ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MOSCOW TREATY

2010

Prepared by:
The U.S. Department of State

In response to
Section 2(2) of the Resolution of Advice and Consent
To Ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
Of May 24, 2002
MOSCOW TREATY ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION REPORT

This Report is submitted in response to Condition (2) of the March 6, 2003, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty). The Moscow Treaty was signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002, and entered into force on June 1, 2003, upon exchange of the instruments of ratification. Condition (2) of the Resolution states in part: "Annual Implementation Report. - Not later than 60 days after exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation." On July 31, 2003, pursuant to Executive Order 13313, the President delegated to the Secretary of State the authority to submit this report to the Senate.

Condition (2) requires that the implementation report include the following:

(A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the United States, and a best estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force levels of the Russian Federation, as of December 31 of the preceding calendar year;

(B) a detailed description, to the extent possible, of strategic offensive reductions planned by each party for the current calendar year;

(C) to the extent possible, the plans of each party for achieving by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(D) measures, including any verification or transparency measures, that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to assure each party of the other party's continued intent and ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty;

(E) information relevant to implementation of this Treaty that has been learned as a result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) verification measures, and the status of consideration of extending the START verification regime beyond December 2009;

(F) any information, insufficiency of information, or other situation that may call into question the intent or the ability of either party to achieve by December 31, 2012, the strategic offensive reductions required by Article I of the Treaty; and

(G) any actions that have been taken or have been proposed by a party to address concerns listed pursuant to subparagraph (F) or to improve the implementation and effectiveness of the Treaty.
Much of the information requested in the Senate condition is classified for national security reasons. A classified version of this Report contains the complete information required by Conditions 2(A) through (G).

The Moscow Treaty both reflects and significantly contributes to the emergence of the new strategic relationship between the United States and Russia. The Treaty places upon the United States a legal obligation to implement fully its publicly announced plans to reduce to a level of 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012.

A. Listing of Strategic Nuclear Weapons Force Levels of the United States, and a Best Estimate of the Strategic Nuclear Weapons Force Levels of the Russian Federation, as of December 31 of the Preceding Calendar Year

The number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads was 1,968 as of December 31, 2009. The classified version of this Report contains the numbers of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW) by category of system, and estimated numbers of Russian Federation strategic nuclear warheads as of December 31, 2009.

As noted in the Moscow Treaty Article-by-Article Analysis, in using the term “operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads” the United States means reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their launchers on board submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. A small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy bomber bases and the United States does not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads.

The Treaty makes clear that the Parties need not implement their reductions in an identical manner. Russia, like the United States, may reduce its strategic nuclear warheads by any method it chooses. Russia could use the U.S. definition of "operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads" or some other counting method to quantify its reductions. Moscow Treaty numbers are not comparable to START Treaty data due to the different counting approaches of the two treaties.

B. Detailed Description, To the Extent Possible, of Strategic Offensive Reductions Planned by Each Party for the Current Calendar Year

In 2010, the United States expects to continue to meet the Treaty limit of 1,700-2,200 ODSNW.

The classified version of this Report describes planned U.S. strategic offensive reductions in greater detail; it also describes the U.S. estimate of planned Russian strategic offensive reductions during 2010, based on information provided by Russia.
C. To the Extent Possible, the Plans of Each Party for Achieving by December 31, 2012, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Required by Article I of the Treaty

The strategic nuclear force posture planned by the United States for 2012 includes 14 Trident SSBNs, 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, 20 B-2 bombers, and 76 B-52H bombers. At any given time, the United States will likely have two of the 14 Trident SSBNs in overhaul. The SSBNs in overhaul will not contain ODSNW. In 2010, the United States expects to continue to meet the Treaty limit of 1,700-2,200 ODSNW. Decisions that have been made to date on the allocation of ODSNW were made during periodic assessments called for in the December 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. As provided for in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. Law 10-181), the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Energy, has conducted a comprehensive review of its nuclear posture that will be factored into U.S. operational plans. We remain confident that the United States will continue to meet its Moscow Treaty obligations.

Information regarding Russian Federation plans for implementing Moscow Treaty reductions is contained in the classified version of this Report.

D. Measures, Including Any Verification or Transparency Measures, That Have Been Taken or Have Been Proposed by a Party to Assure Each Party of the Other Party's Continued Intent and Ability to Achieve by December 31, 2012, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Required by Article I of the Treaty

Article III of the Moscow Treaty establishes the Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC) for purposes of implementing the Treaty. The BIC is the forum in which the United States and Russia discuss and exchange information on their respective Treaty implementation efforts. The Treaty requires that the BIC meet at least twice each year. The United States and Russia held the most recent session of the BIC in Geneva on June 5, 2009. During the meeting, the Parties exchanged briefings on the status of, and plans for, their strategic nuclear forces.

E. Information Relevant to Implementation of this Treaty That Has Been Learned as a Result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Verification Measures, and the Status of Consideration of Extending the START Verification Regime Beyond December 2009

START verification measures provided additional data that helped the Intelligence Community monitor Russia's progress toward meeting its Moscow Treaty obligations. This data, complemented by other information, assisted the United States in better understanding how the Russian Federation is implementing the Moscow Treaty. A further discussion of this subject is contained in the classified Report.

In April 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed to pursue a new, comprehensive legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace START. Preliminary discussion to develop a framework for negotiations began in June 2009. At the July
6, 2009 summit in Moscow, the two Presidents signed a Joint Understanding that provided the broad parameters for the follow-on agreement to START and directed their negotiators to complete the new agreement at an early date.

In September 2009, the United States and Russia began negotiations based on the parameters provided by presidents Obama and Medvedev on a new START Treaty. The New START treaty was signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on April 8, 2010 in Prague. The Moscow Treaty will be superseded by the New START Treaty when it enters into force. The New START Treaty establishes for each party a limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, 1,550 associated warheads and an overall limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. The Treaty gives the parties the freedom to determine their nuclear force structure within the limits and includes a mechanism for verifying compliance in a way that is simplified and less costly than START.

F. Statement as to Whether Any Information, Insufficiency of Information, or Other Situation Exists That May Call Into Question the Intent or the Ability of Either Party to Achieve by December 31, 2012, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Required by Article I of the Treaty

For its part, the United States remains committed to the Moscow Treaty reductions, and anticipates no obstacles to maintaining these reductions. The United States also believes Russia can maintain the Moscow Treaty reductions. Russia has not expressed any concerns regarding the U.S. intent or ability to comply with its obligations under the Treaty.

G. Any Actions That Have Been Taken or Have Been Proposed by a Party to Address Concerns Listed Pursuant to Subparagraph (F) or to Improve the Implementation and Effectiveness of the Treaty

As noted in Section F above, neither Party has expressed concerns at this point about the intent or the ability of the other Party to comply with its obligations under the Treaty.