CHAPTER 2

THE VITAL FUNCTION
World War II and Diplomatic Security

The experiences of the World War II era (1933-1945) expanded and solidified diplomatic security as a vital function of the Department of State. From the first days of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidency, the Department faced grave threats to U.S. diplomacy, primarily from Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and Japan. As a result, the Department broadened its definition of security and expanded the number of entities monitoring and enforcing security. The Department’s new, expanded security apparatus under President Roosevelt, however, was disjointed. Security responsibilities were dispersed across multiple offices with overlapping jurisdictions. Moreover, the Office of the Chief Special Agent, which had handled security since World War I, often was not involved in many of the new security measures. By the end of World War II, the Department was implementing security in a more extensive, formalized manner that touched and altered every level of the Department’s operations. In fact, many security measures first implemented during World War II—such as coded ID badges, formal document classification procedures, and a courier network—are today accepted as part of the Department’s normal, daily routine.

Moscow and Berlin

When Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the Presidency in March 1933, the Department of State faced diplomatic security threats from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1930s, the regimes of both nations respectively targeted the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Moscow for espionage. Security problems at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow began immediately after Roosevelt signed the Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreement of November 16, 1933, which established formal diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. U.S. officials opened the Embassy in Moscow in December, but as diplomat George F. Kennan later recalled, they lacked basic security necessities such as codes and safes during the first few months. The Embassy’s communications with Washington were sent across open telegraph lines. Ambassador William C. Bullitt requested and obtained a group of Marines to serve as guards, but the Soviet NKVD (the Soviet intelligence service that was
the forerunner of the KGB) soon provided “girlfriends” for the Marines.¹ One of the Embassy’s code clerks, Tyler G. Kent, had a Russian mistress, and the chauffeur for the U.S. military attaché was discovered to be a NKVD officer.²

U.S. Embassy officers knew of the Soviet espionage but did little to stop it. Sergei, the caretaker of Spaso House (the Ambassador’s residence), kept his basement apartment in the residence locked, and apparently no one obtained a key from him until 1952. During that time, Sergei had assisted in “bugging” (installing listening devices) the U.S. Embassy from his apartment. In July 1937, when the Embassy’s electrician discovered a microphone in the ceiling above the Ambassador’s desk, several junior Embassy officers were upset and tried to locate other bugs. Ambassador Joseph Davies, who had succeeded William Bullitt, dismissed the affair: “I cooled off [‘the youngsters’] and ‘ kidded’ them about their ‘international sleuthing’.” “My position was,” he wrote in his diary, that “if the Soviets had a Dictaphone installed so much the better – the sooner they would find that we were friends, not enemies.”³

When Military Attaché Major Ivan D. Yeaton arrived in Moscow in 1939, he was “appalled” by the extent to which security at the Embassy had been compromised. Two or three ballerinas from the Moscow Ballet had free run of the Embassy, and the NKVD “generously provided” female companions for parties at the Embassy. In 1940, Yeaton, who knew that the Department was preparing to change its telegraph codes, quietly asked the FBI to send an agent to run a security inspection. Disguised as a courier, the FBI agent arrived, recorded his findings, and submitted his report. Besides the many Soviet employees and visitors that freely roamed throughout the Embassy, the FBI agent found that the code room was left unattended with the door propped open for 45 minutes one evening. He also found he code room’s safes left open and codebooks and classified messages left setting on the table. The agent’s inspection and report prompted a quick upgrade of security, and some embassy officers were brought back to Washington. Not until 1944, did an electrician undertake a comprehensive search for listening devices, and then he discovered 120 hidden microphones during his first sweep of the building. One Embassy officer confessed that Soviet microphones “kept turning up…any and everywhere.”⁴
Nazi Germany proved equally effective in their espionage against the U.S. Embassy in Berlin. One German secret agent remarked, “Routine security precautions in the [U.S.] Embassy [in Berlin] were very poorly observed by U.S. personnel.” Long-time employees Rudolf Kranz (a.k.a. “Karl”) and Heinz Prause were covert German agents who worked in the Naval Attaché’s office. They obtained the Attaché’s codebook and exact details of the Navy’s shipbuilding program. U.S. Embassy personnel left their safes open and left classified documents on their desks during lunch, enabling German agents to steal documents, make copies or photographs, and then return them. The typewriter carbons of classified documents were simply tossed into the trash, providing another source of information for German agents. In addition, the Naval Attaché’s conference room was bugged just before the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Since at least 1936, Nazi intelligence had tapped the telephone lines of the U.S. Embassies in Berlin and Warsaw, the U.S. residences in Berlin, and the apartments of U.S. news correspondents. One German telephone eavesdropper was “amazed that U.S. embassy staff spoke so openly on the telephone” and that U.S. correspondents “freely talked about...what they had learned from officials and colleagues.” Much of Germany’s espionage was not discovered until 1945, when Department officials asked Security Officer Robert L. Bannerman, the son of Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman, to investigate the matter. After much analysis and investigation, Bannerman identified Kranz as an espionage agent, leading to Kranz’s arrest. Bannerman also pointed to others as possible suspects, which U.S. authorities in Germany found to be “for the most part correct.”

Nazi censors, as well as Nazi enforcement of German mail regulations that prompted the opening of U.S. diplomatic mail on occasion, aggravated an already difficult situation for the transport of U.S. diplomatic pouches. The Department initially reverted to using the Despatch Agent network in 1919; however, the opening of many new U.S. diplomatic posts after World War I, combined with the Department’s efforts to maintain fiscal economy during the 1920s and early 1930s, created a more haphazard, less secure system than had existed prior to World War I. As a means to improve security, the Department added couriers to carry diplomatic pouches to and from the new posts in Central and Eastern Europe, but the Department undercut that security when it began shipping pouches directly to Le Havre, France – bypassing the London Despatch

Figure 2: President Franklin D. Roosevelt (left) confers with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who served as Secretary from 1933 to 1944. Unhappy that the Department had cut the courier service, Roosevelt supported an appropriation to fund three couriers in Europe. During World War II, couriers became the Department’s primary carriers of diplomatic pouches. Source: Library of Congress, New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection.
Office – and having the French postal service carry them to Paris. Due to budget constraints caused by the Great Depression, the Department shut down its courier service, but, the volume of mail handled annually by the Department’s Mail Section had grown considerably. By 1936, the Mail Section handled more than 2000 pouches containing military and naval intelligence alone, in addition to the nearly 6000 other diplomatic pouches, quantities that exceeded the capabilities of the Despatch Agent network. Other U.S. posts overseas also relied upon trusted foreign postal services, which were the British and German services.

During the 1930s, security of U.S. diplomatic correspondence declined, and several Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Department employees echoed complaints that Chief Special Agent Robert C. Bannerman had sought to correct in the mid-1920s. The personnel at U.S. posts confused the revived courier service with a “freight hauling” service. There was “no distinction” being made between “Confidential” and non-confidential materials, and some posts sent local national employees to the train station to pick up the diplomatic pouches. There were thefts of pouches containing confidential U.S. documents. Courier Warren M. Hamilton noted that even the most sensitive U.S. diplomatic letters (those containing the Department’s telegraph codes) were left unattended in a French post office for several hours, and then shipped across the Atlantic on ships of foreign registry. The U.S. Legation to Belgrade complained that sending U.S. diplomatic correspondence through the Yugoslav postal service meant that it was subject to search by Yugoslav authorities at all times.

With security of U.S. diplomatic mail in doubt, President Roosevelt worked to restart the Department of State’s courier service. He was displeased when he learned that the Department had cut the courier service, and he told Congress that he supported renewed funding for couriers. In 1935, Congress appropriated $24,000 to the Department, permitting the operation of three couriers out of Paris and a limited service in Asia. For fiscal year 1939, Congress raised the appropriation to $35,000.

The reinitiating of the courier service led to changes in the routes. The Department created a new route in northeast Asia; from its base in Peiping (now Beijing), the route ran between Peiping, Tientsin, Nanking, and Shanghai, with Tokyo added later. In Europe, the Southern Route added Rome and Athens to its destinations, and the circuit consisted of Paris-Rome-Athens-Istanbul-Sofia-Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna, then stopping at Zurich or Geneva before returning to Paris. The U.S. Legation in Bucharest sent a Foreign Service Officer or trusted American clerk to carry its pouch and meet the courier in Sofia. Meanwhile, an FSO or clerk travelled from Tirana and met the courier at the Hotel Oriente in Bari, Bulgaria, in order to exchange that Legation’s pouches. When Austria was absorbed into Germany in the 1938 Anschluss, Vienna was dropped from the route. An Iberian Route was added, which travelled from Paris to Barcelona to Madrid to Lisbon, and back to Paris. The courier handling this route was likely the same courier who made the Paris to London trip. The Northern Route appears to have remained largely the same, following the circuit of Paris-Berlin-Riga-Moscow-Tallinn-Helsinki-Paris.
Neutrality Legislation and New Duties

As tensions escalated in Europe and Asia, the United States strove to remain neutral, and the 1934 book Merchants of Death intensified the U.S. public’s desire for neutrality. The work claimed that arms manufacturers and dealers had unduly influenced the U.S. Government’s decision to enter World War I. A Congressional committee led by Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-ND) investigated the book’s claims but found little evidence to support them. The “merchants of death” thesis, however, became popular just as Italy was preparing to wage war against Ethiopia in 1935. Public sentiment pressed Congress to ensure that the United States remained neutral, and Congress responded by passing the Neutrality Act of 1935, which imposed an embargo upon the sale of arms to nations at war. Congress strengthened the Neutrality Act in 1936 by banning U.S. citizens from making loans or extending credit to belligerents. President Roosevelt, in his 1937 “Quarantine” speech, then declared that the United States should use its “moral influence” to stop war.

