CHAPTER 5

SPIES, LEAKS, BUGS, AND DIPLOMATS
Diplomatic Security in the 1960s

The early 1960s proved to be a difficult time for the Office of Security (SY) because it faced new challenges and expanded responsibilities. Cold War security threats and Congress’s concern about security risks in the Department of State continued. The discovery of two networks of microphones in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw manifested the growing impact technology was exerting on U.S. diplomatic security. The sharp rise in official visits to the United States by foreign heads of state forced SY to reconsider how it conducted protective security details—particularly after the adoption of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which stated that the host country bore responsibility “to take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack.” SY also suffered public embarrassment by an internal struggle over security clearances (the Otto Otepka case); but it garnered praise for its efforts in coordinating the protection of more than 20 heads of state for President John F. Kennedy’s funeral.

The amalgam of spies, leaks, bugs, and protective details stretched and challenged SY and Departmental resources in ensuring diplomatic security. The Irvin Scarbeck case demonstrated the Communist bloc’s commitment to recruiting U.S. citizens as spies. The Otto F. Otepka case found a senior SY officer leaking documents to a Congressional committee, but it brought an end to the debate over security risks that had plagued the Department since the 1945 Amerasia case. Discoveries of networks of “bugs” (listening devices) in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and

Figure 1: Office of Security Special Agent James McDermott (center right, striped necktie) provides protection for Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India (left, white cap). Nehru arrives in New York City on September 25, 1960, to attend the United Nations General Assembly. Indian Foreign Minister V. Krishna Menon (center with cane) escorts the Prime Minister. Source: United Press International.
Warsaw, as well as shortcomings in the Department of State’s communications system during the Cuban Missile Crisis, forced the Department to explore and use new technologies. The Department introduced computers to its communications system, and drew upon British counterintelligence technology. Moreover, it added a detail of Navy Seabees to find existing listening devices and prevent Soviet bloc workmen from installing them in U.S. embassies. By 1964, beset by several challenges to diplomatic security, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration William Crockett recruited G. Marvin Gentile to reorganize and guide SY so that it could fulfill the Department’s expanding demands for security.²

Security in the Spotlight


Tired of the Soviets’ bluster and accusations, Ambassador Lodge unveiled to the Security Council (and the press) the Great Seal listening device that SY’s Joseph Bezjian had found in 1952. Lodge explained how the Soviets had hidden the listening device in a woodcarving, gifted to U.S. Ambassador Harriman in 1945 by the Soviets. Lodge also presented the bug and described how it operated. Moreover, Lodge announced that the United States had found “more than 100 concealed listening devices in [U.S.] embassies and residences” in recent years in Soviet bloc nations. Although the Soviets later denied Lodge’s charges as having “complete groundlessness,” the embarrassment and damage were done. The Soviet resolution against the United States was defeated seven votes to two, with only Poland voting with the Soviets.⁴
The public unveiling of the Great Seal device highlighted SY’s impressive success in technical security. Between 1948 and 1961, SY engineers discovered more than 95 percent of all listening devices found by all U.S. Government agencies. While SY had one technical engineer in 1948, by 1961 it had 15.5 During the fall of 1960, the intelligence community briefed Director of Security William O. Boswell and several senior SY officers on technical threats that SY engineers would face in the future. What was shown to Boswell and the others is not clear, but the briefing left SY officials stunned and unnerved. Immediately afterwards, Boswell sought and obtained approval from the Department and the Bureau of the Budget to request an additional 44 technical engineers and $500,000 for the research and development of technical equipment in SY’s fiscal year 1962 budget. Congress increased the research and development funding to $1 million, but approved only about 20 technical engineer positions. Nonetheless, the one briefing led to a doubling of the number of technical engineers and dramatically increased SY’s funding.6

Less than a year after Ambassador Lodge displayed the Great Seal, SY discovered a spy at the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw. Irvin C. Scarbeck managed travel arrangements, living quarters, and property for the Embassy. Married with three children, Scarbeck had an affair with a young Polish woman, and Polish intelligence blackmailed him into providing them with information about U.S. policy. The Embassy’s security officer, Special Agent Victor Dikeos, discovered Scarbeck’s activities. While SY and the FBI developed the case against Scarbeck, the Department extended Scarbeck’s tour in Warsaw. The Department then recalled him to Washington, and upon his arrival, Scarbeck was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison.7

Also in 1961, the United Nations’ Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was signed, resolving several issues regarding diplomatic privileges that had emerged during the 1950s, most notably involving diplomatic pouches and baggage. Diplomatic legal scholar Eileen Denza describes the 1961 Convention as the first “comprehensive formulation of the rules of modern diplomatic

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“law” in nearly 200 years. Among other facets of diplomatic representation and relations, the Convention defined what constituted a diplomatic bag, what that bag might carry, and how to proceed with a suspect bag. The Vienna Convention also defined diplomatic immunities for diplomats and couriers, the inviolability of mission premises, and the responsibilities of the host state to the mission. The Convention not only helped to improve diplomatic security, but also provided a basis for reconciling diplomatic disagreements over security. As the Convention’s preamble states, the purpose of such privileges and immunities (and of the Convention itself) was “not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States.”

Also, in 1961, the Department of State instituted a new identification card system that coincided with the opening of the new wing of the Department’s building. The new ID cards were intended to help resolve the problem of nearly 2,000 ID cards that had been lost, misplaced, or destroyed since SY had begun issuing them in 1949. The new ID cards differed from the older ID card in that they had a color photograph of the officer or employee and were laminated with a thin plastic film.

**Administrative Reforms**

During the 1960s, SY experienced several administrative reforms. Perhaps the most significant was the rotation of SY personnel between domestic and overseas assignments. William Boswell, who became Director of SY in August 1958, found SY divided between those who continually served
overseas and those who constantly remained in Washington. Boswell erased the division by initiating the rotation of SY agents between overseas and domestic posts.¹⁰

Also, SY’s Intelligence Reporting Branch (IRB), which had emerged in the 1950s, faced an increasing workload. Working with other agencies, the IRB gathered information on threats or illegal activity. The information included threats to the Secretary and foreign dignitaries, passport and visa fraud, activities of diplomatic representatives or aliens in the United States, covert or illegal activities of Department personnel, crank calls, and threats to the Department’s main building (Main State) or Department annexes. Although 90 percent of reports received came from the FBI regarding domestic threats, the IRB also worked with the Department’s Area Desks on intelligence or threats to U.S. posts or diplomatic personnel. By 1961, IRB processed about 30,000 reports per year.¹¹

