

Report on
Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy



International Security Advisory Board

October 9, 2012

Disclaimer

This is a report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide the Department of State with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on scientific, military, diplomatic, political, and public diplomacy aspects of arms control, disarmament, international security, and nonproliferation. The views expressed herein do not represent official positions or policies of the Department of State or any other entity of the United States Government.



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 9, 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING U/S ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

SUBJECT: Final Report of the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy – Part One

I am forwarding herewith the ISAB's report on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy. The report responds to U/S Tauscher's request of August 10, 2011, that the Board undertake a study on South Asian security and strategic stability. The report was drafted by a Study Group chaired by Ambassador Robert Gallucci. It was reviewed by all ISAB members and unanimously approved by October 2, 2012.

The report looks at the U.S.-Pakistan relationship with respect to four potential future outcomes – three negative and one positive. Part One of the report is this unclassified paper which aims to promote the positive future outcome - that Pakistan and the U.S. recognize common interests and enter an ongoing and serious dialogue, while at the same time tensions between India and Pakistan are reduced. As such, this paper outlines U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests, warns against promoting U.S. short-term interests at the expense of its long-term regional interests, and identifies potential overlapping interests, which represent potential areas of cooperation with Pakistan. Additionally, the paper offers a number of policy recommendations and considerations that are summarized in Appendix A.

Part Two of the report is a separate classified paper. It addresses the potential negative future outcomes and offers policy recommendations to prevent and/or prepare for these possibilities. I encourage you to consider all of the report's recommendations carefully. The Study Group members and I stand ready to brief you and other members of the Administration on the report.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "William J. Perry".

William J. Perry

Chairman

International Security Advisory Board

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

Report on

Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy

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ISAB Report on Pakistan and U.S. Security Strategy

The situation in Pakistan today poses certain risks for our security and international security generally. That situation, quite likely, will deteriorate in the coming months and years, posing grave threats to American interests. We have addressed this possibility in a separate, classified paper. Here, we present a discussion aimed at avoiding such an outcome, and promoting a substantial improvement in the security situation in South Asia.¹

How should we think about Pakistan? As a failed state that is thwarting American aims in South Asia? As a state that helped drive Soviet troops from Afghanistan and hastened the end of the Soviet Union? As a sponsor of state terrorism in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and in India? As a state that accepted U.S. drone bases on its territory and provided logistical access to Afghanistan?

Pakistan is all of these things and each of these actions was motivated by Pakistan's perceptions of its interests. Its external interests have been defined fairly consistently over the years by a strategic vision that has not changed much in several decades. Its essence can be summed up as follows:

Do everything possible to hold together the several ethnic and regional groupings of the country so as to avoid any further splintering of the nation's territory. Achieve defensive depth through influence over Afghanistan and good relations with other Muslim states. Use nuclear deterrent and asymmetric warfare capabilities to counter India's superiority in conventional forces. Develop security relations with major nations -- China and the United States -- that will offset or neutralize India's relations with those states.

There is very little that the United States could do to change that strategic outlook in any significant way. The question is whether we can live with a Pakistan that acts in accordance with these strategic principles. If the answer is

¹ While all ISAB members have approved this report and its recommendations, and agree they merit consideration by policy-makers, some members do not subscribe to the particular wording on every point.

“no, we cannot,” an array of actions could be taken, over time, to deprive Pakistan of the strategic depth it seeks, to align the United States more closely with India, to combat Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare capabilities, to limit its ability to exploit its nuclear status, and even to undermine its national unity and territorial integrity.

Such a course would almost certainly do serious damage to short- and long-term U.S. national interests, globally and in the region. These include:

An over-riding national interest in preventing nuclear weapons or fissile material from being transferred, lost, or stolen from Pakistani authorities. This risk will only increase as Pakistan begins to operate more and larger nuclear facilities, making accountability much more difficult. Dealing with this threat will require working with the Pakistani military as well as the civilian government.

Preventing a South Asian nuclear war, slowing the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, and avoiding a nuclear arms race with India. These goals will be served by reduced tension and increased confidence between India and Pakistan, and the U.S. should clearly work to promote this movement.

A Pakistan that has the political will and capacity to deny safe haven for those who wish to do harm to U.S. interests at home or abroad.

In our efforts to accomplish these goals, we should recognize certain realities:

First, there is no reasonable alternative to a re-engagement with Pakistan, primarily through its civilian government, by looking for ways to cooperate in areas of common interest.