The Department of State became the cabinet agency tasked to enforce and secure U.S. neutrality. As Spain descended into civil war in 1936, with German Führer Adolph Hitler and Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini aiding the Spanish Nationalists led by General Francisco Franco, the Department created the Office of Arms and Munitions Control to enforce the Neutrality Acts. The office was charged with registering manufacturers, exporters, and importers of arms, ammunition, and war materiel, as well as licensing the exportation and importation of war materials.
The control of munitions was conceived in terms similar to the control of passports and visas. Like persons who provided false passports to saboteurs and spies, foreign agents and U.S. subversives engaged in the arms trade could subvert U.S. diplomacy and jeopardize U.S. internal security. Arms traders, therefore, were seen to pose a security risk to the United States, much like German saboteurs, anarchists, and Communist agents had done a generation earlier during World War I.

The Office of the Chief Special Agent was pulled into the neutrality debates when Americans ignored or flouted the U.S. ban on travel to belligerent countries. During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Americans volunteered for the Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, and Loyalist International Brigades in order to aid the Republicans in their struggle against Franco and the Fascists. Prohibited by the Neutrality Acts from travelling to Spain, U.S. volunteers applied for passports saying that they were travelling to France, Belgium, England, or other countries, even though their true destination was Spain. By 1937, the Department of State required that young men of military age present affidavits attesting that they were not going to Spain.

Passport fraud resulting from U.S. citizens fighting in Spain prompted the Department of State to change the design of U.S. passports in 1937. When U.S. volunteers arrived in Spain, they were told to give their passports to their regiment leaders “for safekeeping.” As a result, more than 2,000 U.S. passports were shipped to Moscow because some regiment leaders who had joined the Republican cause were Soviet agents or collaborators. U.S. officials soon learned of the thefts and redesigned the U.S. passport. The Department issued free replacements to U.S. citizens as a means of identifying fraud and catching Communist agents. However, U.S. volunteers who had lost their passports returned to the United States with only certificates of identity. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman, who worked in the New York Field Office, recalled staying up until 4 a.m. three times a week interviewing the returning volunteers in order to determine if they were truly U.S. citizens.

False U.S. passports appeared in Denmark, Brazil, and the Soviet Union, and investigations by the Chief Special Agent’s office exposed a Soviet spy network. Department of State Special Agents learned that many U.S.
volunteers for the Spanish Civil War had made their travel arrangements through World Tourists, Inc., a Communist front company (all of its corporate officers were Communist Party members). World Tourists had also provided travel arrangements for the Amtorg Corporation, a Communist front organization that the Chief Special Agent’s office had investigated a decade earlier. In 1939, U.S. authorities seized the records of World Tourists. The Department of Justice indicted the company and its head, Jacob Golos, for passport fraud, and issued a second indictment against Golos for failing to register as a foreign agent. Earl Browder, leader of the U.S. Communist Party, was also indicted and convicted of passport fraud as a result of the World Tourist investigation. Browder served fourteen months in jail before Roosevelt pardoned him as a gesture of wartime friendship to the Soviet Union.16

Another set of passport fraud investigations conducted by the Chief Special Agent’s Office exposed Nazi espionage in the United States. Guenther Gustave Rumrich called the U.S. Passport Bureau in Manhattan, identified himself as “Mr. Weston, Under Secretary of State,” and requested that 50 blank passports be delivered to his hotel. As Sumner Welles was Under Secretary of State at the time, Special Agents and FBI agents trailed the delivery of the blank passports and arrested Rumrich. A deserter from the U.S. Army, Rumrich had received $290 from the Nazi German government, and in exchange, he sent U.S. Government weather reports, the Army-Navy Register (a periodical), and a list of Army and Navy publications to the Germans. All of these items, however, were publicly available, free of charge, and could have been easily obtained by German Embassy officers. Rumrich may not have been the most effective spy, but the investigation of his activities uncovered three other German agents—Erich Glaser, Otto Herman Voss, and Johanna Hoffman. All four were tried in 1938, and received prison terms of two years (Rumrich and Hoffman), four years (Glaser), and six years (Voss).17

With only six Special Agents in 1939, the Office of the Chief Special Agent achieved an impressive track record in passport fraud cases. Each Special Agent juggled between 30 and 40 cases at once. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman recalled that even under the severely limited budget, he conducted passport and visa fraud...
investigations, personnel case investigations, special inquiries made on behalf of consular officers abroad, liaisons with all federal agencies in New York, and arrangements and protection for visiting dignitaries and heads of state.  

Other diplomatic security threats remained undetected. The NKVD, the Soviet intelligence service, had 221 agents operating in the United States. Within the upper ranks of the U.S. Government, these agents included Alger Hiss; Laurence Duggan, Chief of the Division of American Republics at the Department of State; Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; Lauchlin Currie, administrative assistant to the President; and Duncan Chaplin Lee, personal assistant to General William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). In 1939, Whittaker Chambers, an editor for Time magazine and a former Soviet agent, told FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover and Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle about the Soviets’ espionage efforts, and even gave them the names of Hiss, White, and Currie. Berle wrote a memorandum about Chambers’ allegations to an uninterested President Roosevelt, but then set the matter aside.

Communications Security in Wartime

The escalating hostilities in Asia and Europe during the late 1930s emphasized the need for greater security. The July 1937 clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing quickly expanded to war in East Asia. In 1938, Hitler moved German forces into Austria and created a crisis over the Sudetenland, which led to the 1939 occupation of Czechoslovakia by Germany. Then, after signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union in 1939, Hitler launched an air and land attack on Poland on September 1, prompting Great Britain and France to declare war on Germany. While the United States operated under the Neutrality Acts, Hitler’s armies stormed through Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in the spring of 1940. The rapid fall of France in June 1940 shocked the American public and pushed the United States toward active assistance of the Allied cause (Britain, France, and other West European countries) against the Axis Powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. President Roosevelt began rearming U.S. military forces, and convinced Congress to amend neutrality legislation in order to allow a “cash and carry” program to supply Great Britain. The U.S. Government authorized the sale of U.S. destroyers to Great Britain in return for base leases in the western Atlantic, and, in the spring of 1941, provided wholesale economic assistance to the Allied cause through the Lend Lease Act.

With the onset of war in Europe and Asia, the Department’s patchwork diplomatic pouch system collapsed, forcing Department officials to adopt alternatives. The rise of German and Japanese submarine attacks on commercial shipping, and the problems created by wartime hostilities in Europe and Asia (e.g. detention of two U.S. couriers in German-occupied Norway) wrecked pouch transport system. The Department expanded its courier staff in Paris and created a courier office in Berlin. After the fall of France, the Department considered shifting the port of entry for its European pouches to Genoa, but since Italy was an Axis power, this probably did not occur. The Department still used Despatch Agents but as the war progressed, more and more of the
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pouches moved to military transports and airplanes. President Roosevelt approved the use of military officers as couriers where and when necessary, and the Department frequently depended upon the Army’s Courier Service, as well as U.S. military transports and airplanes. The Department opened regional courier centers in Cairo, Algiers, and Naples, and where possible, rebuilt the courier network in Asia.21

Department officials also instituted new wartime procedures for diplomatic correspondence. The Department began requiring all materials intended for the diplomatic pouch to be submitted unsealed, and addressed to a career officer of the Foreign Service or a commissioned attaché. Pouches could be opened or closed only by a Chief of Mission or an officially designated career officer. Couriers also bore increased responsibility for safeguarding their pouches; the Foreign Service Administration instructed them “to keep their pouches always in their possession, at table, on deck, in bed, in the bath.”22

With the increased speed, capacity, and reliability of airmail service, the Department of State began utilizing airplanes for the transport of its diplomatic correspondence on a large scale. In cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Authorities and Pan American Airways, the Department arranged for airmail pouch service. In June 1941, using Miami as a hub, Department officials developed three airmail routes to Latin American posts, and within a year the number of routes was expanded to five.23 With weight and space being key factors in air transport, the Department turned to 35mm or 16mm microfilm as a means to reduce the volume of its reports, newspapers, periodicals, and correspondence.24
With regular airmail transport, the Department pioneered the use of airgrams. Airgrams were prepared on standard forms in a telegraphic style but were transported by airplanes. More extensive in content than telegrams, airgrams arrived at their destination faster than ocean transport; moreover, they significantly reduced traffic on telegraph and telephone lines. Airgrams also cut departmental costs (telegraph and telephone charges) and ensured a more secure transmission of classified correspondence. Using the Department’s new airmail routes, Washington could send an airgram as late as 8:30 p.m., and it would reach Mexico City, Havana, Guatemala City, Port-au-Prince, Ciudad Trujillo (Santo Domingo), or any part of Canada by the next day. An airgram sent from Washington could reach the rest of Central America, Caracas, Bogotá, or Lima within 48 hours; Santiago or Rio de Janeiro in 72 hours; and Buenos Aires in 96 hours. In all cases, the pace of diplomatic communications accelerated.25

However, trans-Atlantic air transport raised new security considerations. The Office of Naval Intelligence expressed concern when several Department of State pouches were found floating off the coast of Lisbon, following the crash of a Pan American flight. Upon an internal review, the Foreign Service Administration proposed that couriers be required to carry knives in order to cut small holes in canvas pouches if they needed to ditch their load in deep water.26
Communications between the Department and U.S. posts in Axis and Axis-occupied territories posed special security challenges. When France fell to the invading Nazi German armies in June 1940, U.S. Ambassador to France William Bullitt telegraphed Washington that he could no longer receive coded messages because the Embassy, following emergency procedures, had destroyed its codes and equipment. He asked the Department to use commercial radio channels to send confidential messages, and to cloak the information within a common and seemingly innocuous personal message from a girl to a family member that would be repeated several times during a day. The Embassy had local telephone and mail service, but lacked telephone, telegraph, or mail service to places outside German-occupied areas. German officials initially refused to permit courier service, but later allowed it to Lisbon, Portugal, only to block the Paris-to-Lisbon courier route in October 1940. The German chargé to the
United States explained that this restriction should not be considered punitive because it applied to all diplomats, neutral or otherwise, in areas experiencing military operations.28

