EVALUATION OF THE U.S. MISSION TO TIMOR-LESTE’S 1207 PROGRAM, “SUPPORTING POLICE, SUSTAINING PEACE”

A PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 1207-FUNDED SECURITY SECTOR REFORM EFFORTS

October 30, 2015

Q015-AID-472-00004

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ACRONYMS

AFP  Australian Federal Police
ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BLO  Border Liaison Office
BPU  Border Patrol Unit
CBR  Community-Based Radio
CMCOP  Conflict Mitigation through Community-Oriented Policing
COR  Contracting Officer’s Representative
CPRN  Conflict Prevention Response Network
CSM-SSD  Civil Society Monitoring of Security Sector Development
CSO  Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations
DAME  Democracy and Development in Action Through Media and Empowerment
DoS  Department of State
DPBSC  Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion
EU  European Union
EWER  Early Warning Early Response
F-FDTL  Timor-Leste Defense Force
FGD  Focus Group Discussion
FM  Fundasaun Mahein
GIOO  General Inspectorate Office of National Police of Timor-Leste
GoTL  Government of Timor-Leste
ICAF  International Conflict Assessment Framework
INL  Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IOM  International Organization for Migration
IP  Implementing Partner
ISF  International Stabilization Forces
KAB  Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behavior
KII  Key Informant Interview
KPK  Community Police Councils
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS  Management Information System
MoF  Ministry of Finance
MOI  Ministry of Interior
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MPU  Marine Patrol Unit
MSS  Ministry of Social Solidarity
NCIS  Naval Criminal Investigative Service
NDASC  National Directorate for Assistance and Social Cohesion
NDPCC  National Directorate for the Prevention of Community Conflict
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization
NYP   National Youth Policy
OIA   Office of Inspection and Audit
OPS   Ofisial Polisia Suco
PMP   Performance Management Plan
PNTL  National Police of Timor-Leste
PTC   Police Training Center
RDTL  Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
SFCG  Search for Common Ground
SGD   Small Group Discussion
SI    Social Impact, Inc.
SOP   Standard Operating Procedure
SoSS  Secretary of State for Security
SOW   Scope of Work
SPSP  Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace
SSR   Security Sector Reform
Suco  Village-level administrative unit in Timor-Leste
SPSP  Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace
TAF   The Asia Foundation
TLCPP Timor-Leste Community Policing Project
TLPDP Timor-Leste Police Development Program
TNA   Training Needs Assessment
ToT   Training of Trainers
UN    United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNMIT United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNODC United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
UNPOL United Nations Police
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG   United States Government
YEPS  Youth Engagement to Promote Stability
YR4PB Youth Radio for Peacebuilding
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2006, Congress enacted Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act, which authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million to the Secretary of State to fund “whole-of-government” strategies and civilian agency–led activities that address reconstruction and stabilization risks which, if neglected, could negatively impact U.S. policy and security interests. The authority was renewed every year for additional funding, through fiscal year 2010. U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (DoS/CSO) is the chair of the interagency 1207 Committee, which reviews and approves the conflict-focused programs, which are selected annually through a competitive process. CSO also serves as the 1207 Secretariat, monitoring project implementation and adherence to program goals.

In 2010, the U.S. Embassy/Dili in Timor-Leste was awarded $11.32 million from State Department 1207 funds to “decrease risks of violence and instability in anticipation of the ongoing drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) police monitoring presence by building capabilities of vetted law enforcement institutions and providing opportunities for at-risk Timorese youth.” The program, which came to be known as “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” (SPSP), was designed to assist in mitigating the potential for violence and instability as the UNMIT policing monitoring presence declined. The SPSP program was made up of seven component activities designed to address critical weaknesses within the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), to support civil society in monitoring developments in the security sector, and to foster positive police-community relations. The program funded a program coordinator who also served as a conflict analyst for the Embassy.

EVALUATION PURPOSE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The purpose of this performance evaluation was to assess all 1207-funded projects managed by the DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)/Timor-Leste under the SPSP program in order to provide accountability and inform future programming of similar interventions. The program funded a program coordinator who also served as a conflict analyst for the Embassy.

The evaluation team collected evidence to identify the relevance of the original 1207 design and assess whether program outcomes were aligned with 1207 program objectives. The following evaluation questions were assessed: (1) Was the design of this 1207 program and its elements appropriate for the evolving context in Timor-Leste? 2) Were the activities as implemented consistent with the 1207 principles and funding authority? 3) What were some of the intended and unintended outcomes of the completed projects, both positive and negative? and 4) Is it likely that the results measured will be sustainable given the context of Timor-Leste?

EVALUATION DESIGN, METHODS, AND LIMITATIONS

The evaluation consisted of three phases: 1) a comprehensive desk review of relevant documents and DC-based interviews; 2) approximately two weeks of field data collection in Timor-Leste; and 3) analysis, report writing, and final presentations.

1 Taken from Congressional Notification Report, Timor-Leste.
2 Original 1207 Program Proposal, Timor-Leste.
The primary methods of data collection were: 1) a document review of USAID- and Embassy-provided documents as well as secondary data sources such as relevant assessments, 1207 program documents, security sector surveys, and other donor studies; 2) 55 key informant interviews (KIIs) to explore key issues in depth with individual stakeholders using a combination of open-ended questions and closed-response (yes/no) or respondent rating (Likert or scale rating) questions to quickly quantify responses and identify response patterns; 3) four small group discussions (SGDs) with 45 PNTL officers and staff; 4) one focus group discussion (FGD) to assess changes and improvements in policing or security practices relating to gender considerations; and 5) a small sample quantitative knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (KAB) exercise with targeted beneficiaries of the SPSP program, specifically PNTL officers who had taken part in training programs and specific 1207 activities and interventions.

The SPSP program has operated in a complex post-conflict context in one of the newest countries in Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste is in the process of building new security, justice, and governance institutions and PNTL is still evolving and growing as a national security institution. Anticipating the Timor-Leste context, the team identified several important challenges that the evaluation approach needed to address. The resources and timeline available for the evaluation meant that the sample size for data collection was small and centered in the capital. Similarly, staff and respondents were not randomly selected and may have had significantly different perspectives from those who did not or could not be included in the evaluation. National perspectives between PNTL officers and civil society and donors were varied in their view of government capacity and security sector actors. Examples of mitigation strategies included utilization of multiple data points for each question, confirmation of data through triangulation and documentation review, customized data collection protocols, and staggered data collection timeframes to provide additional time to locate beneficiaries and other stakeholders who were no longer affiliated with the SPSP Program.

**FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

The evaluation findings, conclusions, and recommendations have been broken down by intervention component rather than by evaluation question. The table below briefly details the SPSP program and provides information about the component area objectives, a brief description drawn from the original 1207 proposal documentation, the United States Government (USG) agency responsible for their monitoring and management, and the implementing partner tasked with the implementation of the 1207-funded activity. This is followed by a summary of some of the key findings and conclusions developed by the evaluation team.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>USG Lead</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict Mitigation through Community Policing</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation (TAF)</td>
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</table>

*Objective:* Strengthen Timorese police capacity in community policing.

*Component description:* Assistance to the PNTL to help implement its new policy of adopting community policing practices across the force. Putting this policy into practice requires educating both the police and the community regarding community police practices, establishing Community Police Councils throughout the country, and facilitating the initial work of these councils.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability Strengthening in the PNTL</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Technical Assistance (Legal Advisor)</th>
</tr>
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</table>

*Objective:* Strengthen civilian oversight of Timorese police in conduct and disciplinary procedures.

*Component description:* Training assistance to the PNTL to the Prosecutor General’s office to improve investigative practices and build stronger ties between the two institutions in the investigative process. Poor
cooperation and substandard investigative practices impeded justice and were undermining the rule of law and security in Timor-Leste.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigation Training Program</th>
<th>DoS/ INL</th>
<th>Trafficking Investigations Program</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>IOM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training for Police Investigators</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creative Corrections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Objective: Strengthen Timorese police capacity in investigations.

Component description: Training assistance to the PNTL to the Prosecutor General’s office to improve investigative practices and build stronger ties between the two institutions in the investigative process. Poor cooperation and substandard investigative practices impeded justice and were undermining the rule of law and security in Timor-Leste.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Strengthening Maritime Borders</th>
<th>DoS/ INL</th>
<th>NCIS, Maritime Border</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Land Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td>UNODC, Land Border</td>
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</table>

Objective: Strengthen Timorese border and maritime policing capacity.

Component description: Specialized training and limited equipment purchases for PNTL Border Guard and Maritime Police units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistical Support to PNTL</th>
<th>DoS/INL</th>
<th>Creative Corrections</th>
</tr>
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Objective: Strengthen the logistical capacity of the Timorese police.

Component description: Technical assistance and advice to the PNTL on the procurement, storage, and maintenance of logistical and communications equipment and supplies.

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<tr>
<th>Youth Engagement to Promote Stability</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Search for Common Ground (SFCG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Objective: Reduce the likelihood of Timorese youth involvement in violence.

Component description: A comprehensive youth engagement program targeted at underemployed youth in Dili and the districts, many of whom are also active in martial arts groups, which were banned in Timor-Leste in 2010 due to their involvement in violence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Society Monitoring of the Security Sector</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Belun **sub-partner, Fundasaun Mahein</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Objective: Strengthen the capacity of Timorese civil society to monitor the performance of the Timorese police and threats to stability in Timor-Leste.

Component description: Assistance to Timorese NGOs to support activities that seek to monitor development in the security sector, the performance of the PNTL, police-community relations, and general and emerging threats to stability. Project activities will be designed to provide independent and objective feedback and advice to the GoTL, PNTL, and the international donor community.

CONFLICT MITIGATION THROUGH COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING (CMCOP)

CMCOP was well-researched and -planned, and adjusted to the changes in the political context as well as donor coordination needs. The implementer, The Asia Foundation (TAF), is the only agency involved in supporting Timor-Leste police reforms that works directly with communities, which places TAF in a unique position that has distinct advantages in addressing village-level security issues. The TAF approach to community policing emphasizes community and police interventions. This method is important in the Timor-Leste context, where the role of the police in providing human security is still forming and there
is still relatively weak access to justice. The TAF program focuses primarily on community policing—the delivery of safety and security—and targets key elements of PNTL necessary to improve community policing practices in Timor-Leste. This is critical for USAID and reflects an emphasis on community and human security needs most relevant to development program objectives.

In examining costing issues as a measure of efficiency, CMCOP’s approach in principally employing Timorese staff is both economical and enables deeper engagement with Timorese networks, including the PNTL and the Government of Timor-Leste (GoTL). USAID’s management and CMCOP’s monitoring and reporting regime are extremely effective and deserve to be recognized as a model within the 1207 framework of components. However, more data and information have been generated from analysis of community policing efforts than can be adequately captured and retained by senior-level decision makers both within the USG and the GoTL. This information must be analyzed and prioritized so that it is more accessible for policymakers working to improve human security in Timor-Leste.

ACCOUNTABILITY STRENGTHENING IN THE PNTL

A Senior Legal Advisor provided technical support and mentoring for the Office of Inspection and Audit (OIA) of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), formally the Secretary of State for Security (SoSS), the General Inspectorate Office of PNTL (PNTL/GIOO), and the Department of Justice of the PNTL. The Advisor worked extensively to assist staff within the MOI in refining and improving its systems for audits and inspections as a means to improve accountability across PNTL. As originally designed, one aspect of this component was to assist the MOI to revise and adopt new Disciplinary Regulations for the PNTL, but this proved to be challenging due to the political climate and changes in leadership within the MOI. Changes between the V and VI Constitutional Government in early 2015 as well as new legal procedures within the PNTL based on the transition to a new ministerial structure made changes in component targets necessary. This was not a design flaw from the original 1207 proposal but rather demonstrated the need for moderation in component design and in identifying ambitious targets, such as revising disciplinary regulations in a new and developing security institution such as PNTL.

PNTL faces a number of challenges in implementing the current regulations and exercising more accountable oversight functions for its commanders and officers. These challenges range from limited awareness and support for the current disciplinary system to limited experience among staff in handling disciplinary issues or conducting performance monitoring, as well as adopting a standard approach to disciplinary training for senior PNTL staff and officials. In addition, some questions remain concerning how the current disciplinary system is aligned with the organic laws for the PNTL.

INVESTIGATIONS TRAINING

The original 1207 proposal design of the Investigations Training component specified that the Police Training Advisor was to support, assist, and advise the Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) in developing country-specific investigation training packages for two advanced levels. Evidence from fieldwork and document review suggests that the program was generally successful; however, the original design of the project did not consider that the three-tiered investigations training model was generally too advanced for PNTL trainees. Moreover, the Portuguese police-training model already in use at the training academy differed greatly from the U.S. and Australian models that were used for the investigations training in the TLPDP. However, the Advisor was able to quickly recalibrate the program to meet the needs of PNTL officers and created an accredited training curriculum in conjunction with the Australian police.
There was some difficulty in working with a nascent institution such as the PNTL. Evidence suggests that the PNTL’s investigative capacity is not up to international standards, and there is limited use of technology, or even basic evidence-storage facilities, to conduct high quality, modern investigations. The PNTL has been afforded numerous training opportunities over the past ten years from a variety of sources, including from Australia, the United States, Portugal, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This training has varied greatly and has not necessarily been coordinated or adapted to the local Timorese context, making it difficult for a national training approach to be adopted by PNTL.

STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, MARINE PATROL UNIT (MPU)

The program design phase for this component did not include INL or potential partners. It was challenging to find suitable partners willing to take on this project. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) did not have a long-term presence in Timor-Leste and was not well versed in the operating environment or what would be appropriate in terms of program design and implementation. The design of the Marine Patrol Unit (MPU) training was intended to be highly practical and therefore was contingent on the possession of functioning equipment. The design did not sufficiently take into account the limited infrastructure and the effect that this would have on training protocols. Remote management also proved to be challenging, especially for a program largely focused on training and capacity development. It would have been useful for an international advisor to have regular, ongoing interactions with MPU staff to ensure utilization of training and to address any issues as they arise. Formal training was often not enough for capacity development, as ongoing mentoring and support, in conjunction with training activities, were necessary to contribute to sustainability.

STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, BORDER PATROL UNIT (BPU)

According to Border Patrol Unit (BPU) trainees, PNTL senior staff, and USG sources interviewed, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) program applied regional and global training models that were not adapted specifically for the realities of border protection needs in Timor-Leste. The two-day training needs assessment conducted by UNODC was not comprehensive enough to adequately inform design, and the proposal written by the UNODC Bangkok office may not have been as consultative as necessary. The trainers were experts in their subject matter, and the trainings were of a high quality but were not sufficiently adapted to the current operational modality of the BPU. UNODC needed to better ascertain the needs of the BPU and adapt training accordingly. In addition, it was unclear whether UNODC as an implementing partner fully understood the national and regional stakeholders working on border protection issues in Timor-Leste.

The program design and management efforts for this component also needed to ensure that implementing partners had fully assessed the border protection stakeholders in Timor-Leste before embarking on training. Border management is a collaborative effort that should ideally involve multiple agencies, all of which should be adequately trained. However, the other agencies along the border (Customs, Immigration, and Quarantine) were not adequately incorporated into this UNODC training and have not received significant training to sufficiently handle complex border issues. Despite participating in numerous training activities and acquiring much-needed equipment, it is unlikely that the BPU can continue to grow and develop without appropriate external assistance. As one of the newer branches of PNTL, BPU has a particularly limited budget. Without sufficient budgetary resources, BPU can provide neither ongoing, high-quality training to staff nor the capacity to implement acquired skills.

POLICE LOGISTICS

While it may have been logical to include an element within the 1207 component for logistics support, both trainee recipients and technical advisors working with the USG on security sector reform (SSR)
programs stated that the INL/Third Party Contractors program was not adapted specifically for the realities of working in Timor-Leste. Respondents stated that there was not a strong understanding of the needs of the Logistics Department before entering into this program. For example, after becoming acquainted with the Logistics Department, the Advisor determined that it would be more useful to focus on systems development, particularly the development and implementation of a comprehensive asset management system. This approach was not specifically conveyed in the original Statement of Work; however, it was an appropriate approach in that mentorship and capacity development of key staff within the Logistics Department was challenging in light of systemic issues that needed to be addressed (e.g., development of an asset management system). Currently, the PNTL uses Excel files to track assets, and PNTL key users cannot accurately ascertain, for example, the total number of cars in the fleet and their condition. This lack of data affects all departments across the PNTL as it is often difficult for individual units to track assets, and corruption concerns are evident due to weak management of assets within the institution. There is still work to be done within the Logistics Department that could not be accomplished during the limited programmatic period of performance. Logistics is an important cross-cutting department that interacts with and affects all other departments of the PNTL. The U.S. Mission and the Logistics Advisor have made slow but steady progress in this area. While there was a lack of support to liaise with higher-level PNTL officials when the Logistics Advisor first began, this has improved recently. As a result, there is increased buy-in from PNTL leadership, which is helping to generate increased cooperation of key actors in the Logistics Department. While logistics is an area likely to meet significant resistance and challenges, the work is essential to successful continuation of outcomes in other areas.

YOUTH ENGAGEMENT TO PROMOTE STABILITY (YEPS)

The YEPS program benefited from the fact that its activities were a continuation of a well-established youth program already implemented by Search for Common Ground (SFCG). SFCG has strong national relationships and is a key player in youth advocacy and politics in Timor-Leste. SFCG acted on lessons learned from their previous program (YR4PB) and national youth policy planning priorities, and appears to be one of the strongest of the 1207 components in terms of gender integration. SFCG emphasized gender-sensitive programming and design, which were addressed at many levels including program management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, and in staffing and recruitment of SFCG staff, YEPS participants, and partners.

YEPS may not have been a suitable choice for 1207 funding. Despite its stabilization intent and the specific contextual justifications, there were still gaps in targeting. Accessing at-risk youth is a challenge in Timor-Leste, but this program would have benefited from more analysis of youth engagement in such activities as martial arts gangs and better coordination with PNTL, particularly the National Community Policing Unit. It would be beneficial to understand how to best target at-risk youth in the Timorese context and use this to inform strategy and project design for future youth programs.

CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING OF SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (CSM-SSD)

This component was developed based on the need for an independent source of monitoring for PNTL activities and incidents at the local level, specifically after UNMIT departed in 2012. According to most sources, it was a well-designed component of the 1207 SPSP program. This component was implemented by Belun, a national non-governmental organization (NGO), and largely focused on expanding access to information and reporting on human security and community security issues for government institutions and civil society actors working on SSR. It was developed from an existing USAID-funded program and was implemented entirely by national institutions with noted success and
efficiency. This component is in line with USAID Forward Policy and is also a legacy program, as USAID has supported Belun since 2003.

Of the 1207 components evaluated, CSM-SSD works with the most ministries and national stakeholders. Despite this reach, Belun has struggled for years to establish memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with PNTL and other ministries. Most sources felt that civil society security monitoring and independent incident reporting were important for national planning and policy, particularly the early response, early warning function. Ministries seem to increasingly recognize the value of the trend analysis and the independent reporting of SSR issues that Belun and partners provide.

**SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Conflict Mitigation through Community-Oriented Policing**
- There is a need to refine the approach to community policing in Timor-Leste, specifically to consider the costing issues associated with specific interventions and ensure that donor efforts are in close alignment with the institutional needs of PNTL writ large, as well as current organic law, procedures, and policies.
- Donors should promote a stronger understanding of community policing within the Timorese parliament and government, where communication about the program is critical to national planning and budgeting.

