Part 1

Political and Security Affairs

Regional Issues

Near East

Iraq

During 2002, the United States worked with members of the international community to make Iraq’s continuing defiance of the UN Security Council a priority at the United Nations.

Iraq continued to fail to meet its obligations, under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and other relevant resolutions, to disclose and relinquish all capabilities and programs relating to weapons of mass destruction and proscribed missile programs. Iraq did not come into compliance with its disarmament obligations even after the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, and the return of UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iraq on November 27. Iraq also continued to reject its obligations pertaining to Kuwaitis and other persons missing since Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and newly appointed UNMOVIC Chair Hans Blix held a series of meetings in March, May, and July of 2002 with senior Iraqi officials to discuss implementation of Security Council Resolution 1284 (1999), which Iraq had rejected, and the resumption of weapons inspections. Iraq continued to maintain that it had met its disarmament obligations and insisted on a lifting of UN sanctions and other preconditions before it would allow inspections.

Four days after President Bush’s September 12 address to the UN General Assembly, Iraq informed the Secretary-General that it was prepared to accept the return of inspectors without such conditions. Dr. Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei continued technical talks with the Iraqis in September and November.

In the weeks following President Bush’s address to the United Nations, the United States, along with the United Kingdom, led an intensive diplomatic campaign to adopt a new Security Council resolution demanding Iraq’s full compliance with all of its obligations. Adopted unanimously, Security Council Resolution 1441 found that Iraq remained in material
breach of its disarmament obligations; gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply; and recalled the Council’s warnings of serious consequences if it did not. Resolution 1441 required that Iraq submit a full, accurate, and complete declaration of its weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related programs within 30 days. Resolution 1441 also enhanced the authorities of the inspections regime, under UNMOVIC and IAEA, and demanded Iraq’s immediate, unconditional, and active cooperation with the inspectors.

Weapons inspection resumed on November 27, with the United States working closely with UNMOVIC and IAEA. The President and senior administration officials met with Drs. Blix and ElBaradei, and U.S. officials maintained regular working- and higher-level contacts with their teams. The United States provided material support, intelligence, personnel, and technical assistance to the inspections.

Iraq submitted its weapons declaration on December 8. In a December 19 Security Council session, Dr. Blix delivered his assessment that the declaration did not provide “much significant new information” on Iraq’s proscribed weapons programs and that it repeated previous Iraqi declarations. U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte concluded that Iraq had committed a “further material breach” of its disarmament obligations by submitting a deficient declaration.

In 2002, the United States also spearheaded an effort to revise and focus UN sanctions on Iraq. After a year of negotiations, that effort culminated in the adoption of Resolution 1409 on May 14, and the “Goods Review List” (GRL), which identified consumer items that also could have military applications. This revised system had two essential elements: (1) keeping in place prohibitions on providing Iraq weapons or the means to produce them; and (2) streamlining the approval process for purely civilian goods. UNMOVIC and IAEA used the List to refer GRL items to the Sanctions Committee for review. Resolution 1409 stipulated a review of the GRL process to consider necessary adjustments. Since that review did not take place prior to the November 25 expiration of the six-month phase of the Oil–for–Food (OFF) program, the United States proposed short-term rollovers to keep OFF functioning. Resolution 1447 of December 4 extended OFF for another six months, and Resolution 1454 added 38 military-related items to the GRL list.

Within the Sanctions Committee, the United States and the United Kingdom continued to insist that the Committee set prices retroactively for Iraqi crude oil in order to minimize Iraq’s ability to exact illegal surcharges. The Multinational Maritime Interception Force reported to the Committee that maritime oil smuggling was significantly reduced during 2002.

Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, UN High-Level Coordinator [for Kuwaiti missing persons and property], appointed under Resolution 1284 (1999), reported regularly to the Security Council on his efforts to obtain Iraqi cooperation on the return of Kuwaiti archives plundered during the
Gulf War and an accounting of Kuwaiti and third-country war missing since 1990. The United States continued to raise the case of U.S. Commander Michael Speicher, missing since the first Gulf War. By the end of 2002, Iraq, under intense international scrutiny, made some overtures of cooperation. Ambassador Vorontsov’s December report cited Iraq’s initial moves to return Kuwaiti archives as reason for hope, but Kuwait later revealed that Iraq had not returned anything of value. On the issue of accounting for war missing, the report characterized progress as “limited.”

During 2002, the human rights situation in Iraq continued to fall far short of international norms. Iraq allowed a brief visit by the UN Commission on Human Rights’ (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq in February 2002. The UNCHR adopted a resolution on April 19 that “noted with dismay” that there had been no improvement in the human rights situation in Iraq and strongly condemned “the systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights by the Government of Iraq, resulting in all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror.”

**UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)**

The UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) was established in 1991 under UN Security Council Resolutions 687 and 689, following the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait. During 2002, UNIKOM contributed to the maintenance of stability in the demilitarized zone between the two countries, a U.S. goal in the region.

The situation along the Iraq–Kuwait border was generally quiet in 2002, and no significant violations were reported. UNIKOM continued to maintain close and regular liaison with the authorities of both Iraq and Kuwait at various levels. UNIKOM also continued to act in coordination with the authorities of Iraq and Kuwait in cases of unauthorized border crossings. UNIKOM, when asked, and in tandem with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, helped facilitate repatriation.

As of December 31, UNIKOM had 1,105 troops and observers from 32 countries. The United States provided 11 military observers. UNIKOM’s operating budget for 2002 was $16.8 million, of which the United States contributed $4.5 million.

**Arab–Israeli Situation**

In the context of intensified violence in the Middle East in 2002, particularly following Israel’s initiation of Operation Defensive Shield in the spring, the United Nations frequently considered resolutions on the situation in the Middle East.

During the spring, the United States successfully blocked the Security Council’s adoption of several one-sided Arab Group draft resolutions that were critical of Israel. The United States chose to engage in discussion and then vote for the following four alternative resolutions that were supportive of U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region.
UN Security Council Resolution 1397 affirmed the President’s vision of two states (Israel and Palestine) with secure and recognized borders. Among other provisions, the resolution demanded an immediate cessation of all acts of violence, including terror, provocation, incitement, and destruction, and called on the two parties to implement the Mitchell Committee recommendations and the Tenet security work plan.

Security Council Resolution 1402 expressed grave concern about suicide bombings in Israel and the military attack against Palestinian Authority headquarters. It called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestinian cities. Moreover, it called on both parties to move immediately to a meaningful cease-fire and to cooperate with the U.S. Special Envoy, Retired General Anthony Zinni, in implementing the Mitchell Committee recommendations and the Tenet security work plan, with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement.

Security Council Resolution 1403 demanded the implementation of Resolution 1402 without delay and welcomed the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell to the region.

Security Council Resolution 1405 emphasized the urgency of access for Palestinian civilians to medical and humanitarian groups and welcomed the Secretary-General’s initiative to develop accurate information on recent events in the Jenin refugee camp.

In September, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1435, which condemned terrorist attacks against civilians; demanded that Israel cease measures in and around Ramallah, and withdraw from Palestinian cities to the positions held prior to September 2000. It also called on the Palestinian Authority to ensure that those responsible for terrorist acts were brought to justice; and it expressed support for the efforts of the Quartet (a group formed by the United States that includes the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia). The United States abstained on Resolution 1435, seeking a stronger resolution that explicitly called for action against terrorist groups and those who support them.

In December, the United States introduced in the Security Council and achieved adoption of Resolution 1450, which condemned terrorist attacks directed against Israelis in Kenya on November 28 and, among other provisions, urged all states to cooperate in bringing those responsible to justice.

The Security Council also considered in December a draft resolution condemning Israeli killings of UN personnel in the Occupied Territories and the destruction of a World Food Program warehouse. The draft resolution, among its other provisions, also demanded that Israel, the “occupying power,” comply fully with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and refrain from excessive and disproportionate use of force. The United States vetoed this draft resolution because it focused more on condemning Israeli occupation than on minimizing threats to UN personnel and facilities.
During 2002, the General Assembly reconvened an “Emergency Special Session on Palestine.” At the May meeting, the General Assembly adopted a resolution that, among other provisions, condemned Israeli attacks against Palestinian people in several Palestinian cities and the refusal of Israel to cooperate with the Secretary-General’s fact-finding team to the Jenin refugee camp. It also demanded that Israel cease all hindrances to the work of humanitarian organizations, and requested that the Secretary-General present a report on events in Jenin and other Palestinian cities. At the August meeting of the Emergency Special Session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution taking note of the Secretary-General’s report and repeating many of the points in the previous resolution. The United States voted against both of these resolutions because it believed they were unbalanced and distorted the reality of the Middle East conflict by ignoring Palestinian terrorism.

During the General Assembly’s regular session, the United States cosponsored and joined consensus in adoption of a resolution on assistance to the Palestinian people. However, the United States continued to oppose a number of resolutions that are introduced each year (except the resolution on Palestinian children mentioned below, which was new this year) on the Middle East. These resolutions were considered under agenda items on the Situation in the Middle East, Question of Palestine, Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, Permanent Sovereignty of the Palestinian People over their Natural Resources, and Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices. The United States also voted against resolutions on the Palestinian Right to Self-Determination and the Situation of Palestinian Children.

The United States opposed these resolutions because they addressed permanent status issues that the Israelis and Palestinians have agreed to decide through negotiations; advocated activities or language incompatible with basic principles of the Middle East peace process; and/or expended resources that could be used in more productive ways to improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

Secretary-General Annan issued statements frequently throughout the year condemning acts of violence by both Palestinians and Israelis against civilians. In addition, the Secretary-General participated in the Quartet to coordinate actions with the objective of moving the Arab-Israeli peace process forward. The Quartet met at the ministerial level in April, July, September, and December. One focus of the Quartet was on developing a roadmap for halting the violence and the steps that were needed to resume negotiations in order to make possible achievement of a Palestinian state within three years—the goal President Bush set out in his June 24 speech.

The representatives of the Quartet met at the White House in December with President Bush, and then issued a joint statement. The statement highlighted the fact that President Bush had expressed strong support for the efforts of the Quartet and his firm commitment to the Quartet’s roadmap, which would realize his vision of two democratic, accountable...
states—Israel and Palestine—living side–by–side in peace and security.
The statement called the roadmap performance–based and goal–driven.

The Quartet also functioned at what was called the “envoy” level, meeting between ministerial sessions to try to advance the process. Terje Roed–Larsen (Norway), who since 1999 had been the Secretary–General’s Special Coordinator (UNSCO) for the Middle East Peace Process, represented the United Nations. Roed–Larsen, who had also served as the UNSCO from 1994–1996, attempted to resolve problems between Israel and its neighbors by offering his good offices. He was based in Gaza. [Also see Part 2, Human Rights.]

UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in March 1978 under UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 in response to the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. When Israel withdrew its forces from Lebanon in July 2000, the UN Secretary–General declared that UNIFIL had accomplished the first two parts of its mandate: confirming the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from southern Lebanon and assisting the Lebanese Government in restoring its authority in southern Lebanon. Since then, UNIFIL has focused on completing the remaining part of its mandate: the restoration of international peace and security in the region. As such, UNIFIL is an integral part of U.S. efforts to maintain a cease–fire between Israel and Lebanon and peace in the region.

However, throughout 2002, the UNIFIL area of operation remained tense, with Blue Line border violations mainly attributable to Hizbollah attacks against Israeli military positions in the Sheb’a Farms, cross–border firing of anti–aircraft artillery over Israeli settlements, and over–flights of Lebanon by Israeli military aircraft. In April, Hizbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) clashed repeatedly in and near the Sheb’a Farms. Hizbollah, as well as pro–Palestinian elements resident in Lebanon, also engaged in sporadic cross–border attacks against Israel from locations west of Sheb’a.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Damascus and Beirut in mid–April seeking Lebanese and Syrian assistance in defusing the situation along the Israel–Lebanon border. Following Secretary Powell’s visit, there was a four–month cessation of cross–border attacks by Hizbollah and other groups. By May, the levels of violence along the Blue Line had dropped significantly. This trend continued for the most part, with the exception of two isolated, yet serious, attacks on the IDF on August 29 and December 8.

