

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Resource Summary

(\$ in thousands)

Appropriations	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
American Positions	280	242	244
Funds	49,292	40,697	41,275

Program Description

The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is responsible for managing a broad range of U.S. Government nonproliferation polices, programs, agreements, and initiatives. The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and related materials, technologies, and expertise, and the fact that terrorists are trying to acquire them, is a preeminent challenge to U.S. national security. Combating this threat through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is one of the highest priorities of the Department. ISN leads the Department's efforts to prevent the spread of WMD - whether nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological - and their delivery systems. ISN also works to control transfers of advanced conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, ISN spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on the threats posed by WMD proliferation and on ways to address such threats, and works to shore up the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime.

A recent reorganization of ISN transferred its arms control functions and corresponding resources to the new Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, allowing ISN to focus all its resources on nonproliferation objectives.

Iran and North Korean Challenges

ISN's highest priority is to deal with the challenges presented by Iranian and North Korean WMD and missile ambitions. The Bureau provides diplomatic and technical expertise in support of the Department's efforts to maintain united international pressure on Iran to abide by its international nonproliferation obligations. The Bureau contributes to the Department's efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea through diplomacy, including through participation in the Six-Party Talks and in cooperation with the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and key allies and friends, and to address its other WMD and missile programs.

Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

A high priority requirement of the U.S. Government is to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by reinforcing the basic bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). ISN manages U.S. engagement in the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and supports the President's Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation. Having overseen a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference in May 2010, the Bureau is already preparing for the five-year cycle leading to the next NPT Review Conference in 2015. ISN manages U.S. engagement with the IAEA and administers the diplomatic aspects of U.S. efforts to establish an international fuel bank and other mechanisms for nuclear fuel assurances. ISN negotiates bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements that promote safe,

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secure, and safeguarded use of nuclear power and leads diplomatic efforts to reduce the amount of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the world.

Preventing Proliferant Transfers

ISN controls, impedes, and interdicts proliferant transfers via its management of U.S. Government participation in the Australia Group (chemical/biological), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement (conventional weapons), as well as through its Export Control and Related Border Security program. ISN spearheads U.S. efforts to promote implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, a legally-binding requirement for states to enact domestic controls to prevent proliferation. ISN has diplomatic responsibility for the Proliferation Security Initiative, a commitment by over 90 states to take action to interdict shipments, disrupt networks, and shut down the front companies that support them. ISN co-chairs a committee with the Department of the Treasury that implements Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and block transactions of designated entities and individuals engaged in proliferation activities.

WMD Terrorism

ISN leads the diplomatic aspects of the President's initiative to secure vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years, playing a leading role in the Nuclear Security Summit of April 2010, implementing its outcomes, and preparing for its 2012 follow-on Summit. ISN supports the Secretary's Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs, who resides within ISN. ISN also manages programs specifically designed to combat nuclear terrorism, such as the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. ISN's Global Threat Reduction program focuses on regions and countries where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest. ISN also manages implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as the U.S. Government prepares for the 2011 BWC Review Conference.

Missile Proliferation

ISN leads U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles, the most destabilizing potential delivery systems for WMD. The centerpiece of this effort is ISN's leadership in the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR), which seeks to deny technology to proliferant missile programs and coordinates international efforts to press countries to stop pursuing or supplying such programs. The combination of MTCR, export controls, interdiction, and sanctions makes proliferant missile programs in countries like Iran and North Korea more costly, time-consuming, and difficult to pursue.

Advanced Conventional Weapons

ISN is committed to stemming the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, particularly through such multilateral efforts as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. ISN conducts participation in international discussions to improve regulation of international trade in conventional arms, and is leading U.S. engagement in consultations preparing for the recently-agreed 2012 negotiations on an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). ISN also directs policy implementation of U.S. and foreign commercial remote sensing satellites which, if not properly managed, can provide critical military advantages to adversary states and terrorists, and negotiates associated international agreements to control transfers of remote sensing satellites and technology.

