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**COMPLIANCE WITH  
THE CONVENTION ON THE  
PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT,  
PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE  
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR  
DESTRUCTION**

**Condition 10(C) Report**



**February 2014**

**Prepared by the U.S. Department of State**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance  
February 2014

**CONDITION (10) (C) ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE  
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**

This Report is submitted consistent with Condition (10)(C) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC). The Convention was ratified by the United States on April 25, 1997, and entered into force (EIF) on April 29, 1997.

Condition (10)(C) provides as follows:

Annual reports on compliance: The President shall submit on January 1 of each year to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives a full and complete classified and unclassified report setting forth—

- (i) a certification of those countries included in the Intelligence Community's (IC) Monitoring Strategy, as set forth by the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Staff and the National Intelligence Council (or any successor document setting forth intelligence priorities in the field of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)) that are determined to be in compliance with the Convention, on a country-by-country basis;
- (ii) for those countries not certified pursuant to clause (i), an identification and assessment of all compliance issues arising with regard to adherence of the country to its obligations under the Convention;
- (iii) the steps the United States has taken, either unilaterally or in conjunction with another State Party;
  - (I) to initiate challenge inspections of the noncompliant party with the objective of demonstrating to the international community the act of noncompliance;
  - (II) to call attention publicly to the activity in question; and

- (III) to seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
- (iv) a determination of the military significance and broader security risks arising from any compliance issue identified pursuant to clause (ii); and
- (v) a detailed assessment of the responses of the noncompliant party in question to action undertaken by the United States described in clause (iii).

For its part, both as a matter of national policy and as a guide to national policy, the United States undertakes its own independent review – based upon the best available information, including intelligence information – of the compliance of CWC States Parties with their obligations under the Convention. The United States believes that CWC States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places a high premium upon their compliance both with specific detailed declaration and implementation provisions (*e.g.*, Articles III, IV, V, and VII) and with the “general obligations” of Article I.

Information and assessments in this report are current as of December 31, 2013. This Report highlights new developments since the last Condition (10) (C) Report, and refrains from repeating much older information found in previously submitted reports. The Federal Republic of Somalia (Somalia) and the Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) became States Parties to the CWC in 2013.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Technical Secretariat (TS) reported, as of July 31, 2013, that there were:

- Two CWC States Parties that had yet to designate a National Authority: Somalia and Timor-Leste.
- Eighty-one CWC States Parties that had not yet notified the TS of the adoption of implementing legislation and/or regulations that cover all the initial measures (scheduled chemical transfers, prohibitions, penalties, extraterritorial obligations, legal basis of regulations, and establishment of national authority): Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei

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Darussalam, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

- Eleven CWC States Parties that had not yet submitted their required initial declarations pursuant to the Convention. Nine CWC States Parties had not yet submitted any initial declarations either under Article III or Article VI: Cabo Verde (December 9, 2003),<sup>1</sup> the Congo (February 2, 2008), Guinea-Bissau (July 19, 2008), Haiti (April 23, 2006), Somalia (June 28, 2013), Timor-Leste (July 6, 2003), Tonga (July 28, 2003), Tuvalu (March 19, 2004), and Vanuatu (November 15, 2005). Two CWC States Parties—Kiribati and the Solomon Islands – had yet to submit their initial declarations under Article VI; and one, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, had yet to submit its chemical weapons-related initial declaration pursuant to Article III. The OPCW TS is unable to fulfill its verification tasks with regard to these States Parties.
  
- The OPCW TS held a bilateral meeting with Cabo Verde on November 25, 2012 during the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of National Authorities, when it asked for guidance on regulations including those for establishment of National Authorities. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines participated in the Fourteenth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Latin America and the Caribbean June 25-27, 2013. During February 4-8, 2013, Togo participated in the Second OPCW Internship Programme for Legal Drafters and National Authority

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<sup>1</sup>The dates indicate the due date of the initial declaration for the State Party concerned (that is, 30 days after EIF of the Convention for the State Party).

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Representatives, and from June 4-6, 2013, participated in the Eleventh Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Africa.

As of December 31, 2013, there were 190 CWC States Parties, the most recent to accede being the Syrian Arab Republic, which became a State Party on October 14, 2013. Six other States have neither ratified nor acceded to the CWC (two signatory states, Israel and Burma, and four non-signatory States, Angola, Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan).

This Report addresses the following five countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation and Syria.