Second, we should engage with Pakistan’s principal neighbors, China, India, Afghanistan, and Iran, looking for areas in which our goals for Pakistan intersect with theirs.

Third, our government could be better organized to design and pursue an integrated policy focused on Pakistan, which is also consistent with our objectives in India, China, and elsewhere regionally. The tilt towards Afghanistan and the military medium is understandable when we are fighting a war, but refocusing our policy and policy-making process should come with our reduced commitment in Afghanistan.

Fourth, no framework exists for deterring or preventing nuclear terrorism launched from non-states, or failed states controlled by non-state actors. To this end, we should consider leveraging existing “open source” cyberspace/global communication networks/social media tools in order to uncover, disrupt, and/or shape unhelpful activities.²

The long-term interests of the U.S. vis-à-vis Pakistan should be a major part of our national strategy towards the region, broadly defined. These long-term interests can be ignored only at our peril and can be damaged if we focus exclusively on short-term dangers. These long-term interests are:

To influence to the best of our ability the gradual evolution of all elements of the Muslim world toward more tolerant, democratic, and modern societies, integrated with the rest of the world, and providing little encouragement for Islamist extremism and terrorism.

To accommodate the rise of China and of India to major power status in a way that results in a stable international system in the Asia-Pacific region.

² For example, communications strategies based on information gained from open source material might influence the actions of the community dealing with proliferation activity, and might also be used to potentially deter and/or change cost-benefit calculations of non-state actors. The application of “open source” mining and “crowd sourcing” could produce new tools to uncover unhelpful activity in a manner that is open to dissemination, supplementing the current activities and tools of the DoD and intelligence communities. These “open source” strategies and methods could be applied in the South Asia context and could prove particularly useful across the spectrum of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and counter-WMD mission sets.

To encourage India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir and other disputed areas, and to develop mutually beneficial economic relations.

To promote conditions that permit the strengthening of Afghanistan's governmental and civil society institutions so that Afghanistan can maintain its independence and enjoy mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors.

To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities beyond those nations that now possess them, to discourage the use of nuclear weapons, and eventually to roll back the nuclear weapons arsenals of all states that currently possess them.

To develop regional strategies and relations even farther afield, to include Iran and the region of the Persian Gulf.

American and Pakistani strategic goals often are, or appear to be, at odds. For instance, American relations with India and China can appear hostile to Pakistan, and Pakistan's insistence on exerting significant leverage in Afghanistan's political and economic choices, in some measure, already appears opposed to American interests. Also, differences over nuclear issues have bedeviled U.S.-Pakistan relations for years; they will continue to do so if one extrapolates this history into the future.

In light of such differences in strategic goals, some observers in both countries have reached the conclusion that dropping all attempts at cooperation is the only answer. Many more believe that a relationship between the two countries can be maintained only at the level of a few strictly-defined and very limited agreements, where mutual trust does not have to be a crucial element.

Both schools of thought fail to allow for the substantial areas in the national goals of Pakistan and the U.S. that are either not in conflict or could be mutually supportive. These, in brief, are as follows:

Use the full range of instruments of U.S. policy and influence to prevent an India-Pakistan war.

Support and strengthen Pakistan's territorial integrity and national unity.

Work for an outcome in Afghanistan that is not in conflict with the goals of the U.S. and Pakistan.

Build a relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. that supports the national aspirations of Pakistan with respect to economic development and sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territory.

Renounce and fight against the use of terrorism as a tool of national policy.

Enter into international activities designed to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.

Work for equal treatment in reducing the threat of nuclear war everywhere in the world.

Promote Pakistan's economic development and deeper integration in the global trade and financial system.

Strive for better mutual understanding through people-to-people programs, military-to-military exchanges, and educational cooperation programs.

Such a platform for future U.S.-Pakistan relations could become operationally meaningful if two things happened: (1) the two nations entered into a discussion of their national goals at senior, influential levels inside and outside of government; and (2) specific actions, programs, and policies were identified in the case of each major national goal that are supported by those who shape public opinion in each country.

The principal - and most visible - conduit for U.S./Pakistan contact should be civilian-to-civilian. For our side, in most cases, that means the Department of State and Embassy team, but at times may appropriately include the President, Vice President, and the Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs. With the impending end of the NATO combat role in Afghanistan, the highly visible role played by the Chairman of the JCS and the CENTCOM Commander in the diplomacy of U.S.-Pakistan relations should sharply decrease. At the same time, contacts and cooperation within the military sphere, between Pakistani and American military officers, can play an essential role in developing and sustaining proper civil-military relations in a democratic Pakistan.