**Accountability Strengthening in the PNTL**
- Work with other donors and PNTL to finalize the existing draft of the *Disciplinary Procedure Manual* to be used by both PNTL and OIA and assist senior officials in establishing technical procedures for the proposed PNTL Disciplinary Law and Regulations.
- Support PNTL in developing a reporting and infraction system that is in alignment with *Civil Service 286/296 penal code*. PNTL officers that commit crimes as public officials are a part of the system of criminal infractions and enforcement is needed to minimize the potential for corruption within PNTL.

**Investigations Training**
- Ensure that training content and methodologies are in line with the local context and culture. Take into consideration that the current technical capacity of PNTL for investigations and evidence protection is still developing. Remain flexible during implementation to ensure that all donors working on training cooperate to support cohesion for PNTL staff working in the PNTL Training Center.
- Ensure that training Advisors are embedded within well-established institutions such as within PNTL or the PNTL Training Center. This will ensure more effective donor coordination on shared training efforts, minimize confusion within PNTL, and ensure that training is effective, well-targeted, and cost-effective for the USG and the GoTL.

**Strengthening Land and Sea Borders (MPU)**
- As Timor-Leste moves toward ASEAN membership, it is critical that the MPU have a strategy and plan for addressing and prioritizing marine protection issues. There needs to be a comprehensive approach to prioritizing marine protection needs within PNTL and a specific strategy and plan for addressing funding needs at the national level.
- The MPU requires a training approach that is catered to the context and resources currently available within PNTL. A maritime police unit requires functioning boats and the internal capacity to
repair and maintain boats. Any training provided should take into account the possession or lack thereof of functioning equipment—as well as an ability to properly procure parts and conduct repairs. MPU also needs to more realistically assess its marine protection needs to assure more realistic asset management and resource requests.

- Remote management as an Advisor for training activities is not the ideal model. It would be more effective for an international staff member to be based in Dili to provide ongoing support and mentorship.

**Strengthening Land and Sea Borders (BPU)**

- If global or regional standards for border protection training are provided in low-capacity environments such as the PNTL in Timor-Leste, a comprehensive training needs assessment (TNA) needs to be conducted that takes into account the specific roles and functions of the BPU. This TNA should be targeted at the BPU and include information about coordinating with other entities also responsible for border protection issues in Timor-Leste.
- Coordinate training among all four agencies responsible for securing the official border crossings. BPU is only one part of the equation. All agencies along the border as well as prosecutors involved in border crimes require the same basic knowledge as BPU in order to perform their jobs sufficiently.

**Police Logistics**

- A mentoring approach to capacity development is useful in this context. It is critical that all future efforts include both ongoing mentoring and specific technical training to ensure that logistics staff are able to manage and monitor the systems developed for the PNTL Logistics Department.
- Developing a comprehensive asset management system, ideally building upon what is in existence at the government, should take priority, as this is an essential tool for PNTL as an institution and is critical for operations.

**Youth Engagement to Promote Stability**

- Pilot a feasibility study on how to increase the capacity of national ministries and local organizations to reach at-risk youth in Timor-Leste. Work with national partners to develop youth strategies to address this evolving and pressing need. This analysis will need to include the added pressures of rural-to-urban youth migration that is likely to continue into the future in Timor-Leste.

**Civil Society Monitoring of Security Sector Development**

- Establish a CSM Secretariat role in the Prime Minister’s office as a way to increase the value and usefulness of this type of security sector reporting. It would be best if this were made up of a consortium of national and local organizations where the lead secretariat role could rotate between groups. This function would allow for synthesized analysis and targeted recommendations to be shared and integrated into national decision-making and SSR reform needs, particularly through the annual planning process.
- This is a legacy program for USAID, and Belun has the potential to share what it has learned to help others develop more effective early warning, conflict-prevention response systems and civil society oversight of SSD. Assess the potential for elements of the Early Warning Early Response (EWER) system to be integrated into the protocols of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or other regional bodies to enhance and learn from conflict-prevention and response systems.
EVALUATION PURPOSE AND EVALUATION QUESTIONS

EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this performance evaluation was to assess all 1207-funded projects managed by the USAID and DoS/INL under the SPSP program, which was designed and awarded in 2010, with funds transferred in 2011. This evaluation aims to provide insight into accountability of funds and to inform future programming of similar interventions. The $11.32 million SPSP program was designed to assist in mitigating the potential for violence and instability as the UNMIT policing monitoring presence declined.

The primary audiences for this evaluation are the U.S. Mission in Timor-Leste as well as DoS/CSO and INL. The evaluation may also be shared with other donors and other USAID and State Department offices to inform the development of ongoing and future conflict- and violence-prevention efforts in other countries. The evaluation team collected evidence to identify the relevance of the original 1207 design and assess whether program outcomes were aligned with 1207 program objectives and how well program management adapted to the evolving context in Timor-Leste.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

This was a performance evaluation of the SPSP Program. The team looked at five key areas of the SPSP program: 1) design, 2) management, 3) program implementation, 4) program outcomes, and 5) sustainability and national ownership.

Evaluation Questions: The original Scope of Work (SOW) contained a detailed list of six primary questions and three sub-questions. Following an initial desk review of relevant and available documentation provided by USAID and State, as well as a discussion with USAID/Timor-Leste to clarify the evaluation purpose and intended users, the team discussed how to reorganize, combine, and refocus the evaluation questions with a particular emphasis on producing a final list of questions that could be answered given the resources, time, and design of the evaluation. The evaluation also seeks to clarify and explicate gender roles and potential gaps in program design, implementation, and sustainability as prioritized by USAID. Table 1 shows the revised and agreed-upon list of evaluation questions. A detailed breakdown of the evaluation guide and data sources for answering these questions can be found in Annex V: Evaluation Questions Matrix.
## Table 1: Final Evaluation Questions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPSP 1207 Program: Design</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Core question:</strong> What was the original program design appropriate or not to the Timorese country context (i.e., a newly independent country with nascent organizations and “forming” institutions, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender sub-question:</strong> Did the original program design incorporate gender considerations in the individual component and activity selection and planning?</td>
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<th>SPSP 1207 Program: Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Core question:</strong> Was the rationale for making changes in the program logical within the country context and timely?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender sub-question:</strong> Did implementing partners and USG stakeholders feel that gender inclusion and empowerment issues were sufficiently addressed and monitored for necessary adaptations in the 1207 program component areas and activities? To what degree?</td>
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<tr>
<th>SPSP 1207 Program: Implementation</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Core question:</strong> Were the activities as implemented consistent with the 1207 principles and funding authority?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender sub-question:</strong> What were some of the issues faced by implementing partners and USG stakeholders in providing opportunities and access for women in the 1207 component areas and activities (i.e., contextual, management, design issues, etc.)?</td>
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<tr>
<th>SPSP 1207 Program: Outcomes</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Core question:</strong> What were some of the intended and unintended outcomes of the completed projects, both positive and negative (i.e., changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior, or KAB)?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender sub-question:</strong> Were there examples of intended and unintended changes in practice, both positive and negative, affecting women and men?</td>
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<tr>
<th>SPSP 1207 Program: Sustainability and National Ownership</th>
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<td><strong>Core question:</strong> Is it likely that the results measured will be sustainable given the context of Timor-Leste? How likely?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Core question:</strong> What key needs addressed by the program still require support and why?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender sub-question:</strong> To what extent are there gaps in gender integration that still need to be addressed or require additional support?</td>
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PROJECT BACKGROUND

Recognizing a pressing need for the United States to engage in conflict-prevention activities around the world in order to establish long-term stability and security, Congress enacted Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act in 2006, which authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million to the Secretary of State to fund “whole-of-government” strategies that were civilian agency–led and designed to address reconstruction and stabilization risks which, if neglected, could negatively impact U.S. policy and security interests. Additional funding was reauthorized in subsequent years, through fiscal year 2010. In general, 1207 programs were meant to quickly respond to an emerging crisis or to respond in countries emerging from crises, outside of the federal budget cycle.

In March 2010, a multi-agency Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) analysis conducted in Timor-Leste identified police capabilities and the growing population of unemployed youth as main risk points to stability, particularly in the context of the progressive withdrawal of the international security presence. In 2010, the U.S. Embassy/Dili in Timor-Leste was awarded $11.59 million from State Department 1207 funds for the program, which came to be known as the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” (SPSP) program. The 1207 program targets Timor-Leste police, border, maritime security unit institutions, and at-risk youth. Activities include training vetted police in community policing and establishing Community-Police Councils; assigning legal advisors to appropriate security institutions to improve the professionalization and the disciplinary system of law enforcement; training police investigators and prosecutors to work collaboratively; providing specialized training for vetted border and maritime units; and providing improved communication equipment to Timor-Leste police. The original 1207 proposal also highlighted that the project would provide vocational training and job opportunities for at-risk youth.3

The SPSP program was justified for funding based on the 2011–2012 withdrawal of UNMIT Police and International Stabilization Forces (ISF) from Timor-Leste, coupled with the planned 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections and growing cadre of unemployed youth, which were seen as risks for civil unrest and violence. At the time of the 1207 program approval, Timor-Leste’s security forces suffered significant capacity gaps. Although Australia and other bilateral donors were providing training and institutional reform support, there were specific security sector reform gaps identified in the ICAF that were seen as critical for stability at the time of the 1207 proposal development and submission.

Initial activities began in 2011, with project management responsibilities shared by the Department of State and USAID/Timor-Leste (with some activities commencing in 2013 and 2014). Overall coordination is provided by a 1207 Coordinator, who also provides ongoing conflict analysis for the U.S. Mission in Timor-Leste and supports 1207 reporting requirements. Activities were regularly monitored through project reporting and narrative analysis supplied to the DoS/CSO on a quarterly basis by the 1207 Coordinator.

3 From the Congressional Notification for the 1207 Timor-Leste Program.
EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

The evaluation consisted of three phases: 1) a comprehensive desk review of relevant documents and DC-based interviews; 2) approximately two weeks of field data collection in Timor-Leste; and 3) analysis, report writing, and final presentations. The evaluation utilized a mixed-methods approach including qualitative data collection as well as a small sample quantitative knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (KAB) exercise with targeted beneficiaries of the SPSP program, specifically PNTL officers who had taken part in training programs and specific 1207 activities and interventions. Additionally, the Community Policing element of the project, which is implemented by TAF through USAID, was evaluated in September 2014 in conjunction with New Zealand Aid’s Timor-Leste Community Policing Project (TLCPP), in addition to a final evaluation of the Youth Engagement component. There has also been extensive documentation of community policing in Timor-Leste as well as plans for a new community policing program to be funded by New Zealand in 2016. The team used this extensive data to triangulate and confirm interview findings.

DATA COLLECTION METHODS

The primary methods of data collection were 1) document review and analysis of documents provided by USAID and the Embassy, as well as secondary data sources such as assessments, 1207 program documents, security sector surveys, and other donor studies; 2) key informant interviews (KIIs) to explore key issues in-depth with individual stakeholders using a combination of open-ended questions and closed-response (yes/no) or respondent rating (Likert or scale rating) questions to quickly quantify responses and identify response patterns; 3) small group discussions (SGDs) to elicit beneficiary feedback; 4) a small focus group discussion (FGD) to generate data on opinions about changes in conflict-prevention capacities or improvements in policing or security practices (particularly relating to gender considerations); and 5) a small KAB exercise with PNTL officers.

The team conducted 55 KIIs to answer evaluation questions, held four SGDs to elicit information specifically on changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior, and conducted one FGD to elicit additional information about gender practices in policing and security reform in Timor-Leste. This mix of data collection sources allowed the team from Social Impact (SI) to obtain a more in-depth understanding of the multiple factors present in the design and implementation of the SPSP program, to mitigate the bias inherent in any one specific research method, and to support sound analysis.

Phase I: Document Review

The documents reviewed consisted largely of official planning documents provided by USAID and State regarding the management and design of the SPSP program. In addition, the team also reviewed individual SPSP implementing partner documents, 1207 reporting documentation, and other relevant data. Since it was imperative that the SPSP program adhere to the parameters and guidelines of the 1207 authority, component activities were analyzed to assess whether they were managed based on 1207 guidance and implemented in accordance with the original intent of the 1207 proposal for Timor-Leste. External conflict assessment documents relevant to Timor-Leste and the security sector were also reviewed to assess whether the component activities were relevant to the evolving context. The evaluation team used documents and 1207 reports to triangulate interviews with implementing partners of the SPSP program as well as national and donor stakeholders. The team also used independent analysis reports from the SSR sector to triangulate with original design documents from the 1207
planning period as well as individual KIIs conducted with USG staff involved in designing the SPSP program. (Please see Annex III for the bibliography.)

Phase II: Fieldwork

The team’s primary data collected included two phases: 1) initial DC-based interviews and 2) Timor-Leste–based interviews and SGDs.

Washington-Based Data Collection (July 13–24, 2015)

Following initial document review, the team began a series of DC-based interviews to gain a better understanding of the overall SPSP program, identify areas of further investigation during the Timor-based fieldwork, and provide a clearer understanding of some of the (often unreported) issues, challenges, and prioritizations/reprioritizations that occurred during implementation as well as donor perspectives regarding the project. For the DC interviews, the SI evaluation team focused on staff involved with the SPSP program design as well as USG staff familiar with 1207 program management in Timor-Leste. Midway through the interview process in Washington, DC, a team planning session was held virtually to analyze some of the initial information and adjust the questions for the Timor-Leste–based fieldwork.

After the interviews in DC, the team refined and finalized the data collection instruments based on new information learned, in collaboration with USAID and the contracting officer’s representative (COR). Finalized interview protocols were translated into Tetum to for use upon the team’s arrival in Dili.

Timor-Leste–Based Data Collection (July 25–August 10, 2015)

On July 27, the team, consisting of the Team Leader, a Democracy and Governance Specialist, and a Conflict Management and Mitigation Specialist, met with USAID and Embassy SPSP teams and stakeholders for an initial in-brief and presentation of the SPSP evaluation design and work plan.

As most of the SPSP activities took place in Dili, the team conducted all fieldwork there. The team was divided based on 1207 partner activity and thematic area, with each team member focusing on answering the evaluation questions with these USG partners (see Table 2). Data was recorded and interview templates were used to establish uniformity across the team and to aid in discussions, comparisons, and analysis.

DATA COLLECTION TOOLS

Each SPSP activity area had several types of stakeholders, and therefore each data collection tool was tailored to ensure that data collection methods aligned with the anticipated role of the key informant. Because not all respondents had the same level of knowledge and experience with the SPSP program, respondents were weighted based on their specific role, which is detailed in Annex V. An Evaluation Interview Guide was created and used during the initial interviews conducted in Washington D.C., allowing the team to refine the data collection tools for subsequent use. The final version of the Evaluation Interview Guide and Tools is included as an attachment to this report.

Gender Integration Tools

Gender integration was critical in the design, implementation, and analysis of this evaluation. Data collected was disaggregated by sex where possible and gender-sensitive data collection methods and tools were applied. The team designed tools to address anticipated gender data gaps specific to the Timor-Leste context, such as gender issues relevant to SSR and PNTL recruitment, practices, and programs. Secondary gender-specific data was analyzed and triangulated with KIIs, SGDs, and one FGD.
that was focused on gender and SSR. The team also spoke with women officers working in PNTL as well as donors working to address gender-specific concerns.

Phase III: Analysis and Report Writing

The SI team used parallel analysis to examine the evidence from its document review, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and KAB survey. This approach allowed the team to analyze data related to an evaluation question using different methods in parallel and then across data collection methods as applicable. Outcome and impacts observed were analyzed for attribution to SPSP program activities as inferred through plausible contribution analysis.

The team conducted out-briefs with the Mission in Timor-Leste and in Washington, DC, to elicit feedback on preliminary findings. These briefings enabled the evaluation team to garner feedback from headquarters and the Mission team and to discuss initial findings that required further clarification.

EVALUATION LIMITATIONS

Complex post-conflict environments can be challenging, so the team designed the evaluation approach and management plan to mitigate anticipated effects to the extent possible. Examples of mitigation strategies included utilization of multiple data points for each question, confirmation of data through triangulation and documentation review, customized data collection protocols, and staggered data collection timeframes to provide additional time to locate beneficiaries and other stakeholders who were no longer affiliated with the SPSP Program.

Anticipating the Timor-Leste context, the team identified several important challenges that the evaluation approach needed to address. The following are data limitations highlighted in the initial evaluation plan:

- **Identifying contributions to SPSP goals and component objectives derived from relatively low-intensity, short-term, and issue-specific interventions.** The team relied on perceptions of contribution as well as analysis of plausibility, given the lack of a comparison group.

  - **Anticipating and analyzing potential response bias of respondents.** Social Impact worked with USAID and other stakeholders to identify potential respondents with varying programmatic experiences, both positive and negative, and relied on some respondents to provide links to other knowledgeable actors. While the team provided clear communication to all respondents regarding the purpose of the evaluation, highlighting their role as external evaluators and the utility of honest responses, respondents were not selected randomly and therefore their views may not be representative of the broader population.

- **Identifying possible sub-national–level outcomes and impacts from the work of staff based primarily in Dili.** As the team was only able to collect data in Dili, outcomes from one geographic region are not necessarily representative of other experiences. As such, the document review and KIlIs from staff knowledgeable about sub-national–level outcomes were crucial in the final analysis but may not represent the experiences from those in other geographic regions.

- **Identifying potential outcome information from activities partially completed.** The team relied on triangulation of data and information from experts to assess the reasonableness of impact assumptions. It was challenging to attribute outcome as there was not an overarching M&E framework and outcome-level indicators were not tracked for most components. The lack of baseline data and a counterfactual further limited attribution analysis.

- **Identifying particular political or governance constraints unique to the Timor-Leste context that may have resulted from changes in government structure and organization.** SI worked to establish a strong rapport
with key informants to enable honest and open responses, but the sensitive nature of the work and environment may have inhibited fully candid answers.

- Changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors (KAB) explicated by the evaluation team may result in lower confidence in the stated change based on the small size of sampling conducted. The team conducted extensive SGDs with PNTL trainee staff and sought examples of KAB factors from KIIs interviewed and triangulated this data with SGDs and one FGD. However, this was a small sample size and there is limited secondary data to support findings.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section synthesizes the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for each component area. The information is organized to address the core evaluation questions within each intervention component, as per USAID’s request, and is framed to address two critical aspects of the intervention. The first aspect investigated is whether the SPSP program components adhered to the original design of the 1207 proposal and guidelines for Timor-Leste. The second aspect addressed the accountability of the 1207 program and whether the SPSP program components were efficient and well designed based on the funds administered and the implementation modalities used.

While there are several discrete component or activity areas, in most cases the primary beneficiary is the PNTL. Activities have been implemented by a variety of USG and non-USG partners including the U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Asia Foundation (TAF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Search for Common Ground (SFCG), Creative Corrections, and Belun (a Timorese NGO). Most recently, the SPSP program initiated activities to address trafficking in persons (under the Investigative Training component), in response to Timor-Leste’s 2014 downgrade to the Tier 2 Watch List for Trafficking in Persons. Some activities were concluded at the time of the evaluation while others were ongoing. Table 2 details the SPSP program and provides information about the component area objectives, a brief description drawn from the original 1207 proposal documentation, the USG agency responsible for their monitoring and management, and the implementing partner tasked with the implementation of the 1207-funded activity.