## **COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS**

### **IRAN**

#### **FINDING**

Based on available information, the United States cannot certify whether Iran has met its chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) declaration obligations, destroyed its specialized chemical weapons (CW) equipment, transferred CW, or retained an undeclared CW stockpile.

#### **BACKGROUND**

The Convention entered into force for Iran on December 3, 1997. Iran made its initial declaration in three separate submissions (June 1998, January 1999, and March 1999).

The United States does not have sufficient information to ascertain whether some Iranian facilities are involved in or intentionally retain the capability to produce CW agents, and likewise the United States possesses insufficient information about the disposition of specialized CW equipment used in former CWPFs. The United States also has insufficient information about possible CW activity prior to EIF of the Convention for Iran. There are reports that Iran transferred CW munitions to Libya in the late 1980s.

**Compliance Discussions**

On the margins of OPCW Executive Council (EC) meetings in 2001 and 2004, the United States engaged the Iranian delegation about Iran's CWC compliance. The outcome of the discussions did not completely resolve any of the issues.

**COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS**

Due to a combination of irregularities in the Iranian declaration and insufficient clarification from Iran, the United States cannot certify:

- that Iran has met its CWPF declaration obligations because of possible CW-capable infrastructure, including the possibility of a clandestine offensive CW production capability dispersed among industrial chemical plants and at military-owned facilities;
- that it has exhaustively declared and destroyed its specialized CW equipment (Iran has probably failed to meet its CWC obligations by failing to declare and destroy some of its specialized CW production equipment);
- that it has not retained an undeclared CW stockpile; and
- that it complied with CWC obligations to declare any CW transfers it may have made to Libya.

The OPCW TS has reported that Iran has fully implemented legislation under Article VII of the CWC that includes penal provisions and measures to control transfers of scheduled chemicals. As part of its obligations under paragraph 4 of Article X of the CWC acknowledging that it has a national protection program, Iran has submitted declarations annually. Iran has also committed to support, by bilateral agreements, as well as through unilateral offers, assistance measures under paragraph 7, Article X.

## **IRAQ**

### **FINDING**

Iraq made its initial CW, CWPF, and industry declarations but has not yet produced a complete General Plan for Destruction.

### **BACKGROUND**

The Convention entered into force for Iraq on February 12, 2009. Iraq made its initial CW and CWPF declarations based on available United Nations (UN) documentation. Due to the fact that the chemical weapon storage facilities (CWSF) bunkers containing declared CW are sealed and have only incomplete UN documentation in relation to their contents, Iraq has had difficulty in formulating its General Plan for Destruction of its declared CW. The TS made helicopter over-flight inspections of some of the declared CWPFs and the CWSFs on May 4, 2011, which may help the TS make destruction planning recommendations, at least in relation to the General Plan for Destruction of some of Iraq's CWPFs.

The on-site TS visit necessary for assessing a requested CWPF conversion of the Al Rashad CWPF was made November 6-8, 2012. The OPCW Executive Council (EC) during its 71<sup>st</sup> Session recommended to the Conference of the States Parties (CSP) that it approve the conversion request for Al Rashad, which CSP-18 did in December 2013.

During the reporting period, Iraq continued to consult with the OPCW TS and States Parties on its destruction planning.

### **Compliance Discussions**

The United States has maintained a dialogue with Iraq in relation to preparation of its General Plan for Destruction of its CW and CWPFs.

### **COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS**

Iraq indicated its intent to meet its declaration and CW destruction obligations by attempting to produce a General Plan for Destruction based on the limited information available to it. Although Iraq has yet to submit its General Plan for Destruction of its CW and CWPFs as required by the CWC, it has taken some positive steps in the preparation of such a plan. Iraq has committed \$55

million for destruction of its CW and CWPFs and made further preparations by conducting necessary surveys and assessments. The CW destruction plan is dependent on the assessment of the contents of the CWSFs, bunkers 13 and 41 at Al Muthanna. Any eventual plan may require the acceptance of the Iraqi Council of Ministers to use non-intrusive destruction methods for Bunker 13 and to conduct an intrusive inventory of Bunker 41. In May 2012, Iraq indicated that it would provide its General Plan for Destruction but a comprehensive plan has yet to be submitted.

