The rise of terrorism transformed diplomatic security. Although new technologies and the growing demands for protection of foreign dignitaries in the United States had prompted changes in security measures in the early 1960s, terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s forced the Department of State and its Office of Security (SY) to reinvent their approach to diplomatic security. The kidnappings and murders of U.S. diplomats in Guatemala, Brazil, and Sudan, and the murders of the 1972 Israeli Olympic team and Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier, compelled SY—and the U.S. Government as a whole—to expand physical and protective security efforts. Furthermore, terrorism brought SY more into the public eye, as Congress demanded that the Department improve the physical security of U.S. Embassies and the protection of U.S. and foreign diplomats.

Two crucial aspects of the “great transformation” of diplomatic security merit attention. First, the transformation occurred in three phases. During the first phase (1967-1978), discussed in this chapter, the threat of terrorism forced SY and the Department to redefine and transform diplomatic security, laying the foundations for diplomatic security as it is understood in the present day. During the second phase (1979-1985), the threat of terrorism accelerated the transformation because the 1979 mob takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and the 1983-1984 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait exhibited new terrorist methods that dramatically altered how U.S. officials perceived the terrorist threat. Finally, the third phase (1992-2000) completed the transformation of...
diplomatic security to the forms recognized today, with the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as the key events that prompted the final phase of transformation.

A second crucial aspect is that during each of the three phases, SY expanded its responsibilities, but did not give up or transfer existing responsibilities. SY continued to conduct background investigations and evaluations, to protect the Secretary of State and foreign dignitaries, and to strengthen technical countermeasures against Soviet espionage. With the onset of terrorism, however, SY implemented new security measures, such as public access controls, armored cars, and closed-circuit television cameras. It established a command center, and created a threat analysis group to analyze threats to U.S. diplomatic security.

The extent of this transformation was not immediately apparent during this first phase. SY, under the direction of Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for Security G. Marvin Gentile (1964-1973) and Victor H. Dikeos (1974-1978), laid the foundations for what diplomatic security would become in the 1990s and 2000s. Perhaps most importantly, the two men—particularly Dikeos—guided SY as it redefined its raison d’etre. Dikeos announced the redefinition in July 1975: “SY’s mission has changed from the traditional concept of thwarting clandestine penetration…to a much broadened role of protection against any and all sorts of hazards including blatant terrorist violence.” SY always had shouldered huge responsibilities in relation to its small size, but, as revealed by Dikeos, SY’s responsibilities grew immensely as terrorists targeted U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities with political acts of violence and destruction.

**Diplomats as Targets**

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the targeting of diplomats and embassies by guerrillas, terrorists, and insurgents in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East pressured SY and the Department to redefine protection. Prior to 1965, protection had centered upon the Secretary of State and visiting foreign dignitaries. The idea of targeting a diplomat or diplomatic facility as a violent act of political expression was on the fringe of extreme
possibilities. Subtle signs of a shift from general security (anti-crime, anti-espionage) to protection of U.S. overseas facilities emerged in the late 1950s as the number of SY personnel tasked with overseas security approached the number of those slated for investigations and evaluations. In 1953, there were 110 officers in investigations and evaluations, but only 15 devoted to physical security and overseas operations. By 1963, the numbers had begun to even out, with 142 SY officers dedicated to investigations and evaluations, and 116 to physical and overseas security. The latter figure did not reflect the 758 Marine Security Guards assigned to 95 posts across the world.3

The increased number of personnel assigned to physical and overseas security was due, in part, to the Cold War and the decolonization in Africa and Asia. As one of two superpowers, the United States expanded its diplomatic corps in order to ensure that it had a diplomatic post in every country across the globe. This occurred at a time when the number of new states was rapidly increasing. In 1940, the Department of State had 58 diplomatic posts, but by 1970, that number had ballooned to 117. The effort to expand diplomatic representation abroad gained particular urgency when the Soviets announced a new strategy at their Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 “to temper Cold War tensions and to compete peacefully” with the United States for the hearts and minds of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.4 Moreover, European decolonization efforts, independence movements, and the emergence of numerous new nation-states in the developing world fostered independence struggles, civil wars,
local political tensions, guerrilla movements, and ethnic conflicts. Several struggles, tensions, and conflicts soon involved U.S. diplomats. As a result, SY needed more RSOs, SO(T)s, Marine Security Guards, and other personnel to secure the rapidly rising number of posts.

By the late 1960s, a growing number of U.S. posts and personnel overseas were becoming targets of violence perpetrated by radical, revolutionary, and terrorist movements. Several U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and United States Information Service (USIS) installations suffered damage from protests, attacks, or riots. During fiscal year 1971, USIS installations alone reported 61 threats or acts of violence. Even in nations perceived as peaceful and safe, such as France, Norway, Chile, and the Netherlands, U.S. posts faced an escalating number of violent acts.

The acts ranged from a few Norwegian demonstrators tossing rocks and bottles at the U.S. Embassy's windows in Oslo, to a bomb exploding in the dining room of the U.S. Consul General in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

The motivations behind the acts depended on locale, issue, and the internal political and economic dynamics of the host countries. In Europe, attacks often arose from opposition to the Vietnam War. In the Middle East, hostility and violence resulted from U.S. support for Israel. During the Six-Day War (June 5-10, 1967), Arab mobs attacked 22 U.S. Embassies and Consulates, with the damage ranging from gutted buildings to broken windows and damaged cars. In Latin America, U.S. actions, past and present, inspired anger and hostility. Such acts included not only the Vietnam War, but also such regional issues as U.S. policy towards Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the presence of U.S. multinational corporations, perceived U.S. support for right-wing dictators and opposition to social and economic reforms. In fact, in April 1968, the senior press chief for Chile's president admitted that it was “in” to be anti-American.
The increasing number of anti-American terrorist incidents in Latin America led U.S. policymakers and SY officials to develop its initial policies and procedures for terrorist attacks in that region. In early 1965, SY organized an ad hoc inter-agency committee to study terrorism, and particularly the isolated attacks against U.S. posts and installations in the region. The result was a “comprehensive guidance document” that SY sent to all Chiefs of Mission in Latin America.³⁸ Although implementation of the documents’ recommendations was subject to the decision of the Chief of Mission, the guidance document requested that all missions set up Security Watch Committees. SY tasked the Watch Committees to evaluate the state of security in their country, and to devise and implement measures to improve post security. For example, SY called for the inspection of all incoming packages to the Embassy. SY also supplied posts with special protective equipment and launched a project to find a substitute for glass at U.S. facilities. The Department also issued new physical security regulations for all Department of State, USAID, and USIS installations. Recognizing that terrorism was not restricted to Latin America, SY and the Ad Hoc Committee sent an expanded version of the guidance document to all missions across the world in 1966.³⁹

By 1970, the levels and methods of violence had escalated. Rocks thrown at U.S. embassy windows in 1965 became Molotov cocktails, car bombs, or sticks of dynamite in 1968 and 1970, and then evolved into fuse and timer bombs in 1972.⁴⁰ In Saigon, a person drove a car to the front of the U.S. Embassy and walked away. A few moments later, a fuse bomb exploded, killing several embassy employees and heavily damaging the building. In Beirut, in 1972, terrorists parked a car across the street from the U.S. Embassy, and then fired rocket-propelled grenades at the chancery through two holes cut in the vehicle’s body panels.⁴¹ In Lagos, Nigeria, during the Biafra civil war, the limits of physical security became evident. A mob gathered and threw stones at the Embassy (it had been attacked twice previously). The Marine Security Guards were not allowed to carry weapons, so the RSO issued them baseball bats. Similar problems also existed within allied countries. By 1968, with anti-American sentiment high and U.S. relations with Western Europe “having deteriorated to an alarming degree,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Gentile recommended
that SY relocate 26 percent of its personnel from its regional operations center in Frankfurt to offices in Washington, DC.¹²

Meanwhile, 1968 – the same year that witnessed the murders of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Robert Kennedy—also found U.S. officials recognizing that terrorists and guerrillas had begun to target U.S. diplomats for kidnappings and murder. During an attempted abduction, Marxist guerrillas killed U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon Mein on the streets of Guatemala City. One year later, Brazilian Marxist guerrillas kidnapped U.S. Ambassador to Brazil C. Burke Elbrick. The Nixon Administration pressured the Brazilian Government to meet the kidnappers’ demands (the release of 15 jailed Communists), and the Brazilian Government did, whereupon the kidnappers released Elbrick. In 1970, the Tupamaros, a revolutionary Marxist guerilla group in Uruguay, abducted and held for ransom Daniel Mitrione, a U.S. police officer who served as an adviser to the Uruguayan police. In this instance, the Nixon Administration stepped back and did not pressure Uruguayan officials to meet the kidnappers’ demands. Ten days later, the Tupamaros killed Mitrione.¹³

Ambassador Mein’s murder sent a shock wave through the Department, in part, because he was the first U.S. Ambassador killed in the performance of duty.¹⁴ SY responded by initiating a “pilot project” for armored vehicles, but soon found that the cost of such vehicles prohibited each U.S. Embassy from purchasing one. While commercially procured armored vehicles had a price tag of $50,000, Department automobiles armored by SY personnel

---

Figure 7: U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon Mein. Mein was killed by leftist guerrillas on the streets of Guatemala City. His death led SY to begin a pilot project for armoring cars for U.S. Ambassadors overseas. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.

Figure 8: Uruguayan Commemorative Stamp in honor of Daniel Mitrione issued in 1992. The Public Safety Officer for the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, Mitrione was kidnapped and then killed on August 10, 1972, by Tupamaros guerrillas. The Tupamaros, like the Montoneros (Argentina) and MIR (Chile), adopted Guevara-type guerrilla tactics, and at times, threatened U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

cost $25,000, with $19,500 of that cost for bulletproof glass. Another option for SY, one which cost only $5,000, was to partially armor embassy cars, without bulletproof glass. SY officials chose this latter course, and Seabees and SO(T)s worked in teams to armor vehicles for select posts, with some teams able to armor a vehicle in less than a day.\textsuperscript{15}

The kidnapping of Ambassador Elbrick prompted the Department to enact extensive changes to physical and personnel security at U.S. posts overseas. In an instruction to the region’s diplomatic and consular posts, SY and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) warned that it had become “all too apparent that American official personnel are now potential targets.” Embassies in Latin America convened their Security Watch Committees to evaluate threats and determine the necessary measures for security preparedness. SY augmented Marine Security Guard forces for several Embassies, such as those in Brazil and Argentina; replaced older vehicles of Embassy motor pools; expanded the use of “follow” cars for Ambassadors; and provided more money for mission security expenses. Embassies built or upgraded fences and walls at chanceries and Ambassadors’ residences, installed emergency generators, upgraded lighting, and added vault doors and window grills.\textsuperscript{16}

SY did not restrict its efforts to the Western Hemisphere. In Europe, it elevated protection for U.S. Ambassadors to Great Britain, Belgium, and West Germany, whom SY believed were the most likely to be targets of violence.\textsuperscript{17} SY organized a “mobile reserve” of equipment that could be shipped to any mission during “extreme emergencies.” SY and ARA, with a representative from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, formed a Departmental Working Group to study the issue of protecting U.S. personnel “on a world-wide basis.” Finally, the Department of State also approached the Vatican, and asked it to lend its moral authority to help protect diplomats and to assist in negotiations should U.S. diplomats be kidnapped.\textsuperscript{18}

Figure 9: C. Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil. Elbrick was kidnapped by MR8 Marxist guerrillas in September 1969. At the Nixon Administration’s urging, the government of Brazil met the guerrillas’ demands, and released Elbrick after four days. Elbrick’s kidnapping prompted SY to make many changes in security, particularly overseas security. Elbrick’s ordeal is told in the 1997 film, Four Days in September.  Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
In the wake of Elbrick’s kidnapping, SY admitted that the abductions of and attacks on U.S. personnel “show[ed] no sign of abatement;” and it and other offices in the Department began to formalize procedures for U.S. posts to undertake in the event of a terrorist incident. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management William B. Macomber, Jr., advocated developing a formal policy regarding kidnapping, but Secretary of State William P. Rogers preferred an “ad hoc policy on kidnappings.” Under the direction of Gentile, SY devised a four-phase plan that outlined “graduated responses” to threats against its missions and staff. The four phases were “Early Warning,” “Clear Existence of Threat,” “Clear Existence of Intense Threat,” and “Unacceptable Level of Threat.” Actions to be taken in the first phase, Early Warning, were demonstrated by the efforts taken in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) after Elbrick’s kidnapping in Brazil. U.S. officials, in consultation with Ceylonese officials, reviewed the situation and deemed the threat minimal, took precautionary measures, and reviewed the situation periodically. The second phase, Clear Existence of Threat, demanded actions similar to those taken by U.S. posts in Latin America in the wake of Elbrick’s kidnapping. Phase Three required all dependents and non-essential personnel to evacuate the country, and the post to move the remaining staff into easier-to-protect buildings. “Unacceptable Level of Threat,” the fourth phase meant that U.S. posts should implement their emergency plans and evacuate the country. In 1971, a more extensive, sophisticated version of this phased plan was distributed, with addenda on personal safety and defensive driving.

