

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Resource Summary

(\$ in thousands)

Appropriations	FY 2012 Actual	FY 2013 CR ⁽¹⁾	FY 2014 Request	Increase/Decrease From FY2012
Positions - Enduring	264	264	264	0
Enduring Funds	47,729	47,662	47,966	237

(1) The FY 2013 CR is based on the annualized continuing resolution calculation for FY 2013 (P.L. 112-175).

Program Description

The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) leads the Department's efforts to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), whether nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological; their delivery systems; and destabilizing conventional weapons. Such proliferation is a preeminent challenge to American national security. Combating proliferation threats through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy therefore is one of the highest priorities of the Department of State. ISN is responsible for managing a broad range of U.S. non-proliferation policies, programs, agreements, and initiatives to combat proliferation threats directly, and to promote international consensus on the threats posed by proliferation and on ways to address them.

Iran and North Korean Challenges

Because of their immediacy, a key ISN priority is to deal with the challenges presented by Iranian and North Korean WMD and missile ambitions. ISN provides diplomatic and technical expertise in support of the Department of State's dual-track efforts to be open to negotiation on their proliferation programs, while maintaining united international pressure, including through increasingly stringent sanctions on Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to have these countries abide by their international non-proliferation obligations. As a result of extensive diplomatic engagement, the international community increased pressure on Iran to cease its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and comply with its international nuclear obligations.

Strengthening the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

ISN works to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime by reinforcing the basic bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament; countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them; and countries can access peaceful benefits of nuclear energy if they abide by their non-proliferation obligations. Having overseen a successful NPT Review Conference in 2010, ISN is already preparing for the cycle leading to the next Review Conference in 2015; preparatory conferences were held in 2012, and are planned in 2013 and 2014. ISN manages U.S. engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and works particularly to strengthen the authority and capability of the IAEA to carry out its international safeguards program to prevent the diversion of nuclear material in peaceful use to weapons purposes. ISN also assists the IAEA with technical expertise in developing standards and technical guidance for nuclear safety and security. The IAEA is of increasing importance as countries look to nuclear energy due to high oil prices and concerns about global warming. In addition, ISN manages the diplomatic aspects of U.S. Government efforts to establish an international fuel bank and other mechanisms for nuclear fuel assurances so that countries can operate their civil nuclear reactors without the need to undertake uranium enrichment and reprocessing, which inherently involve significant proliferation risks. ISN negotiates bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements (so-called 123 Agreements) that allow nuclear

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

commerce between the United States and partner states and promote safe, secure, and safeguarded use of nuclear power. In the 2013-2016 timeframe, seven existing bilateral agreements will need to be replaced. Negotiations are also underway with three countries on new agreements, and other countries have also expressed interest in a 123 agreement. Finally, ISN leads interagency efforts to engage key states on strategic and nuclear security challenges to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, and also engages in many bilateral non-proliferation dialogues with countries that will be expanded to include new regional leaders.

Preventing Proliferant Transfers

ISN works to strengthen international capacity to interdict proliferation-related shipments, close off sources of proliferation funding, use sanctions to deter and punish proliferators, and help countries to improve their border security, export controls, and national legislation against proliferation activities. ISN seeks to control, impede, and interdict proliferant transfers via its management of U.S. participation in the Australia Group (chemical/biological), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional weapons) and ensure that control lists are updated to address emerging technologies and emerging threats such as proliferants' increasing interest in dual-use items. As part of this effort, ISN reviews approximately 100,000 visa applications and 100,000 export licenses annually for proliferation risks. The Administration's Export Control Reform Initiative will add to this labor-intensive but vital task. ISN also engages non-member countries to adhere to regime guidelines. ISN spearheads U.S. efforts to promote implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, a legally-binding requirement for countries to establish domestic controls to prevent proliferation. ISN has diplomatic responsibility for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a commitment by 101 countries to take action to interdict WMD-related shipments. In September, 2012, the Republic of Korea hosted a successful Operational Experts Group meeting and a major Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise. The PSI marks its 10th anniversary in May 2013. ISN co-chairs with the Department of the Treasury a committee that implements Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of entities engaged in proliferation activities. ISN also managed negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty for conventional weapons that was adopted by the United Nations in April 2013.