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Performance

Armed with nuclear weapons, Iran would be a threat to the region and to U.S. interests in the Middle East. This indicator records U.S. and international progress in managing the Iranian challenge to the NPT and to regional and international security. Since the Department began tracking this indicator in FY 2006, Iran has continually refused to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sufficient access and cooperation to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Iran concealed from the international community sensitive fuel cycle activities that are a significant step toward a nuclear weapons capability, pursued development of a nuclear warhead, and continues to develop ballistic missile capabilities. In FY 2009, the Obama Administration conducted an extensive Policy Review on Iran intended to identify ways to execute the President's policy objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability while changing the tone of interactions, including through direct engagement and diplomacy.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY			
Strategic Priority	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons		
Indicator	Status of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program and Adherence to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Obligations.		
RATINGS TREND			
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
▼ Below Target	▼ Below Target	▼ Below Target	▼ Below Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS			
FY 2012 Target	Since the Department did not achieve FY 2009 Targets, FY 2011 targets are repeated here: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iran's suspension of all uranium enrichment-, reprocessing-, and heavy water-related activities (also termed 'proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities') continues and negotiations continue or conclude on a long-term political settlement. • IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues. • Iran ceases using the international financial system to support proliferation and terrorism activities and is denied the ability to engage in clandestine sensitive procurement efforts. 		
FY 2011 Target	Since the Department did not achieve FY 2009 Targets, FY 2010 targets are repeated here: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiations with Iran continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement. • Iran maintains a full suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, verified by the IAEA. • IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues. • Iran provides full cooperation such that the IAEA is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program declarations appear correct and complete. 		
FY 2010 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Negotiations with Iran continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement. • Iran maintains a full suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, verified by the IAEA. • IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues. • Iran provides full cooperation such that the IAEA is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program declarations appear correct and complete. 		

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FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Below Target Throughout early 2010, The U.S. Government negotiated a fourth UN Security Council resolution imposing legally binding sanctions as a mechanism for increasing the pressure on Iran to comply with its international obligations (it was adopted in June). As of this writing, Iran has failed to do so once again. Iran also continues to refuse to cooperate with the IAEA in its investigation into Iran's nuclear program. The United States has been successful in maintaining its coalition, both at the Security Council and through the implementation of accompanying sanctions, such as the autonomous sanctions that go beyond UNSCR requirements adopted by the EU, Australia, Canada, and Norway during the summer of 2010. The P5+1 and Iran met in early December 2010 in Geneva in order to resolve this impasse. Negotiations will continue in Istanbul in January 2011.</p>
Impact	An Iran armed with nuclear weapons would be a serious threat to its neighbors and to international security and stability. Iran's concealment of actions poses a direct challenge to the NPT regime. The U.S. and the international community must continue pressure on Iran to make a choice between complying with its NPT obligations or fact increasing isolation.
Steps to Improve	The Department will continue to develop strategies and tactics for both further isolating Iran and keeping the door open to ensuring negotiations with Iran are constructive should Iran decide to change course.
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Below Target Iran has continued to refuse to comply with its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) obligations. The Obama Administration conducted an extensive Policy Review on Iran, intended to identify ways to execute the President's policy objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability while changing the tone of the interactions, including through direct engagement and diplomacy.</p>
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Below Target Iran continued to refuse to re-suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to cooperate fully with the IAEA. In coordination with Treasury, a diplomatic track through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral sanctions was pursued. In addition to UNSCRs 1696, 1737, and 1747, UNSCR 1803 was adopted in March 2008, imposing additional Chapter VII sanctions on Iran in an effort to get Iran to suspend its nuclear activities and engage in negotiations on the future of its nuclear program. UNSCR 1835 was adopted in September 2008, restating the obligations on Iran and demanding its compliance. The IAEA remained seized of the issue and, in February 2008, was presented with information that described in detail Iran's effort to develop a nuclear warhead, work that the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed was halted in late 2003.</p>
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Below Target Iran continued to refuse to re-suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities enrichment-related activity or to cooperate fully with the IAEA. The U.S. has pursued a diplomatic track through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral sanctions in coordination with the Treasury Department. In addition to UN SCR 1696, two more resolutions have been unanimously adopted (UNSCRs 1737 and 1747) and Chapter VII sanctions were imposed on Iran in an effort to achieve the desired impact of Iran suspending its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, cooperating fully with the IAEA, and engaging in negotiations on the future of its nuclear program. A third Chapter VII sanctions resolution was adopted in March 2008 when Iran continued to fail to comply with its UNSC and IAEA obligations.</p>
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitors current events relating to Iran and consults with other Department and U.S. officials on U.S. policy vis-a-vis Iran.
Data Source and Quality	Intelligence reporting, embassy reporting, bilateral consultations, IAEA and UNSC reporting. Undeclared Iranian activities are inherently difficult to detect, and at times the IAEA may rely on information received from the Government of Iran that might be unreliable.

