

BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Resource Summary

(\$ in thousands)

Appropriations	FY 2012 Actual	FY 2013 CR ⁽¹⁾	FY 2014 Request	Increase/Decrease From FY2012
Positions - Enduring	1,116	1,116	1,102	(14)
Enduring Funds	514,436	514,841	506,366	(8,070)
Overseas Contingency Operations Funds	1,781,092	2,958,556	79,462	(1,701,630)
Total Funds	2,295,528	3,473,397	585,828	(1,709,700)

The FY 2014 Request continues the Department's Consular Realignment Initiative. Bureau specific consular costs have been shifted to the Border Security Program (BSP) and will be funded with consular fees.

(1) The FY 2013 CR is based on the annualized continuing resolution calculation for FY 2013 (P.L. 112-175).

Program Description

In FY 2014, the top priority for discretionary resources for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) is aligned with the President's policy directive for the region: to support the democratic transitions and political reforms across the Middle East and North Africa and strengthen civil society actors as a means toward realizing the aspirations of the people. The continued period of transition will bring many challenges and new opportunities. Building good partnerships with new governments and newly empowered citizens will require sustained engagement. Fiscal stability concerns and long-term economic growth objectives require broad and sustained engagement with the interagency and with international partners. The particular needs of some transitions, such as that experienced in Libya and anticipated for Syria, will further require close coordination with the international community on crisis response and stabilization. Support for political and economic reform requires dedicating resources to analysis, reporting, coordination, and dialogue.

NEA must fully coordinate both traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy programs across the region to achieve positive outcomes. Nurturing nascent civil society organizations is a top priority. A challenge will be to persuade host Governments to allow those civil society organizations to operate without fear of interference or retribution if these groups are to become truly effective. A strong civil society can produce a partner with whom a government can engage to advance the cause of reform. Progress on key components of reform, including rule of law, the development of political parties and institutions, more professional military and security services, and the creation of an open and free media requires both governments and civil society organizations to respect and encourage each other's efforts toward the same goal.

NEA will continue to encourage all governments to renounce violent responses to peaceful protests and to continue to pursue meaningful reforms that open political participation to all members of society, including women, youth, and minority groups. NEA will work with host governments to raise their awareness of human trafficking and to assist them in their implementation of anti-trafficking prevention, prosecution, and protection measures. NEA will continue to respect the fact that each country faces a unique set of circumstances that cannot be addressed by a one-size-fits-all policy. NEA will support and strengthen civil society, engaging with all groups and organizations that renounce violence and seek to constructively participate in the development of a thriving, active, and effective civil society.

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Iraq

The wave of change in the region makes it even more crucial that NEA continue to build a strategic partnership with Iraq. Iraq is already building the kind of democracy that people across the region are demanding. Challenges remain, however, and the U.S. must remain focused on the goal of a stable, sovereign, self-reliant Iraq.

Following the transition to a civilian-led U.S. mission in Iraq, FY 2014 represents a delicate period of normalization as civilian agencies work to hand-off control of vital democratic and security institutions to Iraqi leadership. The Department will be fully responsible for multiple critical support functions once performed by the U.S. military, including security, transportation, and life support. These functions are essential to support the diplomatic profile necessary to make this mission a success by continuing to strengthen democratic institutions in Iraq and encourage its reintegration into the international community.

The request for Iraq Overseas Contingency Operations is discussed in detail in a separate chapter.

Performance

Yemen presents particular challenges to countering extremism. The U.S. Government is working to maintain stability, increase the government's capacity to combat violent extremist organizations, and prevent the establishment of safe havens for terrorists. The Department does so through diplomatic, law enforcement and intelligence cooperation.