Reducing Risks of WMD Terrorism

Many of the tools ISN uses to combat WMD proliferation also contribute to combating WMD terrorism, but some efforts are focused specifically on countering the WMD terrorism threat. ISN leads the diplomatic aspects of the President's initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years, and played a leading role in the Nuclear Security Summits of 2010 and 2012. ISN is engaged in preparations for the third Summit in 2014. ISN also leads diplomatic efforts to reduce the amount of weapons-usable highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the world and to make nuclear reactors and storage sites for weapons-usable nuclear materials more proliferation-resistant. ISN assists the IAEA in establishing norms and technical guidance on the handling of nuclear material and radiological sources, and urges universal ratification of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Bureau also manages the 85-nation Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism that aims to enhance partner states' and international capacities to combat and respond to this threat, as well as programs to combat nuclear smuggling, and manages U.S. participation in the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). In accordance with the *U.S. Strategy for Countering Biological Threats*, ISN works to bolster the BWC by improving national implementation efforts, fostering greater information exchange, and promoting deeper coordination with international and national public health entities in disease surveillance and health security. ISN's Global Threat Reduction security assistance program assists countries in the areas of chemical and biological security and safety.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Performance

Acquisition of an operational nuclear device by al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations is a clear and present danger to U.S. and international security that ISN combats most directly through five tools: (1) the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to strengthen global capacity to combat nuclear terrorism, including by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and interoperability of its partner states; (2) the Prevent Nuclear Smuggling (PNSP) program to help states identify gaps in the capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear or radiological smuggling (3) the Global Threat Reduction (GTR) program to build a self-sufficient nuclear security culture in priority countries through training and integration into the international technical community; (4) assisting the IAEA in developing norms and technical guidance for nuclear and radiological safety and security; and (5) urging ratifications of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which establishes legally binding international norms for physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport, and adds nuclear smuggling and sabotage to the global penal regime.

Strategic Goal 1: Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world					
Strategic Priority	Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons				
Active Performance Indicator	The number of key milestones achieved annually that improve the capabilities of nuclear scientists and foreign governments to combat nuclear smuggling and prevent terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon.				
PRIOR YEAR RATINGS TREND					
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012
New Indicator, No Rating	▲ Above Target	◀▶ Improved But Not Met	◀▶ Improved But Not Met	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS					
FY 2014 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners conduct 8 activities, completes 2 more best practices documents to improve capabilities. • PNSP perform 2 country assessments, secures funding for 5 projects, and organizes 5 activities. • GTR funds 30 activities to engage Iraqi scientists, and 32 activities to improve awareness of nuclear security/safety objectives. • Organize international conference on security of radioactive sources. • Five more countries ratify Amendment to CPPNM. 				
FY 2013 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners conduct 8 activities, and adopt 3 official documents to improve partner nation capabilities. • PNSP performs 2 country assessments, secures donations for 5 projects, and organizes 5 activities. • GTR organizes 23 program activities to engage Iraqi scientists and funds 35 activities to improve scientist awareness of nuclear security/safety. • Update IAEA Guidance on radioactive source export • Five more countries ratify Amendment to the CPPNM. 				