In 1961, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration William J. Crockett initiated a series of reforms to modernize the organization and administration of the Department of State. Popularly known as the “Crockett Reforms,” these recommendations drew upon innovations in corporate organization, and sought to reduce the Department’s “highly structured, multi-layered bureaucracy.” Crockett later recalled that he wanted to create “independent operators” who “really had the authority to run an operation,” and “make that operation more effective.” One of Crockett’s recommendations was moving SY from the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) to the Bureau of Administration. In his opinion, SY’s activities “more closely resembled” those of Administration offices such as Personnel, and “good management” suggested bringing similar offices together. Implementation of this recommendation, however, was delayed.¹²

In the meantime, the new Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA), Salvatore Bontempo, proposed a major reorganization of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, which involved turning over several SY responsibilities to other agencies. His proposal included transferring personnel investigations and evaluations to the
Civil Service Commission, technical security counter-measures to the FBI, and moving IRB to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Whether Bontempo sought to streamline SY; concentrate the office upon protecting the Secretary, foreign dignitaries, and embassies; or simply to dismantle SY as a means to achieve bureaucratic efficiency is not clear. In November 1961, shortly after Bontempo put forward his reorganization plan, SCA announced that it would eliminate 25 positions from its personnel because of Congressional budget cuts.\(^1\)

Bontempo had little support for his proposed reorganization, and the announced personnel cuts prompted uproar from Congress and the public.\(^1\) Many viewed the personnel cuts as a threat to national security because it targeted personnel who conducted background checks and guarded embassies abroad.\(^1\) Several newspaper articles and editorials decried the “gutting” or “emasculating” of SY. In addition, SY’s Deputy Director, Otto Otepka, testified before Congress that the cuts would harm security. In the face of opposition, the Department held a press conference to defend the cuts and explain how they would affect security. SY Director Boswell assured the public that if the cuts endangered national security, he would resign in protest.\(^1\) The controversy doomed Bontempo’s proposal, he resigned, no personnel cuts occurred, and the Department shifted the budget cuts to other offices.\(^1\)

With Bontempo’s departure, Boswell undertook his own reorganization of SY in January 1962. Boswell took few, if any, of Bontempo’s ideas; instead, he reorganized SY in a way that reflected the office’s expanding overseas and protective duties. The Divisions of Investigations and Evaluations remained intact, while the Division of Physical Security was divided into three. The Division of Foreign Operations focused upon overseas security, namely Regional Security Officers, post security, and the Marine Security Guard program. The Division of Technical Services concentrated upon technical threats (such as listening devices) and countermeasures, research and development, and training of SY officers. Finally, the Division of Domestic Operations centered upon

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**Figure 7:** Salvatore Bontempo, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Bontempo tried to give several SY responsibilities to other agencies and offices. His plan was shelved after intense public and Congressional criticism, and he quickly resigned. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
protecting the Secretary and foreign dignitaries, as well as security at the Main State building and its annexes. In another change, Boswell abolished the IRB and re-constituted it as the Intelligence Processing Section (IPS) under SY’s Records and Services Branch. He required IPS to liaise with other agencies, passing on items of interest, but also cut its staff from eleven to five.¹⁸

Just after Boswell’s reorganization, Crockett’s idea of moving SY to the Bureau of Administration became a reality. On August 8, 1962, SY was transferred to Administration, and its director elevated to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. John F. Reilly became the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, and he reported directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William H. Orrick, Jr. As Crockett told the Senate’s Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS), the move demonstrated the increased importance with which the Department regarded the security function.¹⁹

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Communications Security

While Crockett and Boswell were reorganizing the Bureau of Administration and the Office of Security, the Kennedy Administration discovered a weakness in the United States’ diplomatic communications systems. In contrast to the pre-World War II situation, the weakness was not U.S. codes. In November 1952, President Truman created the National Security Agency in an effort to centralize the U.S. Government’s coded-communications and to improve U.S. cryptography. Although the agency officially resided within the Department of Defense, it operated independently and oversaw cryptography used by all government agencies, including the Department of State. The NSA also provided cryptographic intelligence to the Department. While NSA’s Office of Communications Security provided the Department of State with cryptographic equipment and the code itself, the Department employed its own personnel (numbering 31 in 1961) to manage its enciphering and day-to-day cryptographic functions.

In the fall of 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis revealed that the flaw in U.S. diplomatic communications was aging equipment and technology. As tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated over the installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, the Kennedy White House learned that it could not communicate directly with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Department of State had their own system and code for communications; meanwhile, the Department and the White House had a separate, different communications system and codes. During the crisis, cable messages from Moscow to Washington took several hours to reach the White House because telegrams from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow arrived at the Department and were decoded. However, to pass the cable on the White House’s separate communications system, the telegrams were then encoded in different code, sent to the White House, and then decoded again. As a result, the White House learned about some key Soviet messages from Russian radio broadcasts hours before the Department of State delivered them.

The Department’s burgeoning telegraphic traffic and its aging equipment compounded the problem. In 1930, Departmental telegraphic communications amounted to approximately 2.2 million words for the entire year. By January 1960, the Department was sending that quantity every two weeks.
the post-WWII increases in the volume had not been matched by the adoption of improved technologies; the Department of State was still using World War II-era technology. This slowed the Department’s incoming and outgoing cable traffic. When President Kennedy announced the embargo on Cuba, several governments were “caught flat-footed” because the Department was unable to notify them in advance. At the same time, innovations in radio, television, and air travel spread news and information more quickly, exacerbating the Department’s problems of high volume and slow transmittal speeds.22

As a result, and just after the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy created the Orrick Committee, an inter-departmental committee tasked to examine the communications network of the U.S. Government. Chaired by Under Secretary of State for Administration William Orrick, the Committee overhauled the federal Government’s communications infrastructure. It created the National Communications Service, and gave NSA the responsibility for creating the cryptographic system for every department in the federal Government. The Committee also established the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service (DTS), which created combined State-CIA communications centers in U.S. embassies overseas, with joint State-CIA management.23 In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union installed a “hotline” between the two governments, which became operative on August 20, 1963. The hotline, or “MOLINK,” consisted of two lines: a telegraph line routed via Washington-London-Copenhagen-Stockholm-Helsinki-Moscow, and a radiotelegraph circuit routed via Washington-Tangier-Moscow. The first was for messages, while the second was for service and coordination of operations.24

The Orrick Committee also prompted the Department to upgrade its communications. Department officials created the Office of Communications on March 21, 1963. With John W. Coffey as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Communications, the office had a Division of Communications Security and oversight of the pouch and courier service.25 Department officials also automated its communications, introducing “high-speed” computers to the Department. International Telephone and Telegraph received a 2-year contract to install the Automated Terminal
Station system in a new communications facility on the fifth floor of Main State, one floor below the old “comms” center. As “cutting edge” technology, the computer installed was an 18-bit computer, operating at 40 kilohertz, with 52 kilobytes core storage. Such specifications may seem “ancient” compared to a 2006 personal computer, which has a 32-bit computer operating at 3.19 gigahertz with 512 megabytes physical memory with 1.69 gigabytes virtual memory. Yet, in comparison, Wall Street of the 1960s was still employing ticker tape machines and just introducing the same computers as the Department to process stock transactions. The Department’s new Communications Center was a “state of the art” facility for the federal government, and drew numerous visitors from many other agencies.