As of December 31, UNIFIL had 2,300 troops from six states: France, Ghana, India, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. No U.S. troops served in UNIFIL. UNIFIL’s operating budget for 2002 was of $70.2 million, of which the United States contributed $18.8 million.

UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is the first peace–keeping mission organized by the United Nations. UNTSO was estab-
lished in 1948 under UN Security Council Resolution 50 to supervise the truce that the Council called for at the end of the British mandate in Palestine. Since then, UNTSO military observers have remained in the region to monitor cease-fires, supervise armistice agreements, and assist peacekeeping missions operating in the Middle East. UNTSO’s presence demonstrates the international community’s interest in achieving a comprehensive peace in the region.

UNTSO’s activities are spread over territory within five states, requiring relations with all of them: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. UNTSO observers also participate in other UN peacekeeping missions in the region, including the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

In 2002, UNTSO contributed to the maintenance of regional stability. Its military observers and administrative staff continued to provide key support to UNIFIL and UNDOF in the Golan Heights. At Egypt’s request, the mission also provided a small monitoring team to patrol the Sinai.

As of December 31, UNTSO had 151 military observers from 23 nations. The United States provided three military observers to UNTSO. Its operating budget for 2002 was $24 million, of which the United States contributed $5.2 million.

**UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)**

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. UNDOF’s mission is to monitor the cease-fire between Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, and monitor the areas of separation and limitation between the two countries. UNDOF has played a positive role in observing the implementation of the Israel–Syria Disengagement Agreement and serves U.S. national security interests by maintaining confidence levels and preventing the escalation of tensions between Israel and Syria.

During 2002, UNDOF’s area of operations was relatively quiet with incidents only in the disputed Sheb’a Farms area, where Lebanese–based Hizbollah forces conducted periodic attacks against Israeli military positions in northern Golan.

As of December 31, UNDOF had 1,043 troops from six nations: Austria, Canada, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, and Sweden. No U.S. troops served in UNDOF. UNDOF’s operating budget for 2002 was $38.3 million, of which the United States contributed $10.4 million.

**South Asia**

**Afghanistan**

The United Nations, with strong support from the United States, continued to play a pivotal role in Afghanistan in 2002. During the first months of the year, the Afghan Interim Authority, established by the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, slowly began the process of establishing a
central government and constituting the commissions called for in that agreement.

The United States sought to promote a broad–based Afghan government that respects human rights and the rule of law, the rights of women and ethnic and religious minorities, and freedom of conscience. The United States also promoted Afghan and UN policies that provide for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); counternarcotics operations regarding production and trafficking; and Afghanistan’s peaceful cooperation with its neighbors. Additionally, the United States sought to encourage the new Afghan government to adopt policies that facilitate the transition from humanitarian assistance to effective reconstruction and economic development, and the progressively greater involvement of Afghanistan’s economy in international trade and financial systems.

On January 15, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1388 to lift restrictions imposed by Resolution 1267 (1999) and Resolution 1333 (2000) on Ariana Afghan Airlines, the Afghan national airline. These restrictions were no longer appropriate with the defeat of the Taliban regime and the return of Ariana to friendly hands. The United States introduced the draft resolution, and it was adopted as a Presidential text (all Security Council members acted as cosponsors).

On January 16, in Resolution 1390, the Security Council condemned the al–Qaida network and the Taliban regime. It directed states to take certain measures with respect to Usama bin Laden, al–Qaida, and the Taliban and associates, including freezing their assets, restricting their travel, and preventing the supply of arms to them. The United States cosponsored the resolution.

In March, pursuant to the recommendation of the Secretary–General, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1401 establishing the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) for a period of 12 months. The mandate for UNAMA focused on tasks entrusted to the United Nations in the Bonn Agreement, including promoting the protection of human rights and addressing the rule of law, national reconciliation, and gender issues; and managing all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The Secretary–General’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), was appointed to head the mission.

UNAMA worked with the Afghan government and the donor community to create a system of Program Secretariats. Under this model, UN organizations would work closely with their counterpart ministries in Afghanistan to coordinate policy and operations. Typical pairings include the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the Afghan Ministry of Refugee Affairs, the UN Children’s Fund with the Ministry of Education, the World Health Organization with the Ministry of Public Health, and the World Food Program with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
The Program Secretariat system functioned well during 2002, due in part to the presence of U.S. advisors in each ministry, as well as U.S. representatives seeking support from the international community. As the year drew to a close, the United States worked with the United Nations and Afghan authorities to transform these Program Secretariats into Consultative Group mechanisms by which the Afghans, rather than international donors, would progressively take the lead.

U.S. counternarcotics objectives in Afghanistan included a substantial reduction in production and trafficking as a critical element in establishing security. With U.S. support, the United Kingdom—as lead nation in cooperation with the Afghan Interim Authority—undertook a relatively successful one–time effort to compensate farmers for destroying their spring opium poppy crop. According to U.K. estimates, almost 30 percent of the crop was destroyed in 2002. As a longer–term strategy, compensation was determined to be impractical because it was susceptible to abuse and provided no incentive to stop planting.

Immediate actions in pursuit of U.S. counternarcotics objectives included cash–for–work rural livelihood programs, building local Afghan law enforcement capacity, strengthening regional cooperation with interdiction programs, and dissemination of anti–drug messages through public diplomacy. In the second half of 2002, the United States established an effective mix of ground monitoring and intelligence collection and created realistic benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of counternarcotics efforts.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in close collaboration with the United States, assisted the Afghan government in implementing counternarcotics programs in 2002 and drafting the Afghan National Counter–Drug Strategy and a new drug law. UNODC also collaborated with the U.S. Government in holding the Second International Counter–narcotics Meeting in Kabul in October.

In a letter dated May 7, the Foreign Minister of Turkey notified the Secretary–General of Turkey’s willingness to assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from the United Kingdom. On May 23, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1413 to extend the mandate of the ISAF for a further six months beyond June 20. The United States had drafted this resolution, which was adopted as a Presidential text.

Under British and then Turkish leadership, the ISAF helped stabilize Kabul and its environs. In response to calls to expand the scope and mission of ISAF outside Kabul and into the countryside, the United States, while not opposed, consistently pointed out the significant challenges involved in recruiting and sustaining what was essentially a light infantry peacekeeping force to cover the entire country. No country stepped forward to lead or coordinate such an expanded mission.

In the relatively stable environment created by the ISAF in Kabul, the United States began training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) at the
Kabul Military Training Center in May. In the short term, the ANA mission was to conduct stability operations outside of Kabul and to support Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military–led operation in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

The United States committed itself to developing a capable and high-quality ANA Central Corps prior to the June 2004 elections. By the end of 2002, six infantry battalions had been trained and two brigade headquarters were in formation. The United States developed a core of Afghan trainers to sustain and increase the tempo of ANA training, with the goal of sustaining a training program through Afghan resources and capabilities. Elements of the battalions continued enhanced unit training with U.S. trainers embedded in their ranks, and in December they began deploying outside of Kabul on low-risk operations designed to build confidence. In the short term, ANA units would continue their training and stability operations outside of Kabul to expand capabilities, increase unit cohesion, and demonstrate the reach of the central authority.

An emergency Loya Jirga (grand council, or assembly) was held from June 11 to 19, at which the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) was declared and the Afghan Transitional Authority was elected, with Hamid Karzai as president and head of state. The United States had provided $7 million in logistical support for the Loya Jirga, and much of the country listened to the proceedings live on some 30,000 radios distributed by the United States.

To facilitate humanitarian relief and reconstruction, the new government set a priority on actions that would improve security throughout the country. Working with the TISA, the United States sought to put in place building blocks to enable the fledgling central government to protect itself from internal threats while safeguarding human rights and deterring external aggression.

On June 26, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1419, which welcomed the results of the peaceful and successful emergency Loya Jirga, the establishment of the transitional authority, and the election of President Karzai, and reiterated support for the transitional authority as it sought to implement the Bonn Agreement. The United States had cosponsored the resolution.

A Judicial Commission as called for in the Bonn Agreement was established; under the leadership of Italy it began to address the needs of a justice sector that was in almost total collapse. U.S. assistance was targeted at supporting the commission, rebuilding infrastructure, training, development of a criminal justice system that meets international standards of human rights, and the development of civil society.

The U.S. military, through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), continued to pursue al-Qa‘ida terrorists and loyal Taliban remnants in eastern and southeastern Afghanistan, particularly along the border with Pakistan. Close cooperation with Pakistan and combined operations with Afghan forces led to a number of successful interdictions. The United States
believed that eliminating the terrorist threat was necessary to provide the basis for a strong central authority in Afghanistan and the TISA’s ability to build a stable political and economic environment.

The United States and other international stakeholders understood that building national security institutions had to be accomplished hand-in-hand with the reduction in the strength of regional militias. No disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation (DDR) model existed to fit the circumstances in Afghanistan, and the United States, together with DDR lead nation Japan, began working with UNAMA and the TISA to move this program forward during the second half of 2002. The United States did not seek to eliminate regional leaders, often referred to as “warlords,” who played important roles in Afghanistan’s recent history. Rather, the objective was to firmly establish the primacy of the central governmental authority and to encourage regional leaders to cooperate with Kabul.

The Foreign Ministers of Germany and the Netherlands expressed their countries’ willingness to assume command of ISAF from Turkey in a joint letter dated November 21. On November 27, the Security Council again extended the mandate of the ISAF for 12 months beyond the date of December 20 by adopting Resolution 1444. The United States had advocated this extension.

On December 2, the United States participated in a conference on rebuilding Afghanistan at Petersberg, just outside Bonn, Germany. Conducted at the same location as the first conference on Afghanistan one year previously, the conference was widely referred to as “Bonn II.” At the conference, President Karzai issued a decree concerning the organization and composition of the Afghan National Army; and the Governments of China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan took steps toward issuing a “Kabul Declaration on Good Neighborly Relations.” This was signed on December 24 in Kabul. The same day, the Security Council welcomed the Declaration in Resolution 1453, which the United States cosponsored.

On December 6, the UN General Assembly adopted without a vote Resolution 57/113. Part A concerned the implications of the situation in Afghanistan for international peace and security. Citing the fragility of emerging institutions, the resolution reiterated the General Assembly’s strong support for the Afghan Transitional Authority in its efforts to fully implement the Bonn Agreement, and called upon member states to support the Authority through direct budgetary support and long-term assistance for economic and social reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Part B of Resolution 57/113 addressed emergency international assistance for peace, normalcy, and reconstruction. The resolution welcomed the Transitional Authority’s commitment to take the lead in reconstruction efforts; it welcomed the establishment of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund; and it urged the international community to channel assistance through the national development
budget of the Transitional Authority. The United States joined consensus on these resolutions.

On December 18, the General Assembly adopted without a vote Resolution 57/234, which addressed the question of human rights in Afghanistan. It affirmed that the establishment of an environment of good governance, democracy, and the rule of law was the primary responsibility of the Afghan Transitional Authority, and it recognized that a fair and effective national system of justice was key to ensuring fundamental freedoms and human rights, as well as reconciliation and stability. The resolution also welcomed the establishment of several commissions called for in the Bonn Agreement, while noting continued humanitarian concerns and the existence of large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees.

On December 20, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1452 to establish a process whereby funds necessary for basic expenses could be exempted from the freeze imposed by Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1390 (2002).

**India/Pakistan**

The United Nations established the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1949 to supervise a cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute escalated in the 1990s following the outbreak of an insurgency in Indian Kashmir in 1989, and gained renewed U.S. and international attention after India and Pakistan announced nuclear capabilities in 1998, and then nearly went to war in 2002.

The United States has consistently called on the two sides to settle the dispute through bilateral negotiations. The 1972 Simla Accord and the 1999 Lahore Declaration, both signed by India and Pakistan, call for bilateral dialogue on Kashmir as the way forward. The “Line of Control” (LOC) established at Simla generally follows the 1949 cease-fire line.

UNMOGIP observers have been deployed mainly on the Pakistan side of the LOC. India has rejected an equal–sized contingent on its side, arguing that UNMOGIP’s mandate relates only to the 1949 cease–fire, which has lapsed. The UN Secretary–General stated that only a decision of the Security Council could terminate the peacekeeping mission. There have been no mandate renewals and, as the Council has not requested any written reports from UNMOGIP since 1972, the Council has not reviewed the issue in either a formal meeting or informal consultations.

