Part 1

Political and Security Affairs

Regional Issues

Near East

Iraq

On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which, among other things, required Saddam Hussein’s regime to provide to the United Nations an accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of Iraq’s programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems and to cooperate fully by providing unimpeded and unconditional access for UN inspections. Resolution 1441 also decided that Iraq had been, and remained in, material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including Resolution 687 (1991), and afforded Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.”

On February 5, 2003, Secretary Powell addressed the Security Council, arguing that Iraq had failed to avail itself of this final opportunity and continued to defy previous Council resolutions. Referring to Resolution 1441, Secretary Powell stated: “this Council recognized that Iraq continued to pose a threat to international peace and security, and that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its disarmament obligations. Today, Iraq still poses a threat and Iraq still remains in material breach. Indeed, by its failure to seize on its one last opportunity to come clean and disarm, Iraq has put itself in deeper material breach and closer to the day when it will face serious consequences for its continued defiance of this Council.”

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain subsequently circulated a draft resolution in February reiterating Iraq’s continued defiance of Council resolutions and authorizing the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Despite intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts, members of the Security Council were not able to reach an agreement on the matter. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain withdrew the draft. In March 2003, under the authorization of force set out in Resolution 678 and in light of Iraqi acts that the Council in Resolution 1441 had decided constituted material breaches, a U.S.-led multinational coalition initiated military action, bringing an end to a regime that had defied UN Security Council resolutions for more than 12 years.

After Iraq’s liberation, the United States and the United Kingdom successfully sought approval by the Security Council of five resolutions on Iraq: 1472, 1476, 1483, 1500, and 1511. Resolutions 1472, 1476, 1500, and 1511 were adopted unanimously; Resolution 1483 was adopted by a vote of 14 to 0, with Syria abstaining. In March and April 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolutions 1472 and 1476, which authorized the Secretary-General to assume temporary control from the Iraqi Government of the Oil-for-Food
OFF) distribution pipeline and therefore ensure the availability of humanitarian goods to meet the basic needs of Iraqi civilians. Under Resolutions 1472 and 1476, UN agencies selected $1 billion worth of humanitarian goods from the Oil-for-Food pipeline for priority shipment, and facilitated their subsequent distribution.

The United States was a principal cosponsor of Resolution 1483, which the Security Council adopted unanimously on May 22. This resolution lifted non-weaponry trade sanctions on Iraq; recognized the authorities of the United States and United Kingdom as occupying powers; mandated a vital role for the United Nations, including the appointment of a Special Representative; called for international assistance in the reconstruction of Iraq, including the transfer of certain Iraqi assets frozen after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait to a Development Fund for Iraq; directed the termination of the OFF program after a six-month transition period; and required all states to freeze and transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq the assets of Iraqi state entities, former Iraqi senior regime officials, and their agents. The United States and United Kingdom committed to update the Council quarterly on implementation of this resolution.

Resolution 1483 provided the framework and authorization for the Secretary-General to wind down the OFF program over a six-month period through cooperation of the three parties most directly involved, which were the UN Office of the Iraq Program, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the interim Iraqi authority. In accordance with Resolution 1483, 95 percent of Iraq’s oil-derived income was to be deposited into the new Development Fund for Iraq rather than the Oil-for-Food program’s UN-administered escrow account; 5 percent of the income was to be used to compensate victims of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Resolution 1483 caused the transfer of an initial $1 billion of unencumbered funds from the Oil-for-Food escrow account to the Development Fund and required all surplus unencumbered funds to be transferred as well. By December 31, transfers into the Development Fund totaled $5.6 billion. Approximately $5 billion of the remaining funds in the Oil-for-Food escrow account was reserved to fund delivery of previously approved contracts judged beneficial to the Iraqi people.

The United States and the United Kingdom obtained full Security Council support for an asset freeze and transfer mechanism designed to return to the Iraqi people those assets removed from the country by the Saddam regime. Resolution 1483 required member states immediately to freeze and transfer to the Development Fund for Iraq all such funds or other economic resources. The UN committee tasked with identifying Iraqi individuals and entities subject to the freeze and transfer ended with the termination of the Oil-for-Food program on November 21, but on November 24, Security Council members unanimously adopted a U.S./U.K. proposal (Resolution 1518) creating a new committee (the “Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1518”) to continue the identification process.
In August, the United States cosponsored Resolution 1500, which welcomed the establishment of the Governing Council of Iraq and established the mandate for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) for a period of 12 months. The Security Council adopted this resolution by a vote of 14 to 0, with 1 abstention (Syria).

On August 19, a terrorist bombing of the Canal Hotel, the UN’s Headquarters in Baghdad, killed 23 people, including the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil). The Coalition Provisional Authority and U.S. military forces offered extensive emergency assistance to the United Nations and its staff subsequent to the bombing, for which the United Nations expressed its deep appreciation. Concerned about the security of its staff, the United Nations drastically reduced its personnel in Iraq shortly after the bombing, and subsequently withdrew all international personnel. Local Iraqi staff continued their humanitarian and reconstruction work. In October, an independent panel, led by former President of Finland, Mariit Ahtisaari, released its report which examined “all relevant facts about the security situation in Iraq before the attack, the UN security mechanisms, procedure and measures in place,” and identified key lessons for future security arrangements. The report concluded that the UN security management system had failed in its mission to provide adequate security to UN staff in Iraq, recommended that a thorough and professional security assessment be undertaken in order to determine whether the return of international staff was possible and, if so, under what kind of security arrangements. In December, the United Nations temporarily established UNAMI offices in Cyprus, Jordan, and Kuwait, where it carried out limited humanitarian and reconstruction activities, largely via local Iraqi staff. On December 10, 2003, the Secretary-General appointed Ross Mountain (New Zealand) as his Acting Special Representative. The United Nations had not returned its international staff to Iraq by the end of 2003.

One week after the bombing of UN Headquarters, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1502, which recognized the importance of the work of humanitarian and United Nations and associated personnel, and the need to protect them. This resolution specifically condemned the attack on UN Headquarters as an attack on the entire civilized world and an immeasurable loss to the international community.

The United States authored Resolution 1511, which the Security Council adopted unanimously on October 16. This resolution, among other things, invited the Iraqi Governing Council to provide a timetable and program for the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of democratic elections under that constitution; resolved that the United Nations should strengthen its vital role in Iraq; authorized a multinational force under unified command to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq; and encouraged international financial institutions to provide significant and sustained contributions to the reconstruction and development of Iraq’s economy.
UNAMI was paid for from the UN regular budget, at a cost of $9.6 million for 2003. The U.S. assessment was $2.1 million.

**UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)**

UN Security Council Resolution 689, adopted April 9, 1991, established UNIKOM following the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. UNIKOM monitored the Iraq-Kuwait demilitarized zone (DMZ) as well as the Khawar ’Abd Allah waterway. UNIKOM’s presence in the DMZ supported U.S. interests by seeking and maintaining regional peace and stability.

In mid-March 2003, and preceding coalition operations against the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Secretary-General directed UNIKOM to temporarily suspend operations and to withdraw its personnel from the DMZ. As tensions increased, the Secretary-General called for the repatriation of the bulk of the peacekeepers comprising UNIKOM, but allowed a small headquarters element to remain in Kuwait City.

After the liberation of Iraq by coalition forces, Resolution 1490, adopted July 3, directed the end of both UNIKOM’s mandate and the Iraq-Kuwait DMZ, since there appeared no further need to maintain a buffer zone between the two states. UNIKOM concluded its operations on October 6 without further incident.

In February 2003, UNIKOM had 1,111 troops and observers from 32 countries, including 11 American military observers. In July, UNIKOM began to reduce its staff, and by the end of the year, there were no UNIKOM personnel. The UN budget for the mission in 2003 was $9.6 million and the U.S. assessment was $2.6 million.

**Arab-Israeli Situation**

Even as violence continued in the Middle East, the United States actively pursued in the United Nations President Bush’s vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. To this end, the United States worked in partnership with the other members of the Quartet (the United Nations, European Union, and Russia) to realize the Quartet’s Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (“Roadmap”). The UN Security Council formally endorsed the Roadmap by unanimously adopting Resolution 1515 on November 15. This resolution called on the parties to fulfill their obligations under the Roadmap in cooperation with the Quartet.

On August 19, a suicide bomber in Jerusalem detonated a bomb on a crowded bus, killing 23 people and injuring 130. This bombing marked the end of seven weeks without any suicide bombings. The United States made it clear that the Palestinian Authority must dismantle and disarm the terrorist capabilities or organizations that take innocent lives in order to prevent the peace process from going forward and called on regional and international leaders to do their part to halt all assistance, including funding flows, to groups engaged in violence and terror.
In September and again in October, the United States successfully blocked Security Council resolutions that were unbalanced in their criticism of only one party in the dispute, Israel. On September 16, the United States vetoed a draft resolution sponsored by Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, and Syria demanding that Israel cease any act of deportation or threat to the safety of the elected President of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat. In explaining its vote, the United States noted, among other things, that the resolution was flawed in its failure to include condemnation of all acts of terrorism.

Days later, the 10th General Assembly Emergency Special Session on Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories reconvened to consider a similarly unbalanced resolution. Despite intensive U.S. lobbying in capitals and UN missions against the resolution, the General Assembly adopted the measure by a vote of 133 to 4, with 15 abstentions. The United States opposed this resolution for the same reasons it opposed the nearly identical Security Council resolution.

In October, U.S. lobbying efforts helped dissuade Syria from calling for a vote on its draft Security Council resolution condemning Israel’s October 5 military strike on a terrorist training camp on the outskirts of Damascus. The United States argued that unbalanced resolutions heightened tension in the Middle East. Days later, Syria introduced another draft Security Council resolution, this time condemning Israel’s construction of a security barrier. The United States vetoed this proposed resolution, noting in its explanation of vote that the resolution failed to address both sides of the larger security context of the Middle East, including the devastating suicide attacks on Israelis.

Again, the General Assembly Emergency Special Session reconvened to discuss a similar resolution condemning the barrier. A compromise brokered by the European Union resulted in approval, by a vote of 144 to 4, with 12 abstentions, of General Assembly Resolution ES-10/13, which demanded Israel stop and reverse construction of its barrier and requested the UN Secretary-General to report on Israel’s compliance. The United States voted against this resolution as similarly unbalanced.

As directed by this General Assembly resolution, the Secretary-General issued a report on November 28. The report concluded that Israel was not in compliance with the resolution’s demand that it “stop and reverse the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.” In December, the Palestinian Authority introduced a resolution in the reconvened Emergency Special Session that requested an International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the legal consequences of the Israeli barrier.

The General Assembly adopted this resolution by a vote of 90 to 8 with 74 abstentions. Because of strong U.S. lobbying against the resolution and abstentions by European Union countries, the Palestinian resolution failed to receive a resounding endorsement. The United States asserted U.S. policy
that international bodies, including the ICJ, should not offer opinions on final status issues, which the parties themselves had committed to resolve through bilateral negotiations.

In the regular General Assembly session, 20 resolutions concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and related issues were introduced. The General Assembly adopted all of them. The United States opposed many of these resolutions because they addressed final status issues that the Israelis and Palestinians had agreed to decide through negotiations; advocated activities or language incompatible with basic principles of the Middle East peace process; and/or expended resources that could be used in more productive ways to improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

To address such concerns, the United States partnered with the European Union to launch a diplomatic campaign to reduce the number of Middle East resolutions introduced during this General Assembly. The General Assembly voted 133 to 0, with 35 abstentions, for U.S.-initiated Resolution 58/95 on assistance to Palestinian refugees through the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees. These efforts produced a slight reduction in the number of one-sided Middle East resolutions adopted during this General Assembly.

