Terrorism fundamentally changed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1960s and early 1970s, terrorists generally targeted individual diplomats for kidnapping. As hostages, the diplomats would later be exchanged to obtain money or arms, to secure the release of jailed colleagues, or to draw public attention to a cause. By the early 1970s, terrorists became more deadly, killing diplomats if and when they chose. The February 1979 mob takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Iran marked a profound shift in terrorist tactics, repeated in the subsequent attacks on U.S. Embassies in Pakistan, Libya, Lebanon, and Kuwait. Terrorists began targeting U.S. diplomatic buildings as symbols of the United States and sought to wreak as much destruction, injury, and death as possible. By doing so, terrorists subverted long-held diplomatic customs, such as the inviolability of embassies and reliance upon local governments to protect diplomats.1

Terrorism’s shift from individual diplomats to U.S. diplomatic buildings partly resulted because well-trained cadres sponsored by rogue states such as Iran, Syria, and Libya executed the attacks, not the individuals or small groups of a decade earlier. Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger charged that the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut was conducted with the “sponsorship, knowledge, and authority of the Syrian

Figure 1: The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, circa 1975, demonstrates several challenges confronting the Security Enhancement Program (SEP). Like many embassies, the U.S. Embassy Baghdad had low perimeter walls, the walls were not solid stone or concrete, parking was allowed around the Embassy, and the building was an “open” design with large windows. The gates are also left open during the day, making the Embassy even more vulnerable. Other embassies were located in crowded city centers, making SEP upgrades more expensive and more difficult to install. Source: Department of State, Office of the Historian Files.
Government.” In this new milieu, U.S. diplomats and embassies were not just victims of terrorism, but also pawns in certain nations’ and groups’ larger political struggles against the United States.²

Terrorist attacks in Tehran, Islamabad, Beirut, and Kuwait accelerated the transformation of the Office of Security (SY). As the Department of State responded to the new methods of terrorism, SY transformed into a new and larger entity, one that coordinated, implemented, and oversaw the expanding number of security measures enforced at U.S. posts overseas. Although the Inman Panel in 1985 would recommend and define that new entity as the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, by early 1984, before the Inman Panel was formed, SY was already rapidly evolving to the Department’s central entity for diplomatic security. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security David C. Fields admitted that he and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert E. Lamb were reshaping SY: “We were trying to adjust the structure, garner more resources, and change procedures. SY’s role was changing.”³

**Tehran**

Iranian guerrillas attacked the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on February 14, 1979, two weeks after the Ayatollah Khomeini had returned to Iran from exile. During the previous year, civil unrest in Iran increased as Iranians directed their protests against the repressive rule of Shah Rezi Khan Pahlavi, who had ruled Iran since 1941 and had long identified himself as a U.S. ally. In November 1978, a widespread revolt forced the Shah to create a military government and ask Shahpour Bakhtiar, a moderate opposition leader, to serve as premier. Unrest continued, and upon Bakhtiar’s advice, the Shah relinquished power in January 1979 and fled the country.

Hostility towards the Shah’s ally, the United States, remained, and U.S. Embassy officials feared and anticipated an attack against the Embassy. During January and February 1979, U.S. Ambassador William H. Sullivan reduced the number of U.S. personnel at the Embassy, and shipped most of the Embassy’s classified files to Washington. On February 12, the Iranian military unit protecting the U.S. Embassy was ordered back to its barracks, leaving only the Marine Security Guard detachment to protect the Embassy. At 10:30 a.m., on February 14, 75 Iranian guerrillas climbed over the compound’s wall, opened fire on the chancery, and headed to the Ambassador’s residence. Sullivan ordered everyone within the chancery to get into the communications vault on the second floor (the Embassy’s safehaven). He then called the interim Iranian Government and asked for assistance. In the vault, Embassy staff shredded
documents and destroyed cryptographic equipment. The Marine Security Guards, directed by Regional Security Officer (RSO) Rick May, launched a volley of tear gas to slow the guerrillas, and were the last to enter the vault. An Iranian military force arrived at the Embassy to repel the guerrillas, but by then the guerrillas had blasted out the chancery’s front door and shot up every door on the first floor. The episode lasted 2 hours, ending about 1 p.m., and no one was injured.4

In the wake of the February attack, SY moved quickly to improve physical security at the Embassy in Tehran. U.S. officials made major modifications to the chancery’s entrances: they added electronic surveillance cameras, remote-controlled tear-gas devices, and heavy steel doors with automatic alarm systems. During the summer of 1979, however, several agencies returned many boxes of classified files back to the Embassy, creating what one official described as a “paper albatross around [the Embassy’s] neck.”5

After President Jimmy Carter allowed the Shah to enter the United States for medical treatment, Iranian students stormed the Embassy on November 4, 1979, and took 63 Americans as hostages. The security modifications provided some time for Embassy staff, but former hostage Victor Tomseth later remarked that the modifications were “meaningless” when a host government demonstrates an “absence of will and capacity” to protect the Embassy in a crisis. The Iranian students soon released 13 hostages; however, the students gained access to the large amount of classified files. The Iran Hostage Crisis lasted more than a year, involved a disastrous rescue attempt, and concluded with the release of the American hostages on January 20, 1981, just minutes after Carter turned over Presidential power to Ronald Reagan.6

Tehran was not the only location where a mob stormed a U.S. embassy. Two weeks after the start of the Iran Hostage Crisis, on November 21, 1979, Pakistani demonstrators emulated the Iranian students and stormed the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. In the morning, approximately two busloads of Pakistanis
had demonstrated in front of the Embassy but then left. In the afternoon, a much larger group returned and began throwing rocks. The demonstrators-turned-rioters soon broke through the gate and overwhelmed the security perimeters of the U.S. Embassy. One Marine Security Guard was fatally injured. David C. Fields, the Embassy’s Administration Officer, ordered the staff into the communications vault that served as the Embassy’s safehaven. A mob of more than 1,000 ransacked and looted many of the buildings on the Embassy compound and set fire to the chancery. After several hours, Fields sent a team of five to the roof to open the hatch, allowing the staff to climb out of the vault.

As had occurred in Iran, the Pakistan national government was reluctant in coming to the aid of the U.S. Embassy. The Pakistani army did not arrive until six hours after the incident started. Embassy officials believed that many Pakistani officials refused to take seriously the U.S. Embassy’s warnings about possible trouble in the days prior to the attack. One U.S. official admitted that local Pakistani police had never dealt with such a large and riotous crowd; furthermore, the Pakistani Government had few military units available to assist the Americans. In fact, one Pakistani Foreign Ministry official lost an ambassadorship because he made concerted efforts to help the Embassy staff during the crisis.

Other groups emulated the Iranian students and mobbed U.S. diplomatic posts elsewhere. Shortly after the attack in Islamabad, a Libyan mob “sacked” the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Just days after the seizure of U.S. hostages in Tehran, Iranian students stormed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, and burned the U.S. flag. The Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General noted that the attacks in the four capitals exposed “the vulnerability of our installations to mob violence and the futility of relying on host governments” to fulfill their responsibility to protect diplomatic personnel and facilities.
The Security Enhancement Program (SEP)

In response to the new threat of mob attacks, the Department immediately ordered all overseas posts to take three actions to improve security. First, the mission had to review and update its contingency planning to protect its personnel and property. Second, the Department required all posts to reduce non-essential classified file holdings to an absolute operational minimum. This, no doubt, resulted from the well-publicized acts of Iranian students piecing together shredded classified documents, and the large volume of classified documents that fell into students’ hands. Third, the Department instructed posts to contact their host governments and discuss protection of the U.S. embassy and its personnel during crisis situations.11

As another measure, the Department centralized responsibility for post security with the Chief of Mission or officer-in-charge, and granted more authority to Regional Security Officers (RSOs) to implement increased security. When one senior mission officer rejected additional security measures even though the RSO had ample intelligence that the FSO could be a target, the Department told all posts, “key officers . . . are not free to ignore the advice” of RSOs. In another instance, a Chief of Mission tried to relinquish the decision to evacuate dependents to individual officers. The Department considered this unacceptable and instructed all diplomatic and consular posts that the Chief of Mission or acting officer-in-charge would be held accountable for all decisions and actions in an emergency.12