By October 1940, the Nazis relented amid numerous complaints about the lack of courier service and inaugurated daily courier service from Paris to Vichy. U.S. officials refused to use the new service because Nazi officials demanded that all messages carried by courier be written in German or French. U.S. diplomats chose to “stick to our own devices,” which meant using private individuals to smuggle correspondence out of German-controlled France. By November 1940, Nazi German officials had banned all diplomatic correspondence from crossing French frontiers, unless it was sent through the daily courier service. In February 1941, the Nazis enforced this prohibition, which led the Department to strongly discourage the use of private messengers, citing the risk they faced of possible arrest by Nazi authorities.29

In retaliation, U.S. officials considered blocking German courier service from the United States and Latin America, but the Bureau of American Republic Affairs (ARA) argued that this would have the desired effect, and the idea was tabled. The Department decided to move the U.S. Embassy to Vichy, closing the Embassy in Paris in 1941. However, even the closed Embassy created problems, because the U.S. diplomatic staff at Vichy sent “interzone cards” to the custodian of the Embassy, inquiring about official and personal matters. The First Secretary of the U.S. Embassy at Vichy strictly forbade sending interzone cards, citing “serious personal risk” to the custodian and his possible “internment” by German authorities.30

The security problems encountered by U.S. diplomats in Paris were not unique. U.S. diplomats in Oslo, Amsterdam, Brussels, Copenhagen, and Luxembourg also faced delays and restrictions. The Department warned diplomatic and consular officers that telephone lines should be used with “very great caution,” and in January...
1943, it curtailed long-distance calls, except when the matter was especially urgent. Every post had concerns about wiretapping, and Admiral François Darlan, head of the Vichy Government, warned the U.S. Embassy that its telephones were under close surveillance. Chief Electrician’s Mate Albert E. Dunn of the U.S. Navy spent much of the early 1940s traveling from post to post, checking telephone and telegraph lines to ensure that the Nazis or their agents had not wiretapped U.S. embassy lines.

Compared with France and Western Europe, the experience of U.S. diplomats in Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini was relatively trouble-free. Although U.S. Consuls in Italy reported that Italian authorities occasionally impeded their correspondence, the U.S. Embassy usually could send its messages without difficulty, regardless of whether the communications were in code or not. U.S. investigators also did not uncover any wiretaps in Rome. The difference between Rome and the occupied capitals of Paris, Oslo, and Luxembourg was how German officials defined the city: by the Nazis’ reckoning, Paris, Oslo, and Luxembourg were combat zones; whereas, Rome was an Axis capital.

**Securing Codes and Code Rooms**

The amount of telegraph traffic and the number of messages requiring coding and decoding constituted a serious concern for Department officials, particularly after British officials discovered a spy at the U.S. Embassy in London. In the spring of 1940, Tyler Kent, a U.S. code clerk, passed embassy telegrams to a British fascist group, which in turn relayed them to Germany. British officials arrested Kent’s British contacts on May 20. After obtaining Department of State approval, British police searched Kent’s rooms and found copies of over 1,500 documents, as well as keys to the index bureau and code room. The Department fired Kent and stripped him of his diplomatic immunity. The British government tried Kent for violating the Official Secrets Act and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment. Kent’s espionage disrupted U.S. diplomatic communications for nearly six weeks until special U.S. couriers were able to distribute new codes.
Likely prompted by the Tyler Kent case, the Department of State surveyed the security of its communications and codes in early 1941. It asked each post to report how many officers were involved in code work, and how many hours they spent doing it. The Department also wanted to know what security measures its posts took to protect coded messages and codes. The results surprised Washington officials. Posts such as Athens, Cairo, and Berlin handled their traffic easily, while London, Bucharest, Vichy, and Tangiers were overwhelmed, with numerous overtime hours and in the case of London, code clerks working “trying” shifts.35

U.S. embassies and legations in Europe generally implemented effective security measures for their codes and coded messages. Except for U.S. posts in Spain, most embassies and legations had a separate, locked room for communications equipment, and only the code clerks, the Chief of Mission, and the Deputy Chief of Mission had access. Guards or night watchmen guarded the code rooms.36 Coded messages did not leave the room, officers had to read them there, and papers were burned immediately after use. The codes—Brown Code for Strictly Confidential messages and Grey Code for the Confidential messages—were kept in safes in the code room. The Chief of Mission and one code clerk were the only members of the post who had access to the combination or key to the safe in the code room.37

**Physical and Personnel Security at Embassies**

The heightened danger of espionage prompted U.S. officials to increase post security and impose stricter measures at U.S. missions overseas. Posts employed embassy guards and night watchmen primarily to prevent theft and ensure the security of the post’s records and the code room. In Latin America, embassy guards were usually private U.S. citizens hired by the Department and assigned to a particular embassy.38 Their salary (about $1200 plus $500 for housing) was one-half that of Foreign Service Officers and less than most foreign national clerks. Most often, U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates relied upon locally employed nationals as guards and night watchmen. Depending on location, local guards received compensation that was one-tenth to one-quarter the pay received by U.S. citizen guards, making local guards and night watchmen among the lowest paid employees at
the embassy. High turnover was common, and many held the position as a second job.  

After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, the demographics of U.S. embassy guards changed significantly. In Latin America, due to the draft and the personnel demands of the War Department, U.S. citizen guards generally were retired Coast Guardsmen or retired law enforcement. Many embassies and legations also made arrangements with local police or military forces to provide 24-hour or evening and weekend security. Outside the Western Hemisphere, depending upon location, U.S. embassies frequently depended upon U.S. military personnel for guards. Marines assumed guard duty at the U.S. Embassy in London; meanwhile, the Army provided guards for the U.S. Embassies in Tehran, Cairo, and Rome. In some cases, such as Rome, the shortage of guards sometimes required Foreign Service Officers to cover guard shifts in the evening. 

The Department’s shift to U.S. military personnel as guards was partly the result of Department officials’ concerns regarding their reliance on local nationals as guards and employees, and the pressure Axis agents may place on local nationals. In the final months of 1939, the Department learned of at least three instances of “espionage activities” at U.S. consulates. In Italy, the Department was aware that the Gestapo and other German government agents had increased their activities, and that U.S. diplomats were under surveillance. The Department therefore insisted that all U.S. officials should refrain from carrying secret or confidential documents when crossing international borders, and that they should “never (repeat never) carry” documents that were received or sent in code. Other Department concerns ranged from the physical protection of post employees to foreign national employees issuing fraudulent visas. The Department took preventative measures, prosecuted employees committing security breaches when they could, and released or transferred questionable employees. 

The actions taken by the U.S. Embassy in France reveals some of the preventative measures that U.S. posts took regarding foreign national employees. In October 1940, the First Secretary of the Embassy, H. Freeman Matthews, reported that an embassy code clerk had taken a “keen interest in the contents of my telegrams.”
The clerk also had a friendship with a French Foreign Office official who had worked in the French military's censorship office before German occupation. Matthews requested Washington to send another code clerk so that he could transfer the suspected clerk to Vichy or Marseilles where he would work on less sensitive materials. Later, after the U.S. Embassy was moved to Vichy, Matthews strongly warned Embassy staff that the Germans might send agents provocateur disguised as Gaullist or British sympathizers into the Embassy. He explained that the Germans and the Vichy French might try to build a case against the U.S. Embassy by showing that the Embassy was aiding British subjects or French men of military age to escape France and join the Allied forces. Such a case, Matthews feared, could lead to the arrest, detention, or expulsion of Embassy personnel. One local member of the Embassy's staff, Nicolas Goliewsky, who had been a Consulate employee for 19 years, had already been interned at a concentration camp in Compiègne on such charges.

Visa fraud also merited serious concern within the Department. Amidst heightened security threats, U.S. Embassies in Europe faced an escalating workload in visa cases as thousands of people, particularly those of Jewish descent, sought entrance into the United States to escape Nazi persecution. U.S. immigration laws were tight, and efforts to pressure U.S. visa office employees were not unusual. One such case involved Tatiana Stcherbina, a foreign national clerk for 16 years in the U.S. Embassy in Paris. After the war began in Europe in 1939, the U.S. Embassy in Paris transferred its visa office to the U.S. Consulate in Bordeaux. Stcherbina later reported that after being transferred to Bordeaux, Jewish refugees began approaching her at work, on the street, and even at home “with all kinds of offers.” Although she initially refused their entreaties, Stcherbina relented when Maxmiliano Birnbaum offered her several thousand French francs to falsify documents to move twelve people to the top of the visa wait list. The visas would enable twelve Polish and Russian Jews, four of whom were children, to travel to the United States and avoid being sent to German concentration camps. Between March 1939 and February 1940, she forged log entries, allowing the twelve to move to the head of the queue.