The United States also made progress in the General Assembly toward reducing the large majorities by which these recurring resolutions were usually adopted. U.S. lobbying and demarches successfully increased the number of No votes and abstentions over the prior year.

The Palestinian delegation deferred action on a draft resolution aimed at modifying Israel’s UN credentials to exclude Israel’s representation of the Occupied Territories at the United Nations. Vigorous U.S. lobbying highlighted the potential ramifications for the credentials of the many other countries whose territory was in some way contested.

Throughout the year, U.S. representatives spoke out forcefully and frequently in numerous UN bodies to ensure that Israel was not excluded from or isolated at UN meetings and conferences, and that Israeli interests were given fair consideration.

**UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)**

UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 established the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in March 1978. These measures responded to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon following a Palestinian Liberation Organization attack inside Israel. UNIFIL’s mandate includes confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, assisting the Government of Lebanon in restoring its effective authority, and contributing to the restoration of international peace and security in the region. Since 1978, the Security Council has renewed UNIFIL’s mandate at six-month intervals. The Council last renewed UNIFIL on July 31 with Resolution 1496.

With the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in 2002, UNIFIL operations have mainly focused on maintaining the cease-fire along the Israel-
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Lebanon border. UNIFIL’s presence along the line of separation (also known as the Blue Line) helped advance U.S. efforts to achieve peace in the region by working to maintain stability between Israel and Lebanon.

During the first part of 2003, the UNIFIL area of operations was relatively quiet. Cross-border fire exchanges between Hizballah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) accounted for the bulk of violations of the Blue Line during this period. In addition, there were frequent air violations of the Blue Line by Israeli aircraft, as well as incidents of Hizballah’s anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) landing across the border on Israeli civilian settlements.

In the latter part of 2003, Hizballah increased its attacks against IDF posts and personnel across the Blue Line, particularly in the disputed Sheb’a Farms area. IDF air violations of the Blue Line as well as retaliatory AAA fire by Hizballah continued during this period.

As of December 31, 2003, UNIFIL included 1,991 troops from seven nations. No U.S. troops served in UNIFIL during 2003. UNIFIL’s budget was $82.8 million per year, and the U.S. assessed contribution to UNIFIL was $22.1 million.

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was the first UN peacekeeping mission. In 1948, the Security Council established UNTSO under Resolution 50 to supervise the truce at the end of the British mandate in Palestine. Since then, UNTSO has supervised the implementation of general agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Following the 1967 Middle East War, UN Security Council Resolution 236 (1967) directed the parties to fully cooperate with UNTSO observers in implementing and monitoring the cease-fire in the Israel-Syria sector and the Suez Canal Zone. In 1972, pursuant to the recommendation of the UN Secretary-General (S/10611, annex), UNTSO observers deployed on the Lebanese side of the demarcation line between Lebanon and Israel. The Security Council also directed unarmed UNTSO military observers to assist UN peacekeeping forces deployed in the Sinai (1973), on the Golan Heights (1974), as well as in southern Lebanon (1978).

In 2003, UNTSO continued to contribute to the maintenance of regional stability. UNTSO observers and administrative staff provided direct support to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights (UNDOF). UNTSO observers were also present in the Sinai desert, at Egypt’s request.

As of December 2003, UNTSO had 154 military observers from 23 nations, including three U.S. military observers. UNTSO’s budget of $26 million was funded from the regular budget rather than the UN peacekeeping account. The U.S. assessed contribution for UNTSO was $5.7 million.

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

UN Security Council Resolution 350, adopted May 31, 1974, established the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the aftermath
of the Arab-Israeli War. UNDOF observes the implementation of the Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement. It also serves U.S. national security interests by preventing the escalation of tensions between Israel and Syria. The Security Council extends UNDOF’s mandate at six-month intervals. The Security Council renewed UNDOF on December 22, 2003, by adopting Resolution 1520.

UNDOF monitors the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, supervises the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, and monitors the areas of separation and limitation (as established in the Disengagement Agreement) between the two countries. During 2003, UNDOF’s area of operations was relatively quiet. However, the Lebanese-based Hizballah conducted periodic attacks against Israeli military outposts and personnel in northern Golan.

In 2003, UNDOF consisted of 1,032 troops from five nations. No U.S. personnel served in UNDOF. UNDOF’s budget was $38.8 million, and the U.S. assessed contribution was $10.4 million.

South Asia

Afghanistan

Throughout 2003, the United States continued to work with other members of the international community, particularly through the United Nations, to fulfill a vision for a prosperous, democratic, and self-governing Afghanistan. To this end, the United States actively supported initiatives that curtailed narcotics activity; led to greater peace and security in Afghanistan; promoted the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and implemented institutional capacity-building programs.

On March 28, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1471 that extended the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for 12 months. The Security Council established UNAMA by Resolution 1401 (2002) with a mandate to foster the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, including the strengthening and protection of human rights, the rule of law, national reconciliation, and gender issues. The UNAMA mandate also included management of all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), continued to play a critical role in leading the mission.

Concerned with the growing threat of opium production and abuse, the Council released a Presidential Statement on June 18, 2003, stressing the need to promote a comprehensive international approach to fighting the illicit cultivation and sale of opium poppy in Afghanistan. The United States joined consensus on the statement in supporting the continuing efforts of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and welcoming the proposals outlined in both the Afghan Transitional Administration’s Drugs Strategy and the Paris Pact (May 2003), which was endorsed by the G-8 Summit that same month.
The statement also expressed its support for the Afghan Transitional Administration’s efforts to eradicate narcotics production by the year 2013.

The United States was greatly concerned about the resurgence of opium poppy cultivation and trade, as it generates the funds that corrupt institutions and finance terrorism and insurgency, and destabilizes the region by eroding the rule of law. The United Nations achieved several milestones in eradicating the narcotics threat in Afghanistan in 2003. On August 25, the UNODC and the Afghan Minister of the Interior signed an agreement to establish a new drug interdiction department within the Afghan Interior Ministry. The United Nations assisted the Afghan Ministry of Justice with developing new drug control legislation and worked with the Counter-Narcotics Directorate in field offices in major opium-producing regions of the country. Afghanistan demonstrated its commitment to the issue by passing a national drug law on October 20 identifying drug-related crimes and strengthening penalties for trafficking and related activities. The United States continued its commitment to supporting the U.K.-led initiative aimed at building the Afghan Transitional Authority’s capacity to run effective counter narcotics programs and reduce poppy cultivation and trade through alternative livelihood programs. Despite these gains, the Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003, released by UNODC on October 29, reported that Afghanistan—with an annual income for opium farmers and traffickers estimated at $2.3 billion—remained the largest opium-producing country in the world.

On August 11, NATO took the historic step of assuming the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. NATO’s leadership of the ISAF, its first international security force outside of Europe, helped provide a secure environment necessary for the accelerated efforts of the United States and the international community in assisting Afghans with reconstructing their country and rebuilding its political institutions. The Security Council’s unanimous adoption of Resolution 1510 on October 13 extended the ISAF mandate for 12 months.

On December 5, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 58/27 without a vote. The General Assembly addressed Afghanistan’s quest for peace and security by reiterating the General Assembly’s strong support for the Afghan Transitional Authority in its efforts to successfully implement the Bonn Agreement. Members noted the fragility of peace and stability, the uncertainty of which had a profound effect on reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The General Assembly called upon member states to support the Transitional Authority and provide emergency assistance for peace, normalcy, and reconstruction, and encouraged donors to channel assistance through the development budget of the Transitional Authority. The United States joined consensus on this resolution. Its uncontested adoption was an important indicator of the substantial international support for the establishment of peace and security in Afghanistan.

During an address to a UN-sponsored meeting on Afghanistan in New York on September 24, Secretary Powell conveyed President Bush’s
pledge of an additional $1.2 billion in aid. These additional funds sent a clear
signal of the continuing, long-term U.S. commitment to Afghanistan’s future.
Secretary Powell emphasized in his remarks that Afghanistan’s success in its
massive reconstruction effort could not be achieved without strong and
sustained assistance from others across the international community.

Capping a year of effort, Afghanistan’s Constitutional Loya Jirga
(CLJ) assembled December 14 and adopted a new constitution on January 4,
2004. The United States supported these important developments. UN bodies
[including UNAMA, the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)] assisted the CLJ, which was
composed of citizen representatives from all Afghanistan, in creating a
landmark constitution for that country. The new constitution provided for
strong presidential and parliamentary structures, institutionalized the equality
and representation of women, protected the rights of all ethnic groups, and
recognized the role of Islam. UNAMA provided crucial technical and
financial support to the constitutional process, updating donors and the
international community on the needs of the Constitutional Commission and
the developing CLJ. UNAMA also provided critical technical and field-level
support, making issue papers available to the Constitutional Commission
Secretariat, and advising UN Regional Central Secretariat Offices. UNDP
assisted the Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission in creating an
operational budget for the Loya Jirga process, and facilitated the recruitment
of staff for the Loya Jirga at the Secretariat’s central and regional offices.
UNHCR worked with the Secretariat’s offices to facilitate the participation of
the Afghan refugees displaced in Iran and Pakistan in the upcoming election
process.

UNAMA cost $82.2 million in 2003. The U.S. contribution was
$18.1 million. In addition, the United States contributed $52.9 million to the
UNHCR for its work to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of Afghan refugees
and to provide protection and assistance to refugees remaining in neighboring
countries. Three CIVPOL and 72 military observers participated in UNAMA.
No U.S. personnel were assigned to UNAMA.

India/Pakistan

Under the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was given the
choice of acceding either to India or Pakistan. Pakistan objected to Indian
control, and in January 1948, the United Nations established the UN
Commission for India and Pakistan to investigate and mediate the dispute over
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In July 1949, India and Pakistan agreed to a
cease-fire line supervised by commission observers.

The Security Council had established the UN Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to take over this role in 1949 under
Resolution 47 (1948), and in March 1951, the Council terminated the UN
Commission under Resolution 91. UNMOGIP functions were to observe and
report, investigate complaints of cease-fire violations, and submit its findings
to each party and to the Secretary-General. UNMOGIP reports are included in
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations weekly Briefing Notes on Field Operations and circulated to the Security Council. UNMOGIP observers are deployed on both sides of the “Line of Control” agreed upon by India and Pakistan in 1972, which generally follows the 1949 cease-fire line.

Despite UNMOGIP’s passive role in Kashmir, the United States believed that to end the mission without replacing it with an alternative mechanism could upset the delicate equilibrium, which allowed both sides to pass through a tense period in 2003 and meet on a range of bilateral issues.

UNMOGIP’s budget for 2003, paid from the UN regular budget, was $6.2 million, and the U.S. assessment was $1.4 million. UNMOGIP had 44 observers in 2003. No U.S. personnel were assigned to UNMOGIP.

Africa

Burundi

Since 1993, when President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated, 200,000 Burundians have died in conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi factions. In 2003, the United States continued to work in the UN Security Council to support international efforts to assist Burundi’s peace process and promote national reconciliation. The Security Council closely followed the work of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Burundi, Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia). Dinka served as the chair of the Monitoring Committee responsible for ensuring the implementation of the August 2000 Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconstruction in Burundi. Dinka also gave the Council regular briefings on progress in negotiating an all-inclusive cessation of hostilities agreement with the major Burundi rebel group not party to the peace process, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy/Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), led by Pierre Nkurunziza. The United States supported the important role in the Burundi peace process of the African Mission in Burundi.