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

FY 2012 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners conduct 8 activities to implement Principles. • PNSP performs 2 country assessments, secures donations for 6 projects, and organizes 6 activities. • GTR organizes 23 activities to engage Iraqi scientists and funds 19 activities to improve awareness of nuclear security/safety objectives. • At least 100 countries make political commitment to controlling radioactive materials usable in a dirty bomb consistent with IAEA Code of Conduct on radioactive sources. • More countries ratify Amendment to CPPNM.
FY 2012 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners conducted 7 activities to implement Principles. • PNSP performed 5 country assessments, secured donations for 9 projects, and organized 6 activities. • GTR organized 26 activities to engage Iraqi scientists, and funded 46 activities to improve awareness of nuclear security/safety. • 113 countries made a political commitment to the safe and secure management of high-risk radioactive sources. • Seven additional CPPNM Amendment ratifications.
Impact	<p>Failure to prevent terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be measurable and could be catastrophic; success in achieving the objective of preventing such acquisition is harder to measure. Raising awareness of nuclear scientists and foreign governments, and helping them gain the tools necessary to combat nuclear terrorism decrease the chances of a terrorist incident using nuclear material.</p>
FY 2011 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New GICNT structures, including the Implementation and Assessment Group and two working groups, are functional, process for developing best-practices documents begins, and 8 activities conducted. • PNSP completed 4 country assessments, secured funding for 12 projects, and organized 8 activities. • GTR organized 30 activities to engage Iraqi scientists and funded 26 activities to increase awareness of nuclear security/safety. • Completed IAEA Nuclear Security Series on security of radiological and nuclear materials; the 2011 Radiation Source Protection and Security Task Force Report submitted to Congress. • Eight countries ratify amendment strengthening CPPNM.
FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Improved But Not Met</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners adopted revised Terms of Reference creating new leadership roles, established an Implementation and Assessment Group with 2 working groups, conducted 8 activities, and completed 6 activities with international, private cooperation. • PNSP completed 3 country assessments, secured funding for 8 eight projects, organized 8 projects. • GTR organized 26 activities to engage Iraqi scientists and 4 activities to engage nuclear scientists worldwide. • Completed interagency report on feasibility of replacing radioactive sources usable in a 'dirty bomb' with alternative technologies. • Twelve countries ratified CPPNM amendment.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Improved But Not Met</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT conducted 12 activities, Spain hosted field exercise in Oct 2008; U.S. and Russia agreed to expand the Implementation and Assessment Group to help transform the GICNT into a durable institution. • PSNP performed 4 country assessments, secured funding for 6 new projects, and organized 7 activities. • GTR organized 22 activities to engage Iraqi, and five activities to engage Libyan, ex-WMD scientists. • Nine of 10 major radioactive source suppliers commit to standards • Twelve additional ratifications of CPPNM amendment.
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Above Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 additional states endorse the GICNT, for total of 75, and Partners conducted 15 activities. • PNSP performed 3 country assessments, secured funding for 9 projects. • GTR conducted 11 training events for Iraqi, and 9 for Libyan personnel. • Six more states committed to security radioactive sources with IAEA standards, bringing the total to 94 states. • 6 new CPPNM ratifications.
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: New Indicator, No Rating</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Global Initiative began with 13 partners; now over 50. During this first year of implementation, three senior-level political meetings were held; an Exercise Planning Group was created to develop exercises and scenario planning. • A two-year roadmap of GICNT activities was agreed, and a web portal has been created to manage GI information. • PNSP completed 4 country assessments and funded 16 projects. • GTR organized 13 activities to engage scientists in Iraq and Libya. • Six additional CPPNM ratifications, for total of 12.
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis, offices within the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitor and assess information received from the data sources.
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is developed from information from GICNT partners; consultations with foreign governments; IAEA documents and consultations; intelligence reporting; embassy reporting; and from ISN Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs. The Data Quality Assessment revealed minor data limitations. Accurate information on terrorist activities is difficult to obtain.

The 'basic bargain' of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been put at risk by countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities under the guise of peaceful uses. The U.S. seeks to rebuild consensus among NPT Parties on the importance of the NPT, reach consensus on responses to NPT and IAEA noncompliance, and ensure that the IAEA has the authority and resources needed to police the nuclear nonproliferation system through its international safeguards. This indicator tracks (1) efforts to ensure implementation of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, by expanding consensus on important issues, and by outlining next steps (2) efforts to improve the IAEA's safeguards capabilities; (3) universal ratification of the IAEA's Additional Protocol (AP), which gives the IAEA authority to investigate undeclared suspected sites; (4) efforts to ensure reliable access to nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes as an alternative to more countries developing proliferation-sensitive enrichment or reprocessing capabilities; (5) U.S. negotiations on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation agreements with select countries to permit nuclear commerce between us.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Strategic Goal 1: Counter threats to the United States and the international order, and advance civilian security around the world					
Strategic Priority	Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons				
Active Performance Indicator	The number of key milestones achieved annually that strengthen the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).				
PRIOR YEAR RATINGS TREND					
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012
◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS					
FY 2014 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2014 Preparatory Committee sets stage for a successful NPT Review Conference in 2015. • NPT Parties continue to follow up on the 2010 Action Plan with a view to a near consensus document by the beginning of 2015. • Construction of new Nuclear Material Laboratory and enclosure of the site is completed. • Two additional countries sign, have approval by Board of Governors, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, Additional Protocols, and where appropriate modified small quantities protocols. 				
FY 2013 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Parties continue to follow up on 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. • Successful 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. • Construction proceeds on new Nuclear Materials Laboratory; transition from old lab to new lab begins. • Two additional countries sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, additional protocols, and where appropriate modified small quantities protocols. 				
FY 2012 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPT Parties continue to follow up on 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. • Successful 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee. • Construction begins on new IAEA Nuclear Materials Laboratory. • Additional countries sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, Additional Protocols, and where appropriate modified small quantities protocols. 				
FY 2012 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. met all its objectives for the 2012 PrepCom, including a Chairman's summary that retained key U.S. priorities without overly reflecting other Parties' criticism on disarmament; a comprehensive P5 statement; smooth adoption of procedural plans; and continuation of the constructive atmosphere of engagement that began in 2009. • Construction of the new Laboratory is well underway, on schedule and on budget. • Seven additional APs entered into force, four APs were signed, two APs approved by Board of Governors. 				
Impact	The U.S. cannot achieve its NPT objectives without the support of the non-nuclear weapon states; U.S. and P5 affirmation of commitments is important. The IAEA cannot monitor NPT obligations without significant upgrades, requiring significant U.S. diplomatic and financial support.				