Table 2: SPSP Objective and Activity Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>USG Lead</th>
<th>Implementing Partner</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Mitigation through Community Policing</td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation (TAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Objective:</strong> Strengthen Timorese police capacity</td>
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<td>in community policing</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Component description:</strong> Assistance to the PNTL</td>
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<td>to help implement its new policy of adopting</td>
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<td>community policing practices across the force.</td>
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<td>Putting this policy into practice requires educating</td>
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<td>both the police and the community regarding</td>
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<td>community-police practices, establishing Community</td>
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<td>Police Councils throughout the country, and</td>
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<td>facilitating the initial work of these councils.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Accountability Strengthening in the PNTL</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>Technical Assistance (Legal Advisor)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Objective:</strong> Strengthen civilian oversight of</td>
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<td>Timorese police in conduct and disciplinary</td>
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<td>procedures.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Component description:</strong> Training assistance to</td>
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<td>the PNTL to the Prosecutor General’s office to</td>
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<td>improve investigative practices and build stronger</td>
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<td>ties between the two institutions in the</td>
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<td>investigative process. Poor cooperation and</td>
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<td>substandard investigative practices impeded</td>
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<td>justice and were undermining the rule of law and</td>
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<td>security in Timor-Leste.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Investigations Training Program</th>
<th>DoS/ INL</th>
<th>Trafficking Investigations Program</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective:</strong> Strengthen Timorese police capacity</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
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<td>in investigations.</td>
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<td>Training for Police Investigators</td>
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<td>Creative Corrections</td>
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<td>Creative Corrections</td>
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Evaluation of the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” (SPSP) Program
Component description: Training assistance to the PNTL to the Prosecutor General’s office to improve investigative practices and build stronger ties between the two institutions in the investigative process. Poor cooperation and substandard investigative practices impeded justice and were undermining the rule of law and security in Timor-Leste.

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<tr>
<th>Component Description</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Strengthening Land Borders</td>
<td>UNODC, Land Border</td>
<td>Objective: Strengthen the logistical capacity of the Timorese police. Component description: Technical assistance and advice to the PNTL on the procurement, storage, and maintenance of logistical and communications equipment and supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical Support to PNTL</td>
<td>DoS/INL Creative Corrections</td>
<td>Objective: Strengthen the logistical capacity of the Timorese police. Component description: Technical assistance and advice to the PNTL on the procurement, storage, and maintenance of logistical and communications equipment and supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Engagement to Promote Stability</td>
<td>USAID Search for Common Ground (SFCG)</td>
<td>Objective: Reduce the likelihood of Timorese youth involvement in violence. Component description: A comprehensive youth engagement program targeted at underemployed youth in Dili and the districts, many of whom are also active in martial arts groups, which were banned in Timor-Leste in 2010 due to their involvement in violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society Monitoring of the Security Sector</td>
<td>USAID Belun **sub-partner, Fundasaun Mahein</td>
<td>Objective: Strengthen the capacity of Timorese civil society to monitor the performance of the Timorese police and threats to stability in Timor-Leste. Component description: Assistance to Timorese NGOs to support activities that seek to monitor development in the security sector, the performance of the PNTL, police-community relations, and general and emerging threats to stability. Project activities will be designed to provide independent and objective feedback and advice to the GoTL, PNTL, and the international donor community.</td>
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**KEY FINDINGS: CONFLICT MITIGATION THROUGH COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING (CMCOP)**

**Program Design**

**Finding 1:** The CMCOP project is a four-year community policing project (October 2011–January 2016) implemented by TAF and the PNTL. USAID and the New Zealand Aid Project jointly fund the project. After a hiatus of over a year, an expansion of the project commenced officially in late 2011. A new manager arrived to take forward the second phase of the project. According to most sources this delay did not impact CMCOP, as it was designed and influenced from a previous community policing effort funded by USAID from 2008–2010.

**Finding 2:** According to sources interviewed working on community policing in Timor-Leste, CMCOP has been extremely relevant in the current context, although there is a need to more effectively define the “community policing” model versus a “community engagement” approach to policing.
Program Management and Implementation

Finding 3: The CMCOP Project is jointly funded by USAID and the New Zealand Aid Project and both donors have developed a set of common governance arrangements and shared work plans, which are intended to ensure a coordinated approach. This enhanced relationship was not foreseen in the original design of either program but, according to both donors, provided a cost-effective approach to support community policing in Timor.

Finding 4: According to national sources, the notion of “community policing” has evolved from a marginal position to one increasingly central to the identity of the Timorese police (PNTL). This is reflected in documentation as well as by sources working within PNTL.

Finding 5: The establishment of KPKs (Tetum acronym for “Community Police Councils”) is the most visible implementation component of the program. According to most sources interviewed, CMCOP has adapted the concept in a manner that aligns with the cadences and cultures of Timor-Leste and fulfills their objective of demonstrating KPKs as a workable model for dispute resolution.

Finding 6: According to some expert sources, having a KPK in addition to traditional and formal systems and other mechanisms for mediation means that police officers assigned to the KPK need to work in different roles on a case-by-case basis, both with traditional structures and with the official justice system. Thus, the introduction of a KPK might be beneficial but also brings an increase in complexity and confusion in addressing grievances and seeking justice between the formal and traditional system. Especially where the case is a public crime, such as domestic violence, there are issues with the KPKs utilizing traditional systems when the law requires that the case be processed through the formal system.

Program Outcomes

Finding 7: According to national and USAID program management sources, the CMCOP project has contributed extensively to the institutionalization of community policing in Timor-Leste. CMCOP is becoming a “victim of its own success.” PNTL and community leaders have requested KPKs in other sucos and other districts, but even with the rapid expansion of KPKs over the last few years, 80% of sucos are still not covered.

Finding 8: One of the primary behavior-level changes noted in interviews, desk study research, and analysis of independent evaluations of TAF community policing activities has been a revival of the role of traditional leadership in community conflict prevention and resolution. The KPKs have helped to prioritize the role that traditional systems can play in human security needs and TAF staff have trained local leaders so that they are more skilled in dispute resolution and in the identification of local conflicts that should be elevated to the criminal justice system. It is clear from extensive assessments, data, and analysis that community policing has evolved both within PNTL as an institution and at the local level, but tracking changes in behavior was not a specific emphasis of the CMCOP program.

National Ownership and Sustainability

Finding 9: Forward deployment of police is an important part of this overall decentralization agenda. In 2013, the PNTL General-Commander approved the National Community Police Unit’s strategic plan,
“Proximity and Visibility Policing Partnerships in Timor-Leste.” The strategy includes the establishment of 442 suco police officers (Ofisial Polisia Suco, or OPS) and is premised on the need for the PNTL to get closer to the people it serves. It is a popular initiative, supported by 97% of respondents in the 2013 TAF survey. According to respondents, this is linked in some ways to the role that community policing has played in advocating for more resources for security at the suco level.

Finding 10: Deployment and management of the OPS is the responsibility of the district commanders, while the national Community Police Unit is in charge of the overall design of the program and training of the OPS officers. At the time of this evaluation, there was no clear implementation strategy for the OPS rollout. Funds to support this plan were not in the 2015 annual budgets of either SoSS or PNTL. It is currently being funded in an ad hoc manner, with funds cobbled together from other PNTL line items. The Office of the President provided some funding for the project in 2013 but not in 2015. There does not appear to be a realistic plan within PNTL to cost this structure over the long term. In 2016, it is likely that the budget will be insufficient to address all the costs that the OPS will need, specifically equipment for transportation and communication.

Finding 11: The New Zealand Aid program is currently designing a follow-on support program, but the funding will be significantly reduced and there is still some confusion as to how this new program will integrate and address the OPS rollout and how this will impact community policing practices in Timor-Leste.

Finding 12: According to national sources, there is a need to promote a stronger understanding of community policing within the Timorese parliament and government, where communication about the program is also important. Sources felt this approach would improve budgetary allocations for critical elements of community policing programs.

CONCLUSIONS: CONFLICT MITIGATION THROUGH COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING (CMCOP)

Program Design
CMCOP was well researched and planned, and it adjusted to the changes in the political context as well as donor coordination needs. TAF is the only agency involved in supporting Timor-Leste police reforms that works directly with communities, and this places TAF in a unique position that has distinct advantages in looking at some of the recent human security needs in Timor-Leste, particularly at the suco level. The tendency in TAF to orient itself further toward the police presents a slight departure from the focus on the concept of community security. It is important to maintain the program’s focus primarily on community policing—the delivery of safety and security—rather than being focused on the police. This is critical for USAID and reflects an emphasis on community and human security needs most relevant to development program objectives and consistent with the original intention of the design of SPSP and the 1207 proposal.

CMCOP has been working within the context of a rapidly evolving security sector. Against the backdrop of decentralization in Timor-Leste, there have been discussions of merging the KPKs with suco councils. It is critical that there be security sector mapping of providers, particularly at the suco level, as there is a

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profusion of providers beyond the PNTL that are engaged in “community policing” and often confusion on some levels within management of PNTL. TAF has done some of this mapping, but there is a need to look at other local forms of security providers that are often specific to the context at the sub-district level.

**Program Management and Implementation**

TLCPP and CM COP have sought to increase their efficiency and have delineated clear lines of responsibility, community engagement areas, and PNTL coordination issues. KPKs have played an important role in expanding the role of PNTL at the community level, and both programs have contributed to the increased visibility of community policing within PNTL. However, having two programs ostensibly working on a similar set of issues is confusing, as both programs work with PNTL District Commands, OPS, and the National Community Policing Unit. In addition, both programs as well as the TLPDP work with relevant planning units within PNTL and with the Executive to address and influence policy and planning within PNTL.

The design of this component was consistent with the original 1207 proposal and was cost-effective. If one were to look at the costing issues moving forward as a measure of efficiency, CM COP’s approach in principally employing Timorese staff is both economical and enables deeper engagement with Timorese networks including the PNTL and the GoTL. USAID’s management and CM COP’s monitoring and reporting regime are extremely effective and deserve to be recognized as a model within the 1207 framework of components. However, there is more information than can be adequately captured and retained by senior-level decision makers both within the USG and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (RDTL).

**Program Outcomes**

There is insufficient data to show how increases in community policing techniques at the local level have impacted traditional practices and district command planning. There is a myriad of data and information that shows that community policing has had an impact; however, now that the OPS is being funded there are concerns that resources to the National Community Police Unit will decrease, and there is evident confusion as to how the OPS will impact the KPKs and vice versa. The KPKs, where they have been established, seem to positively impact local relations with the PNTL. This is evident in national surveys, independent reports, and in interviews with national stakeholders. KPKs will be impacted by OPS officers and their structure may need to change once PNTL fully establishes these positions nationally.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

The sustainability of community policing programming in Timor-Leste depends in large part upon the continued enthusiasm of the GoTL and the PNTL for the concept, coupled with future budgetary commitments on the part of the GoTL.

The current rollout of the OPS program within PNTL and the persistent and current decreases in the PNTL national budget make it imperative than any further development of pilots be cost-shared to ensure national ownership. Caution needs to be exercised in scaling to ensure that resources are available to adequately finance, support, and monitor such an expansion.
KEY FINDINGS: ACCOUNTABILITY STRENGTHENING IN THE PNTL

Program Design

Finding 1: The lack of a formally approved system of disciplinary regulations is one of the most significant hurdles in professionalizing the PNTL, but there are considerable political and practical problems with working on this issue at the executive level. There are significant delays in disciplinary cases and hearings within the PNTL and this impacts job performance and accountability and weakens the role that the Department of Justice can play in making the case procedures more efficient and relevant. This component was well designed to address some of these issues within PNTL.

Program Management and Implementation

Finding 2: A Senior Legal Advisor provided technical support and mentoring for the Office of Inspection and Audit (OIA) of the Ministry of Interior (formally the Secretary of State for Security), the General Inspectorate Office of PNTL (PNTL/GIOO), and the Department of Justice of the PNTL. Originally, it was anticipated in the 1207 design documents for this component that the Advisor would help to facilitate the approval of Disciplinary Regulations for the PNTL, but this proved to not be possible, based on the political climate and changes in leadership within the Ministry of the Interior as a result of the government transition in early 2015. This was not a design flaw but rather a change necessary as a result of the political transitions within the MOI and PNTL specifically.

Finding 3: Changes between the V and VI Constitutional Government in early 2015 as well as new legal procedures within the PNTL based on the transition to a new ministerial structure made changes in component targets necessary. The Advisor adapted effectively to the current political context and was able to quickly assess an appropriate pathway for intervention that allowed access to both the MOI as well as senior officials in PNTL.

Finding 4: There were two main management and implementation issues with this component. One was to ensure that the OIA worked within the current law and parameters and was able to develop audits and inspection systems that could track and assess systems within the PNTL. The other issue was in working with the General Inspectorate and the Department of Justice to ensure that all PNTL officers were aware of ethical and disciplinary values, principles and rules, and were able to improve complaints and investigation procedural rules.

Program Outcomes

Finding 5: Within the MOI’s Office of Inspection and Audit, it was evident that systems had improved and that confidence in job skills had increased due to the training. According to interviews with leadership in MOI and PNTL senior staff, the services and technical support provided was “excellent” and there were several examples given of specific professional practices, manuals, systems, and procedures that had improved as a result of this support. Sources within the OIA indicated that the tools (specifically the checklists for inspections and audits) would be used by the department chiefs. There was evidence that resource requests had been designed to continue the dissemination of these procedures within MOI and in parts of the PNTL in the 2016 national budget process.

Finding 6: The Advisor for this component assisted the Department of Justice, drafting a Disciplinary Manual to be used in PNTL. This manual was used in training by the Director of the Department of Justice and in the PNTL Training Center course, but there is still significant resistance in the ranks to establishing clear disciplinary procedures, as there are no approved disciplinary regulations currently for PNTL within the MOI.
National Ownership and Sustainability

Finding 7: One of the major issues relating to sustainability is the low level of funding for training within the MOI/OIA and within the Department of Justice.

Finding 8: Consistent decreases in allocated budgets from 2012 to 2015 have made training and professionalization of procedures and systems within PNTL underfunded and in some cases ineffective, according to national sources.

Finding 9: There is minimal use of technology and IT for tracking disciplinary interventions and infractions within PNTL, particularly at the district level, where IT training and database systems are nonexistent.

Finding 10: Coordination with 1207 USG providers and partners enabled computers to be purchased and transferred for district commands, but respondents noted a further need for training as well as an integrated database system that allows cases to be tracked by the Department of Justice within PNTL.

Finding 11: There are specific political issues that have impacted the ability of this component to more directly influence the revision of the disciplinary regulations within the PNTL. The PNTL disciplinary system is governed by a disciplinary regulation that was originally adopted in 2004, which defines a code of conduct, offenses, and procedures for disciplining officers in cases of violations. The Organic Laws for the PNTL (2009) and for the (former) Ministry of Defense and Security (2008) specify their respective functions in overseeing the disciplinary system and in monitoring and auditing the performance and management of the PNTL and other security forces. These laws also specify other monitoring and accountability mechanisms, including audit and performance monitoring within the PNTL and by the (former) Secretary of State for Security. The PNTL and the (former) Secretary of State for Security sought to strengthen their procedures for handling oversight and were in the process of revising the disciplinary regulations.

CONCLUSIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY STRENGTHENING IN THE PNTL

Program Design

This component is critical to the professionalization of the PNTL. However, there were some aspects of the 1207 design that were not able to anticipate some of the changes in PNTL at the time of the SPSP program planning. Gaps that were noted in the original design of this component included increased technical support and training for human rights, ethical intervention and disciplinary liability for senior PNTL commanders and officers, and the disciplinary regulations and systems necessary to track infractions. According to the Ministries' new draft organic law, the MOI has increased responsibility in civil protection, public service, and human security and an increased emphasis on professional skills relevant to civil protection.

Program Management and Implementation

Extensive political issues as well as changes in government structure impacted the original design and eventual activities of this component. The advisor and staff working on this component made course corrections that were logical and cost-effective based on the 1207 proposal and component design.

Program Outcomes

This component was well managed and outcomes were evident in national interviews with senior MOI and PNTL staff. There were numerous examples given of the work of the Advisor and it was clear that the materials provided had been adapted and used by department chiefs as well as senior leadership in
the PNTL. The draft disciplinary manual is used in training by the Department of Justice, despite the political issues in finalizing the official PNTL regulations.

National Ownership and Sustainability
Looking ahead, particularly in light of the passage of the 2014–2018 PNTL Strategy, there is a good argument for continuing support for the Department of Justice as well as other oversight units within the PNTL, as they have a significant part to play in strategy management and planning. The mission of the 2014–2018 PNTL Strategy is termed the VIP approach: “Visibility, Involvement, and Professionalism.” PNTL officers will be asked to work much more directly with community members, local authorities, and other GoTL line Ministry staff. The increase in officers hired under the OPS system also makes a strong case for approved disciplinary regulations for the PNTL, as does the new strategy. There may also be a role for the Police Training College in ensuring that these gaps are addressed in training developed for senior officers likely to encounter these issues as well as new staff hired under OPS.

KEY FINDINGS: INVESTIGATIONS TRAINING

Program Design
Finding 1: The original 1207 proposal design of the Investigations Training component specified that the Police Training Advisor was to support, assist, and advise the Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP) in developing country-specific investigation training packages for two advanced levels. The two advanced levels were to build upon the Tier 1 course already administered and were to encompass complex investigations concepts in the context of complex crimes (murder, sexual assault, etc.) and complex transactional crimes (e.g., transnational financial crimes, money laundering, corruption, fraud, etc.). Documentation and interviews conducted indicated that the program was generally successful in that it produced an accredited and useful training program for PNTL and yielded a high number of trained recruits. However, the original design of the project did not consider that the three-tiered investigations training model was generally too advanced for most PNTL trainees; however, the Advisor was able to quickly recalibrate the program approach to meet the needs of PNTL officers. Moreover, the Portuguese police-training model differs greatly from the U.S. and Australian models that were used for the investigations training in the TLPDP. The Portuguese handled basic recruit training for the PNTL, but there was limited coordination with the TLPDP program, and there have been consistent problems with aligning training materials and curriculum between the two donor efforts. According to interviews with national staff and partners, this caused problems for PNTL trainers and national staff.

Finding 2: The PNTL relies on the justice system, particularly prosecutors, to direct their activities in investigating crimes, similar to the Portuguese and Indonesian court systems. By law, Timorese prosecutors handle investigations through a cumbersome and often slow method of requiring the PNTL to make requests to conduct investigations and then wait for a reply and warrant that gives the PNTL investigator the authority to move forward. Due to this process, PNTL investigators have not been proactive or able to fully integrate learned concepts without direction from the prosecutors within the justice system. This means that the design of the investigations component did not adequately consider how the PNTL are intertwined with the justice system and how this impacts the PNTL’s ability to investigate crimes. This also resulted in a situation where the PNTL was adequately trained but may not be able to implement its trainings as it hit a roadblock among untrained prosecutors.

Finding 3: Key informants and PNTL staff reported that the PNTL’s investigative capacity is not up to international standards, even after training, as there is limited use of technology, or even basic evidence-storage facilities, to conduct high-quality, modern investigations. There are limited facilities for the preservation of evidence, no cold storage facilities, and limited laboratory testing equipment. This lack of
infrastructure and its impact on program activities was not adequately incorporated in the design process, thereby affecting training outcomes and sustainability.