While the new communications center brought praise to the Department, the case of Otto Otepka brought a partisan fight over security clearances within the Department, and embarrassed the Office of Security. The Kennedy Administration entered office in 1961 amidst ongoing debate between Congress and the Executive branch over security risks in the Department of State, a debate first sparked by the 1945 Amerasia case. Congress had dominated the debate, particularly Congressional Republicans led by Senator Joseph McCarthy, who had largely defined the terms and parameters for loyalty and risk among Department employees. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations, meanwhile, had determined and refined clearance and evaluation procedures. The Republicans had effectively used the “Who lost China?” question against the Democrats of the Truman Administration, and the discovery of leaks and spies at the Department had done little to quell the uproar. The incoming Democratic Kennedy Administration sought to prove it was not “soft” on Communism, but it also believed that many people (namely Democrats) had been unfairly targeted by the partisan charges of disloyalty and security risks. All of these tensions came together in the Otepka case.

In December 1960, Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate Robert Kennedy met with Otepka, the Chief of SY’s Division of Evaluations, to discuss security clearances for the new Administration’s political appointees. Of particular concern was Walt W. Rostow, whom President John Kennedy
wanted to serve as his chief foreign policy planner. Rostow had been denied a security clearance three times during Eisenhower’s Administration. Otepka explained that it would require a full field investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for Rostow to get a clearance, and that according to E.O. 10450, if there were even “reasonable doubt,” the clearance would be denied.  

The Kennedy White House proceeded to circumvent Otepka, whom it perceived as a “hard-line McCarthy disciple.” Kennedy appointed Rostow to his staff as Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Since the White House had its own clearance system, Rostow was able to start work immediately. In November 1961, Kennedy moved Rostow to the Department of State as counselor and chair of the Policy Planning Council, forcing the Department to honor Rostow’s White House security clearance. Then, in a departure from usual practice, Secretary Rusk signed 152 emergency security waivers for presidential and political appointees at the Department of State.  

In many ways, Otto Fred Otepka seemed an unlikely candidate for a scandal. He began his career with the Civil Service Commission and moved to the Office of Security on July 15, 1953, as a personnel security officer under Director Scott McLeod. A year later, McLeod promoted Otepka to Chief of the Division of Evaluations, rapid advancement for one who had only worked in SY for a year. As division chief, Otepka improved evaluation techniques and became well known for following protocol on clearances and investigations. In April 1957, Otepka was appointed Deputy Director of the Office of Security, and over the next four years, he assumed greater responsibility and generally ran the daily business of SY. For his dedication, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles presented him with the Meritorious Service Award in 1958. McLeod later stated that, “If I did not do anything else down there [at the Department of State], I did get the man I think is the best [security] evaluator in the government today.”  

Perhaps it was Otepka’s image as a “hard-line McCarthy disciple” that worked against him, because he increasingly was marginalized from security evaluations and determinations of risk. Although Otepka retained his title, SY Director Boswell took over the responsibility for processing “sensitive cases,” and moved Otepka and his team to new offices on a different floor, away from the agents investigating and evaluating the high-profile appointees. Also, Otepka’s position was among the 25 that SCA proposed to eliminate after Bontempo released his reorganization proposal in late 1961. When the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) summoned Otepka to testify about the proposed cutbacks and changes at SY, Otepka said that the reduction in forces would be detrimental to the country’s internal security.  

At the same time, the SISS was investigating a set of security clearances that SY had granted to Kennedy Administration appointees. Boswell testified before the Senate subcommittee on the issue on March 8, 1962, and afterwards ordered Otepka to review the 152 officials who had received clearances. Otepka reported that 32 clearances had been backdated, that is, waivers were issued before background investigations had been completed. Boswell turned the matter over to the Foreign Service Inspection Corps. Due to regular rotation,
Boswell accepted and was posted as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo.\textsuperscript{33}

John Reilly, a former Department of Justice attorney, succeeded Boswell as the head of SY on the recommendation of the Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and Reilly and Otepka soon clashed. Some Senators speculated that Reilly’s main responsibility was to get rid of Otepka, but Reilly denied this. Just after becoming Director, Reilly offered Otepka a 10-month stint to study at the National War College. However, when Otepka learned that he would not be able to return to SY after his studies, he declined the offer. In the weeks afterwards, Reilly and his special assistant overrode several of Otepka’s decisions regarding security clearances, and eventually Reilly denied Otepka access to SY’s central files.\textsuperscript{34}

In February 1963, Reilly and Otepka testified before the SISS, and the experience led Reilly to suspect that Otepka was assisting the SISS counsel, Julian G. Sourwine. As result, Reilly ordered surveillance of Otepka. With the assistance of Elmer Hill, Chief of the Division of Technical Security, Reilly briefly wiretapped Otepka’s telephone, but failed to produce any incriminating evidence. After searching Otepka’s burn bag (used for discarding classified papers or drafts), SY agents under Reilly’s direction found a carbon paper of a list of questions Otepka had prepared for Sourwine to ask Reilly. The discovery proved that Otepka was working with Sourwine to some degree. It was also more than a little unusual that Otepka would develop questions for the SISS to ask his own supervisor, without Reilly’s knowledge, particularly questions that may have put Reilly on the spot. Moreover, the fact that Reilly suspected Otepka immediately after appearing before the SISS suggests that the subcommittee had asked Reilly questions that only an SY insider would know, and/or had information that Reilly knew had not been released to the subcommittee. Reilly continued to monitor Otepka’s burn bag until June 18, 1963, when its contents produced evidence that allowed him to charge Otepka with improper declassification and mutilation of classified documents.\textsuperscript{35}

Reilly and Otepka continued to clash over Otepka’s security evaluations, resulting in Otepka’s removal from duties. In one case, Reilly asked Otepka to disqualify himself from a case, noting that he (Otepka) had “strong feelings” about the case. Otepka remained adamant in his refusal.\textsuperscript{36} In June 1963, Otepka learned that a colleague...
was working on the security file of a case that Reilly had taken from him. Otepka looked through the file, and had his secretary copy a chronology of his earlier handling of the case. Reilly confronted Otepka about this, and took away not only the document, but also the copy machine from the Evaluations Division. On June 27, Reilly relieved Otepka of his duties as Chief of the Division of Evaluations, and assigned him to revising the Office of Security handbook, essentially a demotion. Otepka was locked out of his office and denied access to his personal and office files. Nine other people, including SY evaluators and investigators associated with Otepka, also were transferred or demoted.37