UNMOGIP observers played no role in addressing the significant increase in tensions between India and Pakistan during the summer of 2002, and the issue did not reach the threshold of Council consideration. UNMOGIP’s mandate does not include a mediation role, and more than 50 years of precedent combined with stringent restrictions on movement imposed by both India and Pakistan kept observers from active patrolling of the LOC throughout the year.
Despite UNMOGIP’s passive role in Kashmir, the United States believes that to de-establish the mission without replacing it with an alternative mechanism could upset the delicate equilibrium, arousing Pakistani fears that India had succeeded in taking Kashmir off the international agenda.

UNMOGIP is funded through the UN regular budget rather than the peacekeeping budget. The two-year approved budget for UNMOGIP was $13.1 million. The United States pays 22 percent of the regular budget. As of December 31, 2002, there were 45 military observers serving in UNMOGIP. No U.S. personnel were assigned to the mission.

Africa

Angola

In 2002, the United States continued to press for appropriate modifications to the UN sanctions regime in Angola to support the restoration of peace and security. The UN Security Council lifted all UN sanctions on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in December, after UNITA agreed to end Angola’s 27-year-old civil war and accept the 1994 peace agreement (the “Lusaka Protocol”). UNITA agreed to disarm and to transform itself into a legitimate political party, returning all territory to government control.

The UN sanctions on UNITA were initially imposed in 1993 with the full support of the United States. By 2002, the sanctions were extensive, banning the supply of arms, fuel, financing, and other material support to UNITA; preventing UNITA officials from traveling or opening political offices outside of Angola; and halting the trade in “conflict diamonds” used by UNITA to support armed conflict with the Government of Angola.

After the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi on February 22 and the agreement between UNITA and the Government of Angola to a cessation of hostilities on April 4, the United States led successful efforts in the UN Security Council to support the end of war, including adjusting the sanctions.

To facilitate UNITA’s participation in peace talks, the so-called negotiating “Troika” (the United States and Russia, supported by Portugal) introduced draft UN Security Council Resolutions (1412 and 1432) on May 17 and August 15, respectively, which each suspended travel sanctions on UNITA’s leaders for 90 days. The resolutions were adopted unanimously. The Security Council also unanimously adopted Resolution 1433 creating a UN Mission in Angola for six months to assist the Government of Angola in protecting human rights, reintegrating demobilized soldiers into civilian society, and promoting economic recovery.

Reflecting the positive developments in the peace talks, the United States played a leading role in helping to terminate the travel ban on UNITA officials by cosponsoring Resolution 1439. It was adopted unanimously on October 18. The Security Council ended the remaining sanc-
tions on UNITA by unanimously adopting Resolution 1448 on December 9.

Burundi

In 2002, the United States continued to work in the UN Security Council to support international efforts to assist Burundi’s peace process and promote national reconciliation. The Security Council closely followed the work of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Burundi, Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia). Dinka served as the chair of the Implementation Monitoring Committee responsible for ensuring the implementation of the August 2000 Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi. The Council also received regular briefings on progress in negotiating a successful and all–inclusice cessation of hostilities agreement with the four Hutu rebel groups that remained outside the Arusha process.

The Transitional National Assembly and the Transitional Senate opened in January and February 2002, in accordance with the Arusha Agreement. This followed on the establishment of the transitional government in November 2001. Amidst an upsurge in violence between the rebel groups and government forces throughout the first part of the year, South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma, with the assistance of representatives of Gabon and United Republic of Tanzania, stepped up efforts to negotiate cessation of hostilities agreements between the parties.


Despite this progress, the U.S. delegation noted in the UN Security Council in December that the situation in Burundi still warranted close monitoring by the Council. Specifically, the United States remained concerned that the Agatha Rasa faction of PALIPEHUTU–FNL was continuing its campaign of violence and refusing to sign a cease–fire agreement. In addition, several significant provisions of the Arusha Agreement had yet to be implemented, including the reform of the armed forces, security and intelligence services, and arrangements for the voluntary return of an estimated 800,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania.

Central African Republic


In the UN Security Council, the United States supported the work of the UN Peace–Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA). In particular, the United States supported BONUCA’s efforts
to monitor the human rights situation, to bring about reconciliation among CAR parties, and to mediate friction between the CAR and Chad.

The BONUCA civilian police team organized a training course on investigation techniques in February and March for the Central African police and another course in May on the enforcement of economic and financial rules and regulations. Another course on the maintenance of law and order was organized in June for the CAR gendarmerie.

The United States also made clear its support for the work of the Secretary-General’s representative, General Lamine Cisse (Senegal), and for the October 2002 Libreville Accord that established the peacekeeping mission in the country. This mission was staffed by member states of the Central African Monetary and Economic Community, which replaced Libyan and Sudanese troops deployed under a previous mission of the Community of Saharan and Sahelian States.

The situation in the Central African Republic deteriorated following another coup attempt on October 25, with continual fighting between the government forces and rebel forces of General François Bozizé, former Chief of Staff of the CAR armed forces who had engineered the coup attempt.

The resulting unrest led to the suspension of operations of the U.S. embassy in Bangui and the evacuation of some UN personnel. The conflict increased tensions between the CAR and Chad, with the CAR accusing Chad of complicity in the coup attempt. The conflict also attracted over 1,500 Congolese rebel troops from Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement de Libération du Congo, who fought alongside CAR Government forces in support of President Patassee.

The UN Secretariat periodically briefed the UN Security Council on the unfolding crisis. The CAR foreign minister and the prime minister of Chad separately addressed the Council on December 9 regarding CAR allegations of Chadian involvement in the October coup attempt.

The United States supported the Council’s repeated calls on all parties to restore law and order, implement the Libreville Accord, and undertake an all-inclusive national dialogue that included the rebels.

The budget for BONUCA in 2002 was $4.63 million, assessed through the UN regular budget, of which the United States paid 22 percent.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Security Council established the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) under Resolution 1376 (2001) to verify and monitor compliance with cease-fire and disengagement agreements among the states and Congolese factions involved in the conflict, starting with the July 1999 Lusaka Agreement. The civil war in the Congo and military interventions by neighboring states continued through 2002. MONUC continued monitoring and verifying any disengagement of forces within the Congo, and deployment of troops into the eastern Congo.
in preparation for supporting the voluntary demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation of any Rwandan Hutu rebels and their dependents.

MONUC observers verified that the lines of military disengagement and separation were adhered to. During the first half of 2002, the parties failed to reach agreements on the withdrawal of foreign forces called for by the Lusaka Accords. The Congo did not actively work to demobilize, disarm, and repatriate the Rwandan Hutu rebels within its borders.

In his Report to the Security Council on February 15, the Secretary-General asked that the ceiling on the number of MONUC troops be raised from 5,537 to 6,387. In subsequent Security Council discussions, the United States took the lead opposing this recommendation, noting that there had been no change on the ground to justify an increase; moreover, as of March 31, MONUC had deployed only 3,173 troops and 446 observers. The Council did not increase the ceiling.

In mid-May, following a day of brutal reprisals in Kisangani by the Rwandan–supported Congolese Rally for Democracy–Goma (RCD–Goma) against an attempted uprising by the RCD–Goma Seventh Brigade and some local police officers, MONUC used both Uruguayan soldiers in transit to Kindu and Kisangani–based Moroccan troops to patrol the city in an effort to halt further violence and reprisals.

MONUC and the UN Commission on Human Rights sent an investigative team to Goma between May 14 and 30. The UN Special Rapporteur for Extra–Judicial Killing, Asma Jehangir, then went to the city. Afterwards, she reported at least 55 deaths due to uprising. On June 14, in Resolution 1417, the Security Council, with United States backing, condemned the violence and extended MONUC’s mandate for another year. The RCD–Goma, however, did not investigate the atrocities or bring the perpetrators to justice.

In late May, the Secretary–General named Mustapha Niasse, former prime minister of Senegal, his Special Envoy to the Inter–Congolese Dialogue (ICD), established by the Lusaka Agreement to resolve the civil war in the Congo. Niasse’s efforts, while helpful, were sporadic. South Africa took an increasingly active role in assisting UN efforts by bringing representatives of the warring parties together.

South Africa sponsored a break–through agreement between the Congo and Rwanda on July 30, in which Rwanda agreed to withdraw its forces from the Congo and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo committed to helping Rwandan Hutu rebels demobilize, disarm, and repatriate from territory under its control. Rwanda withdrew its troops by early October, but the Congo had made less progress. By year’s end, the Congo had repatriated only about 800 rebels and dependents to Rwanda.

On September 6, the Congo and Uganda signed a normalization and troop withdrawal agreement, which set up a Joint Pacification Committee for the Ituri region bordering Uganda. The implementation of the Committee would allow Uganda to ensure that its security concerns were met, and
thus permit it to withdraw its forces, numbering around 2,000, from the Congo. Unfortunately, the Committee did not establish a mechanism to ensure law and order, and the proliferation of armed groups and conflicts in the Ituri continued. At year’s end, Congo and Uganda had failed to establish the Ituri Pacification Committee despite the repeated urging of the United States and other Security Council members.

Zimbabwe, whose forces were in the Congo supporting the Government, withdrew all its troops in response to Rwanda’s withdrawal and Uganda’s agreement to withdraw. These withdrawals enabled MONUC to deploy into the eastern Congo to support intensive demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation. The United States supported an increase in MONUC’s troop and observer ceiling to 8,700, to be comprised of two task forces, of which the second task force would only be deployed if the Secretary-General reports that the first task force could not handle the demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation caseload. On December 4, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1445, which extended MONUC’s mandate for full Phase III demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation activities.

On December 17, South Africa and the United Nations facilitated talks among the Congolese Government, political opposition, and armed rebel groups, which resulted in an agreement in Pretoria on an inclusive transitional national government in the Congo. The agreement called for elections within two to three years following an end to hostilities and a period of national recovery and institution building; agreement by the parties on appointments of ministers and others; and agreement on military positions and reform of both the military and security services.

At the end of 2002, MONUC had deployed 4,389 military personnel, including 483 military observers, with no U.S. personnel. The fiscal year 2002 total cost of the mission was $830.89 million of which the U.S. share was $226.39 million.

A driving factor in the continued violence in the Congo has been the struggle for control of natural resources, whose exploitation by militias and governments has provided both funding and impetus for the conflict. Transparency and possible measures to end unethical resource exploitation led to the creation of an independent panel of experts to advise on these issues. On October 24, the Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo presented its report to the UN Security Council. The Panel was charged with investigating whether illegal exploitation of the Congo’s natural resources was contributing to armed conflict in the region and thereby posed a threat to international peace and security. The Panel concluded that a number of regional and international companies, including some based in the United States, were in violation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
Ethiopia/Eritrea

In 2002, the United States worked closely with other Security Council members to support the efforts of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) to promote peace between these two nations.

On March 15, the United States joined other members of the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1398, which extended UNMEE’s mandate for six months, until September 15, 2002. The resolution underlined the necessity for the parties to cooperate with UNMEE and with the Boundary Commission. The Commission is an independent body of international legal experts that receives technical assistance from the UN Cartographer’s office and is charged with recommending a demarcation of the parties’ disputed border. On April 13, the Boundary Commission announced its findings on the location of the disputed border. Each country would gain and lose some territory.

On May 21, Ethiopia and Eritrea met with the Boundary Commission and UNMEE representatives in The Hague to discuss implementation of the demarcation phase, and in particular, what mechanisms could be established to minimize friction and resolve differences. The parties did not agree on procedures for demarcating the border. The United States supported the May 29 Security Council Presidential statement to the press, urging the parties, the Boundary Commission, and the United Nations to consult on achieving agreement on demarcation procedures.

The United States also supported Resolution 1430 of August 14 that authorized UNMEE to demine key areas to support the demarcation and to provide Boundary Commission field offices with administrative and logistic support funded by the UN Trust Fund.

On September 6, the United States voted along with other Security Council members in support of Resolution 1434, which extended UNMEE’s mandate for another six months, until March 15, 2003.

As of December 31, UNMEE consisted of 3,832 troops and 202 observers. The United States contributed six military observers and one staff officer to UNMEE. To support the transition to peace, the United States voluntarily contributed $1 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to the UN Trust Fund to support demarcation and another $500,000 in ESF to assist communities affected by demarcation. In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $247.85 million for UNMEE operations. The U.S. share was $67.65 million.

