Part 1

Political and Security Affairs

Regional Issues
South Asia
Afghanistan

The United Nations, with the strong support of the United States, played a critical role in Afghanistan in 2001, particularly after the fall of the Taliban regime. The United Nations was instrumental in helping establish an interim government and it authorized an international security force to stabilize the situation in Kabul.

Before September 11, the United Nations focused on the Taliban’s role in providing a haven for terrorists, the ongoing Afghan civil war, the human rights situation in Afghanistan, including the treatment of women, and the humanitarian crisis in the country. In January 2001, UN Security Council sanctions imposed on the Taliban and al–Qaida by Resolution 1333 (2000) went into effect. Resolution 1333 repeated the demand made in Resolution 1267 (1999) that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden and added a demand that the Taliban close down terrorist training camps. Sanctions under the resolution included an arms embargo against the Taliban, a freeze on bin Laden’s assets, the closure of Taliban and Ariana Air- lines offices overseas, a ban on non–humanitarian flights to and from Taliban–controlled areas, restrictions on Taliban officials’ travel and a ban on the export to Taliban–controlled areas of a precursor chemical used to manufacture heroin.

In June 2001, the experts panel appointed under Resolution 1333 (2000) recommended the establishment of a monitoring mechanism to oversee sanctions implementation. In July 2001, the Security Council endorsed the panel’s recommendations in Resolution 1363, requiring the Secretary–General to set up a mechanism that would collect information on sanctions enforcement and offer assistance to states to carry out their responsibilities.

The Secretary–General’s Personal Representative, Francesc Vendrell (Spain), continued UN efforts to end the Afghan civil war during this period, but with little success. After the imposition of Resolution 1333 sanctions, the Taliban refused to engage in negotiations under UN auspices. In May 2001, the Taliban ordered the closure of the field offices of
the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), leaving only the UNSMA office in Kabul open.

The United States led efforts to focus attention on the human rights situation in Afghanistan, particularly on Taliban abuses. On March 9, the United States joined 90 other countries in the General Assembly in condemning the Taliban’s destruction of cultural artifacts, especially the Buddhist statues at Bamiyan (Resolution 55/243a). On March 17, the UN Commission on the Status of Women adopted by consensus a U.S.-drafted resolution on the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan. The resolution focused on the denial of equal access to health care to women and girls and particularly condemned Taliban restrictions on freedom of movement and access to education and employment.

The UN Commission on Human Rights adopted by consensus on April 18 a resolution strongly condemning mass killings and systematic human rights violations resulting from the armed conflict in Afghanistan (Resolution 2001/13). The resolution singled out the Taliban for particular criticism, citing credible reports of massacres committed by Taliban forces and highlighting the severe treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan.

In the first part of 2001, the United Nations also devoted considerable attention to the country’s ongoing humanitarian crisis. The Secretary-General requested his Emergency Relief Coordinator, Kenzo Oshima, to visit Afghanistan to assess the situation and to highlight funding shortfalls. In his follow-up report in April, the Secretary-General noted that the crisis was dire and countries needed to devote more resources to stem the crisis. The United Nations was actively involved during the early months of the year in providing protection and assistance to the large numbers of Afghans who entered Iran and Pakistan or were trapped on the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. About 60,000 arrivals in Pakistan were transferred to the new Shamshatoo refugee camp, near Peshawar in the North-West Frontier Province, where the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and nongovernmental organizations provided them with shelter, food, water and sanitation, and health care.

The United States demonstrated its commitment to easing the humanitarian crisis by providing $183 million in assistance to the Afghan people in 2001, making Afghanistan the top recipient of U.S. humanitarian aid prior to September 11. No U.S. assistance went directly to the Taliban government. Primarily because of a drought and the widely publicized suffering of the Afghan people, U.S. aid to the Afghan people in 2001 greatly exceeded that provided in 1999 or 2000 ($76.6 million and $113.2 million respectively).

The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11 transformed the UN’s response to the situation in Afghanistan and dominated the UN’s agenda for the rest of the year. On September 12, Secretary-General Annan joined the Security Council and the General Assembly in condemning the attacks (Security Council Resolution 1368 and General Assembly Resolution 56/1). On September 18, the Security Council
demanded that the Taliban immediately and unconditionally comply with Resolution 1333 by turning over Usama bin Laden and closing terrorist training camps.

After the Taliban refused to comply with U.S. demands, which closely paralleled the requirements of Resolution 1333, the United States and the United Kingdom briefed the Security Council on October 8 about the exercise of their right of self–defense in carrying out military strikes in Afghanistan.

As Operation Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan in October 2001, the Secretary–General reappointed Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria) as his Special Representative. After extensive consultations with the United States and other Security Council members, Afghanistan’s neighbors, and other interested countries, Brahimi proposed a plan to address the situation in Afghanistan after the imminent fall of the Taliban. The Group of Six plus Two (Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors plus the United States and Russia) met at the ministerial level at the United Nations on November 12 and pledged their support for Brahimi’s efforts. The Security Council unanimously endorsed Brahimi’s plan on November 14 in Resolution 1378. The three–part plan focused on urgently convening a representative group of Afghans to form a provisional government, supporting efforts to provide security to the Afghan people and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid.

In late November 2001, Brahimi convened talks in Bonn, Germany under UN auspices on the political future of Afghanistan. Afghan participants included representatives from almost all non–Taliban factions, numbering 62 participants, including at least 6 women. On December 5, with substantial encouragement from Brahimi, the United States, and other international representatives, the Afghan parties entered into an “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re–establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” (the Bonn Agreement). The Bonn Agreement establishes a multi–ethnic Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) to administer Afghanistan until an Afghan assembly (the Emergency Loya Jirga) is able to approve an Afghan Transitional Authority. The Loya Jirga is to be convened within six months of the inauguration of the AIA. On December 6, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1383, which endorsed the Bonn Agreement. On December 22, the AIA (which has 29 members including two women) took office in Kabul.

Concerns about the security situation in Kabul prompted an international coalition of states to agree to form a multinational security force. On December 19, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1386 which authorized the establishment of this force (the International Security Assistance Force or ISAF) to assist the AIA in the maintenance of security in Kabul and the surrounding area. The ISAF mandate will expire in June 2002.

On December 21, the General Assembly adopted without a vote a resolution on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for interna–
ional peace and security (Resolution 56/220B). The resolution, cosponsored by the United States, called on all Afghan groups to cooperate with the United Nations to promote peace and a lasting political settlement and fully implement the Bonn Agreement. The resolution also called on Afghans to refrain from reprisals, respect human rights, and promote the equal rights of men and women and called on the international community to provide assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs. The second part of the resolution (Resolution 56/220A) on emergency international assistance for Afghan reconstruction called on donors, UN bodies, multilateral development banks, and nongovernmental organizations to develop a strategy for early recovery and reconstruction.

On December 18, the UN Credential Committee accepted the credentials of all UN members, including Afghanistan. The representative from Afghanistan received new credentials from the AIA shortly after its inauguration on December 22.

Near East

The Middle East

In the context of the ongoing violence in the Middle East and the lack of progress in the peace process, UN bodies frequently discussed Middle East issues during 2001. In the Security Council, Arab member states repeatedly sought passage of one-sided resolutions critical of Israel and sought to impose a monitoring mechanism not accepted by both sides. In March and December, the United States vetoed such resolutions.

The 56th General Assembly met in an Emergency Special Session on Palestine in December, adopting two resolutions that the United States opposed. In addition, the United States continued to oppose a number of perennial General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East (Israeli Practices, Palestinian Right to Self-Determination, Question of Palestine, and Syrian Golan). The United States opposed these resolutions because they address permanent status issues that the Israelis and Palestinians have agreed to decide through negotiations; the proposed resolutions also advocate activities or language incompatible with basic principles of the Middle East peace process; and/or they expend resources that could be used in more productive ways to improve the lives of the Palestinian people.

The Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator (UNSCO) for the Middle East Peace Process, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway), periodically used UNSCO’s good offices to bring Israeli and Palestinian officials together during 2001 to deal with problems on the ground. He cooperated with the United States and others through the “Quartet” (the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and Russia). The UNSCO was based in Gaza.

UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

UN Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) established UNIFIL to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, assist the Government of Lebanon restore its effective authority, and contribute to the restoration of
international peace and security. Its mandate has since been repeatedly renewed at six–month intervals, but the focus following full Israeli withdrawal in June 2000 has been to maintain the cease–fire along the withdrawal line through mobile patrols and observation from fixed positions. The U.S. interest in supporting peace and stability in southern Lebanon is helped by UNIFIL’s serving as a stabilizing influence in reducing tensions between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.

On January 22, 2001, the Secretary–General reported that the UNIFIL area of operation had remained stable through the preceding six months. His report cited several incidents at certain sensitive locations as well as five serious breaches of the Blue Line (the line of withdrawal), including the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers by Hizbollah on October 7, 2000.

Also in this report, the Secretary–General proposed the reconfiguration of UNIFIL, with an initial reduction from 5,600 to 4,500 troops in light of changes in the general situation in southern Lebanon, notably the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the return of the Government of Lebanon to southern Lebanon. On January 30, 2001, the Security Council, in Resolution 1337, extended UNIFIL’s mandate for another six months and endorsed the general approach for the reconfiguration of the mission. On May 18, 2001, the Security Council endorsed the Secretary–General’s plan for further reduction of UNIFIL’s troop strength to 2,000.

In the closing months of 2001, violations of the Blue Line were limited to two attacks against Israeli positions in October 2001, which did not result in casualties. Israeli incursions into Lebanese airspace continued throughout the year.

As of December 31, 2001, UNIFIL had 3,494 troops from Fiji, France, Ghana, India, Italy, Poland, and Ukraine. During 2001, the operating budget of UNIFIL was $239.7 million. The U.S. share for this mission was $65.5 million. No U.S. personnel serve with UNIFIL. UNIFIL headquarters is located in Naqoura, Lebanon.

**UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)**

UN Security Council Resolution 50 established UNTSO in 1948, the first peacekeeping mission organized by the United Nations, to supervise the truce between Arabs and Jews called for by the Council at the end of the British mandate in Palestine. Since then, the Council has entrusted UNTSO with a variety of tasks, including the supervision of the implementation and observance of the general agreements between Israel and its four Arab neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

In 2001, UNTSO continued to help coordinate and maintain regional stability and, in doing so, supported the Middle East peace negotiations. UNTSO military observers and administrative staff continued to provide key support to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon and the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights. At Egypt’s request, the mission also provided a small monitoring team to patrol the Sinai.
The United States considers UNTSO a valued contributor to the overall stability of the region. UNTSO’s status as the first peacekeeping mission in the Middle East, its longstanding involvement in the Arab–Israeli conflict, as well as its current participation in four peacekeeping missions has provided the mission with the opportunity to establish and maintain relations with five distinct regional governments (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria). In turn, this wide range of contacts provides UNTSO and its observers excellent recognition and acceptance as well as unique access and insight on regional security and peacekeeping issues otherwise not enjoyed by its sister missions. Also, the participation of UNTSO observers in various regional peacekeeping missions serves to signal the interest of the international community in achieving a comprehensive peace in the region.