***Destruction/Assessments of Bunker 41 and 13:***

The destruction technology to be used for bunker 41 will be determined following the assessment of its contents. Due to extremely hazardous conditions inside bunker 13, the Iraqis intend to destroy its contents through concrete encapsulation. Reportedly, the testing and installation of equipment and analysis of concrete for encapsulating the contents of bunker 13 have begun.

On February 11-14, 2013, the United States sponsored project management training for the Iraqi Al-Muthanna bunker decommissioning project (AMBDP) team, which took place at the OPCW headquarters. During EC-74 in October 2013 Iraq reported that it had sampled air in bunker 13 and had mapped and taken photos of the interiors of bunkers 13 and 41, as well as conducted testing of the bunker air assessment systems that will be used as part of the assessment process and initial drafting of the Detailed Facility Information document for the CW destruction process.

The OPCW TS has reported that Iraq has partially fulfilled the requirement to implement legislation under Article VII of the CWC that includes penal provisions and measures to control transfers of scheduled chemicals. Iraq has not declared a national program for protection under paragraph 4 of Article X of the CWC.

**LIBYA**

**FINDING**

Although the new Government of Libya declared two CW stockpiles previously undeclared by the Qadhafi regime, the declaration is not complete as the origin of these stockpiles has not been explained. Despite capacity weaknesses

following 42 years of Qadhafi's misrule, Libya completed destruction of its Category 1 weaponized CW in late January 2014, less than one month after the December 31, 2013 deadline. It is expected to destroy mustard residuals in containers by April.

## **BACKGROUND**

The Convention entered into force for Libya on February 5, 2004, and Libya made its initial declaration in March 2004. Tripoli declared a CW stockpile, CWPFs, and chemical industry facilities under Article VI of the Convention. The UN reported that the new Libyan Government found undeclared CW in September 2011. This was confirmed in late October 2011, by former Prime Minister Jibril, who said that there were two undeclared CW sites. The CW munitions from both sites were declared to the OPCW in November 2011 and February 2012; however, the declaration of the stockpiles lacked information on the origin of the munitions. Libya announced during EC-70 (September 2012) that it had sampled the agent in some of the munitions in response to the OPCW TS Director-General's inquiry addressing the origin question. The analyses were reported to have been done in Tripoli, but no information on the results has been forthcoming as of the end of the reporting period. In response to a Libyan request for assistance on the issue, the TS requested that States Parties provide to Libya any origin information they might have. In February 2013, the OPCW TS Director-General said that no State Party had responded and at EC-71 Libya recognized that the origin of the CW has not been determined.

Libya requested and received approval in January 2005 to convert the CWPFs in Pharma 150 at Rabta to purposes not prohibited by the CWC. Libya began the conversion in January 2005 and completed it in 2009.

In February and March 2004, under the oversight of OPCW inspectors, Libya completed destruction of its declared Category 3 CW unfilled aerial bombs. In addition, it secured sensitive CW materials, agents, and equipment pending their elimination in accordance with the CWC. Libya completed destruction of its Category 1 weaponized CW in late January 2014, less than one month after the December 31, 2013 deadline. It is expected to destroy mustard residuals in containers by April.

**Compliance Discussions**

Between March and December 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom had numerous exchanges with and visits to Libya to discuss WMD issues, including Libya's accession to the CWC. Additional information on the background of these earlier trilateral exchanges can be found in the 2011 and 2012 versions of the CWC Condition (10)(C) Report.

After cessation of the Libyan Category 1 CW destruction efforts in February 2011 and the subsequent hostilities, States Parties were concerned about the security of the CW stockpile at the Ruwagha CWSF and about when destruction activities would restart. The United States encouraged the OPCW TS Director-General to seek relief from the UN Security Council-imposed embargo freezing Libyan assets to get the heating coil repair parts for the Ruwagha Hydrolysis and Neutralization System-1 (RHNS-1) to Libya as soon as possible and was involved in EC efforts to convince Libya to seek an extension of its destruction deadline. In October 2011, after discovery of the CW munitions that were undeclared by the Qadhafi regime, the United States initiated discussions with the Libya, and interested States Parties, aimed at expediting a restart of CW destruction. Libya-United States bilateral consultations were held in 2012 to address security issues for the CW stored at Ruwagha and safety and security requirements for the return of OPCW inspectors to monitor destruction activities. The consultations resulted in the United States sponsoring a security assessment at Ruwagha that indicated areas where security enhancement at Ruwagha was needed. Security upgrades for the Libyan CW stockpile at Ruwagha were implemented in late 2012 and U.S. and German assistance on safety, security, and CW destruction continued in 2013.

**COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS**

The two CW stockpiles discovered by Libya that were not previously declared by the Qadhafi regime revealed that the Qadhafi regime was in violation of the CWC before the revolution. Although Libya ultimately declared these stockpiles, the declaration is not complete in that the origin of the CW has not been explained.

Libya has destroyed all of its Category 3 CW, all of its solid Category 2 CW, and some of its liquid Category 2 CW precursors. It successfully met its Category 1 CW one percent, 20 percent, and 45 percent deadlines. With the interruption of Category 1 mustard destruction activities in February 2011 and the subsequent

domestic hostilities, Libya missed meeting the final extended Category 1 and Category 2 CW destruction deadlines of April 29, 2012.

Like the United States and Russia, Libya found that it could not achieve completion of its Category 1 CW destruction by the final extended deadline of April 29, 2012. Anticipating that possessor States would not meet the deadline due in large part to unanticipated technical and political difficulties, the Conference of the States Parties (CSP-16) in December 2011 decided that possessor States shall complete destruction in the shortest time possible, submit a detailed destruction plan with completion dates and report regularly to the EC and the CSP on its destruction progress. The Libyan plan specified destruction of Category 1 CW from March to December 2013, Category 2 from January 2015 to December 2016, and Category 3 during May 2013. Possessor States Parties are required to submit detailed plans for destruction of CW not later than 60 days before each annual destruction period. Libya submitted a draft destruction plan in January 2011 before the declaration of the CW that was previously undeclared by the Qadhafi regime. However, Libya did not submit a plan covering 2012, though it did submit a plan for 2013.

In April 2013, bulk mustard destruction was re-initiated and completed on May 4, 2013. The Category 3 empty aerial bomb cartridges were destroyed on May 5, 2013. Destruction of the mustard-filled artillery shells and aerial bombs started on November 18, 2013 and continued through the end of the reporting period. At the end of the reporting period (December 31, 2013) there remained to be destroyed: Category 1 CW partially polymerized sulfur mustard "heel" - 2.5 MT and a number of mustard filled artillery shells and bombs; and Category 2 CW precursor chemicals - 846MT. All Category 1 weaponized CW was destroyed by January 2014.

As part of its obligations under paragraph 4 of Article X of the CWC, Libya submitted a declaration in 2005 acknowledging that it had a national protection program. Libya has not submitted any subsequent Article X declarations.

**RUSSIA**

**FINDING**

Based on available information, the United States cannot certify that Russia has met its obligations for declaration of its CWPfFs, CW development facilities, and CW stockpiles.

**BACKGROUND**

The Convention entered into force for Russia on December 5, 1997, and Russia made its initial declaration in March 1998 in accordance with the CWC. The Russian declaration included CWPfFs, CWSFs, a chemical weapons development facility, and a stockpile of almost 40,000 metric tons of CW agent, in both bulk and weaponized form. Its Article VI declaration included Schedule 2, Schedule 3, and other chemical production facility (OCPF) plant sites.

*The Russian CW Stockpile.* The United States assesses that Russia's CWC declaration is incomplete with respect to its chemical agent and weapons stockpiles.

*Undeclared CWPfFs and CW-capable Facilities.* The United States notes that there are additional facilities that Russia may have been required to declare as CWPfFs. The United States continues to seek clarification of reports about mobilization capabilities at declared and non-declared facilities.

*Russian CW Development Facilities.* The United States does not share the Russian view that all CW development facilities, including CW testing facilities, do not need to be declared because of the Russian narrow interpretation of the CWC "primarily for" criterion in Article III of the CWC.

**Compliance Discussions**

The United States has engaged in numerous exchanges with Russia regarding a number of compliance issues in 2002, 2003, and 2006, during which the United States discussed the accuracy of Russia's CWC declaration.

In 2006, the United States reiterated its proposal to hold expert-level consultations, but Russia has not yet agreed to renew such consultations and none were held during the reporting period.

## **COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS**

In May 2013, Russia completed conversion of its last CWPF approved for conversion. Russia completed destruction of its category 2 and 3 CW within the Convention's timelines.

Details of Russian progress towards destruction of its Category 1 CW stockpile are available in previous versions of this report. As of October 31, 2013, Russia had destroyed 77.0 percent of its Category 1 CW stockpile.