SY also outlined a four-stage sequence that U.S. posts should follow in case they required additional protection. The sequence advised embassies first to consult with the host government, which bore the primary responsibility for providing security for foreign missions. If the host country provided extra guards and an incident occurred (e.g., a shoot-out), it would be a local issue under the responsibility of the host government, not a diplomatic incident between the United States and the host nation. As a second stage, SY recommended that U.S. posts examine the possibility of hiring local, reputable, professional guards. If that was not possible, then, as a third option, U.S. security officers might be made available. Gentile made clear that hiring additional Marine Security Guards was to be a last resort, partly due to questions of immunity and jurisdiction. Moreover, since many Marines had served a tour of duty in

Figure 10: Marine Security Guard Post 1 at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, circa 1970. The glass, openness, and easy access made U.S. embassies in the 1960s difficult to protect. Initially, upon the emergence of terrorist attacks by individuals and small groups, SY instituted several changes including a four-stage emergency plan, screening of visitors, access controls, more Marine Security Guards, and extra local guards to increase security. Source: Department of State, Office of the Historian Files.
Vietnam, the Commandant of the Marine Corps made clear that it was “somewhat unfair to ask that a twenty year-old veteran of Viet Nam, whose reflexes have been sharpened by combat, [to] exercise the restraint and cool judgment” required on protective security assignments.22

Reactions by host governments to U.S. requests for added protection were mixed. Some governments, such as those of Ecuador, Tunisia, Lebanon, Ethiopia, and Portugal, cooperated and increased protective details for U.S. diplomats with their military and police forces.23 In Chile, with a presidential election campaign underway, one candidate had accused the government of permitting a “climate of violence” to prevail. The incumbent Chilean Government believed that obvious increases in security for U.S. diplomats would confirm the accusation and perhaps unsettle the public. Instead, officials said that the Ambassador’s chauffeurs could carry firearms, and that the Embassy could hire private Chilean bodyguards. Chilean officials, however, would increase security if intelligence identified a specific threat, and the Chilean Government promised to discuss the matter and review security at future intervals.24

In its discussions with U.S. officials, the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry questioned the legal and diplomatic status of Marine Security Guards. U.S. officials had been quiet and careful about the presence of U.S. Marines at its Embassies, at times insisting that the Marines wear civilian clothes or grow their hair beyond regulation. Although the Uruguayans determined that the Marines merited the privileges and immunities extended to other U.S. Embassy employees, U.S. security concerns had raised the Uruguayans’ awareness of the Marines’ presence, and their anxieties over a possible clash between Marines and locals. Despite their concerns, Uruguayan officials assisted U.S. officials in improving the security of the chancery and Ambassador’s residence, as well as implementing the protective measures for the Embassy staff.25

Elbrick’s kidnapping in Brazil led SY to create two new programs. First, SY officials turned the pilot project for armored vehicles into the formal Protective Security Vehicle Program. This enabled SY to not only purchase fully protective security vehicles, but also install mobile radios in Embassy vehicles, obtain kits to armor existing cars, and buy automobiles equipped with “high performance features.” The vehicles went to “high risk” posts such as Saigon, Beirut, and Montevideo. By 1972, SY could claim success for the armored vehicle program. In Phnom
Penh, Cambodia, a bomb exploded near the Embassy’s armored vehicle, and the Chargé d’Affaires, the Chargé’s
guard, and the chauffeur walked away unharmed.26

The second program SY created was the Mobile Reserve and Emergency Action Teams. The Mobile
Reserve consisted of a reserve of personnel and equipment that could be temporarily sent to a post where
kidnapping and terrorism threats were high. SY officials organized personnel into Emergency Action Teams,
the forerunner of Mobile Tactical Security Teams. The teams were three squads of four to five people each,
and were assigned as emergencies dictated. Once at post, an Emergency Action Team immediately conducted
a “detailed physical survey,” and determined the host government’s capability of protecting U.S. diplomatic
personnel. The squad also made recommendations for enhancing post security, and provided temporary
security services. If needed, the team could request additional Marine Guards for the Ambassador’s residence
or other post buildings.27

Protecting the Secretary

Protests, threats, and violence also occurred in the United States, and such threats raised concerns among
SY officials about whether they could provide “adequate” protection for the Secretary of State and visiting foreign
dignitaries. In 1970, Chief of Protective Services Keith O. “Jack” Lynch cited a notable increase in the number
of threats and demonstrations against the Secretary. The fact that local police departments, such as Washington
and Los Angeles, would not assign officers for 24-hour protective duty unless SY also assigned an agent further
compounded SY’s anxieties. The situation differed little with visiting dignitaries. When the Shah of Iran,
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, visited the United States, SY noted that he received “serious threats”
daily, forcing the office to devote many additional hours investigating and analyzing the threats, and
protecting the Shah.28

Several incidents in 1967, resulting from public
opposition to the Vietnam War, exposed the need for
more Special Agents on the Secretary of State’s detail.
During a speech given by Secretary Dean Rusk in
Los Angeles, 150 protesters held a demonstration
and a mock trial that found Rusk “guilty of gross war
crimes.” The judge of the mock trial was found to be
active in the Maoist Progressive Labor Party. Student
protesters at Indiana University prevented Rusk from

Figure 12: William “Bill” DeCourcy (left, with pin on
lapel, holding radio) protects Secretary of State Dean
Rusk in Oslo, Norway, during a 1966 visit. During the
1960s, large anti-war protests made ensuring the Secretary’s
speaking engagements outside Washington difficult. In
New York City, 1400 New York police were needed to
control multiple anti-Vietnam War groups protesting Rusk’s
appearance and assist with the protection of the Secretary of
State. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
delivering his speech. In New York City, multiple student protest groups demonstrated against his appearance at a speaking engagement, and more than 1,400 police officers were required to control the crowd. After the February 1968 Tet Offensive, antiwar protests further fueled SY’s concern for the Secretary’s safety, particularly at university campuses. The Secretary also received a substantial amount of crank mail on a regular basis, and since crank mail was directed more against the office than the individual, SY anticipated that such threats would continue no matter who served as Secretary of State.29

Despite the increasing threats, resource constraints prevented SY from providing 24-hour protection to the Secretary. In late 1968, SY rotated three agents for portal-to-portal protection for the Secretary. One Special Agent greeted the Secretary at his home, and escorted him to his office (handling the early shift). A second Special Agent took the late shift until the Secretary retired for the evening, and the third agent had the day off. The three agents were responsible for coordinating, arranging, and providing personal protection for the Secretary. The agents also worked to prevent any compromise of the Secretary's classified papers, and to stop any technical espionage of the Secretary’s voice communications. Rusk did receive 24-hour protection when he traveled overseas. In comparison, President Lyndon B. Johnson had approximately 25 Secret Service agents protecting him 24 hours a day, and in the wake of President Kennedy’s assassination, Johnson extended that protection to Presidential candidates, which required an additional 21 agents.30

The rise of terrorism led SY to expand the Secretary’s detail to 24-hour coverage during Secretary William Rogers's tenure (1969-1973). An incident at Rogers’s home, in part, motivated the decision to implement a 24-hour detail. On October 8, 1970, a car pulled into the Secretary’s driveway, and Rogers went out to see who it was. Although the men were well-dressed Drug Enforcement Agency agents, at least one SY agent shook his head in amazement that Rogers took the risk of going outside to the car. When Rogers's personal secretary, Maggie Runkel, heard of the situation, she immediately contacted Protective Services and insisted that the Secretary have 24-hour protection. Gentile ordered the 24-hour coverage to last until Rogers decided to terminate it, but Rogers never did.31

With 24-hour protection, the Secretary’s detail grew in personnel and resources, and in turn, it prompted the formalization and standardization of procedures. Four to five Special Agents now made up the detail, and the number increased when the Secretary traveled abroad. SY renovated Rogers’s garage into a command post, where SY Agents communicated with the Washington Field Office. A Marine guard joined the SY Agent during the night shift. SY also required that two men be with the Secretary at all times, and occasionally more if Rogers attended a public event or dinner. The detail began employing a follow-up car for the Secretary’s motorcade. SY agents now used walkie-talkies, and in 1970, the head of the Secretary's detail, William D’Urso, obtained an earpiece for his radio to coordinate protection. While the Department had leased a Cadillac from General Motors for the Secretary’s use, additional monies in 1971 allowed SY to purchase a Cadillac, and have a group of Seabees install armor plates and bulletproof glass. William DeCourcy, who preceded D’Urso as
head of the Secretary’s detail, instituted procedures that required Special Agents to escort the Secretary’s baggage to the plane and have the baggage x-rayed to prevent placement of bombs.\textsuperscript{32}

Even with added protection, Secretary Rogers faced harrowing experiences while traveling abroad. On July 31, 1969, he barely escaped injury at the Tokyo airport when a Japanese national charged at him with a knife, and SY Agent Joseph McNulty knocked the attacker to the ground. In May 1972, Rogers traveled to Reykjavík, Iceland, to speak at the local university, against the warnings of SY’s advance team and the objection of Secretary’s detail chief William D’Urso. Iceland’s Prime Minister had assured Rogers of his safety. During the speech, large anti-war demonstrations broke out, and Rogers and the SY detail had to fight through the crowd to leave the campus. Soon afterwards, the local police commander informed Rogers that they had to leave for the airport immediately or risk being cut off en route by the protesters, who were now threatening to use Molotov cocktails. They departed before the protesters could organize, and arrived safely at the airport.\textsuperscript{33}

Rogers’s attendance at the inauguration of Argentine President Hector José Cámpora Demaestre in May 1973 proved equally harrowing. A crowd of one million demonstrators formed, and plain-clothes police left rather than try to control the crowd. Ten motorcycle officers remained, one of whom was killed when a protester knocked him off his motorcycle. Fearing for Rogers’s safety, SY agents prepared to leave Buenos Aires, and hid the Secretary in a safe room until Argentine police backup arrived. When Argentine leaders learned of Rogers’s imminent departure, they doubled the forces protecting him in order to convince him to stay for the inaugural festivities.\textsuperscript{34}

Rogers had resisted protection during his golf outings, but this changed too. During an outing in Bermuda, six men with machetes emerged from the woods during a round of golf. The men were groundskeepers, but Rogers admitted that initially he was nervous. Afterwards he permitted SY Agents to accompany him during his golf outings.\textsuperscript{35}

