

# D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

## *Resource Summary* (*\$ in thousands*)

Appropriations	FY 2009 Actual	FY 2010 Enacted	FY 2011 Request	Increase / Decrease
Positions	263	264	271	7
Funds	46,075	48,923	50,047	1,124

### *Program Description*

The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) is responsible for managing a broad range of U.S. policies, programs, agreements, and initiatives in the areas of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and arms control. ISN leads the Department's efforts to prevent the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – whether nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological – and their delivery systems, and the acquisition or development of such weapons capabilities by terrorists. The Bureau also works to control transfers of advanced conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. Through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, the Bureau spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on the threats posed by WMD proliferation and on ways to address such threats and works to shore up the credibility of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The Bureau works closely with the UN Security Council, NATO allies, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threats posed by WMD. It manages U.S. participation in the Conference on Disarmament, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organization. It also manages U.S. participation, and promotes coordination, in the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.

The proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials, technologies, and expertise – and the fact that terrorists are trying to acquire them – is a preeminent challenge to American national security. Combating this threat is one of the highest priorities of the Department of State, led by the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN).

### **Iran and North Korean Challenges**

Because of the immediacy of the threats they pose, ISN's highest priority is to deal with the challenges presented by Iranian and North Korean nuclear ambitions. The Bureau supports the Department's efforts to maintain united international pressure on Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities and address the serious concerns that have been raised about Iran's past efforts to develop a nuclear warhead. The Bureau also contributes to the Department's efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of North Korea through diplomacy, including through participation in the Six-Party Talks and in cooperation with UN, the IAEA and key allies and friends. The Bureau also has responsibility for the diplomatic aspects of the U.S. missile defense program that helps defend against Iranian and North Korean threats, working to secure the cooperation of allies and friends.

### **Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty**

President Obama has called for the US Government to take concrete steps toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The Bureau's highest priority is to strengthen the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by reinforcing the basic bargain of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can access peaceful uses of nuclear energy if they

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abide by their nonproliferation obligations. The Bureau manages the NPT Review process and is working to ensure a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference in which issues of compliance with NPT obligations are addressed. The Bureau also manages U.S. engagement with the IAEA and places a high priority on strengthening the authority and capability of the IAEA to carry out the international safeguards program – especially important given the worldwide expansion of nuclear power due to high oil prices and concern about global warming. In the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the U.S. succeeded this past year in breaking a long-term impasse, allowing negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty to begin, and the Bureau supports USG efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. In addition, the Bureau manages the diplomatic aspects of US Government efforts to establish an international fuel bank and other mechanisms for nuclear fuel assurances so that countries can operate their reactors without the need to undertake uranium enrichment and reprocessing, which inherently carry significant proliferation risks. The Bureau negotiates bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements that promote safe, secure, and safeguarded use of nuclear power. The Bureau also leads diplomatic efforts to reduce the amount of weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium in the world and to make nuclear reactors and storage sites for weapons-grade nuclear materials more proliferation-resistant.

### **Counterproliferation**

The Bureau works to strengthen international capacity to interdict proliferation-related shipments, close off sources of proliferation funding, use sanctions to deter and punish proliferators, and help states to improve their border security, export controls, and national legislation criminalizing proliferation activities. The Bureau spearheaded the Department's effort to get the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1540 in 2004, a legally-binding requirement for states to prevent proliferation, and succeeded in having the mandate for its implementing committee renewed until 2011. The Bureau has diplomatic responsibility for the Proliferation Security Initiative, a commitment by over 90 states to take action to interdict shipments, disrupt proliferation networks, and shut down the front companies that support them. The Bureau co-chairs a committee with the Department of Treasury that implements Executive Order 13382, which authorizes the US Government to freeze assets and block transactions of designated entities and persons engaged in proliferation activities. The Bureau engages in intensive diplomatic activity to encourage other states to join the U.S. in disrupting proliferation networks and detecting and responding to cases of nuclear smuggling.

### **WMD Terrorism**

Many of the tools the Bureau uses to combat WMD proliferation also contribute to combating WMD terrorism. For example, securing WMD-applicable materials keeps those materials out of the hands of terrorists as well as traffickers. ISN leads the diplomatic aspects of the President's initiative to secure nuclear materials worldwide within four years, and will take a leading role in the Nuclear Security Summit planned for March 2010. The Bureau also manages programs specifically designed to combat nuclear terrorism, such as the 2006 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism that aims to enhance partner states' and international capacity to combat and respond to this threat. Our Global Threat Reduction foreign assistance program focuses on regions and countries where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest and seeks to engage scientists and other experts with WMD-applicable expertise so they are not tempted to lend their expertise to terrorists or proliferant states. The Bureau also manages implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and is using these tools to assist in the effort to combat WMD terrorism. A current high-priority focus is on the threat of biological terrorism as the Bureau and the USG prepare for the 2011 BWC Review Conference.