While Reilly conducted surveillance on Otepka, Department officials learned in late 1962 or early 1963 that someone was leaking information to the SISS. The Department asked the FBI to investigate, and the FBI found that Otepka was the leak, although he was not indicted. Crockett recalled that when confronted with this finding, Otepka responded that he believed the Administration was creating security risks for the U.S. Government, and that he therefore had a duty to reveal these risks, even if it meant breaking the law and sacrificing his career.38

In signed testimony to the FBI dated August 15, Otepka acknowledged that he met with Sourwine and provided him documents. After Reilly had testified before the SISS in May 1963, Sourwine had called and asked Otepka to come to his office after working hours. During their meeting, Sourwine showed Otepka a transcript of Reilly’s testimony, asked him to review it, and submit his evaluation in a memorandum. Otepka wrote a 39-page memorandum, with multiple accompanying documents. Otepka told the FBI that he had done this to refute the statements that Reilly made regarding Otepka’s “personal character and performance.”39

The SISS held hearings in early August regarding Otepka’s demotion. Reilly’s men denied their involvement in the surveillance operation, and Reilly denied that he had ordered a wiretap on Otepka’s telephone. After the Congressional August recess, Otepka appeared before the SISS, and admitted to turning over to Sourwine two documents on the appointment of members of a State Advisory Committee on the staffing of international organizations.40 Otepka’s testimony revealed discrepancies in Reilly’s testimony to the SISS earlier that month.

Otepka returned to the Department in September, and received an official letter notifying him that the Department had leveled 13 charges against him and was seeking disciplinary action. Five

Figure 13: SY Special Agent James McDermott (at rear, right) looks on as President John F. Kennedy welcomes Ahmed Ben Bella, Prime Minister of Algeria, to the White House on October 15, 1962. Source: Private collection.
counts consisted of conduct “unbecoming” a Department officer, for providing documents to Sourwine. The Department also claimed that Otepka had violated Truman’s 1948 directive that ordered all files regarding loyalty cases to be kept confidential. The other eight counts charged that Otepka had “mutilated” or “declassified” official papers (the documents in his burn bag). Otepka admitted giving Sourwine documents, acknowledging the legitimacy of five charges, but he refuted charges that he had altered classified documents. He claimed that Reilly and his surveillance team had planted the burn bag items. Otepka faced dismissal, and on October 2, Otepka’s lawyer went public with the Department’s letter.\textsuperscript{41}

The SISS sent a 10-page memorandum to Secretary Rusk protesting Otepka’s dismissal, and asking Rusk to appear before the subcommittee. Rusk did so, and upheld Otepka’s dismissal. Several Senators warned against proceeding with the charges against Otepka, and two believed that Otepka had been charged for giving information to the committee. Rusk assured them that “the charges were not brought in retaliation . . . nor were they motivated by a departmental attempt to interfere with the work of the subcommittee.”\textsuperscript{42}

In a September 1963 speech to the American Foreign Legion, Rusk invited the Legionnaires to “come in and look us over in great detail.” The American Legion accepted, and formed the Special Liaison Committee. Emphasizing security and security risks, the committee reported that the Department had done “a credible job…in a conscientious effort to weed out security risks and to prohibit the entry of new ones.” The committee remained convinced that a few who should not have received clearances did, but the report was largely complimentary.\textsuperscript{43}

By November, Otepka and Reilly faced hearings and possible removal from the Department. On November 6, Reilly sent a letter to the SISS revising his testimony and confessing to wire-tapping Otepka’s telephone.\textsuperscript{44} He was placed on administrative leave pending further investigation.\textsuperscript{45} Otepka had petitioned for an appeal as soon as the Department filed charges against him, and a four-year legal struggle ensued. Secretary Rusk met with Senator James Eastland (D-MS) about the Otepka case in July 1964; they agreed that Otepka should follow the Departmental hearings process. During the meeting, Eastland called Otepka’s lawyer to ask if Otepka would accept reassignment, but was told that Otepka insisted on being restored to his old job. While awaiting his hearing, Otepka continued to work at the Department, but was ostracized. He retained his title and salary, but had a bare desk and did not receive Departmental instructions and reports, or even regular mail. He was given a telephone, but it never rang. It was common knowledge among Department personnel that no one was to speak to Otepka.\textsuperscript{46}

Otepka received his hearing in June 1967 and was found guilty. The hearing officer advised Rusk to consider Otepka’s claim that no standard of conduct existed for federal employees in such matters, but Rusk upheld the verdict. Otepka was demoted in pay grade and reassigned to the Management Analyst Office, where he stayed for a week. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which heard his testimony in May 1968, but rejected his appeal.\textsuperscript{47} In 1970 President Richard M. Nixon appointed Otepka to the Subversive Activities Control Board, an independent governmental body that heard cases against subversive organizations and individuals. The board heard only a few cases, and in June 1972, Otepka retired.\textsuperscript{48}
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The Otepka affair created an embarrassing black eye for SY; however, the changes it wrought would later prove beneficial for the organization. The affair brought an end to McCarthyism and the accusations and debate over security risks that had haunted the Department of State. The affair led to the departure of one Director of SY (Reilly), false testimony by SY officials, and revelations that one SY senior officer leaked documents to Congress. Yet, the affair also led Secretary Rusk and Assistant Secretary Crockett to recruit G. Marvin Gentile from the CIA to head SY and rebuild the office and its morale. Over the course of his ten-year term, Gentile’s influence and initiatives would transform SY into a much more professional law enforcement organization. As Crockett later recalled, Gentile was “a breath of fresh air.”

Moscow and Warsaw Networks

SY officers had expressed concerns about Soviet espionage long before Ambassador Lodge displayed the Great Seal bug at the UN Security Council. In 1959, the security officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow admitted that “Soviet radio/electronic technical capabilities are quite advanced,” and that the Soviets were “keeping abreast of new technical developments in the United States.” He also said U.S. magazines had published wiring diagrams of resonant cavity devices (like the Great Seal bug); moreover, an affordable ($30) “transistorized postage-stamp size amplifier” could be purchased by the public and the Soviets in the United States. Perhaps most disconcerting, the Moscow security officer acknowledged that the Department did not possess equipment that could detect these technical threats. Most discoveries of bugs in 1959 and before had resulted from SY officers conducting their “initial physical search,” with their equipment serving more “to trace out wiring and additional microphones.” In fact, two months after the Moscow security officer presented his conclusions, E. Tomlin Bailey, the Director of SY (1956-58), requested permission to purchase 20 British technical search kits (at a cost of more than $63,000) because they were “across-the-board superior” to U.S. equipment. There was reason for SY officers to worry; U.S. officials had been finding small networks of microphones in U.S. embassies in Communist bloc nations. In April 1956,