The Chicago Incident

While the Secretary of State faced threats at home and abroad, foreign leaders worried about security threats when visiting the United States. Thailand, Colombia, France, Israel, Vietnam, and Mexico began to send advance teams to review security arrangements for their leaders. For SY, it became increasingly evident that even with intelligence provided by its Protective Support section, the Protective Services Division could not meet the protective demands of the foreign diplomats, heads of state, and prominent visitors with its available manpower. While the Secret Service received increased funding and resources during the late 1960s for its protective responsibilities, SY did not. SY’s Protective Services openly wondered if the President mistakenly believed that foreign dignitaries and the Secretary of State received the same protection as Presidential candidates. In fact, despite SY’s calls for additional resources, the office could assign only two qualified SY Special Agents and three Marines to protect visiting dignitaries. More Agents could be utilized if they were pulled off investigations and from other SY divisions. At a time when many heads of state visited the United States, SY could only protect those dignitaries deemed highly visible. Moreover, SY had one “fed pak”/radio-equipped vehicle for protective details, and agents had to rent cars if a detail required a follow-up car. SY Agent Dennis Williams recalled once renting the only available vehicle for a follow car at Washington National Airport: an orange Rambler station wagon. A visit by French President Georges Pompidou in early 1970 exposed the deficiency in resources and transformed protective security for visiting heads of state and dignitaries. Prior to his visit, Pompidou had sold more than 100 fighter jets to the Libyan regime of Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qaddafi, who openly espoused Arab nationalism, supported jihad, and defined “Zionism” and Israel as his enemy. The French sale of jets prompted protests by the U.S. Jewish community and others, who feared that French weapons would fall into the hands of other Arab extremists. Given the extremely strong sentiment against Pompidou—some protests numbered in the thousands—the Governor of New York, Nelson A. Rockefeller, and the Mayor of New York City, John Lindsay, refused to greet Pompidou officially or attend a dinner in his honor at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
Mayor Richard Daley had planned to be away when the French President was scheduled to visit his city. Only after a telephone call from National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger did Mayor Daley decide to stay and greet Pompidou. Nearly 100 members of Congress signed a petition and planned to boycott Pompidou’s speech to a joint session of that body. President Nixon was livid; H. R. Haldeman, Nixon’s Chief of Staff, remarked that it was the angriest he had seen Nixon since becoming President. Nixon told Kissinger, “I consider this unconscionable conduct towards an official guest of the United States of America, and I will not tolerate it.”

Events climaxed in Chicago. Someone pulled the Chicago police back from President Pompidou and his wife. Demonstrators closed in on the French couple, and one demonstrator spit on Madame Pompidou. She was so shaken by the incident that she was determined to return to Paris; meanwhile, the French President threatened to end his visit. As soon as Nixon heard of the incident, he told Emil “Bus” Mosbacher, Jr., the Chief of Protocol, to do whatever was necessary to ensure that Madame Pompidou stayed, and Mosbacher succeeded in persuading her. Nixon immediately altered his schedule, flew to New York, and attended the dinner in Pompidou’s honor at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. He apologized to Pompidou in person, and made kind, humorous remarks that “obviously moved” and “deeply touched” the French President.

The Chicago incident had diplomatic security and foreign policy consequences. Furious with the protesters, Nixon immediately postponed the delivery of 50 Phantom fighter jets to Israel, despite occasional skirmishes between Israel and its Arab neighbor states Egypt and Syria, and despite opposition from Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. Nixon claimed that he faced “a wave of criticism” from Congress and the press, yet he remained firm for 6 months. Then on September 15, 1970, Palestinian extremists supplied by Syria staged an uprising in Jordan that threatened civil war and the demise of Jordan’s King Hussein ibn Talal ibn ‘Abdallah. The Jordan crisis prompted Nixon to release the Phantom jets to Israel.

In the wake of the Pompidou incident, Nixon immediately called for new legislation that transferred the responsibility of protecting foreign dignitaries from the Department of State to the Secret Service. John W. Dean, Counsel to the President, petitioned the Departments of State and the Treasury to develop legislation that reflected Nixon’s wishes. Lawyers from the two Departments favored revising existing arrangements, not a total reorganization. The Secret Service also sought to preserve SY’s involvement in

Figure 15: The Chinese table tennis team visits Robert Mondavi and Margrit Biever at their home in California. After the Pompidou incident, SY was asked to protect the Chinese table tennis team (part of “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” and Nixon’s opening to the People’s Republic of China) as it toured the United States. Headed by Bill DeCourcy, the SY protection team received fulsome praise for its work, rebuilding its reputation. Source: © Associated Press.

protective details. William Dickey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, even asked the Secretary of State to maintain oversight over dignitary protection, with the Secret Service providing additional security protection. Nevertheless, the task for protecting foreign diplomats was transferred to the Secret Service and staffed by its Executive Protective Service (EPS).

Despite the transfer of protective duties, SY continued to receive protective assignments; and one assignment, the Chinese table tennis team, did much to rebuild SY’s reputation. Nixon and Kissinger secretly had begun to explore the possibility of improving U.S. relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) after two decades of hostility, tension, and non-recognition. In April 1971, the PRC Government invited a U.S. table tennis team to visit. The invitation and visit led to a gradual thawing of relations and a visit by President Nixon to China in February 1972. In April, the Secret Service turned down a White House request to provide protection for the Chinese table tennis team during its visit to the United States, prompting Special Assistant to the President John Scali to contact SY Director Marvin Gentile. Gentile accepted the assignment, and tasked protection of the 70-person ping-pong team to Protective Services. SY Agent William DeCourcy organized and led the protective detail, which was assisted by a Marine detail and Army intelligence officers. SY’s Protective Support section provided intelligence, and Protective Services acted as the liaison with local law enforcement in the cities the table tennis team visited. Much to DeCourcy’s frustration, the White House frequently tried to change the team’s schedule. While a few people, such as fundamentalist preacher Carl McIntyre, tried to disrupt the exhibition games, SY led a smooth operation that received extensive praise.

When Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973, he broke with tradition and did not accept the protective detail offered by SY. He preferred the Secret Service detail that he had while serving as National Security Adviser, as well as the White House Communications Agency capabilities he enjoyed. A six-month struggle ensued, during which both the Secret Service and SY Agents staffed Kissinger’s detail. SY insisted that they were responsible for the Secretary’s protection, and Secretary Kissinger insisted upon a Secret Service detail. The Secret Service eventually agreed to provide the protection, on the condition that
they and the Department conclude a reimbursable, annually renewable agreement. The compromise allowed SY to retain “the basic responsibility for the personal protection of the Secretary,” with the Secret Service merely assisting on “an ad hoc basis.” Kissinger’s decision created resentment among SY agents who took pride in having protected every Secretary since Cordell Hull. Kissinger did request that SY protect his wife, Nancy Maginnes, and SY Agents were again travelling and working directly with the Secret Service detail.

**Munich**

The 1972 Munich hostage crisis marked a three-fold turning point for diplomatic security. On September 5, 1972, international television viewers of the Munich Olympic Games watched in rapt horror as the Palestinian terrorist group Black September took the Israeli Olympic team hostage, and killed one athlete and a coach. When the West German government attempted a rescue, a gun battle ensued and the terrorists killed their Israeli hostages. First, Munich brought diplomatic security to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns, where it would remain. Second, the brutal killings implanted terrorism as one of the three fundamental axes upon which SY (and later DS) would operate. SY had focused on background investigations, evaluations, and overseas security since its founding, but Munich shifted SY’s focus to the axes of terrorism, technology, and personnel (investigations and evaluations were collapsed into one). Third, Munich brought the Secretary of State, the White House, and Congress into the policymaking process for diplomatic security.

Upon news of Munich, SY immediately worked to elevate protection of Jewish diplomatic offices across the United States. SY called upon the local police forces of major cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Houston, Atlanta, and Los Angeles to assist in protecting Israeli posts, consulates, commercial and visa offices, as well as local synagogues. SY also asked local police to increase security at airports. In addition, SY requested police protection for West German, Soviet, and Arab missions and commercial offices. In anticipation of upcoming visits by Israeli dignitaries, SY coordinated with the Secret Service to provide heightened protection for Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who would attend the UN General Assembly meetings in New York, and Israeli Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir, who would meet with the International Monetary Fund. SY also worked with the Secret Service and the U.S. Park Police to provide extensive protective arrangements for the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra’s visit to Washington, DC.

![Figure 17: One of the Black September terrorists steps out onto the balcony, where the Israeli Olympic team was being held hostage at the Munich Olympic Games. The hostages were later killed. Munich changed diplomatic security and U.S. counter-terrorism policy. After Munich, SY changed its focus to terrorism, protection, and technology, the Department of State created an Office of Counter-Terrorism, and the Nixon Administration developed a negotiations policy for U.S. diplomatic hostage situations. Source: © Associated Press](image-url)

As SY stepped up its protective measures, Nixon considered it of “the utmost importance that [the United States] move urgently and efficiently to attack” terrorism. The U.S. Government, he believed, needed to take further measures to protect Americans and foreign diplomats in the United States and to develop contingency plans for hijackings, kidnappings, and other terrorist situations. He formed an intelligence committee to develop cooperation between intelligence services of the United States and friendly allied governments in order to identify potential terror threats. Nixon asked Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to head the committee.50

Nixon also created a cabinet-level committee, the Committee to Combat Terrorism. He asked Secretary Rogers to chair it, and its members included Deputy Assistant Secretary Marvin Gentile, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney General, the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the National Security Adviser. Nixon assigned four tasks to the Committee: coordinate activities to prevent terrorism; evaluate preventative activities and programs and recommend ways to improve their implementation; devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism; and make recommendations for funding. The Committee also was to oversee efforts to prevent terrorism, including the “collection of intelligence worldwide, physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad, and protection of foreign diplomats and diplomatic posts in the United States.” The Committee was additionally tasked to address potential terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, as well as terrorist threats against foreign diplomats and dignitaries in the United States. As the chair of the Committee, Secretary Rogers particularly wanted to “take every action possible to preclude” a terrorist incident against foreign diplomats in the United States, which could “cause immediate adverse international reactions.”51

To carry out its tasks, the Committee created the Inter-Agency Working Group on Terrorism. Joseph F. Donelan, Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, headed the Working Group, which included representatives from SY, the FBI, the CIA, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Treasury Department. As the first interagency group devoted to analyzing terrorism on a regular basis, the Working Group coordinated the multiple agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism, evaluated existing counterterrorism measures, and recommended new measures and strategies. The group considered intelligence gathering to be imperative, as well as a clear delineation of jurisdiction and responsibilities for the various agencies so that there would not be any confusion or delay during a crisis.
Since the FBI had the broadest law enforcement mandate, Donelan proposed designating the FBI as the coordinating agency for counterterrorism, but the Department of State assumed the responsibility. Ambassador Armin H. Meyer soon succeeded Donelan, and his title became Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combating Terrorism. Located in the Office of the Secretary of State, Meyer’s office assumed the acronym S/CT; and he reported directly to the Secretary.\(^5\)

Under Rogers’s direction, the Department of State initiated measures to identify and monitor possible terrorists within the United States and among applicants for U.S. visas. The Department required all foreign visitors to the United States to carry visas; however, the anti-terror measures focused on persons travelling from the Middle East. In a joint effort between the Department, FBI, and INS, Rogers instituted a special operation to identify terrorists before they entered the United States. Three days after Munich, Rogers ordered all U.S. posts to screen visa applicants closely. Ten days later, the order expanded into a program that, in addition to close screening, required posts to wire a list of all potential suspect visa applicants to Washington under a special code name. In Washington, SY Special Agent Paul Sorenson served as the expediting officer, and was notified when a person with a specific type of name requested a visa or passport. Upon such notification, Sorenson called Customs, the FBI, the CIA, and INS to check the name and provide a response within 24 hours. Rogers allowed exemptions for ambassadors, diplomatic officers, and aides, but not for celebrities. Department officials admitted that the program created “a bureaucratic storm of paperwork,” and a few complaints emerged from Middle Eastern ambassadors; however, the program continued until 1976.\(^5\)

The Nixon Administration also pressed for and obtained new anti-terrorism legislation. Congress authorized the President “to suspend airline service to and from any country which aids, harbors, or is host to hijackers and/or terrorist groups, or fails to take adequate precautions to guard against hijacking.”\(^5\) At the personal urging of Secretary Rogers, Congress also passed a law that made it a federal offense to commit serious crimes (i.e. murder, assault, harassment, property damage) against foreign diplomats and official guests of the United States. Originally proposed in 1971 but given urgency after Munich, the law also defined a perimeter of 100 feet around any building used by foreign governments for diplomatic, consular, or official purposes (the latter to
include diplomatic residences). The law stipulated that it was illegal “to intimidate, coerce, threaten, or harass any foreign official,” as well as to bring an official or foreign government “into public odium or disrepute.”

