq targeted foreign aid workers, contractors, and other non-combatants. Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi all declared the importance of victory for their terrorist cause in Iraq. In recent months, a growing distinction between the various elements of the Iraqi insurgency and the foreign terrorists has emerged.

The enemy in Iraq, a combination of rejectionists, Saddamists, and terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaida, shares a common opposition to the legitimate Iraqi Government and the presence of Coalition forces. It otherwise has separate, and in many cases incompatible, goals.

- The largest group is composed primarily of Sunni Arabs. Many in their ranks are recognizing that they can achieve political objectives by engaging in the political process.

- Saddamists and former regime loyalists have played a lead role in seeking to turn sentiment against the Iraqi Government and the Coalition, with the goal of reestablishing a Ba’athist dictatorship. However, this role weakened as this group identified more with the overall resistance than with the reestablishment of the former regime.
• Terrorists affiliated with or inspired by al-Qaida are the smallest yet most lethal group, and pose the most immediate threat. They are responsible for the most horrific events like kidnappings, beheadings, and suicide attacks specifically aimed at intimidating the public. They espouse the extremist goals of al-Qaida and aim to foment chaos in Iraq, in order to allow them to establish a base for toppling Iraq’s neighbors and launching attacks outside the region and against Western interests. Currently, most of the members of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) are Iraqi. However, the group includes foreign terrorist fighters, mostly young men recruited from the Middle East and North Africa. Foreign fighters are believed to number about four to ten percent of the estimated 20,000 or more insurgents.

The use of Syria as a facilitation hub for terrorist groups operating in Iraq remained a concern. Foreign terrorists constituted a small percentage of insurgent forces, but their impact was dramatic. Although Coalition and Iraqi commanders consistently reported that most of the enemy killed or captured were Iraqi citizens, the foreign terrorist cells continued to move repeatedly and keep a low profile while training, equipping, and supporting terrorist groups. Local Coalition and Iraqi commanders reported that foreign terrorist cells likely were responsible for a significant number of the more than 500 suicide car bombings and suicide vest attacks since 2003.

The December election in Iraq exposed divisions among the rejectionists and the terrorists over participation in the political process. There were numerous reports in western and north-central Iraq of local Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups engaged in armed disputes (in some cases, deliberate operations) against al-Qaida of Iraq over its targeting of Iraqis and opposition to the election. Despite al-Qaida of Iraq’s pledges to increase attacks on election workers, polling centers, and Coalition and Iraqi security forces, December voter turnout in Sunni areas was consistently higher (well over 50 percent) than it had been in the January election. Some Sunni leaders publicly denounced attacks aimed at disrupting the elections.

Terrorist groups coordinated and conducted attacks on Iraq’s utility infrastructure and also claimed responsibility for kidnappings and attacks on Iraqi personnel working at refineries and electrical stations. Terrorists’ efforts to disrupt and destroy Iraq’s energy infrastructure sought to make the Iraqi Government appear incapable of providing essential services, and hindered economic development. These attacks also sought to undercut public and international support for Iraq.

Iraqi security forces continued to make significant improvements in intelligence gathering and analysis as well as border and infrastructure security. There are three Iraqi intelligence agencies operating, each with a distinct intelligence portfolio:

• The Iraqi National Intelligence Service, a domestic intelligence service.
• The Iraqi Police Service Intelligence, which provides intelligence for police operations.
• The Ministry of Defense Intelligence Agency.
Notable Terrorist Organizations in Iraq are:

**Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR):** Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaida of the Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers), is most clearly associated with foreign terrorist cells operating in Iraq and has specifically targeted Coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. In a July 2005 letter to al-Qaida deputy Zawahiri, Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq war to include expelling U.S. forces, establishing an Islamic authority, spreading the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors, and engaging in battle with Israel. The United States also refers to the group as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI).

**Ansar al-Sunnah:** Ansar al-Sunnah (also known as the Followers of the Tradition) is an Iraqi extremist group dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq based on Sharia law.

**Kongra-Gel/PKK:** The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kongra-Gel/PKK) is a Marxist-Leninist group with roots in Turkey seeking a pan-national Kurdish state carved out of majority Kurdish populated areas. The existence of Kongra-Gel/PKK operatives in northern Iraq continued to be a source of friction between Turkey and Iraq.

**Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK):** The MEK, a largely Iranian group, mixes Marxism, nationalism, and Islam. The MEK was formed in the 1960s and was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Since the late 1980s, its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The MEK conducted anti-Western attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Since then, it has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad.

**Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza**

Between August 15 and 22, Israel withdrew approximately 8,000 settlers from the Gaza Strip and four northern West Bank settlements, as well as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) units protecting them, thus implementing Prime Minister Sharon’s disengagement plan. Responsibility for Gaza was turned over to the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Following the Israeli disengagement, Egypt deployed 750 border guards along the Egyptian-Gaza border. Egypt also dispatched security advisers to Gaza to advise the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) on their new security role along the border.

Palestinian terrorist groups conducted a significant number of attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip even after a “period of calm” was agreed in February. All of these groups used a variety of terrorist tactics, including suicide bombs, rocket attacks, pipe bombs, mortar attacks, roadside bombings and ambushes, and shooting at Israeli homes and military and civilian vehicles. The number of victims killed in Israel in terrorist attacks was less than 50, down from the almost 100 individuals killed in 2004. Israeli security forces successfully thwarted other planned attacks.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Fatah-linked al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB), HAMAS, and the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) were responsible for most of these attacks. Within Gaza, Palestinian militants engaged in occasional bloody skirmishes with PA police and security service officials, and periodically shot at polling stations, electoral offices, and PA security complexes.

According to claims by HAMAS, AAMB, and the PRC, a number of terrorist attacks were perpetrated by one or more organizations acting together, including the January 13 truck bombing of the Qarni cargo crossing terminal on the Israeli-Gaza border, which killed six Israeli civilians and wounded another five.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed credit for several terrorist attacks that occurred in Israel, including:

- The February 25 suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv nightclub.
- The July 12 suicide bombing near a mall in Netanya.
- The October 26 suicide bombing at the market in Hadera.
- The December 5 suicide bombing at the mall in Netanya.

HAMAS activity dropped significantly in 2005, in part because of its adherence to the ceasefire, but also because much of its leadership in the West Bank was arrested or killed. HAMAS claimed credit for the pre-ceasefire January 18 suicide bombing in Gaza that killed an Israeli security officer and injured eight other soldiers and security agents. Individuals linked to HAMAS were involved in the September 21 kidnapping and murder in the West Bank of an Israeli resident of Jerusalem.

Fatah's militant wing, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, claimed credit for the following terrorist attacks, after agreeing to the ceasefire:

- The October 16 drive-by shooting attack at Gush Etzion south of Jerusalem, and a shooting attack the same day in the West Bank in which an Israeli teenager was wounded.
- Qassam rocket launches from the Gaza Strip into the western Negev desert that destroyed property and injured Israeli civilians and soldiers.

The Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) carried out a significant number of terrorist attacks from the Rafah area on the Gaza-Egyptian border, notably rocket attacks against Israel. The PRC was also responsible for armed attacks against construction teams and IDF forces in Gaza during the disengagement process.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) made no claims to perpetrating any terror attacks, though it continued to coordinate with other foreign terrorist organizations to carry out attacks.

Lebanese Hizballah continued to provide support to Palestinian terrorist groups to augment their capacity for conducting attacks against Israel. Hizballah also continued to call for the
destruction of Israel and used Lebanese territory as a staging ground for terrorist operations. On November 21, Hizballah fighters launched a rocket barrage against border communities and IDF outposts. Acting on threat information that Hizballah intended to kidnap Israelis, the IDF stopped the incursion, killing four Hizballah fighters.

Israeli Government sources reported an upsurge in the PIJ's purchase and resale of goods. Israeli security forces and customs authorities seized containers at the port of Ashdod that contained thousands of dollars worth of merchandise suspected of having been purchased by the PIJ for resale. IDF and civil administration forces also shut down two illegal "Daawa" charity organizations in the West Bank to prevent their possible use as conduits for terror finance.

On August 4, an AWOL Israeli soldier opened fire on a bus, killing four Israeli Arabs and injuring ten. During the attack, he was killed by the angry crowd. Prime Minister Sharon publicly condemned the shooting as an act of terrorism.

After Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, IDF sources reported an increase in the number of explosive devices planted along the fence separating Gaza from Israel. In response to these terrorist attacks, Israel deployed forces along the perimeter of Gaza to prevent rocket and mortar attacks, delayed the expected transfer of West Bank towns to PA control, postponed planned meetings with Palestinian negotiators, and used aircraft to set off sonic booms over Gaza. In response to continuing mortar and rocket attacks against Israel, the IDF also fired rockets and artillery against sites in Gaza used for mortar and Qassam rocket attacks.

In response to continuing threat information, Israeli security forces launched frequent arrest and detention raids throughout the West Bank and Gaza, conducted targeted killings of suspected Palestinian terrorists, imposed strict and widespread closures and curfews in Palestinian areas, conducted airborne rocket attacks on buildings affiliated with designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in Gaza, and continued the construction of an extensive separation barrier in the West Bank. Israel did not destroy the homes of any suicide bombers or their families.

**West Bank/Gaza**

The Palestinian Authority's (PA) counterterrorism efforts fell far short of U.S. expectations for the 2005 reporting period. Though the PA Security Forces (PASF) made some improvements in their command and control mechanisms, and contributed to the security of Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and four settlements in the northern West Bank in August, the PA failed to take resolute action against terrorist groups based in the West Bank and Gaza.

President Abbas’ public condemnation of terrorist acts was not matched by decisive security operations following attacks against Israelis. The U.S. Security Coordinator worked with the PASF to encourage comprehensive security sector reform and to enable the PASF to confront militant groups. The PASF, however, did not take serious action against known terrorist groups such as HAMAS, PIJ, PFLP, or AAMB.
On two occasions immediately following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, PASF units were involved in military confrontations with HAMAS militants, resulting in clashes that exposed the PASF’s lack of sufficient military equipment and organization to confront militant groups operating in areas under PA control. In September, the U.S. Consulate General signed a Letter of Agreement with the PA to provide a limited amount of non-lethal assistance to the PASF.

The PA took some actions to curtail terrorist violence through its political activities. In February, the PA -- supported by the Government of Egypt -- brokered a deal between HAMAS, PIJ, and AAMB for a period of "calm" to allow Israel to withdraw from Gaza and four settlements in the northern West Bank. Although terrorist activity against Israel was reduced during this period, attacks continued. PIJ and PRC were particularly active.

Palestinian terrorist groups continued to operate from Palestinian areas controlled by the PA and the Israeli military. The PASF did not take decisive actions to end the use of Palestinian territory for attacks on Israeli civilians. Terrorist groups, such as PIJ and HAMAS, received support from foreign terrorist organizations and foreign governments, including Syria and Iran, and operated extensively in areas of the West Bank and Gaza under both PA and Israeli military control. The PA did not make any sustained effort to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in territory under its control.

There was periodic low-level cooperation between the PA and Government of Israel security services. The PA worked with the Israeli Government in preparation for the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and areas of the northern West Bank. PASF occasionally provided information to the Israeli Government regarding planned terrorist operations and handed over explosives and other materials located by PA forces. The PA failed to take action, however, in several instances when the Government of Israel provided intelligence on the location and activities of wanted terrorists. In many cases, the individuals were briefly arrested and subsequently released. The PA’s lack of action in this area was an obstacle to broader security cooperation.

In the West Bank, the PASF was hindered by restrictions on movement imposed by the IDF. PASF officials frequently raised concerns about operational difficulties imposed by the Government of Israel. While operational issues may have limited the effectiveness of the PASF, a lack of political will from the senior Palestinian leadership was the primary cause of the PA's failure to arrest and prosecute terrorists. In an effort to crack down on terrorists, following the December 5 bombing of a shopping center in Netanya, the PASF arrested nearly 70 militants and activists, most of them affiliated with PIJ.

Efforts to arrest and prosecute terrorists were impeded by a disorganized legal system, the Palestinian public’s opposition to action, lack of political will, a weak security apparatus, and inadequate prison infrastructure. Deficiencies in training, equipment, and leadership of the PASF in Gaza were a significant obstacle to PASF actions there. PA courts were inefficient and failed to ensure fair and expeditious trials.
The PA made no progress in apprehending, prosecuting, or bringing to justice the perpetrators of the October 2003 attack on a U.S. Embassy convoy in Gaza that killed three USG contractors.

The PA took steps to end incitement in the Palestinian media. The Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation toned down inflammatory material, including incitement to violence. PA Minister of Information Nabil Shaath issued instructions to bar images of dead bodies, graphic footage, and inflammatory videos. Nationalistic songs that typically called on fighting the “Zionist enemy” were taken off the air.

Although progress was slow in creating a Financial Follow-Up Unit (FFU) under the Palestinian Monetary Authority (PMA), the PMA expressed its commitment to build capacity to track and deter financial transactions used to fund terrorist activity. Despite the lack of coordination between the PMA and other ministries, a new Prosecutor General was named. The FFU also continued to lack the legal framework in which to act. The PA does not have an Anti-Money Laundering/Countering Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) law.

Jordan

The Jordanian Government aggressively pursued the network of fugitive Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, believed responsible for attacks in Jordan and Iraq, including the November 9 bombing of three hotels in Amman that killed 63 people and the August 19 rocket attack in Aqaba that also impacted Eilat, Israel. Jordan publicly condemned terrorist acts throughout the world, introduced heightened security measures, and began drafting new counterterrorism legislation. Jordanian security forces disrupted numerous terrorist plots during the year, including several that targeted U.S. interests.

Jordan’s State Security Court, which oversees terrorism-related cases, processed a heavy caseload, many of which involved suspects affiliated with Zarqawi.

The November 9 hotel bombings, the country’s worst-ever terrorist attacks, left many Jordanians shocked. The targeting of a wedding reception, in particular, eroded support for Zarqawi and al-Qaida within Jordan. Surveys taken in the weeks after the bombings showed that approximately 80 percent of those polled had negative opinions of al-Qaida; 90 percent believed al-Qaida was a terrorist organization; and approximately 65 percent changed their views as a result of the bombings. The televised confession of would-be suicide bomber Sajida al-Rishawi further reduced support for Zarqawi and Islamic extremists in general.

In mid-November, in response to the hotel bombings, members of the royal family, including Queen Rania and Princess Basma, led a series of street protests, vigils, and marches against terrorism; approximately 200,000 people participated in the largest of these events. The
government promoted religious tolerance, interfaith dialogue, and shared values between civilizations with a number of initiatives, including the July International Islamic Conference in Amman, and the ensuing “Amman Message” of tolerance and moderation in Islam. In December, Jordan called on the Organization of the Islamic Conference to dedicate itself to combating extremism.

After the November bombings, Jordanian Public Security Department commanders met with representatives of hotels, banks, restaurants, and tourist sites to discuss implementing security measures to prevent future attacks. Many hotels, shopping malls, and other major institutions installed metal detectors and electronic surveillance systems. In response to King Abdullah’s call for a strategy to preempt terrorist plots, 23 Jordanian academics created an NGO called The Scientific Society to Combat Terrorism.

Border security remained a top concern of Jordanian officials. Since the Aqaba rocket attack in August, Jordan has enforced strict security measures at the Karama-Trebil border crossing, including thorough manual searches of all vehicles and persons attempting to enter the country. In addition, Jordanian authorities issued a zero tolerance policy toward fuel smuggling. Notably, Jordan and Iraq signed a security agreement to establish a committee to exchange information on terrorists, organized crime, and border infiltration.

The State Security Court (SSC) moved forward several high-profile al-Qaida-related terrorism cases. Legal action against 13 men accused of plotting a chemical bomb attack in Amman in April 2004 continued as reputed cell leader Z'amia Jays threatened court officials and admitted meeting with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in preparation for the attack. In November, prosecutors demanded the death penalty for the plotters. Four of the accused, including Zarqawi, are being tried in absentia. Separately, Zarqawi was sentenced to death by the SSC in 2004 for the 2002 murder of U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley. He is also being tried in absentia for a December 2004 attack at the Karama-Trebil border crossing. In November, the SSC charged Muammar Jaghbir with plotting subversive acts for the 2003 attack against the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad that killed 17.

Jaghbir was arrested in Iraq in 2004 by U.S. forces and handed over to authorities in Jordan, where he is standing trial for the assassination of Laurence Foley. In September, the SSC sentenced 12 Islamist militants to prison terms ranging from one and one-half to three years (falling well short of the maximum penalties of death or 15 years of hard labor) for plotting terrorist attacks against the U.S. and Israeli embassies. During their sentencing, the defendants praised the September 11 al-Qaida attacks and claimed that the verdict would not dissuade them from pursuing the path of extremism.

The SCC heard several non-al-Qaida-related terrorism cases. The highly contentious trial of more than 100 Jordanians charged with involvement in the 2002 Ma’an riots, which left six dead, began in early 2005. Ninety-five of the defendants are being tried in absentia. The main defendant in the case, Abu Sayyaf, retracted his earlier confession, claiming he was tortured and forced to confess. In January, the SSC sentenced two men to two and one-half year prison terms for plotting attacks against foreign diplomats in Amman. In October, the SSC sentenced five Jordanians to prison terms ranging from one to five years of hard labor for
plotting attacks in Israel and against tourists in Jordan. Another three men were sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for plotting attacks on liquor stores and tourists in Aqaba. In November, the SSC said it would re-examine guilty verdicts issued against seven militants convicted of a bungled conspiracy to use poison gas against American and Israeli tourists during Jordan's millennium celebrations in December 1999. An appeals court had ordered a retrial on the grounds that the plotters may be covered under a general amnesty issued by King Abdullah.

In November, the Jordanian Government proposed counterterrorism legislation that would authorize penalties for anyone who condones or supports acts of terrorism. The proposed bill, still in the drafting stage, would also allow authorities to hold terror suspects indefinitely.

**Kuwait**

The Government of Kuwait strengthened domestic counterterrorism efforts following four separate police actions against terrorists in January that resulted in the deaths of four police officers and eight terrorists, and continued its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. The Kuwaiti Government has taken measures to bolster security and enhance protection for Coalition Forces transiting Kuwait. Despite these positive steps, the potential for future attacks remains a serious concern. While Kuwait is a strong ally of the United States and verbally supportive of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in Kuwait, the government was reluctant to confront extremist elements within the local population and continued to temper its measures against terrorists with long-time practices of cooptation to maintain domestic stability.

Kuwaiti law lacks strong provisions to deal effectively with those engaged in conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, but Kuwait State Security (KSS) continued to identify and arrest terror suspects. In the past, there were instances of individuals involved in terrorist cells receiving relatively light sentences for involvement in acts of terrorist violence. For example, the May trial of "Jihadists in Iraq" resulted in the conviction of 22 men; their three-year jail sentences are in the appeal process on the grounds of being "too harsh." The 22 were convicted of recruiting juveniles to fight U.S. forces in Iraq and collecting money to send to the Iraqi insurgency. However, on December 27, 37 defendants stood trial for terrorist activities stemming from January's police actions. Thirty of the 37 were found guilty of terrorism charges; six were sentenced to death. Eleven of the 37 remained fugitives. In general, the Public Prosecutor claimed that insufficient and incomplete evidence hampered the conviction of many suspected terrorists.

Kuwait responded quickly to U.S. concerns about a possible terror attack in January, reviewed security, and initiated a search for the individuals considered the source of the threats. Kuwaiti officials also heightened security along the border with Iraq and signed a security pact with the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior in December to prevent the infiltration of militants and transnational terrorists.

A ministerial committee chaired by the Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs was formed in October 2004 to develop strategies to combat terrorism and extremism. It held conferences in
the spring to promote moderation and tolerance among Kuwaiti youth. Through an outreach program, the group is also working on a long-term plan against terrorism and extremist ideology. The same ministry worked with the Ministry of Information to shut down some weblogs that encouraged extremist ideology.

Earlier in the year, Kuwait froze terrorist funds in accordance with UN designations. In the spring, the government froze the assets of Mohsen Al-Fadhli, a known Kuwaiti terrorist who is a fugitive from justice, after receiving the UN directive that put Al-Fadhli on its terrorism finance watch list.

The Government of Kuwait established a ministerial committee to revise and strengthen the country’s existing anti-money laundering law to criminalize terror finance and strengthen internal procedures. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti Government must do more to stem the flow of private donations from Kuwait to extremists in Iraq. There is no effective enforcement of laws governing the transfer and physical transport of currency into Kuwait, and the country has no cash exit declaration policy.

**Lebanon**

In April, Syrian military forces and overt intelligence agents departed Lebanon after 29 years of occupation. Terrorist activities were still carried out in Lebanon, however. Israeli positions in the Blue Line village of Ghajjar in the Israeli-occupied Golan region were attacked on November 21, probably by Hizballah. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on Israel from Lebanese territory on December 27, but some analysts suspected “rejectionist” Palestinian groups or Hizballah as the perpetrator and, thus far, a clear determination of culpability has not been possible. Throughout the year, Hizballah continued to claim the right to conduct hostile operations along the Blue Line on the premise of a legitimate “resistance” to the occupation of Lebanese territory.

Since October 2004, when a protracted campaign of domestic political violence began, there have been 15 bombings and assassination attempts that resulted in more than 30 deaths, including that of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. More than 230 people have been injured. The attacks have targeted Lebanese journalists and politicians critical of Syrian interference in Lebanon, including Telecom Minister Hamadeh, MP Gebran Tueni, journalist May Chidiac, Defense Minister Elias Murr, and journalist Samir Kassir. These attacks remain unsolved, but the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) is investigating the Hariri assassination and the Lebanese Government, assisted by the UNIIIC, is investigating the other acts of political violence.
Since July, when the government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora took office, Lebanon has taken small but important steps against several terrorist groups, specifically the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada. Under Prime Minister Siniora, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) surrounded several Palestinian terrorist militia bases and restricted access to them. Similarly, since late 2005, the Lebanese Armed Forces strengthened border control posts and increased patrols along the Lebanese-Syrian border to prevent the flow of weaponry to terrorist groups.

Even with the advances Lebanon has made against terrorism, considerable work remains. The most significant terrorist group in Lebanon is Hizballah, because of its power and influence in Lebanon's Shia community, which makes up about one-third of Lebanon’s population. The Lebanese Government still recognizes Hizballah as a "legitimate resistance group." Hizballah maintains offices in Beirut and elsewhere in the country and has elected deputies in Lebanon’s Parliament and a minister in Prime Minister Siniora’s Council of Ministers (Cabinet). Hizballah also operates a comprehensive system of health and education services in several regions of the country. Although Syria withdrew its military forces in April, it continued to maintain a covert intelligence presence in Lebanon. In addition, Syria continued to offer support for, and facilitated arms smuggling to, Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups. Given that the Government of Lebanon does not exercise authoritative control over areas in the Hizballah-dominated south and inside the Palestinian-controlled refugee camps, terrorists can operate relatively freely in both locations.

The Lebanese and Syrian governments have not fully complied with UNSCR 1559, which calls for respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, the end of foreign interference in Lebanon, and the disarming and disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, including Hizballah. The Government of Lebanon, however, has indicated it will abide by its international obligations, including UNSCR 1559’s call to disarm all militias. The Lebanese Government and its political leaders maintain that implementation of Hizballah’s disarmament should be accomplished through “national dialogue” rather than force. This position complicates the process of implementing UNSCR 1559, because under Lebanon’s “consensus” political system, all the country’s sectarian communities, including the powerful Shia community, have to agree on a course of action on matters of national security.

A number of Lebanese leaders, including pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud, reject categorizing Hizballah's activities as terrorist, even though the group's leaders openly admitted to providing support for terrorist attacks inside Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Hizballah, which holds 14 seats in Parliament as well as a seat on the Council of Ministers, is widely considered a legitimate participant in Lebanese society and politics. Some government officials and members of Parliament attended the annual militaristic Hizballah parade in southern Beirut on October 28, known locally as "Jerusalem Day."

Lebanese authorities maintain that their provision of amnesty to Lebanese individuals involved in acts of violence during the civil war prevents Beirut from prosecuting many cases of concern to the United States. These cases include the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered, and the abduction, torture, and murder of U.S.
hostages in Lebanon from 1984 to 1991. U.S. courts brought indictments against Lebanese Hizballah operatives responsible for a number of those crimes.

Despite evidence to the contrary, the Lebanese Government has insisted that Imad Mugniyah, wanted in connection with the TWA 847 hijacking and other terrorist acts, and placed on the FBI's list of most-wanted terrorists in 2001, is no longer in Lebanon. Mohammad Ali Hamadi, who spent 18 years in a German prison for his role in the TWA hijacking, was released in December and is now believed to be in Lebanon. The United States continued its efforts to bring him to trial before a U.S. court and has formally requested his return. The Lebanese Government's legal system failed to hold a hearing on a government prosecutor's appeal in the case of Tawfic Muhammad Farroukh, who, despite the evidence, was found not guilty of murder for his role in the killing of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy and two others in 1976.

The Lebanese Government took judicial action on two terrorist incidents that occurred in 2004: an attempted bombing of the Italian Embassy, and an attempt to bring a bomb onto the U.S. Embassy grounds. Two Lebanese citizens, Mehdi Hajj Hasan and Abed Karim Mreish, were tried and convicted for the U.S. Embassy incident; they are serving sentences of five and two years at hard labor, respectively. Other members of the terrorist cell involved in these actions were freed as part of an amnesty law passed in June, but a judicial investigation is still taking place.

On terrorism finance, Lebanon's Special Investigation Commission (SIC), an independent legal entity with judicial status that is empowered to investigate suspicious financial transactions, investigated 165 cases involving allegations of money laundering and terrorist financing activities. Lebanon assumed a leadership role in the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.

Morocco

Under the leadership of King Mohammed VI, the Moroccan Government implemented important internal reforms to address the socio-economic conditions that create opportunity for extremist recruitment. In May 2005, King Mohammed VI launched the National Initiative for Human Development to combat poverty, create jobs, and improve infrastructure. This $1.2 billion initiative targets Morocco's poorest rural areas and worst urban slums with the goal of eliminating the economic conditions that foster exclusion and despair.

Morocco continued implementing reforms to the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MOIA), first announced in 2004, to promote religious moderation and tolerance. The reforms included measures to counter extremist ideology within Koranic schools and mosques, and a one-year training program for incoming male and female imams initiated in April. The Ministry also launched a radio station whose daily broadcasts cover most of Morocco, and continued development of its TV station and website.

In May 2003, Moroccan suicide bombers affiliated with the Salafiya Jihadiya movement attacked several sites in Casablanca, killing 45 people (including the 12 bombers) and injuring
100 others. The government's swift and ongoing crackdown of the Salafiya Jihadiya movement resulted in the arrest of an estimated 3,000 extremists and the sentencing of at least 900 individuals for crimes under counterterrorism laws. Many of these cases were still active in the judicial system, which acquitted at least nine suspects and reduced the prison sentences of at least 30 individuals in 2005.

On March 22, the Judicial Police arrested seven individuals from a Salafiya Jihadiya cell in Mohammedia suspected of planning attacks against a supermarket and restaurants along the coastline near Casablanca. In July, Moroccan authorities arrested seven more individuals from another Salafiya Jihadiya cell in the city of Sale near the capital of Rabat.

Moroccan police linked the Sale cell to six Moroccans whom Algerian authorities had returned to Morocco after their arrest while training with militants from the Algerian terrorist group GSPC. In November, Moroccan security forces dismantled a 17-member incipient terrorist network that was linked to small terrorist groups in Iraq. Two of the five Moroccans who were detained in Guantanamo Bay and returned to Morocco in August 2004 were among those arrested.

Moroccan-born extremists associated with the al-Qaida-affiliated Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) were implicated in the March 2004, train blasts in Madrid. Although the recent dismantlement of GICM cells in Europe weakened the group, individual members remained at large.

**Oman**

Oman implemented a stringent anti-money laundering regime, including surveillance systems designed to identify unusual transactions over the last four years. The government announced new statutes to block money laundering, and the Central Bank announced plans to require financial institutions to verify customer identities using sophisticated biometrics technology. Of note, Oman required moneychangers to report all transactions over $260. The Omani Government continued to issue public and private statements condemning international acts of terrorism.

**Qatar**

Qatari-U.S. cooperation was strengthened after a March 19 suicide car bomb attack at an amateur theater playhouse that killed a British citizen. The circumstances surrounding the attack remained under investigation by the Qatari authorities. A number of individuals were arrested, but no firm conclusions were drawn about whether the attacker, an Egyptian, acted alone.

In March 2004, Qatar passed the Combating Terrorism Law that defined terrorism and terrorist acts, listed specific punishments for terrorist crimes to include the death penalty, provided measures against terrorist financing or fundraising activities, and gave the government the authority to take action against these activities. The law incorporated existing
laws, including the penal code, the criminal procedure code, judicial law, an anti-money laundering law, and a law on weapons, ammunitions and explosives.

The Qatar Authority for Charitable Works, which monitors all domestic and international charitable activities, increased its resources and capabilities. The Secretary General of the Authority approves international fund transfers by the charities. The Authority has primary responsibility for monitoring overseas charitable, developmental, and humanitarian projects, and reports annually to government ministries on their status.

**Saudi Arabia**

Following the 2003 terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, the government has engaged in offensive operations against militants. After the December 6, 2004, attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah and the December 29, 2004, suicide bombings at the Ministry of Interior and Emergency Special Forces Headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi security forces carried out numerous operations, including at least four major ones that resulted in the killing and capturing of dozens of militants linked to al-Qaida. In August, after Crown Prince Abdullah officially assumed the throne, Saudi security forces staged successful antiterrorist raids in Riyadh, Mecca, and Dammam.

By year's end, Saudi security forces had killed or captured all of the 26 wanted terrorists publicized in a December 2003 announcement. Saudi Arabia first released a wanted list with the names of 19 al-Qaida members in May 2003, just days before suicide bombings at three Western housing compounds in Riyadh. All 19 of the individuals on the first list have been killed or captured.