In April 1940, when U.S. Consulate officials confronted Stcherbina with the forged entries, she cited several reasons for her actions. As the head of household and sole breadwinner, Stcherbina faced financial difficulties, partially as a result of high medical bills incurred by her mother and her only son, and partially due to low wages the U.S. Foreign Service paid its foreign-born employees. Moreover, the U.S. Embassy had contributed to Stcherbina’s difficulties when it transferred its visa section to Bordeaux on four days notice, but refused to provide financial assistance to Stcherbina and other Foreign Service nationals for the move. When Stcherbina complained, the lead U.S. official said the short notice and moving expenses were her own affair. To relieve her extreme indebtedness, Stcherbina had accepted Birnbaum’s entreaties and money, but insisted that this was the first time she had forged entries and documents.

Department officials brought the case to a close and summarily fired Stcherbina. Despite her nearly two decades of loyal service to the United States, the Department’s case review officer remarked that “a person of her background must have had a natural sympathy for aliens of the refugee class and it is not inconceivable that she
could have been prevailed upon to enter the conspiracy.” The review officer, however, omitted from his report Stcherbina’s claim that Birnbaum was trying to get a visa for a young boy in order to prevent him from being sent to a concentration camp.47 “If this affair teaches us anything,” the officer insisted, “it should be that immigrant waiting lists should be carefully maintained under the close supervision of an American consular officer of career at each office.” His superior concurred, and the Department sent out warning notices on the twelve fraudulent visas, which meant that the twelve would be denied entry into the United States and deported back to Europe. Washington officials also determined that Stcherbina’s supervisors, Consul Henry S. Waterman and Vice Consul Taylor W. Gannett, shared the responsibility for the fraudulent visas, and a notation was likely made in their personnel files.48

**Security Developments in Washington**

The Chief Special Agent’s office underwent changes in leadership and personnel during the period as well. On February 27, 1940, Robert C. Bannerman, who had served as the Chief Special Agent for nearly 20 years, died. Thomas F. Fitch, a former Post Office Inspector and the Special Agent-in-Charge of the New York Field Office, assumed leadership of the office. The workload of the office had increased considerably during the 1930s, largely due to the sharp increase in passport and visa fraud cases. During his first year as Chief Special Agent, Fitch doubled his staff from 7 to 17, and then doubled it again during his second year. Fitch posted five agents in the Washington D.C. office for the first time since 1927.49

Between 1938 and 1941, the Department also increased security at the State, War, and Navy Building, near the White House. General Service Administration security guards manned the watches and controlled access to buildings on evenings, weekends, and holidays. The rapid increase in Department personnel after 1939 prompted the Department officials to institute a building pass

Figure 15: The German Embassy in Washington, D.C., flies the Nazi swastika on July 4, 1941. Early in the war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a directive defining the areas of responsibilities for combating espionage. The FBI was charged with investigating foreign agents in the United States (e.g., the German Embassy above) and U.S. posts overseas. Even today, crimes occurring at U.S. posts overseas are equivalent to occurring on U.S. soil and are referred to the FBI. Source: Library of Congress, New York World-Telegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection.
system in August 1941. The color-coded passes had a black-and-white photograph and were laminated to prevent tampering or alteration. Gold passes, printed by the Wilson Magazine Camera Company of Philadelphia, granted unlimited access to any building and allowed holders to transport official papers between buildings. Second-level passes admitted bearers to all buildings during regular business hours only. A third group of passes were largely for visitors. The visitor’s pass was restricted to prescribed hours and locations, and had to be surrendered upon leaving the building. Department employees and FSOs also had to surrender their pass when they left Department employment, and one’s final paycheck was not disbursed until the pass was surrendered.

During these same years, three developments expanded the scope of security concerns and increased the number of U.S. Government entities involved in security. First, the Roosevelt Administration tried to prevent the confused, overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions that had occurred during World War I. In June 1939, shortly before the war began in Europe, President Roosevelt directed that all investigations of espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage be “controlled and handled” by the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID). The three entities had reached agreement on a definition and delineation of their areas of responsibility. The FBI would handle domestic investigations of U.S. civilians, which included Department of State employees. ONI would oversee personnel, property, and areas under the Navy’s control, and MID would do the personnel, property, and areas under control of the War Department.

President Roosevelt’s directive further defined the FBI’s responsibilities to include investigations of foreign agents and activities at U.S. posts overseas. The FBI was tasked to monitor and investigate subversive and covert agents operating within the United States, and was required to keep the Department of State informed. The FBI also would assume responsibility for an investigation if the Department requested it, which included munitions trafficking cases. In addition, the FBI’s authority included investigations of activities that occurred.

Figure 16: Martin Dies, U.S. Congressional Representative from Texas. Dies chaired the Dies Committee, which investigated ties of U.S. Government employees to Communist-front organizations. The Dies Committee investigation led to the 1939 Hatch Act. The Hatch Act forbade any U.S. Government employee from being a member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of the U.S. Government. Source: Library of Congress, Congressional Portrait Collection.
at U.S. posts overseas. Since the buildings and compounds of U.S. embassies, legations, and consulates are considered U.S. soil, most investigations involving activities or crimes by Department of State employees were to be referred to the FBI.

The second development that expanded the scope of security concerns was the Department’s monitoring the activities of foreign nationals and U.S. citizens. The monitoring had begun as an effort to control the sale and trafficking of munitions. In 1938, the Office of Arms and Munitions Control was renamed the Office of Controls, but in October 1941, it was incorporated into the Office of Foreign Activity Correlation (FC). Focused upon intelligence and surveillance, FC monitored several groups: arms traffickers, Nazi and Fascist agents, Nazi and Fascist party members, Germans and Austrians travelling and relocating to Latin America, foreign military attachés, Japanese immigrants, and Nisei, who were U.S.-born children of Japanese immigrants. FC also monitored U.S. citizens travelling to the Soviet Union, as well as those deemed subversives, saboteurs, or disloyal. In addition, FC monitored the transfer and movement of German, Austrian, and Japanese finances, capital, and patents. FC worked closely with the Passport, Visa, Chief Special Agent, and Commercial Affairs Offices of the Department, as well as the FBI, ONI, MID, the Treasury Department, Immigration, and the Office of Censorship. FC devoted much of its efforts to maintaining information on Germans and to creating a readily accessible information register for other agencies and offices.\(^\text{32}\)

The third development that broadened the range of security concerns was institution of loyalty tests and programs. During the 1930s, Congressional queries about the loyalty of federal employees prompted the House of Representatives, in 1938, to create the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, popularly known as the Dies Committee. Named after Representative Martin Dies of Texas, the Dies Committee revealed that several federal employees had ties to Communist front organizations. Consequently, Congress passed the 1939 Hatch Act, which forbade any federal employee from being a member of a group or organization that advocated the overthrow of the U.S. Government.\(^\text{53}\) In 1940, the Civil Service Commission excluded members of the Communist Party, the German-American Bund, or any other communist or Nazi organization from U.S. Government employment. Then, in 1941, Congress appropriated $100,000 to the FBI for investigations of federal employees alleged to be members of such organizations, and required that the heads of relevant agencies be notified of the investigators’ findings. In April 1942, Attorney General Francis Biddle created an interdepartmental committee to review the reports and address any security concerns.\(^\text{54}\)

FBI investigators determined that many complaints and charges raised during the Congressional inquiries were false, but criticism of the FBI’s investigations emerged. Biddle’s interdepartmental committee determined that the FBI’s efforts were “utterly disproportionate to the resources expended.” Of the nearly 44,000 people ruled ineligible for federal employment between July 1, 1940, and March 31, 1947, 714 individuals (or 1.6 percent) were deemed Communists and 599 persons (1.4 percent) were members of Nazi, Fascist, or Japanese groups (the latter likely referring to ultra-militaristic Japanese groups). Biddle’s committee also found that the whole process...
was too susceptible to causing “broad personal injury” on false grounds. The committee concluded that future loyalty investigations should be restricted to issues “clearly pertinent to the vital problem of internal security.” Although Biddle’s committee raised important questions, it was only the opening round of a larger, longer debate over the backgrounds and past associations of U.S. Government employees, particularly those employed at the Department of State.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Diplomatic Detentions during Wartime}

When the United States entered World War II after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Department of State implemented new protective security measures that accentuated its move toward greater security. On December 8, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull requested that Chief Special Agent Fitch assign a protective detail to him (Hull). Although Hull’s protective detail consisted of one Special Agent, it marked the beginning of the Secretary of State’s protective detail that continues to this day. In early 1942, the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration was formally designated and assumed the responsibilities as the Department’s Security Officer.\textsuperscript{56}

As the German and Japanese armies invaded and occupied several nations, the United States had to close diplomatic and consular posts, and the closing procedure involved several security measures. Department regulations governed this contingency, yet many procedures required time, advance notice, and respect for diplomatic immunities and privileges. If time and travel routes permitted, U.S. Embassy officers were to ship confidential files to Washington or, if conditions permitted, seal and store files in a commercial storage facility. If neither option was possible, files were to be burned. As a post neared its final hours, U.S. officers had to destroy, burn, or damage beyond repair, all seals, stamps, codes, cryptographic devices, confidential files, passports, visas, certificates of naturalization, and certificates of registration and identity. Officers also had to ship the first pages of all blank passports to Washington, as well as a list of all documents they had destroyed. Diplomatic officers were to hand-carry the sensitive

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
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\caption{Secretary of State Cordell Hull escorts Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura (left) and Japanese Special Envoy to the United States Saburo Kurusu (right) to the White House for a meeting on November 17, 1941. Three weeks later, Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor. The day after the attack, Hull requested that he be assigned a protective detail by the State Department’s Chief Special Agent. The detail consisted of one Special Agent, and marked the beginning of the Secretary of State’s protective detail that continues to this day. Source: © Associated Press.}
\end{figure}
Grey Code and M-138 coding devices home. The Department gave all locally employed nationals 30 days leave and terminated employment at the end of the period. Departing U.S. officials would then transfer embassy or consulate affairs, and any sealed items, to the diplomatic representative of the nation that had agreed to serve as the protecting power for the United States. During World War II, that nation was Switzerland.\textsuperscript{57}