As President Obama noted in his 2009 speech in Prague, the 'basic bargain' of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains sound: nuclear weapons states will move to disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all can access peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations and safeguards. This bargain

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has been put at risk by countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities under the guise of peaceful uses. The U.S. needs to rebuild consensus among NPT Parties on the importance of the NPT, reach consensus on responses to NPT and IAEA noncompliance, and ensure that the IAEA has the authority and resources needed to police the nuclear nonproliferation system through its international safeguards.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY			
Strategic Priority	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons		
Indicator	Key Milestones in Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).		
RATINGS TREND			
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
◄► On Target	◄► On Target	◄► On Target	◄► On Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS			
FY 2012 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPT Parties continue to follow up on 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. • Successful 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee. • Construction begins on new IAEA Nuclear Material Laboratory. • Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, Additional Protocols, and modified small quantities protocols. 		
FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPT Parties follow up on 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. • Plan for 2012 Preparatory Committee, the first in a series to prepare for the 2015 Review Conference. • IAEA member states agree on the Agency's 2012-13 Program and Budget, with a real increase in budget. • Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, Additional Protocols, and modified small quantities protocols. 		
FY 2010 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPT Parties conduct Review Conference that includes substantive debate on Treaty issues of importance to the USG and helps to strengthen NPT as a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. • Review Conference reaches common ground on many of these issues, though the highly contentious nature of the issues at time of writing means this target cannot include adoption of consensus documents. • IAEA member states continue to formulate the future direction of IAEA, drawing on the Vision 2020 and Future of the Agency Initiatives. • U.S. implements U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol. • Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols. 		
FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RevCon exceeded expectations; all Treaty issues reviewed; progress made on all principal U.S. objectives. Final Document on substantive issues achieved for first time in 10 years, only the 5th time consensus achieved in the 8 RevCons since 1975. • Consensus reached on a plan of follow-on actions to strengthen each of the 3 NPT pillars, first time an NPT action plan has covered each pillar. • Future of Agency general discussions completed; Working Group on Financing the Agency's Activities established to address, inter alia, management reforms. • U.S. preparing to host IAEA inspections under Additional Protocol (AP). • 3 states signed APs, 2 had APs approved by IAEA, and 8 brought APs into force, for total of 101 APs in force; also, 3 states signed and 7 brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force. 		