Burundi’s Transitional National Assembly and Transitional Senate opened in January and February 2002, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement. In a Presidential Statement on May 1, 2003, the Security Council congratulated the parties in Burundi on a peaceful transition of power in the presidency of the Transitional Government. The Council characterized the development as a major milestone in the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement. The United States likewise issued a public statement in support of the peaceful transition of the presidency and encouraged further positive movement in the peace process. Further, with U.S. support, the Security Council formed terms of reference for a Security Council assessment mission to visit Burundi in 2004 to evaluate possible mechanisms to address the issues of impunity for human rights and accountability in Burundi.

The October 2003 signing of the “Pretoria Protocol” by the Government of Burundi and the main rebel group, the CNDD-FDD, demonstrated significant progress in the Burundi peace process. The Protocol addressed the sharing of political, defense, and security responsibilities.
between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD. Although the United Nations played a relatively small role in the actual talks, Special Representative Dinka had a large role negotiating with the parties in the efforts leading up to the talks. The United Nations supported the signing of the Protocol. The United States commended these efforts and urged all the parties to continue to implement all agreements, including the December 2002 cease-fire. The United States continued to call for the remaining armed rebel group, the FNL faction led by Agathon Rwasa, to join the peace process.

Cote d’Ivoire

After a military coup in 1999, Junta leader Robert Guei held contested elections in late 2000, after which the Supreme Court declared Laurent Gbagbo the winner. Gbagbo faced strong opposition, and hostilities between northern rebels and the government broke out on September 19, 2002. The French government interceded, calling for a round table between the 10 Ivoirian political groups in Paris in January 2003. On February 4, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1464, supporting the discussions in Paris which had resulted in the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement on January 24. The resolution called on all Ivoirian political forces to fully implement the Agreement without delay.

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement established a cessation of hostilities between the elected government and the opposition rebels, the Forces Nouvelles, and created the coalesional Government of National Reconciliation to ensure peace and stability. In support of this aim, Resolution 1464 authorized deployment of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces supported by French stabilization troops, and created the position of Special Representative, filled by Albert Tevoedjre (Benin).

Affirming its support for the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, on May 13 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1479 establishing a special political mission in Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI). This resolution structured MINUCI’s mandate to assist with the full and timely implementation of the Agreement by all Ivoirian parties, including the monitoring of the security situation and confidence-building measures. The Security Council also approved a small military advisory component to work in concert with the efforts of established ECOWAS and French stabilization forces (the Licorne forces).

The United States regarded MINUCI’s efforts, in conjunction with those of the ECOWAS forces and the Licorne forces, as critical to bolstering the maintenance of peace and stability in Cote d’Ivoire. In a May 30 speech to the Council, the United States called on all Ivoirian parties to work together to ensure that the cease-fire held and to implement the provisions of the Agreement.

In a Presidential Statement issued on July 25, however, the Council noted with concern the continued existence of regional factors of instability, particularly the proliferation of light arms and the use of mercenaries and child soldiers. The United States joined consensus on August 4 to adopt Resolution
1498, a six-month extension of MINUCI’s mandate, established under Resolution 1464.

On November 13, the Security Council issued another Presidential Statement noting some progress toward fulfilling the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement objectives, such as the appointment of ministers and reopening of borders with Mali and Burkina Faso. It also expressed concerns over an apparent lack of commitment to ensure full implementation of the Agreement and condemned human rights violations.

On November 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1514, which renewed MINUCI’s mandate for another six months, again noting with concern serious difficulties in the Ivorian peace. In a statement to the Council, the United States again called on all parties to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement to fulfill their commitments.

On December 5, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement expressing concern regarding armed elements’ attempts to cross the cease-fire line.

MINUCI cost $13.9 million in 2003, of which the United States paid approximately $3.1 million. MINUCI had eight military observers in 2003. No U.S. personnel were assigned to MINUCI.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Security Council established the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in August 1999 under Resolution 1258 to assist in implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement between the Congolese and the governments of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe for a cessation of hostilities among all belligerent forces. MONUC’s numbers and tasks grew from the 500 military observers authorized in November 1999 by Security Council Resolution 1279, to a force of 8,700 military personnel authorized in December 2002 by Resolution 1445, which added two battalions to undertake demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation of Rwandan Hutu rebel groups. In July 2003, the troop ceiling was again increased by Resolution 1493 to 10,800 to provide for a continuing MONUC security presence in Kinshasa and a brigade-sized force in the northeast Ituri district.

In 2003, Congolese factions agreed to form an inclusive transitional national government, with elections planned for 2005. Despite the political progress, however, violence caused by militia groups in the east, particularly in the Ituri district, continued. MONUC dispatched a reserve Uruguayan guard force to Ituri and in May 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1484, which authorized deployment of an interim emergency multinational force to Bunia, Ituri, to stabilize the city while the United Nations sought reinforcements for its troop presence there.

U.S. lobbying efforts to appoint former U.S. Ambassador to the Congo William Swing, who was serving as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in the Western Sahara, as new SRSG in the Congo,
resulted in his appointment effective July 1. On July 28, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1493, which extended MONUC’s mandate until July 30, 2004, allowed use of all necessary means to enforce its mandate in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and authorized an increase of two further battalions to ensure stability in the Ituri district. The resolution also imposed an arms embargo on non-state actors in the eastern Congo, specifically affecting North and South Kivu and Ituri. By year’s end, SRSG Swing had deployed most MONUC troops and staff into the eastern Congo, noting that political agreements in 2003 had brought Lusaka Agreement signatories into a working governmental structure. Several companies of MONUC troops were authorized to be deployed temporarily under Security Council Resolution 1493 to provide a neutral security presence in Kinshasa during the transitional government, pending training of an integrated Congolese police force. Nongovernmental organizations and the Congolese credited MONUC with restoring stability to Ituri’s central town, Bunia, and expanding access of humanitarian workers to other parts of Ituri.

A driving factor in the continued violence in the Congo was the struggle for control of natural resources, whose exploitation provided both funding and impetus for the conflict. In response, the Security Council in 2000 created an independent Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose mandate was twice renewed in 2003 (Resolution 1457 of January 24 and Resolution 1499 of August 13). The panel presented its final report on October 31, and the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on November 19, urging all states to take appropriate steps to end the illegal exploitation of the Congo’s resources. As called for by the Security Council upon recommendation of the Panel, the United States worked with a number of U.S.-based companies throughout 2003 to ensure that their activities in the Congo were not contributing to the ongoing conflict.

The 2003 UN budget for MONUC was $565.1 million, of which the U.S. share was approximately $151.1 million. At the end of the year, MONUC had deployed 9,981 troops, 553 military observers, and 115 civilian police. The United States did not contribute any personnel to MONUC in 2003.

**Ethiopia/Eritrea**

The UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in July 2000 with Resolutions 1312 and 1320 after the two countries signed an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. A comprehensive cease-fire was then signed on December 12, 2000, ending their border war. In the peace agreement, both sides agreed to the creation of an independent Boundary Commission. They also agreed to cooperate with the Commission and its staff during the process of border delimitation and demarcation, and that the Commission’s determination of the border would be final and binding.

The Boundary Commission announced its findings on April 13, 2002. Eritrea accepted the decision. Ethiopia initially accepted the decision, but in
August 2003 told the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General that it would not hand over Badme in the west or the central Irob region, and asked the United Nations on September 19 to provide an alternative to the Boundary Commission decision, which the United Nations declined to do. Ethiopia said it could not accept the delimitation of two key areas in the central and western sectors as part of Eritrea and refused to accept demarcation. Ethiopia disengaged from constructive contact with the Boundary Commission and ceased paying its share of the Commission’s expenses.

During 2003, the United States joined with other Security Council members in unanimous approval of two six-month renewals of UNMEE’s mandate, Resolution 1466 on March 14 and Resolution 1507 on September 12. These mandate renewals included calls for lifting of administrative restrictions imposed by both countries, though predominantly by Eritrea, for establishment of a high altitude direct air corridor, and for cooperation with the Boundary Commission. The resolutions reaffirmed the importance of political dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea in order to ensure the successful peace process, and called on them to engage in dialogue and confidence building measures in order to normalize relations.

UNMEE continued to monitor the temporary security zone encompassing disputed border areas in 2003, and noted increasing Ethiopian incursions. Eritrea increased administrative restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNMEE, and no progress was made by the international community in getting the two countries to agree on the establishment of a direct flight route between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

In 2003, the UN budget for UNMEE was $182.9 million, with a U.S. assessment of $48.9 million. At the end of the year, UNMEE had 3,795 troops and 209 military observers; seven of the military observers were American.

Liberia

Following several years of civil war in Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brokered a peace agreement in 1993. With the support of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), established in September 1993 after some delays in the peace process, Charles Taylor was elected President of Liberia in 1997. UNOMIL was closed in September 1997 and the UN Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was established in November 1997 to further support national reconciliation and reconstruction. However, government abuses and the inability of the Government of Liberia and opposition parties to reach agreement on key issues such as security sector reform led to a resumption of fighting.

By mid-2003, the Liberian rebel groups Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia had gained control over most of Liberia’s territory and were moving towards Monrovia. The African Union, ECOWAS, the United Nations, and the United States began intensive efforts to bring the Liberian parties, including the rebel groups, to a negotiated settlement during peace talks in

Ghana. On June 4, the Sierra Leone Special Court announced its indictment of Liberian President Taylor for supplying arms and refuge to the Revolutionary United Front rebels, who had committed numerous atrocities in Sierra Leone. The first elements of an Economic Community of West Africa Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) force, organized by ECOWAS, entered Liberia on August 4.

International pressure mounted, and on August 11, Taylor resigned in favor of Vice President Blah and went into exile in Nigeria. The parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, Ghana, on August 18. The Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on August 27, 2003, welcoming the peace agreement between the Liberia parties. The United States stationed an Amphibious Ready Group offshore and assigned a detachment of Marines who operated in and around Monrovia to support ECOMIL operations. U.S. troops departed as the United Nations took over in October. The National Transitional Government of Liberia took office on October 14, under the leadership of Chairman Gyude Bryant.

During 2003, the UN Security Council expressed concern over the events in Liberia through a series of resolutions and other actions. On January 28, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1458, extending for three months the tenure of the Panel of Experts charged with reviewing compliance by the Government of Liberia and other groups with UN sanctions on traffic in arms and Sierra Leonan rough diamonds.

On April 21, the Security Council President endorsed the Secretary-General’s recommendations for heightening the efforts of UNOL to build government capacity for human rights and democracy in Liberia and for supporting the peace process.

Security Council Resolution 1478, unanimously adopted on May 6, registered the Council’s concern about violations of UN sanctions by the Government of Liberia, as well as by LURD and other armed rebel groups, and extended for an additional 12 months the arms embargo, restrictions on trade in Liberian rough diamonds, and the travel ban imposed by Resolution 1343 (2001). Resolution 1478 also imposed restrictions on trade in Liberian timber, effective in July 2003.

In July, the Secretary-General appointed Jacques Paul Klein (United States) as his Special Representative for Liberia, with responsibility for directing UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) operations and coordinating all UN activities in Liberia. In addition to sending Klein, the Secretary-General also instructed his Representative in Liberia (head of UNOL) and his Representative for West Africa to go to Monrovia to begin preparations for the return of UN offices and programs to Liberia. A Security Council mission visited West Africa June 28–July 5 to support the Liberia peace process.