The Department also requested and received from Congress a supplemental appropriation for an “extensive security enhancement program.” It obtained $6.1 million for Fiscal Year (FY) 1980 and $35.8 million for FY 1981, as well as other funds, for a total appropriation of approximately $200 million to harden U.S. embassies. The $200 million supplemental signifies how much terrorism had changed public attitudes about security, particularly if one considers that in 1965, the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee complained when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security G. Marvin Gentile obtained a $1 million appropriation. Even so, the sizeable appropriation created a “big fight” within the Department; the Foreign Buildings Office (FBO), Operations, and the Office of Communications (OC) vied with SY for a portion of the funding. Eventually Assistant

Figure 5: An SY Special Agent (rear left, looking to his left) covers Secretary of State Edmund Muskie (standing center behind saluting U.S. Air Force Honor Guard) while he attends a funeral service at Arlington National Cemetery for American aid workers murdered in El Salvador, in early January 1981. Vice President Walter Mondale (center right) leads the U.S. Government delegation to the service. Source: STATE magazine.
Secretary of State for Administration Thomas A. Tracy took control of the funds, and he created the Special Program and Liaison Staff (A/SPL) to manage the Security Enhancement Program (SEP). George Jenkins was named as head of the division, and John Perdew (who had developed SY’s Command Center) served as his deputy.13

The Security Enhancement Program had four objectives. It worked to harden embassies against mob attacks. It tried to provide security in case the host government fell short on its protection responsibilities. SEP also strove to ensure that U.S. personnel were not killed or taken hostage. Finally, it sought to prevent national security information from being compromised.14

To implement SEP, A/SPL followed a three-stage procedure. First, it sent a team to the post to do a thorough security survey. The team numbered about 15 people and included an SY Special Agent, an architect, and officers from FBO, OC, and other foreign affairs and national security agencies. Furthermore, one of the team leaders was former SY chief Victor Dikeos. After the security survey, A/SPL contracted the security upgrades to a private company, which then completed the required enhancements. FBO supervised installation of the security improvements, which included upgrading and reinforcing perimeter barriers, erecting impediments to forced entry, and raising interior barriers. Other improvements included elements that had worked in Islamabad, such as strengthening the vault/communications room walls, and developing a space into a “safehaven” that would protect U.S. personnel for approximately 12 hours. A/SPL also installed access denial systems that utilized foam or tear gas, and purchased additional document destruction equipment.15

As a direct result of the SEP, SY began to explore several new technologies to improve embassy security. “Centralized electronic storage systems” (i.e. computers) promised a reduction of paper files, quick destruction in a crisis, and rapid reconstruction of post files afterwards. SY also experimented with the Aqueous Foam System. When activated, the system dispensed a great amount of soap foam into an area. The soap bubbles made everything slippery, and holding tools became very difficult. The system was easier to clean up than tear gas (virtually impossible to remove from furniture, drapes, and carpet). The bubbles also refracted light, causing individuals to lose their orientation and have difficulty seeing. SY installed Aqueous Foam systems in the U.S. Embassies in Ankara, Turkey, and Bogotá, Colombia; however, the system lost favor due to the high maintenance that it required.16

Another project involved strengthening doors at U.S. posts. Because the doors at the Embassies in Iran and Pakistan were mostly glass and did little to impede the mobs, SY’s technical engineers tried to design an ideal door. The engineers made two determinations. First, they believed that a mob would have hand tools such as pipes, sledgehammers, clubs, and crowbars, but would not have fire, drills, saws, or explosives. Second, SY decided that the door must withstand attack for at least 15 minutes, time enough for the Marine Security Guard to notify everyone in the building and for the staff to retreat to the safehaven.17
SY engineers worked with H.P. White Labs to test products. John Wolf, who developed many of the Department’s physical security standards, noted two doors that did not survive the testing process. A company that often did work for prisons tested its door prototype by having a group of prisoners try to break the door down in order to get the case of beer on the other side. The door passed that test; however, when H.P. White personnel, assisted by SY’s Franchot White and Russ Waller, tested the door with pry bars and sledgehammers, they broke it down in less than 30 seconds. Another company submitted a door prototype that had bullet-resistant glass in the top and bottom panels, a door designed primarily for gas stations and convenience stores. H.P. White hired local farmers to test it with a sledgehammer. With a single blow, the door fell out of its casing.18

The SEP was never intended nor designed to enhance security at all U.S. diplomatic posts across the world; rather, it focused on posts considered at high risk for terrorism, crime, and other threats. A/SPL made clear distinctions between a post in Beirut, designated as high threat, and a post in Bermuda, designated as low threat. A/SPL implemented a 5-year plan to improve security at 122 selected high-risk posts. Officials had few illusions about the effort needed for the SEP: enhancing security at high-risk embassies constituted “a long term venture” that would require “major funding by the Congress and a strong commitment by both the Congress and the Department of State.” Ultimately, the SEP received little time, funds, and commitment beyond that provided by SY.19

The SEP faced several difficulties from the beginning. Although Congress provided funds, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) did not create any positions for the program. The Department had to reallocate 35 positions from other offices for SEP, and SEP had to maximize the use of contractors and private sector resources. Department officials conceded that the scope and complexity of the SEP was far greater than any previous security program; furthermore, they

Figure 6: A female Special Agent (left) is alert for threats in early 1984 as U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas Pickering (foreground) and U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick (right) view devastation resulting from El Salvador’s civil war. A Salvadoran Army major (rear center) briefs Pickering and Kirkpatrick. SY’s Threat Analysis Division determined the threat matrix for each post and designated some as “high threat.” Such designations enabled SY, in the early 1980s, to maximize its limited resources. Source: Private collection.
confessed that their efforts were hampered by the great variation in size, location, age, vulnerability, and types of construction of its embassies and consulates. The Department originally told Congress that it could harden 25 embassies per year; however, as the surveys and work were undertaken, the figure dropped to 3 or 4 embassies per year. SY and A/SPL additionally had trouble finding products to meet their security requirements, and they had to urge private companies to develop such products. For example, high standard ballistics glass (as opposed to simple bullet-resistant glass) did not exist when the SEP was initiated. The SEP also required A/SPL to coordinate with SY, FBO, and OC; however, a Director headed A/SPL, but SY, FBO, and OC each had a Deputy Assistant Secretary. A/SPL therefore lacked sufficient clout to push its projects through the Department's bureaucracy. Moreover, the SEP was initiated during a transition of Presidential administrations; in fact, during the 1980 Presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan made the reduction of overhead and personnel costs in the federal government a primary goal. In its first year, the Reagan Administration reduced SEP’s funding by one-third, and between 1982 and 1984, the scope and emphasis of SEP projects were further scaled back, and expectations were downgraded.

SEP also faced resistance from Embassy officers in the field, and criticism from the General Accounting Office (GAO). The Embassy in Ankara was among the first to receive a comprehensive security survey; however, A/SPL confessed, “Senior officials at the post have fought [the SEP] plan from the beginning and have successfully delayed implementation.” Embassy officers objected to SEP modifications and requested another survey, even though the architect and A/SPL’s director made special trips to Ankara to resolve the impasse. When the GAO audited the SEP in 1982, it offered a harsh assessment: “State Department officials overestimated the number of posts they could improve each year;” furthermore, “inadequate planning, coordination, and property management” plagued the program.

Despite its difficulties, the SEP laid important foundations for future diplomatic security programs. Under the SEP, SY and many Department officials embraced a “total approach” towards security, an attitude non-existent before 1979. Also, SY and A/SPL completed extensive groundwork for obtaining better materials and equipment, coordinating projects, and determining the various upgrades that each post needed. Likely a result of A/SPL’s small staff, SY assumed leadership of the expanded security efforts overseas. SY resolved differences among the various agencies, and sponsored inter-agency meetings on overseas security. When the Office of Counterterrorism (M/CT) requested information about the status of the SEP at high-risk posts, it contacted SY. Moreover, the Reagan Administration reinvigorated and expanded the SEP after the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 attack on the Marine barracks near the Beirut airport; it did not create a new program. The SEP did not harden the number of embassies that many had hoped, but hopes far exceeded what was possible. Few appreciated the groundbreaking nature of A/SPL’s and SY’s activities.
CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Protective Security in the United States

As Department officials improved security at U.S. posts overseas, foreign diplomats and dignitaries grew anxious about the protection they received in the United States. In January 1982, two Armenian immigrants murdered Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan in Los Angeles. The group, Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility for the killing, and one member was arrested. The Justice Commandos demanded that the Turkish Government admit responsibility for “genocide,” the deaths of more than one million Armenians in Turkey in 1915. After the killing, SY asked its field offices to work with local law enforcement to ensure maximum protection for Turkish establishments and personnel. The Department of State spokesman commented that the murder was “a sharp reminder to all nations of the need to redouble their efforts to stamp out the worldwide menace of terrorism.”