**Finding 4:** As the 1207 handbook and INL programs were developed prior to implementation of the gender mainstreaming policy, only limited references to gender were included during the design phase. However, throughout this component, gender-related crimes were incorporated into the training curriculum, including designated blocks of instruction, specifically on domestic violence investigations and sexual assaults.

**Program Management**

**Finding 5:** The investigations training witnessed a number of program and management changes. As there were funds remaining ($400,000) after the Investigations Training Advisor completed his tenure, and due to Timor-Leste’s recent downgrade in the human trafficking index, the Embassy requested that IOM submit a proposal to target this component. The resulting program is intended to build upon UNODC’s human trafficking training. The IOM project has had a slow start-up: despite beginning in September 2014, the Program Manager was only recently hired and most activities have not yet started. The IOM component was tacked on at the end and is a logical addition to the program due to its focus on a previously identified area of need.

**Program Implementation**

**Finding 6:** The Advisor was initially told that he would liaise directly with the PNTL while on assignment. When he arrived to Timor-Leste, he found that he would be embedded with the Australian TLPDP. This programmatic change was quite positive in that the Advisor had immediate access to key players in the PNTL and worked closely with the Australians, who had already spent considerable time and resources in police training. According to national sources and senior staff from TLPDP, the Advisor’s breadth of experience in homicides and investigation training was significant and added “tremendous” value to the current TLPDP approach.

**Program Outcomes**

**Finding 7:** According to a small sample of sources, the training program was successful in reaching a large number of police officers. Respondents stated that the training was eventually tailored to meet the current level of the average PNTL officer, but they also stated that the training was initially very hard to follow. There was little analysis of the impact of the training on job performance, which would have helped to better identify the specific impact and relevance of the training modules.

**Finding 8:** Despite having a 1207 manual that requests programs to have a consistent M&E framework for the SPSP program, similar to other 1207 components focused on training activities, there was not a comprehensive M&E framework to track outcome-level indicators for behavior change. Simple pre- and post-tests were not conducted for trainees.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

**Finding 9:** The implementation of the investigations training program left the PNTL with an accredited training curriculum and a number of staff trained in Level 1 and Level 2 investigations. TLPDP is planning to continue elements of this training with the Police Training Center (PTC), and there are now several national trainers who have had exposure to this training and can assist in delivery. It was unclear what budget PNTL has to support this training. However, equipment donations are still more of a priority among the PNTL than additional training for the PNTL. This is evidenced by PNTL requests for departmental needs, which typically focus on material goods rather than institutional or structural needs.
The UN had refurbished the existing PNTL Academy, and the TLPDP spent funds to build new classrooms and outfit them. New additions include physical training space, a model police station on site, generators, air conditioning units, computers, and office furniture. The PNTL has also received a large number of vehicles over the years but has not allocated the budget necessary to maintain these assets.

**Finding 10:** PNTL needs advanced forensics equipment but has limited ability to carry out advanced investigations without continued external support both in terms of equipment and advanced technical training.

**CONCLUSIONS: INVESTIGATIONS TRAINING**

**Program Design**

The PNTL is a fairly new entity and has had decreased national-level funding since 2010. Although there has been considerable donor support, the annual budgeting process at the national level needs to take into account funding needs for training and increased skills development as the structure of PNTL grows and new units are formed. Training is an important programmatic function to ensure that PNTL investigators are able to do their jobs to a high standard. Despite being faced with challenges, the component was able to adapt the original training design to the local context. The three-tiered investigations training model is a standard global approach; however, it was quickly found to be inappropriate and was readily modified.

The PNTL has been afforded numerous training opportunities over the past ten years, from a variety of sources, including the Australians, Americans, Portuguese, Indonesians, and other ASEAN countries. This patchwork of training has not necessarily been adapted to the local Timorese context, and it can be confusing for PNTL to receive disparate information from a wide variety of sources. Portuguese approaches still hold some sway, especially within leadership at the PNTL but often differ greatly from US/Australian approaches.

Due to a lack of capacity and limited training for prosecutors in Timor-Leste, the investigation of crimes is slow and “unnecessarily cumbersome.” There are structural issues in the legal system that limit the investigative ability of the PNTL that were not adequately considered in the design phase. Despite these challenges, this component was considered effective by most sources as the Advisor was highly qualified and was able to adapt training rapidly to match the current context and conditions of PNTL. National sources as well as collaborating donors cited the quality of the training, intervention, and professionalism of the Advisor as excellent.

**Program Implementation and Management**

The IOM component was meant to increase national capacity in human trafficking, highlight victim management, and establish a national working group on human trafficking. IOM seems to be taking a measured approach to this training, in that it plans to roll out a comprehensive needs assessment prior to finalizing the training curriculum. This will ensure that the training designed is comprehensive and that the national working group is able to collaborate on key issues and needs as they arise across ministries and GoTL units.

Placing an Advisor in a well-established organization, as was the case with the investigations advisor who was placed within TLPDP, helps to facilitate and streamline the process, and was a logical and timely change within the program context. The Advisor had immediate access to key players in the PNTL and worked closely with the Australians, who had already spent considerable time and resources in police training. This meant that the Advisor did not need to start from scratch and could build upon relationships and training materials that had already been developed. This component tracked well with
the original 1207 design and by embedding an Advisor in TLPDP, the cost benefit was evident in the shared training design and targeting of PNTL staff and officers.

**Program Outcomes**

One of the primary problems with this component was the difficulty in assessing and gathering information about actual outcomes. While high-quality training was conducted for a large number of officers, it is difficult to determine knowledge acquisition and behavior change due to limited data collection tools and very limited monitoring of training application.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

The Investigations Training component has been successful in that a large number of officers have been trained and an accredited curriculum exists that could theoretically guide future training programs. Training and other structural reforms are long-term efforts that are not easily quantifiable. The Investigations Training program did not attempt to measure the higher-level outcomes or the ability of PNTL to carry on these activities independently, as there was no M&E system to capture this type of data. It is challenging to gauge sustainability of this program as this depends on a variety of factors, such as continued donor support and the willingness and capacity of PNTL to continue with established training protocols.

**KEY FINDINGS: STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, MARINE PATROL UNIT (MPU)**

**Program Design**

**Finding 1:** Similar to the other INL-managed programs; this component consisted of an Advisor supporting the MPU. However, the NCIS Advisor to the MPU was based in Singapore and only traveled to Dili occasionally. In addition, the NCIS Advisor’s position with the 1207 program was not full-time, as he maintained his duties as a special agent in addition to managing and advising on this program. As such, the program was designed remotely, in Singapore, with limited consultation with local stakeholders. Moreover, NCIS had not previously worked in Timor-Leste and was not necessarily well-versed on the local context, the capacity of the PNTL, and activities that would work well in this context. NCIS was not the first-choice implementer, but it was challenging to find a partner with the requisite technical background and willingness to work in this context.

**Finding 2:** According to sources interviewed, this project did not take into consideration the unique tidal patterns in Dili. This was evidenced as the constructed pier was damaged almost immediately after it was completed, with no design in place to be able to rebuild within the 1207 program cycle.

**Program Management and Implementation**

**Finding 3:** There were INL funding issues that affected implementation. As per INL procedures, unobligated funds are returned to INL for carryover at the end of each fiscal year, and then they are returned to operating units. However, due to global INL issues, it took months for funds to be returned for program use, and this greatly impacted implementation.

**Finding 4:** The only changes in the program were the allocation of additional funding to the pier construction and a no-cost extension from September 2014 to December 2014. These changes were determined by NCIS and were approved by INL.
Program Outcomes

Finding 5: There have been anecdotal examples of improved work on the ground as a result of training—saving people from a well and searching for bodies lost at sea. MPU officers have had the opportunity to observe modern ports in the United States and Australia as part of study tours. In addition, MPU officers received a wide variety of training in practical topics such as small boat operations, survival at sea, rescue operations, and navigation, among other topics.

Finding 6: There was limited data available to measure behavior change, and program impact was limited to NCIS reporting and anecdotal evidence from KIs. There was limited information beyond basic figures, such as the number of people trained and dollar amounts spent, making it difficult to track outcome-level findings.

National Ownership and Sustainability

Finding 7: KIs indicated that decisions at the ministerial level are not necessarily linked with the on-the-ground reality of the MPU, making the identification of sustainable interventions complex. The budgeting process requires PNTL departments to make requests each year and to justify these requests. There was no evidence that training would be continued with national-level funding.

Finding 8: Training was conducted largely by the United States Coast Guard, and several MPU officers went on study tours to the United States and Australia to observe and learn from foreign ports. The MPU also received material goods as part of this project including: life jackets, dive equipment, first aid kits, radio equipment, maintenance equipment, etc.

CONCLUSIONS: STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, MARINE PATROL UNIT (MPU)

Program Design

The MPU is a new unit within the PNTL and there are limited national-level skills, expertise, and budget for this PNTL unit. The design of the MPU training was intended to be highly practical and therefore was contingent on the possession of functioning equipment—something that the MPU does not yet have. The national budget has not prioritized the funding of the MPU, which has been demonstrated in the national budget and allocations to this unit. Additionally, issues between budget, procurement, and allocation have largely hindered the MPU’s ability to keep working equipment. The design did not necessarily take into account the limited infrastructure and the effect that this would have on training protocols.

Program Management and Implementation

It is challenging to remotely manage a program, especially one largely focused on training and capacity development. It is useful for an international advisor to have regular, ongoing interactions with MPU staff to ensure utilization of training and to address any issues as they arise. Formal training is often not enough for capacity development, but ongoing mentoring and support are necessary in conjunction with training activities.

Funding challenges made implementation difficult at points and caused delays. The funding freeze was a global INL issue that was largely out of the control of the points of contacts in DC who were overseeing the Timor-Leste projects.
There is a definite need for a functioning pier; however, the fact that tidal patterns in Dili were not taken into consideration resulted in a damaged pier with no funds remaining for repair. As such, changes were not sufficiently timely to be of use in addressing programmatic needs.

**Program Outcomes**

The program design and implementation needed more robust reporting and M&E mechanisms to gather information at the outcome level. Without this information, it was incredibly challenging to determine higher-level outcomes and longer-term effects of training activities. Data pertaining to behavior change needed to be collected during the program monitoring process so that more accurate program outcomes could be assessed. Pre- and post-tests would have been helpful, as would have some type of mid-term monitoring of applied training approaches.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

Since training was conducted exclusively by outside agencies, largely in English with Tetum translation provided, and without a Training of Trainers (ToT) model in place, it is unlikely that training will continue without external support. The officers were shown examples of expensive, modern ports; however, these examples are not currently feasible in Timor-Leste.

The MPU is severely under-resourced; therefore, most donations were needed by the MPU, as they were not able to procure such items themselves due to limited national resources. However, it is unlikely that these newly donated assets will remain in a usable condition for very long without additional work on maintenance and asset management systems within the PNTL and MPU.

**KEY FINDINGS: STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, BORDER PROTECTION UNIT (BPU)**

**Program Design**

**Finding 1:** UNODC completed a two-day training needs assessment in December 2011 and created an inception report detailing the findings. This needs assessment informed UNODC’s program design and the program proposal that was written from UNODC’s Bangkok office. Some key findings from the inception report that influenced program design include:

- **BPU staff had not received any regular, structured, or formalized training since its formation in 2003, although United Nations Police (UNPOL) did deliver some individual trainings.**
- **After basic training at the PNTL, BPU officers undergo two months of basic in-house training delivered by BPU staff. There was no training in civilian border guard functions consistent with modern best practices.**
- **There were no written standard operating procedures (SOPs) to support staff in their field postings.**
- **The BPU was poorly equipped.**

**Finding 2:** Although trainers were considered experts in their field, according to sources within the PNTL and USG, the trainings were not always well adapted to the context and, in some cases, technically inappropriate for the current officer capacity or legal mandate of the BPU. According to KIs, the UNDOC program applied regional and global training models that were not adapted specifically for the realities of border protection needs in Timor-Leste. In addition, the BPU required a very basic level of training, as most BPU staff had never received any specialized training related to their job responsibilities, and the training model assumed higher levels of previous knowledge and skills.

**Finding 3:** There are five land border entry posts in Timor-Leste, which are covered by four separate agencies (BPU, Immigration, Customs, and Quarantine). Document review and KIs also mentioned
“green points,” which are areas with no official border crossing. BPU is the only agency at the unofficial border crossings (green points) but shares responsibility at official border crossings and has no additional authority at the green points. During program design, this comprehensive view of border protection, and the implications for training, were not considered by UNODC or USG.

**Program Management and Implementation**

**Finding 4:** The Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) were part of the original program design but were ultimately not implemented. This activity was replaced by additional training (international border training facilitated by Canadians and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol). KIs indicated that this change was logical and timely, in that the BLO concept was found to be unsuitable early on and was quickly changed.

**Finding 5:** UNODC did not previously have a presence in Timor-Leste. There are mixed feelings towards the UN in Timor-Leste, but many KIs cite largely negative feelings. However, despite mixed feelings towards the UN in Timor-Leste, UNODC was able to develop good relationships “up the ladder” in the PNTL, according to KIs. However, UNODC’s lack of operational presence on the ground made it difficult for Dili-based donors to communicate regularly and to receive information in a timely manner. This also made it difficult to provide the type of daily mentoring needed for long-term, sustainable outcomes and also created issues for tailoring the training to the local context.

**Program Outcomes**

**Finding 6:** Desk review documents and KIs provided information on the number of people trained and the value and number of items procured throughout the project cycle. The program did not incorporate an M&E system to measure outcome-level results or to track progress in training skills acquisition.

**Finding 7:** There were some anecdotal examples of success. For example, last year there were five arrests at the border for suspected drug smuggling. There are potentially more cases, but KIs noted that they are not detected, primarily due to the lack of appropriate equipment.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

**Finding 8:** According to national sources, the BPU force is better trained and has new equipment that it did not previously possess. This project supplied them with 38 new motorcycles; the BPU received some vehicles from other sources, but the parts for these vehicles are not always available in Timor-Leste. UNODC delivered training in a variety of topics related to drug trafficking, smuggling, and human trafficking, although the BPU reported limited capacity to actually implement training principles.

**Finding 9:** According to KIs, the BPU has national resources for allowances, but not much else. There are limited resources within the BPU, and as one of the newer branches of PNTL, it has a particularly limited budget. The PNTL’s overall budget must be allocated to different departments depending on need, as determined from proposals from the various units.

**CONCLUSIONS: STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, BORDER PROTECTION UNIT (BPU)**

**Program Design**

It was logical to include an element within the 1207 component for BPU support, as border security is an important aspect of overall security; however, the training model was not sufficiently adapted to local context. The two-day TNA conducted by UNODC was not comprehensive enough to adequately inform design, and the proposal written out of the UNODC Bangkok office may not have been as consultative as necessary.
The trainers were experts in their subject matter, and the trainings were of a good quality but were not necessarily well adapted to the context of Timor-Leste, the mandate of the BPU, or their current capacities. The BPU required a very basic level of training, as most BPU staff had never received any specialized training related to their job responsibilities.

Managing the border is a collaborative effort that should ideally involve multiple agencies, all of which should be adequately trained. BPU is not solely responsible for border security, and other agencies at the border do not possess adequate skills to sufficiently handle complex border issues. The design of the border protection system also necessitates collaboration between these entities, which could be furthered by combined or expanded trainings.

**Program Management and Implementation**

BLOs are a global best practice that have proven to be successful in a variety of contexts. However, BLOs are not currently feasible in Timor-Leste. The BPU informally coordinates with the Indonesian military at the border, but the Indonesians are not yet willing to enter into a formal partnership due to a variety of factors. This program change was logical based on the context and the inability to gain traction with a necessary partner.

It is challenging to remotely manage a program, especially one largely focused on training and capacity development. The model employed in this program was not necessarily effective due to a lack of regular, ongoing interactions between the international advisor and BPU staff. Training, especially at an inappropriate level not tailored to the law or context of Timor-Leste, was insufficient for capacity development; ongoing mentoring and support were necessary in conjunction with training activities.

UNODC did not have a long-term presence in Timor-Leste prior to this program and was therefore viewed in a more positive light than other UN agencies. UNODC provides a very specialized service and was able to serve as a useful partner to the PNTL in terms of possessing the appropriate knowledge base that would support the BPU.

**Program Outcomes**

The lack of M&E systems that report beyond the basic input- or output-level indicators did not allow for a strong understanding of behavior change beyond anecdotal evidence. While the small group discussion groups carried out by the evaluation team provided the opportunity for several BPU officers to reflect upon their experiences with the training, these were limited in scope and are not representative of the population as a whole.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

Despite participating in numerous training activities and acquiring much-needed equipment, it is unlikely that the BPU can continue to grow and develop without external assistance. The BPU has neither sufficient budgetary resources to provide ongoing, high-quality training to staff nor the capacity to implement acquired skills. It is unclear how the BPU will fare during future budget allocation processes as the government has made border control a priority.

**KEY FINDINGS: POLICE LOGISTICS**

**Program Design**

**Finding 1:** According to desk review documents, the original program design included a foreign advisor embedded within the PNTL Logistics Department, working directly with the chief, as well as targeted training and provision of some material goods. However, there was uncertainty regarding what assets
and equipment UNPOL would leave behind when it departed, making it difficult to identify worthwhile projects to be incorporated in the logistics component design.

**Finding 2:** In the SOW and project documents, there was not a clear idea of what was meant by “logistical support” to the PNTL and a number of stakeholders noted that this clarification would have been helpful. There was no overarching needs assessment or training needs assessment conducted to feed into project design.

**Program Management and Implementation**

**Finding 3:** Prior to the recruitment of the Logistics Advisor, USD $50,000 was obligated to the PNTL with the intention to cover the cost of hiring and retaining five new mechanics through the end of 2012 and train a pool of up to 20 additional mechanics. However, this funding was de-obligated due to bureaucratic difficulties and the inability of the PNTL to move forward due to capacity issues. The Advisor determined during this time that it would be more effective to change his approach to focusing on developing systems rather than on training, an evident design change indicated in program documentation.

**Finding 4:** The Advisor began his assignment in August 2013 by acquainting himself with the PNTL and strengthening existing relationships both internally (PNTL) and externally (AFP; TLCPP; the United Nations Development Programme; NZ MAP; DCP-TL). There was a slow start-up because the Advisor had difficulty accessing funds and was not assigned a language assistant until eight months into the program. The Advisor was embedded with the PNTL at its headquarters in Dili. He was not provided much administrative support in terms of settling in, setting up office space, or in developing contacts in the PNTL and government.

**Finding 5:** The Advisor identified that it would be more useful to focus on systems development, particularly the development and implementation of a comprehensive asset management system; however, this change was not explicitly described in program documentation. The Advisor administered Microsoft Office training to key personnel, but otherwise no formal training activities were undertaken. This was not a programmatic shortfall, but rather training would not have necessarily been effective in light of the systemic issues in the department. Instead, the Advisor continued to work to alleviate these systemic issues.

