In late December 2003, the President of the Iraqi Governing Council wrote to the UN Secretary-General asking whether elections in Iraq were feasible by June 30, 2004; and if not, by what alternative means an Interim Government could be formed, to which sovereignty would be restored. On January 19, 2004, the Security Council met with the Chair of the Iraqi Governing Council, who reiterated and clarified these questions. The United States and the United Kingdom joined the Chair in expressing their support for the UN’s re-engagement in Iraq. Soon thereafter, UN Secretary-General Annan responded positively to Iraq’s request and named Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) as his Special Advisor, charged with playing a role in Iraq’s political transition process. Brahimi subsequently led a small team of political and electoral experts to Iraq in February. The findings of his visit were presented to the Security Council as a report of the Secretary-General on February 23. The report included recommendations for preparations for elections to be held by January 2005.

The Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on March 24 welcoming and strongly supporting the Secretary-General’s decision to dispatch Brahimi and an electoral assistance team to Iraq as soon as possible. Brahimi and the electoral assistance team would lend assistance and advice to the Iraqi people in the formation of an Iraqi interim government to which sovereignty would be transferred on June 30, as well as in preparation for direct elections to be held in 2005.

On April 21, the Council adopted Resolution 1538, which welcomed the appointment of the independent high-level inquiry for the investigation of the Oil-For-Food Program and called on the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, and all other member states to cooperate fully with the inquiry.

On April 27, Brahimi briefed the Security Council on UN efforts in Iraq. The Council issued a press statement immediately thereafter in support of Brahimi’s ideas for the formation of an interim Iraqi Government. The statement also encouraged the Secretary-General and Brahimi to continue diligently with their efforts and welcomed the Special Adviser’s intention to return to Iraq shortly. The Council also called on all Iraqi parties to cooperate fully with Brahimi and urged Iraq’s neighbors and the international community at-large to lend support to these efforts.

In late May, the United States and United Kingdom circulated a draft text of a new resolution on Iraq which endorsed the imminent transfer of full responsibility and authority for governing Iraq to the Interim Government of
Iraq, further defined the UN role in Iraq, extended the mandate for the Multinational Force (MNF), extended the mandate for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for the DFI, and called on the international community to provide assistance in several areas, including reconstruction, political, security, and humanitarian efforts. The draft text also noted the Council’s intent to revisit the mandates for the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (on weapons and prohibited missiles) and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

On June 3, the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed the Security Council, urging the Council to adopt the draft resolution to endorse the establishment of the sovereign interim government as soon as possible to support the ongoing political process. He also reaffirmed Iraq’s need to control its own resources, and recognized Iraq’s need for the continued presence of a multinational force in partnership with the Iraqi authorities. The United States encouraged adoption of the text of the draft resolution under consideration.

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1546 on June 8. Annexed to the resolution were letters from Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell which further addressed the MNF’s scope of action as well as the intended establishment of an MNF-Iraqi security partnership. The letter from the Secretary of State also noted the intention to create a distinct entity under unified command of the MNF with a dedicated mission to provide security for the UN presence in Iraq.

On June 30, the Security Council issued a statement welcoming the handover of full responsibility and authority for governing Iraq to the fully sovereign and independent Interim Government of Iraq on June 28, thus ending the occupation of the country, and condemning, in the strongest terms, the continued violence in Iraq.

The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was initially established by Resolution 1500 (2003) for a one-year period to support the Secretary-General in fulfilling his mandate under Resolution 1483 (2003), and to consolidate UN activities. On August 12, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1557, which the United States and the United Kingdom drafted. The resolution extended UNAMI’s mandate for an additional 12 months; stated the Council’s intention to review the mandate in one year or sooner, if requested by the Iraqi Government; and reaffirmed that the United Nations should play a leading role in assisting the Iraqi people and government in the formation of institutions for representative government.

During the reporting period, the United States, on behalf of the MNF and the Coalition Provisional Authority, presented a total of six reports regarding their respective activities in Iraq, pursuant to Resolutions 1483, 1511, and 1546.

Arab-Israeli Situation

Even as violent events continued to unfold in the Middle East, the United States actively pursued in the United Nations President Bush’s vision
of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. To this end, in 2004 the United States continued to work in partnership with the other members of the Quartet (the United Nations, the European Union (EU), and Russia) to realize the Quartet’s Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the “Roadmap”).

In March, the United States vetoed a draft Security Council resolution sponsored by Algeria and Libya condemning Israel for the killing of Hamas leader Shaikh Yassin. In explaining its vote, the United States noted that the resolution was flawed because it was silent about terrorist actions committed by Hamas, did not reflect the realities of the conflict in the Middle East, and would not further the goals of peace and security in the region.

The United States was unable to prevent adoption in May of General Assembly Resolution 58/292 on the Status of the Occupied Territories including East Jerusalem, which received the support of the EU. The United States raised concerns that the resolution contradicted previous Quartet statements that no party should take unilateral actions that seek to predetermine issues that can only be resolved through negotiation and agreement between the two parties.

Also in May, the United States abstained on the otherwise unanimous Security Council Resolution 1544, which expressed concern about Israeli destruction of Palestinian homes in the Gaza Strip. In explaining its abstention, the United States noted that Israel had the right to act to defend itself and its citizens but its operations in Gaza did not serve the purposes of peace and security. However, because the resolution failed to address the broader context of events in Gaza, including terrorists groups smuggling weapons into Gaza, the United States did not support the resolution.

In December 2003, the emergency special session of the General Assembly had adopted Resolution ES-10/14, which requested the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to render an advisory opinion on the “legal consequences” of Israeli construction of a barrier in areas of the West Bank. In response to the ICJ’s July 9, 2004, advisory opinion that “deemed construction...contrary to international law,” Arab states in the General Assembly called for an emergency special session in which it adopted Resolution ES-10/15. This resolution demanded that Israel comply with the advisory opinion by, among other things, the cessation of construction and requesting the Secretary-General to establish a register for damages caused by the construction. In explaining its opposition to the resolution, the United States reiterated that a durable solution could only be found in a negotiated settlement and that the resolution diverted attention from practical efforts to move the parties toward the goal of two states living side-by-side in peace and security.

On October 5, the United States vetoed an Algerian, Pakistani, and Tunisian cosponsored resolution condemning Israeli actions in the Northern Gaza strip and demanding Israeli military withdrawal. In its explanation of
vote, the United States characterized the draft as unbalanced, rife with material omissions, and lacking in credibility.

On December 10, the United States, together with all EU member states, Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the Russian Federation, formally requested the Secretary-General to convene a special session of the General Assembly on January 25, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps. The broad support for this special session represented a significant achievement in Israel’s efforts to focus UN attention on issues of importance to Israel.

In the 59th UN General Assembly regular session, 19 resolutions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and related issues were introduced; all were adopted. The United States opposed 17 of these resolutions because they addressed final status issues that the Israelis and Palestinians have agreed to decide through negotiations; advocated activities or language incompatible with basic principles of the Middle East peace process; and expended resources that could be used in more productive ways to improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

The United States made progress in the General Assembly toward its goal of cutting into the large, automatic majorities by which these recurring resolutions have usually been adopted. U.S. lobbying marginally increased the number of “no” votes and abstentions over 2003.

The United States supported a resolution that addressed humanitarian assistance to Palestinian people. In 2004, the United States provided $127 million to the UN Relief and Works Agency, the UN agency charged with providing humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees. The United States remained the largest single donor to that agency.

Throughout the year, U.S. representatives spoke out forcefully and frequently in numerous UN bodies to ensure that Israel was not excluded from or isolated at UN meetings and conferences, that Israel be included in the Western European and Others Group and UN counterparts outside of New York, and that Israeli interests were given fair consideration.

**UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established by UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 in March 1978. These measures responded to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon following a Palestinian Liberation Organization attack inside Israel. UNIFIL’s mandate included confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, assisting the Government of Lebanon in restoring its effective authority, and contributing to the restoration of international peace and security in the region. In a report to the Security Council in 2000, the Secretary-General asserted that UNIFIL’s remaining task was restoring international peace and security to the area.

In 2004, UNIFIL reported numerous armed encounters in violation of the Line of Withdrawal, or “Blue Line,” by Israeli Defense Forces, Hizballah, and armed Palestinian elements. Hizballah attacked Israeli positions in the
Sheb’a Farms area with rockets, mortar, and small arms fire. Hizballah also directed anti-aircraft fire into Israeli territory. Israel responded to these attacks with aerial bombs, mortars, and helicopter gunship fire. Armed Palestinian groups also fired rockets toward Israel, prompting an Israeli retaliatory air strike on Naameh, 15 kilometers south of Beirut. UNIFIL recorded numerous airspace violations by Israeli military aircraft and the launch of a drone into Israeli territory by Hizballah.

UN-assessed costs for UNIFIL totaled $46.8 million in 2004. The U.S. contribution totaled $10.5 million. As of December 31, UNIFIL had 1,995 troops from seven nations. No U.S. troops served in UNIFIL.

**UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was the first UN peacekeeping mission. In 1948, the Security Council established the UNTSO under Resolution 50 to supervise the truce called for by the Council at the end of the British mandate in Palestine. Since then, the UNTSO has supervised the implementation and observance of the general agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Following the 1967 Middle East War, UNTSO took on cease-fire monitoring responsibilities in the Israel-Syria sector and the Suez Canal Zone. In 1972, the Council established a similar operation in southern Lebanon. The Council also directed the unarmed UNTSO military observers to assist UN peacekeeping forces deployed in the Sinai (1973), on the Golan Heights (1974), as well as in southern Lebanon (1978).

In 2004, UNTSO helped maintain a stabilizing presence in the region, including providing military observers and administrative staff to support the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights. At Egypt’s request, the mission also provided a small monitoring team to patrol the Sinai.

As of December 31, UNTSO had 153 military observers from 23 nations. Three U.S. military observers were assigned to UNTSO. UN-assessed costs for UNTSO totaled $28.2 million in 2004. The U.S. contribution totaled $6.2 million.

**UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. UNDOF plays a positive role in observing the implementation of the Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement and serves U.S. national security interests by maintaining confidence levels and preventing the escalation of tensions between Israel and Syria. The Security Council extends UNDOF’s mandate at six-month intervals. The Security Council renewed UNDOF on December 15, by adopting Resolution 1578.

UNDOF monitors the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, supervises the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, and monitors the areas of separation and limitation between the two countries. In
2004, the security situation in UNDOF’s area of operations remained generally calm.

In 2004, UN-assessed costs for UNDOF totaled $44.3 million; the United States contributed $10.8 million. As of December 31, UNDOF had 1,018 troops from six nations. No U.S. personnel served in UNDOF.

**Lebanon/Syria**

Syrian interference in Lebanon’s electoral process prompted the United States and France to circulate a Security Council resolution intended to preempt foreign interference in Lebanon’s presidential elections. On September 2, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1559. This resolution called for the evacuation of all foreign forces from Lebanon, the disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, and the extension of Lebanese government control over the entire country.