The murder of Arikan resurrected latent concerns within the foreign diplomatic community about the adequacy of protective security in the United States. In a February 11, 1982, letter to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Turkey’s Ambassador to the United States, Sukru Elekdag, expressed grave concerns about the quality of protection that U.S. officials were providing Turkish diplomats and missions. Elekdag was particularly upset because Turkish officials, despite their relatively scarce resources, had made every effort to provide maximum security to foreign diplomats and missions within Turkey. In a letter to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, the Ambassador chided the Department for the lack of “effective, continuous protection,” and insisted that U.S. officials reciprocate Turkish efforts and provide more extensive protective security.

The Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, Daryl F. Gates, also wrote Secretary Haig and raised issues similar to those that New York City policemen had raised a decade earlier as to why municipal

Figure 7: Los Angeles Police Chief Darryl Gates. When Turkish Consul General Kemal Arikan was killed by two Armenians in 1982, Gates wrote Secretary of State Alexander Haig, as well as the White House, asserting that protection of foreign diplomats in the United States was a federal government duty, not a local police responsibility. The Foreign Missions Act of 1982 granted the Department of State (Office of Security) greater authority to protect foreign dignitaries. Source: © Associated Press.
resources should be diverted to diplomatic protection and away from metropolitan policing. Gates believed that protection of foreign diplomats should be a federal government responsibility, not a local one. Gates also wrote William P. Clark, National Security Advisor to President Reagan, and urged him to ask Reagan to find a solution. In the Department of State’s response to Gates, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Tracy assured Gates that the Department would review his proposal. Meanwhile, Secretary Haig acknowledged the opinion among foreign diplomats that the United States had not provided reciprocal protection for visiting dignitaries. Moreover, Haig admitted that if the United States failed to provide adequate, reciprocal protection, it would have detrimental effects on the United States’ ability to conduct diplomacy and combat terrorism.27

Foreign diplomats and dignitaries began requesting additional protective security, even when there was not an imminent threat, but SY simply did not have the manpower to meet all of the requests. When the United Nations held a disarmament conference in June 1982, the number of dignitaries requiring protection far outweighed the number of SY Special Agents available for protective details. Consequently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security Marvin L. Garrett, Jr., made clear that if that many SY agents were going to be utilized for protective services, then no one in Main State should complain about a lack of services at Main State or about emergency responses. To prevent such a situation, Garrett suggested that a high-level protective security review committee be created to address protective security requests exceeding SY’s resources. Garrett’s primary goal was to create a review mechanism to determine the level of threat that a foreign dignitary faced.28

The Department of State quickly moved to ensure that the necessary authority and resources were available to protect foreign dignitaries visiting the United States. In the summer of 1982, the Department asked members of the House of Representatives to introduce a bill that would extend protective security to foreign consulates outside of the Washington, DC, area. The bill would also grant the Secretary of State the authority to request extraordinary protective services for foreign consular personnel from state and local police forces, and the ability to pay for such services. Department officials believed that there was a chance that Congress might grant the Department responsibility for protection of all missions and consulates in the United States. However, they concluded that the cost of reimbursing local police forces for such protection would likely deter Congress from granting the Department this responsibility.29

After debates and hearings, Congress passed the bill, titled the Foreign Missions Act of 1982. The Act increased SY’s authority for protecting foreign diplomats. It also gave the Department of State authority to reimburse or contract protection for foreign embassies in Washington, DC, and for consular officers and personnel elsewhere in the United States (this became the Foreign Consulate Program).30 The Secret Service contested the authority by reminding Congress that in 1974, it had given specific responsibilities to the Treasury Department (the Secret Service) to protect diplomats within the Washington, DC, area. The Foreign Missions Amendment Act of 1983 called for a new regulation to be issued after consultation with appropriate committees of the Congress, but the process soon bogged down.31
On January 4, 1983, Congress also passed Public Law 97-418. This act expanded the authority of the U.S. Secret Service Uniformed Division (formerly the Executive Protective Service, and renamed on November 15, 1977), allowing it to protect motorcades and other places associated with visits of certain foreign diplomatic missions. The law granted additional funds to the Department of State and local governments so that they could assist with protection. The law also directed the Departments of State and the Treasury to consult with the Secretary of the Navy regarding the use of Marine Security Guards at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.  

Although Congress created the Foreign Consulate Program in 1982, it had not granted the funds needed to reimburse state and local authorities. Consequently, the Department of State began drafting legislation in early 1984 to earmark appropriations for this purpose and to transfer authority to grant such funding to the Secretary of State from the Secretary of the Treasury. The Department and Congress soon debated the term equal protection of the law versus extraordinary protection, and over compliance between SY and the Secret Service’s Uniformed Division. Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, who headed M/CT, made clear to Congress that while the Department agreed that the Constitution provided “equal protection of the law” to all persons within state and local jurisdiction, the Department’s request to Congress went beyond that obligation. The Department requested protective security for foreign dignitaries when there was reason to believe that the dignitary was threatened; therefore, the inclusion of the word “extraordinary” was necessary in the legislation.

In March 1984, Sayre crafted a deal with Congress. Congress agreed that the U.S. Government had an obligation to provide protective security for foreign officials that went beyond the equal protection provision of the Constitution; meanwhile, the Department of State agreed to restrict how such funding would be used. The Secretary of State would not grant protective security services unless a specific threat existed against a person and/or facility. The Secretary also assumed responsibility for reimbursing New York City for protective services. On May 23, 1984, President Reagan gave further protective authority to the Department when he signed Executive Order 12478. E.O. 12478 granted the Secretary the authority to reimburse state and local
governments for protection given to foreign missions. The changes largely resolved the protective security issues that had plagued the Department since the 1960s.  

**The Moscow Embassy Again**

Security concerns also plagued the soon-to-be-constructed U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and officials worked to improve security at the construction site. On June 30, 1979, the United States signed a contract with the Soviet firm SVSI to construct the new embassy; however, U.S. officials had no intention of repeating the experience of the 1953 renovation, when the Soviets denied U.S. officials access to the site and placed tarpaulins over the structure to prevent observation of the renovation. As one Department official admitted, it was “a foregone conclusion…that the Soviets will attempt to install one or more clandestine listening systems.”

To prevent technical penetration of the new embassy, the Department, with the assistance of the Seabees and the Army Corps of Engineers, conducted extensive surveillance of the construction site. The Army Corps of Engineers provided an electrical engineer, a mechanical engineer, an architect, and a logistics scheduler to assist with the construction. More than 30 Seabees conducted surveillance and worked at the site; many of them would build the restricted areas of the embassy (e.g. the communications vault). Department officials also assigned an FBO project management team, at least 2 Security Engineering Officers (SEOs) from SY, and 9-10 Marine Security Guards, the latter of which provided two guards on watch at all times at the construction site. The Department conducted numerous inspections of the construction, and SY set up perimeter fences, perimeter alarms, closed-circuit television, microwave alarms, infrared vision devices, and fiber-optic probe viewers for extensive surveillance during construction.

**Protecting U.S. Personnel Overseas**

As construction of the Moscow Embassy proceeded, U.S.-Soviet relations were strained by the killing of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs. On the morning of February 14, 1979, four Afghan terrorists stopped the Ambassador’s car and abducted him as he was traveling from his residence to the Embassy. By 8:50 a.m., the terrorists had taken Dubs to a second floor room in the Kabul Hotel. Afghan police, with Soviet advisers, surrounded and isolated the room, with snipers placed on the roofs of nearby buildings. During the hostage situation, Afghan officials excluded U.S. Embassy officials and kept those U.S. officers present at the hotel at a distance. Despite U.S. Embassy urgings to engage in “patient negotiations,” Afghan police stormed the room just after noon, and shots were fired. When U.S. Embassy officers were able to enter the room, they found the Ambassador dead from several gunshots.

Several questions arose from Dubs’ death, not the least of which was the role of the Soviet advisors in the crisis. Upon receipt of the official report from the Marxist-oriented Afghan Government, U.S. officials deemed it “incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate.” The Afghan Government refused to cooperate in clarifying the
circumstances of Dubs’ death, and U.S. officials could not obtain information on the identities or associations of the terrorists. The report also contained several discrepancies. It said that Afghan police heard gunshots before they stormed the room; U.S. Embassy officers at the scene denied this. Although four terrorists abducted the Ambassador, only three were killed and captured. The report did not mention the Soviet advisers at the scene, even though U.S. officials saw them playing an “operational role.” After the United States lodged official protests, the Soviet Government acknowledged the presence of Soviet representatives at the hotel, but claimed that they “had nothing to do with the decisions of Afghan authorities.” Many of the Department’s questions remain unanswered.