Time was the critical element in closing a post, and the case of the U.S. Legation in Bangkok, Thailand, is an example of what can occur when a post lacked adequate notice and time. Legation officials had anticipated a Japanese attack on Bangkok, but the rapid capitulation of Thailand to Japanese forces caught the Legation off-guard. When the Japanese occupied Bangkok, diplomatic protocol and privileges faded. On December 8, 1941, the Thai Foreign Minister informed the U.S. Minister that Thailand had signed an agreement with the Japanese, allowing Japanese forces to pass through the country to attack the British in the latter’s colonies of Burma and Malaysia. That day, U.S. Legation, Consulate, and military attaché personnel raced to burn all codes and confidential documents, and destroy all seals, stamps, and coding equipment.\textsuperscript{58} This proved fortuitous because the following day, Japanese soldiers appeared at the gates of the U.S. Legation compound and denied entry and exit of all persons and communications. On December 10, Japanese soldiers cut the Legation’s telephone lines, entered the compound, pulled out all telephones and the central switchboard, and removed the radios.\textsuperscript{59} Japanese officials then confined Legation personnel, as well as the U.S. citizens who had gathered there, to the compound; however, three American clerks were taken to an internment camp. Japanese officials allowed the U.S. Minister to communicate and conduct affairs through the Swiss Consul, but Japanese and Thai officials closely scrutinized all correspondence. After 6 months, the Japanese repatriated U.S. officials, and Japanese and Thai authorities seized the U.S. compound for military purposes. The Swiss Consul, meanwhile, took custody of the Legation’s and Consulate’s archives.\textsuperscript{60}

Figure 18: Robert L. Bannerman (image ca. 1980). In 1941, Special Agent Bannerman coordinated the detention of more than 1000 Axis diplomats until U.S. officials could negotiate an exchange with the Axis powers. Bannerman made arrangements with resorts in the Appalachian Mountains to house Axis diplomats assigned to Washington. He also coordinated housing and other services for Axis diplomats from Central America and northern South America, and for Japanese diplomats and officials serving in Hawaii. For the Japanese officials from Hawaii, Bannerman housed them at a dude ranch in Arizona. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
In the United States, responsibility for the detention of Axis diplomats fell upon the Office of the Chief Special Agent. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman recalled that the Department of State “had no precedents to work from;” indeed, the 1941 detention of Axis diplomats differed sharply from what had occurred during World War I, when Chief Special Agent Joseph Nye personally escorted the German Ambassador until his departure. In the months preceding U.S. entry into the war, the Department began preparing for the scenario of detaining Axis diplomats. In April 1941, the Division of European Affairs determined that the U.S. Government would take custody of German diplomats in order to protect them from local authorities and harsh treatment. Germany’s diplomats would be guarded in their home or interned at a hotel, the German Embassy would be closed, and its interests turned over to a protecting power, namely Switzerland. At the end of May 1941, Department officials instructed the U.S. Embassy in Berlin to tell German officials that in the event of breaking of relations, German diplomats in the United States would be protected and allowed “every reasonable facility in order to liquidate their personal affairs.” A similar instruction was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Rome a few days later.

After Pearl Harbor, U.S. officials initially allowed Axis diplomats to stay in their homes and have unrestrained access to the Swiss Legation, but later transferred them to resorts in the Appalachian Mountains until the Department of State could arrange for an exchange of diplomats between the United States and the Axis powers. The Germans had transferred U.S. diplomats to a hotel at Bad Nauheim, yet, reports of Japan’s less than hospitable treatment of U.S. diplomats soon reached the Department. Although “his patience was sorely tried,” Secretary Cordell Hull declared that he would not “be drawn into a contest in which he would have to out stink a skunk;” and “there was a limit below which the United States Government would not stoop” in its treatment of enemy diplomats. The Secret Service objected to Axis diplomats staying in Washington,
particularly when British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was scheduled to arrive on December 22. President Roosevelt ordered the Department to “get the Germans out of Washington.” Special Agent Bannerman, working with Stanley Woodward of the Division of Protocol, moved the Germans to the Greenbrier Hotel in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, and the Japanese to the Homestead Hotel in Hot Springs, Virginia. The hotels were chosen because they were large, accessible, secluded, possessed full services, and were largely empty due to the winter off-season. Diplomats from Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania were allowed to stay in Washington, even though their countries had allied with Germany. On January 9, 1942, the U.S. Attorney General objected to their continued presence in the nation’s capital, and they were then taken to the Greenbrier Hotel to join their German counterparts.

The Department paid all expenses for the detainees and the Chief Special Agent’s office, namely Bannerman, assumed management and coordination of the detention effort, which numbered about 1,000 Axis diplomats and their families. At the Homestead and Greenbrier Hotels, the Chief Special Agent’s office arranged for the Immigration Border Patrol to guard the hotels. In early 1942, Axis diplomats in Central and northern South America were transported to New Orleans. The Chief Special Agent’s office obtained hotels in Virginia, North Carolina, and Ohio, as well as two Immigration Service camps in Texas and one camp in New Mexico, to house Axis diplomats from Latin America until arrangements were made for transport to their home countries. Ultimately, the Department of State arranged for an exchange of Axis diplomats for U.S. diplomats. The exchanges occurred in Portugal (for U.S. diplomats in Europe) and Mozambique (for U.S. diplomats in Asia).

The Chief Special Agent’s office also participated in interning some individuals of Japanese ancestry who had been taken into custody in Hawaii, bringing the total number of persons for whom the Chief Special Agent’s office oversaw custody to about 25,000 people. In 1942, the Office of the Chief Special Agent received word that the Navy was bringing all the official Japanese from Honolulu to San Diego, and the office was to detain them in an “isolated” location. Bannerman arranged for the Japanese internees to stay at a dude ranch, located 30 miles north of Dragoon, Arizona, and he placed Special Agent Wells Bailey in charge. While holding the Japanese officials there for a period...

Figure 21: U.S. Officials Process Two Japanese Diplomats. Besides Axis diplomats in Washington, D.C., the Office of the Chief Special Agent was responsible for detaining and housing Japanese consular and other officials from Hawaii. Special Agent Robert L. Bannerman arranged for the Japanese officials to stay at a dude ranch near Dragoon, Arizona, and placed Special Agent Wells Bailey in charge of the operation. In total, the Chief Special Agent’s office oversaw the custody of approximately 25,000 Axis diplomats and officials until the U.S. Government arranged an exchange with the Axis powers. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
of seven months, Arizona state officials inquired--without success--about who was being held at the dude ranch. Although Bannerman did not specifically identify the individuals, they may have been consular, government, and business officials assigned to Honolulu.64

**Stricter Information Controls: Classification, Clearances, and Security Procedures**

During World War II, the U.S. Government standardized the classification of documents and information to ensure control of sensitive material. On September 28, 1942, the Office of War Information (OWI) instituted a new classification system that had three categories: “Secret,” “Confidential,” and “Restricted.” Documents classified as “Secret” had information that “might endanger national security” or “cause serious injury to the Nation or any government activity.” A “Confidential” marking prevented disclosure of information that “would impair the effectiveness of governmental activity in the prosecution of the war.” “Restricted” had a more amorphous definition. It applied to documents that did not meet the requirements for Secret and Confidential, but contained information that, if disclosed, would affect “the expeditious accomplishment of a particular project.” The “Restricted” classification also reflected the need for certain documents to have a wider distribution in order to accomplish the task required. With the new classification system, OWI warned against over-classifying materials. The OWI did not want to restrict unduly the dissemination of information to the public and Congress, because both required information to participate actively and effectively in the prosecution of the war and the democratic process. The OWI strongly implied that U.S. Government officials should err on the side of dissemination rather than restriction.65

The Department of State also employed supplemental special handling terms beyond the OWI’s classification levels. Airgrams, which the Department introduced on a widespread basis in 1942, employed the terms “Plain” (unclassified), “Confidential,” and “Strictly Confidential” for classification of their content. In April 1943, the Department substituted “Secret” for “Strictly Confidential,” bringing its classifications in line with the OWI system.66

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*Figure 22: Works Progress Administration Poster “Keep Mum: Loose Talk Costs Lives.” During World War II, the U.S. Government enacted many new measures to prevent the loss of key or classified information to the enemy. Posters such as the one above reminded employees of the dangers of “loose talk.” The posters’ encouragement to observe security had an added benefit, aiding the institution of a new classification system. In 1942, the U.S. Government had instituted a new classification system for documents, the system currently in use. Initially, the categories were Secret, Confidential, and Restricted, but in 1944, the category Top Secret was added, and Restricted later became Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU). Source: Library of Congress, Work Projects Administration Poster Collection.*
During the war, the United States and Great Britain shared significant amounts of information, prompting the British and Americans to conclude the Combined Security Classification Agreement of March 13, 1944. Titled “Change No. 1,” this agreement amended the earlier classification system by adding a fourth level of classification known as “Top Secret.” Information placed in this category was to be considered “paramount” to national security, and it was to be used only in cases when “unauthorized disclosure would cause exceptionally grave danger to the nation.” The OWI once again cautioned against over-classifying documents, insisting that “Top Secret” documents “will be kept to a minimum.”

