

CHAPTER 9



A BLUEPRINT FOR SECURITY

DS, Terrorism, and the Post-Cold War World, 1992 - 2000

The euphoria brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led many in the Department of State and Congress to believe that the primary threats to U.S. diplomacy and security had largely vanished. Republican and Democratic Congressmen, as well as political commentators, spoke of a “peace dividend,” and one scholar claimed it was “the end of history.” Amid the euphoria, U.S. leaders forgot two key elements about diplomatic security. First, the euphoria seemed to confuse the end of one threat (the Soviet Union) with the cessation of other threats. Overlooked, perhaps forgotten, was that the transformation of diplomatic security—and the elevation of the Office of Security (SY) into the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)—had resulted from the threat of terrorism, not Cold War threats. Second, U.S. officials seemed to assume that with the Soviet Union gone, the Russians (and others) would no longer be interested in espionage against the United States.¹

The jubilation of the immediate post-Cold War period hampered DS and its efforts to secure U.S. posts and facilities. The “peace dividend” led to cuts in Department of State appropriations, and U.S. officials pursued a “more with less” strategy regarding government services, including those provided by DS. As the post-Cold War euphoria wore off and



Figure 1: November 1989 scene at the Brandenburg Gate the morning after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which had separated East and West Germany. With the end of the Cold War, many spoke of a “peace dividend” and were led to believe that most security threats to the United States had faded. DS suffered cuts in personnel and monies afterwards, even though the threat of terrorism continued, and demands for DS’s services increased. Source: © Associated Press.



Figure 2: Russian President Boris Yeltsin (waving as he enters his limousine) is covered by a DS protective detail (center and left of center) during a visit to the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., on June 20, 1991. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

new tensions surfaced, DS undertook duties that placed its agents in some of the most dangerous regional conflicts of the decade. Such duties increased DS's visibility and demonstrated once again the Department's dependence upon a professional protective security service.

Terrorism from domestic and foreign sources elevated security concerns in the United States. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City, and the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympic Games brought attention to the need for improved diplomatic security. However, the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, directed by Osama bin Laden, caused extensive casualties

and brought a new focus upon security issues at U.S. diplomatic facilities. While the Crowe Commission investigated the attacks, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security David G. Carpenter and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Peter Bergin presented a "blueprint" for a restructured DS to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The Secretary approved it, and the restructuring resulted in more resources, more personnel, more authority, and the ability to report directly to the Deputy Chief of Mission. As the demands for security have increased in the years after the East Africa bombings, DS has continued to build upon this blueprint.

Peace Dividends and Laboratories

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a belief emerged that many security threats had faded, and members of Congress and foreign policy commentators spoke of a "peace dividend." The peace dividend was a budgetary savings that the U.S. Government would incur because it no longer needed elevated levels of U.S. military forces to counter the Soviet threat. Although DS officials were acutely aware that not all threats emanated from or were fostered by the Kremlin, the pressure from Congress and senior Department officials to limit spending overrode DS concerns.

Like his superiors, the new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, affirmed many "peace dividend" sentiments. He commissioned a task force of senior DS officers to study and make recommendations on how DS could adjust to the post-Cold War future. He asserted that DS needed to reexamine "the way we do business in light of changing world realities [and] the growing scarcity of personnel and

financial resources.” Citing the political pressure to streamline the federal government, Quainton advised that DS should do the same “to remain relevant, efficient, and effective.”²

Amid the new post-Cold War world, a movement to “reinvent government” emerged, and Assistant Secretary Quainton and Under Secretary of State for Management Richard Moose sought to make DS a “laboratory” for the movement. Headed by Vice President Albert “Al” Gore, Jr., “Reinventing Government” sought to reduce archaic rules, excessive layers of bureaucracy, and wasteful spending on duplicate efforts in several agencies. If successful, the federal government could be more responsive to the public, more effective and cost-efficient in its operations, and more innovative in resolving challenges and problems. In several ways, such efforts echoed the Crockett Reforms of the 1960s, except that it was a U.S. Government-wide effort. Under Quainton and Moose, “reinventing” DS meant embracing the “risk management” approach more fully (as opposed to risk avoidance) by developing security standards based on threat levels and applying countermeasures in a cost-effective manner based on a post’s threat classification. Reinventing DS also included reclassifying many positions to a lower security clearance, eliminating research and development in technical security, and reducing the Secretary’s detail, the number of local guards at posts, and the Diplomatic Security Guard program. There was an effort to consolidate background investigations and allow U.S. Government employees to transfer their security clearance when they moved to a different agency (a move to a different department or



Figure 3: Anthony C. E. Quainton, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1992-1995. Quainton sought to make DS one of the Department of State’s laboratories for the “Reinventing Government” effort spearheaded by Vice President Albert P. Gore, Jr. Under Reinventing Government, DS lost resources and personnel, and Quainton tried to have some long-time tasks, such as visa and passport fraud investigations, transferred to other agencies. The proposals were unpopular among DS rank-and-file. Source: Department of State



Figure 4: Mark E. Mulvey, Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1993-1996. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.



Figure 5: A DS Security Technical Specialist (foreground) inspects a surveillance camera while a DS Security Engineering Officer works on the mounting hardware at a United States diplomatic facility. Although the Cold War had ended, threats to U.S. diplomacy, such as espionage, terrorism, and crime, continued. Moreover, the United States needed to establish embassies in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. As a result, DS faced many challenges in ensuring the technical security of U.S. diplomatic posts during the 1990s. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.



Figure 6: Winter 1994: A DS Security Engineering Officer works to install alarms in the utility tunnels beneath a U.S. embassy overseas. The alarm system was a precautionary countermeasure aimed at alerting embassy security personnel if intruders entered the tunnels. Running beneath public streets, such tunnels sometimes were used in espionage efforts by foreign intelligence operatives. Source: Private collection.

agency prompts a new background investigation and security clearance evaluation).³

In what was perhaps one of the most controversial elements of the DS “laboratory” effort, Under Secretary Moose asked Quainton to consider having DS relinquish its criminal investigative function. In 1993, Quainton requested Foreign Service Officer Jock Covey to prepare a study on the topic. Covey reported that while the Bureau of Consular Affairs was responsible for preventing passport fraud, it relied upon DS to pursue any fraud cases. To conduct fraud investigations, DS utilized field offices in 21 U.S. cities, which were staffed by Special Agents trained as federal investigators with full law enforcement powers. Yet in order to bring a passport fraud case to court, agents had to persuade the local U.S. Attorney of three things: that a more serious crime was involved, that the case could be won before a jury, and that a meaningful penalty would be imposed.”⁴

Based on Covey’s study, Quainton determined that the investigative function was unproductive, and sought to transfer it to another agency. If DS transferred passport and visa fraud investigations to another agency, DS could shut down several domestic field offices and reap a significant savings for the Department. Moose and Quainton even discussed the transfer of investigation duties with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In a meeting with the Under Secretary of State, DS Assistant Director for Investigations Peter Bergin opposed the transfer. When Moose called Bergin later, Bergin bluntly told Moose, “[Secretary of State Warren] Christopher and you are doing yourselves no service here. You are setting us

[DS] up for failure two to five years down the road.” Ultimately the criminal investigations function was retained; however, as word of Quainton and Moose’s talks with the FBI spread among DS personnel, Quainton’s standing plummeted. In retrospect, Quainton admitted it “effectively ruined [him] with a large number of people” in DS.⁵

Quainton and Moose streamlined other tasks in DS and considered other budget cuts. Under Quainton, the Bureau’s 1993 salaries and expenses budget was approximately \$180 million, a figure unchanged from 1990 and slightly less than the amount in 1986. Quainton and Moose tried to downsize the Secretary of State’s protective detail while the Secretary was in Washington, outsource protection of foreign dignitaries, restrict expenditures on the local guard program overseas, and reconsider embassy security measures. Quainton sought to reduce DS’s protective security commitments, believing that many protective details were unnecessary. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar, was one of only five high level foreign officials who enjoyed a full-time DS protective detail, and Quainton considered cutting it. However, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward P. Djerejian insisted that DS retain it because the Saudis provided the U.S. Ambassador in Riyadh with a full security detail. As enacted by Moose and Quainton, the Reinventing Government effort seemed to view DS as an entity without a past and with a function whose need had lessened. Department officials appeared to forget that DS arose as a bureau and expanded dramatically due to the threat of terrorism, not the threat posed by the Soviet Union. With the Soviet Union gone, Reinventing Government seemed to accept that the Russians, the Newly Independent States (as former Soviet republics were called), and other governments were no longer interested in intelligence gathering on the United States, its policies, and its actions.⁶

Furthermore, the implementation of Reinventing Government seemed disconnected from existing threats and continually expanding security needs. When successor states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States established diplomatic relations with each of the newly independent states. This required establishing new embassies—each with its own staff—and for the new states to establish embassies of their own in Washington. (The U.S. Embassy in Moscow continued to function as the U.S. Embassy to the Russian Federation.) Just as had occurred with post-World War II decolonization and the subsequent emergence of new independent countries, the expansion of U.S. diplomatic posts imposed greater demands upon DS. In the newly independent states such as Tajikistan, Armenia, Estonia, and Ukraine, DS assisted in determining the security of sites for new U.S. diplomatic posts. It also prepared and established security programs and Marine Security Guard details for those embassies and consulates.

