Briefing on Implementation Activities Under the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Signed: April 8, 2010

December 22, 2010 – Resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of the New START Treaty passes in the United States Senate.

February 2, 2011 – Instruments of Ratification signed by the President of the United States.

✓ January 26, 2011 – Treaty Ratification Draft Law was approved by the Soviet of the Federation.

✓ January 28, 2011 – Treaty Ratification Draft Law was signed by the President of the Russian Federation.

Entered into force: February 5, 2011
The New START Treaty Basic Parameters

Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limited by the Treaty</th>
<th>as of March 1, 2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>700</strong> For deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers;</td>
<td>RF</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1550</strong> For warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;</td>
<td>START, USA</td>
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<td><strong>800</strong> For deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.</td>
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Terms of reaching the limits set forth – in seven years after entry into force of the Treaty
The New START Treaty Mechanism Start-Up

**Formulation and coordination of the Russian Federation Government Regulation concerning the implementation of the Treaty provisions**

Delimitation of powers and responsibilities of ministries and agencies involved in issues relating to the Treaty implementation

- ✔ Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- ✔ Ministry of Defense;
- ✔ Ministry of the Interior;
- ✔ Ministry of Health and Social Development;
- ✔ Ministry of Communications and Mass Media;
- ✔ Ministry of Transport;
- ✔ Federal Customs Service;
- ✔ Federal Technical and Export Control Service;
- ✔ Federal Space Agency;
- ✔ Federal Air Transport Agency;
- ✔ State Atomic Energy Corporation "ROSATOM";

and several other ministries and agencies.

**Development of the interdepartmental documentation directed on realization of the Russian Federation Government Regulation**

The developed documents are directed on:
- working out the coordination procedures between ministries and agencies;
- determination of the amount of finance and financing procedures;
- ordering and acquisition of the equipment required for implementation of the Treaty procedures;
- adjustment of an operative data exchange system;
- defining the procedures governing the inspection activities.
The New START Treaty Implementation Structure

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

- Coordination of activities of Federal Executive Authorities.
- Carrying out data and notifications exchange with the American Party.
- Gathering and analysis of the information on a status of SOA.
- Carrying out the procedures of inspection activities.
- Carrying out the procedures of telemetry exchange.

SOA Facilities

ICBM Bases - 11 -
Air Bases - 3 -
Submarine Bases - 3 -
Test Ranges - 4 -
Storage Facilities - 6 -
Conversion or Elimination Facilities - 4 -
Loading Facilities - 2 -
Training Facilities - 3 -

- Providing the inspection equipment and necessary materials to inspectors and in-country escorts.
- Meeting and support of the American inspection teams and members of flight crews.
- Verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
U.S. interagency work consists of continuous coordination between policy oversight departments and committees, interagency analysis and decision-making bodies, the armed services, organizations responsible for ongoing treaty implementation, and respective counterparts on the Russian side.
The New START Treaty Implementation Structure in the United States

- Coordination of activities within the U.S. interagency.
- Carrying out biannual data exchanges and continues notifications exchange with the Russian Party.
- Gathering and analyzing the information provided by the Russian side.
- Carrying out the procedures of inspection activities in the United States and Russia.
- Carrying out the procedures of the annual telemetry exchange.

U.S. Interagency

Close and continuous work between policy and the operators

- Preparations for the biannual meetings of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
- Providing the inspection equipment and necessary materials to inspectors and in-country escorts.
- Meeting and support of the Russian inspection teams and members of Russian flight crews.
- Verification of U.S. and Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

U.S. SOA Facilities

- ICBM Bases - 3 -
- Air Bases - 3 -
- Submarine Bases - 2 -
- Test Ranges - 1 -
- Storage Facilities - 3 -
- Conversion or Elimination Facilities - 1 -
- Repair Facilities - 1 -
Basic Types of Activities Under The New START Treaty

I. Exchange of Notifications
II. Conduct of Inspection Activities
III. Use of National Technical Means of Verification

IV. Exchange of Telemetric Information

Additional confidence-building measure

Issues related to implementation of the procedures set forth by the Treaty provisions

V. Bilateral Consultative Commission
I. Exchange of Notifications

The Parties use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres as well as diplomatic channels in order to provide and receive notifications.

Planned Exchange (half-yearly):
- Data on the aggregate numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms;
- Data on number of deployed and non-deployed Strategic Offensive Arms;
- Data on number of warheads on deployed Strategic Offensive Arms;
- Data on facilities associated with Strategic Offensive Arms.

Current Exchange (updating of the changes in data):
- Notifications Concerning the data relating to Strategic Offensive Arms - 7 Formats;
- Notifications Concerning Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms - 6 Formats;
- Notifications Concerning Launches of ICBMs or SLBMs and the Exchange of Telemetric Information – 6 Formats;
- Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms - 4 Formats;
- Notifications Concerning Inspection Activities - 13 Formats;
- Notifications Concerning the Activities of the BCC and Additional Messages - 6 Formats.