Strategic Goal 1: Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world					
Strategic Priority		Counterterrorism			
Active Performance Indicator		Degree of stability in Yemen as measured by the Yemeni Government's capacity to combat extremist organizations and prevent the establishment of safe-havens for terrorists in Yemen and increase public confidence in government services.			
PRIOR YEAR RATINGS TREND					
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012
N/A	New Indicator, No Rating	New Indicator, No Rating	◀▶ On Target	▼ Below Target	Data Not Yet Available, No Rating
TARGETS AND RESULTS					
FY 2014 Target	Yemeni security forces will conduct regular operations that result in the disruption of terrorist attacks, or the capture or killing of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suspects, pirates, or other violent extremists. At least five are conducted without international assistance. Percentage of respondents reporting that the government is responding to their needs increases by 5 percent from FY 2013 in targeted communities.				

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FY 2013 Target	Yemeni security forces will conduct 30 operations that result in the disruption of terrorist attacks, or the capture or killing of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) suspects, pirates, or other violent extremists. Of those 30, at least two are conducted without international assistance. Percentage of respondents reporting that the government is responding to their needs increases by 5 percent from FY 2012 in targeted communities.
FY 2012 Target	Yemeni security forces will conduct 30 operations that result in the disruption of terrorist attacks or the capture or killing of AQAP suspects, pirates, or other violent extremists. Percentage of respondents reporting that the government is responding to their needs increases by 10 percent from FY 2011 in targeted communities.
FY 2012 Rating and Result	Rating: Data Not Yet Available, No Rating Data Not Yet Available from Embassy Sana'a. Embassy Sana'a will report on FY 2012 results by April 2013.
Impact	Rating and results not available to determine impact. Embassy Sana'a will report FY 2012 impact by April 2013.
FY 2011 Rating and Result	Rating: Below Target While Yemeni security forces conducted significant operations to disrupt terrorist attacks – surpassing the numerical target for FY 2011 – they also took three months to relieve a stranded brigade in Zinjibar that was besieged by AQAP and affiliated fighters, and are still battling the same extremists in daily skirmishes in Abyan governorate, southern Yemen. As a result of AQAP retaining control of parts of Zinjibar and continuing to fight to seize additional territory, the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) security forces have had to expand their focus from targeted anti-terrorist operations to also include ongoing military engagements against extremist fighters.
FY 2010 Rating and Result	Rating: On Target Baseline year. Yemeni security forces conducted four operations that resulted in the disruption of terrorist attacks, or the capture or killing of AQAP suspects, pirates, or other violent extremists. USAID worked during the second half of FY 2010 to establish the performance monitoring plan (PMP) and M&E mechanisms for implementers and the USAID Mission. The PMP was submitted to Washington in October 2010, which effectively defined and launched USAID/Yemen's M&E efforts for at least the next three years.
FY 2009 Rating and Result	Rating: New Indicator, No Rating N/A
FY 2008 Rating and Result	Rating: New Indicator, No Rating N/A
FY 2007 Rating and Result	Rating: N/A N/A
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis the U.S. Embassy in Yemen and NEA monitors events in Yemen and consults with other Department and U.S. officials on U.S. policy.
Data Source and Quality	Reporting from U.S. Embassy Sana'a. The Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations.

The Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs will work to help facilitate through negotiations the establishment of an independent Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace and security. The two-state solution is central to the President's stated goal of comprehensive peace in the Middle East, defined as peace between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and the normalization of relations between Israel and all its neighbors. In

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pursuit of this goal, it will be important to have robust institutional development activities to promote government effectiveness and transparency, improve the Palestinian economy, and promote the rule of law, including security sector reforms.