The Nixon Administration also began working through the United Nations to combat the threat of terrorism and establish international counterterrorist measures. Secretary Rogers spoke to the UN General Assembly when it met one month after the Munich Olympic incident. In his remarks, Rogers noted that in the past five years, 27 diplomats from 11 countries had been kidnapped and 3 had been killed. “The issue is not war…[or] the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence,” Rogers observed, “it is whether the vulnerable lines of international communication…can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together.” He called upon the General Assembly to draft an international treaty for strict punishment of perpetrators of terrorist acts. He recommended swift prosecution and/or extradition of those responsible for attacking or kidnapping diplomats or foreign government officials, and called for the suspension of air service to countries that failed to punish hijackers or saboteurs of civil aircraft. Working with UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, the United States tried to get the measures passed; however, African delegates joined with Arab delegates to create a “weak” resolution “geared for little or no progress.”

Also in the wake of Munich, the Nixon Administration developed its policy for negotiations with terrorists who held U.S. diplomats hostage. The Nixon Administration noted that the Palestinian terrorists had not hesitated to follow through on their threats to kill the Israeli athletes. As a result, Nixon and Kissinger had adopted a new policy that one former Department of State officer referred to as the “three noes: no negotiations with hostage-takers, no deals with them, and no concessions to them.” The policy change was not written down, reviewed for its implications, formalized, nor even announced. Furthermore, it was not the policy that the FBI followed within U.S. borders.

Figure 20: Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management William B. Macomber, Jr. Macomber called for a formal policy for diplomatic hostage situations. He travelled with SY Director Marvin Gentile to Haiti and Sudan to head negotiations during both hostage crises. He and Gentile only made it to Cairo before Black September terrorists killed Ambassadors Cleo Noel, Jr., and George Curtis Moore in Khartoum. Macomber also appointed Gladys Rogers as his Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, in order to break down many gender barriers and create opportunities for women in the Department, including SY. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
The new policy was tested twice in early 1973, with differing results. In January, Haitian gunmen captured and held at gunpoint U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Clinton E. Knox. The gunmen demanded the release of 31 colleagues from jail, transportation out of Haiti, and $1 million in cash. Deputy Under Secretary of State Macomber, accompanied by SY Director Gentile, flew to Haiti, and told the Haitian President, dictator Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, that the United States would neither pay ransom payments nor grant concessions to the gunmen. Duvalier disagreed, and successfully negotiated the release of Knox. After Knox’s kidnapping, Armin Meyer, head of the Office for Combating Terrorism, drafted a Department of State instruction for all diplomatic and consular posts that outlined the Administration’s new hostage policy. However, no senior Department of State official, including Secretary of State Rogers and Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, would sign the memorandum, and the instruction was not sent.

The Foreign Service and U.S. public learned of the Nixon White House’s new policy two months later, during a Presidential press conference. In March 1973, eight members of Black September stormed the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and took several guests hostage, including U.S. Ambassador George Curtis Moore, and his recently arrived replacement, Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr. The terrorists demanded the release of 60 Palestinians being held in Jordan, all female Arab prisoners held by Israel, Robert Kennedy’s assassin Sirhan Sirhan, and the Bader-Meinhoff Gang members held in Germany. The demands were soon reduced to only 17 Palestinians held in Jordan. Macomber and Gentile left for Khartoum. In the meantime, Nixon told a reporter during a press conference that the United States would not be “giving in to blackmail demands.” Shortly after the President’s statement, the terrorists shot Moore and Noel. It is not clear if the terrorists heard Nixon’s statement, but the U.S. Embassy in Sudan reported that it was one of the reasons that the terrorists decided to kill the two U.S. diplomats.

The Nixon Administration informed all posts by airgram on April 1, 1974, that it had “adopted a policy not to pay ransom and to discourage other governments, companies, and individuals from making such payments.” It also would not yield to international blackmail. According to the instruction, the Administration sought three objectives in a hostage situation: release of the hostages, non-acquiescence to terrorist demands, and prosecution of the terrorists. As “a last resort,” the Administration would accept “the Bangkok solution,” which was release of the hostages in exchange for freedom for the terrorists.

There was “considerable” dissent over the new policy, particularly among the middle and lower ranks of Foreign Service Officers who believed that their lives were being sacrificed for the sake of a policy. With opposition to the policy building within Department ranks, a May 1976 telegram to all missions sought to explain the Administration’s policy. The telegram said that 24 hostages had been seized in the last 18 months out of the “hundreds of thousands of Americans living or traveling abroad,” and that in spite of the existing policy, 21 of them had been released unharmed. Statistics, however, did little to assuage the ire of the Department’s rank-and-file, and on July 16, 1976, dissent broke out into the open. Chaired by Peter Lydon, a Foreign Service Officer who served on the Policy Planning
Staff, the Secretary’s Open Forum sent a letter to Secretary Kissinger, informing him of “a certain disquiet among Foreign Service professionals” about the no ransom/no deals policy. The primary objection was that while the Nixon Administration insisted on a tough policy towards terrorists, it had done little to bring the terrorists who had killed Moore, Noel, and other Foreign Service Officers to justice. The eight terrorists had been convicted in Sudan and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Sudanese court, however, reduced their sentence to 7 years, and the men were later transferred to Egypt, where they served their prison sentences. In addition, the Open Forum objected to the fact that the Nixon White House had recently welcomed the President of Sudan on an official visit to Washington—the same President who had released the terrorists responsible for the deaths of Moore and Noel to Egypt. The Open Forum insisted that U.S. policy regarding terrorist incidents be subjected to a “systematic review.”

The Open Forum’s objections had already received attention in the months following the Khartoum crisis. Seven months after the Khartoum incident (in October 1973), the Administration hired the Rand Corporation to examine the negotiations policy, as well as “the whole question of negotiating for the release of kidnapped diplomats,” and to offer recommendations. The resulting study was an “indictment of the hard-line policy.” The Inter-Agency Working Group on Terrorism accepted several recommendations of the Rand Corporation study, including having high-level U.S. government officials remain silent during the crisis, screening information (particularly biographic information) about the hostages to the press, and expanding the Working Group to add psychiatrists and police experts.

The Foreign Service Association also opposed the Administration’s hard-line policy, and it moved on two fronts to have the policy revised. The Association formed the Working Group on Terrorism and Extraordinary Dangers to study the events in Khartoum and the new policy. Second, it insisted that if the Nixon Administration was going to adhere to the no-deals policy, it needed to take a hard line against governments that supported terror.

Figure 21: Francis E Meloy, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. Meloy was conducting talks with rival groups in Lebanon. On the way to a meeting across the Green Line, Meloy’s follow-up car broke off early, and the Ambassador was not seen again. His body, as well as that of Economic Counselor Robert O. Waring, were found later in west Beirut. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
The Open Forum and the Foreign Service Association received little comfort from the top echelons of the Kissinger-led Department of State. Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management Lawrence S. Eagleburger communicated the Seventh Floor’s response to both organizations. To the Open Forum, Eagleburger reiterated the no ransom/no deals policy. He branded the Open Forum’s charge that the Administration had made little effort to bring the perpetrators to justice as “insulting and misleading,” and insisted that “everything possible is being done.” The Foreign Service Association received word from an aide that Kissinger considered their objections “out of order.” Eagleburger told both groups that with regards to the punishment of terrorists, “policy interests would on occasion override other considerations.”

When President Jimmy Carter took office in January 1977, U.S. policy toward terrorism and hostages changed. In early 1977, the Department of State under Secretary Cyrus Vance redefined its goals. While deterring terrorism and denying success to terrorists remained one goal, a new objective consisted of “protect[ing] and sav[ing] the lives of hostages and victims of attacks.” In 1980, when Egyptians suggested releasing the eight men convicted of the deaths of Moore and Noel, the Carter Administration vehemently opposed it. The Carter Administration’s change in policy proved permanent. Under President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989), protection of Department of State employees and dependents remained a policy aim.

**A Climate of Terrorism**

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos acknowledged in April 1975 that the “indiscriminate bombings of U.S. installations,” “the kidnapping and murder of diplomatic personnel,” and other incidents had created “a climate of terrorism.” Indeed, concerns over the protection of U.S. personnel abroad had grown significantly within the Department after the abduction and killing of Moore and Noel in Khartoum. Other incidents fueling the concerns included the 1975 kidnapping and murder of U.S. Consul John Patrick Egan in Córdoba, Argentina, and the 1976 murder of U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Francis E. Meloy.

The climate of terrorism existed domestically as well; on January 29, 1975, shortly after midnight, a bomb exploded on the third floor of Main State. Described as “a damn big bomb” by a Washington,
DC, police sergeant, the bomb damaged offices of the East Asia and Africa Bureaus of the Agency for International Development (AID) on the 23rd Street side of the building. Broken water pipes caused considerable water damage to the offices below on the second and first floors, including the office of Joe H. Morton, chief of SY’s Division of Investigations. The far-left Weather Underground (a splinter group of the Weathermen) claimed responsibility and was targeting AID, which was “an instrument for U.S. domination and control throughout the world, not a charitable agency.” In a 12-page manifesto, the Weather Underground charged that President Gerald R. Ford “continues to wage war in Vietnam and Cambodia,” that “US involvement in Vietnam is a chain of lies,” and that the Ford Administration “grossly violated” and was “repudiating” the Paris Peace Accords.70

Although the Department of State was “one of the most closely guarded buildings” in Washington, DC, the bombing occurred shortly after building security had been relaxed. After a series of bombings of public buildings in 1970, the Department had increased the number of Federal Protective Service (FPS) guards at its entrances, and the FPS guards began inspecting all packages and briefcases entering the Department and restricting those who could enter the building. During the seven months prior to the bombing, the number of FPS guards was reduced 20 percent (from 70 to 57) as a cost-saving measure. Despite the bombing, some Department officials expressed concern that building security would become “too stringent:” “If you attempt to close the building down in a mindless sort of way[,] you make a fortress out the place.”71

The threat of terrorism abroad and at home led SY to engage in more extensive efforts to protect Department personnel and to deter terrorist incidents. Most terrorist attacks in the late 1960s and early 1970s involved a single person or a small group employing a package bomb, a car bomb, or in the case of Beirut, a rocket-propelled grenade to inflict fear. SY pursued measures that aimed at deterring terrorist acts by individuals or small groups. The measures followed two lines: personnel training and physical security. SY adjusted the training of Regional Security
Officers, and by 1974, protective and preventative measures comprised more than one-half of seminar-training time for RSOs. In fact one day was devoted to “improvised explosive devices,” emergency procedures, and control plans. SY also circulated articles on hostage negotiations and hostage survival, and guidelines for hostage situations, to its RSOs.72

To train Department personnel at overseas posts, SY developed Mobile Training Teams (MTTs). With Russ Waller, SY’s resident locksmith, as one of the program’s leaders, an MTT consisted of two SY agents who visited a post and conducted training for all post personnel. Posts were notified in advance and requested to schedule time (two to five days) and facilities for training. Training included defensive driving, reacting to bomb threats, residential security, personal security, and first aid. When possible, the teams held “hands-on” sessions for defensive driving and personal protection. Given the number of posts, MTTs conducted “tours,” with Tour 1 travelling to 30 posts in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. There were three teams to a tour, with each team visiting approximately 10 posts per tour. By August 1976, the MTTs had conducted 4 tours, visited 107 posts, and trained over 9,000 Department officers and employees. The MTTs conducted two more tours in 1977, and in that same year, SY made arrangements with the Foreign Service Institute to conduct mandatory three-day briefings of all persons assigned overseas.73