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

FY 2011 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In June, the Permanent 5 Security Council members (P-5) reaffirmed the Action Plan and intent to work together in pursuit of their shared goals of nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation; they also shared views on how to respond to notification of withdrawal from the NPT and strengthen IAEA safeguards. • Planning for 2012 PrepCom is well underway; NPT Parties agreed Australia would chair the meeting and that it would be held in Vienna; U.S. consultations with Australia and other NPT parties continuing. • IAEA member states agreed on 2012-13 budget with a real increase in 2012, and a price adjustment for 2013. • Eight countries brought APs into force, three countries brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force, and six countries concluded amended small quantities protocols.
FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RevCon exceeded expectations; all Treaty issues reviewed; progress made on all principal U.S. objectives. Final Document on substantive issues achieved for first time in 10 years. • Consensus reached on a plan of follow-on actions to strengthen each of the three NPT pillars, first time an NPT action plan has covered each pillar. • Future of Agency general discussions completed; Working Group on Financing the Agency's Activities established to address, inter alia, management reforms. • U.S. preparing to host IAEA inspections under Additional Protocol. • Three countries signed APs, two had APs approved by IAEA, and eight brought APs into force, for total of 101 APs in force; also, three states signed and seven brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force.
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPT PrepCom completed work quickly and with more cohesion than in the recent past. Parties agreed on procedural matters including a substantive agenda for RevCon. • Safeguards strengthened this year due to agreement on a real increase in IAEA budget for 2010, and to Japanese and U.S. contributions to fund a new IAEA safeguards analytical lab that ROK and others may also fund. • The "2020 review" has evolved into open-ended meetings of IAEA states on the "Future of the Agency" in which we emphasize the need for strengthened safeguards. • The U.S. Additional Protocol entered into force in January 2009. • Six more countries signed Additional Protocols and four ratified. Five states had comprehensive safeguards agreements ratified, signed or approved by the IAEA.
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The second PrepCom for the 2010 Review Conference completed its work, including a substantive discussion of all key issues and decisions on the venue, chairman, and other arrangements for the 2009 PrepCom. • Three Parties signed an Additional Protocol and four brought Protocols into force, bringing the total number in force to 88. The IAEA determined that another 27 states had met its 'integrated safeguards' guidelines, bringing the total to 47 states. • The Department continued to pursue the recommendations for strengthening safeguards through bilateral consultations.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <p>Iran used procedural disputes to constrain time for debate of substantive issues at the 2007 PrepCom (e.g., objecting to a phrase about "reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty"). Other delegations held firm against these ploys in a display of international unity for the integrity of the Treaty review process that included most members of the Non-Aligned Movement. The PrepCom completed necessary work for the 2008 PrepCom, and discussed issues (e.g., how to deter withdrawal from the Treaty by violators). The Safeguards Committee lapsed, but USG will pursue the Secretariat's 18 recommendations for strengthening safeguards in other IAEA fora. One state signed an Additional Protocol; five others brought Protocols into force. Eighty-five states now have Additional Protocols in force.</p>
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitors international developments related to the NPT, the IAEA, and nuclear nonproliferation, and consults with others in the Department and the U.S. Government about U.S. policy approaches and tactics for accomplishing our objectives.
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is from UN, NPT, and IAEA documents, reports of UN and IAEA meetings, U.S. and other governments' statements and papers, embassy reporting, intelligence reporting, consultations with the IAEA, UN, and foreign government officials. The Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations.