As of December 31, 2001, UNTSO had 152 military observers from 22 nations. Contributing countries were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The United States provided three military observers to UNTSO. In 2001, UNTSO’s operating budget was $25 million. The U.S. share for this mission was $6.2 million. UNTSO’s headquarters is located in Jerusalem.

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

The United Nations established UNDOF to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights in accordance with the U.S.–negotiated agreement of 1974 after the 1973 Arab–Israeli war. UNDOF plays a positive role in the Middle East, serving U.S. national security interests by maintaining confidence levels and preventing the escalation of tensions between Israel and Syria. The mandate includes maintaining the cease–fire between Israel and supervising the areas of separation and limitation. The Security Council extends UNDOF’s mandate at six–month intervals. The current mandate expires May 31, 2002, in accordance with Resolution 1381 of November 27, 2001.

On the Golan Heights, the UN Truce Supervision Organization’s Observer Group Golan assisted UNDOF by monitoring the area that separates Israeli and Syrian armed forces. No significant incidents were noted between the parties during the year 2001.

As of December 31, 2001, UNDOF had 1,036 troops from Austria, Canada, Japan, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Sweden. During 2001, the operating budget for UNDOF was $32.1 million. The U.S. share for this mission was $8.8 million. UNDOF headquarters is in Camp Faouar, in Syria.

Iraq

During 2001, Iraq continued to reject its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and other resolutions to disclose and relinquish all capabilities and programs pertaining to weapons of mass destruct-
tion and proscribed missile programs. Iraq also continued to reject its obligations pertaining to Kuwaitis and other persons missing since Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

The United States, joined by other Security Council members, continued to press Iraq to fulfill its obligations. Iraq refused to accept Resolution 1284 (1999) which calls for full cooperation with the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as one of several conditions for suspension of the sanctions imposed in accordance with Resolutions 661 (1990) and others. Iraq refused to meet with UNMOVIC Executive Chair Hans Blix (Sweden) or with the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Coordinator for Kuwaiti Issues, Yuli Vorontsov (Russia). Blix and Vorontsov made periodic reports noting the Iraqi failure to cooperate.

Iraq also refused to admit the UN’s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights. For his report, he relied on reports from individuals and opposition groups, who noted human rights problems, such as extra–judicial killings, forced relocation of ethnic populations, and widespread use of torture.

The periodic reports of the Executive Director of the UN Iraq Program continued to point out Iraqi failure to facilitate Oil–for–Food operations, including through delaying visas for personnel working on program projects and failure to order permitted items in a timely fashion. The Executive Director also noted delays caused by holds placed on contracts for goods out of concern for their potential misuse for military purposes. The United States placed holds on contracts for military and dual use items. Because of Iraq’s refusal to allow weapons inspectors to return, the end–use of such items could not be verified.

The United States worked with other members of the Security Council to restore Council solidarity in dealing with Iraq. Through a series of resolutions, (1352, 1360, and 1382), which also extended the Oil–for–Food program, the Council decided to adopt the Goods Review List that would define which dual–use (military/civilian) items would be subject to review by Council members of the Sanctions Committee (established by Resolution 661 of 1990) before shipment to Iraq. All other items, except those prohibited by Resolution 687 (1991), would be sent to Iraq after approval by experts of the UN Secretariat. U.S. advocacy of the Goods Review List led to Council consensus on a new sanctions regime for Iraq.

Within the Sanctions Committee, the United States continued to press other members to cooperate in stopping civilian air traffic to Iraq that is inconsistent with Council resolutions. The United States also cooperated with the United Kingdom to develop a system to set prices retroactively for Iraqi crude oil that was intended to minimize the ability of Iraq to get illegal surcharges on its oil sales.

**UN Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)**

UN Security Council Resolution 689 (1991) established UNIKOM following the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait. Since its inception, UNIKOM's mission has been to monitor the demilita-
rized zone along the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait as well as to mon-
itor the Khawr ‘Abd Allah waterway between Iraq and Kuwait. The
Security Council reviews UNIKOM’s mandate every six months. UNI-
KOM serves U.S. interests in the region by contributing to the mainte-
nance of stability in the demilitarized zone between the Iraq and Kuwait.

Throughout 2001, the situation along the border was generally quiet
and no significant violations of the zone were reported. UNIKOM contin-
ued to maintain close and regular liaison with the authorities of both Iraq
and Kuwait at various levels. UNIKOM also continued to act in coordina-
tion with the authorities of Iraq and Kuwait in cases of unauthorized bor-
der crossings. UNIKOM, when asked, and in cooperation with the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, facilitated repatriation of refugees
across the border.

As of December 31, 2001, UNIKOM had 1,099 troops and observers
from Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland,
France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, the Russian
Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United King-
dom, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The U.S. had 11 observers
in UNIKOM. During 2001, the operating budget for UNIKOM was
$19.2 million. The U.S. share for this mission was $8.8 million. UNI-
KOM’s headquarter is located in Umm Qsar, Iraq.

Africa
Angola

The UN Security Council continued to be concerned with civil war in
Angola, and in 2001 the Council repeatedly called for the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to halt armed opposition
to the Government of Angola and return to the peace process. Although
the Lusaka Protocol had been signed by both parties in 1994, it was bro-
en in 1998 when UNITA returned to arms. To maintain leverage over
UNITA, the Council depended on the use of arms embargoes and financial
and travel sanctions, an approach supported by the United States

On January 24, 2001, the Council adopted Resolution 1336, extending
the work of its successful monitoring mechanism, which was investigating
UNITA’s access to arms and its trade in illegal diamonds. Reports from
the monitoring mechanism were submitted to the Council on February 22
and again on April 16. The monitoring mechanism’s mandate was
extended for another six months by Resolution 1348, adopted on April 19.
UN sanctions against Angola continued to prove effective in limiting
UNITA’s ability to resupply. The monitoring mechanism’s final supple-
mentary report on 2001 was submitted on December 12.

The Secretary–General’s Special Representative and Special Advisor
on African Affairs Ibrahim Gambari briefed the Council on May 22,
informing the Council that the Government of Angola was becoming more
receptive to UN involvement in peace negotiations, but that the humanitarian crisis in the country was deepening.

By mid-year, UNITA stepped up attacks on civilians and the relief community. UNITA claimed responsibility for an attack in Bengo Province in May, and for shooting at a World Food Program plane near Quito, Ecuador in June. An August attack on a passenger train that resulted in 250 deaths, in Kwanza Norte province, prompted the Council, in a presidential statement, to denounce UNITA for terrorist acts perpetrated against the Angolan civilian population, and for failing to implement objectives of the Lusaka Protocol. Unfortunately, the Council was forced to make a similar statement on November 15 when conditions failed to improve.

In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. Government provided $43 million in humanitarian assistance for Angola, of which $26.5 million (62 percent) was through UN agencies including the World Food Program, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the UN Development Program. In addition, $5 million was provided to UNHCR and the World Food Program to assist Angolan refugees in neighboring countries.

**Burundi**

The United States worked in the UN Security Council to support international efforts to assist Burundi’s peace process and promote national reconciliation. The Arusha Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Burundi was signed in August 2000 under the leadership of Facilitator of the Burundi peace process Nelson Mandela. The Agreement assigned the United Nations the responsibility for chairing the Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC). The Secretary-General appointed Berhanu Dinka as his Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, to serve as IMC chairman. In March, the United States joined with other Security Council members to issue a presidential statement affirming the importance of the IMC in advancing the peace process. The United States again joined with other Council members to issue another presidential statement in June reiterating its support for the Arusha Agreement and Facilitator Mandela.

In July, Mandela brokered separate meetings with the leaders of the Regional Peace Initiative and with the signatories of the Arusha Agreement. The parties decided that a transitional government would begin in November 2001 and last for three years, at which time elections would be held. The parties chose then–current Burundi President Pierre Buyoya to lead the interim government for the first half of the transitional period. At the 15th Summit Meeting of the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi, convened on July 23, these arrangements were confirmed. The Summit also called for an international protection force to be sent to the country as soon as possible and for the army to be reformed following installation of the new, transitional government.
In September, the United States again supported a Security Council presidential statement urging the parties to support the November 1 installation date for the transitional government and called for the swift deployment of a multi-national special protection unit to Burundi to ensure the successful installation of the government.

South African troops arrived in Bujumbura in October as the first contingent of the Special Protection Unit (SPU) to help ensure the successful installation of the interim government. The United States supported Security Council Resolution 1375 which endorsed the deployment of the South African SPU, called on the warring factions to cease hostilities and attacks on civilians, and reaffirmed its support for the November 1 installation. On November 1, the transitional government of Burundi was successfully installed. The Security Council issued a presidential statement in November welcoming the installation and encouraging de-escalation of violence between the rebels. On November 15, Mandela officially stepped down as Facilitator and handed official responsibility over to Berhanu Dinka in his capacity as head of the IMC.

**Central African Republic**

The U.S. policy on the Central African Republic (CAR) focused on promoting peace and security following an attempted coup and a deteriorating security situation and pressing for an end to human rights abuses. In 2001, the United States continued its support of the UN Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which was established by the Security Council in February 2000 to foster political dialogue and respect for human rights. In September 2001, the United States joined consensus in the Security Council to extend BONUCA’s mandate until December 31, 2002.

In late May 2001, a group of soldiers sought to overthrow the Government of President Ange-Felix Patasse by attempting a coup. With the support of loyalist forces, Libyan troops sent to Bangui, and Congolese rebel elements, the putschists were repulsed and the coup failed. In response, the Security Council expressed its condemnation of the attempted coup of an elected government in a Presidential Statement on May 31. The United States made a statement in the Security Council at that time condemning the coup.

During 2001, BONUCA monitored the return of refugees and provided advice on the situation, paid regular visits to detainees alleged to have participated in the failed coup, offered human rights training to law enforcement personnel, made radio broadcasts to raise awareness of human rights issues, and assisted in formulating a disarmament and weapons collection strategy and plans for restructuring of the armed forces. The Secretary-General appointed General Lamine Cissé (Senegal) to replace Cheikh Sy as his representative to the CAR and head of BONUCA in July. Cissé undertook a mission in early November in an attempt to defuse the situation between Patasse, his domestic political opposition, and supporters of General Bozize.
The General Assembly approved appropriations for BONUCA from the UN’s general budget amounting to $6.2 million for the period February 2000–December 2001 (23 months) and $4.6 million for the period January–December 2002 (12 months). Headquartered in Bangui, BONUCA has 54 personnel.

Democratic Republic of the Congo

For the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), 2001 was a year of change. On January 16, President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed the presidency of the country shortly thereafter. Joseph Kabila announced his intention to work with MONUC to end the war in the DRC and invited the United Nations to deploy its observers throughout the government-controlled portion of the country. The United States was actively involved throughout the year in seeking to advance the cause of peace in the Congo. Secretary of State Powell met with Rwandan President Paul Kagame on January 31 and DRC President Joseph Kabila on February 1 in Washington and urged them to move forward on implementing the Lusaka Agreement’s provisions. Later in February, the Joint Military Commission of the Lusaka Agreement signatories agreed on the implementation of the Kampala and Harare disengagement plans. Starting on March 15, the contending forces began to withdraw to their designated New Defensive Positions, and MONUC observers began the process of verifying these withdrawals. By the end of June, MONUC reported that all of the parties had complied with the disengagement plan and that it was monitoring the cessation of hostilities on a continuous basis.

