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**ANNUAL REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE NEW START
TREATY**



January 2013

Prepared by the U.S. Department of State

In response to

Section (a)(10) of the December 22, 2010, Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Prague on April 8, 2010

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NEW START TREATY ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT

This report is transmitted in response to Condition (10) of the December 22, 2010, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty). The New START Treaty was signed in Prague, Czech Republic, on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, upon exchange of the instruments of ratification.

Condition (10) of the New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification calls for the President to submit a report to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of each year beginning with January 31, 2012, providing:

- (A) details on each Party's reductions in strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year;
- (B) a certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation;
- (C) a certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or -
 - (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and
 - (ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case;
- (D) an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including -
 - (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and
 - (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information; and
- (E) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

On November 2, 2011, the President delegated authority to submit the Report to the Secretary of State. On December 14, 2011, the Secretary of State delegated this authority to the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. This Report is divided into sections covering each of the items listed in Condition (10).

A. Details on each Party's reductions in strategic offensive arms between the date the New START Treaty entered into force and December 31, 2011, or, in subsequent reports, during the previous year.

For details related to reductions of each Party's strategic offensive arms between January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2012, please see the classified version of this Report. Below are each Party's aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as of September 1, 2012.

NEW START TREATY
AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS
(As of September 01, 2012, as drawn from the exchange of data by the Parties)

Category of Data	United States of America	Russian Federation
Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	806	491
Warheads on Deployed ICBMs, on Deployed SLBMs, and Nuclear Warheads Counted for Deployed Heavy Bombers	1,722	1,499
Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of ICBMs, Deployed and Non-deployed Launchers of SLBMs, and Deployed and Non-deployed Heavy Bombers	1,034	884

The New START Treaty does not require annual reductions in strategic offensive arms. The Treaty obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their forces so that seven years after entry-into-force of the Treaty, February 5, 2018, each Party's aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms as counted in accordance with the Treaty do not exceed: 700 for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 1,550 for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and 800 for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

B. Certification that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty, or a detailed discussion of any noncompliance by the Russian Federation.

Based on the information available as of December 31, 2012, the United States certifies the Russian Federation to be in compliance with the terms of the New START Treaty. Although the United States has raised implementation-related questions with the Russian Federation through diplomatic channels and in the context of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), these discussions were ongoing as of December 31, 2012. The New START Treaty established the BCC to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. This forum for resolving questions relating to implementation and compliance consists of members from both the United States and Russian Federation and met two times in 2012. For a detailed discussion of issues the United States has raised with the Russian Federation between January 1, 2012, and December 31, 2012, and updates on issues raised previously, please see the classified version of this Report.

C. Certification that any conversion and elimination procedures adopted pursuant to Article VI of the New START Treaty and Part Three of the Protocol have not resulted in ambiguities that could defeat the object and purpose of the New START Treaty, or – (i) a list of any cases in which a conversion or elimination procedure that has been demonstrated by Russia within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission remains ambiguous or does not achieve the goals set forth in paragraph 2 or 3 of Section I of Part Three of the Protocol; and (ii) a comprehensive explanation of the steps the United States has taken with respect to each such case.

During the course of this reporting period (January 1, 2012, through December 31, 2012) no conversion or elimination procedures have been adopted pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty or Part Three of the Protocol.

D. An assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, including – (i) the extent to which either Party encrypted or otherwise impeded the collection of telemetric information; and (ii) the extent and usefulness of exchanges of telemetric information.

The New START Treaty provides for the exchange of telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but no more than five per calendar year. The provisions of the New START Treaty's Annex on Telemetric Information state that the Party conducting a launch of an ICBM or SLBM that it intends to consider for provision of telemetric information to the other Party shall, in a notification of such a launch, specify all frequencies and modulation methods to be used to broadcast telemetric information subject to provision to the other Party. The Party conducting such launches shall not take any measures to deny access to the telemetric signal broadcast, and shall not encrypt telemetric information that may be provided to the other Party.

During 2012, the Parties reached agreement in the BCC on the amount of telemetric information on launches that would be provided and, at the same BCC session, decided to exchange, in 2012, telemetric information on one launch of an ICBM or SLBM conducted by each Party during the period from February 5, 2011 to December 31, 2011. That exchange was accomplished on April 6, 2012, in accordance with the Treaty's timelines.

For an assessment of the operation of the New START Treaty's transparency mechanisms, please see the classified version of this Report.

E. An assessment of whether a strategic imbalance exists that endangers the national security interests of the United States.

The United States does not assess that there is a strategic imbalance between the United States and the Russian Federation. Both the United States and the Russian Federation currently maintain deployed strategic nuclear force levels that are below the limits of the expired START Treaty and of the Moscow Treaty that was superseded by the New START Treaty.