Guinea–Bissau

The United States supported UN efforts to help Guinea–Bissau consolidate its democracy and reconstruct its economy following several years of internal conflict. The U.S. delegation to the United Nations monitored the activities of the UN Peace–building Support Office in Guinea–Bissau (UNOGBIS), which, together with the UN Development Program (UNDP), continued to organize human rights training seminars throughout the year. UNOGBIS’s 2002 budget totaled $2.72 million and was funded through the UN regular budget. The U.S. assessment was 22 percent.
U.S. Agency for International Development also contributed funds to the human rights seminars.

The United States supported the efforts of the Secretary–General’s Special Envoy for Gambia and Guinea–Bissau, James Victor Gbeho (Ghana), to lessen tension between Gambia and Guinea–Bissau. The Special Envoy facilitated a bilateral ministerial meeting between Guinea–Bissau and Gambia on July 4, 2002, at which these two governments made a series of commitments to reduce tensions and increase cooperation between their nations.

In the UN Economic and Social Council, the United States agreed to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea–Bissau to help coordinate international development assistance to that country. The Group first met on October 29, and on November 9, began a seven–day visit to Guinea–Bissau. They met with government officials; UNDP, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank field representatives; and members of the Guinea–Bissau and Dakar–based diplomatic corps.

The Secretary–General and the Ad Hoc Advisory Group noted in separate reports that the political climate in Guinea–Bissau remained unstable. Rumors of coup plots were common and the population lacked personal security. On November 15, moreover, during the Ad Hoc Advisory Group’s visit, President Kumba Yala dismissed the government of Prime Minister Alama Ntchia Nhasse, dissolved the parliament, and called for elections in early 2003. The United States expressed concern in the Security Council about the degree of transparency and fairness of those promised elections.

Liberia

In 2002, the United States continued to back UN sanctions on Liberia, imposed in 2001 because of Liberian President Charles Taylor’s ongoing support of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a group responsible for numerous atrocities in neighboring Sierra Leone. Some 1,500 members of the RUF, including many of its senior leaders, fled to Liberia in late 2000 after the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone established effective control over the country. Liberia’s continued support of the RUF prompted the Security Council to demand in Resolution 1343 (2001) that the Liberian Government expel all RUF members from its territory and end all support of the RUF. On May 6, 2002, the Security Council, with strong U.S. support, adopted Resolution 1408, which imposed sanctions on Liberia. The sanctions included an arms embargo while barring senior Liberian officials from traveling abroad and prohibiting Liberian exports of rough diamonds, many of which were stolen from Sierra Leone.

A UN Panel of Experts, whose mandate the Security Council had unanimously renewed on February 27 in Resolution 1395, monitored implementation of the sanctions. The Panel concluded that the sanctions had often prevented senior Liberian officials from traveling abroad and that Liberian exports of rough diamonds had fallen precipitously—apparently benefiting Sierra Leone’s legitimate diamond trade.
On December 13, the Security Council President, with the Council’s unanimous support, issued a statement condemning Liberia, other states, and non-state groups, including the rebel group Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), for violating the arms embargo. The statement emphasized that the Council would maintain sanctions against President Taylor’s regime until the Council’s demands in Resolution 1343 were met. The statement also outlined the Security Council’s strategy to end hostilities in Liberia, through stopping the flow of weapons into the country, supporting the establishment of a peace process involving the Government of Liberia and the LURD, promoting the development of stable and democratic political institutions, enhancing the respect for human rights, and addressing the humanitarian needs of all Liberians.

The United States, working with the United Kingdom and France, also called for expanding the mandate of the UN Office in Liberia (UNOL), dedicated to promoting democracy and national reconciliation. The United States and other Security Council members wanted UNOL’s mandate to encompass strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law in Liberia, setting the stage to monitor free and fair elections scheduled for 2003, and promoting respect for human rights. In July 2002, the UN Secretariat began negotiations with Liberia to expand UNOL’s mandate, but the regime continued to block the negotiations despite the Security Council’s repeated urgings.

Libya

In 1999, after Libya agreed to turn over two Libyan officials wanted for trial by a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands on the Pan Am 103 bombing, the Security Council suspended, but did not end, sanctions imposed in Security Council Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993). In January 2001, the court convicted one of these Libyans, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi. A Scottish appellate court upheld the conviction in March 2002.

Libya still had not fulfilled its obligations under Security Council resolutions at the end of 2002. For example, it had neither accepted responsibility for the terrorism perpetrated by its officials, nor given appropriate compensation to the victims’ families. During 2002, the United States and the United Kingdom continued a series of discussions with Libya to try to get it to comply with its Security Council obligations.

Rwanda

In 2002, the United States and the United Nations continued to focus on Rwanda’s military involvement in the ongoing war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC). In its discussions, the Security Council reiterated its call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including those from Rwanda and the Congo, and the implementation of the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement (see section on the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

On June 14, the Council adopted Resolution 1417, which called on Rwanda to exercise its influence with its proxy militia in the DROC, the Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma, to end the violence in Kisangani,
and bring to justice those responsible for atrocities. Rwanda, however, continued to provide support to this and other armed groups in the eastern Congo, even though it entered into the Pretoria Agreement with the DROC on July 30, and within three months, withdrew its approximately 20,000–30,000 troops from the DROC.

Security Council Resolution 1161 (1998) imposed an arms embargo against all groups other than the Government of Rwanda involved in the conflict. This embargo continued in force through 2002. While no violation of the embargo was reported in 2002, the United States favored its retention as a contribution to international peace and security in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

Sierra Leone

In 2002, the primary United States’ interest in Sierra Leone was the restoration of peace and stability to that country. The United States worked with other members of the Security Council to advance the efforts of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), created to implement the Lome Peace Agreement and the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration plan, and to contribute to the broader international strategy for Sierra Leone and the region.

On January 16, the United States voted for Security Council Resolution 1389, which authorized UNAMSIL to provide security in elections scheduled for May 14, and to give logistical support to Sierra Leone’s National Electoral Commission. To help Sierra Leone’s police maintain security through the election, the resolution further authorized a temporary increase in the number of UN civilian police (CIVPOL) from 60 to 90.

On March 1, Sierra Leone’s Government lifted the state of emergency imposed in 1998 and allowed political parties to hold public meetings and campaign in the May elections. Because Sierra Leonean law required that the government rapidly charge or release prisoners who had been detained under the state of emergency, the Government brought murder and robbery charges against key members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). On March 4, the Government indicted Foday Saybana Sankoh, leader of RUF, and 49 other RUF members.

On March 28, in Resolution 1400, the United States joined other nations in extending UNAMSIL’s mandate for six months with additional authority to provide the Sierra Leone Special Court with administrative and related support on a cost–reimbursable basis.

Before the May elections, UNAMSIL established an office in each of Sierra Leone’s electoral regions to help monitor the security and transparency of the elections, as well as to transport election materials to election sites. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees helped Sierra Leone refugees and internally displaced persons return home before the elections. Over 2.2 million Sierra Leoneans registered to vote.

Nearly 2 million voters turned out for the May 14 nationwide presidential and parliamentary elections. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was re-
elected for a five–year term with 70 percent of the vote; his party, the Sierra Leone’s People Party, won 83 of the 112 seats in the parliament. The RUF party received less than 2 percent of the presidential vote and did not win a single seat in the parliament. International observers concluded that the election was overall free, fair and transparent. UNAMSIL radio covered the elections live.

In April 2002, a UN team, consisting of military and civilian experts, visited Sierra Leone to gauge the success of the disarmament and demobilization of almost 48,000 former combatants that UNAMSIL supervised between May 2001 and January 2002. The team deemed the efforts successful, while noting that some weapons, including those seized by the RUF from UNAMSIL troops in 2000, had never been recovered, remaining hidden in Sierra Leone or used in Liberia and Guinea by unknown forces.

On June 19, the Secretary–General issued a positive report on the prospects for consolidating the peace after the election. He expressed concern, however, that the Liberian conflict could destabilize Sierra Leone and other countries in the region.

On September 24, in Resolution 1436, the United States joined with other Security Council members to extend UNAMSIL’s mandate for another six months, endorse the deployment of up to a total of 170 civilian police officers to Sierra Leone, and authorize phases one and two of the Secretary–General’s plan to reduce the size of UNAMSIL from 17,500 at December 31, to 5,000 by the end of 2004.

The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces increased its presence throughout the country. With the renewed fighting in Liberia, UNAMSIL continued its deployment in areas near the Liberian border to provide security and assist fleeing Liberian refugees.

On February 26, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Save the Children Fund alleged in a joint report that West African–based representatives of the United Nations, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and possibly some UNAMSIL peacekeeping troops had sexually abused refugees, including minors. In early April, the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted interviews in Sierra Leone and Guinea. The OIOS reported on October 22 that it found evidence of sexual exploitation by UN and NGO employees in 10 out of 43 alleged incidents. However, the majority of allegations could not be substantiated.

Responding to reports of sexual wrongdoing, UNAMSIL established a Committee on Staff Conduct to review its policies and address complaints. UNAMSIL also dispatched teams into the field to investigate allegations of misconduct by its troops. It learned of several situations in which UNAMSIL soldiers had had relationships with local women who were not refugees, but who became pregnant. One case involved a peacekeeper who had had a relationship with a girl who was not a refugee, and, while there was no evidence of duress, was below the age of consent. All of these
troops had either rotated out of Sierra Leone or were sent home. UNAM-SIL asked contributing governments to take disciplinary action. Since the release of the UNHCR/Save the Children Fund report, the United States became actively engaged, primarily with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in efforts to establish a clear and uniform code of conduct for UN agencies and missions.

On December 4, in Resolution 1446, the United States joined other Security Council members in extending the international ban on trading in diamonds from Sierra Leone unless the diamonds are certified as legal. In 2002, Sierra Leone’s legal diamond exports rose from $25 million in 2001 to $41.73 million.

As of December 31, UNAMSIL consisted of 15,788 troops, 254 military observers, and 44 CIVPOL officers. While no U.S. military personnel participated in UNAMSIL, three U.S. officers were assigned to the British–led international military training team advising the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defense. In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed members a total of $747.63 million for UNAMSIL operations, and the U.S. share was $205.94 million.

Somalia


On March 28, 2002, with the Security Council’s unanimous backing, the President of the Council issued a statement expressing serious concern about the continued flow of weapons and ammunition into Somalia from neighboring states despite the embargo.

On May 3, with the aim of strengthening the embargo, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1407, which created a two–member expert panel to investigate violations of the arms ban. On July 22, in Resolution 1425, the Security Council enlarged the panel to include three members. Throughout the year, the United States encouraged states to abide by the embargo, stressing its importance to ending the Somalia conflict.

On December 12, the President of the Security Council, with the unanimous backing of its members, issued a statement supporting a peace process begun in Eldoret, Kenya on October 15 involving all significant Somalia parties and the cease–fire to which they agreed on October 27. The President of the Council noted the concern of member states over cease–fire violations and the slow progress of negotiations.

Sudan

The year 2002 saw progress in the effort to end Sudan’s decades–old civil war and the ability of humanitarian relief groups to deliver services to populations in need. The United Nations continued to comment on the situation in Sudan (the ongoing civil war, human rights abuses, and the
humanitarian crisis generated by the war) through the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly.

The October round of peace negotiations held in Machakos, Kenya concluded with the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement signing an agreement with the United Nations allowing unimpeded access for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The parties also reached a cease–fire agreement, since extended to June 30, 2003. With a few exceptions, the cease–fire has held, and humanitarian access improved.

The United Nations provided humanitarian aid in Sudan through Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), to which the United States contributed. The United States, working within and outside the OLS framework, provided $136.9 million in humanitarian aid to Sudan in fiscal year 2002.

At the 58th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), the United States did not cosponsor a European Union–drafted resolution on Sudan because the text did not condemn the continued practice of slavery by individuals and did not denounce forced religious conversions by private individuals. The resolution did, however, extend the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur for another year. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 25 to 24, with 4 abstentions. [Note: The United States was not a voting member during the UNCHR’s 58th Session.]