In June, the government released a third list with the names of 36 wanted terrorists. By the end of the year, more than ten terrorists on that list had been killed or captured, in addition to numerous other militants and facilitators not previously named on wanted lists. At least eight Saudi counterterrorism officers died in the line of duty, in addition to more than 40 others killed in the previous two years. In recognizing the sacrifices of the Saudi counterterrorism forces, the government initiated survivors’ benefits packages, including financial compensation, honor medals, and memorials such as naming streets after the victims. The Saudi Government also introduced public rewards of up to 7,000,000 Saudi riyals ($1,870,000) for information that leads to an arrest or to the prevention of a terrorist attack.

Nationwide public education and awareness campaigns sought to de-legitimize Islamic justifications for militant activities, while the Kingdom played host to two international conferences focused on terrorism. The Saudi Government also strengthened its capacity to target terrorist financing through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the opening of the Financial Investigations Unit (FIU). In November, Secretary Rice established the U.S.-Strategic Dialogue, which includes a working group on counterterrorism. Overall, counterterrorism cooperation with the United States further improved following the visit of then-Crown Prince Abdullah to President Bush's ranch in Crawford in April.
The Financial Investigations Unit (FIU) originally chartered under 2003 anti-money laundering and antiterrorist legislation, opened on September 10. All banks operating in the Kingdom were required to notify the FIU of any suspicious transactions. In the autumn, the Saudi Government passed a new cash-carrier law that restricted individuals from transporting cash or precious metals worth more than 60,000 Saudi riyals ($16,000) into or out of the Kingdom. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials helped train Saudi officers to enforce these restrictions. The 2003 ban on collecting cash donations at mosques and commercial establishments remained in place. The United Nations Sanctions Committee did not designate any Saudi charities as supporters of terrorism in 2005.

Saudi Arabia took a prominent international role in organizing two major conferences addressing terrorism. In February, more than 50 nations and organizations attended the International Counterterrorism Conference in Riyadh, emphasizing their shared commitment to fight terrorism. The conference closed with the Riyadh Declaration, which calls for greater national, bilateral, and regional cooperation against terrorism, including preventing terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

In December, King Abdullah hosted an extraordinary summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in Mecca, with more than 50 Muslim nations participating. OIC members acknowledged the need to reform the Islamic community to counteract violent misinterpretations of Islam. In the summit's final declaration, OIC members vowed to develop national laws "to criminalize every single terrorist practice and every other practice leading to the financing or instigation of terrorism."

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Saudi Arabia carried out a public awareness campaign against extremism in 2005 that included public service announcements, billboards, television programs, activities in schools and mosques, and information at sporting events. Antiterrorism advertisements were broadcast on Saudi channels and on Arab satellite networks. Part of the campaign aimed to personify the victims of terrorism in the Kingdom over the past several years. Top Saudi officials reiterated their anti-extremism messages throughout the year, including the Minister of Interior's declaration that terrorism is "the product of an aberrant ideology that must be fought." In September, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia called for the government to investigate religious scholars who issued unofficial fatwas that inspired violent acts.

Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism was confirmed as senior officials from the White House, the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies visited the Kingdom. Also, Saudi Arabia provided the United States with information that led to the November conviction in U.S. District Court of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali for plotting to assassinate President Bush. Saudi authorities had arrested Abu Ali, a Jordanian-American, in Mecca in 2003 for his links to al-Qaida, and transferred him to the United States.

**Tunisia**

Tunisian law enforcement organizations carefully monitored the activities of Tunisian extremists, both in Tunisia and abroad. The government worked to improve security
procedures at borders and at Tunisian airports. The Tunisian Government actively prevented the formation of terrorist groups inside Tunisia, including prohibiting the formation of religious-based political parties and groups that it believed would pose a terrorist threat. The Government of Tunisia responded positively to U.S. requests for information and assistance in blocking financial assets and in counterterrorism investigations.

United Arab Emirates

The Emirati Government publicly condemned the terror attacks in Amman, Sharm el-Sheikh, London, and Baghdad. In December, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan strongly denounced terrorists, saying they had no loyalty to their countries of origin. The Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs, and Endowment actively drafted guidance for Friday prayer sermons and was thus able to issue timely condemnations of terrorist acts and also emphasize the virtues of moderate Islam. The Ministry required all 1,500 mosques that delivered sermons to record them each Friday to ensure that imams adhered to prescribed guidelines to prevent extremist preaching.

In December, the Supreme Council, the top policy making body in the country, placed all security agencies under a newly established, though not fully defined and implemented, National Security Council. The Supreme Council's decision follows the government's adoption in August 2004 of a counterterrorism law that defines terrorist crimes and punishments and criminalizes the funding of terrorist organizations. The UAE undertook several border security measures to deter terrorists from reaching UAE soil.

In March, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali in the Emirate of Dubai. CSI has five U.S. Customs officers co-located with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid. CSI is aimed at screening U.S.-bound shipping containers that pass through Dubai ports and that pose a security threat. On average, CSI reviewed approximately 250 bills of lading each week, resulting in 15-20 non-intrusive inspections of U.S.-bound containers. These examinations were conducted jointly with Dubai Customs officers. In addition, Dubai Customs requested that each and every container that originates in Iran be designated for inspection. Cooperation with Dubai Customs in this area was outstanding, and the Dubai CSI operation is a model representative of the program.

In January, May, and September, the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program hosted UAE law enforcement officers for various training programs in counterterrorism and diplomatic security.

The UAE Central Bank provided training programs to financial institutions on money laundering and terrorist financing. In April, the Central Bank hosted the third international hawala (informal money remittance and exchange businesses) conference. The Central Bank investigated financial transactions and froze accounts in response to UN resolutions and internal investigations, and has registered approximately 160 hawala dealers to date.
Yemen

The Republic of Yemen took action against al-Qaida and local extremists, arresting several individuals suspected of having al-Qaida ties and prosecuting the perpetrators of numerous terrorist acts. On February 26, an appeals court upheld verdicts against six al-Qaida members for their role in the October 2000 U.S.S. Cole attack in Aden that killed 17 U.S. sailors and injured 35. The original September 2004 verdict had been appealed by both the defense and the prosecution, the latter arguing that some of the sentences were too light. The appeals court upheld one death sentence against ringleader Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who was tried in absentia. The court commute the death sentence for Jamal al-Badawi to 15 years’ imprisonment. The prosecution failed to secure harsher sentences for the other convicted al-Qaida members, whose original sentences ranged from five to ten years. On August 22, the Supreme Court upheld all six sentences.

On February 6, the Sanaa Appellate Court upheld the convictions against 15 al-Qaida members for multiple crimes: the October 2002 attack on the French tanker M/V Limburg; the murder of a Ministry of Interior officer during the November 2002 attack on an oil company helicopter; a plot to attack the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority; a plot to attack four foreign embassies in Sanaa; a plot to kill the U.S. Ambassador; and the forging of documents for the purpose of carrying out terrorism. The appeals court re-sentenced one defendant to death (from a 10-year sentence), awarded harsher sentences for two defendants, and upheld the remaining sentences. The case is expected to be appealed to the Supreme Court.

On April 23, the Yemeni Supreme Court upheld the 2003 death sentences of Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah and Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel for the December 2002, shootings of three American citizens in Jibla. Jarallah was executed in November. No date has been set for al-Kamel's execution.

Yemeni security forces continued to arrest and try suspected members of al-Qaida and other terrorists groups. In August, the Sanaa Primary Court convicted six al-Qaida members for planning attacks against the British and Italian Embassies and the French Cultural Center. The ringleader, Anwar al-Jilani, received a four-year sentence, with the remaining five defendants receiving sentences ranging from two years to 40 months.

In June, the Sanaa Appellate Court found 11 alleged al-Qaida suspects not guilty of planning attacks on undisclosed targets in Yemen and abroad. The prosecution had alleged that the defendants trained in Afghanistan and were planning to travel to Iraq to fight against U.S.-led Coalition forces.

In August, the Sanaa Primary Court began trying 34 supporters of the slain rebel Shia cleric Hussein Al-Houthi for planning terrorist attacks against Yemeni military sites and the U.S. Ambassador. In December, the Sanaa court also began trying two individuals, Hizam al-Mass and Khalid al-Halilah, for a 2004 plot to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador.
Yemen used its Islamic Dialogue Committee, headed by a leading judge, to continue its dialogue with detainees arrested for connections to terrorist groups and extremist elements. The government releases detainees it considers to be rehabilitated after they pledge to uphold the Yemeni constitution and laws, the rights of non-Muslims, and the inviolability of foreign interests. No comprehensive program exists to monitor recidivism rates. An undisclosed number of released detainees from previous years reportedly have traveled to Iraq to participate in attacks against Coalition forces.

The government’s capacity for stemming terrorism financing remains limited. In 2004, the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee designated prominent Yemeni Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani for his association with al-Qaida. The Yemeni Government took no action to bar his travel or freeze his assets in compliance with its UN obligations. In December, al-Zindani accompanied President Saleh to an Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Saudi Arabia.

South Asia Overview

“Afghanistan’s success, ladies and gentlemen, is owed primarily to two factors: the Afghan people’s determination, and the international community’s support. Today, Afghanistan illustrates how best international cooperation can be utilized to fight a global challenge, such as terrorism, and help rebuild a nation once devastated by foreign interference and violence. If we recall where we were three years ago, our accomplishments to date are truly significant. Together we have steered Afghanistan rather successfully through a tortuous journey over the last three years. Today we celebrate together not the end of our journey, but a very good beginning.”

Hamid Karzai, President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Afghanistan Development Forum
April 4, 2005

Although terrorism remained a major problem in the region, with increases in activity in 2005 by terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, there were encouraging signs. Afghanistan made steps forward in democratization when it conducted successful elections for the National Assembly, began the important process of reconciliation with former militants and, under the leadership of its president, continued building the institutions of a modern democracy. Pakistan captured or killed hundreds of terrorists, significantly
increasing the effectiveness of its counterterrorism operation. In July, President Musharraf declared a “Jihad on extremism” and promised to close down extremist institutions.

The United States works closely with its South Asian partners and capacity-building programs to combat terrorism have been effective. Progress in increasing confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan may help India prevent further growth in terrorism within its borders. India has improved its tactics against terrorists and made significant arrests. Bangladesh made important arrests connected to the bombing campaign begun August 17, and announced that it was reorganizing its counterterrorism operations to increase its ability to bring perpetrators to justice and prevent further attacks.

In Nepal and Sri Lanka, terrorism carried out by the Maoists and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), while not normally directly affecting U.S. citizens, posed a severe challenge to the governments of those nations.

Nepal arrested many Maoist terrorists and associates, but is struggling to slow the growth of Maoist forces. Nepal’s success against the Maoists has not translated into effective control of its rural areas, where Maoists can operate. Sri Lankan operations against the LTTE have also shown success mixed with the inability to roll back LTTE influence in predominantly Tamil areas.

**Afghanistan**

Afghanistan continued its progress toward building a democratic government, holding National Assembly and provincial council elections in September. In spite of Taliban threats to disrupt the democratic process, only minor incidents occurred, and the election results were accepted as legitimate by the Afghan people. The National Assembly was inaugurated December 19, marking the final milestone of the Bonn Process. Programs designed to combat terrorism and lawlessness continued. The Program for Strengthening Peace (PTS), which reconciles former Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG) members, founded six regional offices. As of December, more than 600 former fighters had joined the program. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program processed more than 63,000 former combatants. The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) process began work in June, focusing on vetting parliamentary candidates to ensure they had no ties to illegal armed groups (IAGs). The DIAG disqualified a number of candidates, using the program more as an effort to push compliance rather than punish individuals for past and present actions. The program’s next phase will be a province-by-province effort to disband the most notorious IAGs, coupled with the identification and removal of government officials with links to IAGs.
Increasingly, the Afghan National Army (ANA), with more than 26,000 personnel in its ranks, and the Afghan National Police (ANP), with 54,500, have taken the lead in counterterrorism operations. Proactive arrests of presumed terrorists have continued, probably preventing many bombings. Despite this progress, Afghanistan saw an increasing number of violent incidents in 2005. More than 1,500 people were killed in terrorist attacks.

The use of improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings in Afghanistan increased; there were an estimated 15 suicide attacks, compared to four in 2004. Suspected terrorists and anti-Coalition militants targeted candidates and election workers in the run-up to the parliamentary elections. Terrorists and anti-Coalition militants may be changing tactics to reduce the number of direct fire attacks against Coalition forces.

Overall attacks against non-combatants decreased but terrorists and anti-Coalition militants targeted international NGO and UN workers and recipients of NGO assistance in an attempt to hamper reconstruction efforts and drive the international assistance community out of Afghanistan. Thirty-three NGO staff members were killed, up from 23 in 2004.

Bangladesh

Bangladesh witnessed the emergence of a dangerous terrorist group. Jamaat ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) launched coordinated nationwide attacks on "un-Islamic" persons and facilities in pursuit of its goal of a fundamentalist Islamic society. Bangladesh had limited success in countering JMB's escalating acts of terrorism, underscoring the government's serious institutional, resource, and political constraints. Bangladeshi forces succeeded, however, in capturing Ataur Rahman Sunny, one of the operational commanders of the JMB. Porous borders, and endemic corruption continued to undermine the government's broader counterterrorism posture.

On August 17 JMB exploded nearly 500 small bombs across the country in a coordinated attack, leaving two dead and more than a dozen injured. Leaflets found at the blast sites threatened judges, government officials, politicians, and other "enemies of Islam", including the United States and the United Kingdom. Additional bomb attacks included the use of suicide bombers (in November, JMB launched suicide attacks for the first time in Bangladesh) and targeted judges, police, government offices, local non-governmental organizations, traditional folk festivals, and cultural groups. Despite arrests and seizures of explosive materials, JMB attacks continued. Subsequently, Bangladesh has succeeded in capturing JMB leaders Abdur Rahman and Bangla Bhai.

Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia regularly condemned terrorism at domestic and international forums. The government renewed bans on Jamaat ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) as terrorist organizations.

There was good cooperation between law enforcement agencies on several cases relating to domestic terrorism. With U.S. technical assistance, Bangladesh drafted a comprehensive new
anti-money laundering law. Bangladesh was also working with the United States to strengthen controls at land, sea, and air ports of entry.

India

As in previous years, terrorists staged hundreds of attacks on people and property in India. The most prominent terrorist groups are violent extremist separatists operating in Jammu and Kashmir, Maoists in the "Naxalite belt" in eastern India, and ethno-linguistic nationalists in India’s northeastern states. The federal and state governments have tried various strategies to address some of these grievances within the context of Indian democracy, but the government is firm: groups must cease violence before negotiations can begin, and the government will not entertain territorial concessions.

Some terrorist groups operating in India sought to raise their profile. On May 22, there were nearly simultaneous bombings of two movie theaters in New Delhi by a Sikh terrorist organization, Babbar Khalsa International which many thought was defunct. The attacks left one person dead and more than 60 injured. On October 29, a series of explosions in crowded marketplaces and on a public bus in New Delhi killed approximately 60 and injured more than 150 on the eve of Diwali, India’s most important Hindu holiday. The Indian Government blamed the designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) for the attack.

Kashmiri terrorist groups made numerous attacks on elected Indian and Kashmiri politicians, targeted civilians in public areas, and attacked security forces. Hundreds of non-combatants were killed, most of whom were Kashmiri Muslims. Indian experts asserted that the April attack on the bus depot for Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus was designed to inhibit growing Kashmiri enthusiasm for normalization of ties between Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. The designated FTOs LT and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. Some of these groups are believed to maintain ties to al-Qaida.

Nevertheless, civilian fatalities from terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir continued a five-year decline in the first nine months of 2005. The Indian Government and military credit improved tactics and a fence that runs along the Line of Control (separating the Indian and Pakistani sides of Kashmir) for having significantly reduced the number of terrorists who cross into Indian Kashmir, thus resulting in a lower number of attacks and fatalities in Jammu and Kashmir. After the October 8 earthquake in Pakistan that reportedly killed many Kashmir-based terrorists, however, the terrorists launched a series of high-profile attacks across the degraded frontier defenses in an effort to prove their continued relevance. Indian experts believe that the car bombs, grenade attacks, daytime assassinations, and assassination attempts on Kashmiri political leaders, including current and former state ministers, were designed to signal that the terrorist groups retained the ability to conduct "spectacular" operations despite their reported losses.

Naxalite (Maoist agrarian peasant movement) terrorism, which covers a broad region of eastern, central, and southern India, is growing in sophistication and lethality and may pose a significant long-term challenge. The Naxalites launched two mass attacks in the second half
of 2005, destroying buildings, capturing weapons, and killing several local policemen in an attack on an Uttar Pradesh village. They also attacked the Jehanabad Prison in Bihar, killing two persons, freeing more than 300 inmates, and abducting about 30 inmates who were members of an anti-Naxalite group.

The U.S. Pacific Command conducted in September a counterterrorism tabletop exercise bringing together Indian and American military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and humanitarian assistance professionals. For the first time ever, a U.S. National Guard unit co-trained with Indian troops at the Counterinsurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Mizoram in September and October. The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program has trained hundreds of Indian police and security officers. The U.S.-India Counterterrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG) has met six times since its creation in 2000; India also participates in CTJWGs with 15 other countries, and in multilateral CTJWGs with the EU and BIMSTEC (an organization promoting economic cooperation among Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal).

The Indian Government supports ongoing U.S. investigations in cases involving victims of terrorism related to the United States. On April 26, a special court in Calcutta convicted seven men for the January 2002 attack on the American Center in Calcutta that left five Indian police officers dead and more than 20 injured.

India’s counterterrorism efforts are hampered by its outdated and overburdened law enforcement and legal systems. The Indian court system is slow, laborious, and prone to corruption; terrorism trials can take years to complete. An independent Indian think tank, for example, assesses that the estimated 12,000 civilians killed by terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir from 1988 to 2002 generated only 13 convictions through December 2002; most of the convictions were for illegal border crossing or possession of weapons or explosives. Many of India’s local police forces are poorly staffed, trained, and equipped to combat terrorism effectively. Despite these challenges, India scored major successes, including numerous arrests and the seizure of hundreds of kilos of explosives and firearms during operations against the briefly resurgent Sikh terrorist group Babbar Khalsa International.

In August, the Indian Government announced a new policy on airplane hijackings that included directing ground crews to obstruct a hijacked plane from taking off, and a clearance procedure for authorizing the shooting down of a hijacked plane in flight that might endanger civilians on the ground.

The Indian Government has an excellent record of protecting its nuclear assets from terrorists, and is taking steps to improve further the security of its strategic systems. In May the Indian Parliament passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill, designed to prevent the transfer of WMD, delivery systems, and associated technologies to state and non-state actors, including terrorists.
Nepal

Nepal's primary focus remained the Maoist insurgency, active in Nepal since February 1996. In 2005 alone, Maoists were responsible for the deaths of at least 263 civilians and 330 government security forces, according to press accounts. The government reports that Nepalese security forces arrested thousands of suspected Maoist militants and killed more than 966 in 2005.

On June 6, in the worst attack on civilians since the beginning of the insurgency, Maoists ambushed a passenger bus, killing 41 people and subsequently injuring 71 in a landmine blast. The Maoists imposed two nation-wide blockades February 12-26 and April 2-12, effectively shutting down traffic and businesses throughout most of Nepal. During the February blockade, the Maoists targeted civilian drivers of vehicles who defied the blockade. During the Maoists' unilateral four-month cease-fire from September 3 to January 3, killings decreased dramatically, but kidnappings and extortion continued.

Repeated anti-U.S. rhetoric suggests that the Maoists view U.S. support for the Nepalese Government as a key obstacle to their goal of overthrowing the monarchy. Maoist supreme commander Prachanda issued a press statement with his Indian counterpart on September 1 calling for continued armed struggle and naming the United States as the principal enemy.

In addition to threats against American-affiliated business enterprises, Maoists have threatened attacks against U.S. and international NGOs, including Peace Corps workers. They have continued to extort money from Nepalis and foreigners, including American tourists, to raise funds for their insurgency. The Maoists' public statements criticized the United States, the United Kingdom, and India for providing security assistance to Nepal.

On January 31, Nepal passed the Bank and Financial Institutions Ordinance, which regulates the actions of financial institutions in Nepal and provides the Central Bank with authority to freeze and confiscate the accounts of terrorists.

Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan continued to pursue al-Qaida, the Taliban and their allies aggressively with counterterrorist police measures throughout the country and large-scale military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Al-Qaida has declared the Government of Pakistan one of its main enemies, and has called for its overthrow. Nearly 160 people were killed in Sunni-Shia sectarian attacks, a decline from the nearly 200 killed in 2004.

In the run-up to the September parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, Pakistan deployed approximately 80,000 troops, including Frontier Corps (FC) units, to the border region.
Pakistan Army and FC units raided key al-Qaida safe havens in North and South Waziristan, including a compound used by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a leading Taliban figure. President Musharraf reported in November that Hamza Rabia, al-Qaida’s chief of external operations, was killed in an explosion in North Waziristan. These operations significantly degraded al-Qaida's command and control capabilities in the region and disrupted cross-border operations. Parallel to this military effort, the government developed a strategy designed to win the support of the tribes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas with a combination of negotiations and economic development investments.

Pakistani security services cooperated closely with the United States and other nations in a campaign to eliminate international terrorism. Hundreds of suspected operatives of al-Qaida and other terrorist groups have been killed or captured by Pakistani authorities since September 2001. Notable arrests by Pakistani security forces included Syed Mohammad Hashim, wanted in connection with the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl, Lashkar i Jhangvi chief Asif Choto, and leading al-Qaida fugitive Abu Faraj Al Libi. Taliban spokesman Abdul Latif Hakimi was arrested and transferred to Afghan custody in October. In January, Pakistan extradited two suspected al-Qaida figures to Turkey. The government also cracked down on several groups that had been active in the Kashmir insurgency, banning the publication of the monthly magazine Shahadat run by the Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen.

Despite these successes, al-Qaida and Taliban operations in Pakistan continue to pose a threat to U.S. interests, and tribal support for operations against al-Qaida and the Taliban is mixed.

Uneasy relations between the national government and elements in the province of Balochistan have also led to violence. Pakistani authorities charge that a Baloch separatist group was behind two blasts in Lahore in September that killed six people, a November car bombing in Karachi that killed three, and a December missile attack on a paramilitary base during a visit by President Musharraf. At the close of 2005, Government of Pakistan security forces were engaged in operations to subdue the rebellious Baloch militants.

Following the July 7 London subway bombing, in which three of the bombers had widely alleged ties to Pakistan, President Musharraf addressed the nation on television to condemn terrorism and call for a "Jihad against extremism." Among the measures he announced were a crackdown on banned organizations, hate materials, and incitement by religious leaders; the expulsion of foreign madrassa students; and new registration and financial disclosure requirements on madrassas. Government and religious leaders continued to negotiate over the implementation of these measures.

The October 8 earthquake that devastated Pakistan, killing more than 80,000, created an opportunity for al-Qaida-linked relief organizations to provide aid to survivors in the affected areas. The Government of Pakistan provided its own relief operations, facilitated
international relief operations, and promised to shut down known terrorist relief camps, but nonetheless several such groups were able to raise funds and reap public relations benefits.

Pakistan's antiterrorism courts continue to prosecute terrorism cases. In May, six activists of Harakat ul-Mujahedin al-Almi received 19-year sentences for possession of bombmaking equipment and weapons. In March, two physicians, brothers Arshad and Akmal Waheed, were charged and convicted of providing medical treatment to al-Qaida terrorists.

U.S.- Pakistani joint counterterrorism efforts were extensive. They included cooperative efforts in border security and criminal investigations and several long-term training projects.

**Sri Lanka**

The Sri Lankan Government cooperated with U.S. efforts to track terrorist financing, although no assets were identified in Sri Lanka. The United States worked with Sri Lanka to provide training for relevant government agencies and the banking sector. The government cooperated with the United States to implement both the Container Security Initiative and the Department of Energy's second line of defense Megaports program at the port of Colombo.

The 2002 cease-fire between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), continued to hold despite numerous violations. The Sri Lankan Army remained deployed across the country to fight the insurgency. The paramilitary Special Task Force (STF) police were deployed in the east and at strategic locations in the west.

The LTTE conducted a campaign of targeted assassinations against political opponents in 2005. This included the August 12 assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar outside his Colombo residence by a suspected LTTE sniper team. The Karuna faction, a dissident faction of the LTTE, conducted its own assassination campaign against the LTTE and pro-LTTE civilians in the east. Members of the Karuna faction and suspected Sri Lankan Army informants killed at least 48 individuals in 2005, and approximately 49 members of the Sri Lankan security forces. Including civilian casualties, nearly 200 deaths were attributed to cease-fire violations.

Following the assassination of Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, the government enacted emergency regulations giving arrest power to members of the armed forces, who are required to turn suspects over to the police within 24 hours. Individuals arrested under the emergency regulations may be detained for up to one year. Under these regulations, 148 persons, most of whom already had been released.

The designated FTO Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) finances itself by contributions from the Tamil diaspora around the world, including North America, Europe, and Australia, and by imposing local "taxes" on businesses operating in the areas of Sri Lanka under its control. LTTE military training is self-taught; weapons are either purchased on the international black market or captured from the Sri Lankan Army. Many LTTE innovations, such as explosive belts, vests, and bras, the use of female suicide bombers, and waterborne
suicide attacks against ships, have been copied by other terrorist groups. There is no indication that the LTTE is trying to acquire WMDs.

In general, the LTTE has not targeted U.S. citizens or assets, limiting attacks to Sri Lankan security forces, political figures, civilians, and businesses. However, in November suspected LTTE militants threw a grenade at a truck donated by the United States to a humanitarian demining program. At the time, the truck was occupied by Sri Lankan soldiers, one of whom was killed in the attack.

**Western Hemisphere Overview**

“We stand firm in the fight against terrorism and firm in our conviction that a sustained and permanent victory depends upon the success of each individual country in the struggle for social cohesion. In projecting our security policy to become an axiom of the State, we conceive it to be inexorably linked to the constant improvement of the social conditions of our people.”

Álvaro Uribe Vélez, President of Colombia
60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
September 17, 2005

Terrorism in the Western Hemisphere was primarily perpetrated in by narcoterrorist organizations based in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. With the exception of the United States and Canada, there are no known operational cells of Islamic terrorists in the hemisphere, although scattered pockets of ideological supporters and facilitators in South America and the Caribbean lent financial, logistical, and moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East. Cuba remained a state sponsor of terrorism, while Venezuela virtually ceased its cooperation in the global war on terror, tolerating terrorists in its territory and seeking closer relations with Cuba and Iran, both state sponsors of terrorism.

The threat of terrorist attack remained low in for most countries. Overall, governments took modest steps to improve their counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and tighten border security, but corruption, weak government institutions, ineffective or lacking interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources limited the progress of many. Some countries, like Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Mexico, and El Salvador, made serious prevention and preparedness efforts. Others, especially many that regularly allow narcoterrorists to transit or visit their territory, lacked urgency and resolve to address deficiencies in their counterterrorism posture. Caribbean and Central American nations, recognizing their attractiveness and vulnerability to attack or transit by terrorists, took steps to improve their border controls and secure key infrastructure, especially air and maritime ports. Most countries began to look seriously at the possibility of connections between transnational criminals and terrorist organizations.
The United States enjoyed solid cooperation on terror-related matters from most hemispheric partners, especially at the operational level. The United States maintained excellent intelligence, law enforcement, and legal assistance relations with most countries. The hemisphere boasts the OAS’ Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, the only permanent regional multilateral organization focused exclusively on counterterrorism.

Mexico and Canada are key partners in the global war on terror and for U.S. homeland defense. Cooperation with them was broad and deep, involving all levels of government and virtually all agencies in several initiatives. Mexico strengthened considerably its legal framework for addressing national security threats. Canada played an important counterterrorism leadership role worldwide, often in partnership with the United States. However, media outcry over the U.S. deportation to Syria of a dual nationality Canadian/Syrian terror suspect, and his alleged mistreatment there, threatened to disrupt valuable information sharing arrangements between the United States and Canada.

The United States remains fully committed to assisting the government and people of Colombia to defeat Colombian-based narcoterrorist organizations. The government of President Alvaro Uribe made solid progress, inducing thousands of illegal combatants to demobilize and rejoin society, arresting or killing incorrigible leaders, and bringing government services, economic development, and security to formerly neglected regions of the country. Colombia cooperated unreservedly with U.S. efforts to recover three U.S. citizens taken hostage by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorist organization in February 2003.

Colombia’s neighbors reacted variedly to the threat from Colombian narcoterrorists. While none condemned the terrorists or outlawed membership in such groups in their countries, for the most part they responded positively to Colombian requests to arrest specific fugitives. Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru improved cross-border cooperation with Colombia (often based on local, rather than national, arrangements), but their security forces remained under formal or informal orders to avoid military confrontations with encroaching foreign narcoterrorists. Forces in those countries pursued renascent domestic terrorist groups aggressively. Venezuela remained unwilling or unable to control the traffic of FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) arms, supplies, and drugs across the Colombian border, while moving aggressively against United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) narcoterrorists.

The United States engaged Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in the 3+1 Group on Triborder Area Security to address transnational crime and dissuade those who would support terrorism. The “Three” have significantly increased their coordination, information sharing, and joint activities against criminals in the region where the countries converge.
Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE)

A continuing positive trend in the Western Hemisphere was the increased political will to address terrorism. Although counterterrorism capacity and expertise remain lacking in many states in the hemisphere, countries continued efforts to strengthen their counterterrorism regimes on all fronts, with an emphasis on cooperation.