On October 1, Secretary-General Annan reported to the Security Council that he could not certify that the Syrian or Lebanese governments had fulfilled the requirements of Resolution 1559. In particular, he reported that Syria maintained at least 14,000 troops in Lebanon; several armed elements, among them Hizballah, were present in the south of the country; and the Lebanese government had not extended its control over all of its territory. In response, the United States and France drafted a statement, which was adopted by the Council and issued on October 19, welcoming the Secretary-General’s report and requesting that he continue to report to the Council on the implementation of Resolution 1559 every six months. On December 13, Secretary-General Annan appointed Terje-Roed Larsen (Norway) as his Special Envoy for the implementation of Resolution 1559, with the mandate to work with the governments of Lebanon and its neighbors on fulfillment of the resolution and to prepare the requested reports.

**South Asia**

**Afghanistan**

Throughout 2004, the United States worked through the United Nations and with the international community in pursuit of a prosperous, democratic, and self-governing Afghanistan. At the heart of this mission was assisting Afghans as they rebuilt their country under the terms of the Bonn Agreement (2001).

On January 4, the newly-elected Loya Jirga (the national assembly) adopted a constitution which reflected the determination of the Afghan people to move their country towards a stable and democratic state. Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Afghanistan, ended his assignment on January 6, and on February 6, the Secretary-General announced his intention to appoint Jean Arnault (France) as Brahimi’s replacement.

On March 19, the Secretary-General issued a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. The report described the key
challenges to the successful completion of the Bonn Agreement, including voter registration and holding elections; security; progress in the disarmament, remobilization, and reintegration process; attacking the corrupt culture of the drug economy; and human rights.

The Security Council established the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) by Resolution 1401 (2002) with a mandate to facilitate implementation of the Bonn Agreement, including fulfilling the tasks and responsibilities related to human rights, the rule of law, gender issues, and national reconciliation. UNAMA’s mandate also included management of all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities. On March 26, 2004, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1536, which extended UNAMA’s mandate for a further 12 months.

With strong U.S. support, the principal focus of UNAMA in 2004 was to support the development of Afghan institutions. UNAMA and several UN agencies and programs cooperated with Afghan authorities to develop responses to the drought (in its sixth year) and other related humanitarian issues affecting some 4 million Afghans. More than 740,000 refugees returned to Afghanistan in 2004, bringing the total number of returnees assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 2002 to well over 3 million. As a direct result of the UN Mine Action program, the number of mine victims declined from more than 150 per month in 2002 to fewer than 100 per month in 2004.

Meeting in Berlin from March 31 to April 1, the international community reaffirmed its support for the transitional process in Afghanistan, with continued emphasis on security and the generation of financial and other donations. Pledges from donors at this conference totaled $8.2 billion over three years. This level of assistance reflected Afghanistan’s continued importance to U.S. national security, both as a linchpin for regional stability in South Asia and as a central focus of the Global War on Terror. On April 6, the Security Council issued a presidential statement welcoming the results of the Berlin Conference and stressing the need for donors to honor their pledges.

Having taken command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz in December 2003, on July 1, 2004, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed command of the PRT at Mazar-e-Sharif. The United States strongly supported NATO’s leadership of ISAF, and its expansion into northern and western Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, ISAF took control of the PRT at Maimana, and by year’s end had also assumed command of the PRTs at Fayzabad and Baghlan. On September 17, the Security Council extended ISAF’s mandate for a further year by Resolution 1563.

Due to the absence of census data, Afghanistan’s Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) decided in early July that the difficulty in allocating parliamentary seats among provinces made it necessary to delay parliamentary elections until April 2005. The JEMB simultaneously decided to delay the election for president from September 2004 to October 9. This
decision elicited a statement from the President of the Security Council on July 15 in which the Council emphasized the necessity of making good use of the additional time before parliamentary elections to ensure all conditions could be met for free and fair elections.

Critical to Afghanistan’s success was the implementation of the political process outlined in the Bonn Agreement, including establishment of a constitutional, representative, and effective government that embodied the aspirations of all Afghans. Afghanistan made significant progress towards that goal with the successful elections for President on October 9. More than 8.1 million ballots were cast, representing 70 percent of registered voters. An estimated 41.3 percent of voters were women. From a field of 18 candidates, Hamid Karzai was elected the country’s first democratically chosen head of state, winning 55.4 percent of the vote. The United States worked closely with the Afghan Government and UNAMA to assist the JEMB in conducting what was generally judged to be a credible electoral process. On October 12, the Security Council issued a presidential statement congratulating the Afghan people for this historic event.

Narcotics production in Afghanistan continued to be a concern for the United States in 2004. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimated that opium poppy cultivation increased by two-thirds during 2004, reaching 206,000 hectares. Despite the widespread increase in cultivation, bad weather and crop disease reduced the output per hectare, resulting in an overall increase in production of “only” 17 percent. Afghanistan remained the world’s largest producer of opium in 2004, accounting for over 85 percent of global production. Due to excess supply, opium prices declined by 67 percent in 2004 from the year before.

On December 8, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59/112 by consensus. The General Assembly addressed Afghanistan’s continuing quest for peace and security by reiterating the General Assembly’s strong support for the Afghan Transitional Authority in its efforts to successfully implement the Bonn Agreement. Members applauded the adoption of a pluralistic and democratic constitution, the successful presidential election, and the substantial progress towards empowerment of women in the Afghan political process as historic milestones which would help to consolidate durable peace and national stability in the country. The Assembly acknowledged the continuing fragility of the security sector, the uncertainty of which had a profound effect on reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The General Assembly called upon member states to support the Transitional Authority and provide emergency assistance for peace, normalcy, and reconstruction; and encouraged donors to channel assistance through the development budget of the Transitional Authority. The uncontested adoption of this resolution was an important indicator of the substantial international support for the establishment of peace and security in Afghanistan.

The United States contributed $95 million of the $198 million provided by the international community to pay for voter registration political
party development, civic education, polling operations, and logistics. UNAMA cost $67.5 million in 2004. The U.S. contribution was $14.8 million. In addition, the United States contributed $36.3 million to the UNHCR for its work to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees and to provide protection and assistance to refugees remaining in neighboring countries.

**India/Pakistan**

The UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed in January 1949 under UN Security Council Resolution 47 (1948) to supervise the cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In July 1949, India and Pakistan signed the Karachi Agreement establishing a cease-fire line to be supervised by UN observers.

At the end of 1971, hostilities again broke out between India and Pakistan. Following a cease-fire, India and Pakistan agreed in 1972 on a Line of Control which UNMOGIP monitors. UNMOGIP’s functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of cease-fire violations, and submit its findings to the parties and to the UN Secretary-General.

Despite UNMOGIP’s passive role in Kashmir, the United States believes that to de-establish the mission without replacing it with an alternative mechanism could upset the delicate equilibrium, which allowed both sides to meet on a range of bilateral issues, including the status of Kashmir.

UNMOGIP is funded through the UN regular budget rather than the peacekeeping budget. The 2004 annual budget for UNMOGIP was $7.3 million, and the U.S. assessment was $1.6 million. As of late 2004, 44 military observers served in UNMOGIP. No U.S. military personnel were assigned to the mission in 2004.

**Africa**

**Burundi**

In 2004, the United States continued to work in the UN Security Council to support international efforts to assist Burundi’s peace process and promote national reconciliation. The Security Council closely followed the work of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) for Burundi, Carolyn McAskie (Canada), who was appointed on June 1. The SRSG served as the chair of the Monitoring Committee, which ensured the implementation of the Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconstruction in Burundi (2000). The Council also received regular briefings on progress in negotiating an all-inclusive cessation of hostilities agreement with the major Burundi rebel group not party to the peace process, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy, led by Pierre Nkurunziza.

On May 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1545, which established the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) to restore lasting peace as provided under the Arusha Agreement. The resolution, noting the obstacles
remaining to Burundi’s stability and authorizing the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, set deployment of ONUB peacekeepers for an initial six month-period from June 1.

Additionally, on December 1, the Council adopted Resolution 1577. This resolution reaffirmed the Council’s full support for the process of the Arusha Peace Agreement by calling on all the Burundian parties to fully honor their commitments, acknowledging ONUB’s achievements, and extending its mandate until June 1, 2005.

The total ONUB budget for 2004 was $156 million, with a U.S. contribution of $41.6 million. The authorized strength of the ONUB force was 5,650. The United States did not contribute any personnel.

**Cote d’Ivoire**

After a military coup in 1999, Cote d’Ivoire held elections in 2000, in which the Ivorian Supreme Court declared Laurent Gbagbo President. Rebel forces (the Forces Nouvelles) and the Government of Cote d’Ivoire met in January 2003 and signed the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA). However, tensions have continued in Cote d’Ivoire. In January 2004, the ministers of the Forces Nouvelles ended a three-month boycott of the coalition government and began participating in meetings with President Gbagbo. France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) began deploying troops in northern Cote d’Ivoire. Combatants turned in light weapons, and government forces and rebels began withdrawing heavy weapons, pulling back from the Zone of Confidence separating the two sides, and removing roadblocks. However, by late March, disagreements between the two sides led to the opposition again withdrawing from the government. Riots broke out in Abidjan, leaving an estimated 200 dead.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1527 on February 4. The resolution extended the mandate of the UN Mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI) until February 27 to allow the Council time for discussion of the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a peacekeeping operation. On February 27, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1528, creating the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), with an initial mandate of 12 months beginning April 4, subsuming a UN political mission and a force fielded by ECOWAS. UNOCI was authorized up to 6,240 military personnel, including 200 military observers and 200 staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers. In addition, France continued to field its approximately 4,000-strong force (known as the Licorne forces), and was authorized to use all necessary means to support UNOCI.

The Security Council mandated UNOCI, among other tasks, to observe and monitor implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement; contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights; assist the government in monitoring the borders; support the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); support the 2005 presidential elections; and assist the government with restructuring and reforming the
In April, a delegation led by the UN Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, with representatives from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the African Union (AU), and ECOWAS, traveled to Cote d’Ivoire to underline the international community’s concern. The Security Council issued a statement on April 30 underscoring the need for the Ivorian parties to carry out their commitments under LMA and noting the Council’s readiness to take actions against individuals impeding the peace process. Also in April, the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) sent a Commission of Inquiry to look into the violence in March. The National Assembly adopted a law on the status of foreign nationals and began considering other draft legislation, as called for under LMA.

In May, the Commission of Inquiry looking into the March violence blamed all parties for failing to move the peace process forward but concluded that the “highest authorities of the state” were responsible for the violence. The CHR established another Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations of human rights and international humanitarian law which occurred between mid-September 2002 and the signing of the LMA in January 2003. This new Commission of Inquiry arrived in Cote d’Ivoire in July 2004. The Security Council issued a statement on May 25 expressing deep concern about the actions of both sides.

In June, rival groups of the Forces Nouvelles clashed, and rogue Forces Nouvelles elements attacked Licorne and Ivorian armed forces (FANCI) positions; UNOCI assisted the FANCI and Licorne in repelling the attack. A Security Council mission to West Africa visited Abidjan to underline international concern. ECOWAS heads of state, including President Gbagbo, met in Abuja on June 20, and President Gbagbo subsequently urged the National Assembly to adopt legislation called for by the peace agreement. He hosted a meeting for leaders of the parties who had signed the accord; Forces Nouvelles leaders boycotted the session.