### **Missile Nonproliferation**

The Bureau leads U.S. efforts to stem the proliferation of cruise and ballistic missiles, the most destabilizing potential delivery systems for WMD. The centerpiece of this effort is Bureau leadership

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of U.S. participation in the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR), which denies technology to proliferant missile programs and coordinates international efforts to press countries to stop pursuing or supplying missile programs. The combination of the MTCR, export controls, interdiction, and sanctions makes it more costly, time-consuming, and difficult for proliferant missile programs in countries like Iran and North Korea to advance.

### Advanced Conventional Weapons

Although the bulk of the ISN Bureau's work is devoted to WMD issues, considerable resources are also committed to stemming the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, particularly through such multilateral efforts as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The Bureau also leads U.S. participation in international discussions to improve regulation of international trade in conventional arms; a top priority is to control trade in Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) which, in the hands of terrorists, pose a serious threat to U.S. and international commercial and military aircraft. The Bureau also leads implementation of U.S. policy concerning U.S. and foreign commercial remote sensing satellites, which, if not properly managed, can provide critical military advantages to adversary states and terrorists, and negotiates associated international agreements to control transfers of remote sensing satellites and technology.

### Performance

Iran concealed from the international community sensitive fuel cycle activities that are a significant step toward a nuclear weapons capability, pursued development of a nuclear warhead, and continues to develop ballistic missile capabilities. Iran refused to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sufficient access and cooperation to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons while a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) would pose a direct challenge to the international nonproliferation regime. Armed with nuclear weapons, Iran would be a threat to the region and to U.S. interests in the Middle East. This indicator records U.S. and international progress in managing the Iranian challenge to the NPT and to regional and international security.

<b>STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY</b>			
<b>Strategic Priority</b>	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons		
<b>Bureau Goal</b>	WMD Challenges Posed by Iran are Resolved Consistent with U.S. Interests		
<b>Indicator</b>	NEW INDICATOR: Status of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program and Adherence to Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Obligations.		
<b>RATINGS TREND</b>			
FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
▼ Below Target	▼ Below Target	▼ Below Target	▼ Below Target
<b>TARGETS AND RESULTS</b>			
FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Iran's suspension of all uranium enrichment-, reprocessing-, and heavy water-related activities (also termed 'proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities') continues and negotiations continue or conclude on a long-term political settlement.</li> <li>• IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues.</li> <li>• Iran ceases using the international financial system to support proliferation and terrorism activities and is denied the ability to engage in clandestine sensitive procurement efforts.</li> </ul>		