At the heart of this cooperation lies the Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), which continued to enhance regional counterterrorism cooperation and capacity building. At the February 2005 CICTE Fifth Regular Session in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, CICTE expanded its mission beyond disrupting terrorism financing and enhancing border security to addressing threats to transportation security (aviation and seaport) and cyber security. To accomplish this enhanced mission, CICTE has various ongoing counterterrorism capacity-building programs: airport security training, customs and border security (land, air, and sea), financial controls, policy engagement exercises, and counterterrorism needs assessments.

CICTE delivered more than $5 million in counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in the region. CICTE provided training to nearly 500 port and airport security officials from 29 member states to help meet the requirements of the International Maritime Organization’s International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code, and the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) new air security standards. CICTE advised 15 member state governments on how to meet the requirements of UNSCR 1373, the 13 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (IACAT), which complements and expands on international conventions and protocols. The U.S. Senate ratified the Convention in 2005.

Triborder Area (Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil)

The governments of the Triborder Area (TBA) have long been concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through this region. In the early 1990s, they established a mechanism to address these illicit activities. In 2002, at their invitation, the United States joined them in the “3+1 Group on Triborder Area Security” to improve the capabilities of the Three to fight cross-border crime and thwart money laundering and potential terrorist fundraising activities. The United States remained concerned that Hizballah and HAMAS were raising funds among the sizable Muslim communities in the region and elsewhere in the territories of the Three, although there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.
In October, Paraguay hosted representatives from financial intelligence units (FIUs) and other experts from Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and the United States to address the challenges posed by the transnational movement of funds. Delegations also discussed and planned implementation of a U.S. program to help uncover discrepancies in customs data that suggested illicit activity. The Three also agreed to strengthen border controls, establish customs databases, share legislative standards, and designate points of contact on bulk cash movements.

Brazil hosted a meeting of the broad 3+1 group in December. Delegates reaffirmed their commitment to fulfill obligations outlined in UNSCR 1373 and to exchange information among governments. Additionally, the four countries reiterated the need to strengthen law enforcement ties by organizing a meeting for TBA public prosecutors in early 2006. Brazil agreed to fully implement the Regional Intelligence Center in Foz do Iguacu by mid-2006, and to invite Argentina and Paraguay to send official representatives to staff it. The Three also agreed to implement joint patrols of Itaipu Lake and adjacent waterways and continue work on integrated immigration and border controls.

Argentina

While Argentina cooperated very well with the United States at the operational level, it has not addressed some institutional weaknesses that hinder its counterterrorism efforts. For example, while the Argentine Government and its Central Bank are committed to ensuring that the assets of terrorist groups identified by the United States or the United Nations are frozen if they are detected in Argentine financial institutions, Argentina’s financial investigative unit lacked legal and political weight. New regulations required travelers to report the cross-border transport of currency in excess of U.S. $10,000, but there were no penalties for failure to report, nor were the reports easily accessible by investigators. The government did not advance legislative reform to criminalize support for terrorism.

Argentine security forces were vigilant in monitoring illicit activity in the Triborder Area and potential support links to Islamic radical groups outside Argentina. There is no credible evidence that operational cells of Islamic or regional narcoterrorist organizations exist in Argentina.

There were approximately 20 incidents by local groups involving small bombings, attempted bombings, or arson, mostly against U.S. and presumed U.S. businesses, including Citibank, Bank of Boston, Blockbuster, and McDonalds. No fatalities or injuries resulted. Anti-American pamphlets or graffiti were found at most incident sites.

In February, a new federal prosecutor took over the special prosecuting unit for the July 18, 1994, terrorist bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) that killed 85 people. Hizballah and Iran remain the chief suspects. The prosecutor reinvigorated the problem-plagued investigation, despite suffering a temporary setback: in September, at Iran’s request, Interpol canceled the international capture orders for 12 Iranian nationals whom Argentina seeks in connection with the bombing. There were no new developments in the investigation of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy, which killed 29 people.
Brazil

The government of Brazil vigorously condemned terrorism, but did not provide the necessary political and material support to strengthen counterterrorism institutions. A government commission proposed a new national interagency counterterrorism structure, but the government did not present legislation to implement it.

Overall, Brazil continues to improve its counterterrorism capabilities. The government effectively utilized its financial intelligence unit (COAF) to monitor and prevent possible funding for terrorist groups. With assistance and training from the United States, the COAF upgraded its database and data collection mechanisms. The government is also investing in border and law enforcement infrastructure with a view to gradually control the flow of goods – legal and illegal – through the TBA, the proceeds of which could be diverted to support terror groups.

Brazil chose not to establish a terrorist-designation regime that would make support for and membership in terror organizations a crime. Moreover, the Government of Brazil considers Hizballah a legitimate political party. Brazilian law prohibits the extradition of native-born Brazilian citizens and imposes tight constraints on the extradition of naturalized citizens (for previous crimes and drug trafficking only) and foreigners (for all but ideological or political crimes). The latter could complicate foreign governments' efforts to bring terrorist fugitives to justice. In August, the Brazilian Federal Police arrested Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) "spokesman" Francisco Antonio Cadena Collazos under an international warrant.

The United States continued to work with Brazil in several bilateral, multilateral, and international forums to strengthen neighbors’ and its own CT capabilities.

Paraguay

Although Paraguay is cooperative in counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts, its judicial system remains severely hampered by a lack of strong anti-money laundering and counterterrorism legislation. In 2004, the Government of Paraguay submitted a bill to the legislature to strengthen its anti-money laundering regime, but the draft legislation remained stalled. The government has not yet introduced draft counterterrorism legislation. Both are essential to Paraguay meeting its international counterterrorism obligations under UN Security Council resolutions.

Lacking effective counterterrorism legislation, Paraguay had to prosecute suspected terrorist financiers under tax evasion or other statutes. Paraguayan authorities prosecuted Kassem Hijazi, a suspected Hizballah money launderer connected to 113 businesses and 46 individuals. Hijazi remains free on bail pending a preliminary trial hearing. In addition, officials filed charges against suspected terrorist fundraiser Hattem Barakat for tax evasion and passport and document forgery. Separately, Paraguayan authorities are seeking the arrest
of fugitive Hassan Ali Barakat (Barakat’s cousin), for conspiracy, piracy, and contempt of court.

Paraguay was shocked by the discovery in March of the murder of former President Raul Cubas’ daughter Cecilia, who was kidnapped in 2004. Paraguayan authorities aggressively prosecuted members of the leftist Free Fatherland Party (Partido Patria Libre, or PPL) and revealed that the perpetrators had sought and received advice on the kidnapping from a member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In October, a Paraguayan judge indicted 25 individuals, and PPL faction leader Osmar Martinez repeated earlier admissions of ties with the FARC.

The United States assisted Paraguay with both antiterrorism training and national security strategic planning.

**Bolivia**

Bolivia’s counterterrorism efforts are hindered by inadequate resources, corruption, a weak legal framework, and political uncertainty. The government’s ability to enforce UN sanctions on suspected terrorist organizations and individuals is impeded by domestic law and an ineffective judicial system. As of December, the government had yet to bring an ELN member arrested in Bolivia, Francisco "Pacho" Cortez, to trial. Bolivian authorities nevertheless arrested Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) member Aida Ochoa in La Paz and took custody of MRTA member Julio Cesar Vasquez from Peru. The Bolivian Government sought and received our assistance to deactivate man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which were in deteriorating and unstable condition.

**Canada**

The governments of the United States and Canada collaborated on a broad array of initiatives, exercises, and joint operations that spanned virtually all agencies and every level of government. At the political level, however, tensions over Iraq and U.S. actions against Canadian citizen terror suspects threatened to disrupt valuable information sharing between the two nations. Terrorists and their supporters have capitalized on liberal Canadian immigration policies to raise funds and undertake other activities. The domestic terror legislation Canada passed after September 11, 2001 was used for only one prosecution and is subject to review in 2006.

U.S.-Canadian counterterrorism cooperation rests on a number of established forums, including the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, the terrorism sub-group of the Cross Border Crime Forum, and the Smart Border Accord. The latter led to an agreement to expand the number of Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) covering the border to 15.

Of several exercises held to test the joint U.S.-Canadian response to terrorist attacks, TOPOFF (Top Officials) in April was the most ambitious. This exercise with Canada and the United Kingdom involved more than 8,000 personnel managing scenarios in three countries.
over five days. For Canada, it constituted a dry run of its recently formulated National Response Plan. Smaller exercises afforded local authorities the opportunity to practice their joint response to terror emergencies.

In Afghanistan, Canada assumed command of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team and maintained several hundred troops under NATO command. Although Canada chose not to join Operation Iraqi Freedom, it chaired the donors committee of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, pledged over U.S. $240 million for Iraqi reconstruction, police training (through NATO), and elections, and led international monitoring of all three rounds of Iraqi elections. Canada also helped key countries address terrorism and terrorism financing with new counterterrorism capacity-building programs.

The principal threat to the close U.S.-Canadian cooperative relationship remains the fallout from the Arar case. U.S. authorities in 2002 detained dual nationality Canadian-Syrian terrorist suspect Maher Arar in New York and removed him to his native Syria. Arar claimed he was tortured in Syria, triggering a media outcry in Canada that prompted the Canadian Government to review and restrict information-sharing arrangements with the United States. The two governments are working to develop a mechanism to accommodate Canadian concerns while resuming the free flow of counterterrorism information.

The Arar case underscores a greater concern for the United States: the presence in Canada of numerous suspected terrorists and terrorist supporters. Algerian-born Ahmed Ressam, the "millennium bomber" caught attempting to bring bomb-making materials into the United States, was denied asylum in Canada, yet remained in Montreal for seven years and used false identification to obtain a Canadian passport. Other known terrorists in Canada include:

- Mohammed Mahjoub, member of Vanguards of Conquest, a radical wing of Egyptian Islamic Jihad;
- Mahmud Jaballah, senior member of the Egyptian Islamic terrorist organization al-Jihad and al-Qaida;
- Hassan Al Merei, suspected al-Qaida member;
- Mohammed Harkat, suspected al-Qaida member; and
- Adil Charkaoui, suspected al-Qaida member.

Canada is also home to the Khadr terrorist family. Father Ahmed Said, a member of al-Qaida, was killed by Pakistani security forces in 2003. A son accused of killing a U.S. Army medic and wounding another soldier is being held in Guantanamo. Another son was detained by U.S. forces in Afghanistan and has since returned to Canada. The USG seeks the extradition of a third son for conspiring to kill Americans. A daughter is under investigation by Canadian authorities for terror-related offenses.

Some 38 terrorist groups are officially banned in Canada, but not the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), possibly due to the political weight of the 200,000-strong Tamil community in Canada. The government prohibits known LTTE members from entering Canada, however.
In the wake of September 11, 2001, Canada passed an Antiterrorism Act subject to mandatory periodic reviews and annual reporting on preventive detention provisions. Canada has never used the latter, and has arrested only one person under the Act. The investigative hearing provisions of the Act have been used only once -- in the still unresolved Air India case. Nevertheless, critics of the legislation charge that it could be used to target ethnic groups and seek its repeal.

The British Columbia Supreme Court found Sikh separatists Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri not guilty of bombing Toronto-origin Air India Flight 182 and killing 329 people. Outrage from families of the victims triggered a commission of inquiry, which is tasked to examine systemic issues related to Canada’s counterterrorism preparedness.

Chile

Chilean law enforcement actively cooperated in international terrorism investigations and improved the legal framework for addressing the threat of terrorism.

New legislation removed constraints on intelligence gathering, but Chile's National Intelligence Agency remained an analytical body, reliant on law enforcement and investigative agencies for collection and operations. The government has not allocated adequate resources for Chile's 450-person counterterrorist reaction force to operate at peak efficiency.

Chile assisted Argentine security services during the Summit of the Americas in Argentina, and invited the United States to form joint counter surveillance and observer teams during the Community of Democracies Ministerial in Santiago. Law enforcement monitored possible extremist links between Chile’s Iquique Free Trade Zone and the Triborder Area.

The United States continued to build the capacity of Chilean law enforcement and counterterrorism entities, training approximately 70 Chilean judges on intellectual property crime and its potential link to money laundering and terror financing schemes.

Colombia

The Government of Colombia, facing a domestic terrorist threat, continued vigorous law enforcement, intelligence, military, and economic measures against three designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations -- the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Colombia worked with neighboring countries to thwart terrorist expansion, investigate terrorist activities inside and outside Colombia, seize assets, and bring terrorists to justice. The U.S.-Colombia extradition relationship
remained one of the most successful in the world. The Colombian Government cooperated fully with U.S. efforts to recover three U.S. citizens kidnapped by the FARC in February 2003, and remained amenable, despite FARC duplicity, to third-party proposals for a hostage-prisoner exchange. Colombian terror groups, while weakened, continued to murder, kidnap, and terrorize Colombians from all walks of life.

The Uribe administration maintained its focus on demobilizing or defeating Colombia's terrorist groups. In the course of demobilizing combatants, the armed forces debriefed terrorist group deserters for detailed information on their terrorist cells. The Justice and Peace Law that offers judicial benefits and reduced custodial sentences for qualifying demobilizing terrorists requires all participants to confess fully their crimes as members of a terrorist group. Justice and Peace beneficiaries must also return all illicit profits.

Colombia worked closely with the United States to block terrorists' assets. Colombian financial institutions, on orders of the government, closed many narcotrafficking and terrorism-related accounts.

Colombia emerged as a leader for improving counterterrorism capabilities and for strengthening political will to combat terrorism in the region. Colombia was the first country to offer assistance to Paraguay in the wake of a shocking kidnap-murder there linked to the FARC. Colombia became the Vice-Chair of the Organization of American States' Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).

Colombia extradited more than 130 criminals to the United States, the vast majority of whom were Colombian nationals. In February, Colombia extradited FARC financier Omaira Rojas Cabrera "Sonia." In November, Colombian officials arrested Farouk Sheikh Reyes on suspicion of distributing more than 600 tons of cocaine to Europe and the United States to fund multiple Colombian illegal armed groups. Among the greatest concerns of FARC, ELN, and AUC leaders is the threat of extradition to the United States.

The FARC continued tactical-level terrorist and narcotrafficking activities despite the ongoing military campaign against it. The FARC targeted rural outposts, infrastructure, and several political adversaries; their crimes and suspected crimes include:

- kidnapping 11 people over the Easter holiday;
- killing six municipal councilors and an official, and wounding many others, during a city council meeting in May;
- bombing nine electrical towers in the Atlantic Coast region, causing widespread power outages for several days;
- killing 21 soldiers and wounding 11 in southeastern Putumayo Department in 12 simultaneous strikes in June; and
- injuring nine bystanders with a remote-controlled 50-kilogram explosive device that missed Colombian Senator German Vargas Lleras. More than 400 other persons sustained damage to their property. The FARC denied responsibility, but the Colombian Government has not ruled it out as the perpetrator.
Three Irish Republican Army (IRA) members awaiting final sentencing for training the FARC on IRA bomb tactics fled Colombian parole and resurfaced in Ireland in August. They were detained and questioned by the Irish national police but released without charge. The Colombian Government requested their extradition. Ireland does not have an extradition treaty with Colombia, but the case remains under review. The Irish Director of Public Prosecutions is investigating whether charges can be brought against one of the three for traveling on a false passport.

After abandoning talks with a Mexican intermediary, the ELN began preliminary talks with the Colombian government in December 2005 in Cuba, but had not yet agreed to begin a formal peace process. The group continues to fight but has limited resources and dwindling membership. The ELN had its first mass desertion in June, when a 29-person unit surrendered to officials. The ELN boasted that it removed landmines from a rural area, but refused to let the government verify such removal.

Pursuant to the AUC’s 2003 agreement with the Colombian Government, some 23,000 AUC and allied combatants demobilized over the past two years. As of November, the government's goal was to demobilize all AUC members by the end of March 2006 and ensure their reincorporation into civil society by the end of 2007. AUC-authored murders in remained roughly at 2004 levels, while its overall level of violence decreased. Cease-fire violations targeted civilians and included mass killings, kidnappings, assassinations, illegal evictions, robberies, and impressments of children.

**Ecuador**

Ecuador’s greatest counterterrorism and security challenge is confronting Colombian narcoterrorists on its northern border. The country’s historical neglect of its 400-mile northern border and the lack of licit employment opportunities have made the area ripe for narcoterrorist influence and recruitment by Colombia’s FARC and ELN.

Ecuador’s response to this threat has been uneven. On the one hand, the government shifted troops to the border region, improved military-to-military cooperation with Colombia, and worked with the United States and other donors to spur economic development in the area. Ecuador’s security forces conducted effective operations in the field, given the constraints on their resources and capabilities. On the other hand, Ecuador has allocated insufficient resources for its security forces to consistently and effectively thwart cross-border incursions, and has refused to condemn Colombian terrorist groups, espousing neutrality in the Colombian conflict.

Ecuadorian officers in border units believe that the FARC and ELN hold sway in up to three-quarters of Ecuador’s border hamlets, with these groups’ narco-dollars buying silence or compliance. The Ecuadorian police and military claim that the FARC and possibly the ELN have significant numbers of Ecuadorians in their employ. These narcoterrorist organizations regularly use Ecuadorian territory for rest, recuperation, and re-supply.
Ecuadorian police suspect several Ecuadorian groups of domestic subversion and involvement in terrorism. Of greatest concern is the 200-member Popular Combatants Group (GCP), a faction of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Ecuador. Its members, mainly students, train in the use of firearms and low-yield pamphlet bombs, which they have exploded nationwide without casualties. A handful of other radical groups, most reputed to have ties with and support from Colombian narcoterrorists, also exploded pamphlet bombs in 2005, some targeting U.S.-associated businesses.

According to Ecuadorian press reports allegedly based on Ecuadorian intelligence, Venezuela has provided training to radical leftists from Ecuador – notably the Alfarista Liberation Army (ELA). The reports indicated that ELA members received military training in Venezuela in small arms, intelligence, urban operations, and explosives. The group allegedly had close ties, as well, with the FARC and ELN. An ELA spokesman confirmed in a press interview that several members of the ELA traveled to Venezuela for training and maintained ties with Colombian counterparts.

The government scored a number of counterterrorism successes. Ecuador arrested and returned to Colombia a suspected FARC financial operative, Marcial Campana. The government also cracked down on clandestine FARC combat clinics operating in Ecuador’s interior, capturing 21 persons in Quito and handing over a key FARC commander and four sympathizers to Colombia.

The Ecuadorian legislature passed a landmark anti-money laundering law in October that criminalizes the laundering of illicit funds from any source, penalizes the undeclared entry of more than U.S. $10,000 in cash, and establishes a financial intelligence unit (FIU) under the Superintendency of Banks.

Ecuador’s judicial institutions remain weak and corrupt. While the military and police have made numerous arrests, the judicial system, which until recently lacked a functioning Supreme Court, generally impedes prosecutions.

**El Salvador**

El Salvador backed its outspoken support for the United States-led coalition in the global war on terror by sending a fifth troop rotation to Iraq in August.

The government introduced counterterrorism legislation that has new sentencing requirements for certain terrorist-related crimes but falls short of international recommendations on terror finance. If passed, technical limitations, banking privacy laws, and a culture of protecting clients could complicate its implementation. Existing money laundering laws allow for freezing and
forfeiture of proceeds from illegal activities, but do not outlaw the flow of legitimate money to terrorist organizations.

El Salvador has the basic statutory framework to prosecute terrorists, but the judicial system is weak and inefficient. The constitution expressly protects Salvadoran citizens from electronic monitoring, and the current draft counterterrorism legislation is unlikely to change that.

The National Civilian Police (PNC) is professional and well-regarded by Salvadoran citizens and outside observers. The PNC coordinates well with the National Intelligence Service, the Immigration Service, and the Office of the Attorney General. While its immigration regime is strict, El Salvador does not have a customs and immigration recordkeeping system accessible in real time at ports of entry and by the central authority.

**Guatemala**

Severe resource constraints, corruption, and an ineffective criminal justice system hindered efforts against transnational crime threats such as drug trafficking and alien smuggling, especially through remote areas of the country. Guatemala lacks the technology and manpower to effectively monitor the potential transit of international terrorists. Nevertheless, authorities have provided strong cooperation to U.S. requests for assistance in the investigation of terrorism leads. Deployment of an interagency task force provides a new governmental presence in the previously lawless northwest border region.

Guatemalan law enforcement authorities have sought but do not have wiretapping authority. Legislation pending before the Guatemalan Congress may address this deficiency. Terrorism suspects -- like ordinary detainees -- can only be held for six hours without being charged.

There is no credible evidence of terrorism financing in Guatemala; the government, along with the private financial sector, actively cooperates in looking for such funds. Terrorism finance legislation was passed and complies with international standards.

**Mexico**

The Mexican Government worked closely with the United States on all aspects of counterterrorism security and prevention. In particular, Mexico was extremely helpful in flagging, monitoring, and controlling flights to or over the United States that may have raised terrorism concerns.

A National Security Law that took effect in January established a National Security Council to improve military, intelligence, immigration, and civilian law enforcement cooperation on security issues, including terrorism. The law also established a National Security Commission in the Congress.

Mexico remained engaged with the United States in efforts to improve border security. Working with the United States and Canada, the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America (SPP) was launched to keep North American borders closed to terrorism and open to trade.

The Mexican Government deployed federal authorities and military forces along its northern border as part of "Operation Secure Mexico," in response to deadly attacks against government officials and narcotics-related violence. Mexican officials also worked to implement the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security (OASISS).

Under Mexico's own Plan Centinela, Mexican armed forces were deployed along the northern and southern borders to protect vital infrastructure throughout the nation and to enhance airport security. The Mexican military continued to place great emphasis on expanding its counterterrorism capabilities, maritime air surveillance, and security and response measures for all key national strategic facilities, including the oil production infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico.

Nicaragua

The most pressing counterterrorism issue for the United States concerning Nicaragua is the stalled destruction of Nicaragua’s stocks of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). While the Nicaraguan executive branch and armed forces recognized the danger from these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and cooperated with the United States, the opposition-controlled legislature delayed the MANPADS destruction program. With U.S. assistance, Nicaragua’s armed forces have upgraded security and accountability systems for these weapons, pending the program’s resumption.

The Nicaraguan legislature has also failed to act on a comprehensive counterterrorism law that would create a national counterterrorism operations unit and address deficiencies in existing criminal and money laundering statutes. The latter, coupled with a cash-starved financial analysis unit, amounts to an ineffective anti-money laundering and terror financing regime.

Nicaragua’s court system is politicized and mired in corruption that reaches the Nicaraguan Supreme Court.

Panama

Panama’s primary counterterrorism concerns are protecting the Panama Canal and preventing Colombian narcoterrorists from gaining greater influence in the country.

Panama has invested heavily in security infrastructure for the Canal and in national security planning and preparedness, focusing on improving inter-service cooperation through exercises and joint operations. Panama provides enhanced force protection for U.S. warships transiting the Canal, and provided enhanced security for 80 ships carrying nuclear waste or nuclear cargo through the Canal. Panama hosted PANAMAX, an annual multinational counterterrorism exercise that simulates the defense of the Canal from terrorist attack.
Members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) routinely enter the remote Panamanian province of Darien for rest and refitting. They have killed Panamanians, taken hostages, and proselytized to captive audiences. Panamanian public security forces in the area, while increasing in number, are under formal or informal orders to avoid armed confrontation with these narcoterrorists.

Panama has no army. However, the Panamanian National Police (PNP), with U.S. training and assistance, has established a permanent presence along the Colombian border to try to discourage narcoterrorist operations. As part of its Secure Trade and Transportation Initiative, the government is considering creating a dedicated border control force. Panama maintains a border security cooperation agreement with Colombia for sharing cross-border security information and facilitating security force cooperation on narcoterrorist and illegal migrant issues.

Panama's Foreign Ministry, Council for Public Security and National Defense, Financial Analysis Unit, and Superintendent of Banks were fully cooperative in reviewing terrorism finance lists and played a leadership role in helping other countries in the region improve standards. The Panamanian legislature passed new legislation restricting possession of precursor chemicals and toughening laws on money laundering.

**Peru**

Peru’s top counterterrorism concern is preventing the re-emergence of the militant Maoist Sendero Luminoso (SL or the Shining Path), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that convulsed the country in the 1990s at a cost of more than 35,000 lives.

Although previous Peruvian administrations nearly eliminated the SL in the 1990s, the organization, now intertwined with narcotics trafficking, remains a threat. The SL -- estimated to number approximately 200 armed combatants at present -- conducted several deadly attacks in remote areas in 2005. While the new SL seems shorter on revolutionary zeal than its predecessor did, reports suggest it is attempting to rebuild support in the universities, where it exercised considerable influence in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the drug trade provides SL a greater source of funding to conduct operations, improve relations with local communities in remote areas, and gain recruits. Lack of a government presence in these areas and a deterioration in Peruvian security capabilities has complicated efforts to counter or disrupt SL activity.

SL’s attacks, which targeted the Peruvian National Police (PNP) and the U.S.-Peruvian counternarcotics program, included the ambush and murder of three highway police officers, an attack on three counternarcotics helicopters, and the killing of three police officers with an electronically-detonated explosive device. In November, a group of heavily armed SL members kidnapped ten employees of a USAID economic development contractor. The abductors released the employees, but threatened to kill them if they returned to the area. SL forces ambushed and killed five counternarcotics police officers in December.
President Toledo and the Peruvian Congress allocated more than $55 million to security, national defense, and socio-economic development activities and projects in areas where SL and remnants of other terrorist groups operate. The government has also sought to improve interagency cooperation and strengthen prosecutors. Police units specializing in counterterrorism and counternarcotics conduct operations together with the Peruvian Army. Authorities arrested 143 suspected SL and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) members, including SL leader Toribio Castaneda Quijano and the last at-large original leader of the MRTA, Julio Cesar Vasquez. Toledo has repeatedly reauthorized a 60-day state of emergency in parts of Peru's five departments where SL operates, suspending some civil liberties and giving the armed forces authority to maintain public order.

The Government of Peru aggressively prosecuted terrorist suspects, led by special counterterrorism prosecutors. A special court is retrying approximately 750 of the 1,900 SL and MRTA members whose convictions were overturned by Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal in 2003. The government is also retrying SL founder Abimael Guzman and 20 co-defendants. Peru’s judicial system convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms an SL leader and three associates for the 2002 bombing of the El Polo shopping center and for membership in the SL. Seven co-defendants were acquitted.

There is no evidence that neighboring Colombia’s National Liberation Army (ELN) operates in Peru. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), uses remote Peruvian territory for rest and arms purchases. According to the Peruvian police, the FARC has forced indigenous groups in remote jungle areas to cultivate coca crops. Peru, Colombia, and Brazil are party to a 2004 border security agreement to cooperate against terrorism and arms trafficking.

Uuguay

The Government of Uruguay allocates insufficient resources and lacks the political will to play a more significant role in the global war on terrorism.

Most Uruguayans, including officials responsible for counterterrorism and emergency preparedness, do not believe terrorism will ever directly affect Uruguay. Newly inaugurated President Tabare Vazquez resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba -- a U.S. - designated state sponsor of terrorism -- that the previous government had severed. Uruguay maintains diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran -- another state sponsor of terrorism -- and reacted slowly to the Iranian president’s statements calling for Israel's destruction.

Venezuela

Venezuelan cooperation in the international campaign against terrorism remained negligible. President Hugo Chavez persisted in public criticism of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, publicly championed Iraqi terrorists, deepened Venezuelan collaboration with such state sponsors of terrorism as Cuba and Iran, and was unwilling to deny safe haven to members of Colombian terrorist groups, as called for in UN resolutions.
Chavez' ideological sympathy for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) limited Venezuelan cooperation with Colombia in combating terrorism. FARC and ELN units often crossed into Venezuelan territory for rest and re-supply, with little concern that they would be pursued by Venezuelan forces. Splinter groups of the FARC and another designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), operated in various parts of Venezuela and were involved in narcotrafficking. The government pursued the latter with greater energy.

It is unclear whether and to what extent the Government of Venezuela provided material support to Colombian terrorists, and at what level. An ex-ELN guerrilla told the press in February that a "non-aggression" pact existed between the ELN and Venezuelan authorities, adding that the Venezuelan National Guard allowed the terrorist group to kidnap ranchers. Weapons and ammunition -- some from official Venezuelan stocks and facilities -- regularly turned up in the hands of Colombian terrorist organizations. The government did not systematically police the 1,400-mile Venezuelan-Colombian border to prevent the movement of groups of armed men or interdict arms flows to narcoterrorists.

Venezuela passed an organized crime bill and a penal code reform that outlaw collaboration with terrorists but do not define the terms "terrorist" or "terrorism." In November 2004, the Supreme Court set up a special panel for terrorism cases, but it is unclear whether the panel has tried anyone for terrorist acts.

Radical political elements detonated a series of small bombs, particularly in Caracas. Despite accusations and counter-accusations among various political actors, the exact perpetrators remain unknown.

Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel documents remained easy to obtain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive way-station for terrorists. Senior FARC member Rodrigo Granda, who was captured in 2004, had Venezuelan citizenship and identification papers while residing in Caracas. International authorities remained increasingly suspicions of the integrity of Venezuelan documents and their issuance process.
Chapter 6

STATE SPONSORS OF TERROR OVERVIEW

Libya and Sudan continued to take significant steps to cooperate in the global war on terror. Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria, however, continued to maintain their ties to terrorist groups. Iran and Syria routinely provide unique safe haven, substantial resources and guidance to terrorist organizations.

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture WMD and other destabilizing technologies that can get into the hands of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support they give to terrorist groups.

State Sponsor: Implications

Designating countries that repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism (that is, placing a country on the terrorism list) imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.

2. Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.

3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.