On August 1, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1497, authorizing establishment under Chapter VII of the UN Charter of a multinational force in Liberia to support the June 17 cease-fire, including establishing conditions for the initial stages of disarmament, demobilization,
reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) of ex-combatants. This force, ECOMIL, was charged with helping to establish and maintain security as a successor government took over after President Taylor’s departure and to prepare for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation by October 1. The resolution gave the UN Mission in Sierra Leone authority to provide ECOMIL with logistical support and authorized the Secretary-General to pre-position personnel and equipment to prepare for the UN deployment in October. These were groundbreaking steps, allowing the United Nations to move much more quickly than in the past towards deployment of a UN force.

U.S.-drafted Security Council Resolution 1509, unanimously adopted on September 19, followed up on Resolution 1497, authorizing establishment of UNMIL under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for an initial period of 12 months. It authorized up to 15,000 UN military personnel, including up to 250 military observers and 160 staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police (CIVPOL) officers. Among other tasks, UNMIL was given the mandate of monitoring implementation of the cease-fire agreement; helping to set up and secure cantonment sites where combatants could report for disarmament and demobilization; assisting in development of a DDRR plan; carrying out voluntary disarmament, including collecting and destroying weapons and ammunition; protecting civilians in imminent danger; facilitating provision of humanitarian assistance; helping the transitional Government of Liberia to restructure the Liberian police and armed forces; assisting the transitional government to reestablish government authority; and helping the transitional government to prepare for national elections by the end of 2005. The functions and staff of UNOL were absorbed into the new UN mission.

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1521 on December 22, continuing the arms embargo and the bans on Liberian timber and diamonds, and renewing the Council’s call for transparent accounting for maritime and other government revenues. The resolution revised the travel ban, in light of President Taylor’s departure, to apply to persons posing a threat to the Liberia peace process, including Taylor and a number of his close associates, rather than applying it broadly to members of the former Taylor government.

The UN did not assess member states for UNMIL in 2003. At the end of 2003, UNMIL’s strength was 8,387 troops, 107 military observers, and 312 UN CIVPOL. The United States provided two troops, seven military observers, and 11 CIVPOL. A U.S. citizen, Mark A. Kroeker, served as Civilian Police Commissioner.

Libya

In 1992, with Security Council Resolution 731, the United Nations condemned the acts of international terrorism perpetrated by Libya. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France were all actively involved in issues concerning Libya’s terrorist activities due to the fact that citizens from these countries were victims of Libyan terrorist attacks.
In 1999, after Libya agreed to turn over two Libyan officials for trial by a Scottish court (sitting in the Netherlands) on the Pan Am 103 bombing, the Security Council suspended, but did not end, sanctions imposed in Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). In January 2001, the court convicted one of these Libyans, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi. A Scottish appellate court upheld the conviction in March 2002.

On August 15, 2003, Libya submitted a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, which addressed the remaining requirements of the Security Council resolutions, including acceptance of the responsibility for the actions of its officials in the bombing of Pan Am 103, and payment and appropriate compensation to the families of the victims. In this letter, Libya also renounced terrorism and pledged to cooperate with further requests for information concerning the bombing.

In response to Libya’s action, on September 12, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1506, which lifted the sanctions imposed by Resolutions 748 and 883; dissolved the sanctions committee established pursuant to those resolutions; and removed the letter from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of December 1991 from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. The Security Council adopted the resolution by a vote of 13 to 0, with the United States and France abstaining.

**Sierra Leone**

Conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks from the eastern part of the country, near the Liberia border. Following a series of efforts by the United Nations, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Organization of African Unity to broker peace agreements, in 1998 the Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. Fighting resumed and new peace negotiations began, culminating in the creation under Resolution 1270 in 1999 of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was expanded and given additional tasks in 2000, and expanded again in 2001.

In 2003, the United States drew the Security Council’s attention to the progress being made in restoring stability and government authority in Sierra Leone, and pressed for as rapid a draw-down of troops as security would allow. The United States supported the Sierra Leone Special Court as one element in an overall strategy to restore stability to the region.

In turn, the Security Council focused on beginning the draw-down of UNAMSIL, noting progress in extension of the Government of Sierra Leone’s authority throughout the country, improved control over diamond revenues, and the increasing capabilities of the Sierra Leone armed forces and police. However, the neighboring Liberian conflict intensified during the first half of 2003, threatening Sierra Leone’s hard-won stability and leading UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone armed forces to increase border patrols. A Security Council mission visited West Africa June 28–July 5, including a stop in Sierra Leone. The Liberian peace agreement in August, the departure of Liberian President Charles Taylor, and the deployment of the new UN Mission in
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Liberia in October were important steps forward for the stability of Sierra Leone.


The Sierra Leone Special Court in 2003 indicted 12 persons for crimes against humanity committed during the Sierra Leone conflict, including Liberian President Taylor, former RUF leader Foday Sankoh, and former Sierra Leone Interior Minister Sam Hinga Norman.

UNAMSIL’s budget for 2003 was $548.6 million, of which the United States was assessed $144.3 million. In addition, the United States paid $10 million to the Sierra Leone Special Court in 2003. Throughout the year, the United States conducted demarches at the highest levels to generate increased voluntary contributions from other states for the Court. The United States was successful in generating some additional voluntary contributions, but they were not sufficient to cover the rising costs of the Court.

At the end of 2003, UNAMSIL’s strength was 11,232 troops, 130 civilian police (CIVPOL), and 269 military observers. The United States provided one CIVPOL officer.

Somalia

In 1991, after the overthrow by anti-government forces of dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, Somalia fell into civil war and disorder. In 1992, with U.S. support, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and, in Resolution 733 (1992), imposed an arms embargo on the entire territory of Somalia.

In 2003, the UN Security Council adopted two resolutions and two presidential statements on Somalia. Both Resolution 1474, adopted unanimously on April 8, and Resolution 1519, adopted unanimously on December 16, re-established the UN Panel of Experts (now the Monitoring Group) on the Somalia arms embargo, to focus attention on ongoing violations of the embargo and to recommend how to strengthen enforcement. The United States led efforts to focus the mandate of the Panel of Experts on the transfer of ammunition, single-use weapons (including man portable air defenses), and small arms. Both presidential statements, adopted on March 12 and on November 11, reiterated the firm support of the Security Council for the Somali National Reconciliation Process launched under the auspices of the Inter-governmental Authority on Development and led by Kenya.

The chair of the Security Council Committee on Somalia sanctions (the “751 Committee”) led a mission to Somalia and states in the region from November 11–21, in which the United States participated, as a step towards getting groups to respect the arms embargo. The UN Panel of Experts on the Somalia arms embargo submitted two reports to the 751 Committee in 2003,
on March 25 and again on November 4. The Panel included an expert from
the United States when it was recomposed in May.

**Sudan**

For over two decades, southern opponents of the Sudan Government,
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM), have fought
government forces and regional militia groups allied with the government,
resulting in a catastrophic civil war. Hostilities between the Government of
Sudan and the SPLM resulted in massive population displacement and
insecurity that made providing humanitarian aid difficult. In October 2002, a
cease-fire agreement was implemented, including a provision for unimpeded
access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Throughout 2003, the
United States worked through the United Nations to actively encourage the
peace process, to highlight human rights abuses in Sudan, and to deliver
humanitarian aid. In February 2003, the international community began to
receive reports of violence in the Darfur region of Western Sudan. Since then,
the ethnic violence perpetrated there by government-backed Arab militias,
called Jingaweit, became a serious concern for the international community.

On October 10, the Security Council issued a consensus Presidential
Statement welcoming the security agreement reached between the Government
of Sudan and the SPLM during negotiations sponsored by the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development. The statement also welcomed the
establishment of the Verification and Monitoring Team, Joint Monitoring
Commission, and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, which were
created by a series of agreements between the Government of Sudan and the
SPLM to monitor implementation of the cease-fire between the parties and
their allies in Sudan. These monitoring groups were composed of experienced
international observers, many of whom were retired military officers. The
United States worked closely with the United Kingdom to secure passage of
the statement, which was particularly notable for being the first official
Council action on Sudan since 2001.

Humanitarian issues and human rights in Sudan continued to be
important concerns of the United States. The United States supported a
resolution on the human rights situation in Sudan at the UN Commission on
Human Rights in April 2003. Despite U.S. lobbying efforts, the Commission
did not adopt the resolution. The failure of this resolution ended the mandate
for the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Sudan. The
United States was also disappointed when a similar resolution failed during the
58th General Assembly. Despite U.S. efforts, the 2003 session was the first
year since 1993 that there was no resolution adopted in either the UN
Commission on Human Rights or the General Assembly concerning the
situation of human rights in Sudan.

The United Nations provided humanitarian aid in Sudan through
Operation Lifeline Sudan, established in 1989, to which the United States
contributed. In addition to providing this funding, the United States played a
key role in facilitating the joint planning between the Government of Sudan
and the SPLM, including an ongoing joint assessment mission that collected information about post-peace priorities.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was also active—with U.S. support—in preparing for major Sudanese refugee returns in the event of peace. The UNHCR expected that approximately 110,000 refugees would need repatriation assistance to the south in the first 18 months following the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement. Although assistance planning was still in development, it was expected that much of the aid would be needed to rebuild general infrastructure and provide rehabilitation and reconstruction services. UNHCR also provided considerable assistance to the more than 300,000, mostly Eritrean, refugees inside Sudan.

The United States provided $1.85 million to UNHCR/Sudan in 2003 and $600,000 to the World Food Program for refugee feeding.

**Western Sahara**

On April 29, 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 690, establishing the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to help implement a settlement plan (the “Settlement Plan”) that Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) agreed to in 1988. The Settlement Plan called for a cessation of hostilities, the return of refugees, and a referendum under UN auspices to determine the future status of the territory.

For more than a decade, the parties (Morocco, POLISARIO, and Algeria, which is involved because it supports the POLISARIO) failed to agree on who could vote in the referendum. After the completion of the voter identification process in 1999, MINURSO received more than 130,000 appeals from individuals not included on the voter list.

In 1997, former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III was appointed the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy to the Western Sahara. Mr. Baker revitalized efforts to implement the Settlement Plan, brokering direct meetings between the parties in 1997, which resulted in the Houston Accords. However, his assessment that all attempts to adjudicate appeals to the original UN voting list would end in failure led to his June 2001 report to the UN Security Council that the Plan could not be implemented. In an effort to break the impasse, Mr. Baker proposed a Framework Agreement. Under this plan, there would be a devolution of authority from Morocco to the inhabitants of the Western Sahara territory for five years, followed by a referendum on final status, with no appeals to the UN voting list. Morocco agreed to the plan; however, Algeria and the POLISARIO did not accept this framework.

In a February 19, 2002, report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General presented Mr. Baker’s assessment that the parties were unlikely to implement the Settlement Plan in its current form. The Secretary-General then presented four options: implementing the Settlement Plan without the parties’ concurrence; a revised autonomy plan; partition; or withdrawal of MINURSO. On July 30, 2002, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1429 that
asked Mr. Baker to continue his efforts to reach a political solution and that invited him to devise a proposal that would lead to self-determination in the Western Sahara.