In July, the Forces Nouvelles and Ivorian Government met in Accra, under ECOWAS and AU auspices, and agreed on a timetable to get the peace process back on track. The Security Council issued a statement of support. Following the signature of the Accra III Agreement, President Gbagbo issued a decree restoring three opposition ministers, whom he had accused of undermining the peace process and fired in May, to their positions in the government. He also delegated some powers to Prime Minister Diarra to facilitate the implementation of the provisions in the Linas-Marcoussis Accords. However, the parties did not honor deadlines agreed to in Accra, and the Forces Nouvelles did not begin DDR on October 15 as scheduled. The Security Council issued a statement regretting the lack of progress on implementation of the peace agreements.

Demonstrations ensued, and once again opposition leaders began boycotting cabinet meetings. On November 4, FANCI violated the cease-fire
agreement by bombing Forces Nouvelles bases and launching an air attack on the Licorne base in Bouake, killing nine French troops and an American humanitarian worker, and injuring 35 French soldiers. French forces retaliated by destroying the government’s small fleet of aircraft. An upsurge of violence followed. Many expatriates left Cote d’Ivoire and several thousand Ivorians fled to neighboring countries. Also on November 4, the AU asked South African President Mbeki to meet with Ivorian President Gbagbo and work on a political solution in response to the violence; they met on November 9. Six AU heads of state issued a communiqué on November 14 endorsing a Security Council resolution and called for an arms embargo. On November 15, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1572, imposing an immediate arms embargo on Cote d’Ivoire and targeted sanctions (a travel ban and assets freeze) on individuals who constituted a threat to the peace process, were responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, violated the arms embargo, or publicly incited hatred and violence. The targeted sanctions entered into force on December 15, as authorized by Resolution 1572 if the signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements had not fully implemented their commitments by that date.

On December 8, the UN Secretary-General recommended increasing UNOCI’s force strength. Also in December, the National Assembly passed legislation called for under LMA affecting nationality, eligibility for the presidency, and naturalization. The Security Council issued a statement supporting President Mbeki’s peace mediation efforts and delayed implementation of the targeted sanctions while mediation continued.

UNOCI’s budget for 2004 was $307.7 million, of which the United States was assessed $82 million. By the end of 2004, UNOCI’s strength stood at 5,846 troops, 154 military observers, and 215 UN civilian police. No U.S. personnel were assigned to UNOCI.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established by Security Council Resolution 1258 (1999) to assist in the implementation of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Governments of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Security Council Resolution 1533, adopted March 12, 2004, called on member states to enforce the arms embargo and requested MONUC to undertake monitoring. This resolution also created a DRC Sanction Committee. On October 1, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1565, which strengthened MONUC’s mandate and increased its authorized strength to 16,700. MONUC created three joint commissions to assist the transitional government in security sector reform, legislation, and elections. MONUC’s overall objective in DRC is the holding of elections followed by stable, sustainable peace.

In November, the Parliament adopted laws on nationality and voter registration, but by the end of 2004, the Parliament was still discussing other
electoral laws, raising international concerns that the elections would be delayed. MONUC was expected to provide security and logistics for approximately 28 million potential voters for the national elections. Elections are not expected to take place before the end of 2005 or 2006.

During 2004, despite modest progress in the implementation of the transitional government agenda, the security situation in the districts of Ituri and North and South Kivu remained highly volatile due to the lack of central DRC government authority and recurrent fighting among rival armed militias. There were several attacks on MONUC forces in the Ituri district as MONUC forces progressively expanded operations from Bunia, the capital of Ituri. In February, six MONUC boats on Lake Albert carrying human rights workers were attacked. In late 2004, MONUC’s Ituri brigade sustained many incidents of direct fire from armed militias. Regular clashes between rival militias took place in the districts of North and South Kivu. Security along the border with Rwanda deteriorated in late 2004 when Rwanda accused militias of attacks from DRC territory, and the DRC accused Rwanda of sending its troops into DRC. Rwandan threats of a strike against the DRC were followed by a buildup of Rwandan troops along the border with the DRC and high tension among local communities in North and South Kivu. Later, fighting broke out between rival factions of the DRC armed forces in North Kivu. MONUC’s establishment of a humanitarian zone and transitional government mediation succeeded in defusing tension.

The Bukavu crisis of May and June, rooted in tensions between DRC military commanders and dissident rivals in South Kivu, resulted in widespread violence, rape, and civilian deaths. MONUC had 450 troops in the area when the crisis erupted, and sent about 550 reinforcements soon after. Nevertheless, MONUC’s military contingent was stretched, and Bukavu temporarily fell under control of dissident forces for a few days in early June. Many Congolese and international observers blamed MONUC for not preventing the capture of Bukavu. Rioters attacked MONUC, UN, and non-governmental organization (NGO) facilities in major cities throughout the DRC, resulting in substantial damage and the death of a MONUC military observer at Kalehe. The United Nations and NGOs suspended their humanitarian programs, and the DRC-Rwanda border was closed for several weeks.

The massacre of approximately 160 Congolese refugees at the transit camp at Gatumba, Burundi, in August increased domestic political tensions in the DRC. An armed Hutu extremist group in Burundi, known as Palipehutu-FNL, claimed responsibility for the attack. Despite extensive UN investigation, it was unclear whether the FNL acted alone. MONUC and UN agencies supported NGO efforts to resettle refugees and internally displaced persons in North and South Kivu. Sporadic violence also took place in Katanga and the Kasai provinces.

In September, the Foreign Ministers of the DRC and Rwanda signed the terms of reference for a Joint Verification Mechanism, a framework for the
parties to address border issues. In October, the first meeting of the Joint Verification Commission took place in Kigali, Rwanda, and the parties later endorsed the concept of operations for the Joint Verification Teams. Separately, the United States facilitated a tripartite agreement signed by the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda on regional security. The parties committed themselves to ensure disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation (DDR) of foreign armed groups within 12 months.

The DRC’s DDR program received financial support from the World Bank and the Multi-Donor Demobilization and Reintegration Program, as well as logistical support from MONUC. With assistance from MONUC and the UN Development Program, the transitional government established a disarmament and community reintegration program for an estimated 15,000-person militia. Implementation of the program was slow due to reluctance of militia leaders to allow soldiers to disarm and the transitional government’s failure to integrate some militia leaders into the national DRC army. By December, only about 1,500 former combatants had registered for the DDR program. Although repatriations were slowed by violence at the end of 2004, MONUC reported that more than 11,000 foreign combatants and dependents had been repatriated from the DRC to Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda.

Numerous allegations of sexual misconduct were brought against MONUC personnel in 2004. Please see the section on Peacekeeping Issues: Sexual Abuse for more information.

MONUC’s budget for 2004 was $114 million, of which the United States paid $30.2 million. At the end of 2004, MONUC had a total troop strength of 12,471 military personnel. No U.S. military personnel were assigned to MONUC in 2004.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was established by Resolutions 1312 (2000) and 1320 (2000) after the two countries signed cease-fire and peace agreements in Algiers, ending the border war which had broken out in May 1998. UNMEE’s mandate, which has been renewed in six-month increments, includes monitoring the cease-fire and security commitments agreed to by both parties, verifying redeployment of forces to positions outside a 25-kilometer temporary security zone (TSZ) that separates Ethiopian and Eritrean forces, technical assistance for humanitarian mine-clearing activity, and coordination of activities with humanitarian and human rights activities of the United Nations and other organizations. UNMEE drew down its forces by approximately one-third during the year and reduced its presence from three to two sectors.

Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed to the following provisions in the Algiers accords: to establish a neutral Boundary Commission to delimit and demarcate the border, with expenses to be borne equally by Eritrea and Ethiopia; to cooperate with the Boundary Commission and its staff in all respects during the process of delimitation and demarcation; to agree that the determination of the Boundary Commission would be final and binding; and to respect the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party. The Boundary Commission announced its delimitation decision in April 2002. UNMEE’s mandate was expanded to include support for border demarcation as well as logistical and field support for the Boundary Commission.

The United States, although concerned by lack of progress on the border demarcation, joined the Security Council to unanimously adopt two six-month renewals of UNMEE’s mandate during 2004, Resolution 1531, adopted March 12, and Resolution 1560, adopted September 14. Due to the protracted stalemate, the threat to military stability remained a serious concern. Reaffirming the importance of political dialogue between the two countries in order to ensure the success of the peace process, the Security Council resolutions called on Ethiopia and Eritrea to engage in dialogue and confidence building measures in order to normalize relations.

In November, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi submitted to Ethiopia’s Parliament a five-point proposal in which Ethiopia accepted the ruling of the Boundary Commission in principle but insisted on dialogue with Eritrea. On the other hand, Eritrea accepted the Commission’s decision and wanted Ethiopia to abide by the decision without conditions as well. Efforts by the United Nations and international community to resolve the situation and to complete demarcation were unsuccessful. The situation in the TSZ remained generally calm and stable, despite a steady increase of troops of the Ethiopian Armed Forces south of the TSZ in December.

Eritrean authorities closed a vital road between Asmara and Barentu to UNMEE traffic beginning in March, a major impediment to UNMEE supply operations. Eritrean authorities also refused to allow UNMEE to operate direct flights from Addis Ababa to Asmara.

UNMEE’s budget for 2004 was $185.9 million. The U.S. share was $49.5 million. UNMEE’s military force strength was 3,864. The United States provided six military observers and one staff officer to UNMEE.

Guinea-Bissau

The UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS) was established by the Secretary-General on March 3, 1999, after a military coup attempt and civil war led to the ouster of Joao Vieira, Guinea-Bissau’s first freely-elected president. In February 2000, following two rounds of transparent presidential elections, the interim government transferred power to Kumba Yala. Yala was in turn deposed in September 2003 in a bloodless coup, and businessman Henrique Rosa was chosen by the military as the transitional head of state, pending presidential elections scheduled for mid-2005 under the provisions of a Transitional Charter.

During the first quarter of 2004, under the leadership of David Stephen (United Kingdom), the Secretary-General’s Representative, UNOGBIS staff initiated planning for reform of the Guinea-Bissau’s military, including a program for demobilization and reintegration. UNOGBIS staff also worked closely with the Transitional Government to facilitate political dialogue, and assisted in the development of a National Human Rights Action
Plan. Efforts in the area of gender equality resulted in the election of a woman as President of the Supreme Court and appointment of five women to ministerial posts in the Transitional Government from a cabinet consisting of 16 ministers and seven state secretaries.

Under President Rosa, the country remained peaceful and the Transitional Government made important progress towards restoring order in 2004. Following elections for the President and Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Justice on January 26, credible legislative elections were conducted on March 28. In preparation for these elections, the U.S. election observer mission worked directly with the UNOGVIS-led observer mission, and the United States also provided technical assistance to the National Elections Commission. The new National Popular Assembly and new Government were installed on May 11. Judges and military officers were not part of the National Popular assembly, but both institutions functioned in tandem with the new Government.