SY also moved to improve the physical security of U.S. posts overseas. It began installing shatterproof or bulletproof glass in U.S. embassies, consulates, and residences, or applying Mylar film to all windows. Marine Security Guards were placed in reinforced
control booths. SY engineers installed alarm systems, better lighting, and closed-circuit television cameras. Many embassies built perimeter walls or fences, and the perimeter was extended further out from post buildings. SY expanded Marine Security Guard details at posts, increased Local Guard service to 24-hour protection, and hired bodyguards for ambassadors at high-threat embassies. Even U.S. embassies previously considered “safe” gained Marine Security Guard details, grillwork on windows, alarm systems, fences, and night guards or patrols.74

The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires reflected the means and extent to which SY would go to protect U.S. diplomats overseas in the wake of Munich and Khartoum. Argentina had what the Committee to Combat Terrorism characterized as “the most virulent terrorism in Latin America.” Terrorist groups from the left and the right operated in the country, and acted against “carefully chosen” targets.75 RSO George “Bullets” Beckett supervised a protective detail of approximately 300 men, and part of that “small army” was a 6-man U.S. Marine Corps Personal Protective Security Unit (PPSU). A new development in response to the rise of terrorism, PPSUs consisted of Marines who qualified as expert marksmen with a variety of firearms, were trained in hand-to-hand combat, and were expert drivers. In addition to the PPSU, the Embassy’s protective security force included 16 Marine Security Guards and 270 Argentine Federal Police officers, as well as several off-duty police officers. Two police officers guarded each member of the Ambassador’s family 24 hours a day. The Ambassador’s car was armor-plated, with bulletproof tires. The car could make a sharp turn at 60 miles per hour, and had a fire suppression system that could cover the engine in foam in 5 seconds. The Ambassador’s residence also contained a “safe haven.” It had a room lined with steel, bulletproof windows, a 10-day supply of food and water, and the ability to flood the rest of the residence with tear gas.76

Figure 26: George Beckett, the Regional Security Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, had a “small army” (more than 300 men) to protect the U.S. Ambassador from the Montoneros and other leftist guerrilla groups engaged in terror in Argentina. He is shown here as an instructor at the SY Training Center. Source: SY Focus.
The “safe haven” in the Ambassador’s residence in Buenos Aires marked another development in diplomatic security—improved physical security. After Khartoum, SY received greater funds to protect embassies. Safe rooms, or reinforced rooms with strong doors, were constructed within an embassy to protect personnel in the case of an attack (sometimes it was the communications vault).77

“Access controls” were another modification. Since 1959, SY had defined physical security construction standards for U.S. diplomatic buildings;78 however, in the 1970s, access controls modified public areas (usually lobbies, visa offices) to prevent access by terrorist groups, individuals, or package bombs. In lobbies and public areas, the Marine Security Guard was moved to a reinforced control booth with shatterproof or bulletproof glass. From there, Marine Security Guards could monitor closed circuit television cameras and alarm indicators, as well as all persons and deliveries coming into the building. Control doors, electrically operated by the Marine Security Guard in the booth, were installed to restrict access to internal areas of the chancery or consulate. Metal detectors were set up, and all visitors and packages were required to pass through them before proceeding into the building. Turnstile-type doors were used for exit doors in some buildings, preventing individuals from reentering.79

Access controls and other efforts during this period were not “concerted programs” because physical security at U.S. embassies in the 1970s depended upon individual RSOs and upon the support that the post’s RSO received from the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, and the Administrative Officer. Often, there was only one Post Security Officer at a post, joined by a Marine Security Guard detail and locally hired guards. There was no “security” budget, and funds for security improvements fell under the control of the post’s Administration Officer,
constituted expenditures from his/her budget, and depended upon the other expenses in the Administration budget. Also, SY did not have enough people to install all of the alarm systems, CCTVs, access controls, and other equipment requested, and it needed to hire additional technical engineers. Another potential obstacle was the Foreign Buildings Office, because SY’s security modifications were often viewed as marred “beautiful buildings.”

SY relied upon cooperation, liaisons, and information-sharing to meet and even anticipate security threats. Like Beckett had done in Argentina, many RSOs and Post Security Officers maintained contacts with local police forces, in part, because they provided protection for an embassy and residences, but also because local police provided information about the various threats to an embassy and visiting U.S. officials. Such cooperation represented the overseas version of what SY had long done with local police forces in the United States when protecting visiting foreign dignitaries. In 1976, SY developed these relationships formally, and created the Protective Liaison Staff. Under the leadership of William DeCourcy, the division sought to develop stronger working relationships and exchanges of information with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies within and outside the United States.

SY’s focus upon cooperation and information-sharing led to the creation of the Command Center and the Threat Analysis Group in June 1976. Although there had been an informal coordination center since 1966, operating under names such as “Crest Control” and “Division Control,” the single desk used to coordinate the Secretary’s detail quite simply was not going to suffice. As a result of the many foreign dignitaries visiting Washington for the 1976 Bicentennial celebration, John F. Perdew was asked to formalize SY’s “Command Center.” Perdew developed the idea of a 24-hours-a-day, 7-days-a-week “Command Center” that contained a Watch Officer Group and a Threat Analysis Group.

The Watch Officer Group (WOG) consisted of 10 watch officers rotating in pairs, each pair serving an 8-hour shift, and it fulfilled a number of crucial responsibilities. The WOG received, recorded, and disseminated information, intelligence, and protective security requests. It also assumed operations and alert activities for SY after working hours. The WOG coordinated protective security details, and maintained continuous telephone contact with RSOs.
around the world. In addition, it provided support and communications during crisis situations. To accomplish these tasks, the WOG monitored the Department’s unclassified and classified communications traffic, as well as the Reuters, Associated Press, and United Press International news services for security-related information. The information was passed to the Threat Analysis Group, but it also allowed the Command Center to alert SY agents in the United States or overseas to a particular threat. Also, RSOs could call the 24-hour command center with questions, concerns, or crises, instead of calling Gentile or Dikeos, or the Foreign Operations division. The WOG had radio coverage of the entire Washington metropolitan area, and access to the Federal Telephone Service (FTS), London toll, and international telephone systems. It also had direct lines to the Department’s Operations Center and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In addition, the Command Center could access the National Crime Information Center, which contained information on wanted individuals, arrest warrants issued, criminal history records, and stolen property such as cars, boats, and guns. The WOG also had access to a name index of those involved in customs violations and terrorist activity maintained by the Treasury Department’s Enforcement Communications Systems.

The Threat Analysis Group (TAG), first headed by Concetta Conigliaro, constituted the other component of the Command Center. TAG was a small cohort of analysts who read departmental communications traffic and news stories, and spoke with post RSOs, country desk officers, and local U.S. police forces to determine the threat posed to a particular dignitary visiting the United States or to a particular U.S. post overseas. The analysts specialized by geographic region and submitted written reports of threats and threat situation at various posts or in various countries or cities. TAG also kept a name list of persons or groups that threatened the Secretary or a visiting dignitary.

The Command Center proved an immediate success and earned high praise, largely because SY took advantage of a source of information often overlooked by other agencies: local police forces. In the face of regional and international terrorist threats, the Command Center permitted SY to look across national boundaries, drawing upon information from multiple posts and sources, notably RSOs’ contacts with local police forces. One agent admitted that much security-related information did not go through the Department’s Operations Center because it was not related to political news. This enabled the Command Center, on occasion, to “ace out” the Operations Center, with the subsequent order to brief Operations. The coordination and threat analysis also enabled SY to increase protective security when and where needed.

**Realigned by Terrorism**

When Deputy Assistant Secretary Dikeos reorganized SY in 1975, the degree to which terrorism had changed SY became evident. Dikeos, an FSO who had risen through the Administration cone and had cracked the 1961 Scarbeck spy case, said that SY had “undergone a metamorphosis” after Munich and Khartoum. The office had transformed from a “small, fraternal organization” to “one of the largest single offices and corps of
As a result, Dikeos’ 1975 reorganization differed sharply from that undertaken by Gentile ten years earlier. When Gentile reorganized SY in 1965, he divided SY into two large groupings: “Personnel Security,” which encompassed Investigations, Evaluations, and Protective Security, and “Domestic and Foreign Security,” which addressed technical and physical security overseas and in Washington. Gentile had also created two small staff units: Education and Training, and Special Assignments. The first unit reflected Gentile’s and SY’s view that ongoing training for the Department’s security professionals was needed to meet the threats confronting the Department’s operations; meanwhile, the second unit focused primarily on investigations resulting in the termination of a Department employee based on criminal activity, personal sex practices, or homosexuality.

For the 1975 reorganization, Dikeos expanded Gentile’s two groupings to five, and created the position of Deputy Director. Investigations and Evaluations divisions remained in the Personnel Security section. Protective Security now contained three divisions: DeCourcy’s Protective Liaison division, the Secretary’s Detail, and Foreign Dignitary Protection. The Operations comprised three divisions: Foreign Operations, Technical Services, and Domestic Operations (building security). A fourth group included divisions related to education and training, the Command Center, Special Assignments (investigations for crimes or incidents), and the protective detail at the United Nations. In addition, Dikeos upgraded the Executive Office staff (SY/EX) to a level on par with the others.

Dikeos soon made revisions. Protective Intelligence was added to the Protective Services divisions. The Command Center and Special Assignments were moved to Operations. The fourth grouping now contained the divisions of Education and Training, Policy, Documentary and Information Systems, and Freedom of Information requests.
Figure 31: Illustrated organizational chart for the Office of Security, 1977. Although background investigations still remained prominent, the chart shows SY being reshaped by the new foci of terrorism, overseas security, and protection. Note the large divisions of PRS (protection details) and OPS (overseas operations), as well as the CC (Command Center) and U.S. UN (protection at the UN), compared to organizational charts of the 1950s and 1960s. Source: SY Focus.
Dikeos’ reorganization reflected several developments in SY. Perhaps most notable was the number of SY personnel. SY personnel had numbered 125 in 1962, but Gentile and Dikeos recruited many new agents. By 1979, SY numbered more than 600 people. There were 15 SO(T)s in 1961, but in 1977, there were 68 Technical Security Officers (TSOs). Professionalism increased as well. Gentile initiated professional training for SY agents, which Dikeos significantly expanded during his tenure. Between 1973 and 1978, the Education and Training division under David McCabe grew from 3 to 17 staff members, and SY Special Agents started to attend classes at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia. The Education and Training division also extended RSO training from 3 to 7 weeks, managed the MTT program, and conducted 19 different programs.
The creation of training programs enabled SY to expand its pool of recruits from men with mandatory law enforcement experience to a broader cohort of intelligent, highly qualified, educated men and women. Prior to 1970, SY hired people with law enforcement, intelligence, or technical backgrounds, which minimized the need for training for a small office with a limited budget. After 1970, SY continued hiring recruits with law enforcement experience, but the office drew upon a broader array of federal law enforcement agencies such as the Sky Marshals, IRS, USAID, and military intelligence. The development of training programs now permitted SY to hire college graduates with little or no security or law enforcement training, enabling SY to mold its personnel more extensively. This was, as one agent later described it, “SY’s ‘baby boom’ wave.”

This new wave of recruits entered SY at a time when the Department of State, the federal government, and the nation at large endeavored to remove gender and racial barriers to employment. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 directly encouraged, and even required, government agencies to employ women and minorities at all levels. In 1970, female Department of State employees formed the Women’s Action Organization to lobby the Department to improve the status of women in the Foreign and Civil Service. In 1972, Deputy Under Secretary for Management Macomber appointed Gladys Rogers as Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, with a mandate to create opportunities for women, particularly in offices that did not employ women. SY and the Courier Service were identified as two such offices.