On June 15, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1355, which renewed MONUC’s mandate for one year without changes in tasks or in the troop ceiling of 5,537, established by Security Council Resolution 1291 of February 24, 2000. MONUC troops and observers deployed in the DRC rose from 203 at the beginning of the year, to 3,373 on December 31, 2001.

On November 9, following a meeting with the Lusaka Agreement’s Joint Political Committee, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1376 launching Phase III of MONUC’s deployment. The Council supported MONUC’s new Concept of Operations, which laid out plans for assisting in the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of the armed groups in the eastern DRC, subject to the full cooperation of the parties. The Council repeated its calls for the complete demilitarization of Kisangani, the full restoration of freedom of movement of persons and goods throughout the country, and the establishment of a direct dialogue between the Government of the DRC and the Government of Rwanda as essential conditions to enable the disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation program to go forward.

As 2001 ended, MONUC continued to negotiate with the RCD–Goma and the Rwandan government on deployment of MONUC forces into Kisangani and Kindu. Establishment of expanded MONUC operations in
these two cities is essential to the implementation of Phase III. Rwanda also continued to raise questions about the bona fides of Hutu ex–combatants housed at the Congolese Army base at Kamina. MONUC had interviewed the men and concluded that they were eligible for repatriation to Rwanda, but, by the end of the year, none of them had yet actually been repatriated.

Finally, after many delays, progress toward holding the Inter–Congolese Dialogue (ICD) began in August 2001. A preliminary meeting in Gaborone, Botswana of representatives of various Congolese political parties, rebel groups, civil society, and the Kabila government was held under the auspices of ICD Facilitator Sir Ketumile Masire. Sir Masire adjourned the first official session of the talks in October after only a few days due to disagreement over the representation of various groups.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $296,514,000 for MONUC’s operations, with the U.S. share being $82,373,000. The United States supports MONUC as a means of achieving regional stability in Central Africa through the resolution of the multi-state conflict in the DRC.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

As 2001 began, states began deploying troops in substantial numbers to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). By the end of the year, there were 217 military observers and 3,722 troops (of the 220 observers and 4,200 troops authorized). The United States contributed 6 military observers and 1 officer assigned to UNMEE headquarters located in both Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Asmara, Eritrea; the officer assigned to headquarters is the only American military officer assigned to a UN peacekeeping mission as a “troop” rather than as a military observer.

Special Representative of the Secretary–General Legwaila Joseph Legwaila declared the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) formally established April 18. UNMEE began monitoring and Eritrea began to re-establish civilian administration in the TSZ. Approximately 300,000 refugees and internally displaced persons began returning to the area, which is heavily mined. UNMEE engineers and military forces of both sides participated in limited mine clearance operations to support the deployment of peacekeepers.

During 2001, the cessation of hostilities continued to hold, despite continuing tensions. Ethiopia halted repatriation of prisoners of war, pending Eritrean information on an Ethiopian pilot and several militiamen captured during the war. Eritrea responded in kind. Eritrean authorities restricted UNMEE’s movement in the areas adjacent to the TSZ, in particular in the central and eastern sectors. Eritrea declined to sign a Status of Forces Agreement with the United Nations. Each party alleged violations of the TSZ by the other; UNMEE’s investigations did not support these allegations.

The Security Council allowed the arms embargo imposed on Ethiopia and Eritrea by Resolution 1298 (2000) to lapse on May 16. On September
14, Security Council Resolution 1369 renewed UNMEE's mandate, which was unchanged until March 15, 2002. The United States voted in favor of both resolutions. Ethiopia and Eritrea exchanged a small number of POWs in October. In another positive step, both sides exchanged landmine information at an October 15 meeting with UNMEE.

The independent Boundary Commission began reviewing relevant treaties in order to determine ("delimit") the precise location of the border. In December, the Boundary Commission held hearings in The Hague under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Leaders of both countries said publicly they would accept the decision of the Boundary Commission.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $285,203,000 for UNMEE operations. The U.S. share was $76,989,000.

**Guinea–Bissau**

U.S. policy on Guinea–Bissau focused primarily on assisting in the consolidation of democracy and reconstruction of the economy following two tumultuous years of internal conflict. The United States supported the UN Peace–Building Support Office in Guinea–Bissau (UNOGBIS), established in spring 1999.


Competition between civilian and military rule within the country culminated in an attempted coup in November 2000. The elected government prevailed, but the political and economic situation remained fragile and the stability of the civilian government uncertain. Senior government officials alleged that there were several attempts to overthrow the regime of President Kumba Yala and that they were foiled by the armed forces who backed the elected government in 2001.

UNOGBIS worked to promote dialogue and national reconciliation and organized seminars on anti–corruption, human rights, consolidation of multi–party democracy, elections, and military, and police training. The United States, in collaboration with UNOGBIS and the UN Development Program, sponsored a training program for Guinea–Bissau legislators and judicial personnel. In addition, the United States was a key sponsor of mine–clearing operations coordinated by UNOGBIS.

The 2001 budget for UNOGBIS was $2,418,200. Since UNOGBIS is not a peacekeeping operation, it is funded out of the UN regular budget. Member states are not assessed for its budget.

**Liberia**

In 2001, the Security Council took action to support the efforts of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone to promote peace and security in Sierra Leone.
and throughout the region (see Sierra Leone section). The United States took the lead in the United Nations calling for President Taylor of Liberia to end his support for the Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone and proposed Security Council sanctions when his government failed to do so.

In March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1343 (2001) imposing sanctions on the Liberian government that included an arms embargo, travel restrictions on senior Liberian government officials, a ban on diamond trade and the grounding of Liberian aircraft. A UN Experts Panel, established to monitor compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1343, indicated in an October report that the Government of Liberia continued to violate UN resolutions by circumventing the arms embargo and ignoring the travel ban. The United States supported continued sanctions against the Liberian government, including measures to prevent the illegal registration of aircraft, control diversion of Liberian government funds for illicit arms purchases, monitor revenue from the timber industry and Liberian maritime and corporate registry, extend restrictions on the diamonds trade, and enforce the travel ban. Based on the recommendations of the Experts Panel, by the end of the year the Security Council considered additional sanctions against the Liberian government.

Libya

On January 31, 2001, a Scottish court convened in the Netherlands convicted Abdel Basset Al– Megrahi for his role in the Pan Am 103 bombing, sentencing him to life in prison.

In 1999, the Security Council suspended sanctions applied in accordance with Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993) after Libya turned over two suspects in the Lockerbie bombing to be tried by a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands. Sanctions had not been lifted because Libya had not yet complied with its full obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions, including its obligations to pay appropriate compensation and to accept responsibility for the actions of its officials.

The United States and the United Kingdom held a series of ongoing trilateral discussions with Libya in 2001, which were focused on Libyan compliance with its Security Council obligations.

Rwanda

In 2001, the United States and the United Nations continued to focus on Rwanda’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The Security Council continued to call for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including those from Rwanda, in the Congo, and implementation of the Lusaka Cease–Fire Agreement. (See section on Congo.) In 2001, a UN Experts Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) identified elements of the Government of Rwanda, along with several other governments, as participants in the plunder of the DRC’s natural resources. The United States joined with other Council members in voting to establish the
panel and calling for an end to such illegal activities in the DRC. The U.S. assessed contribution for the general budget helped to fund the panel.

Also in 2001, international efforts continued to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). (See section on War Crimes Tribunals.) While the United States continued its substantial financial assistance to the ICTR, the United States also continued to indicate its desire to see the ICTR improve its management and oversight and pursue an end-game strategy.

Sierra Leone

In 2001, the primary United States interest in Sierra Leone was the restoration of peace and stability to the country. To this end, the United States worked closely with other members of the UN Security Council to support the efforts of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In early 2001, Indian and Jordanian troops in UNAMSIL started drawing down; they were gone by April, with the exception of a Jordanian military hospital unit, which remained part of the force. Following a push for new troop contributors, in which the United States actively participated, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal agreed to send troops to Sierra Leone. UNAMSIL developed a new, detailed concept of operations, laying out steps and conditions for deploying throughout Sierra Leone. On March 30, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1346, which raised the authorized troop level to 17,500. On September 18, Security Council Resolution 1370 extended UNAMSIL’s mandate and troop level unchanged for an additional six months. The United States voted in favor of both resolutions.

With the deployment of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Nepalese troops, as well as a Ukrainian helicopter unit, UNAMSIL approached its 17,500 troop ceiling in late 2001. As of December 31, there were 260 observers, 54 civilian police (CIVPOL), and 17,105 troops deployed. Three U.S. officers were assigned to the British–led International Military Adviser Training Team, which was not part of UNAMSIL and which focused on restructuring the Sierra Leone Armed Forces and advising the Sierra Leone Ministry of Defense.

During the year, five U.S.–trained and –equipped Nigerian and Ghanaian battalions deployed for service in UNAMSIL. One more Nigerian battalion was scheduled to deploy in 2002. This program, known as “Operation Focus Relief,” was a joint effort by the Departments of State and Defense. Both Departments provided funding and Defense provided trainers. Each unit received almost ten weeks of training with the objective of reaching company–level competency in daylight offensive/defensive operations and nighttime defensive operations. Each battalion also received some equipment (uniforms, small arms, some vehicles and unit-level communications). The overall cost of the program was approximately $90 million. While the program’s key goal was bolstering UNAMSIL, it also increased the pool of trained troops available for peacekeeping in the sub–region.
By the end of 2001, UNAMSIL had deployed throughout Sierra Leone, including into the diamond-mining areas in the east, without opposition from the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF, and the Civilian Defense Force (a pro-government militia) signed an agreement on May 15 which allowed the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for ex-combatants to resume. By December 31, over 45,000 ex-combatants had turned in weapons and the RUF had released hundreds of children it had kidnapped. The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was engaged in an effective program to care for the children until they could be united with their families. The United States contributed $750,000 to the UNICEF program in Sierra Leone in 2001.

UN sanctions on Liberian diamond sales and travel by senior Liberian government officials, imposed by Security Council Resolution 1343 of March 7, went into effect on May 7. These sanctions brought pressure on Liberian President Taylor to cease his support for the RUF. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1385 on December 19, which extended the ban on import of non-certified Sierra Leonean diamonds until December 31, 2002. The United States actively supported both measures.

UNAMSIL’s original mandate included providing support, as requested, to the Government of Sierra Leone for elections. The Secretary-General issued a report on December 13 which contained recommendations for UNAMSIL technical and logistical support during the period leading up to and during the May 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections. The Secretary-General also recommended increasing UNAMSIL’s international CIVPOL component from 60 to 90 officers, to advise and support the 6,500-strong Sierra Leone police force.

In an important step forward, by the end of December, Sierra Leone police officers had been assigned to stations in eastern Sierra Leone, marking the extension of the Government of Sierra Leone’s authority into new areas. Units of the Sierra Leone Army were posted near the Guinea border, south and north of Freetown, in Kabala, Bumbuna, Kenema, and along the southern coast. The Government of Sierra Leone also made progress in the restoration of state authority to newly accessible districts. Teachers began returning to rural districts which had been without teachers for years.

In December, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ouyemi Adeniji forwarded recommendations to President Kabbah for four national commissioners and three international commissioners to serve on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which will be established in 2002.