Strategic Goal 1: Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world								
Strategic Priority		Conflict Prevention, Mitigation, and Response						
Active Performance Indicator		Increased ability to maintain law and order in the West Bank and Gaza, as measured by the World Bank Governance Indicator score						
Prior Year Results and Ratings					FY 2012		Planned Targets	
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	Target	Result and Rating	FY 2013	FY 2014
25.2	22 (Baseline)	44.8	49.3	41.3	50	Data available late CY 2013.	55	60
N/A	New Indicator, No Rating	▲ Above Target	▲ Above Target	▲ Above Target		Data Not Yet Available, No Rating		
Impact		FY 2012 rating and results not available to determine impact. FY 2011 rating and results indicate that U.S. assistance in fostering greater rule of law in the West Bank has contributed to this increase.						
Methodology		The World Bank has compiled the results of dozens of separate studies and indices, weighting them by level of accuracy and completeness of the surveys. In FY 2008, the West Bank and Gaza ranked in the 22nd percentile overall. The FY 2009 target was to achieve a ranking of 25th percentile, and a ranking of 44.8 substantially exceeded the target. As a result, FY 2012 and FY 2013 targets were revised to continue this trend.						
Data Source and Quality		World Bank Governance Indicators (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp). The World Bank has provided detailed background notes online on their data collection and statistical methods. These methods have been thoroughly researched and professionally analyzed.						

For Iraq to remain sovereign, stable and self-reliant, governance at all levels must be demonstrably effective and accountable to the people. The World Bank's Governance Indicator highlighted below measures political stability and government effectiveness. Marking a change from last year, this year's indicator does not measure the rule of law or control of corruption in Iraq. By focusing more on Iraq's political stability and governmental effectiveness, we hoped to underscore the importance that security and internal cohesion play in ensuring Iraq's development as a sovereign, stable and self-reliant U.S. partner. This indicator uses a scoring scale from -2.5 to 2.5 (higher average values equal greater democratic stability). The U.S. promotes peaceful elections and transitions of power and the resolution of territorial issues through the process of negotiations. Programs in this area encourage the development of transparent and inclusive electoral and political processes and democratic, responsive, and effective political parties.

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Strategic Goal 2: Effectively manage transitions in the frontline states								
Strategic Priority		Good Governance						
Active Performance Indicator		Stable, Effective, and Accountable Governance in Iraq as measured by World Bank Governance Indicators: Political Stability (P) and Government Effectiveness (G).						
Prior Year Results and Ratings					FY 2012		Planned Targets	
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	Target	Result and Rating	FY 2013	FY 2014
-2.81P; -1.67G; -2.04; -1.45	-2.69P; -1.41G; -1.87; -1.48	-2.33P; -1.26G; -1.83; -1.38	-2.27P; -1.23G; -1.62; -1.32	-1.95P; -1.15G; -1.50; -1.22	-2.30P; -0.83G	Available late CY 2013.	-2.21P; -1.17G	-2.18P; -1.14G
N/A	New Indicator, No Rating	◀▶ Improved But Not Met	◀▶ Improved But Not Met	◀▶ On Target		Data Not Yet Available, No Rating		
Impact		The final FY 2012 rating and results are not available to determine impact. The final FY 2011 rating and results indicate that U.S. assistance in these areas has resulted in minor improvements to these scores, with three exceeding the FY 2011 targets.						
Methodology		Extensive information on the methodology of the World Bank Governance Indicators may be found on their web site (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp).						
Data Source and Quality		The World Bank compiles and publishes annual indicators in its World Bank Governance Indicators. Each indicator is based on multiple sources and surveys, which are weighted on accuracy and level of completeness. The indicators are based on calendar year and published in September of the following year. The World Bank provides detailed backgrounds notes online describing the data collection and statistical analysis methods. These methods have been thoroughly researched and professionally analyzed.						

Justification of Request

The Department's FY 2014 enduring request of \$506.4 million for NEA is a decrease of -\$8.1 million from the FY 2012 Actual level. The request includes a technical adjustment of -\$6.5 million for the shift of consular positions to Border Security Program fee funding. The FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request of \$79.5 million, as detailed in a separate chapter, is a decrease of -\$1.702 billion from the FY 2012 Actual level.