Figure 14: E. Tomlin Bailey, Director of the Office of Security, 1956-1958. The continued discovery of bugs in Soviet bloc embassies led SY to undertake greater technical security countermeasures. Bailey obtained permission to buy British technical search kits because they were far better than the American versions. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
SY technical officers discovered a partially installed network of microphones with wires leading to the attic in the U.S. Embassy in Prague. The network's installers had apparently gained access to the attic via a false brick door in a common wall with another building. SY technical experts discovered other sets of multiple microphones in Budapest and Belgrade.\(^{51}\)

The early discoveries prompted SY to install its first clear, plastic, acoustic conference room (ACR) in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1960. Commonly called “bubbles,” ACRs were made of plastic and aluminum. First generation ACRs were 12 feet by 15 feet, or 12 feet by 20 feet, and had 5 inches between the interior and outer wall, with a door to enter and exit the secure space. After removing all furniture and fixtures from an existing room and sweeping it for bugs, SY engineers erected the ACR to create a secure room where Embassy officers could hold classified discussions without concerns of bugs.\(^{52}\)

Concerns about technical security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow continued, resulting in several security developments in 1962 and 1963. Two more ACRs were installed, prompting the Department to add a Security Officer (Technical) [SO(T)], to the Embassy staff. That person was SY’s Maclyn Musser. The Department installed special shielding to enclose the Embassy’s code room.\(^{53}\) Also U.S. officials noticed that the Soviets had begun directing microwaves at the Embassy in 1962, perhaps starting as early as 1953, and Musser reported in 1963 that the microwave beam was 50 feet across. U.S. officials were uncertain about the purpose of the microwaves, but did not consider the microwaves a technical or health hazard.\(^{54}\)
A tip from a Soviet defector prompted SY officials to return to the Moscow Embassy in 1964 and look for bugs. In February, Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, who had served in the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate, First Department (which monitored U.S. citizens in the Soviet Union), defected to the United States. He told U.S. officials about Soviet technical surveillance in the Embassy and specified particular offices. With the information, SY sent SO(T)s John Bagnal and Donovan Fischer to Moscow to assist Maclyn Musser in searching for bugs.55

Bagnal and Fischer’s search gives credence to Thomas Edison’s dictum that genius is “1 percent inspiration and 99 percent perspiration.” The SO(T)s systematically demolished the 10th floor office of the military attaché, which was several floors above Foreign Service national employees (FSNs), and had access to the ceiling via the attic. Bagnal and Fischer took apart the electric and telephone receptacles, removed the wiring, ripped up the parquet floor, and jack hammered the plaster off the walls, burning out one jackhammer in the effort. In the attic, they searched through two feet of rubble. They chipped into the apex of the wall and removed the doorjambs. After ten days, the men were frustrated because of their lack of success.56

They then turned to the double ring radiator, which was welded to the pipe that ran from the basement. In Moscow, the Soviet Government provided heat for the entire city through a central heating system. Bagnal and Fischer shut off the main valve in the basement. They returned to the attaché’s room and cut the radiator from the pipe. Upon doing so, they noticed a small hole, about 3/16 of an inch in diameter, in the wall behind the radiator. When they began to pick at the hole, the plaster began to flake off, revealing a plaster cast set one foot into the wall. In the cast, they found a microphone. They checked other rooms behind the radiator and found more microphones, discovering a total of 52 bugs in the Embassy.57
After discovering the microphones, Bagnal and Fischer traced the cables to see where the antennae and listening posts were located. They found that the Soviets’ listening posts were in the apartment building across the street, which was the same direction from which the microwave signals emanated. They jackhammered into the wall and found three coaxial cables, which went to the attic, and were attached to a crude grill that was 4 feet by 16 feet in size, and laid 6-7 inches into the concrete of the attic floor. The grill served as an antenna. The Embassy’s communications center was next to the room above which the grill was located.58

The discovery of the Moscow microphone network raised questions about the new Embassy building in Warsaw. Construction of the Embassy building had employed Polish workers, and the first security officer was only present for the last 3 months of construction. Bagnal, this time with Gene Todd, went to Warsaw and looked behind the radiators. They found 37 microphones; however, there were no microphones behind radiators in the Deputy Chief of Mission’s office. Inspecting the office, they found a microphone behind the baseboard, which led to a second network of 17 microphones, bringing the total to 54 bugs at the Embassy. Bagnal later speculated that the baseboard system was a decoy for the radiator system—the Soviets hoped that a technical security officer would find the baseboard system and then quit looking.59

The discoveries forced SY to reassess the technical security program, and SY adopted three changes. First, SY developed new counter-measures equipment to better detect Soviet bloc listening devices. Second, SY accelerated the installation of secure conference rooms “at all major and sensitive posts abroad.”60

The discovery of a “shoe bug” then prompted SY to modify its ACRs. In 1969, Harry G. Barnes, Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission in Bucharest, Romania, called a classified conference, which met in the “bubble.” SY officer Lou Grob was monitoring the meeting from another room and heard the conversation. He immediately informed the Administration Officer (the RSO’s superior) that there was a bug in the ACR. After searching, they found something resembling Don Adams’s “shoe phone” from the 1960s television series Get Smart!—the bug was located in the heel of Barnes’s shoe. Barnes had had the butler take his shoes out to be modified, and someone had installed the bug in the process. After this incident, SY officers covered ACRs with Reynolds plastic wrap to reduce the radiation of low-power devices such as shoe bugs until the proper security modifications could be made.61

Figure 19: Director of the Office of Security G. Marvin Gentile holds one of the listening devices discovered in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1964. Source: Department of State.
As a third change to its technical security program, SY arranged for a group of U.S. Navy Seabees to be assigned to the Department. The Seabee detail resulted from the increasing sophistication of Soviet espionage. Although SY had assigned extra Marine guards to the Moscow and Warsaw construction projects, SY officials noted that Marines did not possess the expertise to recognize efforts by foreign carpenters, electricians, and plumbers to plant bugs. Seabees, however, as a result of their training, could recognize unusual or seemingly unnecessary changes in or aspects of the construction. One senior technical officer later noted that Soviet craftsmanship in masonry and carpentry made detecting Soviet bugs extremely difficult. SY had already utilized Seabees in Warsaw to repair the damage caused by the removal of the microphone network. With 15 “major” building and renovation projects slated for fiscal year 1966, SY decided to create a permanent Seabees detail. The detail would “provide surveillance through close and constant supervision” of projects, and in some cases, complete work in “sensitive” areas. Initially called the “Naval Mobile Construction Battalion FOUR, Detachment NOVEMBER,” the Seabees received as one of their first assignments the removal of the microphone network and the repair of the damage in the Embassy in Moscow. In the last quarter of fiscal year 1965, SY requested money for an additional 59 Seabees, and signed an agreement with the Navy to establish a formal Naval support unit for the Department of State.52

SY divided the Seabees into two groups. One group of 128, plus the later 59, were assigned to specific construction projects, and then returned to the Navy upon the projects’ completion. SY contracted the second group of 27 Seabees on a reimbursable, renewable basis. Assigned to four regional technical centers in Frankfurt, Beirut, Panamá, and Tokyo, this second group assumed several tasks, including setting up secure conference rooms, assisting technical officers, providing labor and supervision for

Figure 20: The Shoe Bug (at left). The shoe has the heel removed to show where the bug was hidden. SY officer Lou Grob was monitoring a secure acoustic conference room and discovered the bug in a Foreign Service Officer’s shoe. Source: Department of State.