4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:

   • Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions;
   • Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U.S. courts;
   • Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist-listed countries;
   • Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the United States;
   • Authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist-list government without a Treasury Department license; and
   • Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist-list states.
Cuba

Cuba actively continued to oppose the U.S.-led Coalition prosecuting the global war on terror and has publicly condemned various U.S. policies and actions. To U.S. knowledge, Cuba did not attempt to track, block, or seize terrorist assets, although the authority to do so is contained in Cuba’s Law 93 Against Acts of Terrorism, as well as Instruction 19 of the Superintendent of the Cuban Central Bank. No new counterterrorism laws were enacted, nor were any executive orders or regulations issued in this regard. To date, the Cuban Government has taken no action against al-Qaida or other terrorist groups.

Cuba did not undertake any counterterrorism efforts in international and regional fora. Official government statements and the government-controlled press rarely speak out against al-Qaida or other designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

Cuba invests heavily in biotechnology, and there is some dispute about the existence and extent of Cuba’s offensive biological weapons program. The Cuban Government maintains friendly ties with Iran and North Korea. Cuban Foreign Minister Perez Roque visited Iran on November 13. Earlier in the year, Iran offered Cuba a 20 million euro line of credit, ostensibly for investment in biotechnology. The Cuba-Iran Joint Commission met in Havana in January. Cuba and North Korea held military talks at the general staff level in May in Pyongyang. The North Korean trade minister visited Havana in November and signed a protocol for cooperation in the areas of science and trade.

The Cuban Government continues to permit U.S. fugitives to live legally in Cuba, and is unlikely to satisfy U.S. extradition requests for terrorists harbored in the country. In previous years, the government responded to requests to extradite U.S. fugitives by stating that approval would be contingent upon the U.S. returning wanted Cuban criminals. U.S. fugitives range from convicted murderers, two of whom killed police officers, to numerous hijackers. Most of those fugitives entered Cuba in the 1970s.

The U.S. Government periodically requests the Government of Cuba to return wanted fugitives to the United States. Cuba continues to be non-responsive. On the other hand, the Cuban regime publicly demanded the return to Cuba of five of its agents convicted of espionage in the United States. The Cuban Government refers to these individuals as heroes in the fight against terrorism. The five are variously accused of being foreign intelligence agents and infiltrating U.S. military facilities. One is accused of conspiracy to murder for his role in the Cuban Air Force’s shooting down of two small civilian planes. Cuba has stated that it will no longer provide safe haven to new U.S. fugitives who may enter Cuba.

Cuba did not extradite suspected terrorists during the year, but demanded that the United States surrender to Cuba Luis Posada Carriles, whom it accuses of plotting to kill Castro and bombing a Cubana Airlines plane in 1976, which resulted in more than 70 deaths. Posada Carriles remains in U.S. custody. Cuba has also asked the United States to return three Cuban-Americans implicated in the same cases.
The Government of Cuba maintains close relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran and North Korea, and has provided safe haven to members of ETA, FARC, and the ELN. There is no information concerning terrorist activities of these or other organizations on Cuban territory. Press reports indicate that U.S. fugitives from justice and ETA members are living legally in Cuba. The United States is not aware of specific terrorist enclaves in the country.

**Iran**

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) were directly involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of groups, especially Palestinian groups with leadership cadres in Syria and Lebanese Hizballah, to use terrorism in pursuit of their goals. In addition, the IRGC was increasingly involved in supplying lethal assistance to Iraqi militant groups, which destabilizes Iraq.

Iran continues to be unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members it detained in 2003. Iran has refused to identify publicly these senior members in its custody on “security grounds.” Iran has also resisted numerous calls to transfer custody of its al-Qaida detainees to their countries of origin or to third countries for interrogation and/or trial.

Iran maintained a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli terrorist activity -- rhetorically, operationally, and financially. Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad praised Palestinian terrorist operations, and Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups -- notably HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command -- with extensive funding, training, and weapons.

Iran pursued a variety of policies in Iraq, some of which appeared to be inconsistent with its stated objectives regarding stability in Iraq and with the objectives of the Iraqi Transitional Government and the Multi-national Forces in Iraq. Senior Iraqi officials have publicly expressed concern over Iranian interference in Iraq, and there were reports that Iran provided funding, safe passage, and arms to insurgent elements.

State sponsors of terrorism pose a grave WMD terrorism threat. A WMD program in a state sponsor of terrorism could enable a terrorist organization to acquire a sophisticated WMD. State sponsors of terrorism and nations that fail to live up to their international obligations deserve special attention as potential facilitators of WMD terrorism. Iran presents a particular concern, given its active sponsorship of terrorism and its continued development of a nuclear program. Iran is also capable of producing biological and chemical agents or weapons. Like other state sponsors of terrorism with WMD programs, Iran could support terrorist organizations seeking to acquire WMD.
Libya

Libya continued to cooperate with the United States and the international community in the fight against terrorism. Specifically, Libya began working more closely with the United Kingdom to curtail terrorism-related activities of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). In addition, Libya extradited to Egypt a member of the terror cell responsible for a bombing that claimed the lives of three tourists in a Cairo bazaar.

Despite its increasing level of cooperation, Libya remained on the state sponsors of terrorism list and was subject to corresponding sanctions. The United States continued to evaluate Libya's assurances to halt the use of violence for political purposes in light of allegations that Libyan officials attempted to facilitate the assassination of then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 2003. In August 2004, Abulrahman Alamoudi pled guilty to one count of unlicensed travel to and commerce with Libya, and as reported in the 2004 Country Reports on Terror, stated that he had been part of a 2003 plot to assassinate the Crown Prince at the behest of Libya officials. In October 2004, Alamoudi was sentenced by a U.S. federal judge to the maximum of 23 years in prison for his dealings with Libya. In August, Saudi King Abdullah pardoned five Libyans held in Saudi Arabia in connection with the plot.

On October 18, Libya and the United Kingdom signed an agreement allowing the United Kingdom to repatriate Libyan nationals suspected of engaging in or facilitating terrorist activities. The agreement was contingent on Libya's provision of written guarantees that the deportees would not be maltreated.

During a September meeting with Secretary Rice, the Libyan Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Abd Al-Rahman Shalgam, renounced terrorism in all its forms and reiterated Libya's 2003 pledge that it would not support international terrorism or other acts of violence targeting civilians. Shalgam also pledged to cooperate in good faith with any requests for information related to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

In December 2004, the United States designated the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In addition to playing a role in the international jihadist movement, the LIFG is dedicated to the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime. The Government of Libya continued to cooperate with the United States and the international community to curtail support for the LIFG.

Libya continued to cooperate with the international community to help ensure that its territory is not used as a safe haven for international terrorists. In May, Libya extradited to Egypt Mohammed Yousri Yassi, a member of the terrorist cell that perpetrated the April 7 and April 30 attacks on tourists in Cairo. The April 7 attack resulted in the death of three tourists. Libya also extradited the Egyptian who had provided shelter to Yassin.
North Korea

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987.

Pyongyang in 2003 allowed the return to Japan of five surviving abductees, and in 2004 of eight family members, mostly children, of those abductees. Questions about the fate of other abductees remain the subject of ongoing negotiations between Japan and the DPRK. In November, the DPRK returned to Japan what it identified as the remains of two Japanese abductees, whom the North had reported as having died in North Korea. The issue remained contentious at year’s end. There are also credible reports that other nationals were abducted from locations abroad. The ROK government estimates that approximately 485 civilians were abducted or detained since the 1950-53 Korean War. Four Japanese Red Army members remain in the DPRK following their involvement in a jet hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

Sudan

Sudan continued its cooperative commitment against known and suspected international terrorist elements believed to be operating in and out of Sudanese territory. The government undertook actions against security threats posed by persons either suspected of using Sudan as a base of operation and/or persons of Sudanese origin purported to be associated with terrorist organizations. Sudan produced desired results against international terrorist elements and the facilitators that support them.

Sudan cooperated with the international community and demonstrated support in regional and global organizations calling for stronger condemnation of terrorism; this was reflected in the country's antiterrorism initiatives. Sudan's history of having played host in the mid-1990s to al-Qaida leader Usama bin Ladin continues to weigh heavily in the objective assessment of Sudan's role in international terrorism, but there is no indication that al-Qaida elements have had a presence in Sudan with the knowledge and consent of the Sudanese Government for at least the past five years.

While there remains significant concern in the international community over Sudan's handling of internal rebel movements, specifically in western Sudan, there is no current data indicating that international terrorists operate in Darfur. The flow of weapons and personnel between Sudan and most of its western, southern, and eastern neighbors, however, has weakened international efforts to stabilize the region. Many of Sudan's borders, particularly those along the Red Sea coast, remain porous and easily penetrable. This fact very likely allowed subversive elements and smuggled humans to enter Sudan without knowledge of any government security units and compounds problems in securing the region.

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, a Ugandan, continued to be a major terrorist threat to Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and southern Sudan. Although Sudan publicly offered to help mediate peace between the LRA and neighboring countries, and vowed to stamp out LRA members in Sudan, little tangible progress was evident.
Continued focus was placed on Sudan for its role in contributing fighters for the Iraqi insurgency. Sudanese and foreign nationals who transited Sudan have been captured as foreign fighters in Iraq. The Sudanese have taken steps, through self-initiation and encouragement by the United States and other international actors, to disrupt jihadists both traveling to and returning from Iraq; however, significant gaps in knowledge and capability to identify and capture such individuals remain.

The Sudanese Government has increased its participation in international events aimed at defining and preventing terrorism, and has pledged to strengthen its laws to better combat acts of terror. In February, representatives from Khartoum attended an international counterterrorism conference hosted by Saudi Arabia at which Sudan expressed its full cooperation with international efforts to combat terrorism. Furthermore, Sudan hosted a similar conference in September for regional partners interested in developing improved means of addressing terrorism issues in East Africa. Overall in 2005, Sudan continued its progress in cooperation to combat terrorism locally and internationally, with some areas of concern remaining.

Syria

The Syrian Government continued to provide political and material support to both Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups. HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others, base their external leadership in Damascus. The Syrian Government insists that the Damascus-based groups undertake only political and informational activities. However, in statements originating from outside Syria, many Palestinian groups claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli terrorist acts. Syria's public support for the groups varied, depending on its national interests and international pressure. In 2003, these groups lowered their public profile after Damascus announced that they had voluntarily closed their offices in Syria. In September, however, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad held a highly publicized meeting with rejectionist leaders, and a month later the rejectionist leaders participated in a meeting in Damascus with the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad Adel. Syria continued to permit Iran to use Damascus as a transshipment point to resupply Hizballah in Lebanon.

Syrian officials publicly condemned international terrorism, but made a distinction between terrorism and what they considered to be “legitimate armed resistance” by Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and by Lebanese Hizballah. The Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986, although preliminary findings of a UN investigation into the February assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri have indicated a strong likelihood of official Syrian involvement.

During the past seven years there have been no acts of terrorism against American citizens in Syria. Damascus has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect U.S. citizens and facilities in Syria.
In the past, Damascus cooperated with the United States and other foreign governments against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations and individuals. In May, however, the Syrian Government ended intelligence cooperation, citing continued U.S. public complaints about the inadequate level of Syria's assistance to end the flow of fighters and money to Iraq.

Syria made efforts to limit the movement of foreign fighters into Iraq. It upgraded physical security conditions on the border and announced that it has begun to give closer scrutiny to military-age Arab males entering Syria (visas are still not required for citizens of Arab countries). The government claimed that since 2003 it has repatriated more than 1,200 foreign extremists and arrested more than 4,000 Syrians trying to go to Iraq to fight.

In the last six months of 2005, Damascus highlighted clashes on Syrian territory with terrorist groups, particularly with the Jund a-Sham group associated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in its government-controlled press information.
Chapter 7

THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF WMD TERRORISM

Introduction

The nexus of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism poses one of the gravest potential risks to the national security of the United States and its global partners. A successful WMD terrorist attack could result in hundreds of thousands of casualties and produce far-reaching economic and political consequences that would affect all members of the international community. This chapter outlines:

- The various types of materials terrorists may use in a WMD attack;
- The potential that the sophisticated resources of a state could be directed or diverted to facilitate WMD terrorism;
- The emerging WMD terrorism threat presented by non-state facilitators; and
- Ongoing U.S. initiatives to combat this growing global risk.

The U.S. Government places the highest priority on working with a broad range of international partners to develop effective policies and initiatives to meet the global challenge of WMD terrorism.

The Material Threats

There are four generally accepted categories of weapons of mass destruction that terrorists may seek to acquire and use in a WMD terrorist attack: nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical. (Note: The White House 2002 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” defines WMD as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, excluding radiological.)

Nuclear

“The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of a secret and sudden attack with chemical, biological, or radiological, or nuclear weapons.” President George W. Bush, February 11, 2004.

Some terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaida, have openly stated their desire to acquire and use nuclear weapons. The diffusion of scientific and technical information regarding the assembly of nuclear weapons, some of which is now available on the Internet, has increased the risk that a terrorist organization with the right material could develop its own nuclear weapon. The complete production of a nuclear weapon likely remains beyond the reach of terrorists for the foreseeable future. Terrorists may, however, seek to link up with a variety of facilitators to develop their own nuclear capability. These facilitators include black market

proliferators or transnational criminal networks that may seek to profit from the sale of nuclear material, a weaponized device, or technical knowledge gathered from alienated individuals of a national nuclear program.

Radiological

Some terrorists seek to acquire radiological materials for use in a radiological dispersal device (RDD), or “dirty bomb.” Most radiological materials lack sufficient strength to present a public health risk, and casualties directly attributable to even the most dangerous radiological materials (cobalt-60 or cesium-137) would likely be limited to dozens of deaths and hundreds of injured if a sufficient amount of material were acquired and dispersed. Radiological material is used across a broad array of industrial settings, including in X-ray machines, well-logging devices, and other measuring instruments. Its widespread use makes radiological material significantly easier to procure than fissile nuclear material.

Biological

Another deadly threat, biological weapons, are pathogens carried through food, air, water, or living organisms. If properly released, biological weapons can kill on a massive scale, even spreading across oceans to distant continents and population centers.

Like other WMD, however, developing a biological weapons capability presents scientific and operational challenges. The quality of the biological weapon greatly determines its ability to harm people. It requires substantial technical expertise to assemble a biological weapon such as the one used in the 2001 anthrax attacks. Some terrorist organizations, however, remain interested in developing a bioweapons capability.

Among present-day terrorist organizations, al-Qaida is believed to have made the greatest effort to acquire and develop biological weapons. U.S. forces discovered a partially built biological weapon laboratory near Kandahar after expelling the Taliban from Afghanistan. Although it was not conclusive that al-Qaida succeeded in obtaining a biological weapon, the discovery demonstrated a concerted effort to acquire a biological weapons capability. Terrorist development of a more advanced biological weapon capability would likely require direct assistance from disenfranchised technicians or scientists formerly affiliated with a state program.

Chemical

Chemical weapons represent another highly dangerous potential tool in the hands of terrorists. Effectively dispersed and in sufficient dosages, chemical weapons could kill tens of thousands and cause severe and long-term health and environmental hazards. Not since the 1995 sarin

“Bioterrorism is a real threat to our country. It’s a threat to every nation that loves freedom. Terrorist groups seek biological weapons; we know some rogue states already have them . . . It’s important that we confront these real threats to our country and prepare for future emergencies.” President George W. Bush, June 12, 2002

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attack conducted by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway system has an attack been
carried out with a sophisticated chemical weapon. Since then, only materials with legitimate
dual uses, such as pesticides, poisons, and industrial chemicals, have been used. Most
chemical weapons are difficult to handle and employ, but as demonstrated by materials
uncovered in Afghanistan in 2001 and by French officials in 2002, terrorists remain keen to
obtain and use chemical weapons. The growth and sophistication of the worldwide chemical
industry, including the development of complex synthetic and dual-use materials driven in
part by the emergence of nanotechnology, may make the task of preventing and protecting
against this threat more difficult. Preventing chemical terrorism is particularly challenging as
terrorists can, with relative ease, use commercial industrial toxins, pesticides, and other
commonly available chemical agents as low-cost alternatives to conventional attacks.

State Sponsorship of Terrorism: A Key Concern

A state that directs WMD resources to terrorists, or one from which enabling resources are
clandestinely diverted, may pose a potentially grave WMD terrorism threat. While terrorist
organizations will continue to seek a WMD capability independent of state programs, the
sophisticated WMD knowledge and resources of a state could enable a terrorist capability.
State sponsors of terrorism and all nations that fail to live up to their international obligations
deserve greater scrutiny as potential facilitators of WMD terrorism. Iran presents a particular
concern, given its active sponsorship of terrorism and its continued development of a nuclear
program.

Non-State Facilitators: An Emerging Threat

State sponsors of terrorism represent just one facet of the overall risk of WMD terrorism.
Non-state facilitators have emerged as a growing WMD proliferation threat in recent years.
In 2003, the United States and its international partners succeeded in interdicting a shipment
of WMD-related material destined for Libya’s nuclear program. As facts emerged regarding
this shipment and its origin, the U.S. Government gained insight into an emerging WMD
terrorism risk. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan had developed a transnational nuclear
proliferation network reaching from Southeast Asia to Europe, and was making available
sensitive technology and WMD-related materials to rogue nations willing to pay.

“In recent years, another path of proliferation has become clear, as well. America and other
nations are learning more about black-market operatives who deal in equipment and
expertise related to weapons of mass destruction...And with deadly technology and expertise
going on the market, there’s the terrible possibility that terrorist groups could obtain the

The dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network revealed an uncomfortable truth about
globalization. The very trends driving globalization – improved communications and
transportation links – can enable development of extended proliferation networks that may
facilitate the terrorist acquisition of WMD. Globalization requires that partner nations work
together closely to prevent, detect, and disrupt linkages that may develop between terrorists
and facilitators such as A.Q. Khan.
Taking Action to Combat WMD Terrorism

Since September 11, 2001, the international community has taken significant strides in responding to the threat of WMD terrorism. States are working together bilaterally and multilaterally to address these threats and protect their populations. The United States has taken concrete measures to build a layered defense against the WMD terrorism threat. In 2003, the U.S. Government announced the first National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Through a variety of multinational initiatives such as the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the United States has taken a leadership role in reducing the threat of WMD in the hands of non-state actors and terrorists.

The Proliferation Security Initiative

Announced by President Bush in 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) deserves special mention as a particularly well received and effective international initiative. The PSI is a global effort that aims to stop the trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern worldwide. States that wish to join the PSI are asked to endorse a Statement of Interdiction Principles that identifies specific measures participants intend to undertake for the interdiction of WMD and related materials. PSI participants also conduct exercises to improve their operational capabilities to conduct interdictions, and meet periodically to develop new operational concepts and share information. PSI has led to a number of important interdictions over the last two years, and is an important tool in the overall U.S. strategy to combat WMD terrorism.

U.S. Partnerships Supporting a Global Defense-in-Depth

The United States has also worked with partner nations through the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reduce the threat of WMD in the hands of terrorists. In the past few years, the UN Security Council has passed two important resolutions related to the prevention of terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. In 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which requires all UN member states to refrain from providing any support, active or passive, to terrorists, and to work together to limit terrorist movement and safe haven. In 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, which requires all UN member states to refrain from providing support to non-state actors that attempt to develop or acquire WMD and their means of delivery. Taken together, these two UN Security Council Resolutions demonstrate the commitment of the international community to work collaboratively to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMD.

In 2005, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention). The United States was one of the first signatories. As of January 1, 2006, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention had been signed by almost 100 countries. The adoption of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, and the recent adoption of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, both U.S. initiatives, underscored the recognition of many countries to the risk of WMD terrorism.

In late 2005, as part of a reorganization approved by Secretary Rice and endorsed by Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Department of State created the Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism in the newly formed International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau. In close partnership with the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and other State Department offices, the mission of the Office of WMD Terrorism is to work with domestic and international partners to develop a global layered defense in-depth to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists.

**Conclusion**

The potential threat of terrorists acquiring and using WMD poses one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States today. During the past year, the U.S. Government has built on a range of activities and launched new efforts to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD. Together with partner nations and international organizations, the United States will continue to take the initiative to reduce the global risk of WMD terrorism.
Chapter 8
FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Ansar al-Sunna (AS)
Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Asbat al-Ansar
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)
HAMAS
Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM)
Hizballah
Islamic Jihad Group (IJU)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)
Al-Jihad (AJ)
Kahane Chai (Kach)
Kongra-Gel (KGK)
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Qaida (AQ)
Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

◊ FTO aliases cited are consistent with the Specially Designated Nationals list maintained by the Department of Treasury. The full list can be found at the following website: http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnlist.txt.
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

a.k.a. Arab Revolutionary Brigades;
Arab Revolutionary Council;
Black September;
Fatah Revolutionary Council;
Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description
The ANO international terrorist organization was founded by Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) after splitting from the PLO in 1974. The group’s previous known structure consisted of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the organization remains unclear.

Activities
The ANO has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets included the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi in 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in 1988. The ANO is suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in 1991. The ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in 1994 and was linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. The ANO has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.

Strength
Current strength and operational status are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Although former and possibly current ANO associates may be in Iraq and Lebanon, the group is largely considered inactive.

External Aid
The ANO received considerable support, including safe haven, training, logistical assistance, and funding from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations. The ANO’s current access to resources is unclear, but it is likely severely impacted by the decline in state support.
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)*
a.k.a. Al Harakat al Islamiyya

Description
The ASG is a violent Muslim terrorist group operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the much larger Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, replaced him as the nominal leader of the group.

Activities
The ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. The group’s stated goal is to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims, but the ASG primarily has used terror for financial profit. Recent bombings may herald a return to a more radical, politicized agenda, at least among certain factions. The group’s first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995. In April 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including ten Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three U.S. citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including U.S. citizen Guillermo Sobero, were murdered. A Philippine military hostage rescue operation in June 2002 freed U.S. hostage Gracia Burnham, but her husband Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah Yap were killed. U.S. and Philippine authorities blame the ASG for exploding a bomb near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 that killed a U.S. serviceman. In February 2004, Khadaffy Janjalani’s faction bombed SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay, killing 132. In March 2004, Philippine authorities arrested an ASG cell whose bombing targets included the U.S. Embassy in Manila. The ASG also claimed responsibility for the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings in Manila, Davao City, and General Santos City, which killed 8 and injured more than 150.

Strength
ASG is estimated to have 200 to 500 members.

Location/Area of Operation
The ASG was founded in Basilan Province and operates primarily in the provinces of the Sulu Archipelago, namely Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The group also operates on the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally travel to Manila. In mid-2003, the group started operating in Mindanao’s city of Cotabato and on the provincial coast of Sultan Kudarat, Mindanao. The group expanded its operational reach to Malaysia in 2000 with the abduction of foreigners from a tourist resort there.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
**External Aid**
The ASG is largely supported by Middle Eastern Islamic extremists, but also receives funding from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which is based mainly in Indonesia, and through acts of ransom and extortion. Libya publicly reported in 2000 that it paid millions of dollars for the release of the foreign hostages seized from Malaysia. JI operatives have provided training to ASG members and likely facilitated at least some of the ASG’s terrorist attacks.

**Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (al-Aqsa)**
a.k.a. al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

**Description**
The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade consists of an unknown number of small cells of terrorists associated with the Palestinian Fatah organization. Al-Aqsa emerged at the outset of the 2000 Palestinian intifada to attack Israeli targets with the aim of driving the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem, and establishing a Palestinian state.

**Activities**
Al-Aqsa has carried out shootings and suicide operations against Israeli civilians and military personnel in Israel and the Palestinian territories, rocket and mortar attacks against Israel and Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip, and the killing of Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israel. Al-Aqsa has killed a number of U.S. citizens, the majority of them dual U.S.-Israeli citizens, in its attacks. In January 2002, al-Aqsa was the first Palestinian terrorist group to use a female suicide bomber.

**Strength**
Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Al-Aqsa operates in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, and has only claimed attacks inside these three areas. It may have followers in Palestinian refugee camps in southern Lebanon.

**External Aid**
Iran and Hizballah probably provide some support to al-Aqsa elements, but the extent of external influence on al-Aqsa as a whole is not clear.

**Ansar al-Sunna (AS)** *
a.k.a. Ansar al-Islam;
Ansar Al-Sunna Army;
Devotees of Islam;

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Followers of Islam in Kurdistan;
Helpers of Islam;
Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna;
Jund Al-Islam;
Kurdish Taliban;
Kurdistan Supporters of Islam:
Partisans of Islam;
Soldiers of God;
Soldiers of Islam;
Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

Description
Ansar al-Sunna (AS) is a Salafi terrorist group whose goals include expelling the U.S.-led Coalition from Iraq, establishing an independent Islamic state in Iraq, and creating an Islamic state in the region. This amorphous group has changed its name several times over the years and was last known as Ansar al-Islam. The creation of AS was announced in the fall of 2003, when a statement was posted to the Internet calling all extremists in Iraq to unite under the new name. The group has subsequently posted to the Internet all claims of attack under the name AS.

AS is closely allied with the al-Qaida central leadership and other terrorist groups in Iraq to include Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s group, al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). Some members of AS trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan, and the group provided safe haven to al-Qaida fighters before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Since OIF, AS has become one of the leading groups engaged in anti-Coalition attacks in Iraq and has maintained a robust propaganda campaign.

Activities
AS continues to conduct attacks against a wide range of targets including Coalition forces, the Iraqi Government and Iraqi security forces, and Kurdish and Shia figures. AS members worked closely with both al-Qaida operatives and associates in AQI.

AS claimed responsibility for many high profile attacks, including the simultaneous suicide bombings of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party offices in Irbil in February 2004, the bombing of the U.S. military dining facility in Mosul in December 2004, and numerous kidnappings, executions, and assassinations.

Strength
Precise numbers are unknown, but believed to number between 500 to 1,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation
Primarily central and northern Iraq.
External Aid
The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from al-Qaida, and is backed by other terrorists throughout the world. AS has operational and logistical support cells in Europe.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA) *
a.k.a. Al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallah;
Groupement Islamique Arme

Description
An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the Algerian regime and replace it with a fundamentalist Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activity in 1992 after the military government suspended legislative elections in anticipation of an overwhelming victory by the Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party.

Activities
The GIA has engaged in attacks against civilians and government workers. Starting in 1992, the GIA conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation, and killing tens of thousands of Algerians. GIA’s brutal attacks on civilians alienated the group from the Algerian populace. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1992, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women, mostly Europeans, in the country. Many of the GIA's members have joined other Islamist groups or have been killed or captured by the Algerian Government. The GIA's most recent significant attacks were in August, 2001.

Strength
Precise numbers are unknown, but probably fewer than 100.

Location/Area of Operation
Algeria, the Sahel, and Europe.

External Aid
The GIA has members in Europe that provide funding, but mostly engages in criminal activity to raise funds.

Asbat al-Ansar
a.k.a. League of the Followers
Partisans' League

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Description
Asbat al-Ansar, the League of the Followers or Partisans' League, is a Lebanon-based Sunni extremist group composed primarily of Palestinians with links to Usama bin Ladin's al-Qaeda organization and other Sunni extremist groups. Asbat is well positioned to play an important role should Abu Mu'sab al-Zarqawi attempt to expand further his terrorist operations to Lebanon. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam that justifies violence against civilian targets to achieve political ends. Some of the group’s goals include overthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country.

Activities
Asbat al-Ansar has carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Lebanon since it first emerged in the early 1990s. The group assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores in the mid-1990s. It was involved in clashes in northern Lebanon in December 1999 and carried out a rocket-propelled grenade attack on the Russian Embassy in Beirut in January 2000. Asbat al-Ansar’s leader, Ahmad Abd al-Karim al-Sa’di a.k.a. Abu Muhjin, remains at large despite being sentenced to death in absentia for the 1994 murder of a Muslim cleric.

In October 2003, Lebanese security forces arrested Ibn al-Shahid, who is believed to be associated with Asbat al-Ansar, and charged him with masterminding the bombing of three fast food restaurants in 2002 and an attempted car bomb attack on a McDonald’s restaurant in Beirut in 2003. Asbat forces were involved in other violence in Lebanon in 2003, including clashes with members of Yassir Arafat’s Fatah movement in the 'Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp and a June 2003 rocket attack in June on the Hariri-affiliated Future TV building in Beirut.

Since 2003, the Lebanese Government has monitored Asbat al-Ansar and the group’s activities have apparently been less successful. In September 2004, operatives with links to the group were believed to be involved in a planned terrorist operation targeting the Italian Embassy, the Ukrainian Consulate General, and Lebanese Government offices. In October 2004, Mahir al-Sa’di, a member of Asbat al-Ansar, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for plotting to assassinate former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon David Satterfield in 2000. Al-Sa’di was working in cooperation with Abu Muhammad al-Masri, the head of al-Qaida at the 'Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, where fighting has occurred between Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah elements.

Strength
The group commands about 300 fighters in Lebanon.

Location/Area of Operation
The group’s primary base of operations is the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon.

External Aid
Probably receives money through international Sunni extremist networks.
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)
a.k.a. A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute;  
A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho;  
Aleph;  
Aum Supreme Truth

Description
Shoko Asahara established Aum in 1987, and the cult received legal status as a religious  
entity in 1989. At first, Aum aimed to take over Japan and then the world, but over time it  
began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world. Asahara predicted 1996 and 1999  
to 2003 as likely dates and said that the United States would initiate Armageddon by starting  
World War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its recognition of Aum as a  
religious organization following Aum’s deadly sarin gas attack in Tokyo in March 1995. In  
1997, however, a government panel decided not to invoke the Operations Control Law against  
the group that would have outlawed it. A 1999 law authorized the Japanese Government to  
maintain police surveillance over the group because of concerns that Aum might launch future  
terrorist attacks. Under the leadership of Fumihiro Joyu, the chief of Aum’s once thriving  
Moscow operation, Aum changed its name to Aleph in January 2000 and tried to distance  
itself from the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder. In late 2003, however, Joyu  
stepped down under pressure from members who wanted to return fully to the worship of  
Asahara. A growing divide between members supporting Joyu and those who remain loyal to  
Asahara is splitting the cult into factions.