Justification of Request

The FY 2014 Request for ISN is \$48 million and 264 positions. The request includes an increase of \$237,000 from the FY 2012 Actual and reflects current services and administrative savings. ISN absorbed inflationary increases by reducing awards, consultant and contractual services, supplies and equipment.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Resource Summary

	Positions					Funds (\$ in thousands)		
	American				Pos	Bureau	American	Funds
	CS	FS Dom	Overseas	FSN	Total	Managed	Salaries	Total
FY 2012 Actual	241	22	1	0	264	17,262	30,467	47,729
FY 2013 Estimate	241	22	1	0	264	17,195	30,467	47,662
FY 2014 Built-in Changes								
Absorption of Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	(240)	0	(240)
American COLA	0	0	0	0	0	17	287	304
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	240	0	240
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	0	17	287	304
FY 2014 Current Services	241	22	1	0	264	17,212	30,754	47,966
FY 2014 Request	241	22	1	0	264	17,212	30,754	47,966

Staff and Funds by Domestic Organization Units

(\$ in thousands)

International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)	FY 2012			FY 2013			FY 2014			Increase/Decrease		
	Actual			CR			Request			From FY2012		
	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds	Am	FSN	Funds
Budget and General Services	10	0	1,579	10	0	1,579	10	0	1,544	0	0	(35)
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	17	0	2,914	17	0	2,914	17	0	2,942	0	0	28
Cooperative Threat Reduction	11	0	1,438	11	0	1,438	10	0	1,334	(1)	0	(104)
Coordinator for Threat Reduction	2	0	472	2	0	472	3	0	592	1	0	120
Counterproliferation Initiatives	22	0	3,382	22	0	3,382	22	0	3,414	0	0	32
DAS for Non-Nuclear & Counterproliferation	6	0	1,503	6	0	1,503	6	0	1,521	0	0	18
DAS for Nonproliferation Programs	2	0	382	2	0	382	2	0	386	0	0	4
DAS for Nuclear Affairs	2	0	408	2	0	408	2	0	412	0	0	4
Export Control Cooperation	17	0	2,180	17	0	2,180	17	0	2,196	0	0	16
Human Resource Division	19	0	2,619	19	0	2,619	19	0	2,642	0	0	23
IAEA-UNVIE	1	0	115	1	0	115	1	0	116	0	0	1
Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation	14	0	2,105	14	0	2,105	14	0	2,124	0	0	19
Multinational Nuclear & Security Affairs	12	0	1,805	12	0	1,805	12	0	1,821	0	0	16
Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund	15	0	1,938	15	0	1,938	15	0	1,954	0	0	16
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	19	0	3,077	19	0	3,077	19	0	3,106	0	0	29
Office of Assistant Secretary	12	0	4,793	12	0	4,726	12	0	4,787	0	0	(6)
Office of the Executive Director	3	0	605	3	0	605	3	0	551	0	0	(54)
Regional Affairs	23	0	3,383	23	0	3,383	23	0	3,414	0	0	31

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Resource Management Division	12	0	1,851	12	0	1,851	12	0	1,868	0	0	17
Spec. Rep. Nuclear Nonproliferation	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation	0	0	327	0	0	326	0	0	329	0	0	2
Strategic Communications and Outreach	10	0	1,334	10	0	1,334	10	0	1,346	0	0	12
Technology Division	15	0	6,891	15	0	6,892	15	0	6,914	0	0	23
WMD/Terrorism	18	0	2,628	18	0	2,628	18	0	2,653	0	0	25
Total	264	0	47,729	264	0	47,662	264	0	47,966	0	0	237

Funds by Object Class

(\$ in thousands)

International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)	FY 2012 Actual	FY 2013 CR	FY 2014 Request	Increase/Decrease From FY2012
1100 Personnel Compensation	24,840	24,840	25,010	170
1200 Personnel Benefits	7,312	7,312	7,381	69
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	3,212	3,212	3,261	49
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	806	806	818	12
2400 Printing & Reproduction	254	254	258	4
2500 Other Services	9,178	9,111	9,150	(28)
2600 Supplies and Materials	495	495	500	5
3100 Personal Property	666	666	607	(59)
4100 Grants, Subsidies & Contributions	966	966	981	15
Total	47,729	47,662	47,966	237