On June 18, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/2004/20) expressing satisfaction with the progress made by the Transitional Government towards restoring constitutional order. The statement noted, however, that the democratization progress remained fragile due to weakness of new governmental institutions and the persistent economic crisis resulting from the 1998 civil war.

David Stephen retired from the United Nations in April. On September 3, the Secretary-General appointed Joao Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique) as his Representative in Guinea-Bissau and head of UNOGVIS.

Tensions arising from persistent arrears in military pay, poor living conditions, and allegations of corruption within the military hierarchy led to a mutiny by military officers and the killings of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff and the military’s Chief of Human Resources on October 6. Responding to these murders and escalating unrest arising from unaddressed grievances and continued economic weakness, the President of the Security Council issued a statement (S/PRST/2004/41) on November 2 condemning such actions and urging all parties to refrain from attempts to seize power by force. The statement also called for contributions from the international community to help the Transitional Government pay overdue military and civil service salaries.

In his report to the Security Council of December 15, the Secretary-General highlighted the Transitional Government’s acceptance of officers nominated by the leaders of the mutiny as Chief of Staff and chiefs of the army, navy, and air force. This “cave in” by the civilian authorities was seen as a dangerous weakening of the authority of the Transitional Government. This erosion intensified the climate of uncertainty in the country, and led to increasingly aggressive demands from civil sector workers.

On December 22, expressing concern that the gains achieved since the installation of the Transitional Government had been jeopardized by the October 6 mutiny, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1580 to extend the
mandate of UNOGBIS for one year. In so doing, the Council revised the mandate to direct the Office to work with the UN country team to facilitate restoration of the rule of law; to assist with planning for presidential elections to be held in 2005; and to integrate development and peace and security activities in order to develop a peace-building strategy for the immediate, medium, and longer terms. Resolution 1580 also cautioned the National Assembly, as it considered the issue of amnesty for those involved in past military coups, to adhere to the principles of justice and to avoid granting impunity to those who had acted with criminality.

**Liberia**

Following several years of civil war in Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States brokered a peace agreement in 1993. With the support of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), established in September 1993 after some delays in the peace process, Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997. UNOMIL was closed in September 1997 and the UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia was established in November 1997 to further support national reconciliation and reconstruction. However, government abuses and the inability of the Government of Liberia and opposition parties to reach agreement on key issues such as security sector reform led to a resumption of fighting.

Following its creation in September 2003, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) began disarming ex-combatants immediately. However, it lacked adequate arrangements for handling ex-combatants and funds for the reintegration stage of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) program. The program was unsuccessful, and UNMIL suspended it. UNMIL mounted an information campaign for ex-combatants throughout Liberia in January 2004, following a meeting with the Liberian Government, ex-Government of Liberia troops, the National Commission for DDRR, and the two former rebel groups (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL)). In addition, construction began on cantonment sites in key areas selected by teams with representatives from all the above groups.

By the end of February, 48 mid-ranking field commanders from ex-combatant groups had attended briefings in Monrovia on DDRR planning. UNMIL disarmament restarted in mid-April. However, the Secretary-General’s December report expressed concern about shortfalls in funding for the critical reintegration phase of the DDRR program.

The August 2003 Accra peace agreement called for the United States to help restructure the Liberian armed forces. A U.S. assessment team visited Liberia in late January 2004, and in February, briefed a donor conference in New York that was opened by the Secretary of State and cosponsored by the United States, the United Nations, and the World Bank. U.S. military planners visited Liberia again in May.

On March 12, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1532, requiring UN member states to freeze the financial assets of former Liberian
President Charles Taylor, his immediate family members, senior officials of the former Taylor regime, and other close allies or associates, as designated by the Liberia Sanctions Committee. On June 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1549, which re-established the Liberia Panel of Experts until December 21, 2004. The Panel’s mandate was to investigate and compile information on the implementation and any ongoing violations of the arms embargo, travel ban, assets freeze, and embargo of rough diamonds, round logs, and timber products.

In May, UNMIL and the Liberian Government launched a recruitment campaign for the Liberian Police Service. Chairman Bryant (head of the Liberian Government) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General briefed a Liberian reconstruction conference liaison group in New York in June. In August, struggles between two factions of the LURD resulted in violence, which was brought under control in a joint effort by the Liberian police and UNMIL.

On September 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1561, which extended UNMIL’s mandate for an additional year, until September 19, 2005. Chairman Bryant made his first trip outside the capital since taking office in 2003, to Buchanan, an indication that the security situation had improved. U.S. Treasury Under Secretary John Taylor visited Liberia in September, underscoring U.S. support for financial reforms; the U.S. Treasury provided a group of experts to work with the Liberian Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. UNMIL restored order during several violent riots in Monrovia during September.

In October, a dispute over land in a Monrovia suburb resulted in several days of rioting in various parts of the city. There were a number of other episodes of violent protests and looting, in part attributable to the growing number of ex-combatants and unemployed youth in Monrovia. Liberian police, UNMIL troops, and civilian police were able to restore order. The disarmament phase of DDRR ended in October, with more than 90,000 ex-combatants disarmed since December 2003.

Sierra Leonean President Kabbah hosted a meeting of LURD factions in Freetown in October 2004. The factions agreed to transform LURD into a political party. In November, LURD, MODEL, and ex-Government of Liberia troops formally disbanded at a ceremony in Monrovia. UNMIL announced that it was handing over to the Liberian security services the discretionary security for most of the faction leaders, cabinet ministers, and other senior government officials UNMIL had been protecting since September 2003. UNMIL continued to provide special protection to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Government.

In December, UNMIL began monitoring flights over Liberian waters. On December 21, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1579, which renewed the arms embargo, travel ban, and timber sanctions for an additional 12 months. The resolution also renewed the diamond sanctions for six months, and re-established the Panel of Experts until June 21, 2005. Heads of
the UN missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire met in Monrovia to discuss cross-border issues, including DDRR, trafficking in persons, and flows of small arms and light weapons.

UNMIL’s budget for 2004 was $944.3 million, of which the United States was assessed $259.4 million. By the end of 2004, UNMIL’s strength stood at 14,501 troops, 189 military observers, and 1,098 civilian police. The United States provided five troops, seven military observers, and 61 civilian police.

Libya

The Security Council considered and lifted sanctions against Libya in September 2003, removing the item from the Council’s agenda. In a December 2003 letter to the Security Council, the Government of Libya announced that it would voluntarily abandon its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council welcomed Libya’s decision in a December 23, 2003, statement to the press after informal consultations among the members of the Council.

On March 10, 2004, Libya signed an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) allowing it enhanced access to verify that Libya’s nuclear activities are for peaceful activities only. On April 22, the Council welcomed Libya’s decision and expressed hope that the agreement would be implemented in a spirit of continued cooperation.

Sierra Leone

After over 10 years of conflict, in 2004 the United States emphasized the progress made in restoring stability to Sierra Leone and pressed the Security Council and the United Nations to begin drawing down the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) as rapidly as security would allow. A UN assessment mission visited Sierra Leone in mid-February to review progress on benchmarks for UNAMSIL’s drawdown and potential residual tasks for a post-UNAMSIL UN presence.

On March 30, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1537, which extended UNAMSIL’s mandate to September 30, 2004. The Council agreed with the Secretary-General’s recommendations that UNAMSIL be reduced by the end of 2004 to approximately 5,000 troops, and further reduced in February 2005 to 3,250 troops. On September 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1562, which extended UNAMSIL’s mandate until June 30, 2005. The resolution laid out tasks for UNAMSIL’s smaller force in 2005, with a focus on building Sierra Leone police and military capacity.

Local elections were held peacefully throughout Sierra Leone on May 22, 2004, for the first time in 34 years. UNAMSIL provided logistical support, helping to move ballots, equipment, and observers to key points throughout the country. In September, UNAMSIL hosted a meeting of the Working Group on UN Inter-Mission Cooperation, part of a continuing dialogue on cross-border issues, which was attended by representatives of the
UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire and by staff of the UN Office for West Africa.

On May 31, the Sierra Leone Special Court rejected former Liberian President Charles Taylor’s claim that he was immune from prosecution as a former head of state. Trials of Special Court indictees belonging to the Civilian Defense Force (pro-government militia) began in June; trials of Revolutionary United Front indictees began in July.

In October, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission issued its final report, concluding that endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights were the underlying causes of the Sierra Leone civil war. The Commission reported that Sierra Leoneans were the main actors in the conflict but that outsiders, in particular former Liberian President Taylor and Libya, had intensified the hostilities. The report also concluded that diamonds were not the root cause of the conflict. During the year, government control over diamond exports improved considerably. Armed political groups ceased operating out of diamond areas. By year’s end, UNAMSIL had transferred to the government primary responsibility for security in all districts of Sierra Leone.

UNAMSIL’s budget for 2004 was $318.2 million, of which the United States was assessed $84.7 million. In addition, the United States paid $12 million to support the Sierra Leone Special Court in 2004. At the end of 2004, UNAMSIL’s drawdown was on track, with the mission’s strength at 4,061 troops, 138 military observers, and 75 UN civilian police. One U.S. civilian police officer assigned to the mission left mid-year.

**Somalia**

In 1991, after the overthrow by anti-government forces of dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, Somalia fell into civil war and disorder. In 1992, with U.S. support, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and, in Resolution 733 (1992), imposed an arms embargo on the entire territory of Somalia. Throughout 2004, the Security Council Committee on Somalia sanctions (the “751 Committee”) discussed a draft list of arms embargo violators, and supported the work of the Nairobi-based Monitoring Group. The Monitoring Group’s mandate is to focus attention on ongoing violations of the embargo and to recommend how to strengthen enforcement.

Resolution 1519 (2003) requested the Secretary-General to re-establish a monitoring group (formerly the Panel of Experts) to investigate arms embargo violations. In January 2004, the Secretary-General appointed four experts to the Monitoring Group. The Monitoring Group found evidence of violations of the arms embargo and recommended continued monitoring. The Security Council reviewed the Group’s report and adopted Resolution 1558 on August 17. The resolution requested the Secretary-General to re-establish the Monitoring Group with the mandate to continue investigating violations of the arms embargo. The Secretary-General re-appointed the experts on August 26.
A presidential statement, adopted on February 25, reiterated the support of the Security Council for the Somali national reconciliation conference launched under the auspices of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development and led by Kenya. In particular, the statement welcomed the January signing of the Declaration on the Harmonization of the Various Issues by the Somali Delegates at the Somali Consultative Meetings.

Sudan

In 2004, The United States continued to lead UN Security Council efforts to encourage the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end over 20 years of conflict in Sudan.

In 2004, the United States drafted and sponsored several key UN Security Council resolutions on the situation in Darfur. These resolutions increased the pressure on the parties to the conflict in Darfur to immediately fulfill Council demands including a cessation of violence, humanitarian access, human rights protection, and peace talks.

At year’s end, there were more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Darfur, and another 200,000 civilians had fled into Chad. Approximately 70,000 people reportedly died as a result of the violence and forced displacement. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell concluded in 2004 that genocide had been committed in Darfur. He affirmed that the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bore responsibility for these atrocities and advocated for a full-blown and unfettered investigation.