Department officials also had grown particularly concerned about the security of U.S. personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. Since the 1976 murder of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, the Department had kept a close watch on the safety of U.S. personnel in Lebanon, and had nearly closed the mission in mid-1976. During the late 1970s, the Embassy came under repeated fire, ranging from small arms fire to rocket attacks. SEP improvements scheduled for the high-risk post were repeatedly revised, and incurred significant delays. In a September 1982 review, John Perdew of A/SPL observed, “Given the war conditions, the shortage of construction materials, and other logistic problems of working in Beirut, it is uncertain how long it will be before we can begin the construction project.”

The Beirut SEP project illustrates how local factors often impeded completion of security enhancements. Local factors ranged from the civil war conditions in Beirut, to the Soviet military presence in Kabul, to the inability to reach agreement with the landlord in Tegucigalpa. In Kampala, Uganda, where the U.S. Embassy building was owned by the United Kingdom, British officials refused to grant the Department permission to “harden” the Embassy.
SY officials also expressed concern about the ability of an embassy’s staff to manage the growing number of security programs and efforts. Holsey Handyside, the Action Officer for High-Threat Posts, noted that most RSOs and Administrative Officers had not been asked to manage such large quantities of resources. For example, the security program at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador in early 1983 involved 110-120 people and cost $1 million per year. Furthermore, the new measures and equipment required more training and management, basic behavioral changes from post staff, and time for the staff to “digest” and “assimilate” them. Handyside urged the Department to continue pressuring all posts to “think security.”

**Rejecting a Single Bureau**

As the magnitude of the security measures and efforts became apparent in early 1982, Department officials rejected the idea of moving all of the Department’s security-related programs and offices into a single bureau. Richard T. Kennedy, the Under Secretary of State for Management, convened a senior level task force to review the status of the Department’s security-related programs in order to recommend improvements. The task force concluded that it saw no benefit in placing all security efforts and programs into one organization; instead, it recommended that Kennedy appoint someone to coordinate security efforts without “interfering with operations.” Kennedy appointed Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Director of M/CT, whose office had recently (January 1982) been moved back into the Bureau of Management. The task force also reviewed the SEP and admitted that SEP faced problems, but it insisted that intra-agency and inter-departmental cooperation and coordination were not among them.

One year later, the Working Group on the Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas reviewed the SEP and other Department security efforts. Headed by SY Director Marvin Garrett, the Working Group determined that sufficient interagency consultation and coordination on security matters existed. The Group found that the “main problem” with enhancing security overseas was “the insufficiency of resources” being provided by Congress, OMB, and the Department.
CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

Even though Department officials rejected creating a single security bureau, the Department’s security responsibilities, measures, and programs were already concentrating under SY. SY’s Threat Analysis Group (SY/TAG) prepared the “threat category list,” which determined which posts were high risk, and thus received SEP improvements. SY worked closely with M/CT to coordinate Department security efforts. Garrett chaired the Working Group on the Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas. He (or his representative) also sat on or headed other groups, task forces, and committees related to post security. SY officials, including former SY head Victor Dikeos, were part of the security survey teams. The RSOs, Post Security Officers (PSOs), Marine Security Guards, and SEOs were responsible for the physical and operational security of the posts; they implemented and installed the new security measures and equipment, and often conducted security training. Regional security technicians, Seabees, and post communicators were swamped with installing and maintaining the new security equipment purchased and distributed by the SEP. Therefore, en toto, the emphasis on physical security overseas was placing greater demands and responsibilities upon SY, straining the office’s resources and structure.

Beirut I: New Method

The 1983 suicide bombing in Beirut increased the already burgeoning demands upon SY and its personnel. The radical aspect of the attack, one which no one anticipated, was that the driver of the vehicle was willing to commit suicide in the process of the attack. On April 18, just after 1 p.m., a suicide bomber drove a one-half-ton black pick-up truck laden with approximately 2,000 pounds of TNT to the east entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The driver crashed the vehicle through the wall of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces guardroom before detonating his bomb. The blast collapsed the building’s entryway and a portion of the building itself, killing 86 people, including 17 Americans, and injuring over 100. Shortly after the bombing, officers at the Beirut Embassy wrote: “We were all

Figure 11: A Marine stands guard as rescue workers search the rubble of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber drove a pickup truck to the east entrance of the Embassy, where the truck exploded. It was the first instance of a suicide bomber attacking a U.S. diplomatic post. Source: © Associated Press.
shocked by the size and intensity of the blast; the fact of an attack was not really a surprise.” Richard M. Gannon, the security officer at the Embassy, said that car bombs were common in the Lebanese capital, and that “the prospect of a car bomb deployed against the embassy had been considered sufficiently real” that Lebanese police refused to allow vehicles to park near the Embassy. Shortly after the bombing, SY’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) sent a telegram to several high-risk embassies, warning them that a “martyrdom complex” was emerging among Palestinian and other Near East and Asian groups. “In the past few years,” wrote TAG, “there appears to be an increasing tendency to carry out operations for the sole purpose of the act itself, with no regard for whether the perpetrator lives or dies in committing the act.”

In its response to the Beirut bombing, SY enacted several security improvements. It evacuated all Beirut Embassy personnel to the British Embassy and the Durraford Buildings, an apartment complex leased by the U.S. Government. Within 30 minutes after the explosion, SY and the Marines increased perimeter security around U.S. facilities in Beirut; and then added bollards, sandbags, and anti-vehicle devices to limit access. Protective Services increased the personnel on the Ambassador’s protective detail and post operations. Marines from the Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), a combat unit that was serving as part of the Multinational Force sent to Lebanon, set up and manned checkpoints on all access roads to the Durraford Buildings and British Embassy. The MAU assigned investigators to the dumping area, where the Embassy’s debris was screened for classified materials and passport and visa plates lost in the explosion.

Immediately after the bombing, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered to provide funds to improve security at U.S. overseas posts. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) said, “I would like to see us have whatever force is necessary to protect our embassies.” “If it takes a small army in places like Iran and places like Beirut,” he added, “my sense is that Congress would support whatever it costs.” Secretary of State George Shultz said that he would “review” the Department’s “security arrangements.”

Behind the scenes, SY and Bureau of Administration officials quickly initiated and implemented an “enhanced” SEP. The Bureau of Administration compiled a list of 64 posts that faced long-term threats and required immediate projects to improve security. The 64 posts were designated as the focus of the SEP. Another 28 posts not placed on the SEP list but still requiring security upgrades received funding through the Department’s regional bureaus. By June, just eight weeks after the Beirut bombing, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Tracy told the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the Department was working on about 40 of the original list of 64, and was giving priority to a “top tier” of 26 posts. Of those 26, said Tracy, the Department had completed security improvements on 10 or 12.50

Then, on October 23, 1983, six months after the Beirut bombing, a terrorist bombing rocked the U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut. A suicide truck bomber crashed through the gates of the command center used by international peacekeeping forces. The subsequent explosion reduced two buildings to rubble, left a 30-foot deep crater, and killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers. After the attack, Lieutenant Colonel Philippe de Longeaux of the French forces in Lebanon remarked that “real security is not possible” in Beirut. Congress promptly questioned the security measures in place; meanwhile, Secretary Shultz told reporters, “the emphasis on security will have to be heightened very significantly.”51

Following the Marine Barracks bombing, the Department submitted and received approval for another appropriation request from Congress, enabling SY to make significant progress in improving embassy security by late 1983. The new funding allowed projects such as reinforcement of the gate at the U.S. Embassy compound in Kuwait to go forward in early December.52 SY worked with local governments to restrict access to U.S. embassies, particularly entrances and on-street parking near the embassy. SY implemented several measures to limit the risk of vehicle bomb attacks worldwide, including screening vehicles, constructing perimeter walls, hiring more local guards, and installing fences, gates, bollards, and vehicle arrest systems. SY approved 81 physical security projects, conducted physical security surveys at 33 posts, and spent $3.5 million on 13 new armored vehicles and weapons for posts in need. SY obtained equipment for public access control projects at 31 western European posts, and it reviewed architectural and engineering drawings for security enhancement projects at 25 embassies. Moreover, SY, FBO, and A/SPL established a mechanism to accelerate the Department’s response to post requests for security enhancements. SY also established long-term procedures (likely in cooperation with FBO) such as more rigid site selection for post buildings, construction of freestanding buildings, and larger compounds.53