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FY 2010 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Negotiations with Iran continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement.</li> <li>• Iran maintains a full suspension of all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, verified by the IAEA.</li> <li>• IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues.</li> <li>• Iran provides full cooperation such that the IAEA is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program declarations appear correct and complete.</li> </ul>
FY 2009 Target	<p>Since we did not achieve FY 2008 Targets, they are repeated for FY 2009:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Iran re-suspends all proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, verified by the IAEA, and negotiations continue until agreement on a long-term political settlement.</li> <li>• IAEA inspections and investigations continue into any remaining outstanding issues with the aim of demonstrating that Iran's nuclear program declarations are correct and complete.</li> <li>• A coalition of states is maintained to press Iran to comply with its international obligations and to implement measures against Iran's use of the international financial system to support proliferation and terrorism activities.</li> </ul>
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: Below Target</b> Iran has continued to refuse to comply with its United Nations Security Council (UNSC) obligations. The Obama Administration conducted an extensive Policy Review on Iran, intended to identify ways to execute the President's policy objective of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability while changing the tone of our interactions, including through direct engagement and diplomacy.</p>
Impact	<p>An Iran armed with nuclear weapons would be a serious threat to its neighbors and to international security and stability; its concealment of actions are also a direct challenge to the NPT regime. The U.S. and the international community must continue pressure on Iran to make a choice between complying with its NPT obligations or face increasing isolation.</p>
Steps to Improve	<p>The US Government offer of direct diplomatic engagement with Iran serves to underscore to Iran's people and the international community more broadly that it is the Iranian government that is preventing resolution of international concerns with its nuclear program. ISN believes this can increase the pressure on the Iranian Government to seek a negotiated settlement.</p>
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: Below Target</b> Iran continued to refuse to re-suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or to cooperate fully with the IAEA. In coordination with Treasury, a diplomatic track through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral sanctions was pursued. In addition to UNSCRs 1696, 1737, and 1747, UNSCR 1803 was adopted in March 2008, imposing additional Chapter VII sanctions on Iran in an effort to get Iran to suspend its nuclear activities and engage in negotiations on the future of its nuclear program. UNSCR 1835 was adopted in September 2008, restating the obligations on Iran and demanding its compliance. The IAEA remained seized of the issue and, in February 2008, was presented with information that described in detail Iran's effort to develop a nuclear warhead, work that the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed was halted in late 2003.</p>
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: Below Target</b> Iran continues to refuse to re-suspend its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities enrichment-related activity or to cooperate fully with the IAEA. We have pursued a diplomatic track through unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral sanctions in coordination with the Treasury Department. In addition to UN SCR 1696, two more resolutions have been unanimously adopted (UNSCRs 1737 and 1747) and Chapter VII sanctions were imposed on Iran in an effort to achieve the desired impact of Iran suspending its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, cooperating fully with the IAEA, and engaging in negotiations on the future of its nuclear program. A third Chapter VII sanctions resolution was adopted in March 2008 when Iran continued to fail to comply with its UNSC and IAEA obligations. (In March 2008.)</p>
FY 2006 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: Below Target</b> Iran restarted its uranium enrichment activities in January 2006. The IAEA reported Iran's noncompliance to the UN Security Council in February, 2006 and the Security Council unanimously adopted a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to fully suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. The U.S., China, France, Germany, Russia, and the UK offered a package of incentives in return for full compliance. In July, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31, 2006 to comply. Iran refused. In December 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1737, imposing Chapter VII sanctions on Iran, which include prohibitions on Iran's procurement of technology that could contribute to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, and provision of financial support.</p>

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VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Methodology	On a daily basis, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitors current events relating to Iran and consults with other Department and USG officials on U.S. policy vis-a-vis Iran.
Data Source and Quality	Intelligence reporting, embassy reporting, bilateral consultations, IAEA and UNSC reporting. Undeclared Iranian activities are inherently difficult to detect, and at times the IAEA may rely on information received from the Government of Iran that might be unreliable.

As President Obama noted in his speech in Prague, the 'basic bargain' of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains sound: nuclear weapons states will move to disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all can access peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations. This bargain has been put at risk by countries seeking nuclear weapons capabilities under the guise of peaceful uses. The U.S. needs to rebuild consensus among NPT Parties on the importance of the NPT, reach consensus on responses to NPT noncompliance, and ensure that the IAEA has the authority and resources needed to police the nuclear nonproliferation system through its international safeguards.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY			
<b>Strategic Priority</b>	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons		
<b>Bureau Goal</b>	A Strengthened Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime		
<b>Indicator</b>	NEW INDICATOR: Milestones to achieve Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty compliance and an effective International Atomic Energy Agency.		
RATINGS TREND			
FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target	◀▶ On Target
TARGETS AND RESULTS			
FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NPT Parties follow up decisions taken, if any, at 2010 Review Conference.</li> <li>• IAEA member states agree on a plan of action for the future direction of the Agency.</li> <li>• Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements, Additional Protocols, and modified small quantities protocols.</li> </ul>		
FY 2010 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NPT Parties conduct Review Conference that includes substantive debate on Treaty issues of importance to the USG and helps to strengthen NPT as a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons.</li> <li>• Review Conference reaches common ground on many of these issues, though the highly contentious nature of the issues at time of writing means this target cannot include adoption of consensus documents.</li> <li>• IAEA member states continue to formulate the future direction of IAEA, drawing on the Vision 2020 and Future of the Agency Initiatives.</li> <li>• U.S. implements U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol.</li> <li>• Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols.</li> </ul>		