On February 14, the UN Secretariat formally informed the Security Council that the Government of Sierra Leone had accepted the terms of a draft agreement to establish an independent special court to bring to justice those bearing the “greatest responsibility” for the commission of crimes against humanity and other serious violations of international law.
and relevant Sierra Leonean law. The Special Court will be a hybrid body, established through cooperation between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone; it will be funded by voluntary, not assessed, contributions.

The United States contributed $5 million for the Court’s establishment and first year of operations to the voluntary UN Trust Fund set up for the Court. At year’s end, the Secretary–General was considering the list of proposed candidates for Prosecutor, one of whom was an American. In December, the UN Legal Advisor made plans for a mission to visit Sierra Leone in January 2002 to make final arrangements for the Court’s operations. The United Nations and Government of Sierra Leone were to sign an agreement on the establishment of the Court at the end of the planning mission’s visit.

In December 2001, as many as 500,000 Sierra Leonean refugees were in the region; within Sierra Leone, hundreds of thousands were internally displaced. The combination of restored peace in Sierra Leone, gradual deployment of UNAMSIL to all areas of the country, and the impetus of attacks on refugees in Guinea and Liberia led refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes. By the end of 2001, over 150,000 Sierra Leonean refugees had returned home from neighboring countries, about half with the assistance of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the remainder spontaneously, on their own. The UNHCR planned to increase its programs for the voluntary repatriation of refugees if the elections in May 2002 were successful. The United States earmarked $4.42 million for UNHCR’s Sierra Leone programs in fiscal year 2001 and funded nearly $5.9 million through other international organizations and nongovernmental organizations in Sierra Leone. In addition, the United States gave funding to UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross on an Africa–wide basis that included programs in Sierra Leone.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $579,758,000 for UNAMSIL operations. The U.S. share was $161,045,000.

**Sudan**

In 2001, the United Nations kept Sudan under scrutiny because of Sudan’s continuing civil war, human rights abuses committed by the Government of Sudan (and to a lesser extent by its armed opponents), and the humanitarian crisis generated by the war. The Government of Sudan attempted to place additional requirements on aid workers that would restrict humanitarian access and potentially jeopardize workers’ safety. There were two periods of bombing of civilians by the government.

At the Commission on Human Rights, the United States withheld support for a European Union drafted resolution on Sudan which failed to condemn the continued practice of slavery in that country and inaccurately presented the Government of Sudan’s aerial bombardment of civilians and relief workers. Because of these concerns, the United States called for a
vote on April 20 and abstained. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 28 in favor and none opposed, with 25 abstentions (U.S.). At the July annual meeting of the Economic and Social Council, the United States again expressed its disappointment over the weak Commission on Human Rights resolution on Sudan.

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1372 to lift sanctions against Sudan on September 28, terminating measures referred to in Resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070 (1996), which had been imposed following the 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak, in which Sudan was implicated for harboring the assassins. The vote was fourteen in favor with the United States abstaining. The Council noted in its decision that Sudan took steps to comply with Resolutions 1044 and 1070, ratified several UN conventions for combating terrorism, and was urged by the Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia to lift the sanctions. In abstaining, the United States cited the Government of Sudan’s failure to turn over the assassination attempt suspects and reiterated concerns about human rights conditions in the country.

In the UN General Assembly, a resolution on Human Rights in Sudan was adopted on November 30. Again, the United States abstained, noting that the resolution did not describe the true scale of the human rights problem or the role of the Sudanese Government in those violations.

In March 2001, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) brokered an agreement between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Sudan to repatriate the 90,000 Eritrean refugees currently in Sudan. Repatriation began in May, and the first phase was completed at the end of July with almost 21,000 returnees and another 28,000 registered to return. In fiscal year 2001, the United States provided $9,624,000 to UN agencies for refugee operations in Sudan; the refugees there also benefited from unearmarked U.S. contributions to UNHCR for its Africa programs. The protracted civil conflict made progress unlikely in repatriating the estimated 443,000 Sudanese refugees who have been living outside of Sudan.

**Western Sahara**

The Security Council adopted Resolution 690 in 1991 to establish the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to help implement the Settlement Plan agreed to in 1988 by Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (POLISARIO Front). This plan called for a cessation of hostilities, the return of refugees, and the holding of a referendum under UN auspices to determine the future of Western Sahara. As of the spring of 2001, obstacles to the implementation of the Settlement Plan remained. Since the conclusion of the voter identification process in 1999, MINURSO was facing more than 130,000 appeals. For more than a decade, the parties failed to resolve their differences on implementation of the referendum.

Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III has been the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for five years. The United States strongly supports Mr. Baker’s efforts to find a durable political settlement, which is
important to regional stability. Three former U.S. Ambassadors have held the position of Special Representative to the Secretary–General. The United States also leads the Friends of Western Sahara, which consults on the margins of the Security Council.

Mr. Baker continued his efforts throughout 2001. Morocco accepted a plan for devolution of authority with a final status referendum five years later, known as the Framework Agreement. The POLISARIO submitted proposals to resume the implementation of the Settlement Plan. In June 2001, the United States supported Security Council Resolution 1359 which granted the Personal Envoy's request for additional time to consult with the parties on the Framework Agreement and any other proposal for a political solution. Mr. Baker met with the POLISARIO, Algerians, and Mauritanians in Pinedale, Wyoming in August 2001. The Algerians and POLISARIO subsequently rejected the Framework Agreement. Mr. Baker then met with Algerian President Bouteflika in Houston, Texas in November.

During 2001, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued to carry out its mandated responsibilities for Western Sahara refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria. A comprehensive assessment by UNHCR in May 2001 concluded that the situation of the refugees was precarious. However, some notable progress was made on prisoner releases. In Resolution 1359 of June 2001, the Security Council urged the parties to solve the problem of persons unaccounted for and abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law to release without further delay all those held since the start of the conflict. The Moroccans released 25 Sahrawi detainees in November. At year's end, the POLISARIO agreed to release 115 Moroccan POWs, some of whom had been held for over 20 years. The United States urged the POLISARIO to release the more than 1,300 Moroccan POWs, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, who were being held by the POLISARIO in 2001.

The United States joined Security Council consensus in extending MINURSO’s mandate in Resolutions 1342 (February 27), 1349 (April 27), 1359 (June 29), and 1380 (November 27). Special Representative of the Secretary–General (SRSG) Bill Swing replaced former SRSG Bill Eagleton on November 30 and assumed his functions in the mission area on December 11. Both Mr. Swing and Mr. Eagleton are former U.S. Ambassadors. Although the United States reduced the number of military observers it contributed to MINURSO from 15 to 7 in 2001, this remained the largest contingent of U.S. military observers participating in a UN peacekeeping operation.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $46,023,000 for MINURSO operations. The U.S. share was $12,624,000.
East Asia and the Pacific

Bougainville

The United States supported UN efforts to peacefully resolve the Bougainville question, efforts which helped bring about a peace agreement in 2001. On August 30, the Government of Papua New Guinea and Bougainville leaders signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Arawa, putting an end to 12 years of fighting. The peace agreement includes three pillars: autonomy, a referendum, and weapons disposal. The UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB), which was established by the Secretary-General and is based in Arawa, will play an important role in assisting the parties in implementation of the Arawa Agreement, particularly in monitoring weapons disposal. The first weapons disposal ceremony was held in December 2001.

In December 2001, the Security Council extended UNPOB’s mandate until December 31, 2002. The seven-person office was allocated $2.3 million in 2001 from the Secretary-General’s discretionary fund. As in previous years, UNPOB Director Noel Sinclair (Guyana) continued to provide regular briefings to the Security Council during 2001 on developments in Bougainville and progress in negotiations.

Secretary-General Annan, in a statement issued on August 30, welcomed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and commended the Peace Monitoring Group (composed of representatives from Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, and Vanuatu) for its role in the peace process. The Secretary-General’s statement confirmed UNPOB’s willingness to assist in implementation of the agreement, especially in weapons disposal. The United States supported a press statement by the Security Council President on December 13 that welcomed the Arawa Agreement and encouraged the parties to implement provisions as soon as possible to achieve a definitive settlement of the conflict. The press statement recalled the important role played by UNPOB and supported a one-year continuation of its activities.

Burma

The United States worked actively in 2001 to maintain international pressure on the Burmese regime (the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC) to improve its human rights practices and to pursue a meaningful dialogue with the democratic opposition. Throughout 2001, the United States continued to support strongly the mission of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Burma, Razali Ismail (Malaysia), who helped persuade the military government to open a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi over Burma’s political future.

Special Envoy Razali visited Burma four times in 2001: January 5–9, June 1–4, August 27–30, and November 27–December 3, following two previous missions in 2000. His January visit coincided with a public announcement that the military regime had opened a quiet dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, one of the most important political developments in recent years. The dialogue, initiated in October 2000, marked a departure
from the regime’s consistent policy of confrontation with her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD).

On November 20, 2001, Special Envoy Razali convened a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland of the Burma Contact Group, which included the United States, the European Union (EU), Japan, and other interested countries. The meeting produced broad consensus on support for Razali and the talks, although U.S. and EU representatives also expressed concern over the talks’ slow pace. During his November visit to Rangoon, Razali announced that he remained cautiously optimistic that contacts between Aung San Suu Kyi and the military regime would move beyond initial confidence–building discussions to a focus on genuine national reconciliation.

By year’s end, the regime had released approximately 200 political prisoners from house detention, including NLD Chairman U Aung Shwe and Vice–Chairman U Tin Oo. Approximately 1,500 political prisoners remained under detention, and Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest, although the regime gradually increased her access to Special Envoy Razali and the international community.

To further pursue U.S. global counternarcotics objectives, the United States encouraged the UN Drug Control Program’s (UNDCP) efforts to eliminate opium cultivation in Burma. With the near eradication of all Afghan opium cultivation, Burma was once again the world’s leading producer of illicit opium, accounting for about 80 percent of Southeast Asian production. Since 1994, the United States has contributed $7 million to a $12.1 million UNDCP program providing development and demand reduction assistance directly to the inhabitants of the Wa region, a key opium cultivating area, without going through the Burmese regime. In 2001, the United States contributed $700,000 to the program. The United States and other donors have worked with UNDCP to ensure funding goes to UNDCP and affected areas, and not to the Burmese government. The United States also insisted that UNDCP continuously apprise the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi of its program.

In April 2001, the Burmese government allowed the first visit to Burma in over six years of a UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights. Also in April, the United States again cosponsored the annual resolution (2001/15) on Burma at the UN Commission on Human Rights. The resolution, adopted without a vote on April 18, welcomed the cooperation extended to Special Envoy Razali and Special Rapporteur Paulo Pinheiro (Brazil), but also expressed grave concern over the systematic government persecution of the democratic opposition and deplored the deterioration of the human rights situation and continuing pattern of gross and systematic violations of human rights. The resolution strongly urged the SPDC to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to take urgent and concrete measures to ensure the establishment of democracy, to immediately release all political detainees, and to ensure freedom of movement and unrestricted communication for all political leaders,
including Aung San Suu Kyi. The resolution also extended for one year the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur, who returned for an extended visit to Burma in October 2001.