Arab Spring Regional Impact: \$39,904,000

Following the Arab Spring revolutions, policy guidance was issued directing all NEA posts to increase their engagement with a broader array of actors, especially outside governments and outside capitals. As a result, many posts now require additional policy and reporting positions to keep up with increased reporting demand, as well as a smaller, but proportional, accompanying increase in management positions. Post budgets are stretched thin by the increased costs of operating in a crisis environment as the Arab Spring has fundamentally transformed the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa with accelerated engagement and outreach requirements with host nations and emerging civil

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society leaders. Post budgets are strained by the increased costs of operating in a crisis environment as the Arab Spring has fundamentally transformed the political landscape of the Near East with accelerated engagement and outreach with host nations. The FY 2014 Request of \$39.9 million for NEA, maintains the FY 2012 Actual level to include support for the Office of Middle East Transitions, mission operations in Tripoli and Yemen, growth in Tunisia, protective powers arrangements in Syria, and the creation of a Consulate General in Alexandria, Egypt. The request also includes coverage for unexpected increases in direct response to policy directives to advance support for the region's democratic transitions, including the resumption of diplomatic activities in Syria.

Manage the Iraq Transition: -\$61,839,000

As Mission Iraq transitions from a contingency operation to a more normalized operation, the \$158.5 million request reflects that transition. The request supports critical functions and includes \$63.1 million for general mission operations, \$59 million for logistical support, and \$36.4 million for consulate operations. Representing a 23 percent decrease from the FY 2012 actual level of \$206 million, FY 2014 Enduring requirements will additionally be supported by an estimated FY 2013 carryover of \$61.2 million and program changes. Normalization of Iraq Operations includes assumption of mail services from the Department of Defense, a shifting of requirements to enduring resources, and an overall reduced mission footprint.

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	Positions					Funds (\$ in thousands)		
	American				Pos	Bureau	American	Funds
	CS	FS Dom	Overseas	FSN	Total	Managed	Salaries	Total
FY 2012 Actual	156	106	854	269	1,385	361,431	153,005	514,436
FY 2013 Estimate	156	106	854	269	1,385	361,236	153,605	514,841
FY 2014 Built-in Changes								
American COLA	0	0	0	0	0	392	1,412	1,804
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	475	0	475
Facility Operating Cost	0	0	0	0	0	1,411	0	1,411
Locally Engaged Staff Wage Increases	0	0	0	0	0	7,526	0	7,526
Locally-Engaged Staff Step Increases	0	0	0	0	0	5,322	0	5,322
Overseas Price Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	4,541	0	4,541
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	0	19,667	1,412	21,079
FY 2014 Current Services	156	106	854	269	1,385	380,903	155,017	535,920
FY 2014 Program Changes								
Arab Spring Regional Impact	0	0	0	0	0	39,904	0	39,904
Consular USDH Shift to BSP	0	0	(14)	0	(14)	(4,708)	(1,797)	(6,505)
Normalization of Iraq Operations	0	0	0	0	0	(61,839)	0	(61,839)
Operational Adjustment	0	0	0	0	0	(1,114)	0	(1,114)
Total Program Changes	0	0	(14)	0	(14)	(27,757)	(1,797)	(29,554)
FY 2014 Request	156	106	840	269	1,371	353,146	153,220	506,366

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Staff and Funds by Domestic Organization Units