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FY 2009 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Third session of the Preparatory Committee completes all necessary preparatory work for the 2010 Review Conference, unless NPT Parties agree to a fourth Preparatory Committee to complete preparations; NPT Parties engage in substantive discussions on key nonproliferation issues.</li> <li>▪ IAEA member states endorse a response to the IAEA Vision 2020 Initiative in a manner that strengthens the international safeguards regime.</li> <li>▪ U.S. prepares to bring U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol into force by the time of the NPT Review Conference.</li> <li>▪ Additional states sign, have Board of Governors approval of, and/or bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols.</li> </ul>
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: On Target</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Buoyed by President's Prague speech pledging U.S. attention to all 3 pillars of the NPT, PrepCom completed work quickly and with more cohesion than in the recent past. Parties agreed on all procedural matters including a substantive agenda for RevCon.</li> <li>▪ Safeguards strengthened this year due to agreement on a real increase in IAEA budget for 2010, and to Japanese and U.S. contributions to fund a new IAEA safeguards analytical lab that ROK and others may also fund.</li> <li>▪ The "2020 review" has evolved into open-ended meetings of IAEA states on the "Future of the Agency," in which we emphasize the need for strengthened safeguards.</li> <li>▪ The U.S. Additional Protocol entered into force in January 2009.</li> <li>▪ 6 more states signed Additional Protocols, and 4 ratified. Also, 5 states had comprehensive safeguards agreements ratified, signed, or approved by the IAEA.</li> </ul>
Impact	<p>The NPT has been the bedrock of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime for 40 years, but has been put at risk by countries undertaking clandestine nuclear weapons programs under the guise of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We need to restore confidence in the regime by, <i>inter alia</i>, agreeing on responses to NPT noncompliance and by strengthening the authority and capability of the IAEA.</p>
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: On Target</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference completed its work, including a substantive discussion of all key issues and decisions on the venue, chairman, and other arrangements for the 2009 PrepCom.</li> <li>• 3 Parties signed an Additional Protocol and 4 brought Protocols into force, bringing the total number 'in force' to 88. The IAEA determined that another 27 states had met its 'integrated safeguards' guidelines, bringing the total to 47 states. Parties also strengthened nuclear safety and security, as 3 more states made political commitments to follow the guidance in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.</li> <li>• We continued to pursue the recommendations for strengthening safeguards through bilateral consultations.</li> </ul>
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: On Target</b></p> <p>Iran used procedural disputes to constrain time for debate of substantive issues at the 2007 PrepCom (e.g., objecting to a phrase about "reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty"). Other delegations held firm against these ploys in a display of international unity for the integrity of the Treaty review process that included most members of the Non-Aligned Movement. The PrepCom completed necessary work for the 2008 PrepCom, and discussed issues (e.g., how to deter withdrawal from the Treaty by violators). The Safeguards Committee lapsed, but USG will pursue the Secretariat's 18 recommendations for strengthening safeguards in other IAEA fora. One state signed an Additional Protocol; five others brought Protocols into force. Eighty-five states now have Additional Protocols in force.</p>

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FY 2006 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: On Target</b></p> <p>The Nonproliferation Treaty Parties responded strongly to Iran's non-compliance. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 requiring Iranian action under Chapter VII in response. The G-8 Summit endorsed nuclear fuel cycle approaches to reduce incentives for developing enrichment and reprocessing. Three additional states signed Additional Protocols and six more brought Protocols into force, bringing the total to 77 countries. The Nuclear Suppliers Group failed to make an Additional Protocol a condition of supply. The International Atomic Energy Agency approved safeguards funding increases. The Special Committee began work, but failed to make recommendations. Fourteen IAEA missions helped strengthen control and security for nuclear and other radioactive material.</p>
<b>VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION</b>	
Methodology	On a daily basis, the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitors international developments related to the NPT, the IAEA, and nuclear nonproliferation, and consults with others in the Department and the USG about U.S. policy approaches and tactics for accomplishing our objectives.
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is from UN, NPT, and IAEA documents, reports of UN and IAEA meetings, U.S. and other governments' statements and papers, embassy reporting, intelligence reporting, consultations with the IAEA, UN, and foreign government officials. The Data Quality Assessment revealed no significant data limitations.

Acquisition of an operational nuclear device by Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations is a clear and present danger to U.S. and international security. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) attacks the threat of nuclear terrorism by using all nonproliferation tools, including interdiction and sanctions, to assist in this effort. The most direct tools are covered by the targets for this indicator. ISN manages the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and works to establish global standards, improve security and safety at facilities handling nuclear or radioactive materials, combat nuclear smuggling, and employ scientists and technicians with nuclear weapons-related expertise to reduce possible incentives for them to share their expertise with terrorists. ISN works closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the G-8 to coordinate efforts.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY			
<b>Strategic Priority</b>	Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons		
<b>Bureau Goal</b>	Combating WMD Terrorism		
<b>Indicator</b>	NEW INDICATOR: Key Milestones Achieved in Combating Nuclear Terrorism.		
RATINGS TREND			
FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009
New Indicator, No Rating	New Indicator, No Rating	▲ Above Target	◁▷ Improved But Not Met
TARGETS AND RESULTS			