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Impact	The NPT has been the bedrock of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime for 40 years, but has been put at risk by countries undertaking clandestine nuclear weapons programs under the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Confidence needs to be restored in the regime by, <i>inter alia</i> , agreeing on responses to NPT noncompliance and by strengthening the authority and capability of the IAEA.
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buoyed by President's Prague speech pledging U.S. attention to all 3 pillars of the NPT, PrepCom completed work quickly and with more cohesion than in the recent past. Parties agreed on procedural matters including a substantive agenda for RevCon • Safeguards strengthened this year due to agreement on a real increase in IAEA budget for 2010, and to Japanese and U.S. contributions to fund a new IAEA safeguards analytical lab that ROK and others may also fund • The "2020 review" has evolved into open-ended meetings of IAEA states on the "Future of the Agency" in which the U.S. emphasizes the need for strengthened safeguards • The U.S. Additional Protocol entered into force in January 2009 • 6 more states signed Additional Protocols, and 4 ratified. Also 5 states had comprehensive safeguards agreements ratified, signed or approved by the IAEA
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference completed its work, including a substantive discussion of all key issues and decisions on the venue, chairman, and other arrangements for the 2009 PrepCom. • 3 Parties signed an Additional Protocol and 4 brought Protocols into force, bringing the total number 'in force' to 88. The IAEA determined that another 27 states had met its 'integrated safeguards' guidelines, bringing the total to 47 states. Parties also strengthened nuclear safety and security, as 3 more states made political commitments to follow the guidance in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. • The Department continued to pursue the recommendations for strengthening safeguards through bilateral consultations.
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: On Target</p> <p>Iran used procedural disputes to constrain time for debate of substantive issues at the 2007 PrepCom (e.g., objecting to a phrase about "reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty"). Other delegations held firm against these ploys in a display of international unity for the integrity of the Treaty review process that included most members of the Non-Aligned Movement. The PrepCom completed necessary work for the 2008 PrepCom, and discussed issues (e.g., how to deter withdrawal from the Treaty by violators). The Safeguards Committee lapsed, but USG will pursue the Secretariat's 18 recommendations for strengthening safeguards in other IAEA fora. One state signed an Additional Protocol; five others brought Protocols into force. Eighty-five states now have Additional Protocols in force.</p>
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitors international developments related to the NPT, the IAEA, and nuclear nonproliferation, and consults with others in the Department and the USG about U.S. policy approaches and tactics for accomplishing U.S. objectives.
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is from UN, NPT, and IAEA documents, reports of UN and IAEA meetings, U.S. and other governments' statements and papers, embassy reporting, intelligence reporting, consultations with the IAEA, UN, and foreign government officials. The Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations.

Acquisition of an operational nuclear device by al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations is a clear and present danger to U.S. and international security. ISN attacks this threat by using all nonproliferation tools, including interdiction and sanctions, to assist in this effort, but the most direct tools are covered by this indicator. ISN manages the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and works to establish global standards, improve security and safety at facilities handling nuclear or radioactive

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materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and employ scientists and technicians with nuclear weapons-related expertise to reduce possible incentives for them to share their expertise with terrorists.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY			
Strategic Priority	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons		
Indicator	Key Milestones Achieved in Combating Nuclear Terrorism.		
RATINGS TREND			
FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010
New Indicator, No Rating	▲ Above Target	◁▷ Improved But Not Met	◁▷ Improved But Not Met
TARGETS AND RESULTS			
FY 2012 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners conduct 8 activities to implement Principles, including targeted activities in nuclear detection and nuclear forensics. • Perform 2 country assessments, secure donations for 6 projects, and organize 6 activities to combat nuclear smuggling. • Organize 15 program activities for nuclear/WMD personnel from Iraq and Libya toward goal of self-sustainability. • At least 100 states commit to controlling radioactive sources usable in a dirty bomb consistent with IAEA standards. 		
FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • New GICNT institutional structures are fully functional. • GICNT partners conduct 8 activities to implement GICNT principles. • Organize 30 program activities to engage Iraqi and Libyan scientists with WMD-applicable expertise, and 5 activities to engage nuclear scientists worldwide. • Perform 3 country assessments, secure donations for 6 projects, organize 6 activities to combat nuclear smuggling. • Finalize high-level Recommendations documents in IAEA Nuclear Security Series on the security of radioactive materials/nuclear materials. • Complete second Radiation Source Protection, Security Task Force Report for Congress that identifies gaps/provides recommendations on improving security of radioactive sources. • 6 countries ratify amendment strengthening the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). 		
FY 2010 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GICNT partners conduct 16 activities to implement GICNT principles. • 8 GICNT partners produce plans/policies/procedures related to combating nuclear terrorism. • Complete 3 GICNT-related activities with cooperation from international organizations, the private sector, and/or local government. • Organize 30 activities to engage Iraqi and Libyan scientists/engineers with WMD-applicable expertise, and 3 activities to engage nuclear scientists/engineers worldwide. • Perform 3 country assessments, secure donations for 6 projects, and organize 6 activities to combat nuclear smuggling. • Achieve consensus with key allies on Guidelines for Management and Minimization of HEU. • Conduct interagency analysis to assess feasibility of replacing radioactive sources of concern with alternative technologies. • 4 countries ratify amendment strengthening CPPNM. 		