Within eight weeks, the joint British-American information control system fell into disarray. Department and Foreign Service officers (“old hands” as well as newcomers) applied multiple standards in classifying documents. Some officers implemented a less stringent standard, resulting in secret information being disseminated to the public. Meanwhile, other officers classified too liberally, overburdening the couriers. Secretary of State Hull responded by reorganizing the classification system. He delineated five categories of document classification: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, Restricted, and Unrestricted, and then defined the handling requirements of each. “Top Secret” and “Secret” documents required transport by diplomatic courier, and under no circumstances could they be sent by registered mail. “Confidential” marked items were to be sent via mail sacks on Army or Navy planes or American commercial airplanes. The final two classifications, “Restricted” and “Unrestricted,” could be transmitted like “Confidential” materials, or in mail sacks carried by U.S. or foreign postal services.

Four months later, the Department supplemented this reorganized classification system by formally incorporating several informal handling restrictions. These included “For the Secretary,” “For the Ambassador,” and “For the Chief of Mission,” as well as “For Department Use Only.” Again Foreign Service Officers too eagerly employed the latter restriction, making it difficult to share needed information with other departments and agencies. Secretary Hull then created the term “For Limited Distribution” as a substitute for the great majority of instances in which Foreign Service Officers were using “For Department Use Only.”

The new classification system supplemented the procedures for the processing and transmission of documents already in existence. Ordinarily, a telegram had to receive at least three signatures, and many times five, in order to clear it for transmission. Former Ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot admitted that it generally took the better part of a day to get the necessary clearances on a telegram. For many, the process of obtaining clearances may have seemed burdensome, particularly when the telegram addressed a mundane, unclassified topic, and/or if the message had to be sent quickly. After retirement, Cabot confessed how he resolved this situation: “I would wait till almost five o’clock, when everyone was frantically rushing to clear his desk, and then barge into the necessary offices, telegram in hand. No one under these circumstances was in a mood to argue, and it was amazing how many initials I could get on a telegram in fifteen minutes.”
The transport and handling of documents abroad continued to be a serious security concern for Department officials. The Department admonished overseas posts to take every precaution to safeguard classified information and to report immediately and in detail any suspicious activity, which was promptly investigated. In 1943, the Embassy in Tehran received four Department letters as “loose mail,” each containing “highly confidential” material. One had confidential codes, and another held a highly classified memorandum that detailed U.S. policy toward Iran and discussed potential threats to the region. More worrisome, the letter containing the policy memorandum had been opened and resealed. Since the Army Courier Service transported the Department’s mail to Tehran (via airplane), the Department of State asked the War Department to investigate. The ensuing investigation suggested poor handling rather than espionage.72

The Department’s anxieties over security also applied to telephone conversations. The Department received a report that the Germans had implanted listening devices in many hotel bedrooms in Spain and Portugal. In another instance, Department officials learned that the Argentine Government was well informed about the U.S. Embassy’s communications with Washington. After an investigation of mail transport to and from Buenos Aires, officials determined that the Argentines were “listening in” on the U.S. Embassy’s telephone lines.73

By 1944, the Department of State believed that German and Japanese agents in neutral countries had intensified their efforts to obtain Allied information. It instructed posts to review their security measures, and investigate the associations of all post personnel “down to the lowliest members.”74 Shortly after the instruction, the U.S. Vice Consul in Arica, Chile, discovered that his janitor was selling the Consulate’s trash to the local chief of Investigaciones (Chile’s counterpart to the FBI), who was known to have contacts with German and Japanese agents. One document in the trash identified U.S. Navy codes but did not contain enough information to permit decoding of messages. The 17-year-old janitor was promptly fired. The Consulate later learned that the chief probably gave the documents to his superiors in order to improve his chances for promotion, rather than passing them to Axis agents.75
Liberation and Security Problems

As the number of Allied military victories increased during 1944, U.S. and Allied forces began to liberate nations held by the Axis powers. U.S. and British forces occupied Italy in 1944; and following the June 1944 D-Day invasion of continental Europe, they liberated Paris in August. On the eastern front, Soviet forces moved into Poland in July 1944 and began to occupy other countries in Eastern Europe as well.

In the wake of advancing Allied armies, the Department of State reopened posts that had been under the care of local custodians. During the war, the premises of U.S. posts were entrusted to one or two custodians selected by Department officials at the time of closure. Washington generally preferred a Foreign Service Officer; however, neither the Germans nor the Italians would allow a U.S. citizen to remain. The custodian’s task, therefore, passed to trusted local employees. Technically the custodians were employees of the protecting country (primarily Switzerland in Europe), but the custodians often lived on the property and received a salary from the Department of State (transferred through the protecting power). Custodial duties included care and maintenance of the property, as well as ensuring that local authorities did not enter the premises, use the facilities, or remove U.S. Government property. Custodians could not conduct any embassy or consular activity, nor allow use of the building as a meeting place for Americans or other persons. U.S. officials did not expect custodians to sacrifice their lives in fulfilling these duties.76

The task of reopening a U.S. Embassy was not an easy one. In the case of the U.S. Embassy in Paris, even though the Germans had not damaged the building or its contents, the tasks remained difficult. Foreign Service Officers re-supplied the post with stamps, seals, blank passports and certificates, and other items ordered from temporary stocks at U.S. posts in Lisbon or Naples. All safe combinations had to be changed, and Washington required the embassy to reinvestigate local employees before

reopening a post were more acute in Eastern Europe and Berlin, particularly after
the collapse of Germany in May 1945. Invading Soviet officials refused to recognize the custodian status of
the United States’ 18 custodian in eastern Germany and Poland, and summarily arrested them. Ambassador Averell
Harriman and Deputy Chief of Mission George F. Kennan of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow determined that
the NKVD (Soviet Secret Police) suspected the 18 custodians of being U.S. spies and had sent them and their
families to Soviet work camps. Soviet refusal to recognize standard diplomatic practices or even to acknowledge
the issue infuriated U.S. officials. Kennan insisted that the United States had a moral responsibility to obtain the
custodians’ release; meanwhile, others insisted that the Department had a moral obligation to reemploy those who
had so faithfully served the United States at their own sacrifice and degradation. U.S. and Swiss diplomats in
Moscow pressed Kremlin officials to release the 18 custodians and their families. The Swiss believed they had a
moral responsibility to do so because Switzerland had served as the protecting power for U.S. interests during the
war. The Soviets released the custodians, but only after many had labored in the work camps for periods of one to
four years. While in Soviet captivity, one former custodian died, one was raped, and another taken away and not
heard from again. The custodian of the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw was repatriated to Poland. U.S. officials brought
him to the United States, but the Embassy lost contact with his wife and daughter when Polish Communist
officials moved them to another city.

Toward a Postwar Security Program

As World War II drew to a close, many senior U.S. officials, including those at the Department of State, wanted
to continue wartime security measures after the war. The Bureau of the Budget (BoB)—predecessor to the Office of
Management and Budget—proposed creating an interdepartmental entity to coordinate government security. Reviewing
the interagency cooperation agreement between the FBI, ONI, and MID, BoB officials concluded that coordination
between the three was “inadequate.” The three agencies had not created a coordinating committee, had not appointed
a chairman to oversee coordination, nor had they delegated authority to coordinate efforts. The BoB found “frequent
triplication, overlap, friction, and some interference with the proper development of certain cases,” and that the three
simply defined spheres “to minimize actual conflict.” The BoB refused to call the inter-agency entity a “committee,”
arguing that the committee approach did not work, and claimed that a “security czar” was “impracticable” because he
would encounter “insurmountable problems” with what some would view as infringements upon their authority. The
Bureau of the Budget insisted that the U.S. Government needed a group to develop a government-wide security plan,
and that the group should be given proper authority and responsibility to undertake such a task. In essence, the BoB-
proposed group anticipated the outlines of a bureau of government security.  

In 1944, at the suggestion of Secretary Hull, the State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee (SNWCC) was formed to coordinate postwar diplomatic and defense issues. As part of its efforts, SNWCC developed a comprehensive security program for the Department of State. SNWCC proposed publishing departmental security rules, written in the style of U.S. Army and Navy regulations, and appointing “Division Security Officers” to enforce regulations. The committee believed that this would institutionalize security measures. The SNWCC also recommended that Department employees internalize security awareness and modify their daily behavior so that personal censorship became “habitual for the majority of people.” SNWCC envisioned a publicity campaign that included memoranda, instructions, cartoons, and slogans in order to encourage Department employees to follow security procedures. The committee also supported the Department’s decision to create the Division of Cryptology within the Office of Communications. Department officials hoped that an in-house, specialized group of cryptographers could develop more complex, less vulnerable codes.

**Conclusion**

As World War II approached its final stages in late 1944, security was “on everyone’s lips.” The Department of State, and the U.S. Government as a whole, was considering how to improve security further. While significant strides had been made in security during the war, U.S. officials found that security as a function was scattered across multiple offices and divisions; moreover, there had been little coordination among the various entities. Department officials favored centralizing diplomatic security responsibilities into a single entity. That single entity would appear in 1945, and it would be done through the efforts of Robert L. Bannerman, not Thomas Fitch and the Office of the Chief Special Agent.
Endnotes

1 NKVD stands for Narodny Kommisariat Vnutrennikh Del, and KGB for Komitet Gosudarstvenny Bezopasnosti.


13 Summers, Outline of the Functions of the Offices of the Department of State, 155-156. Departmental Announcement 115 “Assignment of Responsibility for Intelligence and Security Functions,” 27 August 1948; and Memorandum “Distribution of FC Functions,” Fischer Howe, Deputy Director for the Office of Intelligence and Research, to Charles M. Hulten, Director of the Office of the Executive Secretariat, Stanley T. Orear, Chief of Division of Organization and Budget, and Samuel D. Boykin, Director of Office of Controls, 3 September 1948; both Folder – Survey of Office of Foreign Activity Correlation, Box 13, SF 1932-63, A/SY/Evaluations, RG 59 – Lot 96D584, NA.