In January 2003, Mr. Baker traveled to the region to present to the parties a new proposal entitled “Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara.” This plan incorporated elements from the draft Framework Agreement favored by Morocco as well as elements of the Settlement Plan and the Houston Accords favored by the POLISARIO. It provided a greater degree of autonomy than the Framework Agreement but also allowed the residents of the territory who had resided in the Western Sahara continuously since December 30, 1999, to participate in the referendum on self-determination. The Security Council voted on January 30 to extend the mandate of MINURSO until March 17, in order to give the parties time to consider Mr. Baker’s proposal. The mandate was extended for two additional 60-day periods on March 25 and again on May 30. In July, Algeria and the POLISARIO accepted the plan; Morocco opposed elements of it.

On July 31, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1495 supporting Mr. Baker’s Peace Plan, and extending the mandate of MINURSO until October 31, calling upon the parties to work with the United Nations and with each other towards acceptance and implementation of the Peace Plan. In his report to the Security Council on October 16, the Secretary-General accepted the recommendation of Mr. Baker to accede to Morocco’s request for more time to reflect and consult on the Peace Plan, which had been modified slightly to address one Moroccan concern about the referendum ballot questions. The Secretary-General indicated the Voter Identification Commission had concluded its activities and had transferred all of its files to Geneva for safekeeping. The Security Council accepted the Secretary-General’s recommendation and unanimously adopted Resolution 1513, extending the mandate of MINURSO until January 31, 2004. MINURSO’s largest responsibility in 2003 was the refugee situation in Western Sahara.

As of December 31, Morocco had not concluded its analysis of Mr. Baker’s proposal and had yet to offer a formal response.

The POLISARIO released three groups of prisoners in 2003: 100 prisoners were repatriated to Morocco in February, 243 in September, and 300 in November. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross figures, at the end of 2003, the POLISARIO was still holding 614 prisoners, most of whom had been in detention for more than 20 years.

Throughout the year, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and MINURSO attempted to promote a package of confidence-building measures. These measures included the commencement of limited telephone and personal mail services, and the exchange of family visits. However, in December 2003, unable to make headway on such measures with the parties, UNHCR decided to remove its staff.

The Secretary-General appointed Alvaro de Soto (Peru) as his Special Representative for Western Sahara to replace William Lacy Swing (United
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States), who was named the Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo in August 2003.

The United States continued to lead Friends of the Western Sahara, an informal group that included the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Spain, which consulted on the margins of the Security Council on the next steps in the peace process.

The total cost of MINURSO in 2003 was $20.3 million, of which the U.S. share was $5.4 million. At the end of 2003, 25 countries had contributed a total of 27 troops and 200 military observers. No U.S. personnel were assigned to MINURSO.

East Asia and the Pacific

Bougainville

In 2001, after 13 years of civil conflict, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which granted Bougainville autonomy and an eventual vote on independence from Papua New Guinea in 10 to 15 years. The United States continued to support the UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) in assisting implementation of this Peace Agreement, particularly supporting UNPOB’s role in certifying the collection of arms.

The development of a new Bougainville Constitution was a central part of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. In February 2003, the Bougainville Constitutional Commission drafted a constitution and distributed it island-wide for consultations. Following a review by a bipartisan Ministerial Committee and the National Executive Council of the Government of Papua New Guinea, the draft will be returned to the Bougainville Constitutional Commission for consideration. The Papua New Guinea National Government and the Bougainville parties signed a memorandum of understanding in late February 2003 that established a mechanism for consultations between both parties on all aspects of the implementation of the autonomy arrangements, including the transfer of powers, functions, and resources, and the settlement of disputes.

Also, by the end of February, nearly all of Bougainville had reached Stage II of disarmament, whereby weapons had been collected and placed in secure, double-locked containers under UNPOB’s supervision, and two districts had fully completed the process of disarmament. In Stage III, the final stage, a decision will be made regarding what to do with the weapons. The United States applauded the leadership of the main Bougainville factions for their commitment to the peace process. In order to ensure continued UN oversight of weapons disposal and to encourage full disarmament, the UN Security Council supported Papua New Guinea’s request for a continuation of UNPOB’s mandate. The mandate came up for renewal in December 2003 and at that time was replaced with a small follow-on observer mission, the UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB). UNOMB, among other things, reports on the security and subsequent destruction of contained weapons and

monitors the constitutional process leading up to the adoption of the Bougainville Constitution. The United States concurred with this recommendation in order to ensure international support for the completion of the constitutional process and finalization of the destructions of weapons.

The UN mission in Bouganville cost $1.6 million in 2003. The U.S. assessment was about $350,000.

Burma

The United States worked actively in 2003 to maintain international pressure on the Burmese junta (the State Peace and Development Council) to improve its human rights practices, release National League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and to pursue a meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition. The United States supported the 2003 missions of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Burma, Razali Ismail (Malaysia), and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Brazil). The United States supported resolutions expressing international concern over human rights violations in Burma in both the UN Commission on Human Rights and the 58th General Assembly, and also raised the issue of Burma in the Security Council.

In Resolution 2003/12, the UN Commission on Human Rights stated its concern over the ongoing systematic violation of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, of the people of Burma. The Commission was also concerned about Burmese authorities’ continued refusal to enter into a genuine political dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi (leader of the National League for Democracy, Burma’s leading opposition party) and other democratic leaders, as well as their harassment and attempted intimidation.

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Negroponte introduced the subject of the human rights situation in Burma in the Security Council on July 16. He summarized a briefing that Ambassador Razali had provided to the UN Informal Consultative Group on Burma and emphasized the U.S. concern regarding the continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi following an attack perpetrated against her convoy in Depeyin on May 30. Ambassador Negroponte called for Aung San Suu Kyi’s immediate release and the reopening of the National League for Democracy’s political party offices in Burma, stressing that the Junta must implement a genuine plan for democratization.

On December 23, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 58/247, which expressed again its grave concern at the continued human rights violations in Burma. The measure strongly urged the government to end these violations and to immediately and unconditionally release Aung San Suu Kyi. This resolution was adopted without a vote. The representative from Burma made a statement disassociating his government from the consensus.
Cambodia

The General Assembly adopted without a vote Resolution 58/191, “Situation of human rights in Cambodia,” on December 22, 2003. The resolution detailed Cambodia’s progress and remaining challenges in the areas of support and cooperation with the United Nations; the role of nongovernmental organizations; administrative, judicial, and legal reforms; human rights violations and violence; the Khmer Rouge tribunal; and protection of women and children. The United States joined consensus on this annual resolution.

The United States is a member of the Friends of Cambodia (Friends), an ad hoc group within the United Nations, which also includes the European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. The Friends strongly supported the creation of a Khmer Rouge tribunal that would bring to justice senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and those who were most responsible for the atrocities the regime committed between April 17, 1975, and January 7, 1979.

After much negotiation, the efforts of the Friends resulted in an agreement on June 6 between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia on the establishment of an Extraordinary Chamber in Cambodia. The Extraordinary Chamber would consist of two chambers, with Cambodia appointing three of the five judges to the Trial Chamber and four of seven judges to the Supreme Court Chamber. The remaining judges would be from the international community and appointed by the United Nations.

The UN General Assembly approved this agreement without a vote in a resolution on May 13, 2003. The United States disassociated itself from adoption of the resolution. While remaining committed to the establishment of a credible tribunal, the United States believed it would have been better to delay passage of this resolution until after the Cambodian National Assembly elections in July. The United Nations and Cambodia signed the agreement to create the Extraordinary Chamber on June 6.

Despite the progress made in reaching and signing the tribunal agreement, the Cambodian Government had yet to ratify the agreement by the close of 2003. Original UN budget estimates for the tribunal were $19 million, to be raised through voluntary contributions from member states.

East Timor

The Security Council created the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) on May 17, 2002, by adopting Resolution 1410, to take over at East Timor’s independence on May 20, 2002, from the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET had supported East Timor’s transition from Indonesian rule through a national referendum and elections of a government and provisional legislature.

On April 4, 2003, the United States joined others on the Security Council in unanimously adopting Resolution 1473, revising the composition and strength of the police component of UNMISET and adjusting the schedule...
for downsizing both the police and military components of the mission. On May 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1480, which the United States co-drafted, extending UNMISET’s mandate and aiming for a winding down of the operation by May 20, 2004. These resolutions supported U.S. and international efforts to assist East Timor’s transition to independence, and ensured that steps were taken to build East Timor’s eventual capacity to provide for its own security, in line with U.S. policy priorities. By the end of 2003, the United Nations had handed over policing responsibility to local authorities in all thirteen of East Timor’s districts.

Also by the end of 2003, the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), a UN-staffed office of the East Timor Government, had indicted 369 Timorese and Indonesian persons for crimes against humanity and other serious crimes committed during 1999. The SCU’s Special Panel courts convicted 46 Timorese nationals and acquitted one national by the end of the year. However, 281 indictees remained at large in Indonesia with little chance of being returned to stand trial. The United States supported efforts to bring those responsible for such crimes to justice.

UNMISET’s budget for 2003 totalled $185.1 million, of which the U.S. assessment was $49.5 million. At the end of 2003, UNMISET’s strength was 1,675 troops, 319 civilian police (CIVPOL), and 79 military observers. The United States provided 18 CIVPOL.

**Europe and Eurasia**

**Cyprus**

During 2003, the United States continued to support UN efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the division of Cyprus. Since 1974, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has served as a buffer force between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces on one side and the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek troops on the other. Beginning in January 2002, the Secretary-General, through his Good Offices Mission and his Special Advisor for Cyprus Alvaro de Soto (Peru), accelerated efforts to resolve the dispute through direct talks between the leaders of the two communities on the island.

On the basis of these talks, Secretary-General Annan proposed in November 2002 a detailed settlement plan to reunify the island, giving considerable authority to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states, and enabling displaced persons to return home. The plan was also intended to help Cyprus accede to the European Union as a reunited island. Both sides agreed to postpone customary fall military exercises in an effort to improve the negotiating atmosphere.

The Secretary-General set as his goal the signing of an agreement between the parties before the December 2002 European Council Summit. This goal was not met, principally because of Turkish Cypriot reservations. The two sides continued working toward a settlement, but efforts ended in March 2003 in The Hague when the Turkish Cypriot side left the talks, citing
disagreements with fundamental elements of the Secretary-General’s settlement plan. The United States strongly supported the talks in 2002 and maintained close contacts throughout the process with the United Nations, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Greece, Turkey, and the European Union.

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1475 on April 14, 2003, giving its full support to the Secretary-General’s “carefully balanced plan,” as revised on February 26, as a unique basis for further negotiations. The resolution called on all concerned to negotiate within the framework of the Secretary-General’s April 1 report and asked the Secretary-General to continue to make available his good offices for Cyprus. The unanimous approval of this resolution emphasized the Council’s continued full support for both the Secretary-General’s revised peace plan and the UN’s Good Offices in Cyprus. As one of the principal drafters of the resolution, along with the United Kingdom, the United States remained strongly committed to seeking a just and durable settlement to the Cyprus problem.

Through Resolution 1486, adopted in June, the Security Council endorsed the increase of UNFICYP’s civilian police (CIVPOL) component in order to meet the increased workload resulting from the partial easing of restrictions on island-wide freedom of movement. The Security Council noted the limited steps taken by the Turkish Cypriot side to ease some of the restrictions imposed in June 2000 on the operation of UNFICYP, and urged the Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish forces to rescind all remaining restrictions. The United States joined consensus in voting for this extension of UNFICYP’s mandate for a further six months until December 15, and in augmenting the UNFICYP CIVPOL.