In the wake of the Beirut bombings, the Working Group on Enhancement of Security at U.S. Embassies Overseas gained new relevance. Formed just days before the first Beirut bombing, the Working Group was created by the Interagency Group for Countermeasures (IG/CM). Headed by

Figure 13: British soldiers assist in rescue operations at the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, after a suicide bomber crashed a truck through the gates on October 23, 1983. The explosion killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French paratroopers, and left a crater 30 feet deep. Source: © Associated Press.
History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State

SY, the Working Group’s members were from SY and other foreign affairs agencies, as well as FBO, OC, and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). During the Working Group’s first meeting in May 1983, it identified four goals: 1) moving existing high-threat posts to free-standing buildings; 2) acquiring sufficient land to build free-standing posts; 3) using only U.S. personnel to repair a post’s attic, roof, façade, and other sensitive areas; and 4) working toward building at least one acoustic or treated conference room for each post.54 The IG/CM suggested that the Working Group establish policy guidelines for the entire federal government, and one year later, the SY-led group issued a formal policy statement on embassy security that circulated in the Department of State and the National Security Council. The statement not only elevated the Working Group’s four goals to policy aims of the U.S. Government, but added several other objectives to the federal agenda. These included assigning Marine Security Guards to every U.S. embassy, and ensuring the security of word processing, communications, and information systems. The Working Group then disbanded, and the Overseas Security Policy Group and the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee continued its efforts.55

The surprising element of the Working Group was that M/CT was not included, even though Sayre was charged with coordinating the Department’s security policies. The omission indicated that, on a practical level, SY, not M/CT, was managing the SEP and the Department’s other security matters. SY’s Threat Analysis Group prepared threat alerts for the field, and coordinated with INR, M/CT, regional bureaus, and other intelligence agencies in preparing the alerts.56 In truth, Sayre did not have the personnel to direct counter-terrorism policy and coordinate security policies and programs. M/CT’s staff numbered 13 officers and 6 secretaries. In comparison, SY’s Threat Analysis Group alone had 8 officers and 2 secretaries, and SY as an entity had 436 people.57

Yet SY also lacked the staff to meet the growing security demands. After only a few weeks on the job, David C. Fields, who replaced Marvin Garrett as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, admitted that SY was “hard-pressed to handle its traditional responsibilities and growing demands.” In fact, in addition to 30 vacancies, SY experienced a decline in staff between 1980 and 1982. In order to free resources for the new security demands that it faced, SY, in 1982, “surrendered, with qualms,” its long-held task of conducting background investigations of applicants for civil service jobs to the Office of Personnel Management.58

Just before Marvin Garrett departed as the head of SY, he formulated a proposal that would increase funding for embassy security and provide more staff for SY. Garrett’s proposal was to be submitted to Congress in 1983, no doubt to take advantage of Congress’s expressed interest in improving physical security. Assistant Secretary Tracy and Under Secretary Jerome W. Van Gorkom instead chose to submit Garrett’s proposal as a supplemental request in 1984, after Congress had taken up the Department’s appropriation bill. Sayre, meanwhile, sought to shelve Garrett’s proposal altogether and have SY, FBO, and OC directed to work with M/CT and others to formulate a new proposal.59
CHAPTER 7 ACCELERATING TRANSFORMATION: Enhancing Security, 1979-1985

To Kuwait and Back Again

The December 12, 1983, terrorist attack on the U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait led to a substantial enhancement of SY and a thorough reconsideration by the Department about how to manage security. During the Kuwait City attack, two men crashed a dump truck packed with explosives through the gate of the U.S. Embassy compound, and it exploded next to the U.S. Consulate building. No Americans were killed, but the Consulate was destroyed and the chancery heavily damaged, despite the fact that the Embassy had taken measures to limit vehicular access.60

Department officials determined that the bombing, the third major attack on a U.S. facility in the Middle East since April, constituted “a marked escalation in the security threat” to U.S. posts in the region. On December 16, the Department ordered its embassies to erect barricades or take measures to prevent further truck bomb explosions. Department officials also decided to move the U.S. Embassy in Beirut to the east (Christian) side of the city. Since the move cost significantly less than completing the new Embassy in West Beirut, the Department shifted the remaining funds to acquire and build more permanent and secure facilities in other regional posts, namely Amman, Jordan; Sana’a, Yemen; Manama, Bahrain; and Muscat, Oman. Department officials now embraced the idea that free-standing buildings and larger compounds were a necessity.61

The Kuwait City bombing and the new attitude about security in the Department undercut Sayre’s efforts to shelve Garret’s proposal, primarily because Sayre’s recommendations seemed inadequate to the severity of the threat confronting U.S. posts. Sayre favored “common-sense, less dramatic and less costly” measures for improving embassy security: expanding the Marine Security Guard program to all embassies, constructing better perimeters for missions, assigning more security officers to posts, and purchasing additional armored vehicles. However, he believed the cost for free-standing buildings and larger compounds to be excessive.62 SY, with FBO and others, however, had already extensively developed in other forums the idea of free-standing embassy buildings and larger compounds as long-term policy goals for the U.S. Government. The Kuwait City bombing accelerated acceptance of SY/FBO’s ideas and shifted greater responsibility for coordination of security measures onto the shoulders of SY.

Despite Sayre’s assertion that SY did not have the resources to augment embassy security, SY always seemed to find resources when it needed them. Often, SY responded by using what it had, shifting resources, and coordinating inter-agency or inter-departmental assistance. In early 1984, SY had five security officers engaged in overseas emergency situations. When the U.S. Embassy and personnel in Guatemala faced a threatened terrorist attack, SY quickly sent a security officer and eight additional Marine Security Guards to the Central American capital. M/CT, meanwhile, arranged for a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) team to go to Guatemala; but when the team arrived in Guatemala City, the Embassy’s RSO coordinated and integrated the JSOC team into the Embassy’s MSG detail. In fact, Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields informed Sayre that SY had drastically reduced the role of JSOC teams and that they would eventually be phased out. Just nine months after the first
Beirut bombing, Fields and SY largely and effectively had shouldered the coordination of the SEP and other Department security programs. In fact, Sayre likely recognized that coordination had drifted to SY when he informed his staff that he was “taking steps” to ensure that M/CT was “at least an info recipient” of message traffic on security improvements and enhancements.63

Under Garrett and Fields, SY gained responsibilities; meanwhile, M/CT lacked the resources to carry out its assigned functions. In January 1984, SY instructed its RSOs to submit monthly reports on crimes committed against members of the U.S. missions they served. SY also, at the request of Sayre, assisted with M/CT’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program (ATA). ATA had been created in 1981 with five goals in mind: enrich law enforcement skills of foreign police forces and provide equipment; strengthen bilateral relations with friendly governments; promote cooperation between foreign police forces and the U.S. Government; raise the level of respect for human rights; and assist foreign governments in protecting American installations. When ATA was finally funded in early 1984, M/CT, due to its lack of resources, sought SY’s help. Fields welcomed M/CT’s appeal. He later thanked M/CT for supporting the addition of eight new SY officers who would enable SY to establish a meaningful training program for foreign police and create “a ready reserve pool to provide short-term training for Foreign Service personnel at critical posts.”64

Enhancing SY

After the Kuwait bombing, the Department of State pushed several initiatives to restructure the Department’s organization regarding security. One initiative was the Inman Panel. Conceived in early March 1984 by Under Secretary of State for Management Ronald Spiers, the panel would examine potential security improvements and recommend necessary changes. Several senior Department officers believed that the Department needed to take more dramatic action; otherwise, it was exposing itself to “second guessing and accusations” that it had no strategy for the terrorist threat other than requesting supplemental appropriations from Congress. In a
memorandum to Secretary Shultz, Spiers proposed convening a group of seven esteemed Department of State, Congressional, and business leaders to undertake “a new, comprehensive examination of [the Department’s] security strategy.” Among the luminaries Spiers suggested were former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Ambassador Shirley Temple Black, Chrysler Motors Chairman Lee Iacocca, and former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Shultz immediately liked the idea, and recommended that the panel be given “a limited but reasonable time to complete” their examination. Before moving ahead, Shultz discussed the idea with Fields, Sayre, and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Robert E. Lamb.