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FY 2010 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Improved But Not Met</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the process of improving the GICNT institutional structure, GICNT partners changed the approach to its Program of Work; a newly activated Implementation and Assessment Group will submit projects to the 2013 Plenary rather than piecemeal starting this year. • GICNT conducted 8 activities to implement Principles, completed 7 activities with international, private cooperation. • Organized 26 activities to engage Iraqi scientists/engineers with WMD-applicable expertise, and 4 activities to engage nuclear scientists/engineers worldwide. • Achieved agreement among 47 countries and 3 international organizations, through the Nuclear Summit Communiqué and Workplan, on language for HEU minimization. • Completed interagency report on the feasibility of replacing radioactive sources usable in a 'dirty bomb' with alternative technologies.
Impact	<p>Failure to prevent terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be measurable and could be catastrophic; success is more difficult to measure. Common sense indicates that the more the Department engages with scientists with nuclear expertise, and the more the U.S. Government engages with foreign governments to increase information sharing and coordination, the better the chances of success.</p>
Steps to Improve	n/a
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Improved But Not Met</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partners conducted 12 activities. • Spain hosted field exercise in Oct 2008; Netherlands to conduct a field training exercise in Nov 2009. • June 2009 Plenary included session devoted to enhancing nuclear security public-private-civil society relationships with substantive cooperation from private sector; Spanish field exercise included substantive cooperation from local government. • U.S. and Russia agreed to activate and expand the GICNT's Implementation and Assessment Group to help transform the GICNT into a durable institution. • Organized 22 activities to engage Iraqi, and 5 activities to engage Libyan, ex-WMD scientists. • Performed 4 new country assessments, secured funding for 6 new projects, and organized 7 activities to combat nuclear smuggling. • 9 of 10 major radioactive source suppliers commit. • Agreed draft with France virtually completed.
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: Above Target</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 additional states endorse the GICNT, for a total of 75, already meeting the Department's FY09 target. The Department will continue to invite others to become partners, but most of the key states are involved and the bureau will not retain this target for FY09. • Partner nations conducted 15 GICNT activities, but this high level is not expected to continue. • The field exercise was conducted in October 2008. • Outreach to private sector was suspended per management. • 11 trainings events were conducted for Iraqi personnel and 9 for Libyan personnel. • Performed 3 new country assessments and secured funding for 9 new projects to combat nuclear smuggling in countries of concern. • 6 more states committed to security radioactive sources with IAEA standards, bringing the total to 94 states.

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FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p>Rating: New Indicator, No Rating</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Global Initiative began with 13 partners; there are now have over 50. During this first year of implementation, three senior-level political meetings were held -- in Morocco, Turkey, and Kazakhstan. • A small group of GI partners, called the Exercise Planning Group, was created to contribute to the development of exercises and scenario planning. • A two-year roadmap of activities was agreed, with 17 activities held in calendar year 2007, with at least one Plan of Work activity addressing each principle. • A GI web portal, called the Global Initiative Information Portal, has been created to manage GI information. • 5 statements of support have been received from Fortune 500 companies. • ISN organized 13 activities to engage former WMD personnel in Iraq and Libya. • ISN completed 4 nuclear smuggling country assessments and funded 16 projects.
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis, offices within the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitor and assess information received from the data sources.
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is developed from information from GICNT partners; consultations with foreign governments; IAEA documents and consultations; intelligence reporting; embassy reporting; and from ISN Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs -funded program activities. The Data Quality Assessment revealed minor data limitations. Accurate information on terrorist activities is difficult to obtain.