The United States also worked with other nations to adopt a resolution in the General Assembly condemning human rights abuses in Sudan. On December 18, a resolution was adopted. Although it was not as strong as the United States initially sought, it did condemn human rights abuses in Sudan, identify the perpetrators, and describe their crimes. The General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 80 (U.S.) to 62, with 33 abstentions.

**Western Sahara**

On April 29, 1991, the Security Council established the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to help implement a settlement plan (the “Settlement Plan”) that Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el–Hamra y Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) agreed to on August 30, 1998. The Settlement Plan called for a cessation of hostilities, the return of refugees, and a referendum under UN auspices to determine the future status of the territory. For more than a decade, the parties have failed to agree on who may vote in the referendum. After the completion of the voter identification process in 1999, MINURSO received more than 130,000 appeals from individuals not included on the voter list.

Since 1997, former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III has been serving as the Secretary–General’s Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara. The United States has supported Mr. Baker’s efforts to achieve a durable settlement, which would enhance regional stability.
In a February 19, 2002 report to the Security Council, the Secretary–General presented Mr. Baker’s assessment that the parties were unlikely to implement the Settlement Plan in its current form. The Secretary–General then presented four options: implementing the Settlement Plan without the parties’ concurrence; a revised autonomy plan; partition; or withdrawal of MINURSO.

Most members of the Security Council opposed trying to impose a solution on the parties, but wanted MINURSO to continue. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France supported an approach that would involve a revised autonomy plan; other members disagreed. A divided Security Council decided to extend MINURSO’s mandate on February 27 (Resolution 1394) and again on April 30 (Resolution 1406).

On July 30, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1429 that asked Mr. Baker to continue his efforts to reach a political solution and that invited him to devise a proposal that would lead to self-determination in the Western Sahara. The Council also extended MINURSO’s mandate to January 31, 2003, called upon the POLISARIO to release immediately all prisoners of war, and urged both sides to collaborate with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the International Committee of the Red Cross to resolve the fate of those missing since the beginning of the conflict.

William Swing, a former U.S. Ambassador, served as the Secretary–General’s Special Representative for MINURSO. The United States continued to lead the Friends of Western Sahara, an informal group that includes the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and Spain, which consults on the margins of the Security Council on next steps in the peace process.

As of December 31, 2002, 28 countries had contributed a total of 235 troops (of which seven came from the United States), military observers, and civilian police to MINURSO. The U.S. assessed contribution for MINURSO totaled $13.3 million.

**East Asia and the Pacific**

**Bougainville**

In 2001, after 13 years of civil conflict, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which granted Bougainville autonomy and an eventual vote on independence from Papua New Guinea in 10 to 15 years. By certifying the collection of arms, the United States continued to support efforts of the UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) to implement this Peace Agreement.

On March 28, 2002, the Security Council held an open meeting to discuss progress in the Bougainville peace process. Assistant Secretary–General Danilo Turk reported that significant progress had been made towards collecting weapons and drafting a constitution, but that one faction, led by Francis Ona, remained outside the peace process. The United States and others urged UNPOB not to allow this one marginal faction to further
delay progress in certifying the collection of arms, and, as a result, autonomy for the island.

On December 19, the Security Council President issued a letter (S/2002/1380) that extended UNPOB’s mandate through December 31, 2003. At U.S. urging, this letter stated that the extension would be the last and that UNPOB should submit written reports, within existing resources, setting forth a clear exit strategy with a timetable and benchmarks.

Burma

In 2002, the United States and the United Nations focused on Burmese violations of human rights, forced labor, and opium production. The United States endorsed the missions of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Burma, Razali Ismail (Malaysia), and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Burma, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Brazil). Ambassador Razali sought to facilitate a meaningful political dialogue between the government and the National League for Democracy (NLD), Burma’s leading opposition party. He visited Burma in April, August, and November 2002. The government arranged meetings between Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the NLD, and the Minister of Education and other government officials. But in November, the international community made clear to Ambassador Razali that “no real dialogue” with the regime was occurring.

Mr. Pinheiro visited Burma in February and October 2002. He highlighted Burma’s serious human rights abuses record. Mr. Pinheiro and Ambassador Razali joined members of the international community who were pressing for the unconditional release of all political prisoners.

The United States cosponsored resolutions at the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights that expressed concern about the regime’s continuing violation of human rights. Both UN bodies adopted the resolutions without a vote.

In June 2002, the Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) accused the Burmese Army of systematically using rape as “a weapon of war” in ethnic minority areas along the Thai border. The United States investigated these allegations and found many victims whose stories were similar to those documented by the SHRF. The Burmese regime nonetheless denied these charges. Special Rapporteur Pinheiro could not secure the regime’s agreement to allow for an impartial international investigation.

Forced labor remained a problem in Burma. The United States continued to encourage all members of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to implement the body’s 2000 decision, which called upon all members to ensure that their labor policies did not support forced labor in Burma. In August 2002, the ILO began to make field visits along the Thai–Burme border that Amnesty International and other human rights organizations had identified as places where forced labor occurred and ethnic minorities were abused.
In October, the ILO also established an ILO Liaison Office in Rangoon. In November, the ILO Governing Body urged the Burmese Government to develop a “credible plan of action” to eliminate forced labor.

The United States also contributed to the activities of the UN Office of Drug Control (UNODC) to lower Burmese opium production. In June 2002, the United States pledged $700,000 to support UNODC’s Wa Alternative Development Project, which helped reduce opium cultivation in territories controlled by one of the most notorious former insurgent groups, the United Wa State Army.

Throughout 2002, the U.S. Government worked to make sure that its contributions to the UN Development Program (UNDP) did not help the Burmese regime financially, militarily, or politically. The United States also sought to ensure that the UNDP adhered to instructions from its Executive Board that it only support critical humanitarian needs at the grassroots level, to ensure that its programs helped Burma’s poorest and most vulnerable groups.

Cambodia

The United States continued to support efforts to establish a credible tribunal to bring to justice senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and others who bear the greatest responsibility for genocide and other atrocities committed against the Cambodian people between 1975 and 1979. At the United Nations, the United States is part of an ad hoc group, the Friends of Cambodia, which includes the European Union, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Canada, that has supported the creation of such a tribunal.

In February 2002, after five years of talks, the United Nations announced that it would withdraw from negotiations on creating a tribunal with the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). The United Nations disagreed with the RGC about the relationship between a UN–RGC agreement on UN participation and a Cambodian law promulgated in August 2001 that established the Extraordinary Chambers to prosecute crimes committed during the Khmer Rouge era.

The Friends of Cambodia asked the Secretary–General to reconsider the decision to end negotiations owing to concern that without international participation, the Cambodian Government would not establish a credible tribunal and aging Khmer Rouge leaders might escape justice.

In reports to the UN Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the General Assembly in 2002, the Secretary–General’s Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Peter Leuprecht (Austria), emphasized Cambodia’s need for a functioning judicial system and its problem of election-related violence.

At the CHR, the United States supported Resolution 2002/89, which was adopted by consensus on April 26, 2002 and expressed grave concern about continued human rights violations in Cambodia. The resolution also expressed concern about problems with the Cambodian judiciary and
impediments to the rule of law, while welcoming the government’s commitment to reform. The resolution urged the government to take measures that would ensure judicial independence, impartiality, and effectiveness.

Resolution 2002/89 also appealed to the Cambodian Government to bring to trial senior Khmer Rouge leaders and others who violated Cambodian penal law, Cambodian recognized international conventions, or international humanitarian law and custom, and to do so in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and legal due process. The resolution recognized the need for Cambodia and the United Nations to resume negotiations on a tribunal and appealed to the international community to provide assistance.

In August, following discussions with the Secretary–General, the Cambodian Government addressed some UN concerns regarding the relationship between a UN–RGC agreement and the Cambodian law that established the Extraordinary Chambers. The Secretary–General then requested a clear mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council to restart negotiations with the RGC.

In December 2002, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/228, which requested that the Secretary–General resume negotiations immediately in order to reach an agreement with the Cambodian Government on a tribunal. The General Assembly emphasized that the tribunal should meet international standards of justice, fairness, and due process as set out in articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The United States joined 149 other nations voting for this resolution. The General Assembly also asked the Secretary–General to report to it by March 18, 2003 on the status of the negotiations.

East Timor

In 2002, the United States worked with other members of the Security Council to help the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and its successor, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) to stabilize this nation and help it achieve independence. The United States supported assessed funding for UNMISET on the understanding that the mission would phase out in stages, with the East Timorese Government assuming full responsibility for security, law enforcement, and all other government functions by mid–2004. On January 31, 2002, the United States supported the adoption of Resolution 1392 that extended UNTAET’s mandate until May 20.

On March 22, East Timor’s new constitution went into effect. On April 14, presidential elections were held with UN help with logistics and planning; balloting was peaceful and orderly. National independence hero Xanana Gusmao won with more than 80 percent of the vote.

With East Timorese independence days away on May 17, the Security Council, with U.S. support, adopted Resolution 1410. The Council decided that with independence, UNTAET’s duties would pass to UNMISET, whose initial mandate was 12 months, authorized until May 20, 2003. The Council set UNMISET’s strength at a maximum of 5,000
troops, including 120 military observers; 1,250 UN civilian police officers (CIVPOL); and 100 civilian advisors to help the new East Timorese Government. UNMISET’s mandate included helping to develop a coordinated work plan for UN agencies working in East Timor.

The Security Council, in addition, assigned UNMISET the duty of helping the UN Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which helps the East Timorese to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the 1999 atrocities in East Timor.

Though three U.S. military officers participated in UNTAET, the United States did not contribute troops to UNMISET because of other demands on resources and concern about the potential vulnerability of American personnel to International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction. On August 23, 2002, however, East Timor and the United States signed an agreement protecting U.S. personnel from ICC jurisdiction.

On September 27, East Timor, under its new official name Timor–Leste, became a member of the United Nations with United States support.

The United States maintained several bilateral programs to help UNMISET and, then, UNMISET. The U.S. Pacific Command ran a U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), with a staff of approximately 10 Americans, to coordinate U.S. Navy ship visits and military deployments of medical and engineering teams to East Timor. USGET closed in December. The United States funded two retired American military personnel to staff the Office of Defense Force Development, which is in the new East Timor Ministry of Defense. In addition to the voluntary contribution of U.S. police officers serving in UNTAET’s and UNMISET’s CIVPOL components, the United States supported UNTAET’s and UNMISET’s programs to provide technical assistance, training, and equipment to the East Timor Police Service Police College.

As of December 31, UNMISET, which included 59 Americans, consisted of 111 military observers, 3,742 troops, and 1,307 CIVPOL. In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $381.41 million, of which the U.S. share was $103.52 million.

**Europe and Eurasia**

**Cyprus**

The United States continued to support UN efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement to the territorial dispute between Cyprus and Turkey during 2002. Since 1974, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has served as a buffer force between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces on one side and the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek troops on the other. Beginning in January 2002, the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary-General and his Special Advisor for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto (Peru), accelerated efforts to resolve the dispute through direct talks.

On the basis of these talks, Secretary-General Annan proposed a detailed settlement plan to reunify the island, give considerable authority to Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent states, and enable dis-
placed persons to return home. The plan also was intended to allow Cyprus, as one entity, to seek accession to the European Union. Both sides agreed to postpone customary fall military exercises in an effort to improve the negotiating atmosphere.

The United States strongly supported these talks and maintained close contacts throughout them with the United Nations, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Greece, Turkey, and the European Union.

The Secretary-General set as his goal the signing of an agreement between the parties before the December 12–13 European Council summit. This goal was not met, principally because of Turkish Cypriot reservations. However, the two sides decided to continue working toward a settlement.

The Security Council twice renewed the mandate of the UNFICYP, each for six months. Resolutions 1416 and 1442 also urged the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to rescind restrictions that partly closed crossing points along the UN buffer zone, as well as restore the military status quo ante in the town of Strovilia.

UNFICYP’s troop level was approximately 1,230 during 2002, with an additional 35 civilian police. The United States does not contribute peacekeepers to UNFICYP. Greece and Turkey pay approximately half of UNFICYP’s total costs. In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $21.90 million for UNFICYP operations. The U.S. share was $5.96 million.

Georgia

The UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) on August 24, 1993, expanding its mandate in 1994. UNOMIG monitors the cessation of hostilities between the Georgian Government and Abkhaz separatists, as well as activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force in the Abkhaz region. In practical terms, UNOMIG’s patrolling activities have helped contain the violence and prevent a major escalation of the conflict.