In July 1984, retired Admiral B. R. “Bobby” Inman agreed to serve as the panel’s chair, and in August, Victor Dikeos, former head of SY, agreed to serve as the panel’s Executive Secretary.65

The final membership of the panel included few of the individuals on Spiers’ original list, but it remained a highly respected group. In addition to Inman and Dikeos, Senator Warren Rudman (R-NH) and Congressman Daniel Mica (D-FL) represented Congress. Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger represented the Department of State; Lieutenant General D’Wayne Gray, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Marine Corps, represented the Department of Defense; and Anne Armstrong, chair of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, represented the intelligence community. Robert McGuire, Chairman of the Board for Pinkerton’s, served as the panel’s sole private sector member.66

While the Department was assembling the Inman Panel, Fields put forward two proposals in June 1984 that would create an “enhanced,” larger Office of Security. One proposal, offered jointly with FBO, suggested that the Bureau of Administration disband A/SPL and divide A/SPL’s positions between SY and FBO. The Bureau of Administration could then create an “Inter-departmental Committee on...”
Physical Security” under the leadership of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, and the committee would supervise SEP projects and provide direction and long-range guidance to the Department’s physical security program. With this proposal, Fields was formalizing what was already occurring: management, oversight, and coordination of the SEP and embassy security was being accomplished by SY.67

Fields’ other proposal, put forward on June 12, 1984, was innocuously titled “Acceleration of Security Programs of Department of State;” however, it proposed a much larger, restructured SY and set an ambitious agenda for embassy security over the next several years. Since the Department “has accumulated a body of experience and a growing cadre of experts,” the proposal argued, it was time to increase the personnel and material resources to carry out embassy security improvements. The Acceleration program delineated three categories of work: “extension to all posts…[of] the level of security now afforded the high threat posts,” “replacement of facilities not adequately securable” [85 posts], and provision for “on-going service and maintenance to derive maximum benefit from our security of overseas missions.” To complete the work in the three categories, SY requested 489 new people (which would double its size), plus an additional 275 Marine Security Guards and 100 Seabees, as well as $670 million in funding and another $1.438 billion to construct 85 new office buildings overseas.68

If the sheer numbers were not enough, the Acceleration program clearly indicated that not only would SY become a very large component in the Department’s bureaucracy, but it also would be the lead agency on diplomatic security. Fields’ proposal made clear that SY would assume control over, if not absorb, some M/CT programs, such as the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and Emergency Action Planning (EAP). The Acceleration program also arranged for SY to obtain the funding for the Department’s Rewards for Information program, recently created by the Payment of Rewards for Information Act.69

The parameters of the Acceleration program demonstrate that SY and the Bureau of Administration officials were dissatisfied with the existing organizational structure and now sought a single security bureau to enact and coordinate improvements in overseas security. An important reason for the shift in attitude was change in personnel in the upper echelons of the Department. Sayre had received his responsibilities for coordinating security policy from Under Secretary of State for Management Van Gorkom and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger; however, by May 1984, Ronald Spiers had replaced Van Gorkom
and Eagleburger had left the Department. In November 1983, Garrett received little support for his proposal from Van Gorkom and Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Thomas Tracy; yet, seven months later, Fields found sympathy for a stronger, centralized SY among Spiers and new Assistant Secretary for Administration Robert Lamb. As Spiers told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “we have had some coordination problems within the State Department, and…this is what led me to be a very frustrated Ambassador overseas” (Spiers had served as Ambassador to Turkey and to Pakistan).^70

Another reason for the shift to creating a single security entity was the number of other agencies that now had representatives at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas. Since the 1950s, the number of agencies represented at a given embassy or consulate had increased markedly; moreover, the various agencies had differing security needs. This resulted in “a degree of incoherence” in trying to provide for security at the posts. As SY’s Acceleration proposal noted, “The multiple survey teams, funding sources, approval chains, and supply conduits contribute[d] to confusion and bureaucratic maneuvering which complicates and frequently slows the improvement process.” SY’s proposed program asked the Department to seek the National Security Council’s approval for centralizing overseas security in the Department, specifically in SY, and having all agencies put their security requirements in writing and submit them to the Department.^71

Department officials were sympathetic to both SY proposals. In fact, by August, they had acted on one of them: the inter-departmental committee on physical security. This emerged as the Overseas Security Policy Group, and SY’s Deputy Assistant Secretary chaired it.^72 The support for the Acceleration program reveals that leading officials in the Office of Management and the Bureau of Administration were already contemplating and establishing some form of an “enhanced” SY in the summer of 1984, well before the Inman Panel had begun its work. The SEP and the bombings in Beirut and Kuwait had generated such an emphasis on embassy physical security that existing bureaucratic structures in the Department strained to meet the demand. Administration officials sought to resolve these problems by centralizing diplomatic security into one entity. SY was the obvious candidate; moreover, with Fields at the helm, SY was asking for the responsibility. The centralization included moving M/CT’s ATA and EAP programs, the Rewards for Information program, and A/SPL under the control of SY. The Acceleration program altered the bureaucracy to coincide with existing practice and to keep pace with evolving international circumstances. The program strove to “enhance” SY and outlined the structure of an “Office of Diplomatic Security.” The question was whether Congress, the White House, and OMB would accept the ambitious program.

The Moscow Typewriters

While the Department was moving to enact SY’s two proposals, the 1984 discovery of Soviet bugs in typewriters at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow prompted further scrutiny and criticism of the Department. The discoveries pushed Department officials to adopt a more aggressive technical security program and encouraged the
movement toward an enhanced security office. The discoveries also suggested a possible purpose for the chimney antenna that SY engineers had discovered in 1978.

In 1983, French intelligence informed U.S. officials that the Soviets might have planted a bug in the U.S. Embassy’s communications system. The French had found a Soviet bug in one of their coding machines. A data storage device that transmitted a signal only intermittently, the new Soviet bug could be quickly and easily installed, resisted detection by conventional methods, and was controlled remotely and wirelessly. Working with other agencies, the National Security Agency (NSA) presented the news to President Ronald Reagan and proposed “Operation Gunman,” which sought to replace all information and communications processing equipment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, more than 20,000 pounds total. Reagan approved Operation Gunman, and the NSA found 16 IBM typewriters containing bugs similar to the device that the French had found. The devices could record and transmit keystroke sounds to Soviet monitoring equipment.\(^7^3\)

The typewriter finds proved alarming, in part because SY was unsure how extensively the Soviets had penetrated the Embassy. In response, SY conducted a worldwide search for additional bugs in IBM typewriters. Security Engineering Officer George Herrmann recalled that the news was “terrifying,” because nearly every telegram generated by the Department was prepared as a machine-readable document on an IBM typewriter, and then carried to the post communications center. The bugs also demonstrated that the Soviets possessed highly sophisticated electronic technology. Former head of the National Security Administration Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer admitted that many would concede that the Soviets had “enormously
narrowed the [technological] gap and have caught us in a number of places."

Questions arose over how the Soviets were able to implant the bugs, and how much damage was done to U.S. national security. The Department of State learned that the typewriters had been shipped through "normal channels," that is, by unescorted shipments that had passed through Soviet customs; in fact, one typewriter was left overnight in Soviet customs. The typewriters should have received special diplomatic handling, which included a U.S. Government escort, as required by Department regulations. Moreover, some typewriters had been shipped to the Embassy as early as 1976, and the batteries in a couple of the bugs were found to be dead. This led to the suggestion that perhaps the chimney antenna found in 1978 might have retrieved the data from the typewriter bugs.

While it is possible that damage to national security was minor, Department officials took the breach "seriously" and adopted several measures to improve technical security in U.S. embassies. Of the new measures that the Department adopted to improve technical security, one was a program to provide equipment maintenance, a controlled procurement channel, and inspection and inventory controls for office equipment destined for U.S. embassies and consulates. Also, Secretary Shultz asked the Inman Panel to add electronic espionage against U.S. overseas posts to its list of subjects to study. The Department assured the U.S. public that there was "no evidence that the Soviets ever acted on information obtained from monitoring the compromised typewriters." Yet detractors in the intelligence community and Congress cited the typewriter episode as demonstration of the Department’s inattention to technical security.

**Beirut II**

During the typewriter discoveries and investigation, the Department worked quickly to increase security at U.S.-occupied buildings in Beirut, where the situation was deemed "extremely grave." The Embassy, headed by Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew, recommended moving most of its operations and personnel to a new office building in East Beirut, while keeping a token presence in West Beirut. SY fully supported the move, but expressed "strong reservations" about maintaining a presence in West Beirut, asserting "even a limited U.S. presence in West Beirut...is extremely dangerous and should probably be deferred until the situation improves.
markedly.” The Department supported the East Beirut move, and justified keeping West Beirut open because it feared that closing the West Beirut office would “send a major negative signal to the Muslims in Lebanon.” After surveying the Baaklini office building in East Beirut, SY, FBO, and OC inspectors approved it, with SY asserting that it offered a “substantially lower” threat of terrorism than West Beirut.