In addition, international espionage did not end with the Cold War. One DS engineer recalled a 1985 warning by a KGB colonel: “You will some day see a great peace break out. It is easier to spy on your friends.” With the end of the Cold War, DS reduced its countermeasures; meanwhile, other agencies cut them outright. DS agents knew the FSB (*Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti*—Federal Security Service), the successor to the KGB, was still conducting spy operations. Moreover, the New Independent States, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus, developed their own intelligence services, with people formerly trained by the KGB.⁷



Figure 7: Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger (right) presents the Distinguished Honor Award to Diplomatic Security Service Director Clark Dittmer on January 15, 1993, “for outstanding leadership and unwavering dedication to the ideals embodied in the charter of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.” Dittmer served as DSS Director and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for DS from 1988 to 1993. Source: DS Update newsletter.

For example, DS engineers Bruce Matthews and Lonny Price learned that the Russians were conducting espionage against the new U.S. Consulate in Yekaterinburg, as if the Cold War had not ended. The building that housed the new U.S. consulate abutted a hotel, and upon examining the rooms next to the U.S. Consulate, Matthews and Price found that the Russians were building listening posts in rooms adjacent to the consulate. In Vladivostok, Matthews found that the FSB had set up lines along the new Consulate’s telephone wires. Using a video camera, Matthews began following the lines to their source, only to have some FSB “heavies” chase after him.⁸

***New Security Demands:
The Olympics, World Trade
Center, Burundi, and Haiti***

While Russian espionage continued unabated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demand for security imposed new stresses upon DS, even as Reinventing Government sought to streamline

operations in the bureau. One of the first additional responsibilities that DS gained in the post-Cold War era was protective security for the U.S. Olympic team. DS had been involved with protective security of U.S. Olympic athletes since the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal, Canada—the first Games after the 1972 Black September terrorist attack in Munich where members of the Israeli Olympic team were held hostage and killed. DS became further involved in 1984 when it protected foreign dignitaries who attended the Los Angeles Olympics (President Carter ordered a boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan). More serious concerns about the security of U.S. Olympic athletes first arose in 1991 when Cuba hosted the Pan American Games. During the months preceding the Havana Pan Am Games, several Cuban sports athletes defected. U.S. officials had concerns that the Cubans would exploit and harass U.S. athletes, or even build relationships to exploit at a later date. The U.S. Olympic team turned to the Department of State, and DS Agents briefed Pan Am Games athletes on security issues in Tampa before they flew to Havana.⁹

After the Havana Pan Am Games, DS developed a more formalized program, with particular emphasis upon preparation prior to a Games event. In 1992, the Division of Overseas Programs created a specific position responsible for the security of U.S. athletes for the Olympics in Barcelona, Spain. Bill Marsden, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) in Madrid, served as the first Olympic Coordinator. For the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Special Agent Ed Moreno coordinated the DS effort at the U.S.-hosted games, which consisted largely of dignitary protection and protection of the Israeli Olympic team.¹⁰

The bombing at the Atlanta Olympics, although perpetrated by domestic terrorists, prompted DS to create a permanent Olympic Coordinator position. John Kaufman was named as the first Coordinator, and he began preparations for the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Australia. As Coordinator, Kaufman undertook three tasks: working with and coordinating assistance for Australian security and law enforcement agencies; serving as a liaison with the U.S. business community; and preparing to assist the U.S. Olympic team. He worked with the Australian Prime Minister's office, and coordinated efforts with the Australian Federal Police, Australian intelligence, the Secret Service, the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which provided explosive-sniffing dogs. The U.S., Australian, and New Zealand military forces conducted maneuvers as well. Although Kaufman admitted that in 1996, he did not believe that the Australians were ready for the Games, by 2000, U.S. officials were enthusiastic about the Australians' preparations, measures, and broad public commitment to assist. After the success in Sydney, DS expanded its coordination and preparation for the Olympics and similar events. It initiated an exchange program for the host country's police forces during the years preceding the next Olympics, and DS created a Security Event Training program to coordinate protective security.¹¹




Figure 8: Investigators examine a portion of the site of the July 27, 1996, bombing at Atlanta's Olympic Centennial Park. A DS Special Agent coordinated protective efforts and conducted briefings for U.S. athletes going to the 1992 Games in Barcelona. The 1996 bombing prompted DS to create a permanent Olympic coordinator, who would work with officials of the host country and city in preparation for the Olympic Games. John Kaufman was the first Olympic Coordinator, and he worked with the Australians in preparation for the 2000 Games at Sydney. Source: © Associated Press/Eric Draper.



Figure 9: Damage created by the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City. The bombing was the first indicator that terrorism was evolving into a transnational phenomenon. DS was called to assist the New York Police Department and the FBI in the investigation, and helped to identify the Middle Eastern radical responsible for the attack. Although Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda had ties to the bombing, the connections would not become clear until 1996. Source: © Associated Press / Richard Drew.



Figure 10: A DS Agent operates an explosives detector inside a crater left by the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. DS assisted the New York Police Department and FBI in the bombing investigation, and helped to identify terrorists responsible for the attack. Source: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

The 1993 World Trade Center bombing was the first indication for DS that terrorism was evolving from a regional phenomenon to a transnational phenomenon. On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in a parking garage of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. The NYC Police Department and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force immediately called upon DS for support during the investigation. Working with NYC Police, the FBI, and ATF, DS helped to quickly identify a group of Middle Eastern radicals as those responsible for the attack. FBI and NYC police arrested most of the terrorists before they could leave the United States; however, Ramzi Yousef, the driver of the van containing the explosives, escaped.¹²

The ensuing search for Yousef resulted in a debate between the Department of State and the FBI over the Department's Rewards for Justice program. The Department offered a \$2 million reward for information leading to the arrest of Yousef, but the reward was controversial. First, it departed from previous practice of compensating individuals for information about specific incidents; the Department had not previously paid compensation for information on the whereabouts of suspects. Also, the Department and the FBI clashed over who should pay the reward.¹³ Since the bombing occurred on U.S. soil, the Department of State argued that the FBI should pay. The Department insisted that Congress had prevented them from offering rewards in domestic terrorism cases. The FBI, who placed Yousef on its "Most Wanted" list, asserted that it did not have funds available to pay a reward for Yousef's capture. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

then drafted legislation allowing the Department of State to offer rewards for domestic attacks if perpetrated by international terrorists; in July 1993, the Department offered a \$2 million reward.¹⁴

By this time, Yousef had disappeared underground; however, DS Special Agents did much of the work that led to his capture in Pakistan. U.S. law enforcement officials believed that Yousef had escaped to Pakistan, but they had little reliable information about his location. In February 1995, nearly two years after the WTC attack, a man presented himself at the residence of a U.S. diplomat in Karachi, and claimed to have information about Yousef's location. DS agents in Pakistan confirmed that the man was a legitimate source: he was a former contact for Yousef. Based on his information, DS agents Bill Miller and Jeff Riner alerted Pakistani officials and prepared to raid Yousef's hotel room. On February 7, 1995, a team of Pakistani law enforcement officers and DS agents, including Miller, stormed into Yousef's room, waking him from a nap, and arrested him. The next day, Pakistani officials turned Yousef over to FBI agents, who flew him to New York City for arraignment. The informant received a \$2 million reward, and on March 11, Yousef was indicted for the 1993 WTC bombing.¹⁵




Figure 11: Ramzi Yousef, the driver of the explosives-laden truck in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. DS agents, through a Pakistani source, located Yousef; and DS Agents Bill Miller and Jeff Riner worked with Pakistani law enforcement to apprehend Yousef. Yousef was turned over to the FBI, and brought to the United States for trial. Source: © Associated Press.

DS's protective responsibilities at U.S. Embassies increased, in part due to local conflicts, with two more notable examples being Burundi and Liberia. During the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, ethnic tensions between Tutsis and Hutus spilled over into neighboring Burundi. The situation created a tense, high-risk situation for the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura and threatened the life of the U.S. Ambassador. On April 6, 1994, unknown assailants shot down a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira as it prepared to land at the airport in the Rwandan capital of Kigali. The assassination sparked the Rwandan genocide; meanwhile, Tutsi and Hutu leaders in Burundi appealed for calm.¹⁶ As Rwanda's genocide garnered world press attention, ethnic tensions simmered in Burundi, with occasional



Figure 12: Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, President of Burundi. In 1996, Ntibantunganya, a Hutu, feared for his life during a civilian-led coup attempt by Tutsis and fled to the U.S. Embassy. U.S. Ambassador Morris N. Hughes, Jr., allowed him to stay the night, but that night stretched to several months. DS sent a four-person Mobile Security Detail to the Embassy to assist with security. The lengthy stay raised questions within DS about the Embassy's diplomatic inviolability and wisdom of allowing leaders to seek refuge at a U.S. embassy. Source: © Associated Press / David Guttenfelder.