The breaking down of gender and racial barriers shaped the new wave of SY hires, diversifying what had been prior to the 1970s a nearly exclusive white, male world of SY Special Agents. Gladys Rogers was instrumental in hiring SY’s first female agent, Patricia “Patti” Morton. Morton had served as an FSO staff secretary (FSSO) at diplomatic posts in Katmandu, Nepal; Kinshasa, Zaire; and Pretoria, South Africa, and had received a commendation for her

Figure 34: Patricia “Patti” Morton becomes the first female Special Agent in 1972. Morton had served as a Post Security Officer in Kinshasa. After Special Agent training she served short stints in the Washington and Boston Field Offices, and then was assigned as one of four RSOs in Saigon. She soon became the Assistant Supervisory RSO and the Coordinator of Emergency and Evacuation. When asked how well she was accepted, she said that the Marines serving at Embassy Saigon asserted that since they were the largest MSG detail at any U.S. embassy in the world, they deserved the first woman RSO. Morton later served as RSO at The Hague. Source: Department of State Records, National Archives and Records Administration.
security work in Kinshasa. She recalled receiving an unexpected letter from Rogers requesting a meeting during one of her home visits. Rogers enthusiastically encouraged Morton to consider a position as an SY Special Agent. Morton, despite looking forward to returning to her post in Singapore, felt pressured by the Department’s leadership and agreed to join SY as a Special Agent in April 1972. Six months later, SY hired Doris Rogers, its second female agent. By 1974, Special Agent Mary McAteer was assigned to Nancy Kissinger’s protective detail. The Courier Service also hired its first female courier that same year. Susan Shirley Carter embarked on her first courier trip on November 16. Lillian Godek joined the Courier Service two months later. Both women had previously served in communications and records management in the Department.

The women who served in SY in the 1970s admitted that the transition from an all-male service to a coed force was less than smooth, and many women who entered SY in the early 1970s left after short periods of time. Special Agent Nancy Lestina acknowledged, “Some male agents resent a woman treading on their sacred territory,” and she was “warned that women have a natural fear of weapons.” From this Lestina concluded: “[I]f I did not faint at the sight of a pistol, I could be taken to the range to qualify, and . . . earn the right to carry the badge.” The women also believed that their male colleagues scrutinized their work more harshly, looking for faults and justifications for their dismissal. As a result, female Special Agents felt an enormous pressure to succeed. This often led to a high degree of competitiveness among the few women working in SY, rather than collaboration to overcome the bias they experienced.

Another emergent trend within diplomatic security—computer security—was reflected in Dikeos’ creation of the Documentary and Information Systems division. Although this represented primarily the renaming of the Records and Research unit, the use of the term “information system” indicates that the Department had begun to employ computers beyond using them merely for sending cables. The Department of State had two principal computers in the 1970s, both IBM 370/158 mainframes, located in an enclosed area of the basement. One computer was denoted as classified and supported the Department’s telegram distribution system and the
TAGS system. The unclassified mainframe handled payroll work, personnel record-keeping, and other tasks. The two computers used key cards, and most jobs were submitted either as trays of cards, or as a reel of tape with the job’s control cards submitted in a tray. To submit a classified job, an FSO or Department employee brought a tray down to the window, showed their building pass to a clerk at the desk, asked for their point of contact in the computer room, and gave them the tray. In the absence of the point of contact, one filled out a job form and left the classified job with the clerk.97

“Minicomputers” emerged in the mid-1970s, and they largely handled database management, which included inventory and personnel information. One program, operated on minicomputers, cross-referenced information about an individual agent’s skills, assisting the Personnel office in determining assignments for SY agents. Another database program for the “name check system” appeared in September 1977. Large and bulky by present-day standards, a minicomputer often had its own station/terminal in the office and required the user to insert a 9-1/2 inch floppy disk into the drive to provide the necessary software.98

The Department did not have a computer security program in the 1970s, although SY’s Technical Services division was already considering it. The Department’s two IBM mainframes were located in a large shielded enclosure in the basement of Main State. Security for other Department computers consisted of locking a computer up or placing it in a room that could be locked. Computers were not linked to networks, most software programs did not require a password, and viruses and worms did not exist. In the mid-1970s, an SY Technical Services engineer represented the Department on the intelligence community’s Computer Security Committee, which focused on setting government standards for protecting intelligence information processed in-computer, not the security of computers.99

Something Old, Something New: The Moscow Embassy

As SY and the Department began to wrestle with computer technology, the Soviets were employing new technologies against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets continued to breach security at the U.S. Embassy through the use of microwaves. A “technically unidentified Moscow signal” (referred to as TUMS) was “verifiably
identified” in late 1962 and early 1963; however, it likely had existed since early 1953. Although TUMS’s purpose was unknown, measurements determined that the beam covered the entire west wall of the Embassy, but operated at very low levels. U.S. officials concluded that the signal constituted a security threat but not a health hazard. They set up room to monitor TUMS, which was emitted from an apartment building 100 yards west of the Embassy, but did not inform the Embassy community about the microwaves. In March 1972, a second signal, called SMUT (“second Moscow unidentified technical” signal) appeared. Seven times stronger than TUMS, SMUT lasted little more than a year and then stopped; TUMS, meanwhile, continued.100

In May 1975, the TUMS signal suddenly stopped, but it was soon replaced by 2 signals. Two days after the TUMS ceased, a new signal appeared and was designated MUTS-1. The signal emitted from the roof of a building to the east of the U.S. Embassy; moreover, it comprised a much more filled-in spectrum than TUMS. Three months later, in August, MUTS-2 appeared, emanating from a building south of the Embassy.101

MUTS-1 and MUTS-2 were still well below Soviet and U.S. safety levels; however, Department officials informed the Embassy community about the signals. FSOs and other Department employees expressed concern over the health effects of microwave radiation, and Congress held hearings on the issue. Part of the concern was rooted in the popular understanding of microwaves. Microwave ovens for home kitchens had recently appeared on the market, and concepts about what happened to foods and metal items in microwave ovens were transferred to the situation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.102 Several FSOs filed health complaints, and the Department undertook a bio-statistical study to examine if those serving in Moscow were at a higher risk for cancer, birth defects, and other effects associated with radiation. The study found no connection or statistical association between occurrences of cancer and other health effects and the officers and employees who had served in the Moscow Embassy since 1953. The Department did allow FSOs and other employees to transfer or reject assignments to Moscow, without affecting their careers. The assurances of the study were partially undermined in late 1976 by the ill-timed administrative classification of the Moscow Embassy as an “unhealthy post,” a classification unrelated to the microwaves.103

Facing public, Congressional, and internal outcry, the Department took action to reduce and stop the microwaves. It installed screens that reduced microwave radiation by nearly 90 percent over all of the Embassy’s windows. Department officials pressured the Soviets to stop the signals, and the Soviets agreed to reduce the microwave signals.

What the Soviets intended with the microwaves was and remains unclear. Former Regional Security Officer to the Moscow Embassy Gordon Harvey asserted that the apparent purpose of the microwaving was not to harm people; the signal’s power level was significantly below the safety limits established by the Soviets, which were much lower than U.S. safety limits.104 Bruce Matthews, Chief of the Technical Security Division at the Diplomatic Security Training Center, believes that the Soviets used microwaves for a number of purposes, one of which was to characterize the type of office equipment that the U.S. Embassy was using.105
Besides microwaves, U.S. officials were also concerned about fire safety at the Moscow Embassy; in fact, one Department officer considered the Embassy a “firetrap.” The building’s age, its construction, overcrowding, and the accumulation of records and materials in the hallways, stairwells, and attic led Embassy and Department officials to issue warnings about the possibilities of a major fire. A fire safety inspection team made several recommendations, including storing or removing the clutter, but also, U.S. inspectors noted that Soviet electrical repairmen “often use inadequately sized wire” and that rewiring was needed in several places. When the Embassy asked SY what its personnel should do in case of a fire on the upper, classified floors (Floors 7-10), one SY official wrote that the policy should be to “allow the [chancery] building to burn to the ground” rather than allow Soviet firefighters on those floors. The comment became the policy. An example of the consequences of allowing Soviet fire fighters access to the Embassy occurred on August 5, 1976, when the Australian Embassy experienced a fire that required more than 100 Soviet firefighters to extinguish. Two years later, after Soviet workmen had repaired the fire damage, the Australians found a network of microphones and accused the Soviets of spying.

During the evening of August 26, 1977, a fire broke out in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Initially, Embassy personnel could not find the fire, but Regional Security Officer Jerome F. Tolson, Jr., noted that in the span of 20 minutes the fire “changed from something that could not be located” to engulfing the entire Economic section on the eighth floor. The fire soon spread to the ninth and tenth floors and the attic. Although policy dictated otherwise, Ambassador Malcolm Toon gave permission to the Soviet firefighters to enter the eighth floor, and then allowed the firemen to fight the fire from aerial ladders when it broke through the chancery’s roof. He denied the Soviets access to the tenth floor. Four unescorted Soviet firemen did enter the ninth floor (Communications and Records) through a window, but “became very shy” when they saw Defense Attaché personnel with an (unloaded) camera aimed at them. Chancery offices and the roof suffered extensive damage; however, the RSO concluded that sensitive equipment and records had not been compromised. The eighth floor and the roof/attic
were “gutted;” the ninth and tenth floors suffered heavy heat, smoke, and water damage; and the seventh floor had water and smoke damage. It took several months to complete repairs, much of which was done by Seabees.\textsuperscript{109}

Almost a year later, in June 1978, SY Technical Security Officers discovered a Soviet listening post in the U.S. Embassy, involving a chimney antenna and an underground tunnel. In late May, TSOs John Bainbridge and Jim Frank arrived in Moscow to conduct an investigation of the South Wing of the chancery building. In one of the South Wing apartments, Bainbridge and Frank focused on a chimney that ran up the outside of the building. They opened the chimney wall, and found a dish-shaped radio antenna connected to a cable that ran down the length of the chimney. At the base of the chimney, the cable continued down a tunnel, large enough for a human to crawl through. The tunnel continued under the U.S. Embassy grounds to a Soviet apartment building next door.\textsuperscript{110}

The antenna-tunnel find was an active listening post, and Soviet personnel were discovered using the tunnel. Bainbridge and Frank tested the antenna system, and found the cables to be “energized.” A Navy Seabee, working with Bainbridge and Frank, “surprised” a Soviet technician crawling through the tunnel, prompting U.S. workers (likely Seabees) to build a brick wall to seal the tunnel. Despite an active antenna, SY and U.S. Government technical engineers could not determine from what or where the antenna received signals, although they suspected the Central Wing of the chancery building, which housed the Ambassador’s offices, was a possibility. The antenna/tunnel find revealed that the Soviets had severely breached the security of the U.S. Embassy. A former Office of Communications Security officer recalled that when he joined the Department about two years after the antenna/tunnel find, the Department was suffering “a counter-measures crisis.”\textsuperscript{111}

By 1978, U.S. officials hoped that the new building would offer better security once it was completed. The United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement to exchange sites for their respective new embassies in 1969. Officials of several U.S. Government agencies agreed to offer the Soviets a 12.5-acre site known as Mount Alto, just above the neighborhood of Georgetown. Meanwhile, in Moscow, U.S. officials pressed for and accepted a 10.5-acre site behind the existing Embassy. Contrary to folklore, the area was not in a “swamp.” The site, instead, was prime Moscow real estate that was walking distance from the Ambassador’s residence, and near major thoroughfares and several metro rail stations.\textsuperscript{112}