Like the United States and Libya, Russia found that it could not achieve completion of its Category 1 CW destruction by the final CWC extended deadline of April 29, 2012. Anticipating that possessor States would not meet the deadline due mainly to unanticipated technical and political difficulties, the CSP-16 in December 2011 decided that possessor States shall complete destruction in the shortest time possible, submit a detailed destruction plan with completion dates, and report regularly to the EC and the CSP on its destruction progress.

In the absence of additional information from Russia, the United States is unable to ascertain whether Russia has declared all of its CW stockpile, all CWPFs, and all of its CW development facilities.

The OPCW TS has reported that Russia has fully implemented legislation under Article VII of the CWC that includes measures to control transfers of scheduled chemicals and penal provisions. The text of the adopted measures has been provided to the OPCW. Russia also has acknowledged and declared that it has a national program for protection under paragraph 4 of Article X of the CWC. Russia made its first declaration under this article in 2005 and has continued to do so annually.

**SYRIA**

**FINDING**

The United States is carefully evaluating the accuracy and completeness of Syria's CWC declaration (and related disclosures), and will continue to monitor Syria's compliance with all of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), OPCW Executive Council (EC) decisions, and UN Security Council Resolution 2118 in connection with the elimination of Syria's chemical weapons program. Syria functionally destroyed (rendered useless or inoperable) its CW production and mixing/filling equipment, pending final destruction, and destroyed its declared chemical weapons munitions in accordance with the September 27, 2013, EC decision. Syria did not fulfill its obligation under the November 15, 2013, OPCW Executive Council Decision to complete, by December 31, 2013, removal from Syrian territory of designated chemical weapons agent and key precursors, and in fact no such chemicals were removed from Syria as of that date.

**BACKGROUND**

The United States assessed that the Syrian regime maintained a stockpile of chemical agents, including mustard, sarin, and VX and possessed munitions that could be used to deliver chemical warfare agents. The United States further assessed with high confidence that the Syrian regime used chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in 2013. The most egregious and large scale attack was carried out in the Damascus suburbs on August 21, 2013.

***Syrian Accession to the CWC and the Russia-U.S. Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons***

Syria deposited its articles of accession to the CWC on September 14, 2013, with the United Nations, indicating that it would provisionally apply the Convention until it officially became a CWC State Party on October 14, 2013.

On September 14, 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry negotiated the Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons with the goal of ensuring "the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program in the soonest and safest manner." The Framework tasked Syria to disclose before September 21, 2013, a comprehensive listing of elements of its CW program including names, types, and quantities of CW agents;

types of munitions; location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities. The Framework further committed the United States and Russia to prepare and put forward to the OPCW Executive Council (EC) for approval, a decision setting down special procedures for expeditious destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program and stringent verification thereof.

***OPCW Executive Council Decisions and UNSCR 2118***

On September 27, 2013, the OPCW Executive Council and the UN Security Council adopted unanimously, separate, but mutually reinforcing decisions on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons. The OPCW Executive Council decision (EC-M-33/DEC.1) was explicitly based upon Article IV (8) and Article V (10) of the CWC, which require that, if a State ratifies or accedes to the CWC after the 10-year period for destruction, it shall destroy its chemical weapons and associated production facilities “as soon as possible,” and the “order of destruction and procedures for stringent verification for such a State Party shall be determined by the Executive Council.” This Decision established October 4, 2013, as the date for Syria to disclose additional chemical weapons information to the OPCW to supplement that provided on September 19, 2013; established October 1, 2013 as the date for the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) to initiate inspections in Syria and to inspect all disclosed Syrian CW facilities by October 27, 2013; set October 27, 2013, as the date for Syria to submit its CW data declaration (Article III); called upon the Council to, not later than November 15, 2013, establish intermediate destruction milestones; established November 1, 2013 as the completion date for destruction of chemical weapons production and mixing/filling equipment. This decision also set the first-half of 2014 for the complete elimination of all Syrian CW material and equipment. The September 27, 2013, EC decision provided the OPCW Technical Secretariat with the authority to inspect as soon as possible any other site identified by a State Party as having been involved in the Syrian CW program. In addition, the DG will report to the Council on a monthly basis on implementation of this decision, including progress achieved by Syria.