On July 30, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1556, which imposed an arms embargo on all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in Darfur and endorsed the deployment of international monitors, including the protection force under the leadership of the African Union, to the Darfur region. The resolution further requested the Secretary-General to report in 30 days and monthly thereafter to the Council on progress made by the Government of Sudan in fulfilling its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and committed human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities.

Demonstrating strong Council and international support for the African Union’s peacekeeping efforts, Resolution 1564, adopted on September 18, demanded the Sudan Government to submit to the African Union Mission documentation of the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for human rights abuses. Resolution 1564 also determined that should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Resolution 1556 or 1564, the Council would consider further measures, including restrictions on Sudan’s petroleum sector, the Government of Sudan, or individual members of the Government of Sudan. Both Resolutions 1556 and 1564 called on the Secretary-General to dispatch human rights protection officers and monitors from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Darfur.
United States Participation in the United Nations—2004

On October 26, the Council adopted Resolution 1569, which was initiated by the United States. This resolution provided for meetings of the Security Council to be held in Nairobi November 18–19 to discuss Darfur’s development with representatives of the African Union and the International Government Authority.

Additionally, the United States worked closely with the United Kingdom in drafting and sponsoring Resolution 1574, adopted on November 19, which called on the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A to conclude a peace agreement and to ensure an end to the violence in Darfur. It also supported the decisions of the African Union to increase its mission in Darfur to 3,320 personnel and to enhance its mandate.

In 2004, the United States also supported the appointment by Secretary-General Annan, of Jan Pronk (the Netherlands) as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) to Sudan and the formation of the UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), as a precursor to a UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (upon the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement). SRSG Pronk and UNAMIS’ presence in Sudan further increased the international spotlight on Sudan.

The United States also worked closely with the African Union (AU) and other allies such as NATO and the European Union to stabilize the region, mitigate the violence, and ensure that humanitarian assistance reached as many people as possible. Proactive efforts by the AU Mission were successful in moderating violence in its operation areas.

The United States remained the world’s leader in providing humanitarian assistance to Darfur, contributing $696 million in humanitarian assistance since the beginning of the Darfur emergency in 2003.

Western Sahara

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established by Security Council Resolution 690 (1991) to help implement a settlement plan (the “Settlement Plan”) that Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (POLISARIO Front) agreed to on August 30, 1988. Among other things, the Settlement Plan called for a referendum under UN auspices to determine the future status of the territory.

In January 2003, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara, James A. Baker III, presented to the parties a new proposal entitled “Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara.” This plan incorporated elements from the draft Framework Agreement favored by Morocco as well as elements of the Settlement Plan and Houston Accords favored by the POLISARIO Front. The POLISARIO Front endorsed the Plan for Self-Determination. In April 2004, the Government of Morocco formally rejected the plan. At the same time, the Security Council affirmed its support of the Settlement Plan and renewed MINURSO’s mandate for another six months to give the parties more time to move the peace process forward.
Political and Security Affairs

James Baker resigned in June and was not replaced by a new Personal Envoy. In September, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Alvaro de Soto (Peru), resumed Baker's work with the parties.

UN assessments for MINURSO in 2004 totaled $37.7 million. The U.S. share totaled $10 million. As of December 31, MINURSO had 227 troops and military observers. No U.S. personnel served in MINURSO.

East Asia and the Pacific
Bougainville

In 2001, after 13 years of civil conflict, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which granted Bougainville autonomy and an eventual vote on independence from Papua New Guinea in 10 to 15 years. The UN Security Council established the UN Political Office in Bougainville in 1998. In 2003, the Security Council voted to replace the Political Office with the smaller UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB). UNOMB’s mandate is to facilitate a smooth transition to elections of autonomous Bougainville Government and to certify the collection and disposal of weapons. The United States supported the completion of the constitutional process and finalization of the destruction of weapons.

Based on a recommendation by the Secretary-General, the Security Council on June 30, 2004, endorsed the final extension of UNOMB until December 31. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to present a report to the Council on “an assessment of the ground situation and on a mission closure-plan.” In his September report, the Secretary-General noted that the Bougainville Constitutional Commission had submitted the final draft of the constitution to the Bougainville Constituent Assembly, but they were not ready to hold elections by the end of the year. The report observed that the target date for holding of elections by the end of 2004 would not be met in spite of continuing solid progress in all three areas constituting the major landmarks of the peace process: weapons disposal, constitution making, and preparations for elections.

In his December 21 report, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that 94 percent of the weapons in Bougainville had been destroyed. The Secretary-General also commended the Government of Papua New Guinea and the Bougainville parties for overcoming their differences and adopting the Bougainville Constitution, and expressed his interest in the removal of barriers to the electoral process. In addition, the Secretary-General stated that he would be grateful for the Council’s support in responding positively to the Papua New Guinea Government’s request for UNOMB’s continued presence in Bougainville and recommended that the mandate of the Observer Mission be extended for a period of six months, until June 30, 2005. The Security Council agreed to the extended mandate for the Observer Mission and remained supportive of Bougainville efforts towards peace and reconciliation.
The total budget for UNOMB for 2004 was $1.6 million. The United States provided $350,000 to the Mission.

Burma

In 2004, the United States continued to work through the UN system in order to advocate for the release of National League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and all political prisoners, and to advance national reconciliation and the re-establishment of democracy. The United States remained concerned by the junta’s continued refusal to enter into a genuine political dialogue with the democratic opposition ethnic minority groups. The United States encouraged visits to Burma by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Burma, Razali Ismail (Malaysia), and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Brazil). However, the Burmese Government continued to refuse to allow either UN representative into the country.

On September 29, the United States participated in a meeting hosted by UN Secretary-General Annan with a select number of governments to discuss ways to move forward in Burma. The United States also raised the issue during a lunch on October 7 with Council members and the Secretary-General, and during a Security Council session that day. In addition, the Security Council sent a letter on November 22 to the Secretary-General urging action on Burma. Annan’s reply on December 2 reaffirmed his commitment to encourage the Burmese authorities to move forward with democratization and reconciliation.

Continued U.S. attention to the situation in Burma in the Security Council resulted in statements by the Secretary-General in November and December calling for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release and for the realization of democracy and national reconciliation in Burma. The United States supported resolutions on Burma’s human rights situation in the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights, and both were adopted.

East Timor

During 2004, the United States emphasized the progress made in restoring stability to East Timor and pressed the Security Council to begin drawing down the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) as rapidly as security would allow, with a view to closing the mission in May 2005.

UN civilian police and East Timorese police trainers began a program in January 2004 to train 120 candidates for the East Timor police Rapid Deployment Service to work in the border region. In April, East Timor began training prison guards in non-lethal techniques for subduing prisoners, with assistance from UNMISET, the UN Development Program, and bilateral donors.

In May, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1543, which extended UNMISET’s mandate for six months, while decreasing its size. UNMISET’s mandate was pared back, keeping the focus on assisting East
Timor in carrying out key civilian functions such as public administration and justice, developing law enforcement capacity, and continuing support for stability. The resolution also called for the Serious Crimes Unit to wrap up its investigations by November 2004 and to conclude prosecution by no later than May 20, 2005. UNMISET handed over all responsibility for policing and external security to the East Timor Government on May 19, 2004.

On November 16, Security Council Resolution 1573 extended UNMISET’s mandate for a final six months until May 20, 2005. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General established working groups to prepare for handover of responsibility to Timorese or international experts.

UNMISET’s budget for 2004 was $56.8 million, of which the United States was assessed $15.1 million. At the end of 2004, UNMISET’s strength stood at 429 troops, 43 military observers, and 147 civilian police, including nine U.S. civilian police officers.

Europe and Eurasia

Bosnia/Herzegovina

The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina closed on December 31, 2002, but the United Nations continued to endorse the continuing operations of NATO and the European Union (EU) in support of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement via a series of biannual Security Council resolutions. On July 9, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1551, which demonstrated the Council’s endorsement of the NATO-led multilateral stabilization force (SFOR) for an additional six months. On November 22, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1575, which recognized the conclusion of NATO’s SFOR operation at the end of 2004 and the establishment of a new multilateral stabilization force under EU command (EUFOR) for an initial period of 12 months. The EUFOR had primary peacekeeping responsibility under the terms of the Dayton Agreement. It also recognized the establishment of a follow-on NATO headquarters, with the primary mission of assisting in the reform of the defense and security forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Cyprus

The United States continued to support UN efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the division of Cyprus during 2004. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was created in March 1964 under UN Security Council Resolution 186 to help end the violence between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. Since the de facto division of the island in 1974 as a result of the Turkish military intervention (following a coup d’etat directed by Greece), UNFICYP has served as a buffer force between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces on one side, and Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek (Hellenic Republic) forces on the other.

In November 2002, on the basis of talks between leaders of the two communities on the island, Secretary-General Annan had proposed a detailed settlement plan to reunify the island, give considerable authority to Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states, and enable displaced persons to return home. The plan also was intended to allow Cyprus to accede to the European Union as a reunited island. The United States strongly supported these talks and maintained close contacts throughout the process with the United Nations, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Greece, Turkey, and the European Union.

A referendum on the Secretary-General’s Settlement Plan took place on April 24, 2004, with the Turkish Cypriots voting in favor of the Plan, and the Greek Cypriots rejecting it. Following the collapse of the Secretary-General’s Good Offices peace initiative, the Secretary-General announced a review of the mandate, size, and concept of operations of UNFICYP. In a September report, the Secretary-General recommended maintaining the original mandate while cutting troop numbers by 30 percent by concentrating forces and increasing their mobility. On October 22, the Council adopted Resolution 1568, renewing UNFICYP’s mandate until June 15, 2005, and endorsing the Secretary-General’s recommendations for troop reduction.

The political impasse remained stalled as the Secretary-General, as noted in a report of his Good Offices mission, waited for the Greek Cypriots to clearly articulate concerns they had regarding implementation of the Settlement Plan and its security provisions.

The cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations was $25.7 million, with the U.S. share at $6.8 million. At the end of the year, UNFICYP had 1,269 troops and civilian police from 13 nations. No U.S. personnel served in this mission.

**Georgia**

The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established on August 24, 1993, by Security Council Resolution 858. The mission monitors compliance with a cease-fire agreement reached between the Georgian Government and Abkhaz separatists. On July 21, 1994, UN Security Council Resolution 937 increased the authorized number of military observers in UNOMIG (all unarmed) from 55 to 136. The Security Council renewed UNOMIG’s mandate in Resolution 1554, adopted on July 29, 2004. The mission carried out its mandate despite continued inaccessibility to the Kodori Valley.

Under the May 1994 Moscow Agreement, a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) monitors compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. The CIS force, consisting of approximately 1,700 armed Russian Federation troops, maintained checkpoints along both sides of the cease-fire line. UNOMIG military observers maintained a close working relationship with the CIS force, which is also responsible for UNOMIG’s security.

The United States continued to work with the “Friends of the Secretary-General for Georgia” (consisting of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) to achieve a comprehensive political settlement to the conflict. The “Friends of the Secretary-General for Georgia”
met in February, under the leadership of Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean Marie Guehenno, to develop strategies for advancing negotiations between the Georgian Government and Abkhaz separatists. Progress stalled, however, following a maritime incident in July when a Georgian coast guard vessel fired shots at a Turkish ship bound for an Abkhaz port. Disputed “presidential” elections in Abkazia in October also detracted from the negotiating process. Following resolution of the Abkhaz election dispute in December, the Group of Friends met again to plan for negotiations in 2005 to include the parties.