In November, the International Labor Organization (ILO) Governing Body, with strong U.S. support, called for establishment of a long–term ILO presence in Burma to ensure progress towards elimination of forced labor. The ILO action followed an unprecedented ILO resolution the previous year invoking Article 33 sanctions against the Burmese government, based on its continued inaction in abolishing the “widespread and systematic” practice of forced labor. This invocation was the first time in ILO history that the organization called upon all ILO members to review their economic relations with Burma in order to assure those relations do not abet forced labor.

The United States cosponsored the annual UN General Assembly resolution (Resolution 56/231) on Burma, adopted by consensus on December 24 at the 56th General Assembly. The resolution noted that modest progress had been made during the year, including the release of political prisoners, the reopening of some NLD offices, and the relaxation of some restrictions on NLD activity. However, it also decried continuing violations of human rights, expressed grave concern about continued repression, urged the SPDC to release all detained political prisoners and lift restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi, and encouraged the regime to move forward in talks with the democratic opposition.

Cambodia

The United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) continued to work an agreement between them to bring to justice those responsible for the atrocities committed in Cambodia during 1975–1979. The Cambodian government promulgated in August 2001 a law on the establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea. The legislation had been resubmitted to the National Assembly to address a technical amendment on a constitutional provision regarding the death penalty.

Throughout 2001, the United Nations and the RGC conducted exchanges concerning an agreement on the establishment of a credible tribunal mechanism. The United Nations took the position that, in the case of any discrepancy between the Cambodian legislation and an RGC–UN agreement, the latter should prevail and suggested that the National Assembly might ratify the agreement. The RGC argued that the legislation and RGC–UN agreement were essentially compatible. The United Nations was concerned that prior amnesty of Khmer Rouge officials not be a bar to prosecution. The Cambodians held that this would not be the case and that the legislation prohibits future amnesty. The United States encouraged the United Nations and RGC to continue their discussions and to conclude an agreement without delay.
The UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) adopted by consensus a U.S.–sponsored resolution on the human rights situation in Cambodia on April 27 (2001/82). The United States also cosponsored a UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in Cambodia (Resolution 56/169), adopted by consensus on December 19. The UNCHR and General Assembly resolutions expressed grave concern about the continuation of serious crimes and human rights violations, but noted some positive steps taken by the Cambodian Government. The resolutions urged the Government to develop an independent, impartial and effective judicial system and to ensure that Khmer Rouge leaders are brought to account in accordance with international standards of justice, fairness, and due process of the law.

The Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia, Peter Leuprecht, submitted to the General Assembly a report on the situation of human rights in Cambodia, which highlighted the serious problems of land–grabbing and illegal evictions; overcrowded and unhealthful conditions of detention; and excessive pre-trial detention, police violence, and mob killings. The report also welcomed the adoption of laws on commune elections and administration and the start of demobilization of the armed forces.

East Timor

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1338 on January 31, 2001, which extended the mandate of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) until January 31, 2002. At yeart’s end UNTAET’s troop strength stood at 102 military observers, 1,316 civilian police (CIVPOL) and 7,110 troops. This number included 3 American military observers and 80 American police officers.

Between March and June, UNTAET’s Civil Registry Unit registered more than 730,000 residents of East Timor, including children, to be used as a planning tool in such critical areas as health, education, and infrastructure; this data also provided the base for a provisional list of voters. With UNTAET assistance, East Timorese nongovernmental organizations conducted a country–wide campaign to educate the population in preparation for the August elections. Following successfully concluded democratic elections for a Constituent Assembly on August 30, the Second Transitional Government of East Timor took office on September 20. The UN–administered elections were noteworthy for the high level of voter participation and the peaceful manner in which they were conducted. The Fretilin party, which dominated the Constituent Assembly, won 55 of 88 seats, and occupied 9 of 24 ministerial, vice–ministerial, and senior positions in the new government.

In late November 2001, the new Constituent Assembly began reviewing 151 articles for the draft Constitution, East Timor’s first. As of December 31, it had approved more than 40 articles. Presidential elections are scheduled for April 14, 2002, to be followed by full independence for East Timor on May 20, 2002.
On October 31, the President of the Security Council, with support from the United States and other Council members, issued a statement endorsing the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a scaled-down successor mission to UNTAET for the two-year period following independence. This scaled-down mission would consist of peacekeepers, CIVPOL, and a small civilian support element funded in part by assessed peacekeeping contributions. UNTAET began scaling down in December. The successor mission will continue this phasing-down as East Timorese civil administrators, police, and military are able to assume permanent responsibility for their respective functions.

Through the UN’s Office of Defense Force Development, the United States provided two retired military officers to serve as senior advisors to the international efforts to develop the East Timor Defense Force (ETDF), and these efforts saw the establishment of the ETDF’s first 480-person infantry battalion.

Throughout 2001, in addition to CIVPOL contributions, the United States continued to support UNTAET’s program to develop the new East Timor Police Service (ETPS) by providing advisors and technical assistance to the ETPS Police College for things such as development of curricula and lesson plans, development of the field training officer program, and development of ETPS organizational structures. In addition, the United States delivered specialized training and equipment in areas such as management and supervision, civil disturbance management, basic and advanced criminal investigations, and instructor development.

As a bilateral program, separate from UNTAET, the U.S. Pacific Command maintains the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), which conducts humanitarian and civic assistance activities in support of the East Timorese and their transition to independence. USGET, with a core staff of 15 personnel, coordinates deployments of military, medical, and engineering teams to East Timor, as well as U.S. Navy ship visits, during which U.S. military personnel conduct a range of community relations projects. During 2001, U.S. military personnel repaired nine schools, two orphanages, and four community centers, and twice airlifted supplies to medical clinics. In addition, U.S. military engineers coordinated 14 engineering projects to improve water purification, waste management, and electrical power infrastructure in East Timor’s capital, Dili. USGET also supported three 30-day deployments of U.S. medical personnel, who provided medical and dental treatment and public health information to East Timor’s citizens.

On December 11, the Serious Crimes Unit of UNTAET found 10 members of the gang “Team Alpha” guilty of crimes against humanity in connection with violence following East Timor’s 1999 vote for independence. They were sentenced to terms of up to 33 years. An alleged eleventh gang member was indicted but remains at large. To date, 33 indictments have been issued for serious crimes associated with the violence of 1999.
In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $605,817,000 for UNTAET operations. The U.S. share was $166,638,000, making it the most expensive peacekeeping operation that year.

**Europe and Eurasia**

**Cyprus**

The United States continued to support the Good Offices Mission of the Secretary–General and the efforts of his Special Representative, Alvaro de Soto.

In the summer and fall, the United States worked closely with the United Nations to restart talks that had been interrupted by the Turkish Cypriot leader’s withdrawal in November 2000. At year’s end, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders had agreed to conduct direct talks, in the presence of the UN Special Representative, aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement to the Cyprus problem. The United States, working closely with the United Nations, supported those talks through discussion with the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, in Ankara and Athens, and with the European Union.

The Security Council twice renewed the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for six months each (Resolutions 1354 and 1384). Both resolutions urged the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkish forces to rescind restrictions, which had, in part, closed crossing points along the UN Buffer Zone, leaving only one open in Nicosia. The resolutions also urged the return of the military status quo ante at the town of Strovila.

UNFICYP was established in March 1964 to help end violence between the island’s Greek and Turkish communities. Since 1974, UNFICYP has served as a buffer force between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces on one side and the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek troops on the other. UNFICYP’s troop level was approximately 1,200 during 2001, with an additional 35 personnel serving as civilian police. The United States does not contribute peacekeepers to UNFICYP.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $22,475,000 for UNFICYP operations. The United States share was $6,242,000. These amounts are for the remaining half after Greece and Cyprus pay approximately half of UNFICYPs total costs.

**Georgia**

The Security Council adopted Resolution 858 (1993) which established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). UNOMIG monitors the ceasefire between the Georgian Government and the Abkhaz separatists, as well as the activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force in the Abkhaz region. UNOMIG’s mandate was renewed in 2001 by Resolution 1339, on January 31, and Resolution 1364, on July 31.
During 2001, the Special Representative of the Secretary–General, Ambassador Dieter Boden of Germany, worked to achieve a comprehensive political settlement, with the assistance of Russia as facilitator, the Group of Friends of the Secretary General, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The United States, as a member of the Group of Friends, supported Boden’s efforts. The Special Representative facilitated the holding of Georgian–Abkhaz talks in Yalta hosted by Ukraine from March 15–16, following earlier talks on confidence–building measures in 2000 in Georgia and Abkhazia.

Unfortunately, tensions escalated in the second half of 2001. Unknown persons shot down a helicopter with UNOMIG personnel on August 8; all nine passengers and crew, including the deputy head of mission of UNOMIG, were killed. Armed clashes were reported in the Abkhaz separation zone. In October, the Georgian parliament passed a non–binding resolution calling for the withdrawal of the primarily Russian CIS peacekeeping force; without the security support of the CIS peacekeeping force, UNOMIG would be unable to fulfill its functions in the security zone.

Despite UNOMIG’s small size (107 unarmed military observers, including two Americans in Tbilisi as of December 31, 2001), the Mission had considerable political significance. It is a clear indication of international support for the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Georgia and other newly independent states. In practical terms, UNOMIG’s patrolling activities have helped contain violence and prevent a major escalation of the conflict. The United States played a leading role in keeping the Security Council focused on brokering a peaceful settlement of the Abkhaz conflict. The attention of the Security Council—and the efforts of the Special Representative—have also helped keep consistent pressure on the parties to resume meaningful settlement negotiations.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $25,300,000 for UNOMIG operations. The U.S. share was $7,060,000.

The Former Yugoslavia

Kosovo and other conflicts related to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia remained a serious concern of the United States and the Security Council in 2001. Throughout the year, the United States promoted measures supporting UN objectives of democratization and stabilization in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Several of the Council’s actions furthered implementation of the U.S.–sponsored General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Peace Agreement). In addition, the Council continued to focus on Kosovo, including on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established following the conclusion of NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999.

Violence in Macedonia led in August to the deployment of NATO’s Task Force Harvest, the mission of which was to collect and dispose of weapons and ammunition voluntarily surrendered by the so–called
National Liberation Army, made up primarily of ethnic Albanian separatists. Task Force Harvest was succeeded in September by NATO’s multi-national security presence, Task Force Fox, to provide support to international monitors from the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) overseeing implementation of a peace agreement. Task Force Fox was strongly supported by the Security Council, and remained in place at year’s end.

**UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK)**

The FRY agreed to withdraw its forces from Kosovo and allow an international presence following the 1999 NATO air campaign. On June 10, 1999, Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized an international security presence that became the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), and an international civilian presence to establish an interim governing authority. Resolution 1244 will continue in force until the Security Council decides that its mandate has been successfully implemented.

Resolution 1244 assigns the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) responsibility for providing civilian administration of the province; organizing and developing provisional institutions for a democratic and autonomous self-government, including the holding of elections; facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status; supporting economic reconstruction; supporting humanitarian and disaster relief; maintaining law and order, protecting and promoting human rights; and assuring the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Hans Haekkerup (Denmark) took over from Bernard Kouchner (France) as UNMIK’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on January 13, 2001. Principal Deputy Charles Brayshaw became the top American in UNMIK, joining the mission in November. Several important steps were completed in the implementation of Resolution 1244 during 2001. With significant U.S. legal support, UNMIK developed a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo and oversaw the successful November 17 province-wide election for the first Kosovo Assembly.