The exchange of embassy sites coincided with the Nixon policy of détente, but U.S. and Soviet negotiations over the conditions of construction proved difficult and acrimonious. U.S. officials rejected the conditions that the Soviets imposed on previous occasions. When the U.S. diplomats had moved into the Ulitsa Chaikovskovo chancery in 1953, the Soviets until that moment had prevented U.S. personnel from supervising renovations of the building. The Soviets had even covered the building with tarpaulins to deter U.S. observation of the renovations while Soviet workers finished their work inside. The 1964 discovery of a microphone network ensured that U.S. officials did not want to replay this situation with a new building.\textsuperscript{113} The Soviets insisted that they should control all phases of the construction, and use Soviet contractors, materials, and architectural
designs. Furthermore, the United States was required to pay for the construction in hard currency. U.S. officials rejected the terms, but they also recognized that besides reciprocity (they did not want the Soviets to build their embassy in Washington unsupervised), it was unrealistic from both a financial and security standpoint to “import an army of U.S. workers into Moscow.” Ultimately, the Soviets agreed to give U.S. personnel “unrestricted access” to the Moscow construction site. U.S. workers would install the windows, doors, roofing, all mechanical and electrical equipment, final wiring, plumbing, and other systems. At the height of détente in 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the agreement on construction conditions.\(^\text{114}\)

Despite the 1972 agreement, the conditions of construction in Moscow were what U.S. officials described as “moving targets.” Negotiations over the details stalled the construction and exchange of property for five more years. Eventually after Secretary of State Vance travelled to Moscow in 1977, both nations signed the Protocol of 1977, permitting the formal exchange of properties. The formal exchange of properties generated another element of contention: several buildings for the Soviet Embassy on Mount Alto were completed before U.S. officials had even signed an agreement to begin construction in Moscow. In short, there was little evidence of détente amid the negotiations over new embassies, and tensions would only continue during construction.\(^\text{115}\)

**Protective Security at the United Nations**

While Department officers strove to prevent Soviet breaches of security at the current and future U.S. Embassies in Moscow, U.S. officials wrangled over protective security at the United Nations. Although the Chicago incident involving French President Pompidou indicated that foreign dignitaries and diplomats were targets of violence within the United States, an inter-agency struggle erupted over who held responsibility for protection of UN diplomats. President Nixon obtained a law from Congress (Public Law 91-217) authorizing
him to assign agents from the Executive Protection Service (EPS) to protect diplomatic missions outside of Washington. However, since the EPS was a unit of the Secret Service, the Secret Service only took protective assignments on a case-by-case basis. As one Department official later confessed, “In most cases, foreign countries provide us with far more protection abroad on a permanent as well as an emergency basis than we provide them in Washington…We can well imagine the problems we would confront in the case of a serious incident resulting in the death of a foreign diplomat in this country.”

There was also a lack of communication and coordination between SY and the Secret Service. For example, when the Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al Halim Khaddam arrived at Washington National Airport on September 27, 1974, the Secret Service detail quickly escorted him away without informing the Deputy Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and other Department officials who were at the airport to greet and escort the Foreign Minister. Infuriated, the Department of State immediately sent a letter of concern to the Director of the Secret Service.

The Secret Service and the Department of State’s lack of communication for the Syrian foreign minister was minor compared to the difficulties that the Secret Service, the Department, and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) would have in coordinating protection for the diplomatic missions of the United Nations. The NYPD had constantly assisted the Department and EPS with the protection of the representatives and foreign dignitaries to the United Nations. Attacks on missions, offices, and ambassadors, as well as growth of the United Nations, necessitated the creation of “fixed posts” to ensure protective security for the missions to the international organization. The NYPD, however, lacked the manpower to meet the demands for diplomatic protection in addition to its regular duties. In fact, in 1970, patrolmen of New York City’s 19th Precinct staged a protest against the fixed posts near the Soviet mission. They claimed that foreign missions in the United States received better protection than the nation’s cities. In addition, the city of New York insisted upon being reimbursed for expenses it incurred while protecting UN diplomats and dignitaries.

Nixon Administration officials devised an interim solution in 1974. Funding for protection of the United Nations would come from the Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, which was created in 1965 to direct federal funds to assist state and local police forces. The Secret Service would assume

Figure 39: New York City police check below a manhole cover. In preparation for Fidel Castro’s 1979 visit to the United Nations General Assembly, the NYPD blocked off a four-block area, with steel spikes, to ensure Castro’s security. Protection at the UNGA still requires many DS agents and NYC police to protect the numerous dignitaries who attend each year. Source: © Associated Press /G. Paul Burnett.
responsibility for protecting all heads of state and EPS would protect foreign diplomatic missions in Washington and New York City, and it would delegate funds to the NYPD for local protection of UN Missions. Gradually, the Department of State would take on the duty of protecting all “other” distinguished foreign visitors, when they began receiving additional funding. Until then, the Secret Service handled the protection on a case-by-case basis at the direction of the President.119

With an interim agreement in place, efforts for a more permanent solution stalled. In 1975, the Department of State urged Congress to support a House of Representatives resolution that would expand the EPS so that it could undertake protective duties. The bill did not provide appropriations for reimbursing the NYPD, and without that funding information, the bill died. Representative Robert E. Jones, Jr., (D-Alabama) offered another proposal: he suggested expanding the EPS, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to assign EPS officers to several metropolitan areas to protect foreign missions (mostly consulates), and granting reimbursements to state and local governments for providing protection. The Departments of State and the Treasury urged the President to veto Jones’s bill, in part because neither Department wanted to take responsibility for reimbursing New York City. The agencies also stressed that the increase in federal responsibility for what had previously been a local police function seemed “troubling.” The Department of State proffered expanding the EPS enough to assume protection duties in New York City, but not nationwide. President Gerald R. Ford vetoed the bill.120

Figure 40: Chief of Mission (and future President ) George H.W. Bush, head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, China (seated second from left) attends the July 29, 1975, farewell party for SY Special Agents Peter Bergin (a future Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, seated left) and Michael Woods (seated second from right) in the garden of the Liaison Office compound. An officer from the New Zealand Embassy is seated at right. The U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) was the forerunner of the U.S. Embassy, prior formal diplomatic relations between the two countries. Source: Private Collection.

Figure 41: Karl D. Ackerman, Director of the Office of Security, 1978-1982. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
On December 31, 1975, President Ford signed a compromise bill for protection of UN diplomats. Public Law 94-196 required the EPS to protect diplomatic missions in cities outside of Washington that possessed 20 or more full-time missions, if the situation was an extraordinary protective need for which the city required assistance, and occurred at an international organization of which the United States was a member. Given the criteria, the bill was tailored to New York City and the United Nations. The law also authorized the Department of the Treasury to reimburse state and local entities that provided the protection. The law limited federal reimbursement to $3.5 million annually, but permitted retroactive claims to July 1, 1974. Besides offering reimbursement, P.L. 94-196 did much to resolve the UN security debate.\textsuperscript{121}

U.S. officials became acutely aware of the political and diplomatic ramifications of the death of a foreign diplomat when SY Special Agents stopped an assassination attempt against the former Prime Minister of Turkey. On July 29, 1976, former Turkish Prime Minister Bulen Ecevit was touring the United States, and scheduled to give a speech at New York City’s Waldorf Astoria Hotel. SY had learned that a demonstration against Turkey’s policy in Cyprus would occur at the hotel. SY Special Agents Bernard A. Johnson, George R. Mitchell, Fred Lecker, and Horace H. Mitchell were assigned to protect Ecevit. About 400 protesters pelted members of Ecevit’s party with eggs and tomatoes. Johnson ordered a “tight shield” around Ecevit. As they were walking toward the hotel entrance, Johnson noticed that a man in the crowd had aimed a pistol at the former Prime Minister. Johnson dived at the gunman before the man could shoot. George Mitchell saw the gun rising among the crowd, moved in front of Ecevit to protect him, and with the assistance of Lecker, hurried Ecevit into the hotel. Horace Mitchell pushed through the crowd to assist Johnson in subduing the gunman. He grabbed the gunman’s left arm to put it behind the assailant’s back, and the arm twisted off (it was a prosthetic). The Department of State awarded Johnson and George Mitchell the Award for Heroism, and Horace Mitchell received the Award for Valor. In September 1976, the Government of Turkey hosted Special Agents Bernard Johnson, George Mitchell, and Fred Lecker as official guests, welcoming them as heroes.\textsuperscript{122}

The assassination of former Chilean diplomat Orlando Letelier created a political and diplomatic

Figure 42: SY Special Agent Scott Tripp (third from left) protects Sunao Sonoda, Foreign Minister of Japan, during the latter’s 1979 visit. Protecting foreign dignitaries created inter-agency debates during the 1970s, particularly with the growing size of the United Nations and after the murder (car bomb) of former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.
firestorm. On the morning of September 21, 1976, Letelier and his work colleague Ronni Karpen Moffitt were murdered when a bomb attached to the underside of their car exploded as they entered Sheridan Circle in Washington DC. Letelier was the former Chilean Ambassador to the United States for the government of President Salvador Allende, who had recently been overthrown by a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. The Pinochet regime’s Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) had already carried out an assassination in Argentina, an attempted assassination in Italy, and numerous arrests and disappearances in Chile. The Pinochet regime also helped to organize Operation Condor, a joint effort by the military regimes of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay to target and kill Leftist leaders. Department of State officials had some vague knowledge of Operation Condor; however, they did not anticipate that Condor agents would undertake an assassination in the capital of the United States. The Letelier assassination exacerbated public and Congressional criticism of Secretary Kissinger’s handling of U.S. policy toward Latin America and of supposed U.S. support for a regime such as Pinochet’s. A lengthy investigation by the Justice Department, the FBI, and the CIA led to the arrest of a DINA agent, who pleaded guilty to the bombing in 1978 and implicated several senior Chilean officials. The Pinochet regime refused to cooperate, and cleared those implicated in a military court. In 1982, released correspondence definitively linked the Pinochet government to the bombing.123

Technically Letelier did not merit protection by SY or EPS; however, the publicity and criticism of U.S. policy prompted the Secret Service to reenter the debate over protection of UN diplomats. In 1973, the Nixon and Ford Administrations had extended protection of UN diplomatic missions, in 60- to 90-day increments, by presidential directive. Upon entering office in 1977, the Carter White House questioned the EPS’s expenses for guarding U.N. missions. With an expiration date looming, and despite the Ecevit and Letelier incidents, the Secret Service now suggested that current EPS assignments to the United Nations might be contrary to Congressional intent. EPS officers, the Secret Service asserted, were only supposed to be tasked to New York for short periods of time, and the protection should be terminated “when the local police forces are able to handle the protective need.” Furthermore, the Secret Service said, EPS officers did not have the authority to “challenge” visitors to the mission, and had “no police function except to be present in the event of an emergency.” The Service then proposed that the federal government either reimburse the New York City Police Department for protective security expenses, or create a permanent security detail manned by SY agents.124

The Department of State opposed the Secret Service’s interpretation and suggestion. Assistant Secretary of State for Administration John M. Thomas emphasized the four general conditions governing requests for protection by EPS: 1) an immediate and specific threat directed against the particular mission or person in that mission, 2) a broad and long-term threat targeting that mission, 3) a situation where an incident would damage important U.S. foreign policy initiatives, and 4) the principle of reciprocity. When overseas, he wrote, U.S. diplomats and officials received protection from foreign governments; therefore, the United States should reciprocate for foreign missions in New York. The Department admitted that the EPS provided minimal protection, but argued that
EPS protection satisfied protective and reciprocity demands. The Departments of State and the Treasury had explored the issue of reimbursing the NYPD, but found the cost to be prohibitive. Furthermore, SY opposed assigning Special Agents to the missions on grounds of orientation. The EPS’s main mission was to guard the buildings; meanwhile, SY agents guarded people. Moreover, SY agents were “neither hired nor trained to work as building guards.” The Department of State proposed establishing a small permanent EPS contingent in New York City “to fulfill the U.S. obligation to the diplomatic community.”