SY coordinated, supervised, and/or installed most of the building’s extensive security upgrades, but Deputy Assistant Secretary Fields had grave doubts that SY could have everything in place before summer’s end. He insisted that perimeter security would have to be very tight to preclude a repeat of the 1983 experience. SY had barriers constructed that would “totally block” access to the Baaklini Building, which would be accessible only to Embassy employees. SY brought in a Mobile Training Team headed by Bill Penn to prepare local Lebanese guards in procedures and skills for protecting the Baaklini Building. While many security improvements were completed, Ambassador Bartholomew insisted the move to the Baaklini Building occur before the summer ended. Given this deadline, the company installing several security measures was stretched extremely thin between the two Embassy locations, and could not complete some security upgrades on schedule. One of these upgrades was the swinging steel gates for the two entrances to the Baaklini Building. When the compound was attacked on September 20, 1984, the gates lay on the ground near where they were to be installed.

The Department of Defense endorsed moving Embassy operations to East Beirut, saying that the Embassy’s reliance on the 80-man Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) for guarding the perimeter in West Beirut must end because the Department could no longer sustain the unit in Lebanon. The facts that troop units were needed elsewhere, other members of the Multinational Force had pulled out in February, and the Marines were high profile targets demanded that the Pentagon withdraw the MAU. Also the three Navy ships stationed offshore carrying 2,000 Marines and 1,200 Navy personnel that supported the MAU typically served a combat role, not a protective one. By June, the Navy informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would have to terminate the MAU security support role in Beirut, and it strongly advised that Department of State, Department of Defense, and the NSC should anticipate August 8, 1984, as the termination date for the MAU’s role in supporting the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

The Department of State responded with alarm. If the Marines did not stay to provide reinforcement to the Beirut Embassy, SY proposed that the U.S.
mission be shut down. The Joint Chiefs conceded that the Marines could stay past the August 8 deadline if the Embassy had not completed its move to the Baaklini Building, but they strongly admonished the Department of State for not moving faster in finishing the security improvements. Throughout June, SY alerted senior Department officials of the dire security situation in Beirut, warning that “U.S. personnel who will continue to operate in West Beirut will not be adequately protected.”

Most of the Embassy’s staff relocated to the Baaklini Building on July 31, even though several security enhancements were not completed. The MAU departed shortly after. The Embassy relied upon the MSG detail and an increased number of Lebanese security guards, supported by the Lebanese Army, for the protection of the Baaklini Building and the Embassy in West Beirut. On September 20, 1984, a suicide bomber, driving a van bearing diplomatic plates, approached the northern entrance of the Baaklini Building. Speeding, the bomber navigated the chicanes and headed straight for the U.S. Mission. Guards fired at the vehicle, but could not stop the van before it exploded in front of the building. The blast killed at least 14 people and injured many, including Ambassador Bartholomew, the visiting British Ambassador, and the Embassy’s Regional Security Officer Alan Bigler.

While working to survey the damages and injuries in Beirut, the Department of State immediately required all 262 overseas posts to revise their security arrangements. It dispatched teams to tighten post defenses against vehicle bombs and identify other security needs at 23 high threat posts. Under Secretary Spiers cabled all U.S. ambassadors and consuls, instructing them to review “every conceivable aspect” of post security, and bluntly telling them that “adequate security should be [their] objective, even at the expense of aesthetics or convenience.” Posts were told to advise Washington of their needs and vulnerabilities, and Spiers received assurances from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Congress that SY would receive the necessary support to protect U.S. Government personnel and property overseas.

The Department also requested a supplemental appropriation from Congress for embassy security, and the request’s specifics were drawn directly from Fields’ Acceleration program. Whereas the Acceleration program asked for 40 additional security officers overseas, 90 SEOs, 14 communications staff, 30 new administration staff (for training) and 100 additional Seabees, the supplemental submitted to Congress
requested 26 security officers, 15 SEOs, 15 communications staff, 20 administration staff, and 50 Seabees. The Acceleration program asked for $37.3 million for armored vehicles over 5 years, but the supplemental requested $11 million. The Acceleration program wanted $3 million for new security improvements for Main State and $2 million for the Rewards for Information program; the supplemental asked for $1 million for each. There was $1 million for research into an ideal embassy (this would become the Model Embassy program), and $28 million to seek and obtain new sites for the most vulnerable embassies. In all, SY sought 87 new people and approximately $60 million in new funding for security enhancements.\(^87\)

Members of the House and Senate were sympathetic to the Department’s supplemental request; however, Senate committee hearings revealed that the impediments to improving security overseas rested with the OMB, not Congress’s reluctance to appropriate funds. The Department requested money to improve security at 70 posts, but OMB limited it to 35 posts. The Department requested funds to install physical access control projects at 10 posts; OMB cut it to 2. OMB cut the number of new Regional Security Officers from 104 to 51, and reduced the armored vehicle program from 120 to 60 vehicles. OMB also denied a $12 million request for 310 new Marine Security Guards, and refused a $1.7 million request to improve security at Main State. Of the $174 million of security improvement requests by the Department of State, OMB permitted $28 million. In exasperation, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware) exclaimed, “Is the OMB on our side or on their side? Who does OMB work for?”\(^88\)

Spiers and other Department officials endured extensive questioning and heavy criticism from Congress and the public. Just days after the September attack, Congressional representatives questioned why, in spite of two previous bombings, Department officials could not reduce the risks to U.S. personnel in Beirut. Representative Robert Torrecelli (D-New Jersey) alleged that the entire security program suffered from poor management. “I’ll vote for the $100 million,” he remarked, “but you need 100 good managers more than $100 million.” Congress also sought to identify who decided “to move the embassy to East Beirut before the security enhancements had been completed.” Spiers conceded some of the Congressional representatives’ points, but he insisted that the attack did not result from organizational failings or a lack of resources. He admitted that had all perimeter security measures at the Baaklini Building been completed, the bombing might have been avoided. However, Spiers noted that other threats, such as rocket attacks and kidnappings, were considered more likely, and installation of the vehicle gate was delayed in order to complete improvements for these more likely threats. Spiers stressed that, “the Department and other U.S. agencies understood the risks of maintaining our presence in the middle of a war zone.”\(^89\)

When Congress passed the Department’s supplemental, it rapidly enhanced and expanded SY. Titled the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, the supplemental added $55 million to SY’s budget for FY 1984, doubling SY’s budget for FY 1984 to a total of $110 million. The influx of funds is more spectacular given that SY’s entire FY 1982 budget was only $27 million. The supplemental request nearly quadrupled SY’s monies in less than 2 years, and added 87 positions to SY’s staff, pushing the total personnel for SY to more than 500 people.\(^90\)
The 1984 supplemental, in conjunction with the second Beirut bombing, allowed the Department of State to centralize many security functions under an “enhanced” SY. After the 1984 bombing, the Bureau of Administration implemented SY’s proposal to disband A/SPL and divide its people and responsibilities between SY and FBO. Congress’s supplemental allowed SY to double the size of its Threat Analysis Group and to devote three people toward coordinating security for all agencies with offices and personnel in posts overseas. SY raised its number of Seabees by 60 and its number of Marine Security Guard detachments (6 Marines each) by 37. In addition to obtaining 26 new RSOs and 41 new SEOs, SY initiated a preventative maintenance program for technical equipment, set up a working security committee with the Office of Communications to cooperate on security measures, and worked with FBO to create guidelines and standards for current and new sites and buildings. SY also gained Emergency Action Planning of M/CT, and the Bureau of Administration changed its name to the Bureau of Administration and Security, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security becoming the number-two person in the Bureau.\(^\text{91}\)