UN-assessed costs for UNOMIG in 2004 totaled $28.9 million, with the United States contributing $7.7 million. As of December 31, UNOMIG had 130 military observers. Two U.S. military observers were assigned to the mission.

**The former Yugoslavia: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)**

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo following the U.S.-led 1999 NATO air campaign, aimed at stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) authorized an international security presence that became the NATO-led Kosovo Force and an international civilian presence to establish an interim governing authority.

The civilian presence, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was formed as a unique collaboration of the UN with other organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union. UNMIK implements the broad authority set forth in Resolution 1244. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Kosovo established in April 2002 goals and benchmarks in the areas of functioning democratic institutions; rule of law; freedom of movement; returns and reintegration; economy; property rights; dialogue with Belgrade; and the Kosovo Protections Corps. These goals and benchmarks were designed to advance the “Standards before Status” policy, i.e., creation of a democratic, multi-ethnic, and tolerant Kosovo with a functioning indigenous administration, prior to any determination of Kosovo’s future political status. In November 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed holding a Comprehensive Review of progress on Standards sometime in mid-2005, which could lead to the start of a process to determine Kosovo’s future status.

In March 2004, Kosovo was plagued by several days of ethnic rioting that resulted in over 4,000 displaced persons, mostly ethnic minorities; hundreds of homes and some Serbian Orthodox Churches were damaged or destroyed. In the aftermath of the violence, the Secretary-General asked Ambassador Kai Eide (Norway) to report on the causes of the rioting and the appropriate way ahead in Kosovo. Eide released a report in August, with several recommendations, including prioritization of the Standards, and increased devolution of authority to the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). By the end of 2004, 1,864 persons remained displaced.
by the March riots, despite the PISG’s reconstruction of 88 percent of homes
that had been damaged or destroyed.

In response to the violence, on March 31, UNMIK introduced the
Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, a list of over 400 action items
illustrating Kosovo’s progress on Standards. The action items expanded the
original eight standards into concrete technical measures that the PISG must
undertake to demonstrate progress on implementation.

Following the resignation of UN Special Representative of the
Secretary-General Harri Holkeri (Finland) in May, the Secretary-General
appointed Soren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) in June. He assumed duties as the
new Special Representative to Kosovo in August. Larry Rossin (United
States) was named as Principal Deputy.

With assistance from the OSCE, the Kosovo-run Central Election
Commission in October held elections for the Kosovo Assembly that were
deemed free and fair by international observers. The Democratic League of
Kosovo party, led by President Ibrahim Rugova, and the Alliance for the
Future of Kosovo, led by Ramush Haradinaj, formed a ruling coalition.
Rugova retained the Presidency and Haradinaj assumed the Prime Minister’s
post.

UN-assessed costs for UNMIK totaled $267.6 million in 2004. The
United States contributed $71.1 million. As of December 31, UNMIK’s force
strength stood at 37 observers and 3,509 civilian police, to which the United
States contributed 309 personnel. The U.S. civilian police contingent suffered
three fatalities in April, when a member of the Jordanian Special Police Unit
shot at American officers. Ten other officers were wounded, five seriously.
The perpetrator, who appeared to have acted alone, was killed in an ensuing
exchange of fire. The associated Jordanian unit returned to Jordan in October.

**Western Hemisphere**

**Haiti**

Shortly after former Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide’s
resignation and departure, and at the request of the constitutionally designated
successor, Interim President Boniface Alexandre, the Security Council
unanimously adopted Resolution 1529 on February 29, authorizing the
immediate deployment of a U.S.-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF) for a
three-month period to restore order and prevent civil unrest in Haiti. The MIF
deployed over 3,000 troops drawn from the United States, Canada, Chile, and
France. The headquarters and majority of MIF troops were deployed in the
capital of Port-au-Prince. The MIF also established a presence in the northern
cities of Gonaives, Cap Haitien, and Fort Liberte.

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 1542 on April 30, establishing the multidimensional UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to succeed the MIF for an initial
period of six months. MINUSTAH’s mandate included providing support to
the Transitional Government of Haiti to ensure a secure and stable
environment in which the constitutional and political process in Haiti could take place. The mandate also envisioned assistance to the Transitional Government for the reform of the Haitian National Police; development of a comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program; and facilitation of the national dialogue and reconciliation process. Additionally, a key element of MINUSTAH’s mandate related to the assistance to the Transitional Government in its efforts to organize, monitor, and carry out free and fair municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections at the earliest possible date. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1576 on November 29, to extend MINUSTAH’s mandate for an additional period of six months until June 1, 2005.

In response to Resolution 1542, the Secretary-General appointed Juan Gabriel Valdes (Chile) as his Special Representative to Haiti. Valdes assumed his responsibilities on August 17.

MINUSTAH assumed operational responsibilities from the MIF by June 25, with the minimum military strength required. Chilean and Canadian MIF forces were reassigned as MINUSTAH participants and MIF personnel from the United States and France left Haiti by June 30. In accordance with the military concept of operations, MINUSTAH troops were deployed throughout Haiti in phases. U.S. Ambassador to United Nations Anne Patterson visited Haiti in November to review with MINUSTAH leadership the situation on the ground.

The MIF provided critical assistance in response to major flooding in southern Haiti at the end of May. The MIF provided helicopter transport for much-needed supplies to be delivered to the affected area. UN agencies and humanitarian organizations continued to provide support during the on-going rehabilitation process. Peacekeeping forces were called upon again in September when heavy rains caused flash floods in the northwest of Haiti. MINUSTAH responded to the disaster with the temporary re-deployment of military and police personnel to Gonaives to support Argentine troops providing security for distribution points, warehouses, and humanitarian convoys, as well as providing logistical support to relief activities and participating in clean-up operations.

The total cost of MINUSTAH in 2004 was $221.7 million, with the United States contributing $59.2 million. By the end of the year, approximately 6,000 (of the authorized 6,700) troops and staff officers and about 1,400 (of the authorized 1,622) civilian police officers representing 40 countries were deployed. The United States contributed three troops to MINUSTAH and four U.S. staff officers assigned to MINUSTAH’s military staff; 25 U.S. personnel were assigned to the civilian police by the end of 2004.
Disarmament Issues

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, is a deliberative body intended to consider in depth, and make recommendations on, issues in the field of disarmament. The Commission’s recommendations must be approved by consensus. The UNDC meets annually for three weeks in New York when, working in three-year cycles, it considers a limited number of agenda items. The UNDC reports annually to the General Assembly. All UN member states are eligible to participate, but barely one-third have attended the UNDC in recent years.

The focus of the United States has been to ensure that the UNDC adopts reports that are consistent with, and advance, U.S. policy. The Non-Aligned states historically have tried to focus UNDC discussion almost exclusively on nuclear disarmament issues. A key U.S. interest, however, is to maintain a balance in UNDC work between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, on the one hand, and other disarmament issues, such as conventional arms control matters, on the other. The UNDC last issued consensus recommendations in 2000.

The 2001–2003 issue cycle failed to produce substantive recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly. Indeed, the Non-Aligned delegations actually used their numerical majority to cancel the 2002 session. The 2003 session resumed those delayed discussions on “ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament” and “practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional armaments,” but Non-Aligned states (principal India on the former and Pakistan on the latter) blocked agreement in both areas. In 2004, the UNDC was unable to agree on what issues to consider. The United States and the European Union tabled a number of compromise proposals on the UNDC agenda, but the Non-Aligned countries refused to drop their demand that nuclear disarmament remain the Commission’s focus. As a result, at the 2004 session of the UN General Assembly First (Disarmament) Committee, the United States declined to participate in the adoption of the annual UNDC resolution. As in previous years, the resolution failed to set an agenda for the 2005 session.

The failure of the UNDC to issue consensus reports over the 2001–2004 period indicated the limited contribution that this body made to the UN’s work, and further called into question this body’s ability to advance U.S. disarmament objectives.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the principal multilateral forum for negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. The CD has produced significant treaties in the past, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, the Conference in 2004 adjourned in a stalemate for the eighth consecutive
year because it was unable to agree on a Program of Work (PoW). Progress was stymied because some CD members continued to focus on outmoded Cold War-era issues, and sought to establish links between elements of the proposed PoW.

Although funded from the UN budget, the CD is an autonomous body. The Conference’s 65 member states are divided into geopolitical groups—the Western Group, the Eastern Group, and the Non-Aligned Group, with China as an independent member. All CD decisions are made by consensus. The presidency of the CD rotates among its members on a monthly basis. The CD adopted its annual report to the UN General Assembly on September 7.

In 2004, the CD’s agenda included nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, weapons of mass destruction, conventional armaments, negative security assurances (NSAs), prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS), and transparency in armaments. Much of the discussion focused on a PoW proposal offered by Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, and Sweden. The proposal called for the establishment of four ad hoc committees. Two of those would have negotiating mandates, one for an “effectively verifiable” Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), and the other on NSAs. The other two committees would have mandates to discuss nuclear disarmament and PAROS. The proposal also included elements on which the CD had been unable to reach consensus for several years, so the 2004 session once again ended without any agreement on a PoW.

On July 29, the U.S. representative announced at a CD plenary meeting that the United States had completed an extensive policy review on FMCT. The United States reaffirmed its commitment to the negotiation in the CD of a legally-binding treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, the U.S. review had concluded that effective verification of an FMCT is not realistically achievable. In the same plenary meeting, the United States also announced that it had decided to pursue the negotiation in the CD of an international ban on the sale or export of landmines that do not self-destruct or deactivate within a set time. The United States also welcomed the CD’s decision to hold a series of informal plenary meetings on non-traditional issues, such as landmines and organizational reform.

The United States reiterated its commitment to effective multilateral solutions to disarmament issues, and made clear that the CD will be unable to adopt a PoW while some CD members insist on creating links between agreed subjects and unrelated issues about which there is no agreement. The sustained lack of an agreed PoW, however, raised concerns among members that the CD’s relevance as an international negotiating forum was eroding.

The CD is supported through the budget of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The United States was assessed 22 percent ($880,000) of the CD’s 2004 budget of approximately $4 million.
Peacekeeping Issues

Peacekeeping Financing

In 2004, the United States continued to base its support for UN peacekeeping operations on such established criteria as national interests, clear objectives, a sound plan, acceptable risks and costs, and a realistic end-state and exit strategy. In recognition that these criteria had been met, the United States supported new UN peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, and an expansion of the mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), making it the largest UN peacekeeping mission. UN missions in East Timor and Sierra Leone downsized as they began transferring tasks to the host countries.