Activities
In March 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on  
several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and causing up to 6,000 to seek medical  
treatment. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese Government revealed the group was  
responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in 1994, including a sarin gas  
attack on a residential neighborhood in Matsumoto that killed seven and hospitalized  
approximately 500. The group’s attempts to conduct attacks using biological agents were  
unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and in February 2004  
authorities sentenced him in to death for his role in the 1995 attacks.

Since 1997, the cult has recruited new members, engaged in commercial enterprise, and  
acquired property, although it scaled back these activities significantly in 2001 in response to  
a public outcry. In July 2001, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian Aum followers  
who had planned to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo as part of an operation to  
free Asahara from jail and smuggle him to Russia.

Strength
Aum’s current membership in Japan is estimated to be about 1,650 persons. At the time of  
the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have as many as 40,000 members worldwide,  
including 9,000 in Japan and 30,000 members in Russia.
Location/Area of Operation
Aum’s principal membership is located in Japan, while a residual branch comprising about 300 followers lives in Russia.

External Aid
None.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
a.k.a. Askatasuna;
Batasuna;
Ekin;
Epanastatiki Pirines;
Euskal Herritarrok;
Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna;
Herri Batasuna;
Jarrai-Haika-Segi;
K.A.S.;
Popular Revolutionary Struggle;
XAKI

Description
ETA was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles and encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava, as well as the autonomous region of Navarra and the southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. In 2004, Spain and France formed a joint counterterrorism and judicial unit to combat ETA and Islamic terrorist groups. Spanish and French police in 2005 arrested 71 individuals associated with ETA and dismantled six operational cells, dealing a significant blow to the group’s operational capability. ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, remains banned in Spain, and Spanish authorities in 2005 charged 41 members of Batasuna with providing support to ETA. Spanish and French prisons are estimated to hold more than 700 ETA members.

Activities
ETA is primarily involved in bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures, but it has also targeted journalists and tourist areas. Security service scrutiny and a public outcry after the Islamic extremist train bombings in Madrid in March 2004 limited ETA’s capabilities and willingness to inflict casualties. ETA conducted no fatal attacks in 2005, but did mount more than 30 low-level bombings – most preceded by a warning call – that caused minor injuries and property damage. On February 9, ETA detonated a car bomb in Madrid, the first such attack there since April 2002, at a convention center where Spanish King Juan Carlos and Mexican President Vicente Fox were scheduled to appear, wounding at least two dozen people. On June 10, ETA launched grenades at the airport that serves the city of Zaragoza, shutting down the airport but causing no damage or injuries. ETA also detonated an explosive device at a stadium constructed as part of Madrid’s bid to host the 2012 Olympic Games; there were no
injuries in that attack. Many authorities speculated that these non-lethal bombings were
designed to show that ETA was not a spent force and to give it a stronger bargaining position
in a future “peace process.” The group has killed more than 850 persons and injured hundreds
of others since it began lethal attacks in the 1960s. ETA finances its activities primarily
through extortion and robbery.

**Strength**
Not precisely known, but believed to number in the hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern
France, but also has attacked Spanish and French interests elsewhere.

**External Aid**
Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some
ETA members allegedly fled to Cuba and Mexico, while others reside in South America.
ETA members have operated and been arrested in other European countries, including
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany.

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**Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)**
a.k.a. Communist Party of the Philippines;
CPP;
New People's Army;
NPA;
NPP/CPP

**Description**
The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the NPA is a Maoist
group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted
guerrilla warfare. Jose Maria Sison, the chairman of the CPP’s Central Committee and the
NPA’s founder, reportedly directs CPP and NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he
lives in self-imposed exile. Luis Jalandoni, a fellow Central Committee member and director
of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF), also lives in the
Netherlands and has become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla
group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and at times
uses city-based assassination squads.

**Activities**
The NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, government officials, local
infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion, or “revolutionary taxes.” The NPA
also extorts politicians running for office in NPA-influenced areas by charging them for
“campaign permits.” The group opposes any U.S. military presence in the Philippines and
attacked U.S. military interests, killing several U.S. service personnel, before the U.S. base
closures in 1992. The NPA has claimed responsibility for the assassination of two
congressmen, from Quezon in May 2001 and Cagayan in June 2001, and for many other
killings. In December 2005, the NPA publicly expressed its intent to target U.S. personnel if they were discovered in NPA operating areas.

**Strength**
Estimated at less than 9,000, a number significantly lower than its peak strength of around 25,000 in the 1980s.

**Location/Area of Operations**
Operates in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of northern and eastern Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.

**External Aid**
Unknown.

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**Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)**

a.k.a. Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein

**Description**
CIRA is a terrorist splinter group formed in 1994 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, which split from Sinn Fein in 1986. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) goal of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA’s aliases, Continuity Army Council and Republican Sinn Fein, were also included in its FTO designation. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA (RIRA).

**Activities**
CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets include the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. CIRA did not join the Provisional IRA in the September decommissioning and remains capable of effective, if sporadic, terrorist attacks. In December, the Special Criminal Court in Dublin charged a man with possession of an improvised explosive device, and police were investigating his links to CIRA. In July, CIRA members threw petrol bombs at security forces in Northern Ireland.

**Strength**
Membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 hard-core activists. Police counterterrorist operations have reduced the group’s strength, but CIRA continues to recruit, train, and plan operations.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Does not have an established presence in Great Britain.
External Aid
Suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. May have acquired arms and materiel from the Balkans in cooperation with the Real IRA.

Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)
a.k.a. Al-Gama’at;
Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya;
Islamic Gama’at (IG);
Islamic Group

Description
The IG, Egypt’s largest militant group, has been active since the late 1970s and is a loosely organized network. It has an external wing with supporters in several countries. The group’s issuance of a cease-fire in 1997 led to a split into two factions: one, led by Mustafa Hamza, supported the cease-fire; the other, led by Rifā’i Taha Musa, called for a return to armed operations. The IG issued another ceasefire in March 1999, but its spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, sentenced to life in prison in January 1996 for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and incarcerated in the United States, rescinded his support for the cease-fire in June 2000. IG has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since the Luxor attack in 1997, which killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians and wounded dozens more. In February 1998, a senior member signed Usama bin Ladin’s fatwa calling for attacks against the United States.

In early 2001, Taha Musa published a book in which he attempted to justify terrorist attacks that would cause mass casualties. Taha Musa disappeared several months thereafter, and there is no information as to his current whereabouts. In March 2002, members of the group’s historic leadership in Egypt declared use of violence misguided and renounced its future use, prompting denunciations by much of the leadership abroad. The Egyptian Government continues to release IG members from prison, including approximately 900 in 2003; likewise, most of the 700 persons released in 2004 at the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan were IG members.

The primary goal for IG members is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Disaffected IG members, such as those inspired by Taha Musa or Abd al-Rahman, may be interested in carrying out attacks against U.S. interests.

Activities
IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security and other government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism before the 1997 cease-fire. After that cease-fire, the faction led by Taha Musa launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. IG also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Strength
Unknown. At its peak IG probably commanded several thousand hard-core members and a like number of sympathizers. The 1999 cease-fire, security crackdowns following the 1997 attack in Luxor, and post-September 11 security efforts, have probably resulted in a substantial decrease in the group’s numbers.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Operates mainly in the Al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, and Sohaj Governorates of southern Egypt. Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students. Has a worldwide presence, including in the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Yemen, and in various locations in Europe.

**External Aid**
Unknown. Bin Ladin and Afghan militant groups support the organization. IG also may obtain some funding through various Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

**HAMAS**

a.k.a. Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya;  
Islamic Resistance Movement;  
Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions;  
Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades;  
Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces;  
Izz al-Din al-Qassim Battalions;  
Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades;  
Izz al-Din al-Qassim Forces;  
Students of Ayyash;  
Students of the Engineer;  
Yahya Ayyash Units

**Description**
HAMAS was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both violent and political means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel. HAMAS maintains a political wing that manages the group’s overall policy and a highly compartmentalized military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, that conducts terrorist activities.

**Activities**
HAMAS terrorists have conducted many attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. The group curtailed major terrorist activities in 2005 after agreeing to a temporary period of calm brokered by the Palestinian Authority in February. Despite HAMAS’s general adherence to the calm, it maintained its military capabilities and launched Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli targets on a number of occasions. HAMAS has not directly targeted U.S. interests, though the group makes little or no effort to avoid targets frequented by foreigners.
Strength
Unknown number of official members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation
HAMAS has limited its terrorist operations to Israeli military and civilian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. The group retains a cadre of senior leaders spread throughout the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf States.

External Aid
Receives some funding from Iran but primarily relies on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity takes place in Western Europe and North America.

Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM) *
a.k.a. Al-Faran;
Al-Hadid;
Al-Hadith;
Harakat ul-Ansar;
Harakat ul-Mujahideen;
HUA;
Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA)

Description
HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. It is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). Reportedly under pressure from the Government of Pakistan, HUM’s long time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and, in January, was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir as the head of HUM. Khalil has been linked to Usama bin Ladin, and his signature was found on Bin Ladin’s fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on U.S. and Western interests. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them in autumn 2001. Khalil was detained by Pakistani authorities in mid-2004 and subsequently released in late December. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA). Pakistan banned JUA in November 2003.

Activities
HUM has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. It is linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. HUM was responsible for the hijacking of an Indian airliner in December 1999 that resulted in the release of Masood Azhar. Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar, was imprisoned by India in 1994 and founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) after his release. Also released in 1999 was Ahmed Omar Sheik, who was later convicted of the abduction and murder in 2002 of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
**Strength**

HUM has several hundred armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. It uses light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost a significant share of its membership in defections to the JEM in 2000.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan. HUM conducts insurgent and terrorist operations primarily in Kashmir, but members have also been found operating in Afghanistan. HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

**External Aid**

Collects donations from wealthy and grassroots donors in Pakistan, Kashmir, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf and Islamic states. HUM’s financial collection methods also include soliciting donations in magazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM’s military funding are unknown. Its overt fundraising in Pakistan has been constrained since the government clampdown there on extremist groups and the freezing of terrorist assets.

**Hizballah**

(Common alternate spellings: Hezbollah, Hizbullah, Hizb`allah)
a.k.a. Party of God;
Islamic Jihad;
Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine

**Description**

Formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, this Lebanese-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group follows the religious guidance of Khomeini’s successor, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and often acts at its behest, but it also can and does act independently. Though Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime’s secular orientation, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region. The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group’s highest governing body and has been led by Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah since 1992.

Hizballah promotes Shia interests within the Lebanese political system and is an exemplar for Shia communities throughout the region. Hizballah supports a variety of violent anti-Western groups, including Palestinian terrorist organizations. This support includes the covert provision of weapons, explosives, training, funding, and guidance, as well as overt political support.

In 2005 Hizballah’s status quo changed due both to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory and Hizballah’s broadened role in Lebanese politics following the
Lebanese legislative elections that spring. Hizballah has actively participated in Lebanon’s political system since 1992. The party now claims 14 elected officials in the 128-seat Lebanese National Assembly and is represented in the Cabinet for the first time, by the Minister of Water and Electricity. Hizballah maintains a military presence in southern Lebanon, a presence it justifies by claiming to act in defense of Lebanon against acts of Israeli aggression, such as regular Israeli overflights of Lebanese airspace. Hizballah alleges that Israel has not withdrawn completely from Lebanese territory because, in Hizballah’s view, the Sheba’a Farms area belongs to Lebanon. Hizballah and Israel clashed twice in this disputed part of the Golan Heights in 2005.

**Activities**
Hizballah is known to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984. Four members of Hizballah, ‘Imad Mughniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, Mohammed Hamadei, and Ali Atwa, are on the FBI’s list of most wanted terrorists for the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah also has been implicated in the attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. The U.S. Government has indicted a member of Lebanese Hizballah for his participation in the June 1996 truck bomb attack of the U.S. Air Force dormitory at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. In 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Sheba’a Farms area and kidnapped an Israeli non-combatant.

In 2004 Hizballah Secretary General Nasrallah said Hizballah would come up with new measures to counter Israeli Air Force violations of Lebanese airspace. Subsequently, Hizballah launched an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that left Lebanese airspace and flew over the Israeli town of Nahariya before crashing into Lebanese territorial waters. Hizballah also continued launching small-scale attacks across the Israeli border, resulting in the deaths of several Israeli soldiers. In March 2004, Hizballah and HAMAS signed an agreement to increase joint efforts to conduct attacks against Israel. In late 2004, Hizballah’s al-Manar television station, based in Beirut with an estimated 10 million viewers worldwide, was prohibited from broadcasting in France. Al-Manar was placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) in the United States, which led to its removal from the program offerings of its main cable service provider and made it more difficult for al-Manar associates and affiliates to operate in the United States.

After the February assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Hizballah organized public demonstrations in support of Damascus. To date, however, UNIIIC reports suggesting Syrian Government involvement have not implicated Hizballah in the killing.

**Strength**
Thousands of supporters, several thousand members, and a few hundred terrorist operatives.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beka'a Valley, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.

External Aid
Receives training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, and organizational aid, from Iran, and diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria. Hizballah also receives funding from charitable donations and business interests.

Islamic Jihad Group (IJU) *
a.k.a. Al-Djihad al-Islami;
Dzhamaa Modzhakhedov;
Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan;
Jama'at al-Jihad;
Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami;
Jamiyat;
The Jamaat Mujahedin;
The Kazakh Jama'at;
The Libyan Society

Description
The IJU issued a statement in May fully supporting the armed attacks on Uzbek police and military personnel in Andijon, Uzbekistan, and called for the overthrow of the Uzbekistani regime. The group first conducted attacks in March-April 2004 targeting a popular bazaar and police at several roadway checkpoints. These attacks killed approximately 47 people, including 33 terrorists, some of whom were suicide bombers. The IJU’s claim of responsibility, which was posted to multiple militant Islamic websites, denounced the leadership of Uzbekistan. These attacks marked the first use of suicide bombers in Central Asia. In July 2004, the group struck again with near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the U.S. and Israeli Embassies and the Uzbekistani Prosecutor General’s office in Tashkent. The IJU again claimed responsibility via an Islamic website and stated that martyrdom operations by the group would continue. The statement also indicated that the attacks were done in support of IJU’s Palestinian, Iraqi, and Afghan brothers in the global insurgency. The date of the July attack corresponded with the trial of individuals arrested for their alleged participation in the March-April attacks.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Militants are scattered throughout Central Asia and probably parts of South Asia.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) *

Description
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a group of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. The IMU is affiliated with al-Qaida and, under the leadership of Tohir Yoldashev, has embraced Usama bin Ladin’s anti-U.S., anti-Western agenda. The IMU also remains committed to its original goals of overthrowing Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov and establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan.

Activities
Since Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly occupied with attacks on U.S. and Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although it is difficult to differentiate between IMU and Islamic Jihad Group members, Pakistani security forces continue to arrest probable IMU operatives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Suspected IMU members have also attacked Pakistani Government forces in the FATA and been discovered fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

The IMU previously was active in terrorist operations in Central Asia. Tajikistan arrested several IMU members in 2005. In November 2004, the IMU was blamed for an explosion in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh that killed one police officer and one terrorist. In May 2003, Kyrgyzstani security forces disrupted an IMU cell that was seeking to bomb the U.S. Embassy and a nearby hotel in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The IMU was also responsible for explosions in Bishkek in December 2002 and Osh in May 2003 that killed eight people. The IMU primarily targeted Uzbekistani interests before October 2001, and is believed to have been responsible for several explosions in Tashkent in February 1999. IMU militants also took foreigners hostage in 1999 and 2000 in Kyrgyzstan, including four U.S. mountain climbers in August 2000 and four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyzstani soldiers in August 1999.

Strength
Approximately 500 members.

Location/Area of Operation
IMU militants are scattered throughout South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran. Their area of operation includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

External Aid
The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora community and other Islamic extremist groups and patrons in the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) *

*a.k.a. Army of Mohammed;
Jaish-i-Mohammed;
Khudamul Islam;
Khuddam-ul-Islam;
Kuddam e Islami;
Mohammed's Army;
Tehrik ul-Furqaan

Description
The Jaish-e-Mohammed is an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan that was created by Masood Azhar, formerly among the senior leadership of Harakat ul-Ansar, upon his release from prison in India in early 2000. The group’s aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan, and it has openly declared war against the United States. It is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). Pakistan outlawed JEM in 2002. By 2003, JEM had splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar, and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar, who was released in August 2004 from Pakistani custody after being detained for suspected involvement in the December 2003 assassination attempts against President Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan banned KUA and JUF in November 2003.

Activities
Jaish-e-Mohammed continues to operate openly in parts of Pakistan despite President Musharraf’s 2002 ban on its activities. The group is well-funded, and is said to have tens of thousands of followers who support attacks against Indian targets, the Pakistani Government, and sectarian minorities. Since Masood Azhar’s 2000 release from Indian custody in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages, JEM has conducted many fatal terrorist attacks in the area. JEM continues to claim responsibility for several suicide car bombings in Kashmir, including a suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar in October 2001 that killed more than 30. The Indian Government has publicly implicated the JEM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. Pakistani authorities suspect that JEM members may have been involved in the 2002 anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila, which killed two Americans. Pakistan has implicated elements of JEM in the two assassination attempts against President Musharraf in December 2003. In July 2004, Pakistani authorities arrested a JEM member wanted in connection with the 2002 abduction and murder of U.S. journalist reporter Daniel Pearl.

Strength
JEM currently has at least several hundred armed supporters, including a large cadre of former HUM members, located in Pakistan and in India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also include

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* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. The group uses light and heavy machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, improvised explosive devices, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Location/Area of Operation

External Aid
Most of the JEM’s cadre and material resources have been drawn from the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM). The JEM had close ties to Afghan Arabs, the Taliban, and other Sunni extremist groups in Pakistan such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Sipahi-e-Sahaba Pakistan. Usama bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to the JEM, which also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, JEM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.

Jemaah Islamiya (JI) *
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jama'ah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah
Jemaah Islamiyyah

Description
The Southeast Asia-based Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is an extremist group that seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. More than 300 JI operatives, including operations chief Hambali, have been captured since 2002. The death of top JI bombmaker Azahari bin Husin in November may have disrupted JI operations temporarily, though the group likely continues attack planning, recruitment, and training. Noordin Top, a senior JI operative involved in several major attacks, remains at large. At year end, JI emir Abu Bakar Bashir was serving a 30-month sentence in a Jakarta prison for his involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Activities
The group’s most recent high-profile attack occurred in Bali on October 1 and left approximately 22 persons dead. Other major JI attacks include the September 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the August 2003 bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, and the October 2002 Bali bombing. The 2002 Bali attack, which killed more than 200, remains one of the deadliest terrorist attacks since 9/11. In June 2003, authorities disrupted a JI plan to attack several Western embassies and tourist sites in Thailand. In December 2001, Singaporean authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack the U.S. and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. JI is also responsible for the coordinated bombings of numerous Christian churches in Indonesia in December 2000 and was involved in the bombings of several targets in Manila the same month. JI also provided operatives to al-Qaida for its 2002 plot to use airliners for attacks on targets in the United States.

Strength
Exact numbers currently are unknown, but Southeast Asian authorities continue to uncover and arrest JI elements. Estimates of total JI members vary from the hundreds to the thousands.

Location/Area of Operation
JI is based in Indonesia but believed to have cells in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. JI also operated a cell in Karachi, Pakistan, until it was disrupted in 2003.

External Aid
Investigations indicate that JI is fully capable of its own fundraising, although it also receives financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts, non-governmental organizations, and other groups.

Al-Jihad (AJ)
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ);
Egyptian al-Jihad;
New Jihad;
The Jihad Group

Description
This Egyptian Islamic extremist group merged with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization in 2001. Usama Bin Ladin’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was the former head of AJ. Active since the 1970s, the AJ’s primary goal has been the overthrow of the Egyptian Government and the establishment of an Islamic state. The group’s targets, historically, have been high-level Egyptian Government officials as well as U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. Regular Egyptian crackdowns on extremists, including on AJ, have greatly reduced AJ capabilities in Egypt.
Activities
The original AJ was responsible for the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. It claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations in 1993 of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef. AJ has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never successfully targeted foreign tourists there. The group was responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995 and a disrupted plot against the U.S. Embassy in Albania in 1998.

Strength
Unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core members inside and outside of Egypt.

Location/Area of Operation
Historically AJ operated in the Cairo area. Most AJ members today are outside Egypt in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and Yemen. AJ activities have been centered outside Egypt for several years under the auspices of al-Qaida.

External Aid
Since 1998 AJ has received most of its funding from al-Qaida; these close ties culminated in the eventual merger of the groups. Some funding may come from various Islamic non-governmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.

Kahane Chai (Kach)
a.k.a. American Friends of the United Yeshiva;
American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir;
Committee for the Safety of the Roads;
Dikuy Bogdim;
DOV;
Forefront of the Idea;
Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva;
Jewish Idea Yeshiva;
Jewish Legion;
Judea Police;
Judean Congress;
Kach;
Kahane;
Kahane Lives;
Kahane Tzadak;
Kahane.org;
Kahanetzadak.com;
Kfar Tapuah Fund;
Koach;
Meir's Youth;
New Kach Movement;
Newkach.org;
Kach’s stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach, founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane, and its offshoot Kahane Chai, (translation: “Kahane Lives”), founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin following his father’s 1990 assassination in the United States, were declared terrorist organizations in 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under Israel’s Terrorism Law. This designation followed the groups’ statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s attack in February 1994 on the Ibrahimi Mosque (Goldstein was affiliated with Kach) and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gunmen killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by shooting in December 2000 in the West Bank.

Activities
The group has organized protests against the Israeli Government. Kach has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials, and has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. Kach is suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba’ in Hebron.

External Aid
Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

Kongra-Gel (PKK)
a.k.a. Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan;
Halu Mesru Śavunma Kuvveti (HSK);
Description
Kongra-Gel was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization and formally named the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, began in 1984 its campaign of armed violence, which has resulted in some 30,000 casualties. The PKK’s goal has been to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, and parts of Iran and Syria. In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999, and the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced him to death, a sentence later commuted to life imprisonment following the abolition of the death penalty. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a “peace initiative,” ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, members supported Ocalan’s initiative and claimed the group now would use only political means to achieve its public goal of improved rights for Kurds in Turkey. In April 2002 at its 8th Party Congress, the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed a commitment to non-violent activities in support of Kurdish rights. In late 2003, the group sought to engineer another political face-lift, renaming itself Kongra-Gel (KGK) and promoting its “peaceful” intentions while continuing to conduct attacks in “self-defense” and to refuse disarmament. In June 2004, the group’s hard-line militant wing, the People’s Defense Force (HPG), which had taken control of the group in February 2004, renounced the PKK’s self-imposed cease-fire of the past five years.

Activities
Primary targets have been Turkish Government security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey. The group conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the then-PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists in the early-to-mid-1990s. Turkish authorities have confirmed or suspect that the group is responsible for dozens of bombings that occurred throughout 2005 in western Turkey, particularly in Istanbul, but also in resort areas on the western coast where foreign tourists, among others, were killed. There also were dozens of military clashes between Turkish security forces and KGK militants.

Strength
Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, of whom 3,000 to 3,500 currently are located in northern Iraq.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, Europe, and the Middle East.

External Aid
Has received safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Syria and Iran appear to cooperate with Turkey against KGK in a limited fashion. KGK uses Europe for fundraising and conducting political propaganda.

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) *
a.k.a. Al Mansoooreen;
Al Mansoorian;
Army of the Pure;
Army of the Pure and Righteous;
Army of the Righteous;
Jamaat ud-Dawa and Al Monsooreen;
Lashkar e-Toiba;
Lashkar-i-Taiba;
Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis;
Paasban-e-Kashmir;
Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith;
Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith;
Pasban-e-Kashmir

Description
LT began as the militant wing of the Islamic extremist organization Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad (MDI), which was formed in the mid-1980s. MDI changed its name to Jamaat ul-Dawa (JUD) in 2001, probably in an effort to avoid Government of Pakistan restrictions. The U.S. State Department designated Lashkar e-Tayyiba a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in 2001, and Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf banned LT in 2002. The United Nations designated LT as an FTO in 2005.

LT is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and is one of the three largest and best-trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India. It is not connected to any political party. The Pakistani Government banned the group and froze its assets in January 2002. Elements of LT and Jaish-e-Muhammed combined with other groups to mount attacks as “The Save Kashmir Movement.”

Activities
The LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993. The LT claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in 2001, including an attack in January on Srinagar airport that killed five Indians; an attack on a police station in Srinagar that killed at least eight officers and wounded several others; and an attack in April against Indian border security forces that left at least four dead. The Indian

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Government publicly implicated the LT, along with JEM, for the attack in December 2001 on the Indian Parliament building, although concrete evidence is lacking. The LT is also suspected of involvement in the attack in May 2002 on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that left 36 dead. India blames the LT for an attack in New Delhi in October 2005 and an attack in Bangalore in December 2005. Senior al-Qaida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was captured at an LT safe house in Faisalabad in March 2002, suggesting that some members were facilitating the movement of al-Qaida members in Pakistan.

**Strength**
The LT has several thousand members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, in the southern Jammu and Kashmir and Doda regions, and in the Kashmir valley. Almost all LT members are Pakistanis from madrassas across Pakistan or Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars. The group uses assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad.

**External Aid**
Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and other Kashmiri business people. The LT also maintains a Web site under the name Jamaat ud-Daawa through which it solicits funds and provides information on the group’s activities. The amount of LT funding is unknown. The LT maintains ties to religious/militant groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya, through the fraternal network of its parent organization Jamaat ud-Dawa (formerly Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad).

**Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ)**
a.k.a. Lashkar e Jhangvi;
Lashkari-i-Jhangvi

**Description**
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani President Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom they had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists with safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. In January 2003, the United States added LJ to the list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

**Activities**
LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings. The group attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province, in January 1999. Pakistani authorities have publicly linked LJ members to the 2002
abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. Police officials initially suspected LJ members were involved in suicide car bombings in Karachi in 2002 against a French shuttle bus in May and the U.S. Consulate in June, but their subsequent investigations have not led to any LJ members being charged in the attacks. Similarly, press reports have linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad in March 2002 that killed two U.S. citizens, but no formal charges have been filed against the group. Pakistani authorities believe LJ was responsible for the bombing in July 2003 of a Shiite mosque in Quetta, Pakistan. Authorities have also implicated LJ in several sectarian incidents in 2004, including the May and June bombings of two Shiite mosques in Karachi that killed more than 40 people.

**Strength**
Probably fewer than 100.

**Location/Area of Operation**
LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

**External Aid**
Unknown.

**Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)**
a.k.a. Ellalan Force; The Tamil Tigers

**Description**
Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil secessionist group in Sri Lanka and wants to establish an independent Tamil state in the island's north and east. It began its insurgency against the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The LTTE nominally has observed a cease-fire agreement with the Sri Lankan Government since 2002. The United States designated the LTTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997.

**Activities**
The LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets key personnel in the countryside and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. It also has conducted a sustained campaign targeting rival Tamil groups and figures, and has assassinated the head of government of two countries: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. The LTTE is most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings were commonplace tactics prior to the cease-fire and have increased again since mid-2005.
Strength
Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka, with a core of 3,000 to 6,000 trained fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.

Location/Area of Operations
Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, the LTTE controls portions of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka, where it has set up a comprehensive administrative structure, but has conducted operations throughout the island. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group’s area of control.

External Aid
The LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure weapons, communications, funding, and other needed supplies.

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) *

Description
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in the early 1990s among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and against the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The LIFG declared the Government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Ladin and believed to be part of al-Qaida’s leadership structure or active in the international terrorist network. The United States designated the LIFG a Foreign Terrorist Organization in December 2004.

Activities
Libyans associated with the LIFG are part of the broader international terrorist movement. The LIFG is one of the groups believed to have planned the Casablanca suicide bombings in May 2003. The LIFG claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the 1990s. It continues to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces. The LIFG constitutes a serious threat to U.S. interests and personnel.

Strength
Not known, but probably has several hundred active members or supporters.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Location/Area of Operation
Probably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, but since the late 1990s many members have fled to various Asian, Persian Gulf, African, and European countries, particularly the United Kingdom.

External Aid
Not known. May obtain some funding through private donations, various Islamic non-governmental organizations, and criminal acts.

Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) *
a.k.a. Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain

Description
The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al-Qaida’s war against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the 1990s and is comprised of Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan, including some who fought in the Soviet Afghan war. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. In November 2002, the United States designated the GICM for asset freeze under EO 13224 following the group’s submission to the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee. The United States designated GICM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 11, 2005.

Activities
Moroccans associated with the GICM are part of the broader international terrorist movement. In November, 13 members of a suspected Belgian GICM cell went on trial in Brussels for allegedly providing material support to the group. GICM is one of the groups believed to be involved in planning the May 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, and has been involved in other plots. Members work with other North African extremists, engage in trafficking falsified documents, and possibly smuggle arms. In the past, the group has issued communiqués and statements against the Moroccan Government. In the last year, a number of arrests in Belgium, France, and Spain have disrupted the group's ability to operate, though cells and key members still remain throughout Europe. Although the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, among others, claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Qaida, Spanish authorities are investigating the possibility that GICM was involved in the March 2004, Madrid train bombings.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Morocco, Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Canada.