In addition, SY created a permanent Mobile Training Team (MTT) program. Although MTTs had existed for a decade, the program had become more ad hoc after the training tours of the mid-1970s. When called, the heads of SY’s Range and Locks divisions pulled together a team and headed to the designated post. SY officials asked Alan Bigler, who had been injured in the second Beirut bombing, to head the new MTT program. MTTs were tasked to train U.S. and local personnel at high threat posts, expand SY’s research and development of security products, and increase training for SY personnel. Bigler re-formed the MTTs, creating teams that were a cross between a training team and a Special Forces team. Bigler wanted highly-trained SY experts who could perform several functions, namely giving the best training for post personnel in high-threat areas, offering ambassadors the best advice available, providing local RSOs with highly trained agents to assist them, and furnishing posts with the capability to respond to terrorist, criminal, and high threat situations.\(^\text{92}\)
Bigler developed the MTTs into formal units. Bigler and his staff drew team leaders from select SY agents at high threat posts. All team members received extensive training, including Hostage Rescue Team training from the FBI. The MTTs trained Department personnel in surveillance detection and counter-surveillance. Post personnel learned how to steal cars so that, in a high-threat situation, they could get away from a hostile environment. Other training included how to prevent becoming victims of crime and how to survive when confronted by a criminal. Bigler noted that “a lot of suspicion” existed among Foreign Service Officers about what his teams were doing, and for what situations they were training people. Since their formation under Bigler, Mobile Security Details, as the MTTs were later renamed, have more than doubled their original size, but they still carry out much of the original mission.93

Two other programs gained significant funding from the 1984 supplemental. The first was the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. Comprising about eight staff members and a $9 million budget, ATA approached terrorism as a global problem requiring international cooperation. Under the control of M/CT, ATA trained police forces from other countries in counterterrorism skills, specifically SWAT training, counter-intelligence, and threat analysis, among others. The program sought to offer bilateral assistance for anti-terrorism training and communications in order to increase the ability of other nations to counter international terrorism. By 1985, ATA conducted extensive exchange and training programs with 15 nations, which included Portugal, Costa Rica, Turkey, Italy, Thailand, Tunisia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Cameroon, and Liberia.94

ATA initially generated public protests against its training efforts. The program first conducted its training in the Phoenix area; however, demonstrators appeared and accused ATA of training “death squads” and of being akin to the Pentagon’s “School of the Americas.” ATA moved its training site to the campuses of Louisiana State University and the Louisiana State Police Academy. Congress too had qualms about ATA’s training program, and mandated that training could only occur in the United States. John Rendeiro, SY’s first agent assigned to ATA, recalled that Congress was reacting partly to the old AID programs and to the death of Daniel Mitrione in Uruguay, which had generated considerable hostility and opposition among local nationals in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Despite the concerns, ATA conducted “straight counter-terrorism police training, with humane, law-abiding, police techniques.”95
The 1984 supplemental also funded a second program, which enabled the Secretary of State to pay rewards for information relating to terrorism. Initially called Rewards for Information, the program was designed by Special Agent Steve Gleason, who had investigated the two U.S. Embassy bombings in Beirut. The DS program paid individuals a cash reward for information that led to the arrest or conviction of terrorists, or the prevention or successful resolution of international terrorist acts. The Secretary of State determined whether the information merited a reward, and rewards were paid out of confidential, no-year designated funds. At the Attorney General’s discretion, persons granted a reward could enter the witness protection program if necessary. The program capped rewards at $500,000 per informant. A year later, however, Congress designated $2 million for such rewards, and the program was re-titled “Rewards for Justice.”

**The Inman Panel and the Creation of DS**

Several months after the 1984 supplemental, in June 1985, the Inman Panel submitted its report to Secretary of State Shultz, and in it, the panel urged the Department to undertake a fundamental reorganization of diplomatic security. The panel recommended creating a Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), headed by an Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security who reported directly to the Under Secretary of State for Management. SY and the several initiatives it had gained during the previous two years comprised the bulk of the new bureau, but the Inman Panel advocated moving several other security-related programs and offices into the bureau, including the Diplomatic Courier Service. The panel also proposed stripping M/CT of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Emergency Action Planning programs, and giving both to DS. The Inman Panel advised the Department to create a Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), which would combine Special Agents and SEOs into a highly skilled corps of security professionals within the Foreign Service, to allow for their recruitment and advancement. Although the Inman Panel preferred to move all foreign dignitary protection duties into the new DS, the panel recommended that DS and the Secret Service form a working group to develop standards and procedures, with the function of dignitary protection eventually falling entirely under the purview of DS. The panel also suggested improving intelligence gathering and analysis, physical security (building) standards, and a substantial building program.
The Inman Panel report gained the immediate support of the Secretary of State and Congress. Secretary Shultz appointed Assistant Secretary Lamb to implement the panel’s recommendations and tasked him to complete the reorganization of the Department’s security programs by January 1, 1986.98 The Department established the Bureau of Diplomatic Security on November 4, 1985, with the new Bureau acquiring the Courier Service, the Rewards for Justice program, as well as ATA and the Emergency Planning program. On August 12, 1986, with overwhelming support, Congress passed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (Public Law 99-399), creating the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and providing the new bureau with extensive funding. President Reagan signed the act into law on August 27.99

The transfer of ATA to DS, however, did generate a brief clash between Congress and the Inman Panel on one side and the Department of State on the other. The issue centered upon which office should manage ATA. Secretary Shultz said that M/CT should retain management of ATA. The House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Inman Panel insisted that DS should manage it because ATA was an operational training program. Congress and the Inman Panel members did agree that DS and M/CT should coordinate their efforts with regards to ATA’s training program, and Shultz concurred. The result was that M/CT would provide policy guidance for ATA; meanwhile, DS would manage it.100

With the transfer of ATA and the Emergency Planning offices to DS, the Inman Panel suggested that the remnants of M/CT should be reformed into a policy formation and coordination office. The panel drew a marked distinction between the operations of counterterrorist programs and the development of counter-terrorism policy. It advocated moving all operational components to DS, with the new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security serving as coordinator of terrorism and security matters in the Department and as chair of
the Interdepartmental Working Group on Terrorism. The rest of M/CT, the panel believed, should be shifted to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs because much of counterterrorism involved diplomacy, and counterterrorism policy could “best be carried out from the Department’s foreign policy office.” Implementing the Inman Panel’s recommendations, the Department named Robert Oakley as Acting Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism; and the new office, S/CT, would lead the formulation, presentation, and negotiation of the Department’s counterterrorism policy, with the Ambassador at Large reporting directly to the Secretary of State. On October 1, 1985, the Department transferred the 20 remaining staff of M/CT to the Ambassador at Large.
The shift of terrorist methods from individual and small group acts to mob attacks and suicide bombings redefined diplomatic security during the early 1980s. With attacks on U.S. diplomatic personnel and buildings becoming symbolic acts against the United States, terrorism magnified the need for a larger, more centralized security entity in the Department of State. Hostage situations, killings of diplomats, mob attacks, and suicide bombers subverted the long-held concepts of “gentleman diplomats” and diplomatic immunities, as well as U.S. officials’ commitment to demonstrating U.S. openness and friendliness in its diplomacy and embassies. The mob attacks on U.S. Embassies in Iran, Pakistan, and Libya prompted the Department to create the Security Enhancement Program (SEP) to harden U.S. posts against such attacks. Although the SEP did not attain its lofty goals, the implementation of measures and the installation of new equipment and barriers increased SY’s responsibilities and importance. Moreover, as the local security officers, SY’s RSOs gained greater authority, and they were the ones whom ambassadors and chiefs of mission turned to in crisis situations.

Although the Inman Panel complained that between 1979 and 1984 the “organization for security activities has become complicated by the proliferation of special offices and separate budgets for specific programs,” the opposite had occurred. The 1983 suicide bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and of the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport, and the 1983 suicide bombing in Kuwait pushed the Department to concentrate several security-related initiatives and programs into an “enhanced” SY. It also encouraged the creation of a panel to study how security was implemented in the Department. The second Beirut bombing in 1984 provided the impetus for the Department to embark on SY’s “Acceleration” program, which essentially created the basic structure for a larger diplomatic security entity within the Department. By the time the Inman Panel recommended that the Department create a “bureau of diplomatic security,” such an entity already existed in rough form and substance in the rapidly expanding and evolving SY. The panel justified further centralization, bringing the Diplomatic Courier Service under SY’s wing and giving M/CT’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance and Emergency Action Planning programs to SY.
Although much has been made of the pre-/post-Inman Panel dichotomy, the fact was that between 1979 and 1984, SY was rapidly evolving into a different entity. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security David Fields admitted that he and Assistant Secretary of State Lamb “were trying to adjust the structure, garner more resources, and change procedures.” Whereas in 1982, the idea of centralizing the State Department's security functions into one organization was rejected, just two years later the idea was welcomed and enacted when proposed by SY in David Fields’ Acceleration plan. The growing security needs during the years 1979 to 1984 redefined diplomatic security and accelerated the transformation of SY. It was Fields’ larger, enhanced SY that became DS.

Endnotes

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