UNMIK was formed as a unique collaboration of the United Nations with other organizations. It is comprised of four pillars: police and justice, civil administration, institution building, and reconstruction, each headed by a different organization and with the functions described below. The humanitarian affairs pillar formerly headed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was phased out in 2001.

The United Nations manages the civil administration and the police and justice pillars. UNMIK’s 4,529-strong international armed civilian police force has law enforcement authority and includes 1,050 special police experienced in riot control. American police officers were assigned to UNMIK police throughout Kosovo in a range of capacities. The UNMIK Police Deputy Commissioner who oversees Kosovo Police Service (KPS) development is also an American. UNMIK continued to transfer authority from UNMIK police to the KPS. Over 4,000 KPS officers...
patrolled Kosovo, including some in ethnically mixed patrols. One hundred and thirty KPS officers, including 12 Serbs and 18 women, were appointed to supervisory positions. The most experienced KPS officers received training in specialties such as criminal investigations, supervision, and border control. During 2001, UNMIK police continued full policing duties in four of Kosovo’s five regions. KFOR and UNMIK Police continued joint patrols in Mitrovica, where ethnic tensions resulted in sporadic violence. UNMIK police and KPS worked in close coordination with KFOR to maintain a safe and secure environment for participation of all the people of Kosovo in the Kosovo-wide November 17 elections. The elections were conducted with few reports of violence, harassment, or electoral irregularities.

UNMIK’s Kosovo Organized Crime Bureau (KOCB) was established in late 2001, with the United States providing technical equipment and subject matter experts to the operation. The unit, which numbered ten officers by year’s end, is expected to grow to 60 in 2002. KOCB is charged with investigations into organized crime, terrorism, and extremism. It cooperated closely with UNMIK’s Criminal Intelligence Unit, to which the United States provided several experts and operational resources.

With respect to justice and rule of law issues, Clint Williamson, on loan from the U.S. Department of Justice, became UNMIK’s Head of Judicial Affairs on October 25. At the same time, the U.S. Office in Pristina set up a task force to implement the priorities laid out in a study of the judicial system, which had been undertaken jointly by the United States and the OSCE. The task force, composed of officials from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Justice, UNMIK, and KFOR, began work on increasing judicial independence, equal access, and professional development of judges and prosecutors.

UNMIK took a strong legal step against organized crime when SRSG Haekkerup signed into law three major regulations in September. They deal with stronger penalties for organized crime, witness protection, and work with cooperative witnesses. UNMIK has also committed to doubling the number of international prosecutors and judges, in part to handle an increased number of cases relating to organized crime. Two to three American prosecutors were part of this international legal team in 2001.

UNMIK also worked to root out incompetent and corrupt judges. The Judicial Inspection Unit, part of UNMIK’s Department of Justice, conducted investigations into judicial incompetence that resulted in various sanctions against 17 judges.

Promoting a multi-ethnic Kosovo is one of the stated goals of the U.S. Government and UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took the lead on humanitarian issues in Kosovo. KFOR, UNMIK, and UNHCR continued to support the return of Serb (and other minority) internally displaced persons to Kosovo.
in 2001 and were joined late in the year by the UNMIK Office of Return and Community Affairs (ORC), which will coordinate efforts in 2002. The creation of the ORC signaled the increased importance the issue of returns has assumed, in large part as a result of frequent messages from the State Department to UNMIK. The ORC will assume a coordinating role in the future while UNHCR will maintain its operational capacity and implement returns. The United States not only takes the lead on providing political support to UNMIK and UNHCR on the issue of returns, but the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) provided approximately 25 percent of UNHCR’s budget for Kosovo—far more than any other donor. PRM also supported the work of NGOs working within the UNHCR/UNMIK framework on returns with $2.7 million.

The OSCE made key contributions to human rights, law enforcement, judicial development, civil society, free media, and election-planning issues as head of UNMIK’s institution-building pillar. The OSCE-run Kosovo Police Service School, led by Steve Bennett (United States), provided classroom training to the multi-ethnic KPS. The seventeenth class of cadets graduated on December 15, bringing the total number of trainee police officers trained at the academy to 4,392. It was the first class of cadets to be taught by KPS associate instructors. The fifteen KPS officers co-taught courses with international police trainers in general policing, firearm instruction, defensive tactics, and staff development. The school also offered training in management, investigations, and traffic. The United States contributed eighteen instructors to the international staff of the Kosovo Police School during the year.

The OSCE also directed the Kosovo Judicial Institute, which trained prosecutors in basic trial skills and judicial personnel on issues ranging from human rights law to human trafficking.

Further, the OSCE oversaw the November 17 Kosovo-wide elections that created a new Kosovo Assembly and triggered significant power sharing between UNMIK and the people of Kosovo. About 1,900 international supervisors from the OSCE and 230 international observers from the Council of Europe, as well as Americans on leave from their work in federal, state, and local governments and the private sector were involved in coordinating and monitoring the elections. Reports on the conduct of the election were very positive. Observers were also generally pleased with Serb and other minority participation in the balloting.

The Government of Kosovo was to be organized in early 2002. Plans called for nine ministries reorganized from the twenty departments of UNMIK’s Joint Interim Administrative Structures. Kosovo residents, trained by the OSCE-supported Kosovo Civil Service Institute and by international personnel who will retain certain designated authorities, will staff the ministries. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNMIK will retain final authority in many areas, including foreign affairs, justice, and defense, and will oversee and monitor compliance with Security Council Resolution 1244, the Constitutional Framework, and the
Framework Regulation for the Executive Branch. The transfer of authority and power in some areas will eventually bring a significant reduction in UNMIK’s role.

The European Union directs UNMIK’s reconstruction pillar, focusing on economic development. Among several developments in 2001, UNMIK’s Central Fiscal Authority made further progress in creating functioning tax collection systems. A value-added tax was successfully implemented and tax compliance generally improved. For example, approximately 90 percent of the commercial truckers entering through the official gates of the Administrative Boundary Line with Serbia reported to tax collection offices in Mitrovica, approaching the compliance levels seen in the rest of Kosovo. Businesses in northern Kosovo also registered with UNMIK to pay required taxes. Some 272 Kosovo Serbs applied for the seventeen vacancies in the UNMIK customs service in a recruitment drive in the latter half of 2001.

There was some progress on improving banking, communications, and transportation services. In 2000, there was only one commercial bank licensed to operate in Kosovo. The Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo (BPK) licensed six additional banks that opened in 2001. According to reports from the BPK, the conversion of the official currency from German Marks to Euros proceeded smoothly and according to schedule. The BPK plans to cease providing exchange services as of March 1, 2002, but it will still be possible to change deutsche marks for Euros at several commercial banks in Kosovo. Pristina airport saw an increased number of passengers, and underwent expansion and improvement of services. The Kosovo Electric Company continued to experience major difficulties, including a large deficit due to customer nonpayment and frequent and widespread power cuts stemming from equipment failures. As a result, Kosovo had to import electricity from Montenegro, Albania, and Bulgaria, using central budget funds. Addressing this problem is one of UNMIK’s top priorities for 2002.

As of December 31, UNMIK had 38 military observers and 4,529 civilian police. Of these, the United States provided 4 military observers and 605 civilian police. In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $578,093,000 for UNMIK operations. The U.S. share was $160,303,000.

UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)

The November 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina included a provision (Annex 11 “Agreement on International Police Task Force”) for a UN civilian police operation to assist the parties to create a safe and secure environment. On December 21, 1995, UN Security Council Resolution 1035 established a UN civilian office, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and an International Police Task Force (IPTF). UNMIBH and the IPTF are due to complete their mandates at the end of 2002. The EU agreed to sponsor a follow-on international police mission.
In 2001, IPTF continued co-locating its international police (CIVPOL) with local police units to better advise, monitor, and professionalize these forces. The IPTF also continued development of the Law Enforcement Personnel Registry, which verifies that Bosnian officers have undergone background checks, have met basic training requirements, and are certified for police employment. The United States held a number of senior positions within the IPTF, including that of Deputy Commissioner.

Both the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS) maintained multi-ethnic police academies during 2001 in Sarajevo and Banja Luka respectively. Both academies feature curricula that are based on modern, democratic police standards, and were developed with significant U.S. training assistance. The latest intake into the Sarajevo police academy included 78 women out of 114 cadets. Seventy-five out of the 114 were ethnic minorities. Of the class enrolled at the end of 2001 in Banja Luka, 96 out of 121 were non-Serbs. However, overall minority police representation remains low, running approximately 11 percent in the Federation and 3 percent in the RS.

The multi-ethnic State Border Service (SBS) covered approximately 75 percent of the border points in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Full coverage is planned for 2002. By the end of 2001, the SBS had trained and deployed 1,400 border officers and opened 14 Border Service Units. Two of the country's international airports (in Sarajevo and Banja Luka) were under SBS control. The SBS Training Center opened in May 2001 in Suhodol near Sarajevo. As part of international efforts to assist the SBS, the United States contributed nearly $2 million for uniforms and equipment.

UNMIBH created the Special Trafficking Operation Program (STOP) in July. The STOP program made significant strides in improving Bosnian police capabilities to address the trafficking of people in BiH. It comprised 45 IPTF officers and about 100 local police. Working closely with local police, the STOP program monitored 147 raids of establishments suspected of involvement in trafficking. As part of these efforts, 649 women and girls had been interviewed and offered assistance with repatriation by the end of the year.

UNMIBH supported the BiH Government’s deployment of a 12-person multi-ethnic CIVPOL contingent to the UN Transition Administration in East Timor in 2001. UNMIBH also supported the BiH deployment of a Military Observer team to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. A BiH composite transport unit was prepared during 2001 and is expected to be available for deployment to UN peacekeeping duties in 2002.

The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration contributed 25 percent of the UNHCR’s Bosnia budget since the organization began working to promote minority returns following the war. This cooperation continued in 2001. UNHCR continued to work with the Office of the High Representative to promote refugee returns, with UNMIBH joining in a supporting role. UNHCR programs include legal
aid and the promotion of property rights for the displaced, advocacy with federal and entity–level governments, and coordination of NGO projects. Returns now have momentum in Bosnia—more than 92,000 people went home in 2001, up from 67,445 in 2000.

Jacques Paul Klein (United States) continued as Special Representative of the Secretary–General, a position he assumed in July 1999. As of December 31, there were 4 military observers and 1,661 civilian police (among them 60 Americans) serving in UNMIBH.

In fiscal year 2001, the United Nations assessed member states a total of $194,423,000 for UNMIBH operations. The U.S. share was $53,575,000.

**UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)**

In September 1992, Croatia and the FRY agreed to demilitarize the Prevlaka peninsula, the strategically important parcel of land that guards the approaches to Kotor Bay. To assist the parties, the Security Council in October 1992 established a 14–person military observer mission under the UN Protection Force to monitor the demilitarization (Security Council Resolution 779). Established as an independent mission in 1996, it was increased to 28 observers and renamed the UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) by Security Council Resolution 1038 of January 15, 1996. The Security Council continued to renew UNMOP at six–month intervals, most recently on July 11, 2001 (Resolution 1362).