The Security Council extended the mandate of UNFICYP until June 15, 2004, through Resolution 1517, unanimously adopted on November 24. The Security Council acted on the recommendation of the Secretary-General, whose report of November 12 said that UNFICYP’s continued presence in Cyprus was necessary for the maintenance of the cease-fire between the two sides. The United States supported this routine extension of UNFICYP’s mandate for a further six months. The Security Council also urged the Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish forces to rescind all remaining restrictions on UNFICYP. Expressing concern at the further continuing violations by the Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish forces at Strovilla, the Security Council urged them to restore the military status quo which existed there prior to June 30, 2000.

After voluntary contributions by Greece and Cyprus, the cost of the mission to the United Nations was $21.9 million, and the U.S. share was $5.9 million. As of December 2003, UNFICYP had 1,214 troops and 47 CIVPOL from 12 nations. No U.S. personnel served in this mission.

Georgia

The UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) on August 24, 1993, and expanded its mandate in 1994. UNOMIG monitors the cessation of hostilities between Georgia and Abkhaz
separatists, as well as activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ peacekeeping force in the Abkhaz region. In practical terms, UNOMIG’s patrolling activities have helped contain the violence and prevent a major escalation of the conflict.

UNOMIG provides an international presence in a part of the world important to such U.S. interests as the stability and territorial integrity of the Newly Independent States and the East-West transport corridor, including both the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the trans-Caspian gas pipeline. UNOMIG provides a measure of stability and international scrutiny in the zone of conflict.

In his January 13, 2003, report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, and the need to define the status of Abkhazia within the state of Georgia in strict accordance with these principles. He stated that despite one year of strenuous efforts by Special Representative Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) and the Group of Friends (the United States, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom), the two sides had not moved much closer to the start of negotiations. The tone of the parties had hardened, there was deep mistrust between them, and they showed little willingness to make the substantive compromises necessary for a meaningful peace process.

The Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1462 on January 30, extending the mandate of UNOMIG until July 31. The resolution also strongly supported the continuing efforts of UNOMIG to promote the achievement of a comprehensive political settlement, which must include a settlement of the political status of Abkhazia within the state of Georgia. The United States joined all other Security Council members in adopting this resolution in the hopes that the scheduled February 2003 Friends’ meeting in Geneva would move the peace process forward and that both sides would take steps to renew the forward momentum in their bilateral relations.

In the Secretary-General’s address to the Security Council on April 9, he reported that new proposals of the Group of Friends and bilateral agreements between Georgia and Abkhazia had injected fresh momentum into efforts to reactivate the peace process despite the continued lack of progress on the core political issues of the future status of Abkhazia. He indicated that for the first time in approximately four years, the Abkhaz de facto authorities had received the Group of Friends at the ambassadorial level in Sukhum. The Friends reaffirmed their commitment to the principles for a political settlement as well as to the validity of the current negotiations mechanisms.

On July 21, the Secretary-General reported that his Special Representative continued to build upon the positive momentum that followed agreements between Russian President Vladimir Putin, acting as a representative of the Friends Group, and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze at a meeting in Sochi in March. They identified three sets of
issues as key to advancing the peace process: economic cooperation, return of internally displaced persons and refugees, and political and security matters. The Secretary-General stated, however, that while the parties had moved ahead on economic cooperation and refugee return, little progress had been made on political and security matters, including the future status of Abkhazia.

On July 30, the Council adopted Resolution 1494, extending the mandate of UNOMIG until January 31, 2004. The Resolution also endorsed the recommendation of the Secretary-General to add a CIVPOL component of 20 officers to the mission. The resolution strongly condemned the abduction of four UNOMIG personnel on June 5. The United States joined consensus in adopting this resolution.

The cost of UNOMIG in 2003 was $29.8 million, with the United States contributing $8 million. As of December 31, UNOMIG had 1 troop, 118 military observers, and 10 civilian police from 23 countries. Three U.S. military observers were assigned to the mission.

The former Yugoslavia: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)

After the military campaign by the United States and its NATO allies, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo in 1999. On June 10 of that year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which authorized both an international security presence that became the NATO-led Kosovo Force and an interim governing authority in Kosovo.

The mandate of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under Resolution 1244 is to provide civilian administration; develop provisional institutions for self-government; facilitate the political process to determine Kosovo’s status; support economic reconstruction and humanitarian and disaster relief; maintain law and order and protect and promote human rights; and support the return of refugees and displaced persons. Resolution 1244 will continue in force until the Security Council decides its provisions have been implemented.

In August 2003, the Secretary-General appointed Harri Holkeri (Finland) as his Special Representative for UNMIK. In December, SRSG Holkeri issued the “Standards for Kosovo,” which elaborated eight standards of democratic self-government to act as benchmarks by which the international community could measure Kosovo’s progress in meeting the basic requirements of a democratic, multiethnic society. These steps included having functioning democratic institutions, establishment of the rule of law, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, reintegration of minorities, and development of the economy.

The United States and the international community continued to stress “Standards before Status,” as the only way to prepare Kosovo for future status negotiations. The international community (including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the European Union, UN Security Council, and countries in the region) will conduct a comprehensive review of Kosovo’s implementation of the standards by mid-2005. If Kosovo passes the review, the international community will recommend that the

United Nations begin a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status. If Kosovo needs more time to meet the standards, the Security Council will set another review date.

UNMIK played the leading role in administering police and justice issues. While UNMIK transferred some police authority to the Kosovo Police Service, it retained unified operational control. The Deputy Police Commissioner for Operations was a U.S. police officer and the highest-ranking female in the UNMIK police force. The Director and Deputy Director of the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) were provided by the United States. The United States also contributed significant funding to KPSS as well as equipment and facilities for the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), both in support of the multi-ethnic KPS. The KPS employed some 5,700 staff at the end of the year. Developing the KPS was one of UNMIK’s most impressive accomplishments.

In 2003, the United Nations assessed its member states $266.1 million for UNMIK operations, and the U.S. share was $70.9 million. As of December 31, 2003, UNMIK had 3,691 international civilian police (CIVPOL) and 40 military observers. The United States provided two military observers, 464 CIVPOL, and an FBI agent to work with the Criminal Intelligence Unit. Americans filled several leadership positions in UNMIK. A former Foreign Service Officer served as Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and a former U.S. Department of Justice official headed UNMIK’s Department of Justice in 2003.

Western Hemisphere

Cuba

The United States and the United Nations continued to focus significant attention on Cuba and its human rights record. On April 17, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) adopted Resolution 2003/13 by a vote of 24 to 20, with 9 abstentions. The United States supported this resolution, which urged the Government of Cuba to receive the personal representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Christine Chanet (France), and to provide all necessary means for her to be able to fulfill her mission. Her mandate was to carry out an objective, impartial assessment of the evolution of civil and political rights in Cuba. The resolution encouraged Cuba to adhere to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Through this resolution, the Commission invited the Cuban government to make progress in the field of human rights and civil, political, and social rights. The UNCHR decided to consider the matter further during its next session; the High Commissioner will submit a report on the implementation of Resolution 2003/13.

On November 18, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 58/7 on the “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” by a vote of 179 to 3,
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with 2 abstentions. The United States, joined by Israel and the Marshall Islands, voted against this resolution, which reiterated its call upon all states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures such as the Helms-Burton Act, and urged states to repeal them. The Helms-Burton Act requires the United States to deny visas to anyone who has done business in conjunction with property that was confiscated during the Cuban Revolution in 1959. It also gives American citizens the right to file in domestic courts for financial compensation for the property they lost. The United States found the resolution to be ill-advised and urged all delegations to oppose it. In the U.S. explanation of vote, Ambassador Sichan Siv noted that the U.S. embargo against Cuba is a bilateral issue and should not be debated in the General Assembly. He stated that the objective of the U.S. policy towards Cuba is aimed at fostering a rapid, peaceful transition to a democratic form of government where human rights are protected, civil society thrives, and economic prosperity is extended to all Cubans. The failure of the Cuban government to respect the rights of its people concerns more than just Cuba. The focus of the international community, as manifested in the United Nations, should be on the continuing human rights crisis in Cuba rather than on bilateral U.S. efforts to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy.

Ambassador Siv explained that Cuba’s miniscule level of trade with other countries is not caused by the embargo, but rather by its poor credit rating stemming from unpaid bills and billions of dollars in loans in arrears. It is the communist regime’s failed economic policies—not the embargo—that have impoverished Cubans and destroyed what was once one of the most advanced economies in the region. In May 2002, the United States offered to make changes in the embargo if civil, human, and political rights reform were implemented. However, instead of a political opening, in March 2003, the Cuban government unleashed a brutal crackdown, which was the worst act of political repression against advocates of peaceful change, including journalists, in the history of Cuba.

Guatemala

Through diplomatic engagement, the United States has strongly supported the UN’s efforts to assist Guatemala in implementing the peace agreements it signed with the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca in 1996, ending a 36-year struggle. Although the parties have made progress in some areas, implementation of the peace agreements has fallen behind schedule, and the human rights situation has deteriorated over the last three years, mainly due to violations of human rights by the police. In December 2003, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights established a field office in order to monitor the human rights situation in Guatemala. The Office’s field presence in Guatemala will aim for the full implementation of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights of the Guatemalan people in general. More specifically, it will defend individuals and communities at risk of becoming victims of human rights abuses, including vulnerable groups such as women, children, indigenous peoples, minorities, human rights defenders, and journalists.

The United Nations first authorized the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in 1994, acting on a recommendation by the Secretary-General that such a mission could overcome the pattern of human rights abuses in Guatemala. The primary focus of UN support in Guatemala has been in the area of verifying the Guatemala’s protection of its citizens’ human rights.

On December 23, 2003, the General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 58/238, which noted that the United States played a key role in MINUGUA in promoting the consolidation of peace and the observance of human rights. Resolution 58/238 authorized a final renewal of its mandate from January 1 to December 31, 2004. This extension was aimed at supporting the Guatemala peace process. It emphasized the need for the mission to continue to enjoy the full support of all parties concerned.

The United States strongly supported a pending agreement between the United Nations and Guatemala establishing the UN-led Commission to Investigate Illegal Bodies and Clandestine Security Apparatuses, which would investigate and prosecute human rights abuses and organized crime in Guatemala. Full implementation awaited ratification of the agreement by the Government of Guatemala at the end of 2003.

MINUGUA was paid for from the UN regular budget, at a cost of $13.2 million in 2003. The U.S. assessment was about $2.9 million.

Disarmament Issues

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is the principal forum for discussion of disarmament issues at the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The UNDC focuses on a limited number of agenda items each session, working toward consensus on its recommendations. The U.S. focus has been to ensure that the UNDC adopts reports that are consistent with, and that advance, U.S. policy. A key U.S. interest is to maintain a balance in UNDC work between nuclear and non-nuclear issues, since the non-aligned states historically have tried to focus UNDC discussion on nuclear issues.

Previous meetings in 2000 and 2001 resulted in procedural reports to the General Assembly. Non-aligned delegations used their numerical majority to cancel the 2002 session. Two key issues at the 2003 session, chaired by Mario Maiolini (Italy), were ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament and practical confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the field of conventional armaments. The UNDC adjourned its 2003 session without reaching a consensus on proposals to advance either of these agenda items.