The United States supports UN peacekeeping operations when they can be an effective means of containing conflict and resolving disputes in support of U.S. national interests. It has supported proposals to improve the UN’s ability to assess conflict situations, to plan and manage peacekeeping operations, and to respond quickly to Security Council mandates. The United States also continued to encourage other member states to include peacekeeping in their national security strategies and to contribute forces to peacekeeping whenever appropriate. The total number of troops, military observers, and civilian police (CIVPOL) from all nations serving in UN missions at the end of 2004 increased by approximately 18,905 from 2003. The increase was mainly attributed to the three new missions and the expansion of MONUC. As of December 31, 2004, the United Nations had a total of 64,720 personnel (55,909 troops, 2,046 military observers, and 6,765 CIVPOL) participating in UN peacekeeping missions. The U.S. contribution included eight U.S. troops in Haiti and Liberia; 17 U.S. military observers in Ethiopia, Kosovo, Liberia, Georgia, and in the Middle East; and 404 U.S. CIVPOL in East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia.

The costs of UN peacekeeping operations increased in 2004. The United Nations assessed member states a total of $2.8 billion (compared to $2 billion in 2003), of which the United States was assessed $746.4 million. Assessments increased for operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia. In addition, assessments for new UN peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, and Haiti contributed to an overall increase in assessments. These increases were only partially offset by the downsizing of operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone.

Force Protection for U.S. Peacekeepers

During 2004, there were no fatalities among U.S. military personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations, and there were no injuries resulting from hostile action. In addition, there were no U.S. military personnel captured or taken hostage while in service in UN peacekeeping operations. However, there were casualties among U.S. civilian police contingents participating in UN operations. On April 17, a Jordanian civilian police officer serving in the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo fired on a
convoy of 21 American civilian police officers, killing three and injuring 10. The United Nations performed an investigation and found the Jordanian officer, killed in the crossfire, was acting alone. The associated Jordanian unit returned to Jordan in October. Peacekeeping remains an endeavor with tangible risks, and UN planners scrutinize every deployment with respect to personnel safety and force protection.

During 2004, the U.S. Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W) conducted force protection surveys of all peace operations in which U.S. military observers served under UN operational control. In addition, USMOG-W conducted pre-deployment training for observers, anti-terrorist training such as defensive driving and bomb identification, increased communication during movement, and the use of protective body armor.

In most instances, UN peacekeepers are covered by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreements (SOMA), which are negotiated between the United Nations and host governments. These agreements set the terms and conditions governing the relationship between a host government and the UN peacekeeping forces. In instances where a SOFA/SOMA has not yet been negotiated, the terms and conditions of the standard SOFA/SOMA may apply, per General Assembly Resolution 52/12B (1997). Personnel acting in support of a UN operation, but who are not “blue helmeted,” are generally considered to be “experts on mission” under the terms of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

The potential vulnerability of U.S. personnel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction was again an issue in 2004. The protections provided by Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002) and Security Council Resolution 1487 (2003) were not renewed in 2004. These resolutions precluded the ICC from initiating any investigation or prosecution of current or former officials, or personnel of states that are not party to the Rome Statute for actions or omissions while serving in UN-established or UN-authorized missions for renewable periods of one year. In the absence of a new resolution, the United States took into account the risk of ICC review when determining contributions to UN authorized or established operations. In addition, the United States continued to pursue bilateral agreements with all countries to protect not only peacekeepers but other, broader categories of U.S. personnel and officials from any assertion of ICC jurisdiction by the ICC.

**CIVPOL**

International civilian police (CIVPOL) continued to play a critical role in peacekeeping while the international community struggled to meet worldwide demand for qualified CIVPOL officers. The United States continued efforts to enhance both domestic and international capacities for recruiting, training, and deploying CIVPOL to peacekeeping missions around the world. The United States contributed 25 CIVPOL to the newly created peacekeeping operation in Haiti. As of December 31, the United States had
United States Participation in the United Nations—2004

CIVPOL officers deployed to UN missions in Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and East Timor.

There was an increasing recognition by peacekeeping mission planners that there was a need for “formed units,” a type of international policing that falls between functions performed by regular civilian police and those performed by the military within peacekeeping operations. Specially trained formed units can perform crowd control, conduct high-risk arrests, investigations, and other specialized law enforcement functions. In 2004, formed units were deployed to missions in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and Liberia.

HIV/AIDS

Preventing HIV transmission among UN peacekeepers and host communities was a key UN priority in 2004. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) finalized its testing policy and, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000), made available voluntary and confidential HIV testing and counseling for peacekeepers before their deployment and during missions. The United Nations respected national HIV testing requirements of troop contributing countries. DPKO had a standardized pre-deployment training module on HIV/AIDS for troop contributing countries to incorporate into peacekeeper instruction.

DPKO and the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) coordinate HIV/AIDS prevention activities involving peacekeepers. In 2004, DPKO deployed HIV/AIDS advisers in its major peacekeeping operations. These advisors collaborated with UNAIDS and with national authorities on HIV/AIDS prevention plans. Smaller peacekeeping missions had staff members who served as HIV/AIDS points of contact. UN peacekeepers carried UNAIDS awareness cards, and DPKO reviewed its HIV/AIDS policy in consultation with UNAIDS.

Sexual Abuse

In 2004, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) reported that victims had made a total of 105 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against peacekeeping personnel. Of these, 16 involved civilian UN staff, nine involved civilian police, and 80 involved military. Close to two-thirds of the allegations involved rape or sexual assault. The range of alleged abuse also included child pornography, child molestation, and prostitution. Most of the serious allegations of sexual exploitation, abuse, and misconduct were against UN peacekeeping personnel in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2004. There were other credible allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers assigned to UN missions in Burundi, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in 2004.

In April, following the earliest allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, the United Nations assigned a Personnel Conduct Officer to the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to reinforce disciplinary procedures and adherence to the UN code of conduct for
peacekeepers. From June to September, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services also investigated 72 allegations involving civilian and military members of MONUC located in the Ituri district of DRC. In July, the DPKO distributed guidance to missions on implementing the Secretary-General’s 2003 bulletin on sexual exploitation and abuse and began designating focal points within UN missions to handle complaints involving these types of allegations.

In August 2004, the Secretary-General appointed Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al-Hussein, the Jordanian Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to advise him on sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping personnel and to engage with member states and troop contributing countries on accountability for perpetrators. UN Security Council Resolution 1565, adopted on October 1, asked the Secretary-General to investigate allegations of abuse by civilian and military personnel of MONUC and to take appropriate action. The resolution encouraged MONUC to conduct training to ensure compliance with the UN code of conduct.

In a public statement on November 19, the Secretary-General expressed his outrage at the allegations and demanded accountability. During October and November, Prince Zeid visited MONUC. He noted that sexual exploitation and abuse appeared to be widespread and that there appeared to be no compliance with the UN policy of zero tolerance for sexual exploitation and abuse. In November, the DPKO established a sexual exploitation and abuse task force for MONUC at headquarters in New York, headed by the newly-appointed Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Also in November, the United Nations assigned an Assistant UN Secretary-General to head an investigative team to the DRC to address cases involving MONUC members and to assist the mission in developing a prevention program.

In 2004, the United States demanded stronger UN oversight, transparency, and accountability. The United States endorsed the UN policy of zero tolerance, UN investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and enhanced training for all new UN peacekeeping personnel, while calling on troop-contributing countries to take disciplinary actions to deter and prosecute abuse. U.S. officials, including Secretary Powell, reiterated to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC in October, and to the UN Secretary-General in November, that the United Nations must strengthen enforcement of its code of conduct. The United States encouraged the United Nations to adopt effective preventive measures and procedures to ensure that violators of UN policy are disciplined, and where crimes are involved, prosecuted. The United States commended UN decisions to repatriate civilian perpetrators from its missions and stood ready to work with the United Nations and troop contributors to put in place a system to end sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.
Special Issues

Terrorism

The United States continued its efforts to advance international counterterrorism initiatives throughout the UN system, including in Security Council committees (the 1267 Sanctions Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and in the General Assembly.

The Security Council adopted five resolutions in 2004 directly related to terrorism. Resolution 1526, adopted in January, strengthened the current sanctions regime against individuals and entities associated with the Taliban and al-Qaida. Resolution 1530, adopted in March, condemned as a terrorist act the March 11 bombings that killed commuters in Madrid. Resolution 1535, also adopted in March, established the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), as part of its effort to revitalize the CTC. The United States was a lead sponsor of Resolution 1540, adopted in April, which required all states to take steps to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In response to terrorists seizing a school in Beslan, Russia, and killing more than 300 people, mostly children, Russia introduced Resolution 1566 in October. This resolution recalled that criminal acts against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose of provoking terror, among other things, are unjustifiable by any consideration.

The al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee maintains a list of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Usama bin Laden subject to international sanctions—asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes—that member states are obligated to implement. The United States continued referring names of individuals and entities that were included on the Committee’s sanctions list. If the United States is proposing an addition to the list, the individuals or entities are first vetted within the appropriate U.S. Government agencies and then submitted to the United Nations for circulation to the other 14 members of the Committee with sufficient explanatory information for the Committee to determine whether they should be added. The same U.S. Government interagency group reviews names proposed by other governments.

The CTC, established by Security Council Resolution 1373 after September 11, 2001, made progress towards its goal of raising the level of performance of the governments of all 191 member states in the fight against terrorism. On March 26, 2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1535, which established the CTED to enhance the Committee’s ability to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373 and effectively continue the capacity-building work in which it is engaged. The United States played an active leadership role in the CTC, urging the Committee to become more active in facilitating technical assistance to member states and promoting closer cooperation and coordination among international, regional, and sub-regional organizations.
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 59/46, “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,” on December 2. The resolution condemned all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed. It reaffirmed previous Declarations on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, and urged all states to become parties to the 12 international terrorism conventions and protocols. The resolution stipulated that the Ad Hoc Committee, established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 (1996) to work on the elaboration of international legal instruments to fight terrorism, should continue its work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) and on the negotiation of an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

The eighth and ninth rounds of negotiations on the CCIT in the Sixth Committee (Legal Issues) in 2004 did not make any progress toward ending an impasse on the following two issues: the scope of the offense and the non-application of the convention to state military forces. However, during concurrent negotiations on the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, significant progress was made.

In November 2003, the Secretary-General appointed a High Level Panel to examine global security threats, assess existing approaches, and recommend changes. The High Level Panel of Experts issued their report in December 2004. The report contained recommendations for strengthening the work of the United Nations in response to the threat of terrorism. Among other things, the Experts urged UN members to conclude without delay the two international terrorism conventions and to agree on a definition of terrorism.

Sanctions

The United States continued to support the imposition of UN sanctions in response to threats to international peace and security. Chapter VII, Article 41, of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to mandate member states to implement measures not involving the use of armed force to enforce its decisions. Under this authority, the Council has resorted to the use of multilateral sanctions as an enforcement tool when international peace and security have been threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed.

The United States believes that sanctions, appropriately structured and targeted and supported by the international community, can serve as a key policy tool to prompt a change in policy or behavior of regimes, groups, or individuals that threaten international peace and security. U.S. opposition to artificially time-limited sanctions reflects this philosophy. Sanctions have restricted access to arms, funds, and commodities used to undermine security, while denying political support to the leadership of sanctioned regimes. The United States recognizes that sanctions must be used in conjunction with other appropriate diplomatic approaches. The effectiveness of UN-imposed sanctions is directly linked to the willingness and ability of member states, particularly neighbors of the targeted regime, to implement and enforce the
The United States reviewed efforts to improve member state compliance.