Figure 13: In September 1995, Cuba's Premier Fidel Castro thanks his DS security detail (left and second from left) at the 50th United Nations General Assembly session in New York City, as a U.S. Marshal (center) and an interpreter (right) look on. Source: Private Collection.

human rights abuses committed by extremist Tutsi groups. U.S. Ambassador Robert Krueger investigated the abuses; and in one case where 150 Hutus were massacred, the Ambassador reported his finding to the press. Tutsi newspapers excoriated Krueger and published death threats again him, prompting DS to increase the number of its agents at the U.S. Embassy in Bujumbura. In July 1995, Ambassador Krueger, escorted by RSO Chris Reilly and ARSO Larry Salmon, traveled to a northern province of Burundi with an official government convoy. During the trip, his convoy was attacked. Reilly and Salmon moved Krueger out of danger, and later each received the Department's Award for Valor for protecting the Ambassador. Threat analysts in DS's Intelligence and Threat Analysis office, however, warned that Krueger would continue to face "an extremely serious threat" from Tutsi extremists because of his perceived sympathy for the Hutus; and Krueger returned to Washington for consultations.¹⁷

DS opposed Krueger's return to Bujumbura, but the new U.S. Ambassador Morris N. Hughes, Jr. did not lessen DS's protective work in Burundi. In what Hughes described as "a slow-motion coup led by civilians," the President of Burundi, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya, feared for his life and asked Hughes on July 23, 1996, to permit him to stay the night at the Ambassador's residence. Hughes consented. DS sent a four-person Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) team to protect the Ambassador's residence. Ntibantunganya's protection detail lasted several months. DS had serious qualms about the wisdom of the Burundian president staying in the U.S.

Embassy, and the potential problems it posed for the Embassy, its personnel, and its diplomatic inviolability.¹⁸

As civil war among three factions engulfed the West African nation of Liberia, the declining security environment placed heavy demands upon DS agents at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. In 1996, Special Agent John J. Frese made several trips to negotiate with various factions and bring more than 250 people, most of them U.S. citizens, to safety. Frese earned the Department's Award of Valor and other awards. In 1998, as the capital city of Monrovia, including the neighborhood of the U.S. Embassy, became a war zone, Special Agents Tony Deibler, Scott Folensbee, and Steve Fakan sought to bring Americans to safety, and to rescue several journalists who were trapped in a hotel by factional clashes. Their efforts became the subject of an episode of the History Channel series *Heroes under Fire*.¹⁹

While protecting the Burundian president was unexpected, DS was formally tasked in 1993 to train and advise a protective detail for the President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide. Haiti's chronic economic desperation and political corruption led the United States to assist Aristide in the hope of encouraging democratic stability for the Haitian people—with varying levels of success. In 1994, DS hired DynCorp to provide a protective detail for Aristide when he returned to Haiti, the first time that DS turned to a private contractor to provide personal protection. Then, in October 1994, DS Agent John Rendeiro flew to Haiti with Secretary of State Warren Christopher and President Aristide. He and a DS team trained 50 Haitians to serve as Aristide's protective detail.²⁰



Figure 14: A DS Agent (center, wearing helmet) escorts U.S. Ambassador to Liberia John Blaney to a meeting with a rebel group during that country's civil war. As rival factions fought in the streets of Monrovia near the U.S. Embassy, the Liberian civil war forced the rescue and evacuation of Americans in the West African nation. A DS Special Agent made several trips and brought more than 250 people to safety in 1996. In 1998, DS Agents rescued Americans and journalists trapped by factional fighting on the streets of Monrovia. Source: Private collection.



Figure 15: DS personnel surround Secretary of State Warren Christopher (left foreground) as he walks with President Jean Bertrand Aristide of Haiti (center in dark suit) during a visit to Haiti in October 1994. U.S. Ambassador William Swing follows immediately behind Secretary Christopher. DS was tasked to train and advise a protective detail for President Aristide. A DS team flew to Haiti with Secretary of State Christopher and trained a 50-person protective detail for the Haitian president. Source: Private Collection.




Figure 16: President of Haiti, Rene Prével. DS was also tasked to train a protective detail for President Prével, who succeeded President Aristide. President William J. Clinton added Haiti to the Foreign Assistance list and included funds for protecting Prével. Source: © Associated Press / Lynne Sladkey.

In December 1995, Haitians elected René Prével as Aristide’s successor, and DS now had the task of protecting President Prével as well. However, DS could not legally accept responsibility for protecting Prével under the law enforcement authorities that it had. President William J. Clinton added Haiti to the Foreign Assistance list as an AID mission so that DS could proceed with the operation, and funds for protecting Prével could be included in Haiti’s foreign aid package. The National Security Council pressured other agencies to permit DS to protect Prével, and DS received additional support from the Department of Defense, Secret Service, the Army and Navy Criminal Investigative Services, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. DS conducted the tactical planning and the operations of the multi-agency protective security detail. A DS team arrived by two C-130s on a Sunday morning, and took over the protection of the palace. Later, after several months, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Greg Bujac traveled to Port-au-Prince, and accepted President Prével’s thanks for DS’s efforts. The occasion marked the first-time that a head of state formally thanked the Department of State’s security office for its efforts. DS supervised contracted U.S. personnel serving on the protective detail until the detail ended in April 2006.²¹

🌀 The Boswell Revival 🌀

With the new tasks, DS’s need for additional Special Agents and security personnel in general became acute, particularly in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The April 19 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in that city by domestic, anti-government militia sympathizers prompted President Clinton to direct all federal facilities to meet the minimum security standards. Consequently, the Department of State received \$1.68 million in the 1996 Antiterrorism Budget Supplemental to upgrade security at its domestic facilities. When President Clinton announced that he would request an additional 1,000 law

enforcement officers to combat terrorism at home and abroad, Assistant Secretary Quinton asked Under Secretary Moose “to seize the opportunity to ensure that DS has adequate personnel.” Quinton received no support for his appeal.²²

When Eric J. Boswell took over as Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security in January 1996, he criticized the cutbacks in hiring, personnel, and resources that DS had endured since the end of the Cold War. DS stopped hiring new agents in 1990, and did not begin hiring again until late 1997. DS suffered budget cuts of \$186 million in FY 1993 and \$156 million in FY 1996; the latter was the smallest annual cut during the previous five years. DS lost 126 Foreign Service and 159 Civil Service positions between 1992 and 1996, prompting Boswell to admit that staff shortages left DS “unable to meet our most critical requirements.”²³ Boswell also acknowledged that DS was “graying.” The average age of DS agents was 44, and many were approaching retirement. The average age of Security Engineers was 45, and the average age of the Diplomatic Couriers was 47. In early 1997, Boswell bluntly told Acting Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick F. Kennedy that “asking this Bureau to take further reductions...is irresponsible and inconsistent with the intent of Congress.”²⁴

The Department of Defense became highly critical of the cuts to DS. With many military attachés and other military personnel working in U.S. embassies across the globe, the Department of Defense complained that the Department of State “unilaterally” decided to set aside physical security standards when it opened new embassies in the former Soviet republics, the former Yugoslav republics, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Also, Department of Defense officials disliked the fact that the Department of State had withdrawn Marine Security Guard (MSG) units from several posts, and had not assigned MSG detachments to many of the new embassies. The Department of Defense made clear to the Department of State that it was considering three options: “weigh[ing] the risk of operating in less than secure facilities, choosing not to locate in the host country, or, with DOS approval, constructing a DOD facility.”²⁵




Figure 17: Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1996-1998. Boswell was critical of the cuts DS suffered during the early 1990s, and bluntly said that additional cuts were “irresponsible.” He and DAS Bujac undertook a rebuilding of DS between 1996 and 1998, bringing in many new agents and acquiring additional monies. Source: Department of State.



Figure 18: Gregorie "Greg" Bujac, Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1996-1998. With Assistant Secretary Boswell, Bujac helped to rebuild DS after several years of cuts and personnel losses. Bujac also traveled to Haiti and received, on behalf of DS, the official thanks of President Préval for DS efforts in training Préval's protective detail. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

The 1996 Al-Khobar Towers bombing emphasized the need for greater security, and DS immediately reviewed security at all U.S. posts in the Middle East. On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb destroyed the Al-Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. military personnel were killed, and 515 people, including 240 U.S. military, were injured. Al-Khobar Towers was not a Department of State facility; it was residential quarters for U.S. and allied Air Forces for Operation Southern Watch, the coalition air operation over Iraq. Even so DS immediately sent three security teams of six persons each to the Persian Gulf to survey and "recommend the necessary upgrades" for Department posts and facilities. The three teams divided the posts into groups: one team focused exclusively on Saudi Arabia, another examined posts in Kuwait and Bahrain, and the third surveyed Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.²⁶

Over the next few months, DS completed numerous upgrades at several posts in the Persian Gulf and former Soviet Union. The upgrades consisted largely of perimeter barriers, closed streets, additional guards, and training of U.S. diplomatic personnel. Congress approved a budget

supplemental for DS, funding 55 new positions, including 15 security officers for the Persian Gulf and the Newly Independent States. The extra money also funded six new mobile training teams, more local guards, 43 armored and light-armored vehicles, 80 alarm systems, 80 walk-through metal detectors, and other equipment.²⁷

As a result of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS became very proactive in trying to prevent terrorist attacks. In February 1997, DS officials informed Secretary Albright that there was "credible evidence of planning for a terrorist attack on U.S. interests or facilities in the Persian Gulf."²⁸ With many connecting the Al-Khobar Towers attack to the bombing of a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh six months earlier (November 13,