UN Security Council Resolution 2118(2013) (UNSCR 2118), also adopted on September 27, 2013, reinforced the EC Decision and further provided the UN/OPCW personnel with the authority for immediate and unfettered access to, and the right to inspect, any and all sites, including immediate and unfettered access to certain Syrian individuals. The OPCW Director-General can also report to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on activities related to the

implementation of UNSCR 2118, including Syrian non-compliance. In the event of non-compliance with UNSCR 2118, measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can be imposed.

### *Syrian Disclosures and CWC Declaration*

In accordance with the Framework, Syria made its disclosure of its CW program on September 19, 2013, revealing a significant amount of information on its chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs) and CW stockpile. Pursuant to the September 27, 2013, Executive Council Decision, Syria provided a written disclosure to the OPCW of its program, including agents, munitions, and facilities for conducting CW R&D, production, storage, and mixing/filling. The EC decision required that Syria provide its official CWC declaration by October 27, 2013, as opposed to the regular treaty timeline of 30 days after entry into force of the Convention, ( i.e., November 13, 2013). Syria met the deadline, submitting its initial comprehensive declaration to the OPCW on October 23, 2013. Syria made four amendments to its initial declaration on October 28 and 30, November 21 and December 5, 2013.

### *Syrian CW Removal and Destruction*

On November 15, 2013, the OPCW Executive Council adopted by consensus the Detailed Requirements for the Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons and Syrian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities (EC-M-34/DEC.1, 15 November 2013). This decision established timelines for destruction of chemical weapons agent and precursors and chemical weapons production facilities.

- **December 15, 2013**: Destruction of mobile units/systems designed for mixing and filling, and mixing and filling facilities where specialized equipment is not yet dismantled, collocated with storage sites for binary components and/or empty munitions (a.k.a. priority one CWPFs).
- **December 17, 2013**: Director-General to present to the Council for its consideration a plan for the destruction of CW outside of Syria.
- **December 31, 2013**: “Removal from Syria of mustard agent and the key binary chemical weapon components DF, A, B and BB, including BB salt, as declared by the Syrian Arab Republic.”

- **January 15, 2013**: Destruction of production facilities with disconnected or intact (not yet dismantled) equipment, train/lines for the production of chemical agent or binary components.
- **January 31, 2014**: Destruction in Syria of all unfilled munitions.
- **February 5, 2014**: Removal from Syria of any declared chemical not already removed by then, except isopropanol.
- **February 15, 2014**: Destruction of production facilities with dismantled equipment for production or mixing and filling (Priority 3 CWPFs).
- **March 15, 2014**: Destruction of remaining facilities for the production of declared chemicals (e.g., thiodiglycol, acetic acid, etc.) and facilities that do not hold specialized or standard equipment (Priority 4 and 5 CWPFs).
- **March 31, 2014**: Effective destruction of “mustard agent and the key binary chemical weapon components DF, A, B and BB, including BB salt.”
- **June 30, 2014**: Completion of the destruction outside Syria of all remaining chemicals declared.

## COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS

### *Destruction of Chemical Weapons Equipment and Munitions*

Syria functionally destroyed (rendered useless or inoperable) its CW production and mixing/filling equipment, pending final destruction, and destroyed its declared chemical weapons munitions in accordance with the September 27, 2013, EC decision.

As of December 22, 2013, specialized and standard equipment and special features of declared buildings and structures at CWPFs continued to be destroyed. Specialized equipment has been destroyed at 17 CWPFs including eight mobile CWPFs, standard equipment at six CWPFs, and special features of buildings and structures at seven CWPFs and specialized buildings at five CWPFs. Verification has not yet been accomplished at all of these facilities.

### *Removal of CW Agent/Precursors from Syria*

The November 15, 2013, Executive Council Decision stipulated that, by December 31, 2013, all mustard agent and key binary chemical weapon components declared by the Syrian Government must be removed from Syrian territory for subsequent destruction. Syria did not fulfill its obligation under the November 15 OPCW Executive Council Decision to complete, by December 31,

2013, removal from Syrian territory of designated chemical weapons agent and key precursors, and in fact no such chemicals had been removed from Syria as of that date.

**NEXT STEPS**

The United States will continue to work with key States Parties and through the OPCW and the United Nations to effect the timely removal and destruction of Syrian chemical weapons agent and precursor chemicals. Further, the United States will continue to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of Syria's CWC declaration (and related disclosures).