**Program Outcomes**

**Finding 6:** According to program documents and KIs, Logistics staff were trained on basic Microsoft Office applications, but there was little data to assess impact or utilization of the training with PNTL staff. There was not an M&E system in place to track higher-level outcome indicators, including behavior change from training or mentoring activities to assess how effectively interventions impacted job performance or systems management within the PNTL Logistics Department.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

**Finding 7:** According to program documents and KIs, the PNTL was provided with items from various donors that are needed to run a police department. Some of these items included vehicles, computers, and uniforms. Based on program documentation and interviews, a tracking system and management improvements, which have been implemented as part of the hand-over documents, will assist in managing these assets more effectively.

**Finding 8:** The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has an asset management system (Free Balance), which is standard, off-the-shelf government software. There are also technicians in country to provide support.
There is the foundation in place to track and manage assets, but the government has not implemented a system to transfer skills from the MoF to departments such as the PNTL Logistics Department. The current activities planned under this component are addressing this issue, which, it is hoped, will establish a way for this system to be used by PNTL.

Finding 9: While the Ministry of Finance possesses asset management software, the system is not being used by any branch of the government. Currently, the PNTL uses Excel files to track assets, and the PNTL’s chief of logistics cannot accurately ascertain, for example, the total number of cars in the fleet and their condition.

CONCLUSIONS: POLICE LOGISTICS

Program Design
It was logical to include an element within the 1207 component for Logistics support because it is a cross-cutting department providing essential administrative support to the PNTL. The INL/Third Party Contractors program was not able to gain much traction and make progress in all areas identified in the Statement of Work. For example, one key component was to “train Timorese law enforcement personnel to manage the new logistics program.” Due to capacity and management issues in the PNTL, the only training provided was for basic computer training, as there were not yet appropriate logistics management systems created and implemented. Instead, the Advisor identified systemic issues, primarily the lack of an asset management system, as a primary institutional need.

The Logistics Department is critical within the structure of PNTL and there is evident need for greater skills and more efficient and effective systems to manage assets within the PNTL. The design of this component was not as comprehensive as it needed to be and did not sufficiently identify pressing needs. The Advisor identified key needs during his tenure; however, the program design should have identified very specific areas on which to focus rather than requiring the Advisor to use his tenure to do so. There were structural issues within the Logistics Department that were not understood or addressed during the design phase that negatively impacted program implementation.

The structure of PNTL also impacts the design, implementation, and assessment of activity progress and needs to be taken into consideration for any future efforts and support to this department. As with many units within PNTL, there is a hierarchal approach to management. It is necessary to get buy-in and support from higher-ups before engaging with the rank and file. Within the Logistics Department there is an inherent tension between the senior officers with limited training in asset management systems, and the rank-and-file officers and staff responsible for the implementation and monitoring of these same systems within PNTL.

Program Management and Implementation
Working as a sole advisor can be challenging, especially without institutional support to help with the initial process of building relationships at PNTL, gaining buy-in from stakeholders, and understanding the important issues to focus upon. The Logistics Advisor seemed to have some difficulty in gaining traction initially, partially as a result of not having a language assistant to support with communication and not having long-standing institutional support to build upon or rely on. The Advisor made efforts to interact with numerous stakeholders from other 1207 components, but each of the components was fairly compartmentalized. KIs indicated that it was difficult to reallocate resources from one component to another more highly functioning program component; however, logistics funds were used to purchase NCIS equipment (radios).
**Program Outcomes**

The computer training was positive in that computer skills are vital for the work of the Logistics staff. However, training without adequate follow-up can elicit only short-term results. Building systems is a longer-term approach that will likely show greater results, especially at the outcome level, though it can be a long and challenging process that must involve numerous stakeholders.

PNTL needs a system for asset management, but it also needs staff who are supported and trained in basic computer management skills to ensure better information and systems management. Logistics serves as an important cross-cutting department that requires a solid understanding of asset management in order to properly budget and manage effectively across the police force. It is essential that this support be continued and gaps highlighted productively for national partners as well as other donors seeking to assist PNTL in better asset management, which will create more sustainable results when other donors provide equipment.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

It is highly unlikely that the PNTL can continue projects such as this without donor assistance at this juncture. The Logistics Department in particular lacks capacity and requires additional support to tackle initiatives, such as the development of an asset management system that is effective for all units within PNTL and that can be tracked electronically as well as effectively outfitted. Having an advisor has been helpful, but there is a need for more investment in human resource training and systems development through national budget allocation for the PNTL. Operationalizing this system to be appropriate for the needs of the PNTL requires additional efforts of research, needs assessment, testing, and implementation within the PNTL. This component has helped, but there is still more work to be done, as there are significant human and material resources still needed to ensure that asset management can be scaled appropriately across the PNTL.

**KEY FINDINGS: YOUTH ENGAGEMENT TO PROMOTE STABILITY (YEPS)**

**Program Design**

**Finding 1:** Initiated in 2012, YEPS was a continuation of the Youth Radio for Peacebuilding (YR4PB) program (2010–2012) run by the same organization, Search for Common Ground (SFCG). The design for YEPS built upon the lessons learned and youth-generated recommendations from the YR4PB; it also fused activities under the European Union (EU)–supported Democracy and Development in Action Through Media and Empowerment (DAME) program, which was being implemented simultaneously.

**Finding 2:** According to Senior Program Managers from SFCG and USAID, the new program took into account the contextual issues raised by the previous project and adjusted them, such as expanding activities at the district level through various forums, leadership trainings, and a greater emphasis on Community-Based Radio (CBR) work.

**Finding 3:** The representation and engagement of women is a high priority for SFCG and was already in the design from YR4PB, including the selection of direct and indirect beneficiaries based on gender and a Youth Mapping Exercise; gender-specific indicators integrated into the monitoring data; gender-balanced staffing; and project outputs designed to address issues of gender discrimination.

**Program Management and Implementation**

**Finding 4:** According to national sources and SFCG’s senior managers, SFCG’s experience in youth civic education, peacebuilding and media outreach with youth, and demonstrated knowledge of national youth issues allowed for a rapid start-up and minimal coordination issues with national partners.
Finding 5: YEPS’ suitability for the 1207 proposal, according to some sources interviewed, was questionable. However, in looking at the documentation and original 1207 proposal and design, the decision to continue supporting SFCG’s activities seemed justified as a stabilization program and was motivated by three factors: 1) the upcoming elections and the need to engage youth; 2) the fact that youth constitute almost 50% of the population; and 3) the significant youth involvement in violence in the Timor-Leste context, particularly in martial arts gangs at the time of the 1207 proposal submission.

Program Outcomes
Finding 6: Most sources interviewed felt that measuring legitimate outcomes, especially in terms of KAB changes, takes longer than was allotted by 1207 project timeframes. Based on a recently conducted independent evaluation of YEPS, most indicators suggest that the program has been effective to some degree. All of the outputs from the proposal were met, and tangible outcomes measured so far include:

- **Improved relationships and access of youth and the CBRs to the government ministries for advocacy;**
- **More youth involvement in the traditional decision-making structures at the community level (strengthening civil society) and their role in peacebuilding activities;**
- **Growing number of engaged, vocal youth who are motivated to be involved in governance and peacebuilding; and**
- **Growing listenership of the YEPS radio programs and increased capacities of the CBRs to deliver quality programming.**

Finding 7: SFCG targeting of youth engagement in CBR and improvements in content and journalistic skills were well received by national and donor sources, but according to most sources interviewed, there needed to be more training for youth on basic programming content. Some sources cited that journalism and production skills were increased and that their work under YEPS improved their own advocacy capacities.

Finding 8: According to sources, SFCG application of lessons learned from YR4PB, well-coordinated monitoring and measurement systems, and leveraging of existing funding limited duplication and increased the overall impact of YEPS activities. This allowed YEPS to be relatively cost-effective based on the targets achieved, according to USG and program management sources.

Finding 9: YEPS had a tangible impact on gender integration. According to SFCG, the majority of participants at the district level are women and there is a significant percentage of women leaders that have been developed through the YEPS program. This was triangulated in reports from SFCG as well as in final evaluation results conducted independently for SFCG.

National Ownership and Sustainability
Finding 10: The new Minister of Youth and Sport is a YEPS graduate and strongly supports the program. He is actively expanding the ministry’s work with youth through the National Youth Policy (NYP)—a model that is being replicated in other ministries. The five goals identified by the NYP are to address issues for youth in education, health, civic participation, unemployment, and violence/crime. YEPS leaders are working with the selected ministries to develop frameworks and implementation plans for working on these issues, including targets, indicators, results, and designating roles and responsibilities. One of the gaps has been the ability to track financially how select ministries are prioritizing youth issues in their annual action plans and budgets.

Finding 11: Several of the radio stations continue to use the YEPS shows and formats, although some argue this is because there is no other programming of this kind for CBRs to access.
Finding 12: Some sources also stated that work with YEPS helped them to develop a better relationship with the Secretary of State for Communication. The YEPS comic book program has also been handed over to the Ministry of Education so that it can expand its publication and distribution. It is unclear, however, if the Ministry has the funding necessary to continue distribution of the program.

CONCLUSIONS: YOUTH ENGAGEMENT TO PROMOTE STABILITY (YEPS)

Program Design
YEPS benefited from the fact that the activities were ongoing and built from a well-established youth program. SFCG had strong national relationships and was recognized as a key player in youth advocacy and politics and had begun acting on lessons learned from YR4PB and national youth policy planning priorities. The extra time also provided a longer timeframe over which to measure change, as some of the activities and targets were similar to those for YR4PB.

The increased emphasis on CBR was a useful area of emphasis for YEPS, as CBR programming is often the only access to information that people have in some of the rural areas where access to print media is low. The programming also provided alternatives to violence for youth and ideas for local communities to mitigate and prevent conflict, particularly issues relating to youth engagement in violence. The radio programs developed by YEPS were popular and listenerhip increased significantly over the life of the project, showing effective program content as well as increased capacity of CBR stations.

YEPS appears to be one of the strongest of the 1207 components in terms of gender integration. SFCG emphasized gender programming and design and this was addressed at many levels including program management, M&E systems, and in staffing and recruitment of SFCG staff, YEPS participants, and partners.

Program Management and Implementation
Management and implementation were good, as there was a clear Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) and well-established reporting templates. There were clear indicators and regular monitoring of activities as well as reporting not only to USAID, but also to national partners working with YEPS. This program benefited from a well-established framework of working on youth issues in Timor-Leste, and although targeting could have been more creative by looking at new ways to engage youth at greater risk of engagement in violence, the indications of impact are evident at the national and local levels.

The question that remains is how suitable YEPS was for 1207 funding. Despite its stabilization intent and the specific contextual justifications, there were still gaps in targeting. Accessing at-risk youth is a challenge in Timor-Leste, but this program would have benefited from more analysis of youth engagement in such activities as martial arts gangs and better coordination with PNTL, particularly the National Community Policing Unit. It would also be worth looking specifically at how to best target at-risk youth in the Timor context, and using this to inform strategy and project design of future youth programs aimed at addressing conflict prevention and community security issues.

Program Outcomes
The use of the community radio programming was a particularly powerful tool in the Timor-Leste context. Given the number of people who listen to radio and the media monitoring that SFCG did under YEPS, there seems to be all the necessary tools for continuing to grow CBR in Timor-Leste. Youth issues are critical not only for conflict prevention, but also for civic engagement and development.
planning in Timor. Funding, however, continues to be an issue for radio stations in Timor-Leste and capacity issues prevent programming that is accurate and based on national policies and programs.

The impact of YEPS was improved by fusing with the DAME project activities and the coordination between USAID and the EU was effective. The activities and planning between these donors was done well both by USAID management and by SFCG staff. Youth programming in Timor-Leste is a good area for integrated program planning and coordination, and youth issues are evident in a variety of sectors.

**National Ownership and Sustainability**

Aspects of YEPS seem likely to continue, primarily through the engagement and relationship building that were initiated through the National Youth Forums that have been adopted by the Secretary of State for Youth and Sport. There seems to be momentum with the National Youth Policy as well, and there are efforts to develop actionable frameworks and implementation plans with relevant ministries working with youth.

However, funding for youth engagement activities is often very limited at the national level and targeting and planning is weak at the ministerial level. Advocacy forums increased under YEPS, but there is still work to be done in funding priority youth issues at the national level. There is skepticism of whether national actors are yet capable of understanding and supporting youth programs and prioritizing effectively.

YEPS leadership has expressed a lot of interest in working with Community Policing, but there are gaps in how to engage at the sub-district and suco levels. There are identified youth leaders at the suco and sub-district levels with the ability to organize and advocate for their demographic and connect police with youth. This would be a very strong addition to youth programs in the future, allowing human security issues for youth to be well integrated at the local and national levels through more targeted youth policy planning.

**KEY FINDINGS: CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING OF SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (CSM-SSD)**

**Program Design**

**Finding 1:** This component was developed based on the need for an independent source of monitoring of PNTL activities and incidents at the local level post-UNMIT withdrawal and was, according to most sources, a well-designed component of the 1207 SPSP program. This component focused largely on human security and community security issues and needs and was built from an existing USAID-funded program.

**Finding 2:** The design phase of the CSM-SSD component is unlike most of the 1207 programs because USAID chose to fund the ongoing activities of Belun and Fundasaun Mahein (FM) rather than design a new approach. However, there were two key underestimations in the design stage that have influenced the outcomes: the full impact of the politicized, top-down hierarchical PNTL structure and the lack of a coordinated national platform for planning, prioritization, and data utilization.

**Finding 3:** This component is the only SPSP element implemented entirely by national institutions and, according to several sources, it has performed “better” and “more efficiently” than other components. This component falls in line with USAID Forward Policy and is also a legacy program, as USAID has supported Belun since 2003.
Finding 4: Both Belun and FM have tried to increase the roles and number of women involved, but there are still several challenges specific to cultural norms in Timor-Leste. For example, according to sources, female monitors are unlikely to be able to travel (especially at night) to verify different incidents; they also tend to have smaller and more limited networks to reach out to. It is encouraging that the Chief of Party for this project at Belun is a woman.

Program Management and Implementation

Finding 5: The key complaint raised by the partners was in regards to the USAID financial reimbursement system, which, according to some sources, was particularly hard for small local NGOs; in effect, they had to burn funds and implement activities in advance to receive the payment they needed to implement the next month, as they did not have the reserves of larger INGOs. This is standard practice for USAID, and the team worked hard to make the reimbursements as swift as possible, but it remains a problem for national and local organizations that do not have core funding.

Program Outcomes

Finding 6: Most sources felt that the timeframe of CSM-SSD was insufficient to measure real behavioral change, but there are a number of indications from independent analysis and monitoring of CSM-SSD that show impact. Some of these initial impacts include enhanced trust between the police and communities at the suco and sub-district levels and increased utility of Belun and FM reporting by government stakeholders, including PNTL.

Finding 7: Sources and stakeholders familiar with Belun and FM felt that one of the greatest weaknesses in significant outcome-level and behavioral change was the lack of a more effective response system within PNTL and in national-level planning processes. One significant challenge is the timeframe of reporting. Belun’s EWER reports come out only every three months (although there are weekly check-ins and monthly reporting internally)—making a timely, targeted response difficult if not impossible, particularly with the PNTL. EWER situation updates are released more regularly, but only in Tetum, making them less likely to be read by donors.

Finding 8: According to KIs, the Conflict Prevention Response Network’s (CPRN) peace activities are popular and there is local demand for these activities to increase but the capacity to do so is limited.

Finding 9: According to national sources, FM’s security sector analysis is increasingly more utilized, it has good access to the government, and its reports are regularly used as information sources by media outlets throughout the country. But, according to sources interviewed and based on a review of their reports, FM has reported on issues where it is not considered a legitimate authority, at times undermining its legitimacy as a watchdog organization.

Finding 10: Several sources felt that FM’s reporting and approach with national stakeholders was “combative” towards the government; however, based on KIIs, the relationship between senior government officials and FM’s director seems to remain strong.

5 Please see Belun analysis and reporting for USAID on CSM-SSD, Quarter 3 and 4 2014, and the National Directorate for the Prevention of Community Conflict reporting 2014 on CPRN and EWER.
National Ownership and Sustainability

Finding 11: Of the 1207 components, CSM-SSD works with the most ministries and national stakeholders, although there are few signed MOUs with these institutions. These include PM’s Advisory Council; PNTL, district commands; Community Policing and other units; Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-DTL); Ministry of the Interior (MOI), National Directorate for the Prevention of Community Conflict (NDPCC); Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), National Directorate for Assistance and Social Cohesion (NDASC), Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion (DPBSC); Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Defense and Security; and Parliamentary Committee B.

Finding 12: According to sources, sustainability and national ownership are weakened by the lack of organizational understandings between Belun and the ministries they are trying to improve. Belun has struggled for years to acquire MOUs with PNTL and other ministries. Most sources felt CSM reporting was important for national planning and policy, especially the EWER function, and ministries seem to increasingly recognize the value in the larger institutional analysis provided by FM.

Finding 13: Funding is a key problem for supporting ongoing reporting and monitoring as well as the CPRN.

CONCLUSIONS: CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING OF SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (CSM-SSD)

Program Design

The functioning of this component was strengthened by the fact that the organizations had in place the basic core structures, strategy and plans, and the skills and existing networks of qualified monitors, as well as a better understanding of the national stakeholders and communities than a new implementer would.

The design underestimations meant that there was limited local or ministerial input into how the data/analysis might be meaningfully used once consolidated, especially with the evolving PNTL structures and other security sector actors—a design flaw that has impacted CSM-SSD potential effectiveness.

Gender integration in the CSM component was not well defined, but there are potentially two areas for improvement moving forward: one is to look at gender integration in the security sector itself (monitoring of female officers, getting the information to policymakers in a way to support their growth, etc.); the other is to look critically at the gaps in gender involvement in community-based forums designed to impact and prioritize human security needs.

Program Management and Implementation

This component was a good fit for the 1207 proposal for Timor-Leste, as it added an important role for civil society in security sector reform efforts. This component was extremely cost-effective and the number of national partners that had access to reports and information was significant. The USAID model and procedures were clear to both implementing partners, and the variety of contact and discussion formats for checking in were strong, providing ample opportunity for problem solving and activity adaptation. However, local NGOs face problems that needed to be addressed, such as finding a more streamlined approach to financial reimbursement that prioritizes these issues for national organizations.
Program Outcomes
Efficiency and effectiveness of what the CSM-SSD is trying to achieve overall are hindered by the extremely top-down nature of the PNTL. In addition, the paramilitary character of special units’ leadership does not prioritize community security and human security trend analysis. The value of data and how it can be used needs to be taught and socialized within the PNTL structure and enforced through national leadership working on SSD issues.

Within PNTL there are also varied levels of incident reporting, and this is also true of the Ministry of the Interior and various departments working on SSD. National-level incident monitoring and databases tend to be poorly designed and not well integrated at the ministerial level and the same is true for PNTL.

It is not clear if the program has changed the attitudes and behaviors of the PNTL outside of the CPRN forums. As more senior levels of the PNTL are made aware of the monitoring function, security sector actors as well as community members raise the question as to whether this level of accountability will improve the perception of professionalism and community-level interactions.

National Ownership and Sustainability
National ownership and sustainability require more targeted coordination and greater buy-in with senior-level government staff and PNTL officers. There needs to be a more effective system for looking at incident and trend analysis at the national level that allows a civil society perspective to enhance human security planning at the national level with security sector institutions, but civil society also needs support at higher political levels that does not compromise its independence.