On the issue of nuclear disarmament, the United States felt that the draft proposal was too broad to reach agreement among members. The U.S. representative to the UNDC expressed disappointment that the Commission had not devoted more time to more immediate threats to international peace.
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and security, such as preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Consensus on conventional CBMs was equally elusive. The United States felt that CBMs could be extremely useful in reducing tensions and preventing conflict. However, the introduction of new, contentious draft language by one delegation during the last week of the Commission’s work prevented agreement on this issue.

The failure of the UNDC to issue consensus reports on the two issues that it reviewed from 2001 to 2003 highlighted the limited contribution that this body makes to the UN’s work, and further called into question this body’s ability to advance United States disarmament objectives.

The budget of the UNDC for 2003 was approximately $1.9 million. The United States was assessed about $410,000.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the principal multilateral forum for negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. While the CD has produced significant treaties in the past, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conference in 2003 adjourned in a stalemate for the seventh consecutive year. In recent years, progress has been either paralyzed by outmoded Cold War-era thinking or subverted by those who refuse to live up to their international obligations.

Although funded from the UN budget, the CD is an autonomous body. The Conference’s 65 member states are divided into geopolitical groups—the Western Group, the Eastern Group, and the Non-Aligned (G-21) Group, with China as an independent member. Decisions are made by consensus. The presidency of the CD rotates among its members on a monthly basis. The United States and other countries succeeded in convincing the Iraq Government (still under Saddam Hussein) to step aside from its rotational presidency of the CD, given its failure to comply with CD resolutions. The CD adopted its annual report to the UN General Assembly on September 9.

Much of the discussion in 2003 focused on gaining consensus on a work proposal of the Five Ambassadors (Algeria, Belgium, Chile, Columbia, and Sweden), which was formally presented at the beginning of the year. The Five Ambassadors’ proposal calls for the establishment of four ad hoc committees, each to discuss one of the following topics: negative security agreements (NSAs), nuclear disarmament, a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), and prevention of an arms race in space (PAROS).

The United States continued to oppose proposals for an NSA treaty as well as for an instrument on outer space. A U.S. review of the security implications of an FMCT that would ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices continued in 2003, and the United States did not take a position on a CD work program.

The United States reiterated its commitment to multilateral solutions to disarmament issues, but the sustained lack of a work program continued to erode the CD’s relevance as an international negotiating forum. Discussion on the Five Ambassadors’ proposed program of work will continue in 2004. It is not clear that this proposal will be more successful in gaining consensus than any of its predecessors.

The CD is supported through the budget of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The United States was assessed 22 percent ($880,000) of the CD’s 2003 budget of approximately $4 million.

UN First Committee (UNFC)

The UN First Committee (UNFC) is the main committee of the UN General Assembly that addresses international security and arms control. The presidency of the First Committee rotates on an annual basis: Jarmo Sareva (Finland) presided over the 2003 session, held from October 6–November 6. During its five-week session, the UNFC typically considers 45–60 resolutions and decisions. At each session, the United States promotes key goals and objectives and counters proposals by others that would have negative effects on U.S. national security and arms control interests.

Key issues of interest to the United States were resolved favorably for the most part during the 2003 UNFC session. The Committee considered 47 resolutions and eight decisions; 28 resolutions were adopted by consensus. The United States voted Yes or joined consensus on 31 resolutions, voted No on 19 resolutions, and abstained on three resolutions. Two draft resolutions were withdrawn. Disarmament was the overwhelming focus of this session: 21 resolutions dealt with nuclear disarmament, with another 18 resolutions addressing other disarmament issues.

In July, the United States issued its first-ever worldwide demarche for the UN General Assembly solely focused on First Committee matters. Due to extensive preparation and outreach, the United States generally elicited cooperation from a wide range of delegations, even on such contentious issues as nuclear proliferation and disarmament.

As part of an initiative to improve the UNFC, the United States sponsored a new resolution to increase the effectiveness of the working methods of the committee. Some of the ideas advanced during the UNFC’s consideration of this issue included the merger of agenda items or resolutions dealing with related topics and the setting aside of specific time during the UNFC for the conduct of “interactive dialogue” on issues of common interest to UN member states. The United States secured 64 cosponsors for this resolution, which was the first reform measure to originate in and win approval by the UNFC in its 58 years. The adoption of this resolution by consensus ensured that reform would remain on the UNFC’s agenda for the coming year.

The United States also cosponsored resolutions on transparency in military expenditures, transparency in armaments, European regional
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cooperation on illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, and restrictions on
certain excessively injurious conventional weapons. Three of these resolutions
were adopted by consensus, while the fourth was adopted without opposing
votes.

Consistent with its initiative to streamline the UNFC’s workload, the
United States, working in partnership with its allies, succeeded in forcing the
withdrawal of several resolutions that called for new international conferences
and the re-activation of open-ended working groups.

Specialized Issues

Terrorism

In 2003, the United Nations continued to provide focus and energy to
the international community in its collective fight against terrorism. In his
address to the UN Sixth Committee (legal issues) on October 17, former
Congressman Benjamin Gilman, a U.S. Public Delegate, urged all member
states to engage forcefully in the fight against terrorism.

Whether at the international, regional, sub-regional, or
national level, it is essential that we act with a sustained
sense of urgency. We must act as though 9/11 took place
yesterday … ever mindful that similar attacks could take
place tomorrow. We must never lose sight of the fact that
those states that do not do all they can to combat terrorism
put all of our States at risk. The international community’s
capacity to fight terrorism is only as strong as its weakest
link.

This is a global war against terrorism that must be won. It
will only be won through the unrelenting collaborative
efforts of all of the member states of this organization.

In 2003, the United States continued its efforts to advance
international counterterrorism initiatives throughout the UN system, including
in the Security Council, two of the Security Council’s committees [the 1267
Sanctions Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC)], and in
the General Assembly.

The Security Council adopted four resolutions directly related to
terrorism. Resolution 1455, sponsored by the United States, and adopted in
January, strengthened the mandate of the 1267 Sanctions Committee (the al-
Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee). Resolution 1456, adopted in January,
reaffirmed and reinforced the Council’s commitment to combating terrorism.
Resolution 1465, adopted in February, condemned the bomb attacks in
Bogota, Colombia, and reinforced the determination of the Security Council to
combat all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the
UN Charter. Resolution 1516, adopted in November, condemned the bomb
attacks in Istanbul, Turkey, and again reinforced the determination of the
Security Council to combat all forms of terrorism.
The Security Council issued a Presidential Statement (2003/13) in August 2003, condemning the terrorist attack that took place against the UN headquarters in Baghdad. The statement paid tribute to all those among the UN personnel who lost their lives, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil).

The al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee maintained a list of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and Usama bin Laden subject to international sanctions—asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes—that member states were obligated to implement. Security Council Resolution 1455 called on all member states to report on their implementation of the measures. The U.S. report, submitted to the Sanctions Committee on April 22, 2003, became a model for other member states to follow. The United States also continued a very active process of referring names of individuals and entities for inclusion on the Committee’s sanctions list, submitting 38 names associated with al-Qaida and the Taliban. These names were first vetted within appropriate U.S. agencies and then circulated to the other 14 members of the Committee, with explanatory information. The Committee determined that all 38 names should be added to the list. The United States also approved and supported an additional 47 names submitted by other member states. In addition, the United States worked through bilateral channels to urge member states to implement the sanctions and to submit reports called for in the resolutions.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), established by Security Council Resolution 1373 after September 11, 2001, made progress towards its ambitious goal of raising the level of performance of the governments of all 191 member states in the fight against terrorism. All states met the initial requirement to report to the CTC on the counterterrorism steps taken; 43 member states had become a party to all 12 counterterrorism conventions and protocols. The United States became a party to all 12 conventions in 2002.

The United States played an active leadership role in the CTC, pushing the body to be more proactive and effective. In 2003, the CTC established a central clearinghouse for approximately 60 international, regional, and sub-regional organizations for the exchange of information, standards, and best practices related to counterterrorism. The CTC also developed and posted on its website a detailed matrix listing the technical assistance needs of many states and the programs provided by donor states to meet these needs.

In order to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities, the CTC took first steps to restructure and enlarge its small professional staff. The United States took a leading role in encouraging the reorganization of the CTC staff and operations. The restructuring was expected to be completed in 2004.

On December 9, the General Assembly negotiated and adopted by consensus Resolution 58/81 on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.” The resolution condemned all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever
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committed. It reaffirmed previous Declarations on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, and urged all states to become parties to the 12 international terrorism conventions and protocols. The resolution stipulated that the Ad Hoc Committee, established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 to work on the elaboration of international legal instruments to fight terrorism, should continue its work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) and on the negotiation of an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

The sixth and seventh rounds of negotiations on the CCIT in 2003 did not make any progress toward ending an impasse on two issues: the scope of the offense and the non-application of the convention to state military forces. The U.S. position was to include within the scope of the convention the offensive actions undertaken in the name of national liberation movements and to exclude state military forces, since their activities were governed by other provisions of international law. In view of the continued impasse, the United States urged shorter rounds of negotiations in 2004.

During 2003, the United States and several other states parties to the U.S.-initiated 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (Terrorist Bombings Convention) filed a formal objection to a Pakistani declaration submitted in August 2002, along with its instrument of accession to the Terrorist Bombings Convention. The Pakistani declaration asserted that the Convention did not apply to struggles for national liberation, including armed struggle against foreign occupation. The United States and others objected that the Pakistani declaration was contrary to the purpose of the Convention and to the terms of Article 5 (acts of terrorism cannot be justified on political, philosophical, ideological, or similar grounds). Thus, the Pakistani declaration was not permissible under established principles of international treaty law.

In his September 23 address to the UN General Assembly, President Bush cited the threat posed by rogue states and terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. To combat this threat, the President called on the Security Council to adopt a resolution that would require states to take three steps: criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; enact strict export controls on these weapons and related materials, equipment, and technology; and secure sensitive materials within their borders. In the following weeks, the United States engaged with the other four permanent members of the Security Council to draft a resolution that would accomplish these objectives and garner the support of other Council members. At year end, these discussions were continuing, with the objective of securing Council adoption early in 2004.
Peacekeeping Financing, Force Protection, and CIVPOL

Peacekeeping and Financing

In 2003, the United States continued to base its support for UN peacekeeping operations on such established criteria as national interests, clear objectives, a sound plan, acceptable risks and costs, and a realistic end-state and exit strategy. In recognition that these criteria had been met, the United States supported a new UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia and supported the termination of UN missions in Kuwait (UNIKOM) and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The total number of troops, military observers, and civilian police (CIVPOL) from all nations serving in UN missions at the end of 2003 increased by approximately 6,000 from 2002. The increase was attributed to the deployment of troops, military observers, and CIVPOL to the mission in Liberia and a higher ceiling for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As of December 31, the United Nations had a total of 39,335 troops, 1,773 military observers, and 4,624 CIVPOL participating in UN peacekeeping missions. These totals do not include UNIKOM, which concluded its operations by the end of the year, or personnel from the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan or the special political mission in the Cote d’Ivoire, which were not peacekeeping missions. The U.S. contribution included two U.S. troops in Liberia; 22 U.S. military observers in Ethiopia, Georgia, Kosovo, Liberia, and in the Middle East; and 494 U.S. CIVPOL in East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

The United States continued to promote practical measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations. It supported proposals to improve the UN’s ability to assess conflict situations, to plan and manage peacekeeping operations, and to respond quickly to Security Council mandates, which proved helpful during the planning and execution of the mission to Liberia. The United States also continued to encourage other member states to include peacekeeping in their national security strategies and to contribute forces to peacekeeping whenever appropriate.