Recognizing that the counterterrorism mission and other security concerns will remain our top priority, U.S. military assistance to the Pakistani military should also include increased capabilities to respond to large scale natural disasters. This should be accompanied by a U.S. effort to support a South Asian-wide capability to respond to such disasters, i.e., regional centers, interoperable communications capacity, regional exercises and planning, military-to-military exchanges within and outside the region focused on disaster responses, etc.

NATO should be encouraged to organize broad military-to-military exchanges with Pakistan and professional education jointly and with individual member states of the alliance. The Marshall Center at Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany has played a similar role with respect to the military and diplomatic establishments of the Former Soviet Union. With a NATO lead, the Marshall Center would seem to be well positioned to do this with Pakistan, with complementary efforts from the various national establishments of NATO members.

Pakistan, as Pakistani leaders have recently acknowledged, finds itself burdened with an outsized military establishment that is sapping its economy and placing its long-term viability at risk. However, recognizing that the Pakistani military establishment will likely continue to play a central role in shaping Pakistani policy and doctrine in the foreseeable future, we should review, improve upon, and share the lessons we learned in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to highlight the many dangers and misperceptions associated with our own past Cold War policies/doctrines. Also, it is essential, both to the

future of Pakistan and to U.S. interests in the region, that the U.S. make a major effort to craft policies and initiatives that will provide Pakistan with the opportunities and investment resources that will allow it to participate in the dynamic growth that is taking place in the region.

The U.S. political leadership needs to emphasize that, while we are concerned about the use and security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan, we are motivated by a strong belief that America's interests and Pakistan's future can best be served by an economically-strong and democratic Pakistan that is increasingly integrated into the regional and world economy.

Beyond the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. lies the realm of each nation's relation with third parties: nations like India and China, Afghanistan, the Arab states, and Iran. The U.S.-Pakistan strategic dialogue must extend to these other countries as well. It will not do to have Pakistan and the U.S. agree on a set of mutually-supportive national goals and policies if other concerned nations actively oppose them or subtly undermine them. This is why U.S. policies that put a primary focus on the Afghan-Pakistan axis cannot succeed. Too many other countries in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, East Asia, and Europe have a stake in Pakistan. They see that nation not as inseparably linked with the American exit from Afghanistan, but as a key player in the Muslim world and in the political dynamics of a large part of Asia.

This is particularly true with regard to pressing matters of immediate concern to the U.S., our allies and partners. These include:

Competitions for influence in Afghanistan, especially as between India, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

The role of Islam and other religions, as they play out "geopolitically," where the role of Saudi Arabia and its "religious offshoots" are particularly important and seem to be far more profound than is evident in U.S. policy.

The role of Iran and especially American perceptions of it and policies toward it. Relations between Iran and Pakistan, and Iran and India are

of signal importance in shaping the future of South Asia as well as of South West Asia, and are essential to the charting of effective policies for the entire region.

Of direct relevance to arms control efforts in South Asia and the broader region is the Iranian issue, where it is profoundly in our interest to persuade Iranian leaders that their acquisition of nuclear weapons could create risks to their security, political interests, and perhaps even their survival that would outweigh the benefits they might expect from acquiring these weapons.

What happens in South Asia, and what the countries of that region do in Afghanistan and beyond -- as far west as Iran and Iraq -- will also matter to the NATO alliance and other partnerships, and have a major impact on judgments about American "reliability."

A post-Iraq, post-Afghanistan U.S. foreign policy is called for, and Pakistan should figure importantly in that. It is not a policy to be crafted solely or perhaps even primarily in the government or in think tanks in Washington, although that probably will be the beginnings of it. Like the Marshall Plan of post-World War II, it should be a policy that is shaped by vigorous interaction with America's partners, in Asia as well as in Europe. It will be a policy that knows limits -- limits imposed by economic circumstances and by recognition that America's global reach, while still formidable, will continue to require accommodation to the interests of other nations. American diplomacy will need to operate more in this mode than has been the case in recent decades, and Pakistan is a good place to start.