There are signs that certain ministries are interested in supporting the EWER and other analyses, particularly as more senior commanders at the national level in the PNTL and F-FDTL are being made aware of these reports—but there is no agreement yet on what the modality would be and how better integrated reporting and data analysis would be utilized.

RECOMMENDATIONS: CONFLICT MITIGATION THROUGH COMMUNITY-ORIENTED POLICING (CMCOP)

Program Design
• There is a need to refine the approach to Community Policing in Timor-Leste, specifically to consider the costing issues associated with specific donor interventions and partnerships with PNTL, and to ensure that efforts are in close alignment with current structural and institutional needs of PNTL, as well as current organic law, procedures, and policies.
• Future design efforts should utilize the extensive data generated by TAF and efforts relating to Community Policing for national consumption at the Executive level of the MOI.
• Future community policing efforts funded by donors should focus primarily on elaborating evidence for specific processes of change at the local level. To that end, a number of proxy indicators for strengthening this evidence base and monitoring change should be developed in the inception stages.

Program Management and Implementation
• The efforts working with KPKs should be analyzed to assess how KPKs may assist the GoTL in planning OPS efforts as well as deepening analysis for more systemic ADR services to be administered within PNTL, especially for low-level community conflicts such as local land issues.
• Enhance monitoring of the KPKs that were formed earlier as well as KPKs that seem to more successfully resolve certain types of conflict(s) that are non-criminal in nature, but resource-consumptive for the PNTL or local authorities. Then use that data to adjust program design and scale-up of the KPKs as needed based on this information.

• As operating environments and context changes, programs need to be able to change with the times. Such adaptation and experimentation can be best supported through rigorous M&E processes that can inform decision-making and flexible contracting mechanisms that allow for adaptation. There is a need for better utilization of data generated from community policing efforts and made accessible to District Commanders.

Program Outcomes

• Thorough and meticulous use of data should be replicated in community policing programs, with programmatic efforts grounded in empirical findings and verifiable facts.

• Better track specific institutional gaps in response within PNTL on public crime issues such as domestic violence issues. This could be done through analysis of community policing methods and practices, utilizing public crime response as a point of meta-analysis across districts.

• Refine the methods at the local level for conflict resolution involving PNTL and traditional leaders. There needs to be an emphasis within the justice sector on defining more clearly the role of customary law and the role that this plays in local conflict resolution. This should be codified either in a resolution or through a local government act or law to avoid complications in defining the roles and responsibilities within the local government structure and at the suco level.

National Ownership and Sustainability

• Promote a stronger understanding of community policing within the Timorese parliament and government, where communication about the program is also important.

• To avoid slipping into a more state-centric and top-down understanding of security, the proposed way forward is to focus on the security perspective of the end user and on the content of interaction at and within the suco level. CMCOP has offered a successful model for an increased level of engagement between communities and the PNTL, but more extensive use of the lens of social inclusion, and synergy with other Social Protection and Human Security programs in Timor-Leste, could be explored as part of the practical implementation of Community and Human Security needs in Timor.

• Future community policing programs must build in a tracking system to identify gaps and issues between the traditional systems in Timor-Leste and adaptations planned in the Justice System. These gaps impact community-level security, and “flash points” such as land conflict, domestic violence issues, and child protection issues need to be strategized at a national level but operationalized within the suco.

RECOMMENDATIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY STRENGTHENING IN THE PNTL

Program Design

• Support PNTL in establishing an online system of disciplinary cases and management through the already implemented “Integrated Management System” for criminal cases developed by UNDP. Work with the new UNDP program of support to PNTL to see that this is done.
Program Management and Implementation

- Work with other donors and PNTL to finalize the existing draft of the Disciplinary Procedure Manual to guide investigation officials within PNTL (to be used by both PNTL and OIA) and establish technical procedures for the proposed PNTL Disciplinary Law.

Program Outcomes (Behavior Change)

- PNTL needs more targeted training on international and internal law, especially regarding international human rights standards, constitutional law, criminal law, criminal procedure law, disciplinary laws, and administrative procedural laws specific to the context and conditions in Timor. Determine feasibility of providing this training or identify other actors who are able to do so.
- Civil protection is weak in Timor-Leste and disciplinary infractions are often tied to human rights abuses. Based on the legacy of a more militarized approach to policing, it is critical that the PNTL adapt to its new strategy (2014–2018) and develop curricula and support the Police Training Center to address this need.

National Ownership (Sustainability)

- PNTL is governed by procedures that are too similar to those of F-FDTL. There is a need for legal and technical guidance for the MOI that addresses these issues and helps cabinet staff advise the Minister on critical coordination issues relevant to security sector reform responsibilities.
- Support PNTL in developing a reporting and infraction system that is in alignment with the Civil Service 286/296 penal code. PNTL officers that commit crimes as public officials are accountable and enforcement is needed to minimize the potential for corruption within PNTL.
- Link district-level tracking systems for disciplinary infractions to a central database system to track cases, resolution, and penalties for officers and clearly link these to Human Resources within PNTL.

RECOMMENDATIONS: INVESTIGATIONS TRAINING

Program Design

- Ensure that training content and methodologies are in line with the local context and culture and take into consideration that the current technical capacity of PNTL for investigations and evidence protection is still developing. Remain flexible during implementation to ensure that all donors working on training cooperate in order to minimize confusion for PNTL staff working in the PNTL Training Center.
- Ensure that training Advisors are embedded within well-established institutions such as within PNTL or the PNTL Training Center. This will ensure more effective donor coordination on shared training efforts, minimize confusion within PNTL, and ensure that training is effective, well-targeted, and cost-effective for the USG and the GoTL.
- The PNTL has received a wide variety of training from different sources, and this information must be consolidated into a usable format that is appropriate for the Timorese context so that the curriculum can be fully adopted by the Police Training Center to ensure national ownership.
- Assess in what ways Timor-Leste’s legislature can enact changes in the law to streamline the investigative process and empower PNTL investigators to take investigative actions on key issues that can be dealt with within the PNTL system, while ensuring that necessary procedural safeguards and a judicial check on PNTL remain. This will help to help alleviate stress on the justice system and minimize unnecessary institutional delays as well as improve coordination between PNTL and prosecutors working with the Ministry of Justice.
Program Management and Implementation

- Allow for a no-cost extension for the IOM program so there is adequate time to plan and implement this program.
- Ensure that training advisors are embedded within well-established institutions. This limits the lag time during the start-up phase and allows the Advisor to work more effectively within a limited timeframe and budget.

Program Outcomes

- Enhance the monitoring and reporting requirements for training programs, with a focus on higher-level outcome indicators.

National Ownership and Sustainability

- Create a National Laboratory, instead of a police crime lab, which would be more comprehensive and used by other agencies besides the PNTL. A National Laboratory would address the shortage of investigative equipment and provide a space for other government agencies to undertake scientific testing, such as for environmental services, water testing, etc.
- Timor-Leste is in need of appropriate facilities to carry out police investigation work; however, any equipment donated must be thoroughly considered in terms of availability of qualified staff and long-term maintenance and training needs.

RECOMMENDATIONS: STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, MARINE PATROL UNIT (MPU)

Program Design

- Ensure that implementing partners (IPs) are appropriate in terms of technical approach, as well as possessing a solid understanding of the country context. IPs should ideally have a presence in the country, and the senior-level management staff should also ideally be located in country.
- A maritime police unit requires functioning boats and the internal capacity to repair and maintain boats. Any training provided should take into account the possession, or lack thereof, of functioning equipment.
- In order to be most effective, the original design phase and the implementation design phase should be as consultative as possible. Potential partners should be identified early on and included in the design process, including from the ministerial to the lower levels.

Program Management and Implementation

- Remote management by an Advisor for training activities is not the ideal model. It would be more effective for an international staff member to be based in Dili to provide ongoing support and mentorship.
- Training requires follow-up. Implementation moving forward should consider follow-up with training participants on the application of new knowledge.
- Review administrative and funding procedures for INL programs. Determine potential sticking points and, early on, determine alternative solutions for potential bureaucratic delays.
- Study tours are not the most effective means for training in low-capacity environments. Focus training instead on what is feasible in the local context.
Program Outcomes

- Enhance the monitoring and reporting requirements for training programs, with a focus on higher-level outcome indicators. Regularly gather case studies and examples of successes and failures and capture these in a knowledge management system.
- Support the MPU in establishing a clear mandate. Define what the MPU is and is not responsible for policing. This might include additional clarity regarding issues such as illegal fishing, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and rescue services.

National Ownership and Sustainability

- As Timor-Leste moves toward ASEAN membership, it is critical that the MPU have a strategy and plan for addressing and prioritizing marine protection issues. There needs to be a comprehensive approach to prioritizing marine protection needs within PNTL—as well as more broadly between PNTL, F-FDTL, and other areas of government—and a specific strategy and plan for addressing funding needs at the national level.
- The MPU requires a training approach that is catered to the context and resources currently available within PNTL. A maritime police unit requires functioning boats and the internal capacity to repair and maintain boats. Any training provided should take into account the possession, or lack thereof, of functioning equipment—as well as an ability to properly procure parts and conduct repairs.
- The MPU requires certain material goods to function at a higher level, but there must be systems in place to track, manage, and repair donated items.

RECOMMENDATIONS: STRENGTHENING LAND AND SEA BORDERS, BORDER PROTECTION UNIT (BPU)

Program Design

- A comprehensive Training Needs Assessment (TNA) should precede training delivery that is targeted at the specific PNTL unit and its functional job areas to ensure global or regional standards are appropriately adapted.
- Coordinate training among all four agencies responsible for securing border crossings. BPU is only one part of the equation. All organizations at the border crossings require the same basic knowledge as BPU in order to perform their jobs sufficiently, and require coordination.

Program Management and Implementation

- Ensure that PNTL institutional capacity exists or can be developed when looking into developing new PNTL governance structures such as BLOs.
- Remote management by an Advisor for training activities is not the ideal model. It would be more effective for an international staff member to be based in Dili to provide ongoing support and mentorship.
- A more detailed calculation of the value for money for trainings provided must be done. Are there better uses for funding?
- If global or regional standards for border protection training are provided in low-capacity environments, such as the PNTL in Timor-Leste, a comprehensive training needs assessment (TNA) needs to be conducted that takes into account the specific roles and functions of the BPU. This TNA should be targeted at the BPU and include information about coordinating with other entities also responsible for border protection issues in Timor-Leste.
Program Outcomes
• There is a strong need for a more detailed and comprehensive M&E framework to guide program decision-making and resource allocation. This framework should incorporate appropriate outcome-level indicators for this context according to global best practices.

National Ownership and Sustainability
• It is necessary to continue to follow up with BPU on staff training and ensure that there are practical applications on the job. The approach needs to move beyond simply providing training, but how to integrate learning into work processes.
• Review the budget process for the PNTL and how funds are allocated. The BPU needs data in order to better justify budget requests.

RECOMMENDATIONS: POLICE LOGISTICS
Program Design
• A mentoring approach is useful in this context. It is critical that all future efforts include both ongoing mentoring and specific technical training to ensure that logistics staff are able to manage and monitor the systems developed with the PNTL Logistics Department.

Program Management and Implementation
• Decisions about programs that are not working out as expected, perhaps requiring course correction, should be made earlier. Effective monitoring systems should be in place to support this decision making. Clearly establish milestones and indicators of success for program components. If mitigating circumstances exist that do not allow the program to move forward, there should be the option of reallocating funding more easily.
• For this particular type of programming, with an Advisor embedded within a specific department, ensure that management systems are clearly in place. Advisors can make progress more quickly with strong institutional support.

Program Outcomes
• Perform a cost/benefit analysis of providing training to staff and determine if other uses of resources could provide a larger impact.
• Provide the opportunity for practical applications of training material for better integration of skills learned and ensure there is enough funding to provide more post-training assessment and support.

National Ownership and Sustainability
• The team should work to identify champions within the PNTL, ensuring the right people are in place to sustain initiatives after donor assistance has ended.
• Ensure the creation of appropriate work plans and budgets to adequately resource initiatives.
• Developing a comprehensive asset management system, ideally building upon what is in existence at the government, should take priority, as this is an essential operations and management tool for PNTL as an institution.

RECOMMENDATIONS: YOUTH ENGAGEMENT TO PROMOTE STABILITY (YEPS)
Program Design
• Ensure that future youth program planning at USAID develops tools and methods that ensure implementing partners work with PNTL, ministerial staff, and traditional and local leaders to effectively target at-risk youth at the national, district, and local levels.
• Encourage pilots that track youth civic engagement after elections; this could be another way to identify pathways for youth engagement that involve youth in national-level planning and program development with national ministries and leadership.

Program Management and Implementation
• Continue to fund, where possible, CBR interventions, as this is a critical forum for youth issues in Timor-Leste. Ensure that programs in the local language are expanded at the local and sub-district levels to increase coverage.

Program Outcomes (Behavior Change)
• Pilot a feasibility study of how to increase the capacity of national ministries and local organizations to reach at-risk youth in Timor-Leste. Work with national partners to develop youth strategies to address this evolving and pressing need. This analysis should include the added pressures of rural-to-urban migration of youth that is likely to continue into the future in Timor-Leste.

National Ownership (Sustainability)
• Forums such as the National Youth Parliament are well established but need more training on how to engage in national planning and prioritization with national leadership, including basic budget analysis training.
• Look for means to financially support CBRs in creating new programming and improve the overall technical and operational capacities of the stations by deepening their engagement with the Ministry of Communication.

RECOMMENDATIONS: CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING OF SECURITY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT (CSM-SSD)

Program Design
• Develop a system for ensuring that independent data analysis and reporting is accessible for PNTL district-level commanders of the various units so that they can better respond to community security risks.
• Given that there are fewer women trained and qualified to do this type of analysis and programmatic work, Belun/FM activities should consider working with university programs, intern training mechanisms, etc., so that initial steps for decreasing this particular gender gap can be taken.
• Develop gender-specific indicators to monitor in the EWER work, using that information to support gender-integration standards and policies in the PNTL and other security institutions.
• Clarify the potential conflation/cohesion of the CPRNs with the KPKs and develop action plans to synchronize program planning and anticipated outcomes where possible.

Program Management and Implementation
• Assess the adaptability of the reimbursement/refund system for project management designs in the future for smaller local NGOs. Determine whether there is the potential for an initial funding bump at the start of a project, including core funding on top of activity funding, particularly for national and local organizations.
**Program Outcomes (Behavior Change)**

- A CSM Secretariat role to the government, placed in the Prime Minister’s office, would be a good way to increase the value and usefulness of this type of reporting. It would be best if this were made up of a consortium of national and local organizations where the lead secretariat role could rotate between groups.

- Support the use of experienced national and international advisors to help strengthen organizational capacity for Belun and FM. These national NGOs still need support in institutional development and management information systems (MIS). Targeted technical support will to allow these national NGOs to scale up early warning management and to support early warning early response needs at the national level.

- Look at the potential of establishing different types of data sets and analysis linked directly to improvements in PNTL community-level interactions. With the new suco-level police officers being “rolled out” nationally, this is an advantageous time to look at unique ways to manage data tools and monitoring systems to increase utilization and improve human security.

- Address the lack of EWER awareness among senior officials in PNTL and within MOI by developing a forum at the PM level (CSM Secretariat) that would also increase consultations specifically with the MOI to ensure that there is an effective role for civil society in security sector monitoring and accountability systems.

**National Ownership (Sustainability)**

- Assist Belun in finalizing MOUs with key ministries—synchronizing budgets and priorities for the reporting—and include financial planning for governmental support for peace activities and mechanisms that increase PNTL human security response capacities at the sub-district level.

- This is a legacy program for USAID and Belun that has the potential to share lessons learned to help others develop more effective early warning, conflict-prevention response systems. Assess the potential for elements of the EWER system to be integrated into ASEAN or other regional bodies for greater influence.
ANNEXES

ANNEX I: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

STATEMENT OF WORK

1. TITLE OF ACTIVITY

“Evaluation of ‘Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace’ Program in Timor-Leste”

2. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Task Order is to conduct a performance evaluation of all nine “1207-funded” projects managed by U.S. Embassy/Dili and USAID/Timor-Leste under the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” program, started in 2011 with some projects still on-going (see Annex I).  

The U.S. Mission in Timor-Leste conceived of this suite of nine projects, including a Senior Legal Advisor - 1207 Coordinator/ Conflict Analyst (non-PSC), totaling $11.32 million, to help guard against potential violence and instability as the United Nations policing monitoring presence declined. The evaluation will cover the entire period of programming, starting with the 2010 Interagency Conflict Assessment, which led to the resource request and program planning, through to the present.

This evaluation will be used by the USG to inform the direction of continuing projects under the program, as well as the design of any future support in the conflict prevention, policing and civil society sectors in Timor-Leste. More broadly, the proposed evaluation will be shared with other donors and other USAID and State Department offices and so can provide valuable research to inform the development of ongoing and future conflict and violence prevention efforts by both USAID and the Department of State in other countries.

3. BACKGROUND

In 2010, U.S. Embassy/Dili in Timor-Leste was awarded $11.32 million from State Department 1207 funds (see Annex 2) to “decrease risks of violence and instability in anticipation of the ongoing drawdown of the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste police monitoring presence by building capabilities of vetted law enforcement institutions and providing opportunities for at-risk Timorese youth.”  

The program, which came to be known as “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace,” was designed to address critical weaknesses within the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), as well as support civil society to monitor developments in the security sector and threats to stability, and foster positive police-community relations.

Initial activities began in 2011, with project management responsibilities shared by the Department of State and USAID/Timor-Leste (some activities commenced in 2013 and 2014.) Overall coordination is provided by the U.S. Embassy/Dili 1207 Coordinator. The program has the following components:

- Investigative Training
- Strengthening Land and Sea Border Control

1. The nine projects are grouped as eight components. There is an additional non-project component for the 1207 Coordinator position. This non-project component is not part of the evaluation.
2 Congressional Notification. 1207 Funds are US Department of Defense funds transferred to the US State Department to implement projects in countries that demonstrate, or have recently demonstrated, instability:

- Police Logistics
- Youth Engagement to Promote Stability
- Civil Society Monitoring of Security Sector Development
- Conflict Mitigation through Community-Oriented Policing
- Accountability Strengthening in the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL)
- Conflict Analyst/program coordinator

While there are a number of discrete activities (see Annex 1), in most cases the primary beneficiary is the PNTL. Activities are implemented by a variety of USG and non-USG partners including: U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), U.S. Navy 30th Naval Construction Regiment, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Asia Foundation, International Organization for Migration, Search for Common Ground, Creative Corrections, and Belun (a Timorese NGO). Most recently, the program initiated activities to address trafficking in persons (under the Investigative Training component), in response to Timor-Leste’s 2014 downgrade to the Tier 2 Watch List for Trafficking in Persons (see Annex 1)\(^3\). Some activities will be concluded before the Contractor is deployed for the evaluation.

Activities have been regularly monitored through project reporting and narrative analysis supplied to the State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) on a quarterly basis. (Additionally, the Community Policing element of the project, which is implemented by The Asia Foundation through USAID, was evaluated in September 2014 in conjunction with New Zealand Aid’s own community policing project.) This evaluation will be provided to the evaluation team.

Recognizing the breadth of the evaluation proposed, it is expected that the Contractor will utilize existing documents (such as prior project and related reviews) whenever possible.

4. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

a. How was the original design (choice of components) appropriate or not to the Timorese context i.e. a newly independent country with nascent organizations? How appropriate was the program in addressing Timor-Leste’s country-wide conflict dynamics? Was the design consistent with 1207 principles and funding authority, as defined by the Department of State?

b. Was the rationale for making changes in the program logical within the country context and timely?

c. What were the outcomes of the completed projects (changes in knowledge, attitudes and behavior) and were some of them measurable?

d. For interventions that were completed as of the time of the evaluation, were results sustained? For interventions that are ongoing, are they sustainable without donor assistance (for example, has the PNTL continued to implement changes made with their own funding as necessary)?

e. Were the activities as implemented consistent with 1207 principles and funding authority?

f. What key needs addressed by the program still require support and why? Are there priority needs not addressed by the program that contribute to the program’s objectives?

5. SUGGESTED METHODS OF EVALUATION

The Contractor is expected to rely primarily on qualitative methods utilizing key informant interviews and desk review of relevant documents. As well, the Contractor should implement a small survey instrument to quantify changes in knowledge, attitudes or behavior among direct beneficiaries. The Contractor may propose other applicable qualitative and/or quantitative methods as appropriate.

6. GENDER INTEGRATION

While not all of the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” projects include a specific gender focus, it is USAID policy to include gender aspects whenever relevant including in evaluation activities. To fulfill the Purpose of this evaluation, the Contractor should consider the different needs of men and women. The Contractor should
consider how project outcomes and impacts were affected by the participation of women versus men, and specifically how the projects could increase the number of women beneficiaries (either direct or indirect).

7. PLACE OF PERFORMANCE
The Contractor shall conduct the majority of their work in Dili, Timor-Leste. While most interviews can be conducted in Dili, the Contractor should be prepared to travel to one or more districts outside of Dili (not including Oecusse or Lautem) if necessary to meet project beneficiaries. Trips outside Dili may or may not require overnight travel.

The Contractor may choose to conduct some activities (such as desk review of documents, report writing) before and after deployment to Timor-Leste, as agreed upon in the Work Plan. Prior to deployment to Timor-Leste, interviews with Department of State (DOS) personnel will be required as agreed upon in the Work Plan. These may be done in person (if Washington, DC) or by telecommunication if the DOS contact is not located in Washington, DC.

8. TEAM COMPOSITION
The evaluation team consists of three members: three technical specialists and a local interpreter/logistician. While it would be especially valuable that each of the technical specialists have extensive and documented experience in conducting performance evaluations, it is a requirement that at least the team leader has this experience. While democracy and governance experience is required for team members, at least one of them must have experience working on projects on conflict prevention or policing in a development context. See Section F for Key Personnel. The above is a suggested staffing pattern. The Contractor may propose a different staffing pattern that meets the functional requirements described above.

9. DELIVERABLES
a. **Work Plan.** Within 30 days of the award of the Task Order, the Contractor shall submit a detailed Work Plan to the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) for approval. The Work Plan shall include a list of tasks to be completed including: (1) a brief of explanation of the purpose of the task in connection to the overall objective; (2) the necessary steps to complete the task; (3) the person(s) responsible for the task, and; (4) a timeline for the implementation of the task. The Work Plan should identify any actions required by the COR to support the Work Plan, consistent with Section 10.2 below.

b. **Evaluation Design.** Within 30 days of the award of the Task Order, the Contractor shall submit a detailed Evaluation Design to the USAID Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) for approval. The evaluation design will include a detailed evaluation design matrix (including key and sub-questions, methods and data sources used to address each question and the data analysis plan for each question), draft questionnaires and other data collection instruments or their main features, known limitations to the evaluation design, and a dissemination plan based on input from the USAID COR. The final design requires USAID COR approval prior to data collection.

c. **In-Brief with U.S. Embassy/Dili and USAID/Timor-Leste.** The Contractor must make arrangements through the USAID COR to provide the U.S. Mission with an introductory oral briefing within three business days of arrival in Dili. At this meeting, the Contractor will be expected to present their Work Plan.

d. **Exit Briefing with U.S. Embassy/Dili and USAID/Timor-Leste.** Before departing Timor-Leste, the Contractor shall provide an oral briefing to the U.S. Mission, presenting preliminary findings.

e. **First Draft Evaluation Report.** On a date agreed upon in the Work Plan, the Contractor shall provide the USAID COR (electronically) with a draft version of the evaluation report, using Microsoft Word. Comments from the USG (i.e., U.S. Embassy, USAID, DOS) will be provided to the Contractor through the USAID COR. The report will meet the criteria outlined in USAID’s Evaluation Policy; [http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation and http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation/preparing-evaluation-reports](http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation).
In addition to comprehensively addressing the evaluation questions described in Section 4, the Evaluation Report should include: (1) a discussion of any constraints faced by the Contractor in the performance of the evaluation that were not resolved and impacted the outcome of the evaluation; (2) an index of all information products (source materials) used by the Contractor; (3) a list of all key informant interview participants with their contact details; (4) discussion of methodologies employed; (5) signed disclosures of conflict of interest from each member who worked on any substantive part of the evaluation, and; (6) if applicable, statements regarding any significant unresolved differences in opinion on the part of the evaluation team.

The overall length of the Evaluation Report should not exceed 35 pages (not including annexes), and must include an Evaluation Summary of two to four pages in length that summarizes the evaluation purpose, key findings, and recommendations. (Refer to Evaluation Summary below.)

f. **Second Draft Evaluation Report.** On a date agreed upon in the Work Plan, the Contractor shall submit a second draft evaluation report (electronic version, using Microsoft Word to the USAID COR that considers comments received on the first draft evaluation report. Comments from the USG on this second draft will be provided to the Contractor through the USAID COR.

g. **Final Evaluation Report.** On a date agreed upon in the Work Plan, the Contractor shall submit a final evaluation report (electronic version, Adobe Document – PDF) to the COR that considers comments received from the USAID COR based on the second draft report. The Contractor must submit the final report (Adobe Document – PDF), as approved by the COR, to the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse – DEC ([http://dec.usaid.gov](http://dec.usaid.gov)). At that time, COR will advise if viewership of the report on DEC shall be limited to USAID and Department of State.

h. **Evaluation Summary.** to be posted on the Director for Foreign Assistance Resources’ public website. A template will be provided. The Summary should include:
- Title of the evaluation
- Date the report was submitted
- Evaluation Questions
- Methodology used
- Key findings
- Recommendations
- The summary should discuss broad details rather than specifics. Confidential, sensitive and/or classified issues should be omitted.

i. **Oral presentation of evaluation report in Washington DC** to Department of State and USAID counterparts upon submission of final report.

10. **SUGGESTED TIMELINE**
An illustrative timeline for the evaluation team to conduct their work and provide a Final Report is shown below. A six-day work week is authorized while in Timor-Leste, provided activities are approved by the USAID COR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Week</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Order Awarded</td>
<td>Week 1 after award</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor Work Plan Approved</td>
<td>Week 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Departure Desk Review of Documents</td>
<td>Week 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG Key Informant Interviews in Washington DC</td>
<td>Week 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of Evaluation Team to Timor-Leste</td>
<td>Week 7 – 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis and Report Writing</td>
<td>Week 10 – 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11. LOGISTICS

a. Responsibilities Of The Contractor
The Contractor is responsible for all of their own logistical needs necessary to perform the evaluation including, but not limited to: entry visas, computer access with internet, document printing and copying, lodging, office space, transport, interpretation at meetings with project beneficiaries, and translation of source documents. The Contractor shall communicate directly with the USAID COR, proactively identifying constraints that may impact the performance of the evaluation.

b. Responsibilities Of The COR

The COR for the proposed evaluation is from USAID/Timor-Leste; as such, the COR will:

- Provide overall technical guidance for the evaluation
- Provide all necessary documents to the Contractor to enable the Contractor to perform a comprehensive desk review
- Ensure that the Contractor has the necessary information, including Letters of Introduction if needed, to conduct interviews in Timor-Leste with project beneficiaries and implementing partner
- Meet with the Contractor as necessary to provide technical direction
- Schedule opportunities for the Contractor to brief U.S. Embassy/Dili and USAID/Timor-Leste on the evaluation
- Provide prompt feedback to the Contractor when requested by the Contractor to ensure that the Contractor is able to meet the schedule, as agreed upon in the Work Plan.
- Serve as the overall Point of Contact between the Contractor and the U.S. Mission in Dili
- COR will coordinate with the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations as appropriate.

All modifications to the SOW, whether in technical requirements, evaluation questions, evaluation team composition, methodology or timeline, need to be agreed upon in writing by the Contracting Officer.
ANNEX II: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS

The final Evaluation Interview Guide and Data Collection Tools is included as an attachment to this evaluation report for USAID. Below are is a sample interview protocol as well as the KAB Tool used for the SGDs with PNTL trainees.

SAMPLE INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

The following is a sample KII protocol for USG interviews only. This is a guide tool for the evaluation team. As not all respondents had the same level of knowledge and experience with the SPSP program, respondents were weighted based on their role with the SPSP 1207 Program. Not all respondents were able to answer all questions so the team documented each interview and periodically held TPMs to analyze the data and establish relevant findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METHODS</th>
<th>INTERVIEW QUESTIONS *Coded based on role in SPSP Program</th>
<th>METHOD</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KII, SGD, or FGD, Remote Interview (RI)</td>
<td>1. Primary: Field Managers and Implementing Partners (P-FD)</td>
<td>KII, SGD, FGD</td>
<td>1. Document all staff who &quot;decline&quot; an interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skype or Conference Call</strong></td>
<td>2. Primary: Strategy Planning (P-SP)</td>
<td>KII</td>
<td>2. Ensure that category 1-3 are triangulated with follow-up questions in Timor-Leste and in DC with other USG staff and in SGDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Primary: Strategy Decision and Approval (P-DM)</td>
<td>KII, SGD</td>
<td>3. Coded categories 1-3 are weighted as these staff had primary tasks relating to activity outcome and impact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Secondary: Strategy Review only (S-SR)</td>
<td>KII, SGD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Secondary: Stakeholder key activity area (S-S)</td>
<td>KII, SGD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Peripheral: USG, External (donor, NGO, etc.) (PP)</td>
<td>KII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Introduction: Good morning/afternoon and thank you for taking the time to speak with us today. As mentioned during our interview request, we are currently working with USAID to gain a better understanding of the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” (SPSP) program which started in 2011. The evaluation will cover the entire period of programming, starting with the 2010 Interagency Conflict Assessment, which led to the resource request and program planning, through to the present. This evaluation will be used by the USG to inform the direction of continuing projects under the program, as well as the design of any future support in the conflict prevention, policing and civil society sectors in Timor-Leste.

Our team has had the opportunity to review documents provided by USAID and the Embassy to get a better sense of the design and implementation of the SPSP Program. However, such documents can only tell us so much.

We would like to speak with you today to hear about your experience, in your own words, in order to help us better understand how these projects look and function “on the ground.”

CONFIDENTIALITY PROTOCOL

- We will collect information on individuals’ names, organizations, and positions. A list of key informants will be made available as an annex to the final evaluation report, but those names and positions will not be associated to any particular findings or statements in the report.

- We may include quotes from respondents in the evaluation report, but will not link individual names, organizations, or personally identifiable information to those quotes, unless the respondent grants express written consent. Should the team desire to use a particular quote, photograph, or identifiable information in the report, the evaluators will contact the respondent(s) for permission to do so.
Below are the pertinent evaluation questions, and potential questions, to be addressed via a limited sample survey and triangulated through SGD(s):

**EVALUATION REFERENCE QUESTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 4.1: What were some of the intended and unintended outcomes of the completed projects both positive and negative (i.e. changes in knowledge, attitudes and behavior-KAB)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What were some of the changes in knowledge that you feel occurred as a result of training or inputs of the SPSP program?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What were some of the changes in your attitude regarding security sector performance that you feel occurred as a result of training or inputs of the SPSP program? Please provide specific examples (positive or negative).</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What were some of the changes in behavior or practice that you have noted individually or within your institution (unit) that you feel occurred as a result of training or inputs of the SPSP program? Please provide specific examples (positive or negative).</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 4.1.1: Were there examples in practice both positive and negative (i.e. knowledge, attitudes and behavior) evident as a result of 1207 project inputs?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>How could the positive examples have been improved or strengthened?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How could the negative examples be mitigated?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question 4.1.2: Were there examples of intended and unintended changes in practice both positive and negative effecting women and men?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>What were some examples in KAB, positive or negative relating to women in your institution?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>What were some examples in KAB, positive or negative relating to men in your institution?</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX III: BIBLIOGRAPHY

**No.** | **Document Description and Title**
---|---
1. | Project Reporting (USAID and State) - Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program, First Year Work Program
2. | Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program, FY2013 Q4
3. | Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program, FY2014 Q1
5. | Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program, FY2014 Q3
6. | Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program, FY2014 Q4
9. | IOM Concept Note
10. | IOM Quarterly Report to INL, First Quarter 2015
11. | IOM Quarterly Report to INL, Second Quarter 2015
12. | Report on The Launch of Guiding Principles On The Timorese Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding_SFCG
14. | Civic Leadership Training (CLTS) Report-Final_SFCG
15. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2015 Q1
16. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2015 Q2
17. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2014 Q1
18. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2014 Q2
19. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2014 Q3
20. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2014 Q4
21. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2013 Q1
22. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2013 Q2
23. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2013 Q3
24. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2013 Q4
25. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2012 Q4
26. | YEPS Quarterly Report, FY2012 Q3
27. | NGO Security Sector Monitoring Program Description
28. | CSM SSD Narrative Progress Report, Quarter One, FY 2014
29. | CSM SSD Narrative Progress Report, Quarter Two, FY 2014
30. | CSM SSD Narrative Progress Report, Quarter Three, FY 2014
31. | CSM SSD Narrative Progress Report, Quarter Four, FY 2014
32. | CSM SSD Narrative Progress Report, Quarter One, FY 2015
33. | CSM SSD Narrative Progress Report, Quarter Two, FY 2015
34. | Fundasaun Report to Belun, Quarter One, FY 2014
35. | Fundasaun Report to Belun, Quarter Two, FY 2014
36. | Fundasaun Report to Belun, Quarter Three, FY 2014
37. | Fundasaun Report to Belun, Quarter Four, FY 2014
38. | Fundasaun Report to Belun, Quarter One, FY 2015
39. | Fundasaun Report to Belun, Quarter Two, FY 2015
40. | CMCOP II Quarterly Report, Quarter One, FY 2012
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>CMCOP II Quarterly Report, Quarter Two, FY 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>CMCOP II Quarterly Report, Quarter Three, FY 2012</td>
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<tr>
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<td>CMCOP II Quarterly Report, Quarter Four, FY 2012</td>
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<td>48.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.</td>
<td>CMCOP II Quarterly Report, Quarter Two, FY 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>1207 PROGRAM FINANCIAL REPORTING</td>
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<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>YEPS FY 2012 Q3 Accruals Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>56.</td>
<td>Master Expense Spreadsheet with Supporting Course Logistics and Equipment Expense Spreadsheets, Timor-Leste Maritime Police Unit Capacity Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>57.</td>
<td>1207 Summary Financial Reports, FY2011 Q2 through FY2015 Q1</td>
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<tr>
<td>58.</td>
<td>USAID PERFORMANCE MONITORING PLANS (PMPs)</td>
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<td>59.</td>
<td>Youth Engagement to Promote Stability (YEPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>60.</td>
<td>Award # Aid-486-A-00-10-00005-00 Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (FY 2012 – FY 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61.</td>
<td>BALANCED SCORE CARD (BSC)</td>
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<td>62.</td>
<td>Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program</td>
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<td>63.</td>
<td>Civil Society Monitoring Of Security Sector Development (CSM-SSD) Project</td>
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<td>64.</td>
<td>Award No.: Aid-486-A13-00006 Performance Management Plan (FY 2014 - FY 2016)</td>
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<td>65.</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Through Community Oriented Policing Phase Ii (CMCOP II)</td>
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<td>67.</td>
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<tr>
<td>68.</td>
<td>Baseline Data – Ref. C.3.3. b, October 2014</td>
</tr>
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<td>69.</td>
<td>1207 USG REPORTING</td>
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<tr>
<td>70.</td>
<td>USAID Input to FY 14 Q1 1207 Report (Drafted January 22, 2014)</td>
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<td>71.</td>
<td>USAID Input to FY 14 Q2 1207 Report (Drafted May 12, 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>72.</td>
<td>Timor-Leste, FY14 Quarter 3 (Apr-Jun) Narrative Report, To be submitted by Post 1207 Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73.</td>
<td>Timor-Leste ICAF Report, April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74.</td>
<td>How to Prepare for Monitoring and Evaluation, Delivered January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75.</td>
<td>M&amp;E during the D Piloting in Timor-Leste, Delivered February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76.</td>
<td>Strategic Planning Team Exit Briefing for Mission Dili, April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.</td>
<td>USAID Conflict Assessment Update</td>
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<td>78.</td>
<td>State/CSO Timor-Leste FY 2011 Q1 Narrative Report</td>
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<td>86.</td>
<td>State/CSO Timor-Leste FY 2015 Q1 Narrative Report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1207 USG GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS**

| 87. | 1207 Guidance, Published January 2010 |
| 88. | 1207 Guidance, Published December 2014 |
| 89. | Congressional Notification for use of 1207 Funds |
| 90. | Information Memo USAID/Timor-Leste use of 1207 Funding, March 2012 |
| 91. | Timor-Leste 1207 Project Proposal, April 2010 |
| 92. | Timor-Leste 1207 Project Proposal Budget |

**1207 PROJECT CONTRACTS/COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS**

| 94. | UNODC No-Cost Extension Letter |
| 95. | YEPS Program Description |
| 96. | YR4PB Cooperative Agreement |
| 97. | SCOPE Program Description |
| 98. | Program Description: Civil Society Monitoring of Security Sector Development |

**1207 TRAINING ROSTERS**

| 99. | MPU Class Roster for Small Boat and Logistics Operations Course |
| 100. | MPU Class Roster for Maritime Law Enforcement Training Course by Queensland Water Police |
| 101. | MPU Class Roster for FLECT Commercial Vessel Boarding Training Program |
| 102. | MPU Class Roster for Boarding Officer Course |
| 103. | MPU Class Roster for Joint Boarding Officer Course |
| 104. | MPU Class Roster for Small Boat Operations II Course |
| 105. | MPU Class Roster for Consolidated Training Course |
| 106. | EMT and Monitor List for CSM-SSD |

**NON-USG DOCUMENTS**

| 107. | IOM Submission on the Timor-Leste Trafficking in Persons Law |
| 108. | PNTL Strategic Plan 2014-2018 |
| 109. | Costing the Ofisial Polisia Suco Initiative, February 2015 |
| 110. | Peace building Guiding Principles for Youth |
| 111. | Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Strengthening Governance and Service Delivery, UNDP Agreement |
| 113. | Strengthening Governance and Service Delivery in the PNTL Project 2016-2018 (PowerPoint Presentation) |
| 114. | UNODC BLO Conference Press Coverage |
| 115. | UNODC Pre and Post Test Questionnaire |
| 116. | Agenda: UNODC BLO Follow-Up Conference |
| 117. | UNODC Technical Needs Assessment & Inception Report: Provision of Assistance to the Border Patrol Unit (UPF) of the Policia National de Timor-Leste (PNTL) |
| 118. | UNODC PowerPoint: Smuggling of Migrants |
| 119. | UNODC PowerPoint: Training on Smuggling and Trafficking |
| 120. | DM&E SFCG-TL Quarterly Bulletin, August 2014 |
| 121. | UNODC Website Story: UNODC Supports the Combating of Illicit Trafficking Across the Land Border between the Republic of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste |
| 122. | UNODC Website Story: Strengthening border controls in Timor-Leste |
| 123. | UNODC Website Story: Border Patrol Units and Customs Officers in Timor-Leste Receive International Border Interdiction Training by U.S. Customs and Border Protection and UNODC |
| 125. | BALANCED SOCRED CARD (BSC): Accountability Strengthening in the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) Program |
| 127. | Institutionalizing Community Policing in Timor-Leste: Exploring the Politics of Police Reform (Asia Foundation) |
| 128. | Security Sector Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Country: Lessons from Timor-Leste (SFB) |
| 129. | UN Police, Justice, and Corrections Programming in Timor-Leste: A Compact Case Study (Stimson Center) |
| 130. | The Asia Foundation: The Proliferation of Security Providers and Assisters in the Context of Community Policing in Timor-Leste |

**MONITORING AND EVALUATION REPORTS**

| 131. | SFCG Mid-Term Media Monitoring Report |
| 132. | Joint Evaluation of Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme (TLCPP) and Hametin Koperasaun Hamutuk Polisia ho Komunidade (HAKOHAK) |
| 133. | Evaluation of the Konselhu Polisia Komunidade (KPK) component of the HAKOHAK program implemented by The Asia Foundation 2012-2015 |
| 134. | Final Evaluation, Youth Engagement to Support Stability |
## ANNEX IV: DISCLOSURE OF ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sarah Wood</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Social Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation Position?</td>
<td>Team Leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evaluation Award Number</td>
<td>AID-472-TO-15-00004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.