Figure 21: The 1965 Seabees Class trained by SY. This was likely the first SY-trained Seabees class. SY officials admitted that Marine Security Guards did not have the skills to recognize changes in construction that could hide listening and other espionage devices. The discoveries of the Moscow and Warsaw microphone networks led to the detailing of a permanent Seabees unit to the Department of State. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
renovation projects in sensitive areas, and repairing the damage incurred while locating a bug. By 1968, the Seabees program was permanent, and securing construction projects at embassies had emerged as a diplomatic security priority.63

With the Moscow and Warsaw finds, several U.S. officials expressed outrage at the potentially damaging effects the bugs might have on diplomacy and U.S. security. However, seasoned Foreign Service Officers and Moscow Embassy veterans played down the threat. When questioned by the press, they assured the public that “American diplomats have always assumed that the embassy in Moscow was not secure against eavesdropping,” and held “their most sensitive discussions” either in “several small rooms-within-rooms installed by Americans for security reasons,” or outdoors. Curiously, in playing down one threat, the veteran FSOs revealed that the Embassy had installed ACRs as a technical countermeasure.64

Some members of Congress dismissed the potential consequences of the technical finds, and maintained their focus upon personnel security. House Appropriations Subcommittee Chair John J. Rooney (D-NY), for example, was unimpressed with the discoveries of microphone networks. He belittled SY Director Gentile’s revelations, his displays of bugs, and his requests for resources to improve physical security. “We have been finding microphones in that building [the Moscow embassy] for as long as I can remember,” declared Rooney. He noted that five years earlier, SY had also shown him microphones, and then “took a cool million dollars” for its budget. In Rooney’s view, SY was merely trying “to impress us again with microphones.” Instead of asking how SY might improve physical and technical security, Rooney devoted more attention to how much taxpayer money was needed to repair damages incurred in the removal of microphone networks from the Warsaw and Moscow embassies.65

During SY’s appropriations hearings, Rooney showed more interest in how many homosexuals SY had dismissed from the Department than discovered listening devices. After entering questions regarding SY’s budget in the public record, Rooney turned the subcommittee’s focus to what he once derisively quipped as “the machinations of the Mattachine Society,” an organization which lobbied for ending discrimination against gays.
and lesbians in the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s and early 1970s, homosexuals constituted three-fourths of all Department of State dismissals by SY. In some years they constituted nearly all dismissals. Amid the security breaches of U.S. facilities in Eastern Europe, Rooney was always more interested in the details concerning the highest ranking, longest employed men and women dismissed from the Foreign Service as security risks.\textsuperscript{56}

\section*{Protecting Diplomats}

Visits by foreign dignitaries to the United States increased dramatically in the 1960s. President Kennedy entertained more dignitaries and heads of state during his first two years in office than Roosevelt had in his 12 years in office or Truman had in eight years. Kennedy hosted 74 official visits in 1961 and 1962, whereas his predecessor Dwight Eisenhower had hosted 32 official visits in 1953 and 1954. Moreover, the assignment of diplomats from newly independent African and Third World nations—22 in the summer of 1961 alone—multiplied the protective duties of SY. For the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations, SY was scheduled to protect 10 foreign heads of state, with the possibility of another 12 attending. Two-thirds of these leaders were from nations that had achieved independence during the previous 8 years.\textsuperscript{67}

Despite protecting diplomats and foreign dignitaries since the 1920s, SY did not possess the formal responsibility to do so. It had implicit responsibility, which was noted in the legal code authorizing security agents to carry firearms. However, the Secretary of State did not have formal authorization and direction from Congress to protect foreign diplomats and visiting dignitaries. When the 1961 Vienna Convention specifically required host countries to provide protection, SY Director William Boswell petitioned SCA to propose Congressional legislation that would specifically authorize the Secretary to assume direct responsibility for protecting foreign officials and dignitaries working and/or traveling in the United States. The SCA drafted the bill for the session of Congress that began in January 1962, but Congress did not pass it.\textsuperscript{68}

By November 1962, SY’s Protective Services Branch had assumed oversight of dignitary protection, and had been transferred from the Division of Domestic Operations to the Division of Investigations. Under the leadership of Keith O.

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\caption{Special Agent Leo Crampsey (left) escorts Cuba’s new Premier Fidel Castro (center) during an April 1959 visit to Washington, DC. Special Agents have protected royals, revolutionaries, autocrats, and democrats during their visits to the United States, including United Nations sessions in New York City. As the number of visits by foreign leaders steadily increased during the 1950s and 1960s, the task of protecting them stretched SY’s limited resources. SY constantly asked for more staff and collaborated with the FBI and local police forces to ensure sufficient protection. Source: Department of State.}
\end{figure}
“Jack” Lynch, Protective Services with 10 Special Agents and 1 secretary was too short-staffed to handle the number of assignments given it; in fact, Protective Services had to pull 5 full-time Agents from other branches and divisions to meet its protective assignments. In fiscal year 1961, Protective Services provided protection for 41 heads of state and dignitaries, as well as dignitaries attending 25 conferences. During the first 6 months of fiscal year 1962, the branch protected 22 heads of state and foreign dignitaries, as well as dignitaries attending 22 conferences. SY Director Boswell admitted that agents working protective details had logged more than 4,000 hours in uncompensated overtime. Given the lack of resources, Protective Services often pulled manpower from the Investigations Division, which in turn caused backlogs in security investigations. Accordingly, Boswell also called attention to the constant lack of manpower for protection, and urged SCA to increase SY’s staffing. The shortage of Special Agents also forced SY to collaborate with other agencies, particularly the FBI and local police, to meet its tasks. For example, in September 1960, the New York City Police Department detailed thousands of officers to assist SY in ensuring the safety of 19 heads of state, including Premiers Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, during the General Assembly meeting at the United Nations.

SY protective details, however, could not protect foreign diplomats from segregation and discrimination, particularly diplomats from Africa and Asia. Discriminatory practices were still common in Washington, DC and the surrounding area during the early 1960s. Ambassadors, their staffs, and families routinely were denied service, and African diplomats struggled to find suitable housing in the informally segregated District of Columbia. Washington’s Metropolitan Club granted free membership to ambassadors, but denied it to African and Asian diplomats. White supremacists “roughed up” a Ghanaian diplomat who traveled to Georgia to observe an election. When an Ethiopian diplomat “received menacing phone calls” and found the tires of his car “repeatedly flattened,” Washington police “ignored” his requests for an investigation.