(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)	FY 2012			FY 2013			FY 2014			Increase/Decrease		
	Actual			CR			Request			From FY2012		
	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds
Administration	0	0	22,000	0	0	0	0	0	32,000	0	0	10,000
Chief Information Officer	0	0	9,000	0	0	9,000	0	0	9,000	0	0	0
Office of Arabian Peninsula	7	0	2,949	7	0	3,210	7	0	3,324	0	0	375
Office of Egypt and Levant Affairs	14	0	2,843	14	0	2,956	14	0	2,999	0	0	156
Office of Executive Director	70	0	9,473	70	0	9,816	70	0	9,940	0	0	467
Office of Iranian Affairs	11	0	3,168	11	0	3,376	11	0	3,463	0	0	295
Office of Iraq Affairs	25	0	4,547	25	0	4,574	25	0	4,568	0	0	21
Office of Israel and Palestinian Affairs	17	0	2,734	17	0	2,856	17	0	2,903	0	0	169
Office of Maghreb Affairs	17	0	2,883	17	0	3,005	17	0	3,052	0	0	169
Office of Partnership Initiative	28	0	5,008	28	0	5,149	28	0	5,195	0	0	187
Office of Press and Public Diplomacy	23	0	3,608	23	0	3,722	23	0	3,762	0	0	154
Office of Regional Affairs	19	0	2,740	19	0	2,840	19	0	2,877	0	0	137
Office of the Assistant Secretary	29	0	4,468	29	0	4,613	29	0	4,664	0	0	196
Total	260	0	75,421	260	0	55,117	260	0	87,747	0	0	12,326

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Staff and Funds by Post

(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)	FY 2012			FY 2013			FY 2014			Increase/Decrease		
	Actual			CR			Request			From FY2012		
	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds
Algeria, Algiers	18	6	8,286	18	6	9,043	18	6	9,376	0	0	1,090
Bahrain, Manama	18	11	9,226	18	11	10,125	18	11	10,522	0	0	1,296
Egypt, Cairo	62	42	25,028	62	42	27,170	61	42	28,101	(1)	0	3,073
Iraq, Baghdad	298	0	213,252	298	0	215,065	291	0	165,758	(7)	0	(47,494)
Israel, Jerusalem	33	14	14,482	33	14	15,769	32	14	16,333	(1)	0	1,851
Israel, Tel Aviv	49	34	21,338	49	34	23,241	48	34	24,073	(1)	0	2,735
Jordan, Amman	48	20	17,244	48	20	18,557	47	20	19,120	(1)	0	1,876
Kuwait, Kuwait	30	10	10,508	30	10	11,274	30	10	11,600	0	0	1,092
Lebanon, Beirut	27	17	8,132	27	17	8,631	27	17	8,839	0	0	707
Libya, Tripoli	17	0	10,089	17	0	11,161	17	0	11,638	0	0	1,549
Morocco, Rabat	36	19	11,906	36	19	12,731	35	19	13,079	(1)	0	1,173
Oman, Muscat	21	5	7,073	21	5	7,589	21	5	7,809	0	0	736
Qatar, Doha	18	4	6,444	18	4	6,943	18	4	7,157	0	0	713
Saudi Arabia, Riyadh	61	31	23,952	61	31	25,962	60	31	26,835	(1)	0	2,883
Syria, Damascus	24	17	10,579	24	17	11,543	24	17	11,965	0	0	1,386
Tunisia, Tunis	25	16	10,757	25	16	11,699	25	16	12,110	0	0	1,353
United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi	46	16	20,836	46	16	22,713	45	16	23,535	(1)	0	2,699
Yemen, Sanaa	25	7	9,883	25	7	10,508	25	7	10,769	0	0	886
Total	856	269	439,015	856	269	459,724	842	269	418,619	(14)	0	(20,396)

Funds by Object Class

(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA)	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	Increase/Decrease
	Actual	CR	Request	From FY2012
1100 Personnel Compensation	166,410	175,793	197,160	30,750
1200 Personnel Benefits	43,419	45,370	46,129	2,710
1300 Benefits Former Personnel	116	133	141	25
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	9,240	10,914	14,874	5,634
2200 Transportation of Things	2,270	2,746	4,044	1,774
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	20,152	22,215	26,264	6,112
2400 Printing & Reproduction	304	350	371	67
2500 Other Services	246,474	225,884	171,728	(74,746)
2600 Supplies and Materials	6,768	8,453	14,557	7,789
3100 Personal Property	16,858	19,754	24,003	7,145
4100 Grants, Subsidies & Contributions	2,425	3,229	7,095	4,670
Total	514,436	514,841	506,366	(8,070)

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