Yes

### If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:

Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:

1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

### Signature

[Signature]

### Date

June 20, 2015
Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Erin Blankenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Conflict Mitigation Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID Project(s) Evaluated(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</td>
<td>USAID/Timor-Leste-- Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace (SPSP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose. [ ] Yes [x] No

If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:

1. I have a family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant through indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
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Signature: Erin Blankenship
Date: 11/16/15
Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Meghan Neumann</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Democracy and Governance Specialist</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Evaluation Position?</td>
<td>☐ Team Leader  ☑ Team member</td>
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<tr>
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<td>☐ Yes  ☑ No</td>
</tr>
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If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>9/11/15</td>
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ANNEX V: EVALUATION QUESTION MATRIX

The following questions highlight the leading questions that were used to shape the evaluation and ensure that data was collected in a way that allowed Mission and USG priorities to be addressed for data collection and analysis. Lead questions were followed by sub-questions to guide the interview and discussion process and ensure that respondents were provided with enough time and detail to form their perspective and response. Each activity and component area of the SPSP program was also analyzed to assess possible attribution and contribution and also ensure that respondents were knowledgeable of USG inputs and resource contributions. Evaluation questions, sub questions, and data collection methods were noted as well as indications that were used to provide evidence of attribution and/or contribution to impact.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER AND CODE</th>
<th>EVALUATION QUESTIONS</th>
<th>DATA METHOD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION 1.1</td>
<td>&quot;Was the original program design appropriate or not to the Timorese country context (i.e. a newly independent country with nascent organizations and “forming” institutions etc.)?&quot;</td>
<td>DESK RESEARCH AND KII(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR</td>
<td>Did the original 1207 proposal and objectives track effectively with activities and near term outcomes of the project(s)?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What were the challenges in the context that may have impacted this?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Detail examples.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;Was the original program design appropriate or not for addressing Timor-Leste’s countrywide conflict dynamics?&quot;</td>
<td>DESK RESEARCH AND KII(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-QUESTION 1.1.1</td>
<td>Did the original 1207 proposal and objectives match the current context of the conflict in 2011?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What were the major conflict challenges in Timor-Leste at that time?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Were there any conflict or contextual factors that may have been missed in the original design of the 1207 SPSP Program?</td>
<td>DESK RESEARCH AND KII(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUB-QUESTION 1.1.2</td>
<td>What was the status of the security sector and what reforms were needed?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Was their agreement across donors and the RDTL as to the priorities for SSR improvements?</td>
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<td>If not? What were some of the areas of disagreement on national priorities vs. donor analysis (i.e. specifically conflict analysis)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUB-QUESTION 1.1.3</td>
<td>&quot;What were the challenges in working with nascent institutions and systems (i.e. newly formed RDTL ministry units or newly formed SSR systems)?&quot;</td>
<td>DESK RESEARCH AND KII(S), SGD(S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-3) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM</td>
<td>What was the status of PNTL as an institution in 2011 and now in 2015?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>What changes in government structure may have impeded or improved coordination and impact of the SPSP Program?</td>
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<tr>
<td>GENDER SUB-QUESTION 1.1.4</td>
<td>Did the original program design incorporate gender considerations in the individual component and activity selection and planning?</td>
<td>DESK RESEARCH AND KII(S),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR</td>
<td>What was the status of women in PNTL in 2011 and now in 2015? (i.e. recruitment numbers and officer positions etc.)</td>
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<td>What gender analysis and information was used to guide the original SPSP design?</td>
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<td>What resources were designated to the SPSP program to address imbalances in gender gaps identified during the design phase?</td>
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### SPSP 1207 Program Management

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 2.1</td>
<td>Was the rationale for making changes in the program logical within the country context and timely?</td>
<td>Desk Research and KII's</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • How were changes made in the SPSP Program?  
  • What was the role of the 1207 coordinator vs. the State Department (i.e. State CSO etc.)? |                                   |
| Sub-Question 2.1.1 | How were changes made in the individual component and activity areas of the SPSP Program? What was the process (i.e. decision making etc.)? | Desk Research and KII's          |
| (1-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • At the implementing level (i.e. program partners)  
  • How were these changes reviewed and operationalized? What was the process? |                                   |
| Sub-Question 2.1.2 | What were the USG or country management structures that allowed for or inhibited program design changes (i.e. national partnership issues, MIS, monitoring systems etc.)? | Desk Research and KII's          |
| (1-3) P-FD, P-SP, AND P-DM | • How long did the decision process take?  
  • Could resources be easily reallocated for activities that were not well suited for the context?  
  • How were national counterparts involved in the decision making process for the SPSP program with the 1207 management team?  
  • What were the challenges? Could these have been mitigated?  
  • If so what are some examples. |                                   |
| Sub-Question 2.1.3 | Did implementing partners and USG stakeholders feel that changes in 1207 program components were logical based on the country context? To what degree? | Desk Research and KII's          |
| (1-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • Were changes in the 1207 program components logical based on the current context and needs for SSR in Timor-Leste?  
  • On a scale from 1-5 with “1” being “not well informed by country context conditions” and “5” being “very well informed by country context and conditions” how would you rate these changes?  
  • Any specific examples of why you used this rating? |                                   |
| Gender Sub-Question 2.1.4 | Did implementing partners and USG stakeholders feel that gender inclusion and empowerment issues were sufficiently addressed and monitored for necessary adaptations in the 1207 program component areas and activities? To what degree? | Desk Research and KII's          |
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • How were gender gaps or issues addressed in your component/activity of the SPSP program?  
  • For example…recruitment (inclusion) and promotion (empowerment)  
  • On a scale from 1-5 with “1” being “gender gaps not well identified” and “5” being “gender gaps well identified” how would you rate your component/project?  
  • Any specific examples of why you used this rating?  
  • On a scale from 1-5 with “1” being “MIS systems not designed to address gender needs” and “5” being “MIS systems well designed to address gender needs” how would you rate your component/project?  
  • Any specific examples of why you used this rating? | Desk Research and KII's, and FGDs |
# SPSP 1207 Program Implementation

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| QUESTION 3.1    | **Were the activities as implemented consistent with the 1207 principles and funding authority?**  
|                 | • Were the activities and component areas implemented consistent with the 1207 authority parameters?  
|                 | • Were there any issues or concerns with funding or resource use based on the 1207 funding authority guidelines? | Desk Research and KIIs |
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | **Was the original program design consistent with 1207 principles and funding authority, as defined by the Department of State?**  
|                 | • Were the activities and component areas as designed consistent with the 1207 authority parameters?  
|                 | • Were there any issues or concerns with the design and its funding or resource use based on the 1207 funding authority guidelines? | Desk Research and KIIs |
| SUB-QUESTION 3.1. | **Were there challenges faced by implementing partners and USG stakeholders in adhering to the original project design (i.e. contextual, management, design issues etc.)?**  
|                 | • Were there challenges in adhering to the original proposal and 1207 design?  
|                 | • If so, what were they? Please provide specific examples. | Desk Research and KIIs |
| (1-3) P-FD, P-SP, AND P-DM | **What were some of the issues faced by implementing partners and USG stakeholders in providing opportunities and access for women in the 1207 component areas and activities (i.e. contextual, management, design issues etc.)?**  
|                 | • Were there challenges in addressing gender gaps and needs in the 1207 activities and component areas?  
|                 | • If so, what were they? Please provide specific examples. | Desk Research and KIIs, SGDs |
### SPSP 1207 Program Outcomes

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 4.1</td>
<td>What were some of the intended and unintended outcomes of the completed projects both positive and negative (i.e. changes in knowledge, attitudes and behavior-KAB)?</td>
<td>Desk Research, Small Sample Survey, KII S and SGD Ss</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | - What were some of the changes in knowledge that you feel occurred as a result of training or inputs of the SPSP program?  
- Please provide specific examples (positive or negative).  
- What were some of the changes in your attitude regarding security sector performance that you feel occurred as a result of training or inputs of the SPSP program?  
- Please provide specific examples (positive or negative).  
- What were some of the changes in behavior or practice that you have noted individually or within your institution (unit) that you feel occurred as a result of training or inputs of the SPSP program?  
- Please provide specific examples (positive or negative). | Desk Research, Small Sample Survey, KII S and SGD Ss                        |
| Sub-Question 4.1.1 | Were there examples in practice both positive and negative (i.e. knowledge, attitudes and behavior) evident as a result of 1207 project inputs? | Desk Research, Small Sample Survey, KII S and SGD Ss                        |
| (1-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | - How could the positive examples have been improved or strengthened?  
- How could the negative examples be mitigated? | Desk Research, Small Sample Survey, KII S and SGD Ss                        |
| Gender Sub-Question 4.1.2 | Were there examples of intended and unintended changes in practice both positive and negative effecting women and men? | Desk Research, Small Sample Survey, KII S and SGD Ss                        |
| (1-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | - What were some examples in KAB, positive or negative relating to women in your institution?  
- What were some examples in KAB, positive or negative relating to men in your institution? | Desk Research, Small Sample Survey, KII S and SGD Ss                        |
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<tr>
<td><strong>QUESTION 5.1</strong></td>
<td>Is it likely that the results measured will be sustainable given the context of Timor-Leste? How likely?</td>
<td>DESK RESEARCH, SMALL SAMPLE SURVEY, AND KIIS</td>
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</table>
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • Do you think the activities within your institution supported by the SPSP program will be sustainable?  
• If so why?  
• How likely do you think these activities will be continued on a scale from 1-5, with “1” being “not likely at all” and “5” being “very likely” | |
| **SUB-QUESTION 5.1.1** | Of the projects not yet completed is there evidence that the efforts of the 1207 projects can be continued without donor assistance? | SMALL SAMPLE SURVEY AND KIIS |
| (1-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • Do you think the activities within your institution supported by the SPSP program will continue without donor assistance?  
• If so how? | |
| **SUB-QUESTION 5.1.2** | Is there evidence that elements of the 1207 projects are being continued using only national resources? | DESK RESEARCH, SMALL SAMPLE SURVEY, AND KIIS |
| (1-3) P-FD, P-SP, AND P-DM | • Can you provide some examples of how SPSP activities or inputs are being conducted using only national resources? | |
| **QUESTION 5.2** | What key needs addressed by the program still require support and why? | DESK RESEARCH AND KIIS |
| (1-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • Are their key activities or inputs of the SPSP program that you think need to continue and still require support?  
• What are they? Please provide example.  
• Why do you think they need to continue? | |
| **SUB-QUESTION 5.2.1** | What are the priority needs not addressed by the program that contribute to the program’s objectives, if any? | DESK RESEARCH AND KIIS, AND FGDs |
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • Are there other activities or inputs that you feel contribute to the SPSP objectives?  
• What are they? Please provide example. | |
| **GENDER** | To what extent are there gaps in gender integration that still need to be addressed or require additional support? | DESK RESEARCH AND KIIS, AND FGDs |
| **SUB-QUESTION 5.2.2** | | |
| (2-4) P-FD, P-SP, P-DM, AND S-SR | • Are there gender gaps or issues in your component/activity of the SPSP program that still need to be addressed?  
• If so what are they? For example…recruitment (inclusion) and promotion (empowerment)  
• What type of support is needed? Why?  
• Please provide specific examples. | |
ANNEX VI: SPSP EVALUATION INTERVIEW LIST

WASHINGTON D.C. AND REMOTE INTERVIEW LIST
1. Sara Mangiaracina - Department of State - Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) - Team Lead - 1207 Secretariat
2. Hilary Bullis - Department of State - Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
3. Jeff Kee - Department of State - Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)
4. Viveta Rozenbergs - Department of State - INL Bureau - Foreign Affairs Officer
5. Jane Gamble - Department of State - Timor-Leste Desk Officer
6. Bret Saalwaechter - USAID - Former DG Officer / Timor-Leste
7. Julie Pekowski, USAID - Timor-Leste Desk Officer
8. Peter Cloutier, Former USAID Timor-Leste Office of General Development / Office Director
9. Eileen Derby, Former Timor-Leste DG Officer
10. Cheryl Williams, Former Timor-Leste Program Officer and Director
11. Jonathan Hennick, Former DCM, Timor-Leste
12. Jeffery Borenstein, Former POL/ECON Officer at the Embassy in Dili

TIMOR-LESTE INTERVIEW LIST

SPSP implementing Partners
1. Sarah Dewhurst, The Asia Foundation, Chief of Party
2. Todd Wassell, Deputy Chief of Party, the Asia Foundation
3. Maria Marilia da Costa, Belun, Chief of Party
4. Nelson Belo, Fundasaun Mahein, Executive Director
5. Jose de Sousa, Search for Common Ground, Country Director
6. Carlos Almeida Simoes, Legal Advisor
7. Sabastao Freitas, UNODC
8. Bruno Maltoni, IOM, Chief of Mission
9. Andrew Harrington, IOM, Program Officer
10. Len Barak, NCIS, Special Agent
11. Steve Kissik, Creative Corrections, Lead Police Advisor, Logistics
12. Ken Johnson, Creative Corrections, Lead Police Advisor, Investigations

Other Donors
13. Ian McLachlan, New Zealand Police Project, TLCPP Team Leader (Former)
14. Pat Handcock, New Zealand Police Project, TLCPP Team Leader (Current)
15. Augusto Soares, New Zealand Embassy, Development Program Coordinator
16. Scott Watson, Australia Police Project, Detective Sergeant
17. Suzuki Masahiro, JICA Representative
18. Stephen Moore, UNDP, Senior Technical Advisor, Capacity Building Support to PNTL

USG
19. U.S. Ambassador Karen Stanton, Timor-Leste
20. Lisa Whitley, USAID - Director, Office of General Development
21. Lindsey Greising, US Embassy, 1207 Coordinator and Analyst
22. Ana Guterres, USAID, Project Management Specialist
23. Jerry Boavida, USAID, Project Management Specialist
24. Katherine Dueholm, US Embassy, Deputy Chief of Mission
27. Jason Mohler, US Embassy, Regional Security Officer
### GOTL

28. Carlos Jeronimo, PNTL Dept. of Justice, Director  
29. Carlos Moniz Maia, PNTL Dept. of Justice, Deputy Chief  
30. Virgílio Correia da Costa, PNTL General Inspectorate, PNTL Inspector  
31. Candida Soares, MOI Office of Inspection and Audit, Director General  
32. Fatima Graziela, MOI Office of Inspection and Audit, Department Chief  
33. Olimpia Lurdes, MOI Office of Inspection and Audit, Department Chief  
34. Manuel Luis da Silva, MOI Office of Inspection and Audit, Department Chief  
35. Boavida Ribeiro, PNTL National Commander of Community Policing, Asst. Superintendent  
36. Helena das Dores Alves, PNTL Community Police Unit, Chief Inspector  
37. Joao Sancho Pires, PNTL Border Control Unit, Superintendent Assistant  
38. Lino Saldhana, PNTL Maritime Unit, Commander  
39. Linho Vinhas, PNTL Maritime Unit, Admin Officer  
40. Mr. Aniceto, PNTL Maritime Unit, Operations Commander  
41. Basilio de Jesus, PNTL Chief of Logistics, Asst. Superintendent  
42. Nuno C. Xavier, PNTL Database Logistics

### KAB Survey and Small Group Discussions (SGDs)

#### PNTL Trainees

**PNTL Maritime Control Unit**

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<tr>
<th>ID</th>
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<th>Training Received</th>
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<tr>
<td>12529</td>
<td>Jose Manuel Gomes</td>
<td>Boarding Officer Course (2012), Instructor Course (2012), FLETC Commercial Vessel Boarding Training (2014), Consolidated Training Course (2013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12292</td>
<td>Jose da Conceicao (Fereira)</td>
<td>Small Boat Operations (2012), FLETC Commercial Vessel Boarding Course (2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13037</td>
<td>Francisco Maria de Sousa</td>
<td>Commercial Vessel Boarding Training (2014), Consolidated Training Course (2013)</td>
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**PNTL Border Control Unit**

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<tr>
<td>831727</td>
<td>Domingos A.T. GALOS</td>
<td>Human Trafficking Training 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>12506</td>
<td>Octaviana Ita Comala Seran</td>
<td>Human Trafficking Training 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>13729</td>
<td>Elizito dos Santos da Costa</td>
<td>Border Introduction Training</td>
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Evaluation of the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” (SPSP) Program
Evaluation of the “Supporting Police, Sustaining Peace” (SPSP) Program

PNTL Logistics

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<tr>
<td>13895</td>
<td>Vicente Gomes Maia Lembra</td>
<td>Border Introduction Training</td>
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<td>13767</td>
<td>Jaime Gracia dos Santos</td>
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<td>13862</td>
<td>Revelino Augusto da Silva</td>
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<td>13667</td>
<td>Agustinho de Se Sena</td>
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<td>13791</td>
<td>Jose Mendonca Tilman</td>
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<td>13724</td>
<td>Domingos Mariano de Assuncao</td>
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<td>13762</td>
<td>Isgar Gomes</td>
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<td>13845</td>
<td>Paulino Alves de Jesus</td>
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<td>77230198</td>
<td>Superintendent Assistant Joao Sancho Pires</td>
<td>Small cash smuggling</td>
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<td>77858047</td>
<td>Chief Inspector Bernardo Freitas</td>
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<td>77304017</td>
<td>Inspector Policia Jaimito Hei</td>
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<tr>
<td>77304016</td>
<td>Inspector Policia Adao de Araujo</td>
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Accountability Strengthening in MOI and PNTL

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<td>10070</td>
<td>Carlos Moniz Maia</td>
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<td>11833</td>
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<td>PNTL Dep. Justice</td>
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<td>12035</td>
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<td>PNTL Dep. Justice</td>
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