Justification of Request

The Department’s FY 2012 request of \$41.275 million and 244 positions for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation maintains current services and supports a broad range of U.S. Government nonproliferation polices, programs, agreements, and initiatives.

ISN requests one Senior-level officer for the new Office of Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation. This office manages U.S. Government engagement with several multinational export control regimes and develops related nonproliferation analysis and recommendations for improved approaches on complex, sensitive, and controversial missile, chemical, and biological nonproliferation-related issues worldwide. This office has one senior-level incumbent to work on missile nonproliferation issues at the policy level; it needs another for chemical and biological nonproliferation issues at the policy level.

ISN requests one FTE to allow conversion of a contractor to a permanent position for the Office of Export Control Cooperation. This office manages the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) foreign assistance program which provides assistance to over 50 countries. Several of the program management positions are filled by personal service contractors, including the program analyst for obligations support who works closely with foreign affairs officers and program managers to draft contracts, ensures that interagency partners practice sound financial and program management when handling EXBS funds, and helps coordinate over \$50 million in obligations. ISN requests conversion of this contractor position to an FTE in order to ensure more effective program management.

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Resource Summary

	Positions				Funds (\$ in thousands)			
	American			FSN	Pos Total	Bureau Managed	American Salaries	Funds Total
	CS	FS Dom	Overseas					
FY 2010 Actual	244	22	14	0	280	20,838	28,454	49,292
FY 2011 CR	219	22	1	0	242	15,652	25,045	40,697
FY 2012 Built-in Changes								
Efficiency Savings	0	0	0	0	0	(343)	0	(343)
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	0	535	0	535
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	0	192	0	192
FY 2012 Current Services	219	22	1	0	242	15,844	25,045	40,889
FY 2012 Program Changes								
New Domestic Positions	2	0	0	0	2	134	252	386
Total Program Changes	2	0	0	0	2	134	252	386
FY 2012 Request	221	22	1	0	244	15,978	25,297	41,275

Staff by Program Activity
(positions)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	280	239	241
Domestic Administrative Management	3	3	3
Domestic Financial Services	12	12	12
Domestic General Services	10	10	10
Domestic Personnel Services	18	15	15
International Security Affairs	224	189	191
Mission Direction	12	10	10
Domestic Administrative Support	0	2	2
Domestic Personnel Services	0	2	2
Public Diplomacy	0	1	1
Total	280	242	244

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Funds by Program Activity

(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	49,160	40,565	41,143
Domestic Administrative Management	651	653	657
Domestic Financial Services	1,841	1,844	1,851
Domestic General Services	1,490	1,497	1,502
Domestic Personnel Services	2,636	2,550	2,560
International Security Affairs	38,762	30,691	31,214
Mission Direction	3,780	3,330	3,359
Public Diplomacy	132	132	132
International Security Affairs	10	0	0
Public Diplomacy - Program Costs	122	122	0
Total	49,292	40,697	41,275

Program Activities

Department Of State	Positions			Funds (\$ in thousands)			
	American		FSN	Pos Total	Bureau Managed	American Salaries	Funds Total
	Domestic	Overseas					
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	240	1	0	241	15,968	25,175	41,143
Domestic Administrative Management	3	0	0	3	353	304	657
Domestic Financial Services	12	0	0	12	633	1,218	1,851
Domestic General Services	10	0	0	10	486	1,016	1,502
Domestic Personnel Services	15	0	0	15	835	1,725	2,560
International Security Affairs	190	1	0	191	11,215	19,999	31,214
Mission Direction	10	0	0	10	2,446	913	3,359
Domestic Administrative Support	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
Domestic Personnel Services	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
Public Diplomacy	1	0	0	1	10	122	132
Total	243	1	0	244	15,978	25,297	41,275