Recommending diplomatic tactics is not the purpose of this paper, but some principles of conduct may be advanced and debated. The classic distinction between nations as being either the object of policy or the subject of policy is useful here. Pakistan for too long has been the object of our policy. We knew what we wanted Pakistan to do, and we were willing to give or withhold favors to have our way. That continues to be the mindset of too much of American diplomacy vis-à-vis Pakistan. It will no longer work. To the extent it had value; it has outlived its usefulness. From now on, Pakistan must be a subject of our policy,

meaning that our two nations should devise a modus vivendi in fairly concrete terms, along the lines described above.

Other nations should be brought into this common understanding of what the two countries will try to do together to advance each other's goals. Afghanistan, India, and Iran should be the first. They will be dubious about the whole exercise. But if they see America and Pakistan acting out the script they all have jointly devised, their attitudes can change. This is what a "principled foreign policy" really is. It should be the way America conducts its policies in the next phase of its history.

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Appendix A – Summary of Findings and Recommendations

1. There is no reasonable alternative to a re-engagement with Pakistan, primarily through its civilian government, by looking for ways to cooperate in areas of common interest.
2. We should engage with Pakistan’s principal neighbors, China, India, Afghanistan and Iran, looking for areas in which our goals for Pakistan intersect with theirs.
3. Our government could be better organized to design and pursue an integrated policy focused on Pakistan, which is also consistent with our objectives in India, China, and elsewhere regionally. The tilt towards Afghanistan and the military medium is understandable when we are fighting a war, but refocusing our policy and policy-making process should come with our reduced commitment in Afghanistan.
4. No framework exists for deterring or preventing nuclear terrorism launched from non-states, or failed states controlled by non-state actors. To this end, we should consider leveraging existing “open source” cyberspace/global communication networks/social media tools in order to uncover, disrupt, and/or shape unhelpful activities.
5. Ensure that the long-term interests of the United States vis-à-vis Pakistan are a major part of our national strategy towards the region, broadly defined. Potential areas of overlap in the national goals of Pakistan and the United States are:
 - a. Support and strengthen Pakistan’s territorial integrity and national unity.
 - b. Work for an outcome in Afghanistan that is not in conflict with the goals of the U.S. and Pakistan.

- c. Build a relationship between Pakistan and the United States that supports the national aspirations of Pakistan with respect to economic development and sovereignty over all its internationally recognized territory.
 - d. Renounce and fight against the use of terrorism as a tool of national policy.
 - e. Enter into international activities designed to strengthen the safety and security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.
 - f. Work for equal treatment in reducing the threat of nuclear war everywhere in the world.
 - g. Promote Pakistan's economic development and deeper integration in the global trade and financial system.
 - h. Strive for better mutual understanding through people-to-people programs, military-to-military exchanges, and educational cooperation programs.
6. A platform for future U.S.-Pakistani relations could become operationally meaningful if two things happened: (1) the two nations entered into a discussion of their national goals at senior, influential levels inside and outside of government; and (2) specific actions, programs, and policies were identified in the case of each major national goal that are in turn supported by those who shape public opinion in each country.
7. The principal – and most viable – conduit for U.S.-Pakistan contact should be civilian-to-civilian. At the same time, contacts and cooperation within the military sphere, between Pakistani and American military officers, can play an essential role in developing and sustaining proper civil-military relations in a democratic Pakistan.
8. Recognizing that the counterterrorism mission and other security concerns will remain our top priority, U.S. military assistance to the Pakistan military should also include increased capabilities to respond to large scale natural disasters. This should be accompanied

by a U.S. effort to support a South Asian-wide capability to respond to such disasters.

9. NATO should be encouraged to organize broad military-to-military exchanges with Pakistan and professional education jointly and with individual member states of the alliance.
10. Recognizing that the Pakistani military establishment will likely continue to play a central role in shaping Pakistani policy and doctrine in the foreseeable future, we should review, improve upon, and share the lessons we learned in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in order to highlight the many dangers and misperceptions associated with our own past Cold War policies/doctrines.
11. It is essential that the U.S. make a major effort to craft policies and initiatives that will provide Pakistan with the opportunities and investment resources that will allow it to participate in the dynamic growth that is taking place in the region.
12. Treat Pakistan as a subject – not as an object – of USG policy.

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Appendix B - Terms of Reference

S/ES 201113876

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
WASHINGTON

August 10, 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD (ISAB)

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference – ISAB Study on South Asian Security and
Strategic Stability

The ISAB is requested to undertake a study of South Asian Security and Strategic Stability.

The South Asian region is of great importance to U.S. security interests. India and Pakistan are both important partners of the United States. At the same time, terrorist groups continue to operate within the region and seek to undermine internal stability and Indo-Pak relations; and India and Pakistan have active nuclear and missile programs.