1995), NSC Advisor Sandy Berger inquired whether the U.S. Government should issue a security alert message for the Middle East. Boswell did not believe this was necessary because information on a specific threat did not exist. However, Boswell assured Albright that DS had elevated the threat level in the region to “high” and was “properly and adequately” addressing the heightened threat situation. Boswell also detailed for the Secretary the specific security upgrades DS had undertaken at U.S. posts around the Persian Gulf.²⁹

After the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS gained new resources and other agencies began turning to DS on issues regarding security and related issues at U.S. posts overseas. With intelligence reports citing more “surveillance and possible pre-attack planning against” U.S. diplomatic facilities, the Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the NSC asked DS in mid-1997 to coordinate three interagency teams that would conduct security vulnerability assessments of possible targets. Former SY chief Ambassador David Fields headed one of the teams, and the three teams presented their findings to the Counterterrorism Subcommittee in September 1997. When Boswell requested an additional 70 agents, 31 were approved immediately, with many going to the security details of the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Acting Under Secretary Kennedy believed that another 32 agents were “warranted” and requested information on costs. In December 1997, Boswell told Secretary Albright that DS had hired 105 new agents and was “reversing a long period of slow decline.”³⁰



Figure 19: A soldier stands guard in front of the damaged Al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. The June 25, 1996, bomb killed 19 Americans. DS immediately afterwards made many security upgrades at U.S. embassies and consulates in the Persian Gulf, and it added 105 Special Agents and 6 Mobile Training Teams. DS also adopted a more aggressive approach to overseas security. Source: © Associated Press/Greg Marinovich.



Figure 20: A U.S. Navy Seabee Building Chief Petty Officer, a DS contractor, and a Senior DS Engineer (left to right) replace a Delta Barrier in Athens, Greece, in 2008. After the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, DS obtained additional resources to improve security at U.S. posts overseas. DS also became an active member of the Counterterrorism Subcommittee of the National Security Council. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.




Figure 21: A Security Engineering Officer tests the integrity of a telephone console. During the 1990s, SEOs were assigned to the geographic bureaus, but the Global Plan brought them under DS. The Global Plan originally sought to restructure SEOs and make personnel cuts in the immediate post-Cold War period and during the computer revolution. Many U.S. embassies in Europe opposed the cuts, and after the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, the SEOs were moved to DS and DS was hiring more SEOs. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

DS's Global Plan for Security Engineering Officers perhaps best demonstrates the rapid change of attitudes within the Department regarding security in the wake of the Al-Khobar Towers bombing. Designed during the Quanton/Moose period, the Global Plan resulted from efforts by the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) to cut personnel at its posts in the immediate post-Cold War years. DS offered the Global Plan in hopes of making "the best out of a bad situation." The proposed plan argued that the technological revolution of computers, wireless communications, and connectivity demanded that DS restructure its technical security programs; that is it would turn over the lock/safe/alarm repair tasks to privately contracted technicians under DS supervision and eliminate 16 SEO positions. The trade-off was that all SEO positions would be transferred out of the geographical bureaus and into DS (SEO positions were formally part of the geographic bureaus, and DS needed approval from the geographic bureaus for changes and initiatives). Shortly after Boswell became Assistant Secretary, Under Secretary Moose approved the Global Plan just before he departed, and the plan was soon implemented.³¹

After Oklahoma City and the Al-Khobar Towers bombings, the new leadership of EUR questioned the wisdom of the Global Plan. In fact, they now opposed it. Apparently not aware that the Global Plan was a EUR initiative, EUR's new senior officials asked DS "to justify" the Global Plan and the cuts of SEOs at European posts. In addition, several U.S. embassies, who had opposed the Global Plan from the start, mounted "valiant and convincing" appeals for retaining their SEOs. By August 1997, just one year after the Global Plan's approval, DS found itself implementing a plan it originally had not wanted, at embassies that steadfastly opposed it, and that was now rejected by the geographic bureau that had initially pressed for it. By the fall of 1997, DS was hiring more SEOs, and it pledged to work with EUR to resolve issues and concerns. Meanwhile, the SEOs moved to DS, and there were few actual cuts.³²

The Al-Khobar Towers bombing and the increase in terrorism renewed interest in the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). OSAC was a liaison for the private sector, primarily for U.S. companies operating overseas. With “peace dividend” budget cuts, OSAC withered from a lack of resources and inactivity. To conserve limited resources, Assistant Secretary Quainton had tried to combine OSAC’s private liaison analyst group with DS’s Intelligence and Threat Analysis (ITA) division, believing that a combined group of analysts could fulfill both obligations. ITA struggled to meet the Department’s increasing need for threat analysis, and as a result, OSAC suffered. In the late 1990s, OSAC developed the Research and Information Support Center (RISC), which directly supported the private sector by providing threat analysis information. The revival of OSAC improved its effectiveness as a liaison and an advisor to the private sector. OSAC was soon being touted as “something that works;” moreover, it began bringing in other government agencies to assist the private sector.³³



Figure 22: Former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz (left) addresses a February 2004 Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) executive council meeting. Others at the table (from left to right) are Joe Morton, Diplomatic Security Service Director and OSAC co-chair; Ray Mislock, director of corporate security for DuPont and former director of the DS Office of Counter-intelligence Programs; and Joe Petro, executive vice president of Citigroup’s Security and Investigative Services and OSAC’s co-chair from the private sector. By the mid-1990s, OSAC emerged as an example of successful collaboration between the public and private sectors. Today it serves several thousand constituent members. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

🌀 *The Half-Finished Embassy* 🌀

DS under Boswell renewed its emphasis upon physical security overseas, but construction of the stalled, bugged, and much-maligned new U.S. Embassy in Moscow began moving forward. In 1994, Congress approved the Secure Chancery Facilities plan for Embassy Moscow, and the project became known as “Tophat.” The next year, the Department of State contracted architects Hellmuth, Obata & Kassebaum, P.C., to design the demolition to the fifth-floor slab and the subsequent construction of five new floors. The lower four floors would be the unclassified common areas and offices for local employees, as well as the Embassy’s offices for administration and budget. The upper floors (the 5th floor and above) contained the classified briefing areas and the post communications center. In 1997, U.S. construction teams began demolition of the upper floors down to the fifth-floor slab and reconstruction of the New Embassy Office Building (NOB). Shielding was inserted between the fourth and fifth floors to prevent installation of any “bugs” from the lower floors.³⁴



Figure 23: Uniformed Protective Division officers operate a metal detector at Saint Patrick's Cathedral in New York City, for the Diplomatic Mass held during the United Nations General Assembly's 50th Anniversary observance in September 1995. The DS Uniformed Protective Division, 761 strong in 2009, safeguards more than 100 Department of State domestic facilities in 22 states and the District of Columbia. Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Files.

DS Agent Richard Gannon served as the Director of Security at the Moscow Embassy construction project, and he and DS worked with the intelligence community on the project to address its concerns in the best possible manner. One of the intelligence community's fears was that the Russians would manage to place a team of agents into the building and implant listening devices. DS responded by having Marine Security Guards guard the construction site 24 hours a day. DS installed video cameras along the fences and put infrared beam alarms inside the fences. The cameras also contained alarms to prevent tampering or adjustment. DS collected all videotapes from the surveillance cameras in case a concern about security arose. If someone got into the building, DS could review the specific tape.³⁵

DS also developed a counter-intelligence program for the U.S. workers brought to Moscow to work on the NOB in order to safeguard the construction site. DS officials concluded that a no-fraternization policy was unachievable, in part, because U.S. electricians and laborers would want to visit the city and would need an outlet for rest and entertainment. Despite opposition, DS implemented a program that permitted fraternization of U.S. workers with Russians, notwithstanding the workers' Top Secret clearance. DS agents educated workers on the possibilities and signs of espionage, and developed relationships with them. DS encouraged the workers to report any fraternization with Russians, and assured them that such reporting was without repercussions or punishment. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security Peter Bergin said that the idea was to develop transparency, and investigate the persons with whom the workers fraternized to see if they were KGB operatives or posed any other problems for U.S. workers. If the fraternization was not reported, the worker was sent home. Bergin admitted the program was counter-intuitive, but it sought to serve as an enabler for security.³⁶

Secretary Albright's "Worst Day"

By the mid-1990s, DS recognized that terrorism was changing to a more transnational phenomenon and that it was starting to pose a different type of threat. Because many analysts expected a terrorist attack in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, DS took several preparations. In 1997, Peter Bergin, who was then Director of the Office of Investigations and Counter-Intelligence, heard that Richard A. Clarke of the NSC and head

of the Counterterrorism Security Group was holding meetings on terrorism. The Department of State's Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (S/CT) attended these meetings, but DS did not. Bergin attended one meeting and determined that DS should participate. By the fall of 1997, DS was participating in the meetings, and Clarke soon asked DS to do vulnerability assessments for him. DS led 10 or 12 assessment teams, and when the Bureau made its presentation Clarke liked what DS produced.³⁷

According to long-time DS Threat Analyst Dennis Pluchinsky, most terrorist groups have a domestic agenda, with some groups possessing a regional agenda; however, Al-Qaeda's global agenda made it difficult to predict. Also, he said, there was a lot of terrorist rhetoric, but the key question for threat analysts was whether action would accompany the words. The 1992 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the Jewish Defense League, led to the arrest of El Sayyid Nosair, the first member of Al-Qaeda arrested in the United States. That arrest indicated that something was brewing in Afghanistan. DS Threat analysts noted that there were rumblings and a lot of jihadists without jobs. Although U.S. officials had identified Ramzi Yousef in the World Trade Center attacks of 1993, the connection with bin Laden was not clear until early 1996. Bin Laden also was involved in terrorism in Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Al-Khobar Towers bombing, but again, the connections were not immediately clear. Also, Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks in Israel, Argentina, and Bahrain, as well as a far right group's bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City further clouded the terrorist picture. On February 23, 1998, bin Laden and four associated



Figure 24: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (center, with sunglasses), Acting Ambassador John Lange (pointing, with tie), a DS Special Agent (standing between them), and the Embassy RSO (right), survey the damage at the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Albright then travelled to Nairobi to view the damage there. The August 7, 1998, bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were perpetrated by Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda group, and killed 224 people, including 12 Americans, while injuring more than 5,000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Americans. Source: © Associated Press / Brennan Linsley.