External Aid
Unknown, but believed to include criminal activity abroad.
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
a.k.a. MKO; 
Mujahedin-e Khalq; 
Muslim Iranian Students’ Society; 
National Council of Resistance; 
National Council of Resistance (NCR); 
Organization of the People's Holy Warriors of Iran; 
The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA); 
The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI); 
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI); 
Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran 

Description
The MEK advocates the violent overthrow of the Iranian regime. The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism, feminism, nationalism, and Islam. The group emerged as one of several political movements seeking to unseat the Shah in the 1960s. After Khomeini’s regime arrested most of the MEK leadership a few years after the Islamic Revolution, many members fled to Europe. Saddam Hussein invited the group to Iraq in the late 1980s, where it reformed as a paramilitary organization and conducted several cross-border forays into Iran. A Marxist element of the MEK murdered several of the Shah’s U.S. security advisers prior to the Islamic Revolution, and the group helped guard the U.S. Embassy after Islamic students seized it in 1979. Since then, the MEK has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad.

Activities
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK reportedly assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in
mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforcement units and government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward the end of 2001. The MEK leadership ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and they surrendered their arms to Coalition forces in May 2003.

Strength
Over 3,000 MEK members are currently confined to Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad, where they remain under the Geneva Convention’s “protected person” status and Coalition control. As a condition of the cease-fire agreement, the group relinquished its weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have voluntarily left the Ashraf group, and several hundred of them have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.

Location/Area of Operation
In the 1980s, the MEK’s leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. On resettling in Iraq in 1987, almost all MEK armed units were stationed in fortified bases near the border with Iran. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, the bulk of the group is limited to Camp Ashraf, although an overseas support structure remains with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America.

External Aid
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group received all of its military assistance, and most of its financial support from the former Iraqi regime. The MEK also has used front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.

National Liberation Army (ELN)
a.k.a. Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional

Description
The ELN is a Colombian Marxist insurgent group formed in 1965 by urban intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. It is primarily rural-based, although it possesses several urban units. The ELN began preliminary talks with the Colombian Government in December 2005 in Cuba, but had not yet agreed to begin a formal peace process.

Activities
Kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and extortion. Minimal conventional military capability. Conducts kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign employees of large corporations, especially in the petroleum industry. Derives some revenue from taxation of the illegal narcotics industry. Assaults energy infrastructure and has inflicted major damage on pipelines and the electrical distribution network but has lost much of its capacity to carry out attacks in the past few years.

Strength
Approximately 3,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters.
Location/Area of Operation
Mostly in rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern, and southwestern Colombia, and Venezuelan border regions.

External Aid
Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation. Venezuela continues to provide a hospitable environment.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
a.k.a. PLF-Abu Abbas Faction

Description
The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) splintered from the PFLP-GC in the late 1970s and later split into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (a.k.a. Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Activities
Abbas’s group was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Abu Abbas died of natural causes in April 2004 while in U.S. custody in Iraq. Current leadership and membership of the relatively small PLF appears to be based in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Based in Iraq from 1990 until 2003, the group currently is based in Lebanon.

External Aid
Current sources of funds uncertain, although may receive some financing from Iran.

Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
a.k.a. Islamic Jihad of Palestine;
PIJ-Shaqqi Faction;
PIJ-Shallah Faction;
Al-Quds Brigades

Description
Formed by militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is committed to the creation of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine and the destruction of Israel through attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets.
Activities
PIJ terrorists have conducted numerous attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. In 2005, the group increased operational activity over the previous year and claimed several attacks against Israeli interests, including five suicide bombings. PIJ continues to plan and direct attacks against Israelis both inside Israel and in the Palestinian territories. Although U.S. citizens have died in attacks mounted by the PIJ, the group has not directly targeted U.S. interests.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Primarily Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The group’s central leadership resides in Syria. Other leadership elements reside in Lebanon, and official representatives are scattered throughout the Middle East.

External Aid
Received financial assistance primarily from Iran. Syria provides the group with a safe haven.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Description
Formerly a part of the PLO, the Marxist-Leninist PFLP was founded by George Habash when it broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The PFLP does not view the Palestinian struggle as religious, seeing it instead as a broader revolution against Western imperialism. The group earned a reputation for spectacular international attacks, including airline hijackings, that have killed at least 20 U.S. citizens.

Activities
The PFLP committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978, the group has conducted attacks against Israeli and moderate Arab targets, including the killing of an Israeli settler and her son in December 1996. The PFLP has stepped up its operational activity since the start of the current intifada, highlighted by at least two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, and the assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minister in 2001 to avenge Israel’s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
External Aid
Receives safe haven and some logistical assistance from Syria.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (PFLP-GC)

Description
The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Originally, the group was violently opposed to the Arafat-led PLO. Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army whose son Jihad was killed by a car bomb in May 2002, has led the PFLP-GC since its founding. The PFLP-GC is closely tied to both Syria and Iran.

Activities
The PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. The organization was known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. The group’s primary focus now is on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon, training of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and small-scale attacks in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Ahmad Jibril denied accusations made in a United Nations investigation that PFLP-GC members were involved in the February assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.

Strength
Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation
Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.

External Aid
Receives logistical and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

Al-Qaida*
a.k.a. International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusaders;
Islamic Army;
Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites;
Islamic Salvation Foundation;
The Base;
The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites;
The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places;
The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders;

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Usama bin Ladin Network;
Usama bin Ladin Organization

**Description**
Al-Qaida was established by Usama bin Ladin in 1988 with Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. The group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Al-Qaida’s goal is to unite Muslims to fight the United States as a means of defeating Israel, overthrowing regimes it deems "non-Islamic," and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Its eventual goal would be establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate throughout the world. Al-Qaida leaders issued a statement in February 1998 under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere. Al-Qaida merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001, renaming itself “Qaidat al-Jihad.”

**Activities**
Even as al-Qaida's top leaders continue to plot and direct terror attacks worldwide, terrorists affiliated with al-Qaida but not necessarily controlled by bin Ladin have increasingly carried out high-profile attacks. In 2005, bin Ladin’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri appeared to say that al-Qaida was responsible for multiple attacks against the London public transportation system. The extent of leadership involvement in planning the attack is unclear, and homegrown United Kingdom-based extremists may have been inspired rather than directed by al-Qaida. Over the past four years, al-Qaida, its affiliates and those inspired by the group were also involved in many anti-U.S. or anti-Coalition attacks in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, including suicide bombings and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.

In 2003 and 2004, Saudi-based al-Qaida operatives and associated extremists launched more than a dozen attacks, killing at least 90 people, including 14 Americans in Saudi Arabia. Al-Qaida may have been connected to the suicide bombers and planners of the November 2003 attacks in Istanbul that targeted two synagogues, the British Consulate, and the HSBC Bank, resulting in more than 60 dead. Pakistani President Musharraf blames al-Qaida for two attempts on his life in December 2003.

In October 2002, al-Qaida directed a suicide attack on the French tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen that killed one and injured four. The group also carried out the November 2002 suicide bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, which killed 15. Al-Qaida probably provided financing for the October 2002 Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiya that killed more than 200.

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qaida suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets -- two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania -- leaving nearly 3,000 individuals dead or missing. In October 2000, al-Qaida conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39.
Al-Qaida also carried out the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killing at least 301 individuals and injuring more than 5,000 others. Al-Qaida and its supporters claim to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993, and to have conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden in December 1992.

**Strength**
Al-Qaida’s organizational strength is difficult to determine in the aftermath of extensive counterterrorist efforts since 9/11. The arrests and killing of mid-level and senior al-Qaida operatives have disrupted some communication, financial, and facilitation nodes and disrupted some terrorist plots. Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide who are inspired by the group’s ideology may be operating without direction from al-Qaida’s central leadership, though it is impossible to estimate their numbers. Al-Qaida also serves as a focal point of inspiration or imitation for a worldwide network that is comprised of many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including some members of the Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Group, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahedin, Ansar al-Sunnah, the Taliban, Jemaah Islamiya, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Al-Qaida’s worldwide networks are augmented by ties to local Sunni extremists. The group was based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. While the largest concentration of senior al-Qaida members now resides in Pakistan, the network incorporates members of al-Qaida in Iraq and other associates throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe who continue working to carry out future attacks against U.S. interests.

**External Aid**
Al-Qaida primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters and individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian or other cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations. Additionally, parts of the organization raise funds through criminal activities; for example, al-Qaida in Iraq raises funds through hostage-taking for ransom, and members in Europe have engaged in credit card fraud. U.S. and international efforts to block al-Qaida funding have hampered the group's ability to raise money.

**Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)**
a.k.a. Al-Qaida Group of Jihad in Iraq;  
Al-Qaida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers;  
Al-Qaida in Mesopotamia;  
Al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Rivers;  
Al-Qaida of Jihad in Iraq;  
Al-Qaida of Jihad Organization in the Land of The Two Rivers;  

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
Al-Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers;
Al-Tawhid;
Al-Zarqawi Network;
Jam‘at al-Tawhid Wa‘al-Jihad;
Tanzeeem Qaidat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini;
Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn;
The Monotheism and Jihad Group;
The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers;
The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia;
The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in Iraq;
The Organization of al-Jihad's Base in the Land of the Two Rivers;
The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in Iraq;
The Organization of al-Jihad's Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers;
The Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers

Description
Since its official statement declaring allegiance to the al-Qaida terrorist network in October 2004, the group identifying itself as Tanzim Qaidat Al-Jihad in Bilad al-Rafidayn (Organization of Jihad's Base in the Country of the Two Rivers), better known as the Zarqawi Network or al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), has lost dozens of lieutenants and high-ranking network members through Coalition and Iraqi security force operations. This group is most clearly associated with foreign terrorist cells operating in Iraq and has specifically targeted Coalition forces and Iraqi citizens. In a July 2005 letter to al-Qaida deputy Zawahiri, AQI leader Abumusab al-Zarqawi outlined a four-stage plan to expand the Iraq war to include expelling U.S. forces, establishing an Islamic authority, spreading the conflict to Iraq's secular neighbors and engaging in battle with Israel. Consistent with their stated plan, groups affiliated with Zarqawi also were linked to regional acts of terrorism, such as the Sharm al-Sheikh bombings in Egypt in July, the Aqaba rocket attack on the USS Ashland in August, and the multiple hotel bombings in Amman in November.

In addition to Zarqawi’s foreign recruiting efforts, the network likely is receiving material support through al-Qaida. In addition, local criminal activities also fund many of the Zarqawi Network’s actions. There are reports indicating that the network steals cars and uses ransom money from kidnappings to fund its terrorist activities. In Mosul alone, Zarqawi affiliates are reportedly responsible for more than 1,700 attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces over a three-month period in 2005. Many of these attacks were suicide and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks using cars and other motor vehicles driven by foreign fighters or locally recruited Iraqis trained by foreign fighters. Like some Zarqawi operations, these attacks often targeted Iraqi Shia in an attempt to incite sectarian violence.

Activities
In August 2003, Zarqawi’s group carried out a major terrorist attack in Iraq when it bombed the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, followed 12 days later by a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against the UN Headquarters in Baghdad that killed 23, including the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. That same month the group also conducted a VBIED attack against Shia worshippers.
outside the Imam Ali Mosque in al Najaf, killing 85, including the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). The group kept up its attack pace throughout 2003, striking numerous Iraqi, Coalition, and relief agency targets such as the Red Cross. Zarqawi’s group conducted VBIED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure throughout 2004, including suicide attacks inside the Green Zone perimeter in Baghdad. The group successfully penetrated the Green Zone in the October 2004 bombing of a popular café and market. It also claimed responsibility for the videotaped execution by beheading of Americans Nicholas Berg (May 8, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 20, 2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004). Zarqawi’s network was likely involved in other hostage incidents as well. In 2005 AQI largely focused on conducting multiple high-profile, coordinated suicide attacks. AQI claimed numerous attacks primarily aimed against civilians, the Iraqi Government, and security forces, such as the coordinated attacks against polling sites during the January elections and the coordinated VBIED attacks outside the Sheraton and Palestine hotels in Baghdad on October 24. The group also continued assassinations against Shia leaders and the Shia Badr Corps.

AQI also increased its external operations in 2005 by claiming credit for three attacks: suicide bomber attacks against hotels in Amman on November 9; a rocket attack against U.S. Navy ships in the port of Aqaba in August, which resulted in limited damage in Jordan and in Eilat, Israel; and the firing of several rockets into Israel from Lebanon in December. In addition, an AQI operative was arrested in Turkey in August while planning an operation targeting Israeli cruise ships. Prior to 2005, AQI planned and conducted limited attacks in Jordan, including the assassination of USAID official Laurence Foley in 2002.

Also in 2005 AQI increased its rhetoric against governments in the region that it sees as collaborating with the West.

**Strength**
More than 1,000 members, but the exact number is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**
AQI’s operations are predominately Iraq-based, but the group maintains an extensive logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe.

**External Aid**
AQI probably receives funds from donors in the Middle East and Europe, local sympathizers in Iraq, a variety of businesses and criminal activities, and other international extremists throughout the world. In many cases, AQI’s donors are probably motivated by support for terrorism rather than affiliation with any specific terrorist group.

**Real IRA (RIRA)**
a.k.a. 32 County Sovereignty Committee;
32 County Sovereignty Movement;
Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association;
Real Irish Republican Army;  
Real Oglaigh Na Heireann

**Description**
Like the Continuity IRA, RIRA did not participate in the September weapons decommissioning. RIRA was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. RIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. The 32 County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein’s adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence; it also opposed the amendment in December 1999 of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution that laid claim to Northern Ireland. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members, including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt, for a cease-fire and disbandment, RIRA has pledged additional violence and continues to conduct attacks.

**Activities**
Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left that organization after the Provisional IRA renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bomb-making to RIRA. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998), British security forces, police in Northern Ireland, and local Protestant communities. RIRA’s most recent fatal attack was in August 2002 at a London army base, killing a construction worker. The organization wants to improve its intelligence-gathering ability, engineering capacity, and access to weaponry; it also trains members in the use of guns and explosives. RIRA continues to attract new members, and its senior members are committed to launching attacks on security forces. Five people were convicted of membership in RIRA in 2005.

**Strength**
The number of activists may have fallen to less than 100. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and Republican sympathizers dissatisfied with the IRA’s continuing cease-fire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process. Approximately 40 RIRA members are in Irish jails.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Irish Republic.

**External Aid**
Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from U.S. gun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans.
**Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)**

a.k.a. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia

**Description**

Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Latin America’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency of Marxist origin, although it only nominally fights in support of Marxist goals today. The FARC is governed by a general secretariat led by long-time leader Manuel Marulanda (a.k.a. “Tirofijo”) and six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. “Mono Jojoy”). The FARC is organized along military lines but includes some specialized urban fighting units. A Colombian military offensive targeting FARC fighters in their former safe haven in southern Colombia has experienced some success, with several FARC mid-level leaders killed or captured. France, Spain, and Switzerland formed an international commission in November 2005 to aid the Colombian Government and the FARC with humanitarian exchange negotiations.

**Activities**

FARC has carried out bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. The FARC murdered a U.S. citizen and a Colombian soldier and continues to hold three other U.S. citizens kidnapped in February 2003 when their plane crashed in a FARC stronghold. Foreign citizens often are targets of abductions that FARC carries out in pursuit of ransom and political leverage. The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution.

**Strength**

Approximately 12,000 combatants and several thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily in Colombia with some activities such as extortion, kidnapping, weapons sourcing, logistics, and R&R in neighboring countries.

**External Aid**

Cuba provides some medical care, safe haven, and political consultation. The FARC often uses the Colombia/Venezuela and Colombia/Ecuador border areas for cross-border incursions and Venezuelan and Ecuadorian territory as a safe haven.

**Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)**

a.k.a. Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas;
ELA;
June 78;
Liberation Struggle;
Organization of Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity;
Popular Revolutionary Struggle;
Description
Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad range of anti-establishment and anti-U.S./NATO/EU leftist groups active in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group is believed to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece’s most prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since January 1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left by ELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene. RN’s few communiqués show strong similarities in rhetoric, tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, nor has it announced its disbandment.

Activities
Since it began operations in January 1995, the group has claimed responsibility for some two dozen arson attacks and low-level bombings against a range of U.S., Greek, and other European targets in Greece. In its most infamous and lethal attack to date, the group claimed responsibility for a bomb it detonated at the Intercontinental Hotel in April 1999 that resulted in the death of a Greek woman and injury of a Greek man. RN’s modus operandi includes warning calls of impending attacks, attacks targeting property instead of individuals, use of rudimentary timing devices, and strikes during the late evening to early morning hours. RN may have been responsible for two attacks in July 2003 against a U.S. insurance company and a local bank in Athens. RN’s last confirmed attacks against U.S. interests in Greece came in November 2000, with two separate bombings against the Athens offices of Citigroup and the studio of a Greek-American sculptor. Greek targets have included judicial and other government office buildings, private vehicles, and the offices of Greek firms involved in NATO-related defense contracts in Greece. Similarly, the group has attacked European interests in Athens. The group conducted no attacks in 2005.

Strength
Group membership is believed to be small, probably drawing from the Greek militant leftist or anarchist milieu.

Location/Area of Operation
Primary area of operation is in the Athens metropolitan area.

External Aid
Unknown but believed to be self-sustaining.

Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)
a.k.a. Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri;
17 November
Description
17 November (17N) is a radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta. 17N is an anti-Greek establishment, anti-United States, anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO group that seeks the ouster of U.S. bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’s ties to NATO and the European Union (EU).

Activities
Initial attacks were assassinations of senior U.S. officials and Greek public figures. Five U.S. Embassy employees have been murdered since 17N began its terrorist activities in 1975. The group began using bombings in the 1980s. In 1990, 17N expanded its targets to include Turkish diplomats, EU facilities, and foreign firms investing in Greece, and added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. The group supported itself largely through bank robberies. A failed 17N bombing attempt in June 2002 at the port of Piraeus in Athens, coupled with robust detective work, led to the arrest of 19 members, the first 17N operatives ever arrested, including a key leader of the organization. In December 2003, a Greek court convicted 15 members, five of whom were given multiple life terms, of hundreds of crimes. Four other alleged members were acquitted for lack of evidence. In December 2005, against the backdrop of a sympathetic press, a group appeals trial opened for the 15 convicted members and two of the previously acquitted members. The appeals trial essentially represents a new trial for the convicts because new evidence and facts can be introduced under Greek law. At year’s end, Greek authorities were continuing their investigation of suspects and evidence connected to 17N and considered the case open and on-going.

Strength
Unknown but presumed to be small.

Location/Area of Operation
Athens, Greece.

External Aid
Unknown.

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
aka. Dev Sol;
Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units;
Dev Sol Silahlı Devrimci Birlikleri;
Dev Sol SDB;
Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi;
Devrimci Sol;
Revolutionary Left

Description
This group originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party”
refers to the group’s political activities, while “Front” is a reference to the group’s militant operations. The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is vehemently anti-U.S., anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish establishment. Its goals are the establishment of a socialist state and the abolition of F-type prisons, which contain one- to three-man prison cells. DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion.

Activities
Since the late 1980s the group has targeted primarily current and retired Turkish security and military officials. It began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990, which included attacks against U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. To protest perceived U.S. imperialism during the Gulf War, Dev Sol assassinated two U.S. military contractors, wounded an Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, commercial, and cultural facilities. In its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C in 1996, the group assassinated a prominent Turkish businessman and two others. DHKP/C added suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with successful attacks against Turkish police in January and September. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used improvised explosive devices against official Turkish targets and soft U.S. targets of opportunity; attacks against U.S. targets beginning in 2003 probably came in response to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operations and arrests against the group have weakened its capabilities. DHKP/C did not conduct any major terrorist attacks in 2003, but in June 2004, just days before the NATO summit, an explosive device detonated, apparently prematurely, aboard a passenger bus in Istanbul while a DHKP/C operative was transporting it to another location, killing the operative and three other persons. Also prior to the NATO summit, DHKP/C and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP) placed or attempted to place IEDs on the fringes of the pre-summit security perimeters to signal their displeasure with political events in Iraq and embarrass the Turkish Government prior to hosting NATO members. A Turkish policeman was seriously injured when one of the IEDs planted near the hotel where the U.S. president was to stay detonated. Turkish authorities suspect the DHKP/C of perpetrating several small-scale bombings in Istanbul in 2005.

Strength
Probably several dozen terrorist operatives inside Turkey, with a large support network throughout Europe. In April 2004, authorities arrested more than 40 suspected DHKP/C members in coordinated raids across Turkey and Europe. In October 2004, 10 alleged members of the group were sentenced to life imprisonment, while charges were dropped against 20 other defendants because of a statute of limitations.

Location/Area of Operation
Turkey, primarily Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds in Europe.

External Aid
Widely believed to have training facilities or offices in Lebanon and Syria.
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
a.k.a. Le Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat;
Salafist Group for Call and Combat

Description
The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), seeks to overthrow the Algerian Government with the goal of installing an Islamic regime. GSPC eclipsed the GIA around 1998, and is currently the most effective and largest armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC pledged to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria.

Activities
The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. In 2005, GSPC claimed responsibility for an attack on a remote Mauritanian military outpost, killing 15, and indicating a possible shift in GSPC strategy toward a more global war beyond Algerian borders. Police in France, Italy and Spain arrested several Algerians suspected of providing support to GSPC, and French officials announced that the GSPC had issued an Internet call-to-action against France, declaring France "public enemy number one." The Government of Algeria scored major counterterrorism successes against GSPC in 2004, killing GSPC leader Nabil Sahraoui and separately taking custody of Abderazak al-Para, who led a GSPC faction that held 32 European tourists hostage in 2003. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe and the Middle East maintain contact with other North African extremists sympathetic to al-Qa'ida. In late 2003, the GSPC leader issued a communiqué announcing the group’s support of a number of terrorist causes and movements, including al-Qa'ida.

Strength
Several hundred fighters with an unknown number of facilitators outside Algeria.

Location/Area of Operation
Algeria, the Sahel, Canada, and Western Europe.

External Aid
Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistical support. GSPC members also engage in criminal activity.

Shining Path (SL)
a.k.a. EGP;
Ejercito Guerrillero Popular (People's Guerrilla Army);
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (People's Liberation Army);
EPL;
Partido Comunista del Peru (Communist Party of Peru);
Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui (Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui);
Description
Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. Approximately 35,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. The Peruvian Government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, but recent SL attacks against Peruvian counternarcotics police and kidnappings of counternarcotics NGO workers underscore the continuing threat SL poses, as well as the group’s increasing ties to narcotrafficking. SL’s stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments. In response to SL’s bloody attacks in late 2005, Peruvian authorities have stepped up counterterrorism efforts against the group.

Activities
SL has conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns, ambushes, and selective assassinations. Its increased drug ties have raised operating revenue.

Strength
Unknown but estimated to be some 300 armed militants.

Location/Area of Operation
Peru, with most activity in rural areas, specifically the Huallaga Valley, the Ene River, and the Apurimac Valley of central Peru.

External Aid
None.

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)
a.k.a. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

Description
The AUC, commonly referred to as the paramilitaries, is an umbrella group formed in April 1997 to organize loosely affiliated illegal paramilitary groups that emerged to retaliate against leftist guerillas fighting the government and the landed establishment. The AUC quickly discarded its counter-guerilla mission, however, electing instead to involve itself in the illegal drug trade. Recently, as the result of a large demobilization process, most of the AUC’s centralized military structure has been dismantled and nearly all the top paramilitary chiefs have stepped down. More than 23,000 paramilitary members have demobilized bloc by bloc since 2003 to 2005. Colombia now faces criminal gangs formed by some demobilized paramilitaries and some paramilitary groups that have refused to disarm. These groups are
often referred to as the AUC because of their origin and the loose decentralized structure, which make it difficult to differentiate between the AUC and other paramilitary groups. Like the AUC, these new groups claim to fight guerrillas and are supported by local elites, some drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effective government security. Many of the still active paramilitary blocs or newly formed criminal gangs are focused primarily on drug trafficking, other lucrative illicit activity, and controlling local politics.

**Activities**
Paramilitary operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent supporters to engaging guerrilla combat units. As much as 70 percent of the paramilitary operational costs are financed with drug-related earnings, with the rest coming from “donations” from sponsors. These groups generally avoid actions against U.S. personnel or interests. Colombia’s homicide rate is at its lowest level in 18 years, in part because of the cease-fire agreement and the large number of demobilizations. Other violence indicators such as kidnapping and terror attacks have also decreased significantly.

**Strength**
About 10,000 remaining active paramilitary members and unarmed support network members.

**Location/Areas of Operation**
Paramilitary forces are strongest in northwest Colombia in Antioquia, Cordoba, Sucre, Atlantico, Magdelena, Cesar, La Guajira, and Bolivar Departments, with affiliate groups in the coffee region, Valle del Cauca, and in Meta Department.

**External Aid**
None.
OTHER GROUPS OF CONCERN

The following groups of concern have not been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under 8 USC Section 1189, although many have been designated under other U.S. Government counterterrorism authorities.

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Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)

Description
The al-Badhr Mujahedin split from Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM) in 1998. Traces its origins to 1971, when a group named al-Badr attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. Later operated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami (HIG) in Afghanistan and, from 1990, as a unit of HM in Kashmir. The group was relatively inactive until 2000. Since then, it has increasingly claimed responsibility for attacks against Indian military targets. Since the late 1990s, al-Badhr leader Bakht Zamin repeatedly has expressed his support for Usama bin Ladin and the Taliban, and in 2002 declared jihad against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. Since late 2001, al-Badhr members have reportedly targeted Coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Strength
Perhaps several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation
Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

External Aid
Unknown.

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) *∧∇

Description
AIAI, a Somali extremist group that was formed in the 1980s and reached its peak in the early 1990s, failed to obtain its objective of establishing a Salafist emirate in Somalia and steadily declined following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991 and Somalia’s subsequent collapse into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive, lacked central leadership, and suffered divisions between factions. Following military defeats in 1996 and 1997, AIAI devolved into a loose network of cells, factions, and individuals without central control or coordination. In recent years, the existence of a coherent entity operating as AIAI has become

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
∧ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
∇ Designated under Executive Order 13224.
difficult to prove. Former elements of AIAI continue to pursue a variety of agendas ranging from social services and education to insurgency activities in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. Some sheikhs formerly associated with AIAI espouse a fundamentalist version of Islam, with particular emphasis on a strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law), a view often at odds with Somali emphasis on clan identity. A small group of former AIAI members embrace global jihad and support al-Qaida members in East Africa. There is no information, however, to indicate that the group itself supported terrorist activity against the United States or U.S. interests. The United Nations al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee has listed AIAI for its associations with al-Qaida.

Activities
Individuals formerly associated with AIAI may have been responsible for several kidnappings and murders of relief workers in Somalia and Somaliland since 2003 and also in the late 1990s. Factions of AIAI also may have been responsible for a series of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997. Most AIAI factions in recent years have concentrated on broadening their religious base, renewed an emphasis on building businesses, and undertaken “hearts and minds” actions, such as sponsoring orphanages and schools and providing security that uses an Islamic legal structure in the areas where it is active.

Strength
The actual membership strength is unknown and remains open for debate.

Location/Area of Operation
Primarily in Somalia, with a presence in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti.

External Aid
Receives funds from Middle East financiers and Somali diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Arabian Peninsula.

Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)^

Description
The ABB, the breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army, was formed in the mid-1980s. The ABB was added to the Terrorist Exclusion List in December 2001.

Activities
Responsible for more than 100 murders, including the murder in 1989 of U.S. Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. In March 1997, the group announced it had formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA). In March 2000, the group claimed credit for a rifle grenade attack against the Department of Energy...

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^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
building in Manila and strafed Shell Oil offices in the central Philippines to protest rising oil prices.

**Strength**  
Approximately 500.

**Location/Area of Operation**  
The largest RPA/ABB groups are on the Philippine islands of Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas.

**External Aid**  
Unknown.

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**Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei for the Construction of the Communist Combatant Party (NTA-PCC)**  
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units

**Description**  
The NTA is a clandestine leftist extremist group that first appeared in Italy’s Friuli region in 1995. Adopted the class struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s and a similar logo -- an encircled five-point star -- for its declarations. Seeks the formation of an “anti-imperialist fighting front” with other Italian leftist terrorist groups, including Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei and the New Red Brigades. Opposes what it perceives as U.S. and NATO imperialism and condemns Italy’s foreign and labor policies. In a leaflet dated January 2002, NTA identified experts in four Italian Government sectors -- federalism, privatizations, justice reform, and jobs and pensions -- as potential targets.

**Activities**  
To date, NTA has conducted attacks only against property. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NTA members threw gasoline bombs at the Venice and Rome headquarters of the then-ruling party, Democrats of the Left. NTA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in September 2000 against the Central European Initiative office in Trieste and a bomb attack in August 2001 against the Venice Tribunal building. In January 2002, police thwarted an attempt by four NTA members to enter the Rivolto military air base. In 2003, NTA claimed responsibility for the arson attacks against three vehicles belonging to U.S. troops serving at the Ederle and Aviano bases in Italy. There has been no reported activity by the group since the arrest in January 2004 of NTA’s founder and leader.

**Strength**  
Accounts vary from one to approximately 20 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**  
Primarily northeastern Italy and U.S. military installations in northern Italy.
External Aid
None evident.

Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)^
a.k.a. Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
Ex-FAR/Interahamwe

Description
The Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), which is the armed branch of the PALIR, or the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda, was supplanted by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) in 2001. ALIR was formed from the merger of the Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR), the army of the ethnic Hutu-dominated Rwandan regime that orchestrated the genocide of over 500,000 Tutsis and regime opponents in 1994, and Interahamwe, the civilian militia force that carried out much of the killing. This occurred after the two groups were forced from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, then Zaire) that year. Though directly descended from those who organized and carried out the genocide, identified ALIR/FDLR leaders are not thought to have played a role in the killing. They have worked to build bridges to other opponents of the Kigali regime, including ethnic Tutsis.