UNOMIG’s mandate was unanimously renewed in January 2002 by UN Security Council Resolution 1393 and again in July through Resolution 1427. The Security Council stressed in its press releases that the lack of progress on reducing hostilities and addressing the refugee and displaced persons problem was unacceptable.

These renewals of UNOMIG’s mandate occurred as calls were being raised in the Georgian parliament for the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force. The United States believed that without the security support of the CIS force, the risk was greater that UNOMIG would be unable to fulfill its functions in the security zone.

The Special Representative of the Secretary–General for Georgia, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland), worked steadily after her appointment in 2002 to achieve a comprehensive political settlement, with the assistance of the Group of Friends of the Secretary–General (the
The Special Representative’s efforts have focused on getting the parties to initiate settlement negotiations based on principles that include protecting the territorial integrity of Georgia and providing substantial autonomy for Abkhazia. The Abkhaz separatists resisted dialogue. In December, the Friends of Georgia agreed to convene a high-level session in Geneva in early 2003 to discuss new settlement strategies.

Russian–Georgian tensions during much of 2002 tended to overshadow the Abkhaz issue. Russia was concerned about the presence of Chechen fighters in Georgian border areas; the Georgia Government was concerned about the movements of the primarily Russian CIS peacekeeping force in Abkhazia.

Despite UNOMIG’s small size (114 unarmed military observers, including two Americans in Tbilisi as of December 31), the Mission has had considerable political significance. It is a clear indication of international support for the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Georgia and other newly independent states. In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $26.74 million for UNOMIG operations. The U.S. share was $7.34 million.

The Former Yugoslavia

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

After the military campaign by the United States and its NATO allies, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo in 1999. On June 10 of that year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which authorized both an international security presence that became the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and an interim governing authority in Kosovo.

The mandate of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) under Resolution 1244 is to provide civilian administration, develop provisional institutions for self-government, facilitate the political process to determine Kosovo’s status, support economic reconstruction and humanitarian and disaster relief, maintain law and order and protect and promote human rights, and support the return of refugees and displaced persons. Resolution 1244 will continue in force until the Security Council decides its provisions have been implemented.

In January 2002, the Secretary-General appointed Michael Steiner (Germany) as his Special Representative (SRSG) for UNMIK. SRSG Steiner put forward a plan outlining eight standards of democratic self-government to act as benchmarks by which the international community could measure Kosovo’s progress in meeting the basic requirements of a democratic society. These include functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, return of refugees and internally displaced persons, reintegration of minorities, and development of the economy.
The United States and the international community stressed “standards before status,” asking Kosovars to focus on achieving sustainable self-government rather than Kosovo’s final political status. However, the issue of final status retained a stronghold in the minds of the local leaders and populace during the year.

UNMIK is a unique collaborative effort of the United Nations with such entities as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). UNMIK’s four pillars of activity, under the authority of the SRSG, are police and justice, civil administration, democratization and institution building, and reconstruction and economic development.

UNMIK has the leading role in administering police and justice issues. As of December 31, UNMIK had 4,442 international civilian police (CIVPOL) and 38 military observers. The United States provided two of the military observers and 545 members of the civilian police. The Deputy Police Commissioner for Operations and Kosovo Police Service (KPS) Development is a United States police officer. UNMIK transferred police authority to the KPS while retaining unified operational control. The KPS employed some 5,200 at year’s end. Developing the KPS is one of UNMIK’s most impressive accomplishments.

The United States provided equipment and personnel to the UNMIK Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau (KOCB), which became operational in 2002 to investigate organized crime, terrorism, and extremism. By year’s end, 17 U.S. officers had served in the bureau. The United States contributed funds to UNMIK to purchase equipment that helped the KOCB conduct sensitive investigations. The United States also provided an assistant U.S. attorney who worked with UNMIK’s Department of Justice (DOJ) on complex organized crime cases and was instrumental in promoting a better relationship among the UNMIK DOJ, KFOR, and UNMIK police for handling cases related to ethnic extremism and organized crime.

The OSCE has the lead on democratization and constitution building. Its Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS), led by the United States, provided classroom training to the multiethnic KPS. The 22nd class of cadets graduated in December, bringing the total number of police officers trained at KPSS to over 5,500.

The OSCE–run Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) provides continuing legal education for judges and magistrates. The OSCE oversaw successful municipal elections across Kosovo in October and the resultant inaugurations of 30 municipal assemblies, several with Serb majorities or significant Serb participation. This was the third Kosovo–wide election since 1999.

Following the seating of the Kosovo Assembly in December 2001, a provisional government with a president and prime minister was formed in March 2002. The Assembly and 10 ministries make up the Provisional Institutions of Self–Governement (PISG). The SRSG and UNMIK retain reserved powers in areas such as foreign affairs, justice, and defense, and
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oversee and monitor compliance with Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Framework, and the Framework Regulation for the Executive Branch. The United States encouraged UNMIK to transfer additional responsibilities to the PISG in accordance with Resolution 1244 and the Constitutional Framework.

The EU, which has responsibility for reconstruction and economic development, worked with UNMIK to build a stable macroeconomic environment in Kosovo. Delays in the promulgation of laws and regulations and the transfer of authority from UNMIK to the PISG hindered the process. A regulation creating the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) did not pass until June, slowing implementation of KTA’s operating procedures and the privatization process. In addition, ongoing discussions over land use regulations hindered the initiation of the privatization process.

In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed its member states $249.39 million for UNMIK operations. The U.S. share was $67.11 million. Americans filled several leadership positions in UNMIK, including a U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) official who headed UNMIK’s DOJ for 2002.

UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)

The November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) included a provision for a UN civilian police operation to assist in creating a safe and secure environment. On December 21, 1995, UN Security Council Resolution 1035 established a UN civilian office, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). Jacques Paul Klein (United States) was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary–General in 1999 and served until UNMIBH’s closure on December 31, 2002, after successfully completing its mandates. The United Nations transferred responsibility for policing to the follow–on European Union Police Mission (EUPM).

In 2002, IPTF continued to advise and monitor local police. It also completed formulation of the Law Enforcement Personnel Registry, which verifies that Bosnian officers have undergone background checks and have met basic training requirements. Through this vetting process and other personnel cuts, IPTF reduced the number of local police officers in Bosnia from some 40,000 in 1996 to approximately 20,000 at the end of 2002. Both the Bosnia–Herzegovina Federation and the Republica Srpska (the Bosnia–Serb entity within Bosnia–Herzegovina) maintained multiethnic police academies during 2002, with extensive bilateral assistance from the United States. Several U.S. officers held key positions within the IPTF, including that of Executive Officer to the Commissioner.

With UNMIBH’s assistance, the State Border Service (SBS)—Bosnia’s first state–level, multiethnic armed law enforcement agency—reached full coverage of all border points in 2002, including BiH’s international airports. Full deployment of the SBS appears to have reduced illegal immigration. The United States made significant bilateral
contributions to the SBS, including a country–wide radio communications system and computer based information management system.

UNMIBH’s Special Trafficking Operation Program (STOP) continued to raise the profile of trafficking in persons in Bosnia among local police and the public at large. The U.S. Department of State’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons met twice during 2002 with Celhia de Lavarene (France), Director of STOP, and maintained close communications.

Of the approximately 1,600 civilian police in the IPTF during 2002, 40 were U.S. officers. The IPTF began downsizing following elections in October 2002, in preparation for the transition of responsibility to the EUPM. In fiscal year 2002, the United Nations assessed member states $67.65 million for UNMIBH operations. The U.S. share was $18.28 million.

**UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)**

In September 1992, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agreed to demilitarize the Prevlaka Peninsula at the southernmost tip of Croatia. The peninsula overlooks Kotor Bay, the home of the Yugoslav Navy.

To assist the parties, the UN Security Council established a military observer mission (the UN Protection Force) in October 1992 to monitor the demilitarization. In 1996, it was increased to 28 observers and renamed the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) under Security Council Resolution 1038. UNMOP was renewed at six–month intervals until July 2002, when pressure from the United States and others to wind down the mission culminated in only a three–month renewal under Resolution 1424. In October 2002, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1437, authorizing the final extension of UNMOP’s mandate until December 15, 2002.

Croatia and the FRY signed an agreement on a temporary land and sea protocol for Prevlaka on December 10. This step, and the signing of a free trade agreement on December 30, were further indications of the normalization of relations between the two countries.

The United States had pressed throughout 2002 for UNMOP’s orderly withdrawal, given the continued stability in the region and solid progress in the normalization of relations between Croatia and FRY, and the evidence that the parties were committed to peaceful and negotiated solutions to disagreements. Because of this focus, the United States did not contribute to the mission.

Throughout most of the year, UNMOP was comprised of 27 military observers. Just before its closure in December, UNMOP began to cut staffing. UNMOP did not have its own budget; its expenses were included in UNMIBH’s budget. It also received administrative support from UNMIBH.
Western Hemisphere

Cuba

The United States and the United Nations continued to focus significant attention on Cuba and its human rights record in 2002. On April 19, the UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) adopted a resolution sponsored by Uruguay and 35 other nations chastising Cuba for its human rights situation. The vote was 23 to 21, with 9 abstentions. [The United States was not on the UNCHR in 2002, so it did not vote.] The resolution called on the Government of Cuba to “make efforts to achieve progress in respect of human, civil and political rights,” in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and requested that the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights send a representative to Cuba to obtain its cooperation in the implementation of the resolution. This was the fourth consecutive year in which the UNCHR had adopted such a resolution.

On November 12, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by Cuba on the “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.” The vote was 173 to 3, with 4 abstentions. The United States voted no, along with Israel and the Marshall Islands. The resolution called on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws “such as… the ‘Helms–Burton Act,’” and urged states that have such laws to repeal them. In their explanations of vote, a number of countries voted in favor of the resolution but expressed continuing concern over Cuba’s poor human rights record.

In the U.S. explanation of vote, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Sichan Siv noted that the United States embargo against Cuba is a bilateral issue and should not be debated in the General Assembly. The Ambassador called the resolution “misguided” and urged all delegations to oppose it. He explained that the goal of U.S. policy towards Cuba remained to “foster a rapid, peaceful transition to a democratic form of government where human rights are protected, civil society thrives, and economic prosperity is extended to all Cubans.”

Guatemala

Through diplomatic engagement, the United States has strongly supported the UN’s efforts to assist the Guatemalan Government in implementing the peace agreements it had signed with the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca in 1996, ending a 36–year struggle. There has been progress in some areas, but implementation of the peace agreements has fallen behind schedule, while the human rights situation has worsened.

The primary focus of UN support for the peace accords has been in the area of human rights verification. The United Nations first authorized the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in 1994, acting on a recommendation by the Secretary-General that such a mission could overcome the disturbing pattern of human rights abuses in Guatemala.
During 2002, the activities of MINUGUA included conducting impartial investigations into alleged human rights abuses, monitoring the disbandment of the Presidential Guard and the post–conflict roles and activities of the Guatemalan military, promoting grassroots participation in development planning, and using its good offices to try to defuse social conflicts. In addition, the mission focused increasingly on trying to build the capacity of local institutions that would take over once MINUGUA was terminated.

The Guatemalan Government requested in 2002 that MINUGUA be continued through 2004, in light of the presidential election that would take place in December 2003. The United States and other countries in the so–called “Friends of Guatemala” group, including Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, and Venezuela, agreed in principle to support this request, with the understanding that MINUGUA would continue to scale back its operations and that no extensions would be considered beyond 2004.

The Secretary–General reported that he planned in 2003 to reduce MINUGUA’s administrative costs and the number of international professional staff in its headquarters in Guatemala City, while retaining the level at its field offices at their current strength. On December 16, 2002, the General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 57/161, which extended MINUGUA’s mandate until December 31, 2003.

In 2002, MINUGUA, which is led by Thomas Koenigs (Germany), had 271 personnel and a budget of $14.8 million. Since it is not a peace-keeping operation, MINUGUA is funded out of the UN regular budget. The U.S. assessment rate for the UN regular budget is 22 percent.