Figure 25: Damage to the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, shown the day after the August 7, 1998, bombing. Source: © Associated Press / Sayyid Azim.



Figure 26: The damage to the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The August 7, 1998, bombing occurred four minutes after the bombing in Nairobi, blowing out windows and raining debris several blocks away from the Embassy. Source: © Associated Press.



Figure 27: Followed by a DS Special Agent (left), Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (wearing a DSS cap) arrives at the U.S. Army's McGovern Base north of Sarajevo, in June 1997, to visit American troops serving in Bosnia. Secretary Albright strongly supported DS's efforts to improve security at U.S. posts overseas. Source: © Associated Press.

clerics issued a “fatwa,” calling for “jihad against Jews and Crusaders,” i.e. the United States and its allies such as Israel. The CIA tried to follow this in order to see if words would translate into action.³⁸

On August 7, 1998, two trucks laden with explosives entered the U.S. Embassy compounds in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania—at 10:35 a.m. and 10:39 a.m. respectively—and detonated. The near-simultaneous explosions killed 224 people, including 12 Americans. The blasts also injured more than 5000 Kenyans, Tanzanians, and Americans. Both embassies were heavily damaged. Secretary Madeleine Albright described it as “my worst day as Secretary of State.” President Clinton called the attacks “abhorrent” and “inhuman,” and vowed, “We will use all means at our disposal to bring those responsible to justice, no matter what or how long it takes.” The U.S. Embassy was located in downtown Nairobi on Haile Selassie Avenue, near one of the city’s busiest intersections. The bomb, comprising 400-500 pounds of explosives, destroyed the rear of the U.S. Embassy, leveled the six-story Ufundi Cooperative Building, set ablaze a passing city bus, and blew out windows more than one and one-half miles away. U.S. Ambassador Prudence Bushnell was meeting with the Kenyan Trade Minister in the 18th story of a nearby building, and both were injured in the blast. In Tanzania, the near-simultaneous blast occurred next to the U.S. Embassy, which was located three miles out of Dar es Salaam city, in an up-scale residential neighborhood. It devastated the front of the U.S. Embassy, blew out windows and damaged homes blocks away. Secretary Albright travelled to Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to survey the damage, met

with the staffs of both embassies, and personally escorted the caskets containing the bodies of the American dead back to Washington. President Clinton, the families of the dead, friends, and Department of State personnel met the plane carrying the 10 Americans at Andrews Air Force Base, and held a tearful, “grim ceremony.”³⁹

The severity and coordination of the terrorist attacks immediately directed suspicions at Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. The Clinton Administration took several actions, including an attack on bin Laden. First, based upon intelligence that bin Laden would be meeting with his top staff on August 20 in Afghanistan, President Clinton ordered National Security Adviser Sandy Berger to coordinate “Operation Infinite Reach.” On August 20, 79 cruise missiles struck targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, heavily damaging al-Qaeda training camps, killing 20-30 al-Qaeda members, but missing bin Laden by a few hours. Second, the Clinton Administration commissioned the Accountability Review Boards, chaired by Admiral William J. Crowe (Ret.), to investigate the bombings and make recommendations on embassy security. The boards were informally and collectively referred to as the Crowe Commission. Third, the Administration asked Congress for \$1.8 billion for emergency security improvements overseas.⁴⁰

Under new Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security David G. Carpenter, DS’s response to bin Laden’s attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, initially resembled SY’s approach in 1983-84 but then diverged sharply. Upon news of the bombings, DS sent 41 DS agents, 4 SEOs, and 41 Seabees to Tanzania and Kenya to meet the two Embassies’ immediate security needs. Clarke, the NSC member serving as the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, asked the Department of Defense to send two FASTs (Fleet Anti-terrorism Support Teams) to the two African capitals, with 50 Marines going to Dar es Salaam and a platoon of Marines to Nairobi.⁴¹

DS moved to enhance security at U.S. diplomatic posts regionally and worldwide. Carpenter informed Secretary Albright and Under Secretary for Management Bonnie Cohen that, “The Usama bin



Figure 28: David G. Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1998-2002. Under his leadership, DS assumed a more proactive approach to overseas security. He expanded security procedures for high-threat posts to all embassies and required daily reporting by RSOs. He briefed Secretary Albright every day on security matters, and he and DAS Peter Bergin proposed a new “blueprint” for DS that revamped the Bureau to meet the trans-national terrorist threat. Source: Department of State.

Laden [UBL] organization has the ability, training, funding and motivation to strike at U.S. interests almost anywhere in the world.”⁴² With reports that al-Qaeda might be planning more attacks, the three U.S. Embassies in Kampala, Uganda, Kigali, Rwanda, and Tirana, Albania, were closed temporarily. DS sent additional agents to several posts, including Kampala, Tirana, Asmara, Kosovo, and Kuala Lumpur. DS officers increased embassy security at the Department of State’s most vulnerable posts, installing more video cameras and new alarms systems. The Bureau instructed low-threat posts to implement the vehicle inspection and personal identification procedures that had been followed at high and critical threat posts for some time. DS asked its RSOs around the world to submit daily reports on their “security posture,” and to develop long-term and short-term requests for security upgrades for their posts. DS officials also created the Emergency Coordination Group, which served as the “focal point for all security action issues.”⁴³

DS assembled seven Embassy Security Assessment Teams (ESATs) to evaluate and make recommendations for improvements in the security posture of its embassies. Each team was led by a DS agent and composed of one officer each from FBO and several foreign affairs agencies. The teams traveled to 27 embassies around the world between August 20 and September 8, 1998. A seventh ESAT traveled to the East Asia and Pacific region on September 30. At the recommendation of the ESATs, the U.S. Embassy in Doha (Qatar) was relocated to a more secure location in the city. Meanwhile, operations of the U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, were transferred to Almaty, Kazakhstan. In summarizing the ESATs’ findings to Under Secretary Cohen, DS officials confessed that most of the 27 embassies required replacement facilities and that there were limits to

what the United States could do to improve existing facilities.⁴⁴

DS created the Surveillance Detection Program when 217 of 260 U.S. posts (about 85 percent) were unable to meet the 100-foot setback. The Surveillance Detection Program was a departure for DS because its basic focus was to look outward from the post. Previously DS and its predecessor SY had concentrated on upgrading security within the post’s perimeter. The program hired and trained local nationals to detect suspected terrorist or surveillance activities, as well as suspicious activities of individuals or vehicles. The program was part of a larger effort to upgrade embassy security, particularly perimeter security and local guard details. As Bergin later remarked, DS began “looking beyond the



Figure 29: Indonesian local guard officers stand guard at the U.S. Embassy compound in Jakarta. As a key part of the Surveillance Detection Program that arose after the East Africa bombings, local guard details were upgraded. Security personnel at U.S. embassies began looking outward to watch those conducting surveillance of the embassy and engaging in other suspicious activities. Source: © Associated Press.

perimeter” and “watch[ing] the people who were watching us.” Under the direction of an embassy’s RSO, local guard personnel patrolled the area around the embassy in cars, food stands, and even apartments overlooking the embassy. Bergin informed all diplomatic and consular posts that the terrorists’ “preliminary target assessment and information gathering on [embassy] vulnerabilities” was “the weakest link” of their attack plan. Target assessment and information gathering, i.e. surveillance of the embassy, was often “poorly done” and occurred over a period of time, thus allowing possible detection.⁴⁵

For its intensified effort, DS received the necessary money from Congress and support from senior Clinton Administration officials. Supplemental funding from Congress not only funded the Surveillance Detection Program and security upgrades at U.S. embassies, it also enabled DS to hire 200 new Special Agents (130 of whom were hired before 1998 ended), 34 new technical security specialists, and 20 new couriers. The hires expanded DS by one-third, and the Bureau numbered more than 1,000. It also increased DS’s presence at overseas posts from 270 people to more than 400.⁴⁶ By December 1998, Secretary Albright had promised that all posts would receive funding for a Surveillance Detection Program. The Department reinvigorated the long understaffed Mobile Training Teams and advised all Chiefs of Mission to “personally participate” in as many training sessions as possible. In his 1999 State of the Union message, President Clinton declared diplomatic security a national priority, and asked the nation to give U.S. diplomats the “support, the safest possible workplaces, and the resources they need so that America can lead.”⁴⁷