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Staff by Domestic Organization Unit (positions)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
Budget and General Services	10	10	10
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction	13	0	0
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	17	16	16
Cooperative Threat Reduction	10	11	11
Coordinator for Threat Reduction	1	1	1
Counterproliferation Initiatives	22	21	21
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls and Negotiation	2	2	2
Export Control Cooperation	17	17	18
Human Resource Division	18	17	17
Missile Threat Reduction	10	0	0
Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund	15	15	15
Office of Assistant Secretary	11	9	9
Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy	9	0	0
Office of the Executive Director	3	3	3
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation	2	0	0
Regional Affairs	24	25	25
Resource Management Division	12	12	12
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation	2	0	0
Strategic Planning and Outreach	11	0	0
WMD/Terrorism	19	18	18
DAS for Counterproliferation	0	6	6
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations	2	2	2
Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation	0	14	15
Multinational Nuclear & Security Affairs	14	13	13
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	21	20	20
Senior Advisor IAEA/UNVIE	1	1	1
Spec. Rep. Nuclear Nonproliferation	0	2	2
Strategic Communications and Outreach	1	7	7
Total	267	242	244

D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Funds by Domestic Organization Unit

(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
Budget and General Services	1,490	1,497	1,502
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction	2,277	0	0
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	2,785	2,697	2,710
Cooperative Threat Reduction	1,591	1,787	1,795
Coordinator for Threat Reduction	440	436	440
Counterproliferation Initiatives	3,039	2,957	2,967
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls and Negotiation	289	292	293
Export Control Cooperation	2,327	2,420	2,620
Human Resource Division	2,636	2,550	2,560
Missile Threat Reduction	1,542	0	0
Nonproliferation & Disarmament Fund	1,838	1,920	1,924
Office of Assistant Secretary	3,780	3,330	3,359
Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy	1,449	0	0
Office of the Executive Director	651	653	657
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation	354	0	0
Regional Affairs	3,460	3,641	3,654
Resource Management Division	1,841	1,844	1,851
Senior Advisor to the International Atomic Energy Agency	159	59	60
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation	457	453	457
Strategic Planning and Outreach	1,224	10	10
WMD/Terrorism	2,659	1,894	2,662
DAS for Counterproliferation	0	765	767
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations	421	423	426
Missile, Biological, and Chemical Nonproliferation	0	2,619	2,826
Multinational Nuclear & Security Affairs	3,579	3,362	3,387
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	3,186	3,099	3,113
Senior Advisor IAEA/UNVIE	0	101	101
Strategic Communications and Outreach	0	1,129	1,134
Weapons of Mass Destruction	0	759	0
Total	43,474	40,697	41,275

**D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION**

Staff by Post
(positions)

International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)	FY 2010			FY 2011			FY 2012		
	Actual			CR			Request		
	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total
Commissioner to Conf on Disarmament & Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Commissioner to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Vienna)	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	13	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0

Funds by Post
(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
Commissioner to Conf on Disarmament & Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	3,242	0	0
Commissioner to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Vienna)	1,034	0	0
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	1,542	0	0
Total	5,818	0	0

**D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION**

Funds by Object Class

(\$ in thousands)

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2010 Actual	FY 2011 CR	FY 2012 Request
1100 Personnel Compensation	24,583	21,805	22,007
1200 Personnel Benefits	5,888	5,201	5,251
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	3,853	3,523	3,561
2200 Transportation of Things	11	11	11
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	937	915	951
2400 Printing & Reproduction	341	282	286
2500 Other Services	11,679	6,981	8,477
2600 Supplies and Materials	215	215	216
3100 Personal Property	159	138	139
4100 Grants, Subsidies & Contrb	1,626	1,626	376
Total	49,292	40,697	41,275