Disarmament Issues

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is the principal forum for discussion of disarmament issues at the United Nations when the General Assembly is not in session. The UNDC operates by consensus to make recommendations on various disarmament issues. The focus of the United States has been to ensure that the UNDC adopts reports that are consistent with, and advance, U.S. policy. A key U.S. interest is to maintain a balance in UNDC work between nuclear and non–nuclear issues, since historically, non–aligned states have tried to focus UNDC discussions on nuclear issues.

The April 2001 session of the UNDC considered two reports, drafted by the chairs of its two working groups, on the ways and means to achieve nuclear disarmament and practical confidence building measures (CBMs) in the field of conventional arms. The starting point of these reports was the expressed views of the UNDC delegations. The U.S. delegation’s remarks focused on how nuclear disarmament could be advanced and how effective CBMs could promote international peace and security.
In the end, the nuclear report was an unfocused compendium of conflicting views, while the CBM report developed arguments showing how CBMs could contribute to regional and international peace and security.

At the request of the non–aligned states, which the United States believed was indicative of the limited value this body adds to the UN’s work, the UNDC did not meet in 2002. The members, including the United States, agreed to the postponement to allow time to prepare revised papers. The UNDC will consider the proposed revisions to these 2001 papers during its 2003 session.

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The Geneva–based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the principal multilateral forum for negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. It specifically addresses nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, weapons of mass destruction, conventional arms, prevention of an arms race in outer space, transparency in disarmament, and terrorism. While the CD has produced significant international treaties in the past, notably the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993), it currently is in its sixth year of stalemate. In recent years, progress has either been paralyzed by outmoded Cold War–era thinking, or subverted by those who refuse to live up to their international obligations.

Although the CD is financed through the UN regular budget and submits an annual report on its actions to the United Nations, it is an autonomous organization outside the formal UN system, and it makes its decisions by consensus.

The 66 members of the CD are divided into geopolitical groups—the Western Group, the Eastern Group, and the non–aligned group, with China as an independent member. With CD concurrence, the UN Secretary–General appoints the Secretary–General of the CD (a largely ceremonial position). The latest appointee, Sergei Orzhonikidze (Russia), was appointed in March 2002 but has no fixed term. He is also Director–General of the UN Office in Geneva.

The CD’s 2002 session met in three rounds (January 21–March 29, May 13–June 28, and July 29–January 13, 2003). U.S. objectives included the establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT would ban production of fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices.

Other members sought to establish a working group on negative security assurances, which are guarantees by nuclear weapon states to not employ, subject to conventions, nuclear weapons against non–nuclear weapon states.

The non–aligned states supported negotiation of a global treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non–nuclear weapon states. The United States opposed such a global treaty, preferring instead to provide negative security assurances through a unilateral
national declaration provided to parties to the Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and through treaties creating regional nuclear weapon free zones, under which the nuclear weapon states have acceded to protocols containing such assurances to the parties.

China, supported by Russia and Pakistan, continued to insist that the work program include negotiations on outer space arms control. The U.S. Government is against arms control restrictions that could infringe on its right to field assets in outer space.

The 2002 session was the sixth year of deadlock over the CD’s work program. The U.S. keynote speech at the CD in the spring underlined the continuing U.S. commitment to multilateralism, but also warned that the CD urgently needed to overcome gridlock and establish its relevance as a negotiating forum. The primary proposal to break the impasse in the future, supported by the vast majority of CD members, focuses on commencing FMCT negotiations, with discussion–only mandates for outer space and nuclear disarmament.

The CD is supported through the budget of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs. The United States pays 22 percent of the approximately $4 million devoted to CD costs.

**UN First Committee (UNFC)**

The First Committee is the subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly that addresses international security and arms control. It is based in New York. The presidency of the First Committee rotates on an annual basis among UN members. During its five–week session each autumn, it typically considers 45 to 60 resolutions and decisions. During each session, the United States promotes key goals and objectives and counters proposals by others that would have negative effects on U.S. national security and arms control interests.

In the 2002 session, the United States tabled resolutions on compliance with arms control agreements and U.S.–Russian strategic arms reductions, which were both adopted by consensus. Due in part to extensive U.S. lobbying, an Iraqi resolution on depleted uranium munitions was defeated outright in the First Committee (last year’s resolution had survived until the Plenary vote). It was the only resolution defeated.

One new agenda item was an Indian resolution calling for strengthened measures to prevent terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. A majority, including the United States, supported this resolution.

The First Committee effectively put behind it the issue of the 1972 Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, which had figured prominently in the 2001 debate. The United States had officially withdrawn from the treaty with the former Soviet Union earlier in 2002.

Because of concerns over enforceability and verifiability and other issues, the United States will not ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This position led to several U.S. no–votes on resolutions calling for the universal adherence and entry into force of the treaty.
In all, the United States voted for or joined consensus on 30 resolutions, voted against 17, and abstained on five. The United States supported resolutions on wider adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention; implementation of the Small Arms and Light Weapons Protocol; support for a nuclear weapons free zone in Central Asia; implementation of a UN arms registry promoting transparency in armaments; and a number of procedural resolutions acknowledging reports to the General Assembly by arms control organizations.

Specialized Issues

Terrorism

In 2002, international efforts to combat terrorism continued to be a focal point at the United Nations. As U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John D. Negroponte said during the UN’s event to commemorate the September 11, 2001 attacks:

The United Nations understood that the attacks on the United States were attacks on civilization everywhere. The General Assembly gave swift voice to its outrage; the Secretary–General spoke out forcefully; and the Security Council condemned acts of international terrorism as threats to international peace and security. The United States is grateful for this solidarity. We must make common cause against terror, and we have made common cause against terror.

At the Ministerial meeting on September 11, 2002, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/25) indicating its determination to combat terrorism until the principles and purposes of the United Nations could be fulfilled for all people.

The United States deposited Instruments of Ratification for the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism on June 26. Having done this, it was now party to all 12 UN and UN specialized agency terrorism conventions and protocols.

In October, the Sixth Committee (legal issues) debated Resolution 57/27, “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.” This resolution strongly condemned all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed. It reaffirmed previous Declarations on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, and urged all states to become parties to the 12 international terrorism conventions. It stipulated that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) and on the negotiation of an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Upon the Sixth Committee’s recommendation, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/27 without a vote on November 8.

The Sixth Committee Working Group engaged in a fifth round of negotiations on the CCIT on October 15 and 16. The states remained at an impasse on two issues: the scope of the offense and the non-application of
the convention to state military forces. The U.S. position was to include within the scope of the offenses actions undertaken in the name of national liberation movements and to exclude state military forces from the scope of the convention.

The United States continued its efforts to advance international counter-terrorism initiatives throughout the UN system. It focused its efforts not only in the General Assembly and its working groups, but also in the Security Council and two of its important committees, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the 1267 Sanctions Committee. The CTC, established under Resolution 1373 in September 2001, seeks to raise member states’ capacity to fight terrorism. The 1267 Committee, composed of all members of the UN Security Council, maintains and updates a consolidated list of terrorists associated with Usama bin Laden, the Taliban, or al-Qaida that are subject to sanctions under Resolutions 1267 and 1390—travel restrictions, arms embargoes, and asset freezes. All member states are obligated to implement these sanctions. As of December, the Committee had over 330 names on its list and member states had frozen $120 million in assets.


The fourth resolution, Resolution 1452, adopted unanimously, sets out procedures for UN member states to make limited exceptions to asset freezes for those on the 1267 Committee list. Exceptions to asset freezes can be used, among other things, to buy food and pay taxes, rent, and legal fees.

The United States supports the work of the 1267 Committee and submitted more names for consideration to be added to its consolidated list than any other member state. Many member states have not submitted any names, and many member states lack the technical expertise or legal framework to implement sanctions effectively. The 1267 Committee’s Monitoring Group issued three reports that the United States found useful for improving the implementation of sanctions. These reports provided a frank assessment of the progress that had been made and areas for improvement in implementing the sanctions under Resolutions 1267 and 1390. In October, 50 member states cosponsored the proposal to add to the 1267 list Jemah Islamiyah, an organization thought to be responsible for the Bali bombings. This unprecedented level of support sent a powerful signal against terrorism in South East Asia.

The United States also played an active role in the work of the CTC. In its first year, the CTC was able to review the capacity of more than 180 states in seven critical areas: legislation, financial asset controls, customs,
immigration, extradition, law enforcement and arms traffic. This information enabled the CTC to identify gaps in a state’s counter-terrorism capacity. It worked with those states to ensure they received assistance from organizations and states that could help them close the gaps. Chair Sir Jeremy Greenstock (United Kingdom) was very active in reaching out to regional, sub-regional, and functional international organizations to seek expertise and assistance in strengthening member states’ capacity to fight terrorism.

**Peacekeeping, Force Protection, and CIVPOL**

**Peacekeeping**

In 2002, the United States continued to base its support for UN peacekeeping operations on such established criteria as national interests, clear objectives, a sound plan, acceptable risks and costs, and a realistic end-state and exit strategy. In recognition of these criteria, the United States supported the termination of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) following East Timor’s independence in May, as well as the transition to the new UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). The United States also supported the closing of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) at the end of the year following the successful completion of their mandates.

The total number of troops, military observers, and civilian police (CIVPOL) from all nations serving in UN missions fell from 47,108 to 39,652 in 2002. These reductions were attributed to the closure of UNMIBH and UNMOP and the drawing down of troops in missions in Lebanon, Sierra Leone, and East Timor. As of December 31, there were a total of 1,799 military observers, 5,333 civilian police, and 32,520 troops involved in UN peacekeeping missions, including 26 U.S. military observers in Western Sahara, Kuwait, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kosovo, Georgia, and the Middle East and 603 U.S. civilian police in Kosovo and East Timor.

The United States continued to promote practical measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations. It supported proposals to improve the UN’s ability to assess conflict situations, to plan and manage peacekeeping operations, and to respond quickly to Security Council mandates. The United States also continued to encourage other member states to include peacekeeping in their national security strategies and to contribute forces to peacekeeping whenever appropriate.

Costs of UN peacekeeping operations declined slightly in 2002. The United Nations assessed member states a total of $2.9 billion, of which the United States was assessed $795 million. Assessments increased for operations in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and also for the one-time cost for the Strategic Deployment Stock (see Part 4, Peacekeeping Reform). These increases in costs were offset by the end of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the downsizing of operations in East Timor and Lebanon.
Force Protection

During 2002, there were no fatalities among U.S. military personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations, and there were no injuries resulting from hostile action. In addition, no U.S. military personnel were captured or taken hostage. However, there were casualties among other national contingents participating in UN operations.

When UN Security Council Resolution 1410 established UNMIS as a scaled-down successor mission to UNTAET in May, the United States decided not to deploy peacekeepers to replace three American officers who had served with UNTAET. The U.S. Government was concerned about the potential vulnerability of U.S. personnel to International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction, and other demands on U.S. resources.

ICC concerns arose again during debate on the renewal of UNMIBH. The United States vetoed a draft resolution on June 30 that would have extended UNMIBH’s mandate, because of the unresolved ICC issue. A number of short technical rollovers of the mission’s mandate kept UNMIBH going while the Security Council reviewed the matter. On July 12, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1422, introduced by the United States, effectively providing for a twelve-month deferral from ICC investigation or prosecution of current or former officials, or personnel of states that are not party to the Rome Statute for actions or omissions while serving in UN–established or UN–authorized missions. The Security Council resolution also expressed an intention to renew this deferral in 2003.

With this assurance, the UNMIBH renewal resolution was adopted on the same day. Over the next several months, the United States pursued bilateral agreements under Article 98 of the Rome Statute to protect not only peacekeepers but other, broader categories of U.S. personnel and officials from ICC jurisdiction.

In most instances, UN peacekeepers are covered by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreements (SOMA) negotiated between the United Nations and host governments. These agreements set the terms and conditions governing the relationship between a host government and the UN peacekeeping forces. In instances where a SOFA/SOMA has not yet been negotiated, the terms and conditions of the standard SOFA/SOMA apply, per General Assembly Resolution 52/12B. Personnel acting in support of a UN operation, but who are not “blue–helmeted,” are generally considered to be “experts on mission” under the terms of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

The U.S. Military Observer Group–Washington (USMOG–W) serves as the executive agent for force protection assessments of U.S. military observers in UN operations. During 2002, USMOG–W conducted force protection surveys of all peace operations in which U.S. military observers served under the operational control of the United Nations. To address an increased mine threat to troops involved in the UN Mission in Ethiopia
and Eritrea’s (UNMEE) central and western sectors, USMOG–W ordered mine blast blankets for vehicles used by U.S. observers. The blankets were delivered even as UNMEE suffered another mine incident. UNMEE acquired armor–reinforced Scout vehicles for its other military observers.