A Blueprint for DS

After the East Africa bombings, DS shifted to a proactive approach. Partially symbolized by the creation of the Surveillance Detection Program, DS’s new approach led it to more aggressively pursue several initiatives. DS began working more closely with other agencies to share information and coordinate responses to terrorist threats overseas, particularly the NSC’s Counter-terrorism Security Group (CSG) chaired by Richard Clarke. Assistant Secretary Carpenter chaired an ad hoc group of the CSG to study how to implement additional security countermeasures for U.S. posts abroad.⁴⁸ DS organized and dispatched five Security Augmentation Teams (of 5 persons each) to embassies in the Middle East and Africa. Their objective was to evaluate posts for physical security vulnerabilities, lack of host government support/capabilities, and possible Osama bin Laden targets. DS also formed a task force to examine chemical and biological warfare threats to overseas posts, and then adjusted emergency action plans and provided CBW equipment and training for U.S. personnel. DS also held a town hall meeting with more than 500 Department of State employees to discuss security concerns.⁴⁹

No single effort represented DS’s new proactive approach better than the Carpenter and Bergin “blueprint” for DS. Just as David Fields and Robert Lamb had put forward SY’s Acceleration proposal and did not wait for the Inman Panel, Carpenter and Bergin did not wait for the Crowe Commission to recommend changes. Instead, they detailed specific proposals to implement and enforce security measures in Department facilities



Figure 30: Peter Bergin, Director of the Diplomatic Security Service and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, 1998-2003. Bergin helped to develop and institute the Surveillance Detection Program. He and Assistant Secretary Carpenter proposed a “blueprint” for DS that restructured the Bureau, expanding it and making it more responsive to the threats of the post-Cold War world. Source: Department of State.

at home and abroad. Their proposals were more extensive than those that the Crowe Commission would recommend.⁵⁰

In their memorandum, Carpenter and Bergin pressed for several structural changes for DS and its people. First, given the priority of security, they asked that the RSO report directly to the Chief of Mission or the Deputy Chief of Mission, instead of the Administrative Officer as was then currently done. Second, they requested permission to create Regional Directors of Security who would supervise, review, inspect, and consult with RSOs in a designated region. The Regional Director of Security would also serve as a liaison with the particular geographic bureau. Third, Carpenter and Bergin asked to have the management of and resource support for RSO and ARSO positions transferred from the geographic bureaus to DS, just as had occurred earlier with the SEOs. Without control over DS personnel and monies, Carpenter argued, he had “no flexibility... to meet an evolving emergency or crisis.” Carpenter and Bergin also asked that a formal career path be established for DS personnel, and that DS create separate promotion panels for its agents and SEOs,

with DS personnel chairing and comprising a majority on the panels. Finally, Carpenter and Bergin requested that the “time-in-class” requirement be adjusted so that senior DS officers would be able to train and mentor the new recruits without being selected out of the Foreign Service (many DS agents were facing this in 1999).⁵¹

On March 9, 1999, in a meeting requested by Albright, Carpenter and Bergin presented their “Blueprint for DS.” Describing DS as a 1980s car, Carpenter and Bergin asked the Secretary, “How many of us are still driving a 1984 automobile?” They recommended that DS be rebuilt in the likeness of the Secret Service. They requested each of the items listed above and added two others. They asked that the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security report directly to the Secretary regarding security matters, and that DS be allowed to hire an additional 500 agents over the next three years. Albright was sympathetic, and recommended that they consult with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering, Director General of the Foreign Service Edward

W. “Skip” Gnehm, Counselor Wendy Sherman, and Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Barbara Larkin.⁵²

Although some resistance arose—in fact, one senior officer warned Bergin to “marshal his allies”—Carpenter and Bergin obtained nearly everything they requested. In consultations with Pickering, Gnehm, Sherman, and Larkin, they found no opposition to the career path, promotion panel, and time-in-service proposals. The creation of Regional Director of Security and the changing of the chain of command so that the RSO reported to the DCM or Chief of Mission were also approved, although resistance stalled the latter proposal for several months. DS obtained six of the seven positions requested for Regional Director of Security, and an authorization for 300 additional agents (they had requested 500). The proposals for the Assistant Secretary to report directly to the Secretary and for moving the RSO and ARSO positions into DS were opposed outright; in fact, three of the four officers consulted expressed concern that this would be creating “an autonomous DS.”⁵³

Despite not achieving the last two elements, DS emerged a much stronger, much larger organization. The Department established 37 new RSO positions and 106 new ARSO positions, raising the number of overseas posts served by either from 172 to 254. The Department announced that it would undertake a “comprehensive curriculum review” of the RSO training, and it pledged to establish 37 new Marine Security Guard detachments, increasing the number of posts having such details to 159.⁵⁴

🌀 *The Crowe Commission* 🌀

When the Crowe Commission issued its report, it harshly criticized DS, the Department of State, and Congress for not meeting the standards set by the Inman Panel. Admiral Crowe attributed the severity of the attacks to “a collective failure by several administrations and Congresses over the past decade to invest adequate efforts and resources to reduce the vulnerability of U.S. diplomatic missions.”⁵⁵ Commission also criticized DS for not requiring full application of security standards at all U.S. posts. It found that DS had granted exceptions



Figure 31: A DS Regional Security Officer (wearing ball cap) speaks with a young man who scaled a fence at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia, in November 1994. The youth was seeking U.S. support for independence for East Timor. Source: Agence France-Presse.



Figure 32: Admiral (Ret.) William J. Crowe, head of the Crowe Commission created by President Bill Clinton. The Crowe Commission examined overseas security in the wake of the East Africa bombings. Crowe was critical of the Department and Congress for not following through with the Inman Panel recommendations. As a result, Congress approved a program of more than \$1.4 billion to improve embassy security overseas. Source: © Associated Press.

to both East African embassies on such mandated security standards as the 100-foot perimeter requirement, because both facilities were categorized as medium risk posts and built before 1986. What was perhaps less noticed was that DS had completed many security improvements at high-risk posts, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Moreover, following a risk management strategy, DS officials expected an attack on a U.S. post in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, but not on the continent of Africa, where no terrorist attacks had occurred, and where DS considered crime to be the greater threat.⁵⁶

The Crowe Commission offered several conclusions regarding the course of action Congress and the Clinton Administration should take to improve security at U.S. diplomatic posts overseas. It advised the Department and the Federal Government as a whole to “give sustained priority and funding to security improvements.” The Commission recommended that the Department should fully examine all posts, make note of needed improvements, and, if necessary, close those posts that were highly vulnerable and difficult to convert to new standards. The Commission encouraged the Secretary of State to create an Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) to oversee this work, and to evaluate “our overseas presence in the context of our national priorities, our resource constraints, and

our worldwide security concerns.” Albright created the panel, and Admiral Crowe served on it with several former ambassadors, members of Congress, and heads of nonprofit organizations and private corporations.⁵⁷

DS largely concurred with the Crowe Commission’s report; however, the Crowe Commission’s criticism, as well as its proposal for a capital building program for the Department of State, signified Washington’s re-recognition of the threat of terrorism. In some ways, the Crowe Commission in its criticism seemed to overlook international developments (end of the Cold War) and domestic political dynamics (“peace dividend”) of the previous decade. While many lawmakers and commentators spoke of the new post-Cold War order, many DS agents and engineers

did not conflate the threats of Cold War, espionage, and terrorism. Enduring shrinking resources, in part due to the “peace dividend” and Congressional budget cuts, DS had analyzed all U.S. posts across the world and focused its energies and resources accordingly. Now, after a series of terrorist attacks that included al-Khobar Towers, the *U.S.S. Cole*, and the East Africa bombings, Washington’s attention focused upon terrorism.

The Crowe Commission’s proposal for a capital building program for the Department of State reflected Washington’s new appreciation of the terrorist threat. The Commission estimated that the sustained building program for new U.S. embassies would require \$1 billion per year for 10 years, and an additional \$400 million per year for security upgrades and new security personnel. The Clinton Administration had already asked for \$3 billion over 5 years to rebuild embassies overseas, but budget caps prevented the Department from asking for more. Secretary Albright also tried to convince a hostile Congress to lock in a commitment for the five-year building program. Admiral Crowe now criticized Congress and the Department of State. He said that the Department was being “intimidated by Congress,” and he warned Congress not to appear as if it was “putting money in front of lives on the priority list.”⁵⁸ By the summer of 1999, the Clinton Administration increased its request for FY 2000 by another \$264 million, and by \$150 million a year for the following 4 years. In an attempt to demonstrate the national commitment to security that the Crowe Commission had called for, Congress approved \$1.4 billion for embassy security in 2000, more than what the Clinton Administration had requested.⁵⁹

The Crowe Commission also faulted DS’s Division of Intelligence and Threat Analysis (formerly called the Threat Analysis Group) for its method of compiling the Crime-Threat List (CTL). The CTL



Figure 33: Seven DS Special Agents are shown at Andrews Air Force Base in March 1997, forming the protective detail for visiting Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat (third from left). Source: Private collection.