During 2004, sanctions remained in place against Saddam Hussein and other senior officials of the former Iraqi regime, their immediate family members, and individuals and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, and al-Qaida. UN sanctions also remained in effect in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan. The Security Council imposed sanctions on Cote d’Ivoire. UN restrictions on non-governmental groups in Rwanda and Sierra Leone also remained in effect.

On January 30, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1526 to improve implementation of the arms embargo, travel restrictions, and assets freeze imposed by Resolution 1267 (1999) and succeeding resolutions on Usama bin Laden, members of the Taliban and al-Qaida, and their associates.

Resolution 1533, concerning the DRC, adopted March 12, established a sanctions committee and a panel of experts to assist in monitoring the arms embargo on armed groups and militias operating in the districts of North and South Kivu and Ituri and on groups that were not party to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement. Resolution 1552, adopted July 27, renewed the DRC arms embargo and re-established the panel of experts.

An arms embargo, assets freeze, travel restrictions, and restrictions on the export of conflict diamonds and timber remained in effect in Liberia. On March 12, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1532, which required member states to freeze the assets of former Liberian President Charles Taylor, his immediate family members, senior officials of the former Taylor regime, and other close allies or associates. Resolution 1579, adopted December 21, renewed the arms embargo, travel restrictions, and timber ban on Liberia for a period of one year, and the diamond ban for a period of six months, and re-established a panel of experts.

The arms embargo on Somalia, dating back to 1992, remained in place as the oldest sanctions regime currently in effect. By Resolution 1558, adopted on August 17, 2004, the Council re-established a monitoring group, established by Resolution 1519 (2003), to continue monitoring implementation of the arms embargo on Somalia.

On July 30, 2004, the Council adopted Resolution 1556 concerning Sudan, imposing an arms embargo on non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the Sudanese states of North, South, and West Darfur. In Resolution 1564, adopted on September 18, the Council encouraged proactive monitoring of the Darfur region by the African Union and threatened imposition of additional measures, including restrictions on Sudan’s petroleum sector, if the Government of Sudan failed to fully comply with the demands of the Council.

The Council imposed an arms embargo on Cote d’Ivoire by Resolution 1572 on November 15. It also imposed travel restrictions and an assets freeze on those who constituted a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process, were responsible for serious violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law, publicly incited hatred and violence, or violated the arms embargo.

**Oil-For-Food**

The UN Oil-for-Food Program ended in November 2003, as mandated by Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). First-hand Iraqi accounts and documentary evidence of abuses of the Program surfaced in 2003, when the Coalition Provisional Authority obtained access to official Iraqi documents that revealed systemic abuses of the Program by the former Iraqi regime. As early as 2000, the United States brought reports of abuses to the UN Security Council and its Iraq Sanctions Committee.

In response to allegations of wrongdoing by UN officials, in April 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed an independent, high-level inquiry to investigate the administration and management of the Program. Specifically, the Independent Inquiry Committee (IIC) was established to collect and examine information relating to the administration and management of the Program, including allegations of fraud and corruption on the part of UN officials, personnel, and agents, as well as contractors. Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, was appointed chair of the IIC.

On April 21, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1538, which endorsed the inquiry and called for full cooperation in the investigation by all UN officials and personnel, the Coalition Provisional Authority, Iraq, and all other member states, including their national regulatory authorities. Throughout 2004, the State Department responded to numerous requests for information and briefings from the IIC. The Department devoted considerable time and resources to retrieving relevant archived documents covering the span of the Program. The IIC issued a status report on August 9 and a briefing paper on October 21, and was expected to release a final report in 2005. Six committees of the U.S. Congress investigated the Program during the year.

**Non–Self-Governing Territories**

The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24 or C-24) and the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the UN General Assembly annually consider the status of non-self-governing territories, defined as “territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”

As the administering power of three non-self-governing territories—American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands—the United States has consistently partnered with the United Kingdom to ensure agreement on an “omnibus” resolution on the “Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States
Virgin Islands.” This resolution confirms the right of self-determination and reiterates the call for complete decolonization. It further recognizes the work of the administering powers to this end. As in prior years, this resolution was adopted by consensus. The United States continued to fulfill all reporting requirements as requested by this resolution and Article 73(e) of the UN Charter.

During the General Assembly, the United States voted against or abstained on a series of resolutions further addressing the governance and independence of non-self-governing territories. The United States opposed these resolutions because of unacceptable references to land tenure, economic and military activities, and the responsibilities of administering powers.

**Security Council Thematic Debates**

In 2004, the Security Council held debates on 15 thematic items, three more than in 2003, and six more than in 2002. As in the past two years, terrorism continued to command the greatest attention. In March, the Security Council revitalized the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and established the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to support the CTC in its work (Resolution 1535). In addition to the open meetings described below, three additional meetings took place in March, May, and September to condemn the train bombing in Madrid (Resolution 1530); the bomb attack in Grozny which killed Ahmad Kadyrov, President of the Chechen Republic (S/PRST/2004/14); and the taking of hostages at a school in Beslan, Russia, as well as terrorist attacks in Moscow and on two Russian airliners (S/PRST/2004/31). The Security Council also issued a statement to the press to commemorate the first anniversary of the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003.

The Security Council discussed the following themes:

- **Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts.** At the end of January, the Security Council improved sanctions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban and established an analytical support team to assist the sanctions committee with its work (Resolution 1526). In October, the Council declared that terrorist acts are never justifiable and established a working group to consider measures against terrorist groups other than al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Resolution 1566). The Council further discussed the general issue of terrorism at open meetings held in January, March, May, September, and December. Additionally, the Council held open meetings on the work of the CTC in March, July, and October. The United States made several statements acknowledging the accomplishments of the United Nations and the CTC in combating international terrorism. Upon adoption of Resolution 1566, which it cosponsored, the United States emphasized that the deliberate targeting of civilians is never justifiable in any cause.

- **Role of Business in Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping and Post-conflict Peace-building.** In April, the Security Council held an open meeting on
the role of the private sector in conflict prevention and the issue of corporate citizenship in conflict zones. The United States declared that the private sector is the true engine of development, urged member states to promote economic freedom, and noted that companies can provide leadership by setting examples of good corporate citizenship. The United States also expressed support for mechanisms such as the Kimberly Process for diamond certification and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s anti-bribery convention.

- Children and Armed Conflict. The Security Council held two open meetings in January and April calling on all parties to respect their international obligations regarding the protection of children affected by armed conflict (Resolution 1539). In its statement, the United States recognized the terrible consequences of using children in armed conflict, called for the active monitoring of governments and armed groups that use child soldiers, and stressed the need to eliminate this practice.

- Role of Civil Society in Post-conflict Peace-building. The Security Council held an open meeting in June, in which the United States highlighted the importance of civil society to achieve international peace and security and acknowledged the role of the Economic and Social Council in providing an important link with civil society.

- Civilian Aspects of Conflict Management and Peace-building. In September, the Security Council held a High-Level meeting and issued a Ministerial statement on the importance of civilian aspects of conflict management and complex crises (S/PRST/2004/33). While supporting an improved civilian police response in conflict management, the United States advocated an integrated approach that incorporates all elements of public security and criminal justice and announced the formation of the new Office of the Special Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the State Department to improve the U.S. response to post-conflict situations.

- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. The Security Council held open meetings in June and December. The President of the Council issued a Statement following the December meeting, in which the Council condemned violence that targeted civilians and called on all parties to a conflict to comply with their obligations under international law (S/PRST/2004/46). The United States noted that protection of human rights is one of the foundations of U.S. foreign policy and reiterated its commitment to international accountability for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

- Complex Crises and United Nations Response. During an open meeting in May, the Security Council discussed the UN role in addressing complex crises and emergencies afflicting different parts of the world, especially Africa. In its statement, the United States recognized that complex crises require case-specific responses and bilateral and national responses should be coordinated with a system-wide UN response.
• Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Security Council held three open meetings, two in April and one in December, to discuss the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) to non-state actors, particularly terrorists. At the end of April, the Council decided that member states should take effective measures to prevent the proliferation of WMDs, especially to non-state actors, and established a committee to monitor compliance with these obligations (Resolution 1540). Addressing the Council upon adoption of Resolution 1540, which was a U.S. initiative, the United States stated that the resolution fulfilled the following key goals laid out by President Bush in his address before the General Assembly in 2003: to criminalize the proliferation of WMDs, to ensure all countries have strong export controls, and to secure sensitive materials within each country’s borders.

• United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The Council issued a Presidential Statement following an open meeting in May, which highlighted the operational needs of UN peacekeeping operations (S/PRST/2004/16). The United States expressed support for innovative solutions to the capacity challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations and, recognizing the role of other actors, stressed that the Council must be careful not to assign tasks to peacekeepers for which they are not prepared.

• Post-conflict National Reconciliation: Role of the United Nations. In January, the Council reaffirmed, in a Presidential Statement, the important role the United Nations played in the process of post-conflict reconciliation (S/PRST/2004/2). Addressing the Council, the United States expressed its belief that the establishment, restoration, and preservation of democratic governance should be the most important, over-arching objective of post-conflict reconciliation.

• Refugees. An open meeting in May included a briefing by Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The United States expressed its gratitude for the work of the High Commissioner, noting that his office probably had an impact on more people than any other UN office.

• Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations in Stabilization Processes. The Council held an open meeting in July, followed by a Presidential Statement, which encouraged increased collaboration between regional and subregional organizations and the United Nations to effectively address conflict situations and to coordinate their efforts in stabilization processes based on their complementary and comparative advantages (S/PRST/2004/27). While highlighting the advantages of regional arrangements to support peace and stability, the United States noted that a troop-contributing country might have its own agenda independent of the peacekeeping agenda and that its actions must be carefully monitored.

• Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations Role. Following an open meeting in October, the Council issued a Presidential Statement which
addressed the issue of helping war-torn societies re-establish the rule of law and come to terms with large-scale abuses through mechanisms such as tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions (S/PRST/2004/34). In its statement, the United States underscored the importance of a judicial system based on transparency and openness as a true engine of the rule of law, while expressing concern over respecting national decisions about criminal justice and U.S. objections to the International Criminal Court.

- Small Arms. In January, the Council held an open meeting, followed by a Presidential Statement, which encouraged arms-exporting countries to exercise the highest degree of responsibility in small arms and light weapons transactions and encouraged international and regional cooperation to prevent their diversion to terrorist groups (S/PRST/2004/1). The United States recognized the serious consequences of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, especially the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems, welcomed the Secretary-General’s recommendations to combat the problem, and expressed its belief that a results-oriented approach to the problem was best.

- Women and Peace and Security. Following an open meeting held in October, the Security Council, in a Presidential Statement, strongly condemned the continued violence against women in situations of armed conflict (S/PRST/2004/40). Addressing the Council, the United States expressed its commitment to end trafficking in persons, welcomed the UN commitment to enforcing its zero-tolerance policy in sex trafficking at every UN peacekeeping mission, and called for mandatory training for all peacekeepers prior to deployment.