With discrimination and harassment threatening to damage U.S. relations with newly independent states, the Kennedy Administration moved to rectify the problem. President Kennedy strongly believed that winning the “hearts and minds” of the Third World was essential to the U.S. Cold War strategy,
and discriminatory treatment of diplomats and dignitaries from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and even Latin America, did nothing to assist the United States; in fact, it harmed U.S. efforts to win the Cold War. To counter discrimination against foreign dignitaries, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles suggested creating a Special Protocol Service Section (SPSS) within the Department’s Office of Protocol. With Kennedy’s approval, the new division began work in February 1961, under the direction of Pedro Sanjuan. The new SPSS worked in conjunction with SY’s Protective Services to offer protection for African diplomats in the United States, and to ensure that their visits went smoothly, much as the Chief Special Agent had done in the 1920s.72

To his credit, Sanjuan was acutely aware that many African diplomats were from the elite and professional classes in their nations, and news of discriminatory treatment could flow back to the diplomats’ home countries, threatening to magnify the issue into a much larger problem. In response to an incident involving Nigerian diplomats, Sanjuan wrote, “What affects one or more members of these groups is likely to have a strong influence on the opinions and attitudes of their governments,” and could “influence the nature of United States-Nigerian relations to a considerable degree.” Such incidents also affected diplomats and dignitaries of several other African nations, including Mali, Ghana, and Sierra Leone.73

Yet SPSS was not always successful. For example, a restaurant on U.S. Route 40 (connecting Washington, DC with New York City) denied service to the Ambassador from the new nation-state of Chad, Adam Malik Sow, who was travelling to Washington to present his credentials to President Kennedy. After the incident, the Ambassador did not continue to Washington; he instead returned to Chad and quit. Kennedy ordered Sanjuan to “do something” about the Chadian’s humiliation; Sanjuan sent a “lengthy and very formal apology” to the Government of Chad. Secretary of State Rusk related another instance in which an African delegate to the United Nations was travelling to New York and his plane stopped in Miami. “When the passengers disembarked for lunch, the white passengers were taken to the airport restaurant; the
black delegate received a folding canvas stool in a corner of the hanger and a sandwich wrapped with waxed paper. He then flew to New York, where our delegation asked for his vote on human rights issues. That same ambassador later became his country’s prime minister. We learned later that his chronic bitterness toward the United States stemmed from that incident.”

In addition to expanding protection of foreign diplomats, Keith Lynch, the chief of SY’s Protective Services, tried to upgrade the Secretary’s detail by providing 24-hour, round-the-clock protection. The upgrade required two additional officers, because up until that time, the Secretary had received only “portal to portal” protection. Despite Lynch’s efforts, SY only provided 24-hour coverage for two short periods during the early 1960s: the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, and after a major escalation of the war in Vietnam in 1964. During these periods, Rusk did not want to alarm his family, so SY maintained a security post in the Secretary’s automobile outside his residence from midnight until 8 o’clock in the morning.75

SY provided constant security for the Secretary while he traveled abroad. Such protection required comprehensive collaboration with police and officials in those countries. However, this did not prevent untoward acts against the Secretary. While in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, Rusk was laying a wreath on a memorial when a man broke through the police barricade, ran toward Rusk, and tried to spit on him. The police caught him before he reached the Secretary. Rusk also made trips to South Vietnam, but he eventually suspended his travel there, citing the great amount of effort required to protect him.76

The November 1963 assassination of President Kennedy brought federal protective services under close scrutiny. SY flew in more than 100 agents from its various field offices to protect the more than 25 heads of state and other dignitaries who came to Washington for Kennedy’s funeral. The effort also required 115 intelligence agents from Army Intelligence, 20 agents for the Army Criminal Investigation Unit, and 40 agents from the CIA. Keith Lynch and Leo E. Crampsey coordinated the protection effort. SY set up a 24-hour “nerve center,” or command center, to
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assist in coordinating efforts and passing information from various agencies. The “unprecedented” efforts were the largest protective security operation that SY had ever undertaken, and they merited special recognition from Secretary Rusk.77

In the aftermath of Kennedy’s assassination and funeral, SY reviewed its own protective security practices and procedures. While the Secret Service required tighter security for Presidential and Vice Presidential visits abroad, foreign governments argued that the U.S. officials failed to provide the same level of service to foreign dignitaries traveling in the United States. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Gentile noted in 1964 that if Protective Services failed to receive the additional funding for more security officers, “it would be . . . difficult to explain a reduction in the present coverage, if harm came to a Presidential guest.” To further justify the need for additional officers, the Protective Services Branch illustrated the increase in the number of visits it covered—from 14 in 1957 to an average of 60 in 1964. Despite the growing number of visitors, Protective Services had only gained one officer since 1962. To staff each detail, Protective Services was still forced to enlist the assistance of temporary personnel from field offices and other divisions in the Office of Security.78

Gentile also sought revisions in the travel plans of foreign visitors. He expressed concern about heads of state and foreign dignitaries who often flew on commercial airliners, particularly on airlines that prevented security from searching passengers and luggage. To combat this security risk, Gentile proposed that heads of the other executive agencies place military aircraft at the disposal of visiting dignitaries. Apparently this proposal failed because Protective Services determined that if visitors insisted on traveling on commercial airliners, SY would only assume responsibility for the domestic portion of the itinerary. Thus, SY protective details began and concluded at U.S. ports of entry and departure.79

Figure 27: Special Agent James McDermott (right) listens as U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk addresses journalists on May 1, 1961, after his appearance before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. SY tried to upgrade protection for the Secretary to a “24/7” detail, but Rusk did not want to alarm his family. SY instead maintained a security post in an automobile outside Rusk’s home from midnight to 8 a.m. Source: Washington Post.
President Kennedy’s assassination led Congress, on August 27, 1964, to pass Public Law 493, which made it a federal crime to assault or injure foreign dignitaries. Moreover, the law imposed stricter fines of $5,000 and up to 3 years of imprisonment for assaulting dignitaries and Department of State Security Officers working on a protective assignment.  

After the release of the Warren Commission Report on the Kennedy assassination, Gentile offered several proposals to improve security for visiting dignitaries. He recommended transporting dignitaries in armored limousines, creating standard written procedures to govern cooperation with local police, heightening coordination between federal agencies, and increasing SY personnel. Gentile also proposed creating an intelligence unit within SY to collect and analyze intelligence and threat information that could impact the protective assignment of a particular dignitary. The Intelligence Processing Section within the Records and Research Branch was already doing much of this, so Gentile likely was proposing expansion of intelligence processing and analysis efforts. On July 1, 1965, SY created the Protective Research Section under the Division of Protective Security, with Francis R. Tully as its first chief. Rather than creating an entirely new section, the Protective Research Section probably was staffed by moving the Intelligence Processing staff from Records and Research to Protective Security, together with additional staff that SY had hired. New Protective Security procedures mandated that the agent-in-charge of protection during a visit submit a written request for protective intelligence when the Secretary or visiting
dignitaries travelled outside the greater Washington, DC area. The Protective Research Section furnished statistics on threats, bombings, demonstrations, and picketing, against both United States missions abroad and foreign missions in the United States. It also passed specific threat information about the President or Vice President to the Secret Service. Information on threats against the Secretary or visiting dignitaries automatically passed to the Section from other protective and intelligence agencies. In 1966, SY renamed the Section the Protective Support Section, and later elevated it to branch level, underscoring its importance.  