The issue of reimbursing the NYPD plagued the Carter Administration, but was partially resolved in 1980. In the spring of that year, the Department of the Treasury revised its regulations and authorized reimbursement to New York City for costs incurred during fixed post assignments and extraordinary protective operations. However, this regulation only covered costs associated with protecting UN missions and foreign dignitaries. It did not include costs relating to protecting diplomatic residences or foreign commercial offices, nor did it cover costs associated with maintaining order during demonstrations outside the UN building.

**Organizing for Terrorism**

Unlike the Nixon Administration, the new Carter Administration viewed terrorism as a “given” and organized itself accordingly. With Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, SY resumed its protection of the Secretary; however, Vance’s protective detail differed significantly from that for Secretary Rogers in the early 1970s. Vance’s 37-man detail included a chief, a deputy, and three full shifts to provide 24-hour protection. Director of the detail, William D’Urso, upgraded communications, increased the vehicle pool to 35 cars, and required a dummy motorcade and a follow-up car. Besides regular in-service and firearms training, all SY Special Agents serving on the detail were required to re-qualify on a quarterly basis, including qualifying at the shooting range on handguns, Uzi sub-machine guns, and shotguns. Another change was to detail an SY Special Agent as the Secretary’s chauffeur. D’Urso wrote a manual to formalize the detail’s procedures and operations, and insisted upon advance preparation for all of Secretary Vance’s travels and appearances.
The Carter Administration also restructured the Office for Combating Terrorism. In August 1976, the Office reported to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management instead of the Secretary, and the office’s chief was Director of M/CT and Chair of the Inter-Agency Working Group. The move was intended to “provide a more effective link between the policy and operational aspects of efforts to combat terrorism.” However, M/CT remained a small staff of six, although its responsibilities now included overseeing emergency action planning.\textsuperscript{128}

By September 1977, the Carter Administration abolished the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism created by Nixon. The Committee had met only once (in 1972), and as a result, the Inter-Agency Working Group became a working group of the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee. The Carter Administration also created the Executive Committee on Terrorism, with its membership determined by the NSC. Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, selected the Department of State’s Director of M/CT as the chair for both the Working Group and the Executive Committee. Thus, the Department of State continued its lead role in the government-wide effort to coordinate counterterrorist efforts.\textsuperscript{129}

In 1978 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton became Director of M/CT, and he found the Working Group too cumbersome, with its representatives from 28 departments and agencies. Quainton reorganized the group and streamlined its work. He divided the Working Group into seven committees, which included the Research and Development Committee, the Foreign Security...

Policy Committee, the Domestic Crisis Management Committee, and the Foreign Crisis Management Committee. However, the following autumn, the Department reorganized itself too, moving M/CT to the office of the Deputy Secretary of State (D/CT).130

\section*{Conclusion}

Beginning with the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Elbrick, SY and the Department of State responded quickly to the threats posed by terrorism, and in the process of doing so, dramatically altered security procedures. SY developed emergency plans for U.S. posts overseas as they faced emergency situations in the face of terrorist attacks. SY developed an armored car program, a mobile reserve of equipment, and Emergency Actions Teams to train and assist posts. Threats forced an upgrading of the Secretary of State’s protective detail. When a member of the crowd in Chicago spit on the wife of French President Georges Pompidou, President Nixon ordered improvements in the protection of foreign dignitaries when they visited the United States.

The kidnapping and murder of Israeli Olympic team members at Munich prompted additional changes that began a counterterrorism effort and policy by the United States. Nixon created the Committee to Combat Terrorism, which evolved into the Office of Counter-Terrorism under the Secretary of State (S/CT). The Nixon Administration also developed a hard-line policy regarding U.S. diplomatic hostages, a policy that was challenged by rank-and-file in the Department of State. An inter-agency debate occurred over the protection of UN diplomats, a debate that was largely resolved during the Carter Administration.

When Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Victor Dikeos declared in 1975 that “a climate of terrorism” existed, the office he headed (SY) was already reoriented and reshaped toward three new axes: terrorism, protection, and technology. Training of Special Agents, RSOs, and Department personnel focused on how to prevent and anticipate the various types of terrorist attacks. SY created Mobile Training Teams to train personnel at U.S. posts. SY also installed access controls to limit persons entering U.S. posts, and the office installed bulletproof glass or Mylar on windows to prevent shards from shattering windows. Protective details of ambassadors were increased, and safe havens were built into U.S. embassies and consulates. SY developed a liaison office to coordinate and build relationships with foreign law enforcement entities. John Perdew created the Command Center and the Threat Analysis Group to coordinate SY efforts and anticipate developing threats. With microwaves and the chimney antenna, the Soviets were still trying to breach security at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The adoption of computer technologies by the Department led SY to add computer security to its calculations.

As Dikeos reached the end of his four-year tenure as head of SY in 1978, the Office of Security and diplomatic security at the Department of State had undergone a great transformation as a result of terrorism. The organization and its efforts bore little resemblance to the security entity that existed 10 years earlier. Gentile—and particularly Dikeos—had initiated numerous changes to meet the new threats posed by terrorism. Yet no sooner were these changes made than the terrorist threat evolved into a different form, accelerating SY’s transformation.
Endnotes

1 The phrase “the great transformation” is drawn from Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001 [1944]).


6 Instances from “List of Damages Resulting from Overseas…,” in Testimony of Ralph S. Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget, 4 October 1966, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, Departments of State, Justice... Appropriations for 1967, p. 299.


8 The document also appears to have been sent to Saigon as well. Report “The Protection of U.S. Personnel and Installations Against Acts of Terrorism in Latin America,” Office of Security (Inter-agency Ad Hoc Committee), 12 May 1965, NA.


11 Testimony of William J. Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, 9 June 1965, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1966, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965, p. 134. Telegram 9948, Buffum, to Secretary of State, 21 December 1972, Folder – BG Beirut, Box 6, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA.


14 Memorandum “Transportation for the Body of Ambassador John Gordon Mein,” John P. Walsh, Acting Executive Secretary (Viron P. Vaky) to Walt W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 29 August 1968, Folder – PER Mein, John Gordon, 1/1/68, Box 180, CFPF 1967-69, RG 59, NA.


Telegrams 1280 “GOC Announces Additional Protection for Diplomatic Missions,” Korry to Secretary of State, 9 April 1970, Folder – SY Aden 1/1/70; Telegram 1438 “Arming of Ambassador’s Chilean Personal Security Guards,” Korry to Secretary of State, 21 April 1970, Folder – SY Santiago 1/1/70; and Airgram A-191 “Protection against Terrorism,” Korry (Friedman) to Department of State, 10 May 1970, Folder – SY Santiago 1/1/70; all Box 279, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA.

Telegram 981 “Foreign Ministry’s Query Re Embassy Marine Guards,” Adair to Secretary of State, 15 April 1971; Telegram 1118, Adair to Secretary of State, 4 May 1971; Telegram 83950, Rogers (D. W. Cox) to U.S. Embassy Montevideo, 14 May 1971; and Telegram 1896, Adair to Secretary of State, 28 August 1970; all Folder – BG Monrovia, Box 8, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA. For Marines being less identifiable as U.S. military, see Beckett, Special Agent, 83-84.


34 Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, pp. 3-4.


38 For Qaddafi’s declarations and ideology of this period, see Ronald Bruce St. John, Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 87-106.

History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State


44 Memorandum, General Counsel of the Treasury to Director of Management and Budget, n.d. [September 1970]; and Memorandum, William L. Dickey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Macomber, 22 September 1970; both enclosed with Information Memorandum “Proposed Legislation to Transfer Protective Security Functions to United States Secret Service,” J. Edward Lyerly, Office of the Legal Advisor, to Macomber, 28 September 1970, A/DUSA, Subject and Name Files, 1970 (Macomber), Folder – SY, Box 1, RG 59 - Lot 72D179, NA.


47 Oral History Interview, William DeCourcy, 19 May 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, William D’Urso, 9 May 2005, p. 4. Letter, John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 27 March 1974, Folder – SY 1 General; Letter, Director of the Secret Service to Thomas, 16 September 1974; both Folder – SY 1 General; and Memorandum “Protection of Mrs. Kissinger,” Carlyle E. Maw, Office of Legal Affairs, to the Secretary 7 May 1974, Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism; all Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59-Lot 76D71, NA.

48 Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan (Gentile) to Rogers, 14 September 1972; Memorandum “Protection Against Terrorism in the United States,” Donelan (Gentile) to Macomber, 14 September 1972, attached to Memorandum, Donelan (Gentile) to Rogers, 14 September 1972; and Memorandum “Protection of Israeli Establishment in the United States,” Gentile to Donelan, 12 September 1972; all Folder – SY 4, Box 4, DUSA Subject Files, 1972, RG 59 - Lot 75D101, NA.


The law and the protective security accorded foreign diplomats became an issue in Michael Moore’s 2004 film Fahrenheit 9/11. In the scene outside the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington DC, Moore highlights the fact that Secret Service agents pressed him to cease and desist his filming and commentary. Moore suggests that the Saudis, due to their close relationship with the Bush family, had gained special “presidential” type protection from the same entity that protects the President. He either was unaware of or omitted the fact that Secret Service protection of foreign diplomats and foreign embassies is based on 30-year-old practices and laws, resulting from the rise of terrorism in the early 1970s. Memorandum “Evening Report,” Rogers to Nixon, 6 September 1972, FRUS 1969-76, Volume E-1, Chapter 1, Document 97. Memorandum “Signing of Legislation for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests…,” Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Ronald J. Bettauer, L/UNA) to Kissinger, 19 October 1972, Folder – SY 4 Protection against Terrorism; Memorandum “Status of Administration’s Proposed Legislation of Protection of Foreign Officials,” Bettauer to Gentile, George H. W. Bush, Ambassador to the United Nations, et al., 18 January 1972, Folder – SY 3 Organization and Conferences; both Box 4, DUSA Subject Files 1972, RG 59-Lot 75D101, NA. Letter, Rogers and John N. Mitchell, Attorney General, to Spiro T. Agnew, Vice-President of the United States, 9 August 1971; and Memorandum, David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (J. H. Michel, L/O/SCA) to George P. Shultz, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 16 June 1971; both Folder – SY – Security 1970 General, Box 278, CFPF 1970-73, RG 59, NA.


Korn, Assassination in Khartoum, 110, 111-115.
The term “Bangkok solution” resulted from a December 1972 incident, during which 4 members of Black September entered the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok and took hostages. Thai officials allowed the 4 men safe passage out of Thailand in exchange for releasing their hostages.


Memorandum “Inching Towards a New Embassy in Moscow,” Eaton to Spiers, 15 October 1986, pp. 5-7.


117 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Protection of Foreign Diplomatic Missions, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982, Number 97-687, p. 1. Memorandum “Meeting Foreign Dignitaries,” Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, to Ambassador Henry Catto, Chief of Protocol, 27 September 1974; and Letter, Ingersoll (David Korn, NEA/ARN), to Stuart Knight, Director of the Secret Service, 1 October 1974, attached to Memorandum “Meeting Foreign Dignitaries,” Ingersoll to Catto; both Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, NA.


119 Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations,” John M. Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, to Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism, 9 August 1974; Memorandum “Discussion between State Department and Secret Service on December 4, 1974, Relative to EPS Responsibilities…,” Acting Special Agent in Charge Wilson Livingood to Assistant Director Hill, 4 December 1974, enclosed with Memorandum, “Memorandum of Conversation with Secret Service,” Hoffacker to Thomas and Dikeos, 5 December 1974; and Memorandum “Protection of Foreign Officials and Installations (NSC 4853),” George S. Springsteen, Executive Secretary, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Council, 6 December 1974; all Folder – SY 4 Protection/Terrorism, Box 4, A/DUSA Subject Files 1974, RG 59 – Lot 76D71, NA.


Petersen, “The Office for Combatting Terrorism (M/CT).”