UNMOP’s zone of responsibility consists of two UN–designated zones: a UN–only “Blue Zone” and a demilitarized “Yellow Zone” in which the governments’ official presence is limited to police bearing small arms. The UN military observers enjoyed unrestricted freedom of movement on the Yugoslav side of the “Yellow Zone,” while the Croatian authorities required that UNMOP provide written advance notice before patrolling the northern part of the zone. Croatian police normally accompanied UNMOP’s foot patrols in this area. Following reductions in the static police presence on the Croatian side, and a modest reduction in police numbers on the Yugoslav side, the number of police in fixed positions at both sides of the border in the “Yellow Zone” was reduced to the lowest level since UNMOP’s inception. Both sides continued to violate the “Blue Zone’s” prohibition of personnel not authorized by UNMOP. While the United Nations did not consider these violations security threats, they were violations of the agreed security regime.

Croatia claimed sovereignty over the peninsula and viewed the matter as a security issue, a position the United States supported. The FRY, in an attempt to safeguard sea access to and from Kotor Bay for its navy, had in the past asserted a territorial counter–claim. The UN Security Council continuously reaffirmed Croatia’s territorial integrity “within its internationally recognized borders,” which the United States believed in effect acknowledged Prevlaka’s status within Croatia.

The FRY and Croatia indicated repeatedly their willingness to resolve the dispute, and continued official contacts during the year to that end. On
November 11, the two Foreign Ministers met in New York and issued a joint statement, declaring *inter alia*, their intention to set up an inter-state border commission and to examine further the issue of demilitarization. Despite this progress, the uncertainty of Montenegro’s future status and certain internal political issues in the two countries have led to support for the continuation of the mission. Continued commitment by Croatia and the FRY to an improvement in their relations, however, may allow for the conclusion of the UNMOP in the near future. The United States supported a negotiated settlement with the participation of all parties, including Montenegro, and, in the interim, supported enhanced freedom of movement for civilians in the UNMOP area.

Colonel Rodolfo Sergio Mujica (Argentina) succeeded Colonel Graeme Williams (New Zealand) as UNMOP’s Chief Military Observer on September 15. As of December 31, there were 27 military observers (none from the United States) in the mission.

UNMOP does not have its own budget. It is included in the budget of UNMIBH and also gets administrative support from UNMIBH.

**Western Hemisphere**

**Cuba**

The UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution sponsored by the Czech Republic (Resolution 2001/16) on the human rights situation in Cuba by a vote of 22 (U.S.) to 20, with 10 abstentions, on April 18, 2001. This represented the third consecutive year in which the Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on human rights in Cuba, after failing to do so in 1998 by a narrow margin.

The 56th General Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba” by a vote of 167 to 3 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions, on November 27, 2001. The Cuban-sponsored resolution called on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws such as the ‘Helms–Burton Act,’” the extraterritorial effects of which affect the sovereignty of other states, and urged states that have such laws to repeal them. The United States strongly opposed this resolution. A number of countries voted in favor of the resolution but expressed continuing concern over Cuba’s poor human rights record in their explanations of vote.

Several UN agencies, such as the UN Development Program and the World Food Program, have small humanitarian and development programs in Cuba. In making voluntary contributions to these organizations from the Department of State’s International Organization and Programs (IO&P) account, law requires the United States to withhold from its annual pledge the U.S. proportionate share of the organization’s expenditures in Cuba and other “pariah” states.

**Guatemala**

The United States strongly supports UN efforts to assist the Guatemalan Government in implementing the peace agreements signed between
the government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca on December 29, 1996, ending that country's 36–year internal struggle.

During 2001, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) continued to verify compliance with the peace agreements. Its activities included conducting impartial investigations into alleged human rights abuses, working to improve the administration of justice, aiding in opening access to the government for indigenous people, and providing technical assistance to the National Civil Police.

The Mission, headquartered in Guatemala City, Guatemala and led by Gerard Merrem, had 280 personnel and a budget of $14.8 million. Since MINUGUA is not a peacekeeping operation, it is funded out of the UN regular budget. Member states are not assessed for its budget. On December 24, 2001, the 56th General Assembly acted by consensus to adopt Resolution 56/223, extending MINUGUA’s mandate until December 31, 2002.

The UN Secretary-General recommended scaling back gradually the scope of MINUGUA’s programs in Guatemala while transferring some of its projects to UN agencies in the context of the UN Development Assistance Framework for Guatemala. In late 2000 and early 2001, MINUGUA reduced its eight regional offices to six offices and its five sub–regional offices to four offices, while reducing its budget and staff. MINUGUA is expected to close by December 31, 2003.

Disarmament Issues

UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

The UNDC is the principal forum for substantive discussion of disarmament issues when the General Assembly is not in session. It meets in New York for three weeks each spring, and is supported by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. The UNDC operates by consensus, has universal membership, and considers and makes recommendations on various disarmament issues. Historically, the non–aligned states have tried to focus predominantly on nuclear issues. It remains a key U.S. interest to maintain balance in the UNDC’s work between nuclear and non–nuclear topics. Recent difficulties in filling its agenda highlight the growing perception that the UNDC as an institution that may be out of date in today’s post–Cold War world.

The April 9–27 session of the UNDC continued consideration of two agenda items adopted the previous year, “Ways and Means to Achieve Nuclear Disarmament” (subgroup chaired by Ghana) and “Practical Confidence Building Measures in the Field of Conventional Arms.”

Conference on Disarmament (CD)

The Geneva–based Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the principal multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. Although the CD submits an annual report on its actions to the United Nations, it is an autonomous organization outside the formal UN system.
CD decisions require consensus, a rule the United States insisted on to protect its interests.

The 66 members are divided into geopolitical groups — the Western Group, the Eastern Group, and the non-aligned group, with China as an independent member. Power is exercised by the Presidency, which rotates monthly among members, and by the members themselves. In 2001, the Secretary General of the CD (a largely ceremonial position) was Vladimir Petrovsky (Russia). The CD has no secretariat of its own. Six officials from the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs are based in Geneva and devote all or most of their time to the CD.

The CD met in 2001 in three rounds (January 22–February 15, May 14–June 29, and July 30–September 14). U.S. objectives included the establishment of a negotiating committee for a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). An FMCT would ban production of fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium) for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. Unfortunately, the 2001 session saw the fifth year of deadlock over the CD’s work program. China, supported by Russia and Pakistan, continued to insist that the work program include negotiations on outer space arms control.

The primary proposal to break the impasse, supported by the vast majority of CD members, focuses on commencing FMCT negotiations and includes a discussion-only mandate for outer space and nuclear disarmament.

The CD is financed through the UN scale of assessments and is included in the $15.3 million budget of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA).

**UN First Committee (UNFC)**

The First Committee is the subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly that addresses international security and arms control. It is based in New York and funded through the UN Scale of Assessments. Its presidency rotates on an annual basis among UN members. During the five weeks that it meets each fall, it typically deals with 45–60 resolutions and decisions. These resolutions and decisions express the sentiment of the international community on issues ranging from the obscure and trivial (e.g., Disarmament Week) to the extremely important and highly controversial (e.g., the Russian resolution in 2001 on preserving the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty). The United States balances efforts to promote its goals and objectives while minimizing the negative effect that the goals and objectives of others have on U.S. national security and arms control interests.

Meeting in the shadow of the September 11 terrorist attack, the First Committee was characterized by muted rhetoric and avoidance of unnecessary confrontation or controversy. The majority of First Committee resolutions were voted on as in the past or with minor changes, and Mexico failed to win sufficient support for new initiatives on tactical nuclear weapons.
and a proposed Nuclear Dangers conference and withdrew both draft resolutions. However, the idea of the Nuclear Dangers Conference survived in a procedural decision, thus keeping it on the agenda for the following year. U.S. leadership produced the defeat in the General Assembly of an Iraqi resolution on the use of depleted uranium in armaments.

The United States voted against Japan’s resolution on “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” which it had supported in previous years, due to concerns about language on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Similarly, the United States voted against New Zealand’s procedural resolution on the CTBT. Despite active ongoing talks with Russia on superseding the Anti–Ballistic Missile Treaty, Russia again introduced its resolution on preservation and compliance with the ABM treaty, which the United States opposed. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 80–3(U.S.) with 63 abstentions.

In all, the United States joined consensus on or voted for 33 resolutions (in 2000: 34), voted against 13 (in 2000: 8), and abstained on 5 (in 2000: 6).

Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects

The 54th General Assembly decided in 1999 to convene in mid–2001 a United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW). The SA/LW Conference was held July 9–20, 2001 in New York. In the final hours, the United States managed to forge an agreed Program of Action with the 139 other delegations.

The result was a focused document that reflected many U.S. “best practices” and concentrated efforts on conflict regions where action was most urgently needed. Language that could be interpreted as restricting the right of U.S. citizens to bear firearms was dropped, as was a proposed ban on transfers of SA/LW to non–state actors, both at U.S. insistence. The United States pushed for measures to tighten export controls, regulate re–transfers of arms, enforce Security Council embargoes, destroy excess arms, and improve security of small arms stockpiles. The United States would have supported even stronger measures to control arms brokers and basic norms for regulating international arms transfers, but the final document did chart a credible multilateral course to deal with these serious problems.

The Program called for a review conference by 2006 and a biennial meeting to consider implementation. Ad hoc regional meetings may also be held to create regional frameworks for implementation, i.e., including coordination of technical assistance to states needing help to strengthen export controls.
Special Political Issues

International Terrorism

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks (on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania) on September 11, the United Nations acted swiftly to strengthen international engagement in the fight against terrorism.

Security Council Consideration

The Security Council adopted three important Resolutions: 1368, 1373, and 1377.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 1368 the day following the attacks. The resolution recognized the inherent right of self-defense, unequivocally condemned the attacks, characterized such acts as a threat to international peace and security, and expressed readiness to take steps to respond.

Resolution 1373, adopted on September 28 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, obliged member states to, inter alia, limit the ability of terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate internationally by freezing assets of terrorists, affiliated persons and organizations; bringing those who commit terrorist acts or assist them to justice; and denying them safe-haven. The resolution also established a Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to oversee implementation of the resolution. The Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom was elected as its Chair. The resolution required member states to send reports to the CTC on the steps they are taking to fight terrorism in seven critical areas: legislation, financial asset controls, customs, immigration, extradition, law enforcement, and arms traffic. By the end of the year, a majority of the member states had responded.

On November 12, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1377, a Ministerial Declaration on International Terrorism. Addressing the Security Council, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell noted:

“We have declared war on all terrorist organizations with a global reach. As President Bush made clear to the General Assembly, because these organizations are global, we need the support of all of our partners in the international community.”

The Secretary went on to express the appreciation of the American people for the forceful response of the international community:

“The United States is grateful that so many nations and so many international organizations have responded so quickly and so forcefully. The American people were heartened by worldwide solidarity after the attacks. The swift action taken by this body and by the General Assembly on September 12th made clear that the perpetrators and supporters of terrorism will be held accountable.”
General Assembly Consideration

The General Assembly adopted two resolutions, engaged in plenary debate on terrorism, and continued negotiations on a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

On September 12, the General Assembly unanimously adopted Resolution 56/1, which condemned the “heinous acts of terrorism” in Washington, D.C., Pennsylvania, and New York.

The General Assembly held a plenary debate on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism” during the first week of October. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, speaking on the opening day of the plenary debate, October 1, described the terrorist attacks as “acts of terrible evil” that shocked the conscience of the entire world. He praised Security Council Resolution 1373, noting that “out of evil can come good.” Prior to the opening of the debate, then New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani addressed the Assembly, the first time the host city Mayor had spoken before the body since 1952.