Activities
ALIR sought to topple Rwanda’s Tutsi-dominated government, reinstitute Hutu domination, and, possibly, complete the genocide. In 1996, a message -- allegedly from the ALIR -- threatened to kill the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda and other U.S. citizens. In 1999, ALIR guerrillas critical of U.S.-UK support for the Rwandan regime kidnapped and killed eight foreign tourists, including two U.S. citizens, in a game park on the Democratic Republic of Congo-Uganda border. Three suspects in the attack are in U.S. custody awaiting trial. In the 1998-2002 Congolese war, the ALIR/FDLR was allied with Kinshasa against the Rwandan invaders. ALIR/FDLR’s political wing mainly has sought to topple the Kigali regime via an alliance with Tutsi regime opponents. It established the ADRN Igihango alliance in 2002, but this has not resonated politically in Rwanda. In March 2005, FDLR representatives announced a willingness to cease military actions and return to Rwanda. FDLR denounced the genocide, committed to a political struggle rather than a military one, and indicated it would voluntarily demobilize and repatriate. No large-scale FDLR repatriation to Rwanda occurred, however, owing to FDLR concerns about security and the “political space” it would be allowed in Rwanda.

Strength
Exact strength is unknown, but an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 FDLR guerrillas operate in the eastern DRC close to the Rwandan border. In 2003, the United Nations, with Rwandan assistance, repatriated close to 1,500 FDLR combatants from the DRC. A senior FDLR

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
military commander returned to Rwanda in November 2003 and has been working with Kigali to encourage the return of his comrades.

Location/Area of Operation
Mostly in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

External Aid
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo provided training, arms, and supplies to ALIR forces to combat Rwandan armed forces that invaded the DRC in 1998. Kinshasa halted that support in 2002, though allegations persist of continued support from several local Congolese warlords and militias, including the Mai Mai.

Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)
a.k.a. Cholana
Kangtoap Serei Cheat
Kampouchea

Description
The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November 1998 in the wake of political violence that saw many influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cambodian People’s Party assume power. With an avowed aim of overthrowing the government, the U.S.-based group is led by a Cambodian-American, a former member of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party. The CFF’s membership reportedly includes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand and the United States, and former soldiers from the Khmer Rouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various political factions.

Activities
Alleged CFF leader Chhun Yasith was arrested in June in the United States on charges of conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, conspiracy to damage or destroy property in a foreign country, and engaging in a military expedition against a nation with which the United States is at peace. If convicted, Yasith faces prison without parole for each of the charges. Meanwhile, a Cambodian court in October dropped charges against five alleged CFF members arrested in April 2004 in connection with a bombing at a ferry, which slightly injured three persons. In 2003, the Cambodian Government arrested seven CFF members who were reportedly planning an unspecified terrorist attack in southwestern Cambodia. Cambodian courts in February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFF members suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in 2000. The courts convicted 19 members, including one U.S. citizen, of “terrorism” and/or “membership in an armed group”, and sentenced them to terms of five years to life imprisonment. A Cambodian court later judged that the three-year sentences of six other members were too light and decided in December 2005 to extend them to six to 10 years. The group had claimed responsibility for an attack in late November 2000 on several government installations that killed at least eight persons and wounded more than a dozen. In April 1999, five CFF members also were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel depot outside Phnom Penh with anti-tank weapons.
Strength
Exact strength is unknown, but totals probably never have exceeded 100 armed fighters.

Location/Area of Operation
Northeastern Cambodia near the Thai border, and the United States.

External Aid
U.S.-based leadership collects funds from the Cambodian-American community.

Communist Party of India (Maoist)
a.k.a. Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI) and People’s War (PW)

Description
The Indian groups known as the Maoist Communist Center of India and People’s War (a.k.a. People’s War Group) joined in September 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist). The MCCI was originally formed in the early 1970s, while People’s War (PW) was founded in 1975. Both groups are referred to as Naxalites, after the West Bengal village where a revolutionary radical Left movement originated in 1967. The new organization continues to employ violence to achieve its goals of peasant revolution, abolition of class hierarchies, and expansion of Maoist-controlled “liberated zones”, eventually leading to the creation an independent “Maoist” state. The CPI (Maoist) reportedly has a significant cadre of women. Important leaders include Ganapati (the PW leader from Andhra Pradesh), Pramod Mishra, Uma Shankar, and P.N.G. (alias Nathuni Mistry, arrested by Jharkhand police in 2002).

Activities
Prior to its consolidation with the PW, the MCCI ran a virtual parallel government in remote areas, where it collected a “tax” from villagers and, in turn, provided infrastructure improvements such as building hospitals, schools, and irrigation projects. It ran a parallel court system wherein allegedly corrupt block development officials and landlords — frequent MCCI targets — were punished by amputation and even death. People’s War conducted a low-intensity insurgency that included attempted political assassination, theft of weapons from police stations, kidnapping police officers, assaulting civilians, extorting money from construction firms, and vandalizing the property of multinational corporations. Together the two groups were reportedly responsible for the deaths of up to 170 civilians and police a year. The group conducted two major attacks in 2005. In June, some 500 members attacked a village in Uttar Pradesh, killing several local policemen, destroying buildings, and seizing weapons. In November, an estimated 300 members attacked a prison in Bihar, killing two people, freeing more than 300 inmates, and abducting 30 landowners belonging to a group opposed to the Naxalites.

Strength
Although difficult to assess with any accuracy, media reports and local authorities suggest the CPI’s (Maoist) membership may be as high as 31,000, including both hard-core militants and dedicated sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation
The CPI (Maoist), which is believed to be enlarging the scope of its influence, operates in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and parts of West Bengal. It also has a presence on the Bihar-Nepal border.

External Aid
The CPI (Maoist) has loose links to other Maoist groups in the region, including the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), but does not appear dependent on outside sources of support. The MCCI was a founding member of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA).

Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN/M)

Description
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) insurgency grew out of the radicalization and fragmentation of left-wing parties following Nepal’s transition to democracy in 1990. The United People’s Front, a coalition of left-wing parties, participated in the elections of 1991, but the Maoist wing failed to win the required minimum number of votes, leading to its exclusion from voter lists in the elections of 1994 and prompting the group to launch the insurgency in 1996. The CPN/M’s ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Nepalese Government and the establishment of a Maoist state. In 2003, the United States designated Nepal’s Maoists under EO 13224 for terrorist activity.

Activities
The Maoists have utilized traditional guerrilla warfare tactics and engage in murder, torture, arson, sabotage, extortion, child conscription, kidnapping, bombings, and assassinations to intimidate and coerce the populace. In 2002, Maoists claimed responsibility for assassinating two Nepalese U.S. Embassy guards, citing anti-Maoist spying, and in a press statement threatened foreign embassies, including the U.S. mission, to deter foreign support for the Nepalese Government. Maoists are suspected in the September 2004 bombing at the American Cultural Center in Kathmandu. The attack, which caused no injuries and only minor damage, marked the first time the Maoists had damaged U.S. Government property.

The Maoists entered into peace talks with the government in 2001 and 2003, but negotiations failed after a few months. In 2005, the group announced a unilateral cease-fire in September, and entered into an alliance with the seven-party alliance of opposition political parties in November.

Strength
Approximately several thousand full-time members.

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
▼ Designated under Executive Order 13224.
**Location/Area of Operation**
Operations are conducted throughout Nepal. Press reports indicate some Nepalese Maoist leaders reside in India.

**External Aid**
None.

**East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) \(^\wedge\)**

**Description**
The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a small Islamic extremist group linked to al-Qaida and the international jihadist movement. It is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent “Eastern Turkistan”, an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. In September 2002, the group was designated under EO 13224 for its terrorist activity. ETIM is also listed by the UN al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee for its associations with al-Qaida.

**Activities**
ETIM militants fought alongside al-Qaida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. In October 2003, Pakistani soldiers killed ETIM leader Hassan Makhsun during raids on al-Qaida–associated compounds in western Pakistan. U.S. and Chinese Government information suggests that ETIM is responsible for various terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May 2002, two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as well as other U.S. interests abroad.

**Strength**
Unknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs supports the Xinjiang independence movement or the formation of an independent Eastern Turkistan.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Afghanistan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan.

**External Aid**
ETIM has received training and financial assistance from al-Qaida.

\(^*\) Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
\(^\wedge\) Designated under Executive Order 13224.
\(^\wedge\) Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO); Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre

Description
GRAPO was formed in 1975 as the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain during the Franco era. It advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist regime. GRAPO is vehemently anti-American, seeks the removal of all U.S. military forces from Spanish territory, and has conducted and attempted several attacks against U.S. targets since 1977. The group issued a communiqué following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, expressing its satisfaction that “symbols of imperialist power” were decimated and affirming that “the war” has only just begun. Spanish authorities had believed they had nearly eradicated GRAPO, but a joint Spanish, French, and Italian police operation in October that resulted in the arrest of two GRAPO members led observers to speculate that the group may be reconstituting itself. GRAPO was designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.

Activities
GRAPO did not mount a successful terrorist operation in 2005, marking the fourth consecutive year without an attack. The group suffered setbacks in 2004, with several members and sympathizers arrested and sentences upheld or handed down in the appellate case for GRAPO militants arrested in Paris in 2000. GRAPO has killed more than 90 persons and injured more than 200 since its formation. The group’s operations traditionally have been designed to cause material damage and gain publicity rather than inflict casualties, but the terrorists have conducted lethal bombings and close-range assassinations.

Strength
Fewer than two dozen activists remaining. Police have made periodic large-scale arrests of GRAPO members, crippling the organization and forcing it into lengthy rebuilding periods. In 2002, Spanish and French authorities arrested 22 suspected members, including some of the group’s reconstituted leadership. More members have been arrested in the past three years.

Location/Area of Operation
Spain.

External Aid
None.

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
\(\diamondsuit\) Designated under Executive Order 13224.
Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)^
(Movement of Islamic Holy War)

Description
HUJI, a Sunni extremist group that follows the Deobandi tradition of Islam, was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. It also is affiliated with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F) of the extremist religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). The group, led by Qari Saifullah Akhtar and chief commander Amin Rabbani, is made up primarily of Pakistanis and foreign Islamists who are fighting for the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan. The group has links to al-Qaeda. At present, Akhtar remains in detention in Pakistan after his August 2004 arrest and extradition from Dubai.

HUJI’s operations in Kashmir were led by Commander Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commander in the Afghan jihad, under the group HUJI 313. Kashmiri was arrested in October on charges of attacks against President Musharraf in 2003.

Activities
The group has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. It is linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year.

Recent reporting indicates that HUJI is active in South India and has been linked with the December Bangalore attack at the Indian Institute of Technology. A former member of HUJI was arrested by Pakistani police in September for his alleged role in planting explosives for the 2002 suicide car bomb that killed 11 French engineers near the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi.

Strength
Exact numbers are unknown, but there may be several hundred members in Kashmir.

Location/Area of Operation

External Aid
HUJI operatives have received training at Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID)-sponsored camps in Pakistan.

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
Harakat-ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Description
The goal of HUJI-B is to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. The group's core membership consists primarily of Bangladeshi veterans of fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. The Bangladeshi Government arrested a senior HUJI-B leader, Mufti Abdul Hannan, in October. HUJI-B has connections to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) and Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM), which advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. The leaders of HUJI-B and HUM both signed the February 1998 fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Ladin that declared American civilians to be legitimate targets for attack.

Activities
HUJI-B was accused of stabbing a senior Bangladeshi journalist in November 2000 for making a documentary on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HUJI-B and its detained leader, Mufti Hannan, are suspected in the assassination attempt in July 2000 of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Strength
Unknown; some estimates of HUJI-B cadre strength suggest several thousand members.

Location/Area of Operation
The group operates in Bangladesh.

External Aid
HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international Islamic NGOs, including the South African-based Servants of Suffering Humanity, may have funneled money to Bangladeshi militant groups, including HUJI-B. HUJI-B also can draw funding from militant madrassa leaders and teachers in Bangladesh.

Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Description
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Hikmatyar has long-established links with Usama bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996, and has consistently offered public support for him since the 9/11 attacks. Hikmatyar has issued regular statements on the need for Afghans to reject the international community’s presence in their country. He most recently responded to protests against Danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammad with a new call for the expulsion of international troops from Afghanistan.
**Activities**
HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force the international community to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Government, and establish an Islamic fundamentalist state. U.S. troops have encountered regular violence in Konar, the area of Afghanistan in which HIG is most active, which has occasionally led to U.S. casualties, and it is likely that HIG is responsible for at least some of this violence.

**Strength**
Unknown, but possibly could have hundreds of veteran fighters on which to call.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Eastern Afghanistan, particularly Konar and Nurestan Provinces, and adjacent areas of Pakistan’s tribal areas.

**External Aid**
Unknown.

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**Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)**

**Description**
Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM), the largest Kashmiri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some members favor independence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and targets Indian security forces and politicians in Jammu and Kashmir. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s and trained with the Afghan Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. The group, led by Syed Salahuddin, is comprised primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.

**Activities**
HM has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The group also occasionally strikes at civilian targets, but has not engaged in terrorist acts outside India. HM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks within Kashmir in 2004.

**Strength**
Exact numbers are unknown, but estimates range from several hundred to possibly as many as 1,000 members in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistan.

**External Aid**
Specific sources of external aid are unknown.
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

Description
The INLA is a terrorist group formed in 1975 as the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), which split from the Official IRA (OIRA) because of OIRA’s ceasefire in 1972. The group’s primary aim is to end British rule in Northern Ireland, force British troops out of the province, and unite Ireland’s 32 counties into a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary state. It is responsible for some of the most notorious killings of “The Troubles”, including the bombing of a Ballykelly pub that killed 17 people in 1982. Bloody internal feuding has repeatedly torn the INLA. The INLA announced a cease-fire in August 1998 but continues to carry out occasional attacks and punishment beatings.

Activities
The INLA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has conducted bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. It is also involved in drug trafficking. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets include the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. The INLA did not join the IRA’s September weapons decommissioning, but continues to observe a cease-fire because, in the words of its leadership in 2003, a return to armed struggle is “not a viable option at this time.” However, the group continues to recruit members and was responsible for a 2005 arson attack against the home of a local official.

Strength
Unclear, but probably fewer than 50 hard-core activists. Police counterterrorist operations and internal feuding have reduced the group’s strength and capabilities.

Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Does not have a significant established presence on the UK mainland.

External Aid
Suspected in the past of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States.

Irish Republican Army (IRA)
a.k.a. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA),
the Provos

Description
Formed in 1969 as the clandestine armed wing of the political movement Sinn Fein, the IRA is devoted both to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and to unifying Ireland. The IRA conducted attacks until its cease-fire in 1997 and agreed to disarm as part of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which established the basis for peace in Northern Ireland. Dissension within the IRA over support for the Northern Ireland peace process resulted in the formation of two more radical splinter groups: Continuity IRA (CIRA) in 1995, and the Real IRA.
(RIRA) in 1997. The IRA, sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distinguish it from RIRA and CIRA, is organized into small, tightly-knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council.

Activities
Traditional IRA activities have included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, smuggling, and robberies. Before the cease-fire in 1997, the group had conducted bombing campaigns on various targets in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, including senior British Government officials, civilians, police, and British military targets. In August 2002, three suspected IRA members were arrested in Colombia on charges of helping the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) improve its explosives capabilities; the men subsequently escaped from prison and appeared in Ireland in 2005. Irish police have questioned the men but have filed no charges. Colombia has requested their extradition, which is unlikely, since Ireland has no extradition treaty with Colombia.

On July 28, a spokesperson for the IRA made a statement calling for an end to all forms of IRA illegal activity. This statement was confirmed on September 26 by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning’s announcement that the IRA had met its commitments to put all arms beyond use. The Independent Monitoring Commission also reported that since the September decommissioning the IRA has shown no evidence of training and recruiting terrorists or an intent to return to violence. However, the IRA has yet to abandon its extensive criminal activities, which reportedly provide the IRA and the political party Sinn Fein with millions of dollars each year.

Strength
Several hundred members and several thousand sympathizers despite the defection of some members to RIRA and CIRA.

Local/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Europe.

External Aid
In the past, the IRA has received aid from a variety of groups and countries, and considerable training and arms from Libya and the PLO. It is suspected of receiving funds, arms, and other terrorist-related materiel from sympathizers in the United States. In addition to the apparent contact with the FARC, similarities in operations suggest the IRA has links to the ETA.
Islamic Army of Aden (IAA)*∧∇
a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)

Description
The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid-1998 when the group released a series of communiqués that expressed support for Usama bin Ladin, appealed for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government, and called for operations against U.S. and other Western interests in Yemen. IAA was first designated under EO 13224 in September 2001.

Activities
The IAA, a group with established connections to al-Qaida and whose membership includes veteran fighters from the Soviet-Afghan war, in the past has engaged in small-scale operations such as bombings, kidnappings, and small arms attacks to further its agenda. The group reportedly was behind an attack against a medical convoy in June 2003 in the Abyan Governorate. Yemeni authorities responded with a raid on a suspected IAA facility that killed several individuals and captured others, including Khalid al-Nabi al-Yazidi, the group’s leader. The IAA’s previous involvement in terrorist attacks includes the throwing of a grenade into the British Embassy compound in Sanaa in October 2000. In 2001, Yemeni authorities found an IAA member and three associates responsible for that attack. In December 1998, the group kidnapped 16 British, American, and Australian tourists near Mudiyyah in southern Yemen. Although Yemeni officials previously claimed that the group is operationally defunct, their attribution of the 2003 attack against the medical convoy and reports that the group’s leader was released from prison in October 2003 suggest that the IAA, or at least elements of the group, may remain active.

Strength
Not known.

Location/Area of Operation
Operates in the southern governorates of Yemen, primarily Aden and Abyan.

External Aid
Not known.

Islamic Great Eastern Raiders–Front (IBDA-C)

Description
The Islamic Great Eastern Raiders–Front (IBDA-C) is a Sunni Salafist group that supports Islamic rule in Turkey, is sympathetic to al-Qaida, and believes that Turkey’s present secular leadership is “illegal.” It has been known to cooperate with various opposition elements in

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
∧ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
∇ Designated under Executive Order 13224.
Turkey in attempts to destabilize the country’s political structure. The group supports the establishment of a “pure Islamic” state to replace the present “corrupt” Turkish regime that is cooperating with the West. Its primary goal is the establishment of the Federative Islamic State, a goal backed by armed terrorist attacks primarily against civilian targets. It has been active since the mid-1970s.

**Activities**
IBDA-C has engaged in activities that minimize personal risk, such as bombings, throwing Molotov cocktails, and sabotage. The group has announced its actions and targets in publications to its members, who are free to launch independent attacks. IBDA-C typically has attacked civilian targets, including churches, charities, minority-affiliated targets, television transmitters, newspapers, pro-secular journalists, Ataturk statues, taverns, banks, clubs, and tobacco shops. One of IBDA-C’s more renowned attacks was the killing of 37 people in a firebomb attack in July 1993 on a hotel in Sivas. In May 2004, Turkish police indicted seven members of the group for the assassination of retired Colonel Ihsan Guven, the alleged leader of the "Dost" (Friend) sect, and his wife. Turkish police believe that IBDA-C has also claimed responsibility for attacks carried out by other groups in order to elevate its image.

**Strength**
Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Turkey.

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**Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)\(^\mathbb{V}\)**

**Description**
The IIPB is a terrorist group affiliated with the Chechen separatist movement demanding a single Islamic state in the North Caucasus. In 1998 Chechen extremist leader Shamil Basayev established the IIPB, consisting of Chechens, Arabs, and other foreign fighters, which he led with Saudi-born mujahedin leader Ibn al-Khattab until the latter’s death in March 2002. The IIPB was one of three groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that seized Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater and took more than 700 hostages in October 2002. While this group has not been identified by the mujahedin media as conducting attacks since its designation three years ago, those Arab mujahedin still operating in Chechnya now fall under the command of Abu Hafs al-Urduni, who assumed the IIPB leadership in April 2004 after the death of Khattab’s successor, Abu al-Walid. IIPB was designated under EO 13224 in February 2003 and listed by the UN al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee for its associations with al-Qaida.

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\(^{*}\) Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
\(^{\mathbb{V}}\) Designated under Executive Order 13224.
\(^{\mathbb{^\wedge}}\) Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
Activities
The IIPB has engaged in terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Chechen non-combatants.

Strength
At its peak, up to 400 fighters, including as many as 100 Arabs and other foreign fighters, but almost certainly has suffered significant attrition.

Location/Area of Operation
Primarily in Russia and adjacent areas of the North Caucasus, particularly in the mountainous south of Chechnya, with major logistical activities in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

External Aid
The IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be a primary conduit for Islamic funding of the Chechen guerrillas, in part through links to al-Qaida-related financiers on the Arabian Peninsula.

Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)

Description
JMB is a Bangladeshi Islamic extremist group dedicated to the use of violence to achieve its objective of a society subject to Islamic law. JMB, which emerged in the late 1990s, has been associated with several bombings during the past several years. The Bangladeshi Government banned the group in February.

Activities
On August 17, JMB claimed responsibility for nearly 500 simultaneous explosions throughout Bangladesh. Subsequent bombings, possibly involving suicide bombers, targeted judges, police, government offices, traditional folk festivals and cultural groups, and local non-governmental organizations. The Bangladeshi Government has captured several of the group’s most important leaders.

Strength
Estimates range as high as 11,000.

Location/Area of Operation
Bangladesh.

External Aid
The group emerged from the Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (Alhe Hadith Movement in Bangladesh), which has received financial support from a Kuwait-based Islamic NGO, the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society. JMB probably also receives some support from persons of Bangladeshi origin living in Europe and the Middle East.
Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM) ^

**Description**
The JUM is a small pro-Pakistan militant group formed in Jammu and Kashmir in 1990. Followers are mostly Kashmiris, but the group includes some Pakistanis.

**Activities**
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military and political targets in Jammu and Kashmir, including two grenade attacks against political targets in 2004.

**Strength**
Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Jammu, Kashmir, and Pakistan.

**External Aid**
Unknown.

Japanese Red Army (JRA) ^
a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)

**Description**
The JRA is an international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from the Japanese Communist League–Red Army Faction. The JRA’s historical goal has been to overthrow the Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. The JRA’s leader, Fusako Shigenobu, claimed that the forefront of the battle against international imperialism was in Palestine, so in the early 1970s she led her small group to the Middle East to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel and the West. After her arrest in November 2000, Shigenobu announced she intended to pursue her goals using a legitimate political party rather than revolutionary violence, and the group apparently disbanded in April 2001.

**Activities**
During the 1970s, the JRA carried out a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, the 1974 seizure of the French Embassy in The Hague, in which the Ambassador was among the hostages, and an attempted takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. During the late 1980s, the JRA began to single out American targets and used car bombs and rockets in attempted attacks on U.S. Embassies in Jakarta, Rome, and Madrid. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a U.S. servicewoman. He was convicted of the charges and is serving a

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
lengthy prison sentence in the United States. JRA operative Tsutomu Shirosaki, captured in 1996, is also jailed in the United States. In 2000, Lebanon deported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum. Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in November 2000 and faced charges of terrorism and passport fraud. Four JRA members remain in North Korea following their involvement in an airline hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.

**Strength**
At its peak, the group claimed to have 30 to 40 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**
In its heyday, possibly in Asia and/or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.

**External Aid**
Unknown.

### Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM)
a.k.a. Kumpulan Militan Malaysia

**Description**
Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM) favors the overthrow of the Malaysian Government and the creation of an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. Malaysian authorities believe an extremist wing of the KMM has engaged in terrorist acts and has close ties to the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Key JI leaders, including the group’s spiritual head, Abu Bakar Bashir, and JI operational leader Hambali, reportedly had great influence over KMM members. The Government of Singapore asserts that a Singaporean JI member assisted the KMM in buying a boat to support jihad activities in Indonesia.

**Activities**
Malaysia continues to hold a number of KMM members under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for activities deemed threatening to Malaysia’s national security, including planning to wage jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings, robberies, the murder of a former state assembly member, and planning attacks on foreigners, including U.S. citizens. A number of those detained also are believed to be members of Jemaah Islamiya. Several of the arrested KMM militants reportedly have undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahedin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Some members allegedly have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines. One alleged KMM member was sentenced to 10 years in prison for unlawful possession of firearms, explosives, and ammunition; eight other alleged members in detention since 2001 were later released in July and November 2004; three others were freed in November 2005. In March 2004, alleged KMM leader Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz and other suspected KMM members went on a hunger strike as part of an unsuccessful bid for freedom, but the Malaysian court in September 2004 rejected their applications for a writ of habeas corpus. In September 2005, detention orders for Aziz and eight other alleged KMM members were...
extended for another two years. The Malaysian Government is confident that the arrests of KMM leaders have crippled the organization and rendered it incapable of engaging in militant activities. Malaysian officials in May 2004 denied Thailand’s charge that the KMM was involved in the Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand.

Strength
KMM’s current membership is unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Kuala Lumpur. According to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians, and to the southern Philippines for operational training.

External Aid
Largely unknown, probably self-financing.

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) *

Description
The LRA, founded in 1987, succeeded the ethnic Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement and other insurgent groups. LRA leader Joseph Kony has called for the overthrow of the Ugandan Government and its replacement with a regime run on the basis of the Ten Commandments. More frequently, however, he has spoken of the liberation and honor of the Acholi people, whom he sees as oppressed by the "foreign" government of Ugandan President Museveni. Kony is the LRA’s undisputed leader. He claims to have supernatural powers and to receive messages from spirits, which he uses to formulate the LRA’s strategy.

Activities
The Acholi people, whom Kony claims to be fighting to liberate, are the ones who suffer most from his actions. Since the early 1990s, the LRA has kidnapped some 20,000 Ugandan children, mostly ethnic Acholi, to replenish its ranks. Kony despises Acholi elders for having given up the fight against Museveni and relies on abducted children who can be brutally indoctrinated to fight for the LRA. The LRA forces kidnapped children and adult civilians to become soldiers, porters, and "wives" for LRA leaders. The LRA prefers to attack camps for internally displaced persons and other civilian targets, avoiding direct engagement with the Ugandan military. Victims of LRA attacks sometimes have their hands, fingers, ears, noses, or other extremities cut off. The LRA stepped up its activities from 2002 to 2004 after the Ugandan army, with the Sudanese Government’s permission, attacked LRA positions inside Sudan. By late 2003, the number of internally displaced persons had doubled to 1.4 million, and the LRA had pushed deep into non-Acholi areas where it had never previously operated.

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
During 2004, a combination of military pressure, offers of amnesty, and several rounds of negotiation markedly degraded LRA capabilities due to death, desertion, and defection of senior commanders.

**Strength**  
Estimated at 500 to 700 fighters.

**Location/Area of Operation**  
Northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and northeast Democratic Republic of Congo.

**External Aid**  
Although the LRA has been supported by the Government of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese now appear to be cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a campaign to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.

### Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) *

**Description**  
An extreme Loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the LVF did not emerge publicly until 1997. It is composed largely of UVF hardliners who have sought to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occasionally uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover name for its actions but has also called for the group’s disbandment. In October 2001, the British Government ruled that the LVF had broken the cease-fire it declared in 1998 after linking the group to the murder of a journalist. According to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, the LVF decommissioned a small amount of weapons in December 1998, but it has not repeated this gesture. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.

**Activities**  
Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting attacks. Finances its activities with drug money and other criminal activities. LVF attacks have been particularly vicious; the group has murdered numerous Catholic civilians with no political or paramilitary affiliations, including an 18-year-old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a Protestant boyfriend. LVF terrorists also have conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in Irish border towns. From 2000 to August 2005, the LVF engaged in a violent feud with other Loyalists, which left several men dead. The group said in October that it would stand down its “military units”, but the Independent Monitoring Commission has no evidence of the LVF disbanding.

**Strength**  
Small, perhaps dozens of active members.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
**Location/Area of Operation**
Northern Ireland and Ireland.

**External Aid**
None.

**New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)**
a.k.a. Brigate Rosse/Partito Comunista Combattente

**Description**
This Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Brigades, active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to ideology, both groups share the same symbol, a five-pointed star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy’s foreign and labor policies and to NATO.

**Activities**
Italian authorities in 2003 captured at least seven members of the BR/PCC, dealing the terrorist group a severe blow to its operational effectiveness. The BR/PCC continued to suffer setbacks in 2004 and 2005, with its leadership in prison, key suspects convicted and sentenced, and additional arrests made. In June, a Rome court sentenced five BR/PCC members to life in prison for the 2002 assassination of Labor Ministry external adviser Marco Biagi. One month later, three of the five also were found guilty of assassinating Labor Ministry external adviser Massimo D’Antona in 1999, again incurring a life sentence. An additional nine BR/PCC suspects were sentenced to between four and nine years, and some convicted members provided valuable information to Italian authorities, leading to additional arrests. In December 2005, an Italian judge refused to pardon Adriano Sofri, leader of Continuous Struggle (Lotta Continua), a precursor movement to the Red Brigades, whose life sentence was suspended for health reasons. The BR/PCC has financed its activities through armed robberies.

**Strength**
Fewer than 20.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Italy.

**External Aid**
Has obtained weapons from abroad.

**People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)**
a.k.a. Muslims Against Global Oppression
Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders

^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
**Description**  
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and its ally Qibla (an Islamic fundamentalist group that favors political Islam and takes an anti-U.S. and anti-Israel stance) view the South African Government as a threat to Islamic values. The two groups work to promote a greater political voice for South African Muslims. PAGAD has used front names such as Muslims Against Global Oppression and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders when launching anti-Western protests and campaigns.

**Activities**  
PAGAD formed in November 1995 as a vigilante group in reaction to crime in some neighborhoods of Cape Town. In September 1996, a change in the group’s leadership resulted in a change in the group’s goal, and it began to support a violent jihad to establish an Islamic state. Between 1996 and 2000, PAGAD conducted a total of 189 bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the western Cape that caused serious injuries. PAGAD’s targets included South African authorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and Western-associated restaurants. PAGAD is believed to have masterminded the bombing on August 1998, of the Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Since 2001, PAGAD’s violent activities have been severely curtailed by law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts against leading members of the organization. Qibla leadership has organized demonstrations against visiting U.S. dignitaries and other protests, but the extent of PAGAD’s involvement is uncertain.