Figure 34: A Marine Security Guard at “Post One” at U.S. Embassy Madrid. The 1998 East Africa bombings marked a shift in Department attitudes towards security. Not only did Department personnel expect adequate security and protection (and demand the resources for it), several changes also occurred. Hereafter, an embassy’s Regional Security Officer (a DS Agent) would report directly to the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission, to brief them on security at the mission. Source: U.S. Embassy Madrid.

rated the threat each post faced with regards to the categories of crime and terrorism. The categories were rated on a scale of Critical, High, Moderate, and Low. While the Defense Intelligence Agency compiled a similar list by country, DS was the only agency examining each post, recognizing that in large countries like Germany, Brazil, and India, one area of a country might have a different threat dynamic than another area. Critical of why DS had not put Tanzania and Kenya higher on the list, the Crowe Commission believed the CTL was not properly compiled, and demanded changes. In response, DS Threat Analyst Pluchinsky divided the “Terrorism” category into three separate categories: “Indigenous Terrorism,” “Transnational Terrorism,” and “Political Violence.” He also changed the name of the list to SETL (Security Environment Threat List). To the present day, the Department of State, NSC, and other agencies continue to rely on SETL for determining the threats faced by a post.⁶⁰

The Crowe Commission further suggested that the Department of State should consider closing small posts. U.S. diplomatic representation to small nation would not be eliminated, but merely carried out from new, regional embassies located in less threatened and vulnerable countries. Ambassadors serving at the consolidated posts would be “accredited to several governments.” Called the Special Embassy Program, this had been proposed when the New Independent States emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but was recast in the wake of the East Africa Bombings. The idea represented an effort to regionalize certain functions and re-conceptualize the embassy. Some hoped that new technology and a division of labor between posts within the same region could improve the efficiency of the U.S. embassy system. Proponents of the Special Embassy Program argued that it would reduce costs while increasing security by reducing “field presence and thus the exposure of employees.” Although the program was not implemented, the Department of State believed that too many U.S. Government representatives served abroad, and suggested that there be an interagency effort to achieve a “leaner, more agile” overseas work force.⁶¹

Perhaps the most dramatic change precipitated by the East Africa bombings was a marked shift in attitude towards security within the Department of State. As one FSO told *The New York Times*, “Once you treated the threat of terrorism as the price of being a diplomat; you didn’t demand resources for embassy security. Now you do.”⁶² With the emergence of transnational terrorism, the Foreign Service became even more conscientious about diplomatic security. Secretary Albright took “a personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad.” Albright met with her Assistant Secretary Carpenter every morning when she was not traveling, and Carpenter and Albright regularly reviewed intelligence pertaining to potential future attacks and other security related information.⁶³

This support proved crucial, for DS had asked Secretary Albright to elevate the RSO, so that he/she would report to the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) at the post. Up through the East Africa bombings, if the RSO wanted to talk to the Ambassador or DCM, he went through the Administrative Officer. Bergin believed this imposed an artificial constraint, and hence, he and Carpenter had asked Albright for a change in post organization. She approved it. Under Secretary Pickering did not like it, and it took a number of months

to craft a cable implementing it. The initial draft telegram said the RSO “should report” to the ambassador. Bergin objected to the phrasing, asserting that use of the word “should” made the change discretionary and did not serve the ambassador or the United States well. In 2000, the draft wording was changed to read that the RSO “will report” to the Ambassador. The ALDAC telegram was sent, and as a result, the RSO reports directly to the Ambassador, like the post’s Political or Economic Officer. With this change, Carpenter and Bergin achieved nearly every item they requested under the blueprint they presented to Secretary Albright.⁶⁴

🌀 Security Breaches at Home 🌀

In the late 1990s, the Department of State suffered several security breaches within Main State. The first occurred in February 1998, before the East Africa bombings, when an unknown man removed classified documents from a secure office suite that served Secretary Albright. DS instituted an escort policy for all visitors at Main State. In December 1999, the investigation of suspected surveillance of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Affairs’ conference room culminated with the arrest of Russian intelligence officer Stanislav Gusev outside the building. Gusev had monitored conversations on the Department’s Seventh Floor conference room via a bug implanted in the arm of a chair. Unable to prosecute Gusev due to his diplomatic immunity, the United States declared him *persona non grata*. One month later, a laptop containing highly classified work disappeared from the offices of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).⁶⁵

Assistant Secretary Carpenter admitted that the security breaches resulted not from an absence of policy, but from non-compliance and a lax attitude toward security among Department personnel. For example, a review of the INR laptop incident revealed that staff had allowed contractors without appropriate clearances to enter restricted workspaces, and had propped open doors to secure areas. DS tightened its oversight of security, established further access restrictions to the



Figure 35: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Few Secretaries were more supportive of the Diplomatic Security Bureau. Secretary Albright approved Assistant Secretary Carpenter’s and Director Bergin’s “blueprint” to restructure and revamp DS. During a Department-wide town hall meeting, she declared, “I don’t care how skilled you may be as a diplomat, how brilliant you are at meetings, or how creative you are as an administrator, if you are not professional about security, you are a failure.” Source: Department of State.

Secretary's suite, instituted a more rigorous escort policy, strengthened computer safeguards, and set up more security patrols and sweeps within Main State. Carpenter also convened an interagency review panel, comprising senior representatives from the FBI, DOD, Secret Service, CIA, and DS to review existing countermeasures.⁶⁶

Following the security breaches, Secretary Albright initiated measures to emphasize the necessity of following security procedures. On May 3, in response to the lost INR laptop, Albright held a Department-wide town meeting dedicated exclusively to security. She stressed to all employees the importance of security: "I don't care how skilled you may be as a diplomat, how brilliant you are at meetings, or how creative you are as an administrator, if you are not professional about security, you are a failure."⁶⁷ Albright also ordered a full-scale investigation into the laptop incident. This led to the discipline of a number of Department personnel, including the dismissal of Allen Locke, a member of the senior executive service, the suspension of INR's Donald Keyser, and the resignation of Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research.⁶⁸

During hearings on the security breaches, Congress questioned Carpenter on the Department of State's escort policy. Carpenter had implemented a stringent escort policy for most visitors shortly after he assumed leadership of DS in November 1998; however, many geographic bureaus complained that the policy restricted their work, forcing Carpenter to withdraw the new escort rules. Carpenter re-implemented new escort regulations in August 1999, requiring escorts for all visitors and restricting unescorted members of the press to the first two floors of the Truman building. Congressmen questioned the effectiveness of the new policy, particularly what they referred to as the "gentleman's agreement" with the press. Carpenter assured Congress that he was exploring new

approaches to securing restricted areas, such as hiring permanent escorts or establishing an entirely separate facility for press events.⁶⁹

Technology and Y2K

During the 1990s, computer security constituted a growing concern for DS. DS security engineers admitted that the Department's Wang computer system installed in the 1980s provided computer security, primarily because it was a "cocoon" system, without connections to outside or civilian networks. With the rise of the Internet, Department officers and employees increasingly pressured DS to permit access to the Internet. Although the Department did have File Transfer (FTP) capability before the 1990s, the earliest Internet connection appeared in the computer



Figure 36: The Watch Floor of the DS Office of Computer Security's Network Monitoring Center in Beltsville, Maryland, in 2000. Established in 1999 during concerns about Y2K, the Center now operates around the clock with state-of-the-art cyber security technology to detect and respond to threats to the Department of State's information networks. Source: Department of State.

room in 1991. Such connections did not expand to major departmental offices until 1993 and 1994. In 1995, the Department possessed three connections for its posts: one to Seoul for Asia and two to Ankara for Europe, Middle East, and Africa. In 1998, the Internet tunnel was constructed to Scandinavia, and during the same year, the Department introduced IP (internet protocol) communications system to its posts. The NASH handled the encryption of the circuits.⁷⁰

With the rapidly developing Internet connections, by the mid-1990s, email emerged as a significant problem. The Department had three email systems operating: MS Mail, Wang Office, and CC Mail. By the late 1990s, Department officials recognized that they needed to develop tools to manage email. With the looming Y2K (Year 2000) computer conversion concerns, IRMA took the lead to consolidate everything

onto Microsoft software and completed the conversion in 1999. Despite email, the number of cables between the Department and its posts continued to increase, with instructions, formal statements, and others messages sent.⁷¹

Telephone communications experienced innovations as well. Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III appeared in the early 1990s, and arrived as a telephone-size package. The package contained a key and a sealed telephone, and one had to insert the key into the telephone for it to work properly. Although transmission of one's voice was encoded, users still had to consider whether the space in which they talked was bugged. The security of the STU-III mattered little if the conversation occurred in a "bugged" room. Even so, one DS technical engineer recalled that the STU-III became "status symbols" within the Department, suggesting that one had "important" information to relay to Washington or overseas.⁷²

The looming threat of Y2K computer conversion problems greatly improved the security posture for Department of State communications. Computer experts and public officials around the world worried that the change of date would cause problems for a myriad of computer and electronic equipment. No one was sure whether computers, automatic teller machines, power stations, and anything else that relied on computers would continue to function when the computer read "2000" for the year. As a result, much of the old equipment was replaced; however, the worry was that other countries, particularly allies, might go down as a result of the Y2K phenomenon. DS headed the contingency planning for Y2K, and it was a pleasant surprise when Y2K did not prove the problem that many feared.⁷³



Figure 37: DS Special Agents (left and extreme rear, center) serve on the protective detail for Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (left foreground) during her meeting with North Korea's supreme leader Kim Jong Il (right foreground) in Pyongyang, on October 23, 2000. Source: Associated Press.