18 Oral History Interview, Robert L. Bannerman, State Magazine (November 1991), 46.


20 Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 144-268.
For detention of U.S. Couriers in Nazi-occupied Norway, see Despatch 656 “Attack at Kristiansand, Norway on Legation’s Couriers,” Raymond E. Cox, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, U.S. Legation Oslo, to Department of State, 27 May 1940, FW 121.67/1352, Folder – 121.65, Box 280, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Davis to Long, 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 ½.

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Memorandum, Davis to Long, 3 June 1940, 051.01/547 1/2. Letter, Edwin C. Wilson to Claude G. Bowers, U.S. Ambassador to Chile, 17 July 1941, 1941 Volume IV: 110 – 121 Couriers, General Records of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, Chile, Record Group 84, NA. Memorandum “Notice to United States Government Agencies Forwarding Telegram through the Department of State,” Department of State, 16 September 1942, enclosed with Memorandum “Use of Airgrams by Representatives of Other Government Departments and Agencies Abroad,” Long to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 23 October 1942, Folder – 124.066/Airgrams, Box 661, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum Regarding Microfilms, n.d. [early December 1942], enclosed with Circular, G. Howland Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 8 December 1942, attached to Memorandum, David A. Salmon to James B. Pilcher, 19 April 1943, Folder – 124.0064/221 – 12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum “Notice to United States Government Agencies Forwarding Telegram through the Department of State,” Department of State, 16 September 1942.

Letter, Capt. A.D. Struble, US Navy, to Secretary of State, 23 March 1943; and Letter, Davis, Foreign Service Administration, to U-L, 29 April 1943, 051, Box 34, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NARA. According to courier lore, couriers were physically handcuffed to their road bags until the Lisbon crash. Since the aircraft crashed at sea, the pouch dragged the courier under water because he was unable to release the handcuff quick enough. Carl E. Lovett, Jr., “The Diplomatic Courier Service,” SY Focus, 3/1 (February 1977): 14.

Telegram 711, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 16 May 1940, 124.512/1050, Folder – 124.512/1049 – 7-644, Box 723; Telegram 1108, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 9 June 1940, 124.516/274, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Telegram 1138, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 10 June 1940, 124.516/275, Folder – 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Despatch 6711 “Further Destruction of Codes and Cipher Tables,” Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 8 July 1940, 124.516/319, Folder 124.516/263-330, Box 726; Telegram 1142, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 11 June 1940, 124.516/277, attached to Memorandum, de Wolf (unreadable) to PA/D, EU, SD, and A-L, 12 June 1940, Folder – 124.516/263 – 330, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 17, Bullitt to Secretary of State, 4 July 1940, 124.51/154; Telegram 992, Matthews to Secretary of State, 1 October 1940; and Memorandum of Conversation, James Clement Dunn with Herr Hans Thomsen, Chargé d’Affaires, 8 October 1940, 124.51/178; all Folder 124.51/126-179, Box 722, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 1384, Barnes (Paris) to Secretary of State, 24 October 1940, 124.516/334; and Telegram 818, Matthews (Vichy) to Secretary of State, 25 October 1940, 124.516/335; Telegram 579, Leahy (Paris via Vichy) to Secretary of State, 20 February 1941, 124.516/345; and Memorandum, Reber to Atherton and Summers[,] (M. P. Davis), 21 February 1940, FW 124.516/345, attached to Telegram 584, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Vichy France, 21 February 1940, 124.516/345; all Folder – 124.516/331-386, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Memorandum, Beam, 10 April 1941, FW 124.516/356; and Memorandum, Philip W. Bonsal to Lawrence Duggan, 14 April 1941, both attached to Telegram 1266, Morris (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 4 April 1941, 124.516/356, Folder – 124.516/331-368, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 4283, Kirk (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 10 October 1940, 124.51/177, Folder 124.51/126-179, Box 722; Instruction, Breckinridge Long to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, 14 June 1940, 124.02/1321A, attached to
Memorandum, Nathaniel P. Davis to C. R., 15 June 1940, Folder – 124.02/664 – 1406B, Box 649; Instruction “International Telephone Conversations,” Shaw to American Diplomatic Officers, 8 September 1942, 124.06/330A, Folder – 124.06/300-350D, Box 659; and Instruction, Shaw to All Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 26 January 1943, 124.06/359B, Folder – 124.06/351 – 399½, Box 660; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

For Darlan’s comment, see Despatch 264 “Transmitting Copy of a Strictly Confidential Office Memorandum Cautioning the Utmost Discretion in Conversations,” H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Vichy, to Department of State, 27 June 1941, Folder – 124.516/369-408, Box 727, D 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For concerns about wiretapping, see Instruction “Wiretapping,” Breckinridge Long to Certain American Diplomatic Officers, 14 June 1940, 124.02/1321A, Folder – 124.02/664—1406B, Box 649; Despatch 6893 “Steps Taken to Prevent Wiretapping American Embassy, Paris,” Maynard B. Barnes, First Secretary, U.S. Embassy Paris, to Department of State, 9 September 1940, 124.512/1076, Folder 124.512/1049—7-644, Box 723; Telegram 294 Phillips, U.S. Embassy Rome, to Secretary of State, 1 March 1941, 124.65/95, Folder 124.65/79—12-444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Dunn’s work, see Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 7 November 1941, 124.65/99, Folder – 124.65/79—12-444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 1961 “Censorship of Correspondence of Embassy and of Consulates in Italy,” Edward L. Reed, Chargé ad Interim, to Secretary of State, 14 August 1940, 124.656/115, Folder – 124.656/110A-168, Box 766; and Despatch 1960 “Censorship of Correspondence of Embassy and Consulates in Italy,” 10 August 1940, 124.656/117, Folder – 124.656/110A-168, Box 766; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Memorandum, Nathaniel P. Davis to Atherton, 24 February 1940, FW 124.516/34; and Telegram 584, Secretary of State to U.S. Embassy Vichy, 21 February 1940, 124.516/34; and Telegram 876, Morris (Berlin) to Secretary of State, 7 March 1941; both Folder – 124-516/331-368, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Despatch 4539, Leland Morris, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (Berlin), to Secretary of State, 27 February 1941, 124.06/248, Folder – 124.06/232, Folders – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; Despatch 4788 “Work on Codes and Confidential Files at Athens and Salonika,” Lincoln MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1941, 124.06/249, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659; Despatch 2348 “Submitting Information on Manner of Handling Codes and Confidential Files,” Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

N.B. These guards and watchmen were not Marine Security Guards or military personnel. The Marine Security Guard program did not begin until 1948, and military personnel were not used. Most guards were either contracted U.S. citizens (largely male) or trusted local nationals. The night watchmen were usually trusted local nationals.

Report, W. E. DeCourcy to Shaw, Davis, Erhardt, and Salmon, 23 May 1941, 124.06/267, attached to Note, Davis to D.C.R., 2 June 1941, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For specific embassies and consulates, see Telegram 586, Johnson (London) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/232, Folder – 124.06/254 – 299A, Box 659; Despatch 62 “Maintenance of Codes and Confidential Files at Vichy and Lyon,” 1 March 1941, 124.06/251, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659; Telegraph 120, Gunther (Bucharest) to Secretary of State, 7 February 1941, 124.06/222, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; Memorandum, DeCourcy, 23 July 1941, FW 124.06/244, Folder 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; Memorandum “Handling of Confidential Codes and Correspondence,” n.d., enclosed with Despatch 4539, Leland Morris, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim (Berlin), to Secretary of State, 27 February 1941, 124.06/248, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; Despatch 4788 “Work on Codes and Confidential Files at Athens and Salonika,” Lincoln MacVeagh (Athens) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1941, 124.06/249, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659; Despatch 2348 “Submitting Information on Manner of Handling Codes and Confidential Files,” Bert Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253, Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

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State, 18 February 1941, 124.06/249; Despatch 2348, Fish (Cairo) to Secretary of State, 15 February 1941, 124.06/253.

38 Memorandum, G. Howland Shaw to Jeff Bridges, 3 February 1942, 124.163/143A, Folder – 124.163/118 – 196; Memorandum, Shaw to John Williams Hunter, 7 August 1942, 124.163, Folder – 124.163/118 196; and Travel Order 5-2349, Shaw to William F. Ellis, 24 November 1944, Folder 124.163/197 – 12-1544; all Box 669, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

39 Despatch 276 “Personnel of the Legation (Combined Office) at San Salvador,” Walter Thurston, U.S. Ambassador, to Secretary of State, 13 April 1943, 124.163/202, Folder 124.163/197 – 12-1544, Box 669; and Telegram 1024, Dreyfus (Tehran) to Secretary of State, 26 October 1943, 124.911/233, Folder – 124.911/233 – 255B, Box 780; both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

40 Shaw to Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, 26 December 1941, 124.018/8A; and Knox to Secretary of State, 8 January 1942, 124.018/9; both Folder –124.018/1 – 10-244, Box 649, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. The Navy investigated retired Coast Guardsmen interested in serving as guards and provided the Department with a list of 114 names. Knox to Hull, 18 February 1942, 124.018/10, Folder 124.018/1 – 10-244, Box 649, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For local police arrangements, see Despatch 847 “Reclassification of Government Employee in Ambassador’s Leased Official Residence,” Thurston to Secretary of State, 12 October 1943, 124.163/229, Folder – 124.163/197 – 12-1544, Box 669, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.