**Strength**  
Early estimates were several hundred members. Current operational strength is unknown, but probably vastly diminished.

**Location/Area of Operation**  
Operates mainly in the Cape Town area.

**External Aid**  
May have ties to international Islamic extremists.

**Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM)**

**Description**  
The RSM is a Philippines-based Islamic extremist group comprising Christian converts to Islam, many of whom had embraced extremist Islamic ideology while working in the Middle East. RSM promotes the use of violence and terrorism against Philippine Christians and Westerners with the aim of turning the Philippines into an Islamic state.

**Activities**  
The RSM has assisted with the terrorist plots of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Manila and other areas in the northern Philippines. It was involved in ASG’s bombing of SuperFerry 14 in February 2004 and the February 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings, according to Philippine
security officials. In 2005, however, the RSM suffered several major setbacks. In March, Philippine security forces seized more than 1,300 pounds of explosives from an RSM safe house in metropolitan Manila. In October, Philippine intelligence agents arrested RSM leader Ahmad Santos in Zamboanga City and charged him with plotting to bomb high profile targets, including the U.S. Embassy in Manila. Two months later, Philippine security forces arrested another RSM leader in Zamboanga City. Philippine officials subsequently claimed that debriefings of these captives helped them thwart an alleged RSM plot to conduct attacks in Manila during the Christmas holiday season.

**Strength**
The exact number of members in the RSM is unknown, but the group likely has fewer than 100 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**
The RSM operates throughout the Philippines and maintains a significant presence in metropolitan Manila. Some RSM operatives likely trained alongside members of the Abu Sayyaf Group and other militants in the southern Philippines.

**External Aid**
The Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah have provided training, funds, and operational assistance to the RSM. Some Middle East-based non-governmental organizations and other sympathizers also may provide funds to the RSM.

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**Red Hand Defenders (RHD)**

**Description**
The RHD is an extremist terrorist group formed in 1998 and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from Loyalist groups observing a cease-fire. RHD seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January 2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schools in Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimate targets. Despite calls in February 2002 by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its disbandment, RHD continued to make threats and issue claims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often used by elements of the banned UDA and LVF. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.

**Activities**
In early 2003, the RHD claimed responsibility for killing two UDA members as a result of what is described as Loyalist internecine warfare. It also claimed responsibility for a bomb that was left in the offices of Republican Sinn Fein in West Belfast, although the device was defused and no one was injured. In recent years, the group has carried out numerous pipe

[^] Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
[V] Designated under Executive Order 13224.
bombings and arson attacks against “soft” civilian targets such as homes, churches, and private businesses. In January 2002, the group bombed the home of a prison official in North Belfast. Twice in 2002 the group claimed responsibility for attacks -- the murder of a Catholic postman and a Catholic teenager -- that were later claimed by the UDA-UFF, further blurring distinctions between the groups. In 2001, RHD claimed responsibility for killing five persons. The RHD has claimed responsibility for hoax bomb devices, and recently has set off petrol bombs and made death threats against local politicians.

**Strength**
Up to 20 members, some of whom have experience in terrorist tactics and bombmaking. Police arrested one member in June 2001 for making a hoax bomb threat.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Northern Ireland.

**External Aid**
None.

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**Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)**

**Description**
The NIPR is a clandestine leftist extremist group that appeared in Rome in 2000. Adopted the logo of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s -- an encircled five point star -- for its declarations. Opposes Italy’s foreign and labor policies. Has targeted property interests rather than personnel in its attacks.

**Activities**
The NIPR has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since an April 2001 bomb attack on a building housing a U.S.-Italian relations association and an international affairs institute in Rome’s historic center. The NIPR claimed to have carried out a bombing in May 2000 in Rome at an oversight committee facility for implementation of the law on strikes in public services.

**Strength**
Possibly 12 members.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Mainly in Rome, Milan, Lazio, and Tuscany.

**External Aid**
None evident.

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^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

Description
RS is a radical leftist group that is anti-Greek establishment and ideologically aligns itself with the Revolutionary Organization 17 November.

Activities
RS first became known when the group conducted a bombing in September 2003 against the courthouse at which the trials of alleged 17 November members were ongoing. In May 2004, the group detonated four improvised explosive devices at a police station in Athens. These two attacks were notable for their apparent attempts to target and kill first responders, the first time a Greek terrorist group had used this tactic. RS also claimed responsibility for a large explosion in December in Constitution Square in the center of Athens, apparently targeting the Ministry of National Economy, injuring three and badly damaging the facade of a post office and other buildings. RS is widely regarded as the most dangerous indigenous Greek terrorist group at this time.

Strength
Likely less than 50 members.

Location/Area of Operation
Athens, Greece.

External Aid
Unknown.

Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM) *

Description
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM), led by Chechen extremist Shamil Basayev, uses terrorism as part of an effort to secure an independent Muslim state in the North Caucasus. Basayev claimed the group was responsible for the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 2004, which culminated in the deaths of about 330 people; simultaneous suicide bombings aboard two Russian civilian airliners in August 2004; and a third suicide bombing outside a Moscow subway that same month. The group has not mounted a terrorist attack since the Beslan operation. The RSRSBCM, whose name translates into English as “Requirements for Getting into Paradise,” was not known to

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
∇ Designated under Executive Order 13224.
Western observers before October 2002, when it participated in the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. The group was designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.

**Activities**
RSRSBCM has primarily engaged in terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Russian and Chechen non-combatants.

**Strength**
Probably no more than 50 fighters at any given time.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Primarily Russia.

**External Aid**
May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahedin.

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**Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)**

**Description**
The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian group that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-Shia, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian revolution. Pakistani President Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002. In August 2002, the SSP renamed itself Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and Musharraf re-banned the group in November 2003. The SSP also has operated as a political party, winning seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly.

**Activities**
The group’s activities range from organizing political rallies calling for Shia to be declared non-Muslims to assassinating prominent Shia leaders. The group was responsible for attacks on Shia worshippers in May 2004, when at least 50 people were killed.

**Strength**
The SSP may have approximately 3,000 to 6,000 trained activists who carry out various kinds of sectarian activities.

**Location/Area of Operation**
The SSP has influence in all four provinces of Pakistan. It is considered to be one of the most powerful sectarian groups in the country.

**External Aid**
The SSP reportedly receives significant funding from Saudi Arabia through wealthy private donors in Pakistan. Funds also are acquired from other sources, including other Sunni extremist groups, madrassas, and contributions by political groups.
Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) * ∧∇

**Description**
The SPIR is one of three Chechen-affiliated terrorist groups that furnished personnel to carry out the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2002. The SPIR has had at least seven commanders since it was founded in the late 1990s. Movsar Barayev, who led and was killed during the theater standoff, was the first publicly identified leader. The group continues to conduct guerrilla operations in Chechnya under its current leader, Amir Aslan, whose true identity is not known. SPIR was designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.

**Activities**
SPIR has primarily engaged in guerrilla operations against Russian forces. Has also been involved in various hostage and ransom operations, including the execution of ethnic Chechens who have cooperated with Russian authorities.

**Strength**
Probably no more than 100 fighters at any given time.

**Location/Area of Operation**
Primarily Russia.

**External Aid**
May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahedin.

Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)* ∧∇
a.k.a. Jama’a Combattante Tunisienne

**Description**
The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as the Jama’a Combattante Tunisienne, seeks to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and has targeted U.S. and Western interests. The group is an offshoot of the banned Tunisian Islamist movement, an-Nahda. Founded around 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the TCG has drawn members from the Tunisian diaspora in Europe and elsewhere. It has lost some of its leadership, but may still exist, particularly in Western Europe. Belgian authorities arrested Maaroufi in late 2001 and sentenced him to six years in prison in 2003 for his role in the assassination of anti-Taliban commander Ahmed Shah Massoud two days before 9/11. The TCG was designated under EO 13224 in October 2002. Historically, the group has been associated with al-Qaida as well. Members also have ties to other North African extremist groups. The TCG was designated for sanctions under UNSCR 1333 in December 2000.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
∧ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
∇ Designated under Executive Order 13224.
Activities
Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international terrorist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected of planning an attack against the U.S., Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in April 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

Strength
Unknown.

Location/Area of Operation
Western Europe and Afghanistan.

External Aid
Unknown.

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)

Description
MRTA is a traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group active in the 1960s. It aims to establish a Marxist regime and to rid Peru of all imperialist elements, primarily U.S. and Japanese influence. Peru’s counterterrorist program has diminished the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks, and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprisonment or deaths of senior leaders, and the loss of leftist support.

Activities
MRTA previously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drastically. In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupied the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima and held 72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forces stormed the residence in April 1997, rescuing all but one of the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group members, including the remaining leaders. The group has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since and appears more focused on obtaining the release of imprisoned MRTA members, although there are reports of low-level rebuilding efforts.

Strength
Believed to be no more than 100 members, consisting largely of young fighters who lack leadership skills and experience.
Location/Area of Operation
Peru, with supporters throughout Latin America and Western Europe. Many exiled members live in Bolivia. Controls no territory.

External Aid
None.

Turkish Hizballah*^  

Description
Turkish Hizballah is a Kurdish Sunni Islamic terrorist organization that arose in the early 1980s in response to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s secularist approach of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Turkish Hizballah spent its first 10 years fighting the PKK, accusing the group of atrocities against Muslims in southeastern Turkey, where Turkish Hizballah seeks to establish an independent Islamic state.

Activities
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Turkish Hizballah, which is unrelated to Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base and modus operandi from killing PKK militants to conducting low-level bombings against liquor stores, bordellos, and other establishments the organization considered “anti-Islamic.” In January 2000, Turkish security forces killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish Hizballah, in a shootout at a safe house in Istanbul. The incident sparked a year-long series of counterterrorist operations against the group that resulted in the detention of some 2,000 individuals; authorities arrested several hundred of them on criminal charges. At the same time, police recovered nearly 70 bodies of Turkish and Kurdish businessmen and journalists whom Turkish Hizballah had tortured and brutally murdered during the mid-to-late 1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish interests in January 2001, when its operatives assassinated the Diyarbakir police chief in the group’s most sophisticated operation to date. Turkish Hizballah has not conducted a major operation since 2001, and probably is focusing at present on recruitment, fundraising, and reorganization.

Strength
Possibly a few hundred members and several thousand supporters.

Location/Area of Operation
Primarily the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey.

External Aid
It is widely believed that Turkey’s security apparatus originally backed Turkish Hizballah to help the Turkish Government combat the PKK. Alternative views are that the Turkish

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* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.
^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
Government ignored Turkish Hizballah activities because its primary targets were PKK members and supporters, or that the government simply had to prioritize scarce resources and was unable to wage war on both groups simultaneously. Allegations of collusion have never been laid to rest, and the Government of Turkey continues to issue denials. Turkish Hizballah also is suspected of having ties with Iran, although there is not sufficient evidence to establish a link.

Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF) *^  

Description  
The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest Loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organization for Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA membership. The UDA/UFF declared a series of cease-fires between 1994 and 1998. In September 2001, the UDA/UFF’s Inner Council withdrew its support for Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement. The following month, after a series of murders, bombings, and street violence, the British Government ruled the UDA/UFF’s cease-fire defunct. The dissolution of the organization’s political wing, the Ulster Democratic Party, soon followed. In January 2002, however, the UDA created the Ulster Political Research Group to serve in a similar capacity. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.

Activities  
The UDA/UFF has evolved into a criminal organization deeply involved in drug trafficking and other moneymaking criminal activities through six largely independent "brigades." It also has been involved in murder, shootings, arson, assaults, and exiling. According to the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), "the UDA has the capacity to launch serious, if crude, attacks." Some UDA activities of a sectarian nature directed at the Catholic community are aimed at so-called “soft” targets, and often have taken place at the interface between the Protestant and Catholic communities, especially in Belfast. The organization continues to be involved in targeting individual Catholics and has undertaken attacks against retired and serving prison officers. The IMC blamed the UDA/UFF, along with the Ulster Volunteer Force, for a September armed attack on police and soldiers during a parade in Whiterock. The IMC also said that the UDA/UFF was responsible for the murder of a fellow UDA member in October.

Strength  
Estimates vary from 2,000 to 5,000 members, with several hundred active in paramilitary operations.

* Listed on the UN 1267 Committee List.  
^ Listed on the Terrorist Exclusion List.
Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland.

External Aid
Probably obtains weapons from abroad.

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

Description
The UVF is a Loyalist terrorist group formed in 1966 to oppose liberal reforms in Northern Ireland that members feared would lead to unification of Ireland. The group adopted the name of an earlier organization formed in 1912 to combat Home Rule for Ireland. The UVF’s goal is to maintain Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom; to that end, it has killed some 550 persons since 1966. The UVF and its offshoots have been responsible for some of the most vicious attacks of “The Troubles”, including horrific sectarian killings like those perpetrated in the 1970s by the UVF-affiliated “Shankill Butchers.” In October 1994, the Combined Loyalist Military Command, which included the UVF, declared a cease-fire, and the UVF’s political wing, the Progressive Unionist Party, has played an active role in the peace process. Despite the cease-fire, the organization has been involved in a series of bloody feuds with other Loyalist paramilitary organizations, although the UVF is considering a stand-down similar to that of the Irish Republican Army. The Red Hand Defenders is linked to the UVF.

Activities
The UVF has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. UVF members have been linked to recent racial attacks on minorities; however, the UVF leadership reportedly did not authorize these assaults. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets include nationalist civilians, Republican paramilitary groups, and, on occasion, rival Loyalist paramilitary groups. The UVF is a relatively disciplined organization with a centralized command. The Independent Monitoring Commission has said that the UVF was responsible for four killings in 2005.

Strength
Unclear, but probably several hundred supporters, with a smaller number of hard-core activists. Police counterterrorist operations and internal feuding have reduced the group’s strength and capabilities.

Location/Area of Operation
Northern Ireland. Some support on the UK mainland.

External Aid
Suspected in the past of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers overseas.
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

Description
Northeast India’s most prominent insurgent group, ULFA — an ethnic secessionist organization in the Indian state of Assam, which borders Bangladesh and Bhutan — was founded in 1979 at Rang Ghar during anti-foreigner agitation organized by the state’s powerful students’ union. The group’s objective is an independent Assam, reflected in its ideology of “Oikya, Biplab, Mukti” (“Unity, Revolution, Freedom”). ULFA enjoyed widespread support in upper Assam in its initial years, especially from 1985 to 1992. ULFA’s kidnappings, killings, and extortion led New Delhi to ban the group and start a military offensive against it in 1990, which forced it to go underground. ULFA began to lose popularity in the late 1990s after it increasingly targeted civilians, including a prominent NGO activist. It lost further support for its anti-Indian stand during the 1999 Kargil conflict. In recent years, the group has been in decline, losing popular support and suffering from aggressive counterinsurgency operations by Indian security forces. The Royal Bhutan Army’s attack on ULFA camps in Bhutan in 2003 and the suspension of operations by Bodo tribal insurgent groups in Assam also have contributed to the group’s decline. Despite the ban on the group, New Delhi held official talks with ULFA’s representative Peace Consultative Group in October.

Activities
ULFA trains, finances, and equips its cadres for a "liberation struggle", while extortion helps finance military training and weapons purchases. ULFA conducts hit-and-run operations on security forces in Assam, selective assassinations, and explosions in public places. During the 1980s and 1990s, ULFA undertook a series of abductions and murders, particularly of businessmen. In 2000, ULFA assassinated an Assam state minister. In 2003, ULFA killed more than 60 “outsiders” in Assam, mainly residents of the bordering state of Bihar. Some important ULFA functionaries surrendered in Assam, but incidents of violence continue, although of a lesser magnitude than in the past. In 2004, ULFA started targeting civilians and killed some 14 people in August that year.

Strength
ULFA’s earlier strength of more than 3,000 dropped following the December 2003 attack on its camps in Bhutan. Total cadre strength now is estimated at several hundred, plus supporters providing safe houses and logistical and intelligence assistance.

Location/Area of Operation
ULFA is active in the state of Assam, and members transit and periodically conduct operations in parts of the neighboring states of Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya and Nagaland. All ULFA camps in Bhutan are reportedly demolished.

External Aid
ULFA reportedly procures and trades in arms with other Northeast Indian groups.
FOREWORD:

Consistent with its statutory mission to serve as the U.S. Government's knowledge bank on international terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing the Department of State with required statistical information to assist in the satisfaction of its reporting requirements under Section 2656f of Title 22 of the U.S. Code. The statistical information included in this Annex to the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism is drawn from the data NCTC maintains on the www.nctc.gov website. This Annex includes:

- this Foreword, which provides important context for the contents of this Annex;
- a methodology section that explains how the data was compiled and the inherent limitations of the data;
- content boxes intended to summarize and, where appropriate, break down the aggregate number of incidents of terrorism in 2005, more information about which is found on the www.nctc.gov website.

Section 2656f(b) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code requires the State Department to include in its annual report on terrorism "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year." While NCTC keeps statistics on the annual number of incidents of "terrorism," its ability to track the specific groups responsible for each incident involving killings, kidnappings, and injuries is significantly limited by the availability of reliable open source information, particularly for events involving small numbers of casualties. The statistical material compiled in this Annex, therefore, is drawn from the number of incidents of "terrorism" that occurred in 2005, which is the closest figure that it is practicable for NCTC to supply in satisfaction of the above-referenced statistical requirements. In deriving its figures for incidents of terrorism, NCTC applies the definition of "terrorism" that appears in the 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), i.e., "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

The figures in this Annex are not directly comparable to statistics reported in pre-2005 editions of Patterns of Global Terrorism, or to the figures NCTC reported in 2005. Those figures were compiled on the basis of a more limited methodology tied to the definition of "international terrorism," which is also contained in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f. Subject to changes in reporting statutes, NCTC anticipates that future statistics provided by NCTC for the Country Reports on Terrorism will (like this year's report) be tied to the broader definition of "terrorism."

To establish the repository for the U.S. Government's database on terrorist incidents, in 2005 NCTC unveiled the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), a data management system with a more comprehensive dataset than those used in previous years. The NCTC website, available on the Internet at www.nctc.gov, allows public access to WITS to facilitate an open and transparent look at the NCTC data. NCTC will ensure that data posted to the website is updated as often as necessary. Thus, the NCTC website must be viewed as a living document, regularly incorporating information about prior incidents as well as current events. As information on specific incidents is revealed through court cases or criminal investigations, for example, NCTC reviews its files and updates the relevant incident data.
NCTC cautions against placing too much weight on any set of incident data alone to gauge success or failure against the forces of terrorism. For a number of reasons, NCTC does not believe that a simple comparison of the total number of incidents from year to year provides a meaningful measure:

- Approximately one half of the incidents in the NCTC database involve no loss of life. Note also that an attack that damages a pipeline and a car bomb attack that kills 100 civilians may each count as one incident in the database. Thus, an incident count alone does not provide a complete picture.

- The nature of this exercise necessarily involves incomplete and ambiguous information, particularly as it is dependent on open source reporting. The quality, accuracy, and volume of such reporting vary significantly from country to country. Thus, determining whether an incident is politically motivated can be difficult and highly subjective, particularly if the incident does not involve mass casualties.

- As additional information sources are found, and as more information becomes available, particularly from remote parts of the globe, NCTC will continue to enrich the database, revising and updating the tabulation of incidents as necessary. Thus, this data cannot be meaningfully compared to previous years since it suggests that attacks on civilians may have been occurring at a substantially higher rate than was reflected in previous years’ reporting and accounting.

- Counting protocols inevitably require judgment calls. Events identified as simultaneous and coordinated, for example, would be recorded as one incident, as would be attacks that subsequently targeted first-responders. For instance, on August 17, 2005, there were approximately 450 small bomb attacks in Bangladesh. Because they were coordinated, NCTC counted them as one incident; an argument could be made that they represented 450 separate attacks.

Despite these limitations, tracking incidents of terrorism can help us understand some important trends, including the geographic distribution of incidents and information about the perpetrators and their victims. Year-to-year changes in the gross number of incidents across the globe, however, may tell us little about the international community’s effectiveness in preventing these incidents, and thus reducing the capacity of terrorists to advance their agenda through violence against the innocent.
Methodology Used to Compile NCTC’s Database of Terrorist Incidents

Over the course of the past year, NCTC, working with a panel of terrorism experts, has revised the methodology for counting terrorist incidents, basing it on the broader statutory definition of “terrorism” rather than that of “international terrorism,” on which the NCTC based its incident counting in previous years. The broader definition and revisions in cataloging have resulted in a larger, more comprehensive set of incident data, all of which can now be found on NCTC's website, www.nctc.gov.

The data provided on the website are based on the statutory definition set forth in the Foreword to this Annex. Accordingly, the incidents NCTC has catalogued in the database are those which, based on available open source information, meet the criteria for “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Determination of what constitutes an incident of terrorism, however, is sometimes based on incomplete information and may be open to interpretation. The perpetrator’s specific motivation, whether political or otherwise, is not always clear, nor is the perpetrator’s identity always evident. Moreover, additional information may become available over time, affecting the accuracy of initial judgments about incidents. Users of this database should therefore recognize that expert opinions may differ on whether a particular incident constitutes terrorism or some other form of political violence.

NCTC has made every effort to limit the degree of subjectivity involved in the judgments. In the interests of transparency NCTC has adopted counting rules which require that terrorists must have initiated and executed the attack for it to be included in the database; foiled attacks, as well as hoaxes, are not included in the database. Spontaneous (i.e., non-premeditated) hate crimes without intent to cause mass casualties are excluded to the greatest extent practicable.

What is a “noncombatant”?

Under the statutory definition of “terrorism” NCTC uses to compile its database, the victim must be a “noncombatant.” However, that term is left open to interpretation by the statute. For the purposes of the WITS database, the term "combatant" was interpreted to mean military, paramilitary, militia, and police under military command and control, in specific areas or regions where war zones or war-like settings exist. Further distinctions were drawn depending on the particular country involved and the role played by the military and police, e.g., where national security forces are indistinguishable from police and/or military forces. Noncombatants therefore included civilians and civilian police and military assets outside of war zones and war-like settings. Diplomatic assets, including personnel, embassies, consulates, and other facilities, were also considered noncombatant targets.

1 Users who wish to determine the number of incidents of “international terrorism” (i.e., incidents that involve the territory or citizens of two or more countries) will find these incidents included in the WITS database.
Although only acts of violence against noncombatant targets were counted as terrorism incidents, consistent with the statutory definition of terrorism, for purposes of the WITS database, if those incidents also resulted in the death of combatant victims, all victims (combatant and noncombatant) were tallied. In an incident where combatants were the target of the event, non-combatants who were incidentally harmed were designated “collateral” and the incident excluded from the posted data set. For example, if terrorists attacked a military base in Iraq and wounded one civilian bystander, that victim would be deemed collateral, and the incident would not be counted.

In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all incidents and to distinguish terrorism from the numerous other forms of violence, including crime and sectarian violence, in light of imperfect information. The distinction between terrorism and insurgency in Iraq is especially challenging, as Iraqis participate in the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and other terrorist network as well as in tribal and sectarian violence. Therefore, some combatants may be included as victims in some incidents when their presence was incidental to an attack intended for noncombatants. We note, however, that because of the difficulty in gathering data on Iraq and Afghanistan, the dataset may not provide an accurate account of all incidents of terrorism in these two countries.

What is “politically motivated violence”?

The statutory definition also requires the attack to be “politically motivated.” NCTC has adopted a series of counting rules to assist in the data compilation. Any life-threatening attack or kidnapping by any "Foreign Terrorist Organization" or group appearing on the list of "Other Organizations of Concern" is deemed politically motivated. Similarly, any serious attack by any organization or individual against a government/diplomatic official or a government/diplomatic building is deemed politically motivated and is therefore considered terrorism. On the other hand, any attack that is primarily criminal or economic in nature or is an instance of mob violence is considered not to be “politically motivated.” Similarly, any terrorist organization actions that are primarily intended to enable future terrorist attacks (robbing a bank or selling narcotics for the purpose of raising money, for example) are not considered terrorism.

In between these relatively clear-cut cases, there is a degree of subjectivity. In general, NCTC counting rules consider that attacks by unknown perpetrators against either unknown victims or infrastructure are not demonstrably political and therefore are not terrorism. However, there are exceptions to this general rule: if such an attack occurs in areas in which there is significant insurgency, unrest, or political instability, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the attack may be considered terrorism; or if the attack occurs in a region free of such political violence but involves something more than a shooting (for instance, improvised explosive device, beheading, etc.), the attack may, depending on the circumstances, be considered terrorism. Finally, if low-level attacks against noncombatant targets begin to suggest the existence of a chronic problem, the attacks may be considered terrorism.
NCTC Observations Related to 2005 Terrorist Incidents Statistical Material

According to the counting rules utilized by NCTC and the data available on April 7, 2006, approximately 11,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2005 and resulted in over 14,600 deaths.

- Iraq accounted for just over 30% of the worldwide attacks (approximately 3500) and 55% of the fatalities (approximately 8300).

- Approximately 630 attacks accounted for just over 50% of the total fatalities (7450 out of 14,600); approximately 6000 attacks (almost 54% of the total) were against facilities and/or resulted in no casualties.

- Although most Sunni extremist attacks appear to have been conducted by various affiliated groups, few could be linked to what remains of the al-Qaida central leadership, according to available information.

- Muslims bore a significant share of the burden of terrorist attacks in 2005. Of approximately 40,000 individuals worldwide killed or wounded by terrorist attacks, based on a combination of reporting and demographic analysis of the countries involved, at least 10,000-15,000 victims were Muslim, most of which were in Iraq.

- Several identifiable categories of noncombatants also bore a significant brunt of terrorism in 2005. Approximately 6,600 police, 1000 children, 300 government officials, 170 clergy/religious figures, 140 teachers, and 110 journalists were killed or wounded by terrorists in 2005.

- Armed attacks and bombings accounted for the vast majority of fatalities in 2005. Suicide attacks rose in a number of countries; approximately 360 suicide bombings accounted for about 20% of all deaths (approximately 3000 fatalities).

- In Afghanistan there were 4 suicide attacks in the first half of 2005 and 16 in the last half. However, despite the growth in attacks, the number of casualties in the latter half of 2005 declined. In the last 6 attacks of 2005 only one person was killed.

- No attacks approached the sophistication of those on 9/11, and 2005 saw many attacks perpetrated by relatively unskilled operatives. Nevertheless, technology has empowered the terrorists; the use of coordinated attacks in different locations, initial attacks followed by those directed at first responders, and the novel use of traditional and improved explosives all contributed to deadly attacks in 2005.

The State Department reported that 56 Americans were killed in terrorist attacks in 2005; 47 of these fatalities occurred in Iraq.
### Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide, 2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents of terrorism worldwide</td>
<td>11,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one individual</td>
<td>8,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in the death of at least one individual</td>
<td>5,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in the death of zero individuals</td>
<td>5,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in the death of only one individual</td>
<td>2,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in the death of at least 10 individuals</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in the injury of at least one individual</td>
<td>3,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents resulting in the kidnapping of at least one individual</td>
<td>1,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals worldwide killed, injured or kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism</td>
<td>74,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals worldwide killed as a result of incidents of terrorism</td>
<td>14,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals worldwide injured as a result of incidents of terrorism</td>
<td>24,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals worldwide kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism</td>
<td>34,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Incidents of Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents of terrorism in Iraq</td>
<td>3,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents in Iraq resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one individual</td>
<td>2,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals in Iraq killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism</td>
<td>20,711</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents of terrorism in Afghanistan</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents in Afghanistan resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one individual</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals in Afghanistan killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism</td>
<td>1,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In all cases limited to incidents targeting noncombatants.*
The term "Private U.S. Citizen" refers to any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. Government; therefore these figures do not include, for example, U.S. military personnel killed or injured in a terrorism-related incident while on active duty or employees of the Department of State and other federal agencies. Members of U.S. Government employees’ households are considered private U.S. citizens.

Although every effort was made to include all terrorism-related deaths and injuries involving private U.S. citizens, the figures below reflect only those cases reported to, or known by, the U.S. Department of State, and may not reflect actual numbers of injured, which may not always be reported depending on their severity. As NCTC also notes, in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all incidents and to distinguish terrorism from the numerous other forms of violence.

| U.S. citizens worldwide killed as a result of incidents of terrorism | 56 |
| U.S. citizens worldwide injured as a result of incidents of terrorism | 17 |
| U.S. citizens worldwide kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism | 11 |

*In all cases limited to incidents targeting noncombatants.

### Terrorism Deaths of Private U.S. Citizens in 2005 (by country)

#### Afghanistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kandahar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Egypt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 23</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sharm el-Sheik</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Iraq:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mosul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nasiria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Balad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hilla, Near Biap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
April 1    1   Fallujah
April 16   1   Baghdad
April 20   2   Baghdad
April 21   6   Tikrit
April 21   1   Ramadi
May 7      2   Baghdad
May 10     1   Ramadi
May 12     1   Baghdad
June 3     1   Camp Victory
June 4     1   Baghdad
June 27    1   Baghdad
July 3     1   Baghdad
August 3   1   Basrah
August 20  1   North of Kalsu
August 23  1   Baqubah
September 4 1   Balad
September 4 1   Baghdad
September 7 4   Basrah
September 19 4   Mosul
September 20 3   Near Balad
October 1  1   Ramadi
November 17 1   Balad
December 22 1   Baguba

Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Near Tulkarm, West Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jordan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Kingdom:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Terrorism Injuries of Private U.S. Citizens in 2005 (by country)

Egypt:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cairo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indonesia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jordan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Amman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

United Kingdom:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Terrorism Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens in 2005 (by country)**

Iraq:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 12^</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Taji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22^</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 10^</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 7^</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mansour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Baghdad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Incident</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 12^</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Khan Younis [Gaza]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^Date rescued/released