Two other UN peace operations reported increased threats to U.S. military observers during 2002. In the Middle East, the continuation of suicide bombing campaigns and political violence raised the collateral threat to U.S. military and other UN observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organization. In the UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission, increased random shootings in Kuwait City and the coastal road threatened U.S. military observers during the conduct of their official functions. In response to these increased threats, U.S. military observers employed various passive protection measures, including such pre–deployment, anti–terrorist training as defensive driving and bomb identification, increased communications during movement, and the use of protective body armor. [Also see Part 4, Peacekeeping Reform.]

CIVPOL

International civilian police (CIVPOL) continued to play a critical role in peacekeeping while the international community struggled to meet worldwide demand for qualified CIVPOL officers. The United States continued efforts to enhance both domestic and international capacities for recruiting, training, and deploying CIVPOL to peacekeeping missions around the world. The United States contributed CIVPOL officers to UN missions in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor in 2002. The U.S. CIVPOL in Bosnia–Herzegovina were withdrawn, however, as UNMIBH came to a close on December 31.

Sanctions

The United States continued to support the imposition of UN sanctions in response to threats to international peace and security, where such sanctions can be enforceable and effective. The authority for these mandatory sanctions is Chapter VII, Article 41 of the UN Charter. The United States believes that use of sanctions, backed by the international community, can greatly restrict access to the arms and finances used to undermine international security, while denying political support to the leadership of sanctioned regimes.

In 2002, UN sanctions were in effect in six cases. Iraq remained subject to comprehensive sanctions throughout the year in response to its failure to fully comply with its obligations under various UN Security Council resolutions, including failing to verifiably cooperate in disarming itself of weapons of mass destruction and long–range missile programs. Wide–ranging sanctions, including asset freezes and arms/travel bans, targeted Usama bin Laden, members of the Taliban and al–Qaida, and their supporters. UN sanctions also continued against Liberia, Somalia, and non–state groups in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. These sanctions included arms embargoes, travel bans, and limits on the exports of uncontrolled rough diamonds (also known as “conflict diamonds”).
The United Nations lifted all sanctions on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola in December 2002, following the restoration of peace in that country. UN sanctions on Libya, imposed for its role in the bombing and destruction of flights Pan Am 103 and UTA 772, have been suspended, but not lifted, since 1999 as Libya had not met its Security Council obligations, including paying appropriate compensation to victims’ families and accepting responsibility for terrorism perpetrated by its officials.

**HIV/AIDS**

The United States was successful in including language in the August 2002 report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations that encouraged the UN Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) to review training procedures for increasing awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS among UN peacekeepers. The report also encouraged efforts to measure the effectiveness of these procedures.

The Center for South Asian Studies International Policy Institute of King’s College, University of London, conducted an assessment of HIV/AIDS policies for UN peacekeepers in the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and found numerous shortcomings. The study revealed a degree of confusion among commanding officers and senior medical personnel, with conflicting information sometimes provided by senior members of the same contingent. There was particular disagreement about the policy regarding troops found to be HIV–positive. Policies on confidentiality and permission for testing also differed among units.

The study also found inadequate counseling and testing facilities at UNAMSIL. Eight of ten battalion–level medical facilities did not have HIV test kits, and none had post–exposure prevention testing and treatment packages for use in the event of possible accidental exposure. Problems with distribution of the HIV/AIDS awareness booklets and condoms were cited, and the varying degrees of literacy of the troops pointed to the need for more visual training materials. The report also noted that while HIV/AIDS awareness cards were well received, knowledge, attitude, and practice surveys were needed to assess the real impact. Finally, the assessment found that the HIV/AIDS Policy Officer needed support staff and a dedicated budget. The United States believed that the guidance provided valuable information and recommendations for future peacekeeping missions.

Admitting these and other shortcomings, DPKO conducted a review of its HIV/AIDS policy. It prepared draft guidelines directing field missions to develop a comprehensive and integrated policy with emphasis on increasing awareness, providing voluntary counseling and testing, and improving availability and distribution of necessary resources. The draft document was circulating at the end of the year, with final approval anticipated early in 2003. The U.S. Government agreed with the recommendations of the draft guidelines.
The Training and Evaluation Service of DPKO’s Military Division also prepared standard generic training and education modules on HIV/AIDS for use by field missions.

Four new posts for HIV/AIDS Policy Advisers were authorized for DPKO in 2002. Three posts were approved for UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. These advisers, serving in the offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, are responsible for carrying out programs as set forth in the new guidelines. The fourth adviser post for DPKO was funded by the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS. DPKO recruited a qualified candidate to begin working early in 2003.

Security Council Thematic Debates

In 2002, the Security Council held nine thematic debates on a variety of topics, but with more of an emphasis on terrorism, compared with 12 in 2001. The United States participated in all thematic debates, and joined the other members in agreeing to the Presidential Statements resulting from these debates. On the first anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Council held a high–level meeting and issued a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/25) to indicate its determination to combat international terrorism. It also held three meetings between October and mid–December to condemn the bomb attacks in Bali (S/RES/1438), the Moscow hostage crisis (S/RES/1440), and the bomb attacks in Kenya (S/RES/1450). This latter resolution conveyed condolences not only to Kenya, but for the first time, to Israel as a victim of a terrorist attack.

On several issues such as Refugees and Food Aid, the debates involved a briefing followed by discussion.

The following themes were discussed:

- **Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts.** Open meetings were held in January and April, followed by a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/10), which encouraged the Counter–Terrorism Committee to continue its work and urged member states that had not submitted a report to the Committee to do so as soon as possible. Additional open meetings were held in June and October.

- **Acts of International Terrorism.** This high–level meeting and Presidential Statement commemorated the anniversary of 9/11.

- **Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.** Open meetings were held in March and December, each followed by a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/6 and S/PRST/2002/41, respectively). S/PRST/2002/6 listed primary objectives for the Security Council to keep in mind when considering this issue. S/PRST/2002/41 reiterated the duty of the Security Council and states involved in conflict to protect the rights of civilians.

- **Children and Armed Conflict.** An open meeting was held in May, followed by a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/12), which expressed concern over the impact of armed conflict on children.

- **Women and Peace and Security.** Open meetings were held in July and October, followed by a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/32),
which reaffirmed the importance of full attention on the impact on and the role of women in peacekeeping operations and post–conflict reconstruction.

• Small Arms. Open meetings were held in October, followed by a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2002/30), which expressed concern at the harmful impact of small weapons on civilians during armed conflict and encouraged international cooperation to prevent, combat, and eradicate illicit brokering in small arms.

• Refugees. An open meeting was held in February, during which Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, gave a briefing.

• Food Aid in the Context of Conflict Settlement: Afghanistan and other Crisis Areas. An open meeting was held in April, which included a briefing by Catherine Bertini, Executive Director of the World Food Program.

• Africa’s Food Crisis as a Threat to Peace and Security. An open meeting was held in December, which included a briefing by James Morris, Executive Director of the World Food Program.

Admission of New Members

On September 10, 2002, the United Nations admitted two new members, the Swiss Confederation and the Democratic Republic of Timor–Leste (East Timor), bringing the number of member states to 191. As outlined in Chapter II, Article 4 of the UN Charter, membership is open to “peace–loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.” Admission requires “a decision of the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.”

The Security Council unanimously endorsed the membership applications of both East Timor and Switzerland. On May 23, it adopted Resolution 1414, recommending to the General Assembly that East Timor be granted membership. On July 24, it adopted Resolution 1426, recommending membership for Switzerland.

The General Assembly approved both applications during its 57th Session. Switzerland, long an observer state, was admitted with adoption by consensus of Resolution 57/1. East Timor was admitted with adoption by consensus of Resolution 57/3.

Non–Self–Governing Territories

Chapter XI of the UN Charter sets forth the responsibilities of member states for the “administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self–government.” The status of these non–self–governing territories (NSGTs) is considered annually by two committees of the UN General Assembly: the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24, or C–24) and the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (the Fourth Committee). The C–24 makes suggestions and recommendations to the Fourth Committee on the implementation of General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun-
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tries and Peoples), on specific matters affecting the decolonization process, and on the activities of specialized agencies and other UN bodies in those territories.

The United States is the administering power of three NSGTs: American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Since 1996, the United States and the United Kingdom have participated in an informal dialogue with the Chair of the Fourth Committee in an effort to arrive at a consensus “omnibus” resolution to address the 11 remaining NSGTs with which the C–24 is concerned. In 2002, as in previous years, this process enabled the United States to support the omnibus resolution, “Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.”

However, the United States also voted against or abstained on a series of resolutions and one decision at the 57th UN General Assembly because of unacceptable references to land tenure, economic and military activities, and the responsibilities of administering powers. The United States voted “no” on these resolutions: Resolution 57/81, “Economic and Other Activities which Affect the Interests of the Peoples of NSGTs” [156 to 3 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions]; Resolution 57/19, “Military Activities and Arrangements by Colonial Powers Under Their Administration” [106 to 53 (U.S), with one abstention]; Resolution 57/19, “Dissemination of Information on Decolonization” [154 to 4 (U.S.), with 2 abstentions]; and Resolution 57/82, “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” [139 to 3 (U.S.), with 19 abstentions]. The United States abstained on Resolution 57/82, “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and International Institutions Associated with the UN” [111 to 0, with 51 abstentions (U.S.)], and Resolution 57/80, “Information from NSGTs Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter of the UN” [156 to 0, with 8 abstentions (U.S.)].

Article 73(e) of the UN Charter requires the administering powers of the NSGTs to “transmit regularly to the Secretary–General for information purposes, subject to such limitations as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories.” In 2002, the United States submitted a report covering years 2001–2005.

Effects of Atomic Radiation

The General Assembly established the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in 1955 to provide continuous review and evaluation of the effects of ionizing radiation on humans and their environment. Governments and international organizations around the world rely on UNSCEAR evaluations for estimating radiological risk, establishing protection and safety standards, and regulating radioactive materials. UNSCEAR’s work is of significant interest to many U.S. agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Energy. It is in the U.S. interest that UNSCEAR should continue to operate as an effective independent scientific body, especially with the increased awareness of the risks posed by radiological exposure and associated terrorist threats.

The USCEAR Secretariat is composed of a small office staff in Vienna with a full–time scientist or scientific secretary. Since its transfer to Vienna in 1974, UNSCEAR has been administratively attached to the UN Environment Program (UNEP) in Nairobi, Kenya. The UNEP budget allocation for the biennium 2002–2003 for the UNSCEAR Secretariat was $674,000. This amount was a 50 percent decrease since 1994, and along with UNEP’s reduced administrative and financial support in recent years, placed UNSCEAR in budgetary difficulty. This budgetary shortfall forced the Scientific Committee and the Secretariat to cancel its annual meeting in April 2002. The 51st session was then scheduled for January 27–31, 2003, so that 2003 funds could be coupled with 2002 funds to allow one full–scale meeting during the two–year period.

The United States expressed concern that these drastic cuts in UNSCEAR’s budget significantly affected its ability to carry out its mission. The UNSCEAR yearly allotment for consultants, staff, and representatives dropped from $184,950 in 1994 to $91,400 in 2001. Funding for scientific consultants decreased from $84,250 in 1994–1995 to $26,000 in 2000–2001. In addition, a 3 percent overall reduction mandated by the General Assembly for all agencies had an impact on UNSCEAR’s consultant services.

UNSCEAR provided notice of the dire financial situation in its report to the General Assembly (A/57/46), and requested that the problem of inadequate funding be addressed. As a result, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/115, which “urges the UN Environment Program to review and strengthen the present funding” and “emphasizes the need for the Scientific Committee to hold regular sessions on an annual basis so that its report can reflect the latest developments and findings in the field of ionizing radiation.” The United States endorsed the General Assembly resolution, having stated before that the relationship and interaction between UNSCEAR and UNEP merited closer scrutiny and review.