42 Circular Instruction “Investigational Activities of Alien Clerks,” [Indecipherable] to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 4 January 1940, 124.06/195A, Folder 124.06/195A-253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Italy, see Hull to Knox, 15 March 1941, 124.65/96A, Folder 124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 764; and Telegram, Secretary of State (Adolf A. Berle, Jr.) to All Diplomatic Officers, 25 May 1944, 124.06/443A, Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660; both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

43 Despatch 788, H. Freeman Matthews, First Secretary of Embassy (Paris) to Secretary of State, 21 October 1940, 124.513/1426, Folder – 124.513/1425—1452, Box 724, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

44 Despatch 264 “Transmitting copy of a Strictly Confidential Office Memorandum Cautioning the Utmost Discretion in Conversations,” Matthews, 27 June 1941, 124.516/376, Folder – 124.516/369-408, Box 727; and Telegram 737, Secretary of State (Shaw) to U.S. Embassy Vichy, 29 September 1941, 124.513/1638A, Folder – 124.513/1621—1644, Box 724; both DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

45 Goliewsky, after four years at the Compiegne concentration camp, was released, and even though he was 67 years old and “to a large extent broken physically,” the U.S. Consulate recommended re-employing him in order to provide him a “small pension.” See Despatch 35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, Counselor of Embassy, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-1444, Box 726, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

46 Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Robert D. Murphy, Counselor of Embassy (Paris) to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940, 124.513/1323, Folder – 124.513/1304 – 1363, Box 723, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. Affidavit, Tatiana Stcherbina, 17 April 1940, enclosed with Despatch 6368 “Irregularities in the Issuance of Certain Visas,” Murphy to Secretary of State, 15 April 1940. Also enclosed with Despatch 6368 was a summary of each of the twelve who obtained fraudulent visas.
47 This suggests that Stcherbina knew more about events than she is letting on in her affidavit.


51 Memorandum, The President to the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Commerce, 26 June 1939; and Memorandum of Understanding between the War Department, Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 5 June 1940; both attached to Draft of Interdepartmental Agreement on Security, 23 October 1944, Bureau of the Budget, 23 October 1944, Folder – Post-War Intelligence Plans I, Box 1, Intelligence Files 1942-1951, Records of the Bureau of Administration/Office of Security, RG 59-Lot, NA. For inviolability of diplomatic premises, see Eileen Denza, Diplomatic Law: A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Second edition (New York: Oxford University Press for Clarendon Press, 1998), 113-117.


57 Instruction 102, G. Howland Shaw to Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., U.S. Minister to Iran, 21 May 1942, 124.91/87A, Folder – 124.91/80 – 12-2144, Box 780; Telegram 602, Shaw to U.S. Legation Cairo, 23 June 1942, 124.83/86A, Folder –
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124.83/85 – 12-1544, Box 773; Telegram 419, Shaw to U.S. Embassy Rome, 17 June 1941, 124.65/100A, Folder – 124.65/79 – 12-444, Box 764; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.


60 “Narrative Account,” U.S. Legation Bangkok, 19 August 1942, pp. 7-10. Telegram 3161, Harrison in Bern to Secretary of State, 7 July 1942, 124.92/225; and Telegram 3696, Harrison in Bern to Secretary of State, 11 August 1942, 124.921/231; both Folder – 124.921/186 ½ – 234, Box 783, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.


64 Bannerman, “June 1941 to June 21, 1945 (Parts D and E),” 3.

65 Memorandum, Elmer Davis (OWI) to Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 28 September 1942; and Memorandum “OWI Regulation No. 4,” OWI, 28 September 1942; both enclosed with Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

66 Memorandum, Department of State, 16 September 1942, enclosed with Memorandum, “Use of Airgrams by Representatives of Other Government Departments and Agencies Abroad,” Long to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 23 October 1942, 124.066 Airgrams/10A; and Airgram, Secretary of State to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 26 April 1943, 124.066/Airgrams/34A; both Folder – 124.066/Airgrams, Box 661, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

67 Capitalization in the original. Memorandum, Edward Klauber (OWI) to Heads of All Departments and Agencies, 13 March 1944; and Memorandum “Change No. 1 to OWI Regulation No. 4,” OWI, 15 March 1944; both enclosed with Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944.

68 Memorandum “Security Classifications and Routing Procedure of Diplomatic Pouch Mail,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 16 May 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

69 Memorandum “Use of Modifying Phrases with Security Classifications,” Shaw to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 4 August 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

70 Memorandum “Use of Phrase ‘For Department Use Only’,” Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 27 December 1944, Folder – 124.0064/221-12-2744, Box 648, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.
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72 Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, to Kildroy P. Aldrich, Chief Post Office Inspector, 4 June 1940, 124.06/205B, Folder – 124.06/195A-253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. Telegram 328, Dreyfus to Secretary of State, 30 March 1943, 124.916/154; and Memorandum “Delivery of Material from Department of State Air Pouch No. 2199,” David McK. Key, Assistant Liaison Officer, to Major Julius A. Pate, Department of War, 14 April 1943, 124.916/154; both Folder – 124.916/126—12-2344, Box 782, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

73 For listening devices, see Telegram, Secretary of State (Berle) to all Diplomatic Officers, May 25, 1944, 124.06/443A, Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660, DF 1940-1944, RG 59, NA. For the Argentine incident, see J. P. Tuck to Laurence Duggan, Chief of Division of the American Republics, 20 February 1940, 124.06/207, Folder – 124.06/195A-253; Memorandum, L. C. Frank to Long, 10 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, to Long, 6 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; and J. M. Clarke to Frank, 22 May 1940, enclosed with Tuck to Duggan; all Folder – 124.06/195A – 253, Box 659, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

74 Circular telegram, Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Officers, 25 May 1944, 124.06/443A; and Telegram 169, Secretary of State (Berle) to Chief of Mission Stockholm, 27 January 1944, 124.06/408A, attached to Memorandum, George A. Gordon to Berle and Dunn, 27 January 1944; both Folder – 124.06/400-453C, Box 660, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

75 Despatch 10360 “Dismissal of Abel D. Solano, Messenger-Janitor in the Consulate at Arica,” Bowers to Secretary of State, 1 August 1944, 124.253/8-144; and Report of the Legal Attaché “César Gacitua Vergara alias ‘Cafaz,’” R.L.M., 26 July 1944, enclosed with Despatch 10360, Folder – 124.253/8-144, Box 686, DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

76 Memorandum “To Custodians of American Government Property in Germany and Occupied Territories,” George F. Kennan, First Secretary of U.S. Embassy Berlin, 20 October 1941, enclosed with Despatch 5940, Kennan to Secretary of State, 22 October 1941, 124.01/971, Folder – 124.01/954 – 12-2744, Box 648; Telegram 7306, Winant (Reber) to Dunn, 7 September 1944, 124.511/9-744, attached to Memorandum, Frank to Kreis, 7 October 1944, Folder – 124.511/542 – 12-2744, Box 723; Telegram 1915, Wadsworth (Rome) to Secretary of State, 8 December 1941, 124.65/106, Folder – 124.65/79 – 12-444; Telegram 24, Wadsworth (Rome) to Secretary of State, 17 January 1942, 124.653/538, Folder – 124.653/535 – 570, Box 765; Telegram, Leahy (Vichy) to Secretary of State, 8 July 1941, 124.513/1555, Folder – 124.513/1549 – 1579, Box 724; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

77 Telegram 7306, Winant (Reber), U.S. Embassy Paris, to Secretary of State, 7 September 1944, 124.511/9-744, attached to Memorandum, Frank to Kreis, 7 October 1944, Folder – 124.511/542 – 12-2744, Box 723; Instruction “Reopening in Liberated Areas of Offices Closed on Account of the War,” 9 June 1944, 124/74A, Folder 124/61 – 8-144, Box 648; Despatch 35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, Counselor of Embassy Paris, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; Despatch 35 “Decision Requested Relative to Employment of Former Employees,” Hugh S. Fullerton, Counselor of Embassy Paris, to Secretary of State, 26 October 1944, 124.513/10-2644, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA. For Embassy requests for more code clerks, see Telegram 212, Chapin to Secretary of State, 10 October 1944, 124.513/10-1044, Folder – 124.513/3-2144 – 11-144, Box 726; all DF 1940-44, RG 59, NA.

Aide Memoire 3053, C. H. Owsley, U.S. Minister to Switzerland, to the Federal Political Department of Switzerland, 14 June 1948, attached to Telegram 1455, Smith, to Secretary of State, 29 June 1948, Folder [3], Box 1166; Airgram A-241, Kennan to Secretary of State, 21 September 1945, 124.623/9-2145, Folder [2], Box 1166; and “Report of Our Arrest by the Soviets and Our Internment in Russia,” Willy Strube, 13 January 1949, enclosed with Despatch 1677 “Release by Soviets of German Employees… ,” Lane to Department of State, 2 March 1949, 124.623/3-249, Folder [4], Box 1165; and Telegram 70, Murphy to Secretary of State, 12 January 1949, 124.623/1-1249, Folder [4], Box 1165; all DF 1945-49, RG 59, NA.


Chapter 15: Communications – Cryptographic Security and Coordination and Review, Records of the War Histories Branch, Box 2, RG 59 – Lot Files, Entry 714, NA. Cryptographic experts Commander Lee W. Parke of the U.S. Navy and Major James Moak of the U.S. Army had been detailed to the State Department at the Secretary's request and were assigned to Assistant Secretary Shaw's office to assist in the organization and management of the cryptographic unit and the general security program.

Memorandum, Commander Parke to Mr. Shaw, 13 May 1944, Samuel Boykin Files, Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 53D223, NA. Chapter 15: Communications – Cryptographic Security and Coordination and Review, Box 2, Records of the War Histories Branch, RG 59 – Lot Files, Entry 714, NA.