Conclusion



Figure 38: In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (center but unseen) is targeted by eggs thrown by anti-American protestors during her visit to the Czech Republic. As it is trained to do, her DS Special Agent protective detail leaps into action to provide cover for the Secretary. Secretary Albright emerged unscathed from the assault. Source: Radek Mica / MF Dnes/Profimedia.

By 2000, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security had emerged as one of the Department's preeminent offices working on the frontlines of diplomacy. Struggling since its creation in 1985, especially during post-Cold War efforts to streamline it and transfer responsibilities to other agencies, DS witnessed an expansion of its responsibilities as the Department's demands for security grew during the 1990s. Continued espionage and terrorism, in addition to rapidly expanding and evolving computer technology placed greater demands upon DS. New security responsibilities for protecting the U.S. Olympic team, the President of Haiti, and U.S. personnel in the regional crises of Liberia and Burundi increased demands on DS. Under the leadership of Assistant Secretary Eric Boswell and Deputy Assistant Secretary Greg Bujac, DS underwent a revival that sought to match its financial and personnel resources with the responsibilities it was accumulating.

With the 1998 East Africa bombings, DS experienced a fundamental shift: it moved from a responsive entity to a proactive office. Before the Crowe Commission completed its work, Assistant Secretary David Carpenter and Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Bergin offered the blueprint for DS that reconstructed the bureau into one of the leading operational bureaus of the Department. DS gained greater funding and increased its personnel to meet the terrorist and technological threats confronting U.S. posts overseas. Now, DS's Assistant Secretary briefed the Secretary on a constant basis, and at posts, the RSO reported directly to the Ambassador, just as the Political and Economic Officers did.

By 2000, DS had grown into one of the largest bureaus in the Department, and one of the most critical for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. Security tasks and responsibilities increased at U.S. posts overseas, and expanded to computer-based security threats that could compromise the operation, communication, and files of the Department. DS also expanded its liaisons and cooperation with overseas police forces, its training of local law enforcement, and its assistance in developing protective details for foreign leaders. Although DS agents and engineers had always recognized the value of their work, the 1990s found the Department as a whole even more appreciative of the DS role as a critical element in U.S. diplomatic operations.

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- 47 Telegram 225284, Albright (S. Baker, DS/PSP/FPD) to ALDAC, 4 December 1998, Folder – ASEC – Gen, Box 12, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Telegram 051275, Albright (Bergin) to Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Lilongwe, March 1999, Folder – AF-Lilongwe Malawi, Box 4, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. See also Written Version of Secretary Albright’s Testimony Before House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State Department, 1 March 1, 2000, Folder – AMGA - Cong. Testimony, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 03D085, Suitland. President Clinton’s 1999 State of the Union Message quoted in Draft Summary “Department of State’s response to the Crowe Commission Reports,” 1 April 1999, Folder – ASEC – ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.
- 48 Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Bergin to Cohen, 3 December 1998, Folder – Chron December 1998, Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Carpenter to Cohen, 13 January 1999; and Memorandum “Embassy Security Countermeasures – UBL Threat,” Carpenter to Clarke, 8 January 1999; both Folder – January 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.
- 49 Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Carpenter to Cohen, 13 January 1999. Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Wayne S. Rychak, Acting, to Cohen, 10 December 1998, Folder – Chron December 1998; and Memorandum “Weekly Highlights,” Carpenter to Cohen, 19 November 1998, Folder – Chron November 1998; both Box 10, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland.
- 50 Carpenter’s memorandum to Cohen is dated 7 January 1999, the day before the release of the Crowe Commission reports. However, a signed memorandum on Cohen’s desk on 7 January indicates that the memorandum was typed and proofed a couple of days before that date. It is likely that Carpenter, Bergin, and others were discussing or formalizing these ideas before 1 January.
- 51 Memorandum “DS Position and Personnel Issues,” Carpenter to Cohen, 7 January 1999, Folder – January 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.
- 52 Memorandum “DS: A Blueprint for the Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 16 March 1999, Folder – March 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. Attached are two memoranda: The first is “A Blueprint for DS,” and the second is Carpenter’s 7 January memorandum to Cohen; however, minor adjustments were made to wording and it was re-dated 9 March, the day Carpenter and Bergin met with Albright. For Albright’s suggestion to consult with the four senior State Department officers, see Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 9 April 1999, Folder – April 1999 Chron, Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.
- 53 Oral History Interview, Bergin #1, pp. 3, 5. Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 9 April 1999. Memorandum “Status Report – Blueprint for DS’ Future,” Carpenter to Cohen, 29 June 1999, Folder – June 1999 Chron, Box 1; and Memorandum “State of DS Blueprint for the Future,” Carpenter and Edward W. Gnehm, Director General of the Foreign Service, to Cohen, 3 August 1999, Folder – August 1999 Chron; both Box 1, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. The last shows Cohen marking all accepted proposals as “OK.”

- 54 Report to Congress on Actions Taken By the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999, Folder – ASEC - ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.
- 55 Letter, Admiral William J. Crowe (Ret.), to Secretary of State Albright, 8 January 1999, Crowe Commission Files, DS Files, Rosslyn.
- 56 Executive Overview of Crowe Commission Report, DS Files, Rosslyn. Memorandum “Countering the Persian Gulf Terrorist Threat,” McKune and Boswell to Albright, 5 February 1997, Folder – 1997 SEC S/C Files, Box 5, RAG 59-Lot 01D129, Suitland. Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #2, 15 December 2005, p. 4. Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, p. 3.
- 57 Crowe Commission Report, DS Files, Rosslyn. Report to Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999, Folder – ASEC - ARB, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland.
- 58 Crowe Commission Report, DS Files, Rosslyn. David Johnston, “Administration to Seek \$3 Billion to Protect Embassies Abroad,” *New York Times*, 25 January 1999, p. A9. James Risen, “Embassy Security Budget Is Far Less Than Panel Urged,” *New York Times*, 5 February 1999, p. A3. Shenon, “Spending To Avert Embassy Attacks Assailed as Timid,” *New York Times*, 19 February 1999, p. A1.
- 59 James Risen, “U.S. To Seek \$264 Million for Building of Overseas Embassies,” *New York Times*, 5 June 1999, p. A3. Shenon, “House Votes \$1.4 Billion for Embassy Security; Senate May Balk,” *New York Times*, 22 July 1999, p. A5.
- 60 Oral History Interview, Dennis Pluchinsky, 22 December 2005, p. 3. See also Telegram 94065 “Security Environment Profile Questionnaire,” Albright (L. E. Tibbetts – DS/DSS/ITA), 13 September 1999, Folder – ASEC Counterintelligence, Box 3, RAG 59-Lot 02D078, Suitland. Report to Congress on Actions Taken By the Department of State in Response to the Program Recommendations of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, April 1999.
- 61 Albright, Pickering, Cohen, and Chairman of the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP) Lewis Kaden comments at Press Briefing on the OPAP Report, November 5, 1999, released by the Office of the Spokesman, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/991105.html> accessed 12/1/2003.
- 62 Shenon, “A Year After Bombings, A Case of Diplo-Jitters,” *New York Times*, July 18, 1999, p. WK-6.
- 63 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005.
- 64 Oral History Interview, Peter Bergin #1, 15 November 2005, p. 5.
- 65 Statement of Carpenter, House Committee on International Relations, 11 May 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/000511-carpenter.htm, accessed 1/26/2006. Transcript of Testimony of Carpenter at Hearing on Current Challenges to State Department Security, 11 May 2000, Folder – AMGA Congressional Testimony, Box 2, RAG 59-Lot 03D085, Suitland.
- 66 Statement of Carpenter, House International Relations Committee, 11 May 2000. Transcript of Testimony of Carpenter at Hearing on Current Challenges to State Department Security, 11 May 2000.
- 67 Statement of Carpenter, House International Relations Committee, 11 May 2000. “Albright ‘furious’ over missing laptop,” CNN, 3 May 2000, 3:03 EDT, accessed <http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/05/03/state.depart.laptop/> 2/22/06.
- 68 Statement of Carpenter, House International Relations Committee, May 11, 2000; “Albright ‘furious’ over missing laptop,” CNN.com, May 3, 2000, 3:03 EDT; Steven Mufson, “Senior Diplomat Resigns to Protest Albright’s Action,” *Washington Post*, 5 December 2000, p. A02. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, 5 December 2000, accessed <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2000/12/dos120500.html> 2/22/06.

- ⁶⁹ Transcript of Testimony of Carpenter at Hearing on Current Challenges to State Department Security, 11 May 2000.
- ⁷⁰ Oral History Interview, Charles Wisecarver, 18 November 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, p. 2-4.
- ⁷¹ Oral History Interview, Charles Wisecarver, 18 November 2005, p. 1. Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, conducted by Mark Hove, pp. 2-3.
- ⁷² Oral History Interview, Bruce Matthews, 17 February 2006, p. 1.
- ⁷³ Oral History Interview, Alan Herto, 19 December 2005, p. 3.