Costs of UN peacekeeping operations declined in 2003. The United Nations assessed member states a net total of $2 billion, of which the U.S. share was $538 million. Costs increased for operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Assessments had not yet been levied for the new mission in Liberia. Increases in assessments were more than offset by the close-out of operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kuwait, as well as the downsizing of operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone.

Force Protection for U.S. Peacekeepers

During 2003, there were no fatalities among U.S. military personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations, and there were no injuries resulting from hostile action. In addition, there were no U.S. military personnel captured or taken hostage as a result of their service in UN peacekeeping
operations. However, there were casualties among other national contingents participating in UN operations. Peacekeeping remains an endeavor with tangible risks, and every deployment is scrutinized by UN planners with respect to personnel safety and force protection.

In most instances, UN peacekeepers are covered by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreements (SOMA) negotiated between the United Nations and host governments. These agreements set the terms and conditions governing the relationship between a host government and the UN peacekeeping forces. In instances where a SOFA/SOMA has not yet been negotiated, the terms and conditions of the standard SOFA/SOMA apply, per General Assembly Resolution 52/12B. Personnel acting in support of a UN operation, but who are not “blue helmeted,” are generally considered to be “experts on mission” under the terms of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

The U.S. Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W) serves as the executive agent for force protection assessments of U.S. military observers in UN operations. During 2003, USMOG-W conducted force protection surveys of all peace operations in which U.S. military observers served under the operational control of the United Nations. In addition, USMOG-W trained observers in anti-terrorist maneuvers, as well as in increased communication during movement, and in the use of protective body armor.

The potential vulnerability of U.S. personnel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction was again an issue in 2003. Security Council Resolution 1487 was adopted on June 12, extending by one year the deferral from ICC investigation or prosecution of current or former UN peacekeepers from states not party to the Rome Statute. In addition, the United States continued to pursue bilateral agreements under Article 98 of the Rome Statute to protect not only peacekeepers, but other, broader categories of U.S. personnel and officials from ICC jurisdiction.

CIVPOL

International civilian police (CIVPOL) played a critical role in peacekeeping, while the international community struggled to meet worldwide demand for qualified CIVPOL officers. The United States continued efforts to enhance both domestic and international capacities for recruiting, training, and deploying CIVPOL to peacekeeping missions. The United States contributed its initial CIVPOL to Liberia within two months of the passage of Security Council Resolution 1497, its shortest turnaround time to date. As noted earlier, as of December 31, the United States had deployed CIVPOL officers to UN missions in East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Peacekeeping mission planners increasingly recognized a need for “formed units,” a type of international policing involving both regular CIVPOL and military troops within peacekeeping operations. Specially trained units can perform crowd control, conduct high-risk arrests, investigations, and other specialized law enforcement functions. For the

mission in Liberia, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations identified such a need, and the UN Mission in Liberia mandate included such formed units of CIVPOL.

**HIV/AIDS**

In January 2003, an HIV/AIDS policy adviser, sponsored by the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS, worked in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to develop policy and assist with the standardization of awareness and prevention programs. HIV/AIDS policy advisers also served in four major peacekeeping operations—in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Sierra Leone, while a fifth was recruited for Liberia. DPKO developed a pre-deployment training module on HIV/AIDS, while reviewing and updating other training and awareness materials, and urging member states to incorporate HIV/AIDS awareness in their military training.

DPKO’s policy on HIV testing for uniformed peacekeepers was being finalized. DPKO was expected to recommend voluntary, confidential counseling and testing both before and after deployment to the field. The United Nations did not require that individuals be tested at any time for HIV in relation to their deployment as peacekeepers. Training of mission HIV counselors continued, with DPKO seeking to increase their overall number in 2004.

**Sanctions**

The United States continued to support the imposition of UN sanctions in response to threats to international peace and security where such sanctions could be enforced and effective. The authority for mandatory sanctions is Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter. The United States believes that the use of sanctions, backed by the international community, can restrict access to arms and funds used to undermine international security, while denying political support to the leadership of sanctioned regimes.

Early in 2003, UN sanctions were in effect in eight cases. By the end of the year, UN Security Council Resolution 1506, adopted on September 12, lifted sanctions on Libya, leaving seven sanctions regimes in place. Comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq were lifted with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1483 on May 22; however, the arms embargo remained in place. Resolution 1483 determined that financial assets located outside Iraq belonging to the previous Government of Iraq, to Saddam Hussein, or to other former senior Iraqi officials, were subject to immediate freeze and forfeiture to the Development Fund for Iraq, to be used for Iraq’s reconstruction. Wide-ranging sanctions, including assets freezes and arms/travel bans, targeted Usama bin Laden, members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and their supporters. UN sanctions also continued against Liberia, Somalia, and non-state groups in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. These sanctions included arms embargoes, travel bans, and limits on the exports of conflict diamonds. Resolution 1493, adopted on July 28, additionally imposed an arms
embargo on non-state groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to support peace efforts there, including the UN peacekeeping force.

**Non–Self-Governing Territories**

The status of non–self-governing territories, defined as “territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government,” are considered annually by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24 or C-24) and by the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the UN General Assembly.

As the administering power of three non–self-governing territories—American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands—the United States has consistently partnered with the United Kingdom to ensure agreement on an “omnibus” resolution on the “Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin Islands.” This resolution confirms the right of self-determination and reiterates the call for complete decolonization. It further recognizes the work of the “administering powers” to this end. As in prior years, the General Assembly adopted this resolution by consensus. The United States continued to fulfill all reporting requirements requested by this resolution and by Article 73(e) of the UN Charter.

During the General Assembly, the United States voted against or abstained on a series of resolutions that further addressed the governance and independence of non–self-governing territories. The United States opposed these resolutions because of unacceptable references to land tenure, economic and military activities, and responsibilities of administering powers.

**Security Council Thematic Debates**

In 2003, the Security Council held 12 thematic debates, three more than in 2002, and the same number as in 2001. As last year, terrorism continued to command the greatest attention. The Security Council held a High-Level Meeting in January and issued a Ministerial Declaration in Resolution 1456, which called for various steps to be taken to combat terrorism. In addition to the open meetings on terrorism described below, three additional meetings took place in February, August, and November to condemn bomb attacks in Colombia (Resolution 1465), the terrorist attack in Baghdad on UN headquarters (S/PRST/2003/13), and bombings in Istanbul (Resolution 1516).

The Security Council discussed the following themes:

- Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts. The Security Council held an open meeting in January, resulting in the adoption of Resolution 1455, which strengthened requirements on member states’ implementation of sanctions (asset freeze, travel ban, arms

- **Children and Armed Conflict.** Open meetings occurred in January followed by adoption of Resolution 1460, which called on all parties to armed conflict to halt the recruitment and use of children. The United States made a statement in the meeting that deplored the use of children as soldiers, runners, guards, sex slaves, and spies. The United States also applauded the work of the Security Council and regional and sub-regional organizations in making children and armed conflict a priority concern in their policies and programs.

- **Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.** Open meetings took place in June and December, followed by a Presidential Statement, which adopted as an annex the first update of the 2002 Aide Memoire to be used as an operational tool and as a basis for improved analysis during deliberations on peacekeeping mandates. The United States welcomed the revised Aide Memoire and viewed it as a vital resource for the Security Council in applying best practices in future resolutions.

- **Africa’s Food Crisis as a Threat to Peace and Security.** An open meeting in April included a briefing by World Food Program Executive Director James Morris.

- **Peace and Security: HIV/AIDS and International Peacekeeping Operations.** An open meeting in November included briefings by Jean-Marie Guehenno, Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, and Peter Piot, Executive Director of the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS.

- **Importance of Mine Action for Peacekeeping Operations.** Open meetings in November, followed by a Presidential Statement, recognized the long-term consequences of landmines and unexploded ordnance to peace and security and development. The United States acknowledged the vital role that mine clearance efforts can and should play in furthering peace and stability and detailed some U.S. efforts in that regard.

- **Role of the Security Council in the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.** An open meeting in May, followed by a Presidential Statement, reiterated the Council’s commitment to make effective use of those procedures in the UN Charter relating to pacific settlement of disputes as an essential component of its work. In its statement, the United States noted particular instances in which the Security Council and the United Nations prevented disputes from escalating into war.

- **Protection of UN Personnel, Associated Personnel and Humanitarian Personnel in Conflict Zones.** An open meeting in August, followed by the
adoption of Resolution 1502, expressed the Council’s determination to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel. The United States welcomed the adoption of the resolution.

- The Security Council and Regional Organizations: Facing the New Challenges to International Peace and Security. An open meeting in April included briefings by several representatives of regional organizations. The United States declared that regional and sub-regional organizations fulfill a vital role in the furtherance of peace and security.

- Justice and the Rule of Law: the UN Role. Open meetings in September discussed the centrality of justice and the rule of law in international affairs.

- Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Mercenary Activities: Threats to Peace and Security in West Africa. An open meeting in March, followed by the adoption of Resolution 1467, concerned the impact of the proliferation of small arms on peace and security in West Africa. Addressing the Council, the United States supported the adoption of the resolution, noting that illicit trade in small arms and light weapons contributed to violence and suffering around the world.

- Women and Peace and Security. An open meeting took place in October to take stock of progress since the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000), to advance its implementation and to provide an operational perspective. As President of the Security Council in October, the United States convened this meeting, stressing that no approach to peace can succeed if it does not view women and men as equally important components of conflict resolution.

**Effects of Atomic Radiation**

The UN General Assembly established the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in 1955 to provide continuous review and evaluation of the effects of ionizing radiation on humans and their environment. Governments and international organizations around the world rely on UNSCEAR evaluations for estimating radiological risk, establishing protection and safety standards, and regulating radioactive materials, informing policy decisions, and targeting international assistance programs. UNSCEAR’s work is of significant interest to many U.S. agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, and Energy.

The 51st session met in Vienna, on January 27–31, 2003. The U.S. delegation, led by Dr. Fred Mettler of the University of New Mexico and the Veterans Administration, included eight other advisors from different universities, medical centers, and U.S. Government agencies. The Committee reviewed eight scientific texts and two overview annexes. These documents included sources-to-effects assessment of radon in homes and workplaces;
exposures of workers and the public from various sources of radiation; the
effects of ionizing radiation on the immune system; epidemiological
evaluation and dose response of diseases that might be related to radiation
exposure; new epidemiological studies of radiation and cancer and health
effects from the Chernobyl accident; radioecology; and medical radiation
exposures. The publication of the next major report, originally due in 2005,
will be delayed as a result of a budget shortfall and a cancelled meeting in

Although increased communication and coordination between
UNSCEAR and the UN Environment Program (UNEP) in 2003 partially
restored UNSCEAR funding levels back towards 1994 nominal funding levels,
funding issues remained a continuing problem for UNSCEAR. The United
States continued to urge UNEP and the UNSCEAR Secretariat to establish
strong links of communication and coordination to work together on
UNSCEAR funding. The United States continued to monitor the relationship
and interaction between UNSCEAR and UNEP. In light of ongoing and future
U.S. and international efforts to prevent, manage, and mitigate radiological
incidents, it is in the U.S. interest that UNSCEAR continue to operate as an
effective independent scientific body and that its findings are widely
disseminated.

UNSCER’s budget for 2003 was $358,000. The U.S. assessment
was approximately $79,000.