It would be of great assistance if the ISAB could examine and assess:

- U.S. policy options for assisting Pakistan in improving its internal security and stability;
- Current Indian and Pakistani security postures and doctrine, especially in relation to each other, and how U.S. interests (geopolitical, nonproliferation, arms control, disarmament, security) are affected by the growing role of nuclear weapons in Pakistan-India relations;
- The impact of U.S. policy on the arms build up in South Asia and how the United States might better encourage strategic restraint by Pakistan and India, and whether there is a regional diplomatic construct that could move us forward on South Asian arms control;
- Whether and where there are overlapping areas of agreement between the disarmament agendas laid out by the United States, by India (Rajiv Gandhi plan), and by Pakistan (calls for a strategic restraint regime), and how this could be parlayed into positive actions;
- Whether there are areas of U.S. cooperation with either or both countries (scientist-to-scientist, military-to-military, nongovernmental, or

governmental) that could usefully be developed in new and untried directions; and

- Best practices for confidence-building and risk-reduction measures and their applicability to South Asia.

During its conduct of the study, the ISAB may expand upon the tasks listed above, as it deems necessary. I request that you complete the study in 270 days. Completed work should be submitted to the ISAB Executive Directorate no later than May 10, 2012.

The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security will sponsor the study. The Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation will support the study. Kathryn Schultz will serve as the Executive Secretary for the study and Chris Herrick will represent the ISAB Executive Directorate.

The study will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act." If the ISAB establishes a working group to assist in its study, the working group must present its report of findings to the full ISAB for consideration in a formal meeting, prior to presenting the report or findings to the Department.



Ellen O. Tauscher

Appendix C - Members and Project Staff

Board Members

Dr. William Perry (Chairman)
Mr. Charles Curtis (Vice Chairman)

Dr. Graham Allison	Dr. David A. Kay
Dr. Michael R. Anastasio	Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz (USAF, Ret.)
Hon. Doug Bereuter	Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs (USA, Ret.)
Dr. Bruce G. Blair	Rep. Harold Naughton
Mr. Joseph Cirincione	Mr. Robert N. Rose
Hon. Terry Everett	Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF, Ret.)
Amb. Robert Gallucci	Mr. Walter Slocombe
Amb. James Goodby	Dr. James Tegnalia
Amb. Robert E. Hunter	Mr. William H. Tobey
Dr. Shirley Ann Jackson	Dr. Ellen Williams
Dr. Raymond Jeanloz	Dr. Joan B. Woodard

Study Group Members

Amb. Robert Gallucci (Chairman)

Mr. Joseph Cirincione	Dr. Raymond Jeanloz
Hon. Terry Everett	Dr. David A. Kay
Amb. James Goodby	Rep. Harold Naughton
Amb. Robert E. Hunter	Dr. James Tegnalia

Project Staff

Mr. Richard W. Hartman II
Executive Director, ISAB

Mr. Christopher Herrick
Deputy Executive Director,
ISAB

Mr. Matt Brechwald
Ms. Kathryn Schultz
Executive Secretaries

Ms. Thelma Jenkins-
Anthony
ISAB Action Officer

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Appendix D - Individuals Consulted by the Study Group

Persons Consulted in Study Group Meetings

September 6, 2011

Ms. Kathryn Schultz	Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Regional Affairs, Department of State
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November 7, 2011

Assigned Briefers	WINPAC, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Daniel Feldman	Deputy to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Department of State
American Journalist	Reporting from Pakistan
Dr. Neil Joeck	Senior Fellow, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Mr. Timothy Lenderking	Director of Pakistan Affairs, Department of State
Assigned Briefers	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Near East and South Asia, Department of State

Jan 13, 2012

Dr. Thomas Graham	Brookhaven National Laboratory
Mr. Paul Kerr	Analyst in Nonproliferation at the Congressional Research Service, Washington DC
Mr. Michael Curry	Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Office, Department of State
Ms. Daniela Helfet	Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism Office, Department of State
Mr. Geoff Pyatt	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia, Department of State
Mr. Philip Reiner	Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan, National Security Staff
Mr. Michael Newbill	Director, South Asia, National Security Staff

February 07, 2012

Assigned Briefer	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Mr. Matt Brechwald	Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of Regional Affairs, Department of State

April 18, 2012

Dr. Gary Hufbauer

Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for
International Economics

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