In his address to the plenary debate, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador John D. Negroponte, noted that the response to the heinous acts of terrorism:

“...will require the sustained application of political will, a vital commitment to one another that infuses all of the measures we take today and will give us the courage to undertake unforeseeable actions tomorrow. I know we can muster that political will because the General Assembly and Security Council both showed it in their swift resolutions of September 12, an unprecedented manifestation of our collective outrage and condemnation.”

President Bush’s speech before the 56th UN General Assembly, delayed until November 10, 2001 due to the belated opening of the High-Level Segment, evoked the memory of September 11 and called on civilized nations to unite for a long struggle against terrorism. The President went on to express gratitude to the United Nations for its “strong and principled stand,” while underscoring that more was expected of the coalition against terror:

“We meet in a hall devoted to peace, in a city scarred by violence, in a nation awakened to danger, in a world uniting for a long struggle. Every nation has a stake in this cause...We’re asking for a comprehensive commitment to this fight. We must unite in opposing all terrorists...This struggle is a defining moment for the United Nations itself.

Members of the Sixth Committee, responsible for international law, continued the debate on “Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,” and a resolution was subsequently adopted without a vote by the General Assembly on December 12 (56/88). The resolution strongly condemned all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed; reaffirmed previous Declarations on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism; urged all States to become parties to the 12 international terrorism conventions; and decided
that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its work on the negotiation of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and on the negotia-

The Sixth Committee Working Group engaged in a third round of negotiations on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism from October 15–26. Progress was made on many issues, but an impasse occurred in two areas: the scope of the offense and the application of the convention to state military forces. The Secretary–General and the UN Legal Counsel subsequently convened informal consultations with Permanent Representatives of concerned member states in an effort to achieve a compromise. It was not possible to achieve consensus and further negotiations were scheduled for January 28–February 1, 2002.

**International Peace and Security**

**Peacekeeping**

In 2001, the United States continued to consider criteria such as national interests, cost, size, risk, and exit strategies when deciding whether to support proposed peacekeeping operations. None of the 15 UN peacekeeping operations ended in 2001, and the total number of UN peacekeepers increased from 37,733 in 2000 to 47,108 in 2001. This rise was attributed to the new operation in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and expanding operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone. As of December 31, there were 47,108 military and civilian police personnel deployed (1,801 military observers, 7,642 civilian police, and 37,665 troops). They included 41 U.S. military observers and 1 troop in Western Sahara, Kuwait, Kosovo, Georgia, East Timor, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Middle East, and 707 U.S. civilian police in Bosnia–Herzegovina, Kosovo, and East Timor.

Funding for UN peacekeeping operations also increased in 2001. The United Nations assessed member states a total of $3 billion, of which the United States was assessed $832 million. The increase in funding assessments was mitigated by delays in assessments for operations in Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia/Eritrea as the United Nations prepared updated budgets for the missions. The United States continued to press for reform of UN peacekeeping administration and financing in several related resolutions (discussed in Part 2 Peacekeeping Reform) and for implementation of improvements to the UN’s capacity to manage and carry out UN peacekeeping.

The United States continued to promote practical measures to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations, supporting proposals to improve the UN’s ability to assess conflict situations, plan and manage peacekeeping operations, and respond quickly to Security Council mandates. The United States also continued to encourage other member states to include peacekeeping in their national security strategies and contribute forces to peacekeeping wherever appropriate.
Force Protection

The executive agent for force protection assessment of U.S. Military Observers serving in UN operations is the U.S. Military Observer Group–Washington (USMOG–W). During the year, USMOG–W conducted force protection surveys of all peacekeeping missions where U.S. military observers were serving under the operational control of the United Nations. In one instance, USMOG–W enlisted the assistance of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to address an increased mine threat in UNMEE’s central and western sectors during the latter half of 2001. The result was that UNMEE brought in reinforced Scout vehicles for its personnel and USMOG–W ordered mine blankets for vehicles used by the U.S. observers.

CIVPOL

International civilian police (CIVPOL) played a critical role in peacekeeping in 2001, and the United States continued efforts to enhance both domestic and international capacities for recruiting, training, and deploying CIVPOL to peacekeeping missions around the world. Although staffing shortages continued to exist in CIVPOL missions, particularly the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, the situation improved considerably from the previous year. However, the international community struggled to provide adequate numbers of qualified CIVPOL officers to meet worldwide needs. Due primarily to the downsizing of the U.S. contribution to the UN Mission in Bosnia–Herzegovina, the total number of U.S. CIVPOL deployed on missions dropped from 849 to 707.

HIV/AIDS

Efforts to address the threat to international peace and security from HIV/AIDS continued during 2001. The Security Council held an open debate in January to take stock of progress made since the adoption of Resolution 1308 (2000). The Council also met in June to consider “The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security: HIV/AIDS and international peacekeeping operations.” In January, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations entered into a formal agreement to work together on the problem of HIV/AIDS in UN peacekeeping operations. The agreement focused on issues related to training, code of conduct, HIV/AIDS testing, civil–military cooperation, and resource information. For example, UNAIDS financed the recruitment of an HIV/AIDS gender advisor to address the needs of women affected by HIV/AIDS and conflict in Sierra Leone and supported the distribution of HIV/AIDS awareness cards to peacekeepers there. During a Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration of Commitment. In it, each government pledged to strive for benchmark targets relating to prevention, care, support and treatment, impact alleviation, and orphaned children as part of a comprehensive AIDS response. The Secretary–General gave a detailed assessment of the epi-
demic in his report to the General Assembly, stressing the need for national leadership, coordination, and adequate resources.

[For the general health–related discussion of HIV/AIDS, see the World Health Organization, Part 8.]

**Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS)**

COPUOS was formed in 1958 pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII) which was submitted by the United States and 19 other states. The resolution established the *ad hoc* Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and laid the foundation for COPUOS as the only standing body of the General Assembly to consider international cooperation in the exploration of outer space. By Resolution 1472 (XIV) (1959), the General Assembly established COPUOS as a permanent body to succeed the *ad hoc* committee. The Committee has been responsible for the elaboration and adoption by consensus of five multilateral treaties governing space activities, as well as five sets of non–binding principles concerning matters such as the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, direct broadcasting satellites, the sharing of the benefits of space exploration, and remote sensing of the earth from space. The treaties form the basis for international law in the use and exploration of outer space.

COPUOS met June 6–15, 2001, in Vienna, Austria. Some delegations expressed the view that disarmament aspects of outer space fell within the COPUOS mandate. The U.S. and other delegations represented the view that such subjects belonged within the purview of the UN Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, and the First Committee of the General Assembly. The plenary also considered the reports of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on such subjects as space–related technology capacity building in developing countries. Reports of the Legal Subcommittee (space debris, review concept of launching state, delimitation of outer space, and review of geostationary orbit) were also considered.

On December 10, 2001, the General Assembly adopted without a vote Resolution 51, accepting the annual COPUOS report and renewing the mandate of the Committee.

**Non–Self–Governing Territories**

Chapter XI of the UN Charter sets forth responsibilities of member states for the “…administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self–government.” These non–self–governing territories (NSGTs) are considered annually by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24 or C–24) and by the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) of the UN General Assembly. The C–24 makes suggestions and recommendations to the Fourth Committee on implementation of General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 1960 (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples), specific
issues affecting the decolonization process, and the activities of specialized agencies and other UN bodies in those territories.

The United States is the administering power of three non–self–governing territories: American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Since 1996, the United States and the United Kingdom have participated in an informal dialogue with the Chair of the Fourth Committee in an effort to arrive at a consensus “omnibus” resolution to address the 11 remaining NSGTs for which the C–24 is concerned. In 2001, as in previous years, this process enabled the United States to support the “omnibus” resolution “Questions of American Samoa, Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Guam, Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.”

However, the United States also voted against or abstained on a series of resolutions and one decision at the 56th UN General Assembly because of unacceptable references to land tenure, economic and military activities, and the responsibilities of administering powers. The United States voted “no” on Resolutions: 56/66, “Economic and Other Activities which Affect the Interests of the Peoples of the Non–Self–Governing Territories” (147 to 2 (U.S.), with 5 abstentions); 56/73, “Dissemination of Information on Decolonization” (147 to 2 (U.S.) with 4 abstentions); 56/74, “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (132 to 2 (U.S.), with 21 abstentions); and the Decision, “Military Activities and Arrangements by Colonial Powers in Territories under Their Administration” (91 to 51 (U.S.), with no abstentions). The United States abstained on Resolutions: 56/67, “Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and International Institutions Associated with the UN” (106 to 0, with 50 abstentions (U.S.)); and 56/65, “Information from Non–Self–Governing Territories Transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter of the UN” (149 to 0, with 6 abstentions (U.S.)).

Article 73(e) of the UN Charter requires non–self–governing territories’ administering powers to “transmit regularly to the Secretary General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories.” In accordance with this Charter obligation, the United States in March of 2001 submitted to the United Nations Secretariat a report on American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

Security Council Thematic Debates

In 2001, the Security Council continued the recent trend of discussing general issues related to international peace and security in debates with a thematic focus. The number of thematic debates were comparable to 2000. Many Security Council members defined their month’s presidency with a theme and other members called for further meetings in order to discuss a certain topic. Reports by the Secretary General were an additional trigger
for thematic debates on a topic. Security Council resolutions and presidential statements on thematic issues often included a call for a report by the Secretary General on the topic. The report, usually produced a year or more later, could then generate another round of Security Council debate and action. A number of thematic debates listed below will be the subject of Secretary General reports in 2002, including Small Arms, Women and Peace and Security; Children and Armed Conflict; and Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict. The Security Council held 12 thematic debates during 2001:

- Strengthening Cooperation with Troop Contributing Countries [S/PRST/2001/3 adopted on 1/31/01]
- Peace–building: Towards a Comprehensive Approach [Open meeting held 2/5/01; S/PRST/2001/5 adopted on 2/20/01]
- Peace and Security: Africa (Millennium Summit) [Open meeting held 3/7/01; S/PRST/2001/10 adopted on 3/22/01]
- Peace and Security: HIV/AIDS and International Peacekeeping Operations [Open meeting held 1/19/01; S/PRST/2001/16 adopted on 6/28/01]
- Prevention of Armed Conflict [Open meeting held 6/21/01; S/RES/1366 adopted on 8/30/01]
- Small Arms: Impact of Illicit Trade [Open meeting held 8/2/01; S/PRST/2001/21 adopted on 8/31/01]
- General Issues Relating to Sanctions: [Open meeting held 10/22/01 and resumed on 10/25/01]
- Women and Peace and Security [S/PRST/2001/31 adopted on 10/31/01]
- Children and Armed Conflict: Rights and Protection of Children [Open meeting held 11/20/01; S/RES/1379 adopted on 11/20/01]
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict [Open meeting held 4/23/01; Open meeting held 11/21/01]
- Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts [S/RES/1368 (9/12/01); S/RES/1377 (11/12/01); S/RES/1373 (11/28/01)]
- Africa: Inter–Agency Mission to West Africa [Open meeting held 12/18/01; S/PRST/2001/38 adopted 12/19/01]