The Parties continue the exchange of data, information and materials through the national Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers as well as via diplomatic channels. The number of notifications transmitted by both Parties since the signing of the Treaty is close to 7000. Within a year the Parties exchange approximately 2000 notifications.
II. Conduct of Inspection Activities

Type One Inspections
(10 inspections per year)

➢ Purpose:

▪ confirm the accuracy of the declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed Strategic Offensive Arms; number of warheads located on such deployed Strategic Offensive Arms;
▪ To provide assurances that the converted Strategic Offensive Arms have not been reconverted.

Type Two Inspections
(8 inspections per year)

➢ Purpose:

▪ To confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types and technical characteristics of non-deployed Strategic Offensive Arms;
▪ To confirm the fact of conversion or elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms;
▪ To confirm that formerly declared facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.

Exhibitions

✓ Aimed at demonstrating distinguishing features and confirming technical characteristics of new types, and demonstrating the results of conversion of the first item of each type of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Since the Treaty entered into force:

➢ The Parties have completely exhausted the established annual inspection activities quota (18 inspections for each Party);
➢ The Parties have conducted a number of exhibitions provided for by the Treaty.
## Inspection Activities Support

(arrangements made from the moment of receiving the notification of intent to conduct an inspection)

### Prior to Arrival of Inspection Team

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operative notifying of Federal Authorities, organizations and agencies</td>
<td>Operative update of the information on a status of SOA located at the facilities subject to inspection, determination of the presence of force-majeure circumstances impending the possibility of carrying out of inspection.</td>
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<tr>
<td>concerned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Allocation of necessary material resources (financial resources and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>required inspection or auxiliary equipment)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparation of accommodations (living premises and working rooms) in</td>
<td>Ordering and allocation of necessary means of transportation.</td>
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<td>the Point of Entry and at inspection sites.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formation of In-country Escort Team.</td>
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### Upon arrival of Inspection Team (in the Point of Entry and during the inspection)

- ensure prompt passing of inspectors and members of flight crew through the passport control.
- ensure their unobstructed passing through the customs.

Procedures in the Point of Entry (inspection of brought-in inspection equipment and personal luggage of inspectors; SSR and RDE operability check).

### Support of inspection team and rendering it of assistance in performing its functions during all period of stay on the territory of the Russian Federation

- provide inspectors and members of flight crew with meals, and, if necessary, with medical and other urgent services during all period of their stay in the country.
- provide inspectors the possibility to maintain telephone contact with the embassy on the territory of the Russian Federation; provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups at the inspection site.

Average duration of stay of inspection teams within the territory of the inspected Party makes 5-7 days.
III. Use of National Technical Means of Verification

For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty each Party uses National Technical Means of Verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

Obligations of the Parties:

- Not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with the Treaty;
- Not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

It is specified that:

The concealment measures shall not be used at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing.

This does not apply to the following practices:

- To cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or
- To the use of environmental shelters for Strategic Offensive Arms

The national technical means of verification shall be also used for the verification of conversion or elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms.
IV. Exchange of Telemetric Information
(additional confidence-building measure)

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such telemetric information.

The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs each calendar year.

When exchanging telemetric information, the Parties shall provide:

- Recording media containing a recording of telemetric information broadcast during a launch (in the agreed amount);
- Summaries of the recording media;
- Interpretive data for the telemetric information.

For each launch of an ICBM or SLBM that the Party is considering for provision of telemetric information to the other Party it shall not take any measures to deny access to the telemetric signal broadcast and shall not encrypt telemetric information that may be provided to the other Party.

Restriction: The Parties shall not exchange telemetric information that originates in reentry vehicles or in other objects installed on an ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space.

The Parties within the time frames set forth by the Treaty shall:

- agree on a number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, conducted in the previous calendar year, on which an exchange of telemetric information will be carried out;
- exchange telemetric information on agreed number of such launches of ICBMs and SLBMs.
V. Bilateral Consultative Commission

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The sessions of the BCC shall be convened no less than twice a year in Geneva, Switzerland. The Bilateral Consultative Commission is authorized to agree and, if necessary, to make changes in the Protocol to the Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty.

Within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission the Parties shall:

- Resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed by the Parties;
- Agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty;
- Resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm;
- Hold consultations on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of the Treaty;
- Discuss other issues raised by either Party.

The Parties have held nine sessions in course of which:
- discussions and an exchange of opinions on the issues related to the implementation of the procedures set forth by the Treaty took place;
- a number of additional measures directed at perfection of activities provided for by the Treaty was agreed upon;
- a number of agreed decisions directed on improving the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty was made.

During the intersessional period the Parties continue to:
- analyze the incoming data and information as well as the Treaty implementation progress;
- consider the specific questions raised in the BCC.
Conclusion

✓ The course of implementation of the New START Treaty confirms the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.

✓ The Parties demonstrate a constructive approach in resolving the questions related to the implementation of provisions of the Treaty.

✓ The Parties joint efforts have already brought tangible results.

✓ The New START Treaty clearly promotes implementation of the U.S. and Russia’s nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Parties will continue to implement the New START Treaty provisions.