The 1965, Gentile reorganized SY. He divided the office into two large wings. One wing, “Personnel Security,” comprised the Divisions of Investigations, Evaluations, and Protective Security, the latter of which was pulled out of Investigations and elevated to division status. The other office, “Domestic and Foreign Security,” consisted of the Divisions of Foreign Operations, Technical Services, and Domestic Operations, the latter of which handled security for the Department’s buildings in the Washington metropolitan area. Gentile also created two small staff units. One focused upon Education and Training, and the other on Special Assignments, which constituted primarily investigations resulting in the termination of a Department of State employee (for homosexuality, espionage, and criminal acts).  

Figure 29: Organization chart for the Office of Security, 1965. The chart shows how Director Marvin Gentile reorganized the office to meet the security demands for the 1960s. Again, the reorganization shows the steady growth of overseas and physical security in relation to investigations, which dominated SY’s work just ten years earlier. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
Conclusion

The years between 1960 and 1965 were difficult for SY and diplomatic security, but the most notable developments for diplomatic security and SY resulted from four events. The Cuban Missile Crisis exposed the aging state of U.S. diplomatic communications, leading to the adoption of new computer technologies to provide secure, quick, and effective communications for the Department. The Otepka affair resulted in a wholesale change in SY’s leadership and the exposure of a senior SY official who was leaking classified information to Congress. The affair also brought an end to McCarthyism in the Department of State, and further led to the recruitment of G. Marvin Gentile, who professionalized and rebuilt SY. Third, SY’s discovery of two extensive microphone networks in the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and Warsaw led to the expansion of SY’s technical security division and the creation of a Seabees detachment at SY. Finally, the assassination of President Kennedy initiated a series of improvements in protective security and the expansion of SY’s protective details for foreign dignitaries. In addition, the emergence of numerous new states in Africa and Asia, in conjunction with the Civil Rights Movement, led the Kennedy Administration, largely through the efforts of Pedro Sanjuan, to work aggressively to end discrimination against foreign diplomats.

As 1965 drew to a close, SY was expanding as an organization under the leadership of Marvin Gentile, and the Department was improving security. However, the security threats of the early 1970s would transform SY well beyond the organization that Boswell, Reilly, and Gentile had inherited.
Endnotes


2 Oral History Interview, Deputy Under Secretary William J. Crockett, 20 June 1990, interviewed by Thomas Stern for the Foreign Affairs Oral History Project of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, p. 46. Hereafter cited as ADST.


10 Oral History Interview, David McCabe, 31 March 2006.


For examples of internal, Congressional, and public complaints, see Letter, Otto F. Otepka, Deputy Director of the Office of Security, to John Ordway, Chief of the Personnel Operations Division, Department of State, 18 December 1961; Memorandum “Security Office Personnel Cuts,” Joel H. Stearns, Special Assistant to the Administrator of SCA, to E. Allen Fidel, Office of Congressional Affairs, 1 December 1961; Letter, Frederick G. Dutton, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Affairs (Fidel), to John G. Tower, U.S. Senate, 18 December 1961; Letter, Dutton (Boswell) to Glenard P. Lipscomb, U.S. House of Representatives, 11 December 1961; and Letter, Dutton (D. Frahme) to Page Belcher, December 1961; all Folder – 1-E/1.2, Box 2, SCA-Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59-Lot 68D175, NA.

Newspaper Clipping “State Department Staff Firings Endangering National Security: Twenty-Five Trained Men to go in Economy Drive,” *New York Journal-American*, 9 November 1961, Box 2, SCA Subject Files 1961-64, RG 59 – Lot 68D175, NA.


Reilly was appointed as Director of SY in April 1962, but with the move to the Bureau of Administration, he was raised to a Deputy Assistant Secretary. Office Letter, Executive Officer to all SY employees, 8 August 1962, Folder 1, Box 5, Protective Services Policy Files, 1962-1968, RG 59 - Lot 70D292, NA. Report to William Crockett for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 26 August 1963, Box 2, Security Policy Files 1949-69 (Otepka Files), RG 59 - Lot 96D563, NA, p. 64.

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GILL, THE ORDEAL OF OTTO OTEPKA, 12, 46, 56.


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43 The American Legion Special Liaison Committee to the U.S. Department of State (Washington DC: The American Legion, 1964), pp. 59, 28. This booklet contains the committee’s report, as well as the relevant portion of Rusk’s speech and the correspondence between the Department of State and the American Legion on setting up the committee and its review.


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49 Oral History Interview, Crockett, 20 June 1990, p. 46. Memorandum “Otepka’s Assignments,” Gentile, 24 February 1967, Box 3, DUSA Subject Files 1967, RG 59 – Lot 70D403, NA.


59 Oral History Interview, John Bagnal, 28 November 2005, p. 3.


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Romano, “No Diplomatic Immunity,” JAH 87/2: 552.


Memorandum “Proposed Budget for the Future, Lynch to Grignon, September 1964; and Memorandum, Grignon to Crockett, 5 August 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.


Memorandum “Protection of Visiting Dignitaries,” Lynch to Robert L. Berry, 1 March 1963; and Memorandum “Justification for Personnel,” Lynch to LaSelle, 30 April 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68 RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.

Memorandum, Benjamin H. Read, Special Assistant to Secretary and Executive Secretary, to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 20 May 1964; and Memorandum “SY Policy for Protection of Visiting Dignitaries,” Gentile to Crockett, 26 May 1964; both Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.


Memorandum “Establishment of the Protective Research Section,” Lynch to All PRS Personnel, 24 September 1965; Memorandum “Protective Intelligence,” Lynch to All Officer Personnel, 2 February 1966; Memorandum “Study of the Protective Functions of the Office of Security, Department of State,” Grignon to Richard W. Barrett, 5 May 1965; Agreement Between the Department of State and the Secret Service, 28 June 1966; Memorandum “Progress of the Division of Protective Security since July 1, 1964,” Lynch to Grignon, 16 December 1966, Folder – Policy 1965; and Memorandum “Additional Justification Increase in Staff SY/PrS,” Lynch to Muhonen, 25 August 1967, Folder – Policy 1967; all Box 5, PSPF 1962-68, RG 59-Lot 70D292, NA.