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FY 2011 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improvements to GICNT institutional structure are established.</li> <li>• 10 GICNT partners produce plans/policies/procedures related to combating nuclear terrorism.</li> <li>• Organize 30 program activities to engage Iraqi and Libyan scientists with WMD-applicable expertise, and 5 activities to engage nuclear scientists worldwide.</li> <li>• Perform 3 country assessments, secure funding for 6 projects, organize 6 activities to combat nuclear smuggling.</li> <li>• Finalize high-level Recommendations documents in IAEA Nuclear Security Series on the security of radioactive materials/nuclear materials.</li> <li>• Complete second Radiation Source Protection, Security Task Force Report for Congress that identifies gaps/provides recommendations on improving security of radioactive sources.</li> <li>• 6 countries ratify amendment strengthening the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM).</li> </ul>
FY 2010 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GICNT partners conduct 16 activities to implement GICNT principles.</li> <li>• 8 GICNT partners produce plans/policies/procedures related to combating nuclear terrorism.</li> <li>• Complete 3 GICNT-related activities with cooperation from international organizations, the private sector, and/or local government.</li> <li>• Organize 30 activities to engage Iraqi and Libyan scientists/engineers with WMD-applicable expertise, and 3 activities to engage nuclear scientists/engineers worldwide.</li> <li>• Perform 3 country assessments, secure funding for 6 projects, and organize 6 activities to combat nuclear smuggling.</li> <li>• Achieve Consensus with key allies on Guidelines for Management and Minimization of HEU.</li> <li>• Conduct interagency analysis to assess feasibility of replacing radioactive sources of concern with alternative technologies.</li> <li>• 4 countries ratify amendment strengthening CPPNM.</li> </ul>
FY 2009 Target	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partner nations conduct 12 activities (workshops, seminars, exercises).</li> <li>• Conduct another interoperable field exercise, and one more tabletop exercise.</li> <li>• Complete two GICNT-related activities with substantive cooperation from private sector or local governments.</li> <li>• Agree with Russia co-chair on ways to transform GICNT into durable institution.</li> <li>• Organize 15 program activities each for nuclear/WMD personnel from Iraq and Libya toward goal of self-sustainability.</li> <li>• Perform 4 new country assessments, fund 6 new projects, and organize 6 activities to combat nuclear smuggling in states of concern.</li> <li>• All major supplier states commit to implementing IAEA export controls for radioactive sources.</li> <li>• Develop an agreed draft with France of a set of guidelines for management and minimization of highly enriched uranium, and begin consultations with other IAEA members.</li> </ul>
FY 2009 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: Improved But Not Met</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partners conducted 12 activities.</li> <li>• Spain hosted field exercise in Oct 2008; Netherlands to conduct a field training exercise in Nov 2009.</li> <li>• June 2009 Plenary included session devoted to enhancing nuclear security public-private-civil society relationships with substantive cooperation from private sector; Spanish field exercise included substantive cooperation from local government.</li> <li>• U.S. and Russia agreed to activate and expand the GICNT's Implementation and Assessment Group to help transform the GICNT into a durable institution.</li> <li>• Organized 22 activities to engage Iraqi, and 5 activities to engage Libyan, ex-WMD scientists.</li> <li>• Performed 4 new country assessments, secured funding for 6 new projects, and organized 7 activities to combat nuclear smuggling.</li> <li>• 9 of 10 major radioactive source suppliers commit.</li> <li>• Agreed draft with France virtually completed.</li> </ul>

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Impact	Failure to prevent terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon would be measurable and could be catastrophic; success in achieving the objective is more difficult to measure. But common sense tells ISN that the more we engage scientists with nuclear expertise, the more the U.S. Government engages with foreign governments to increase information-sharing and coordination, etc., the better the chances of success.
Steps to Improve	ISN did not completely meet the 5th, 7th, and 8th FY 2009 sub-targets. ISN will invest additional diplomatic effort into working with Libya so target can be met. ISN will continue diplomatic efforts to persuade the tenth major supplier of radioactive sources to accept IAEA export control guidance. Having agreed to a draft with France on HEU, ISN will now begin consultations with other IAEA members.
FY 2008 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: Above Target</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 13 additional states endorse the GICNT, for a total of 75, already meeting our FY09 target. We will continue to invite others to become partners, but we have most of the key states involved and will not retain this target for FY09.</li> <li>• Partner nations conducted 15 GICNT activities, but we do not expect to continue at this high level.</li> <li>• The field exercise was conducted in October 2008.</li> <li>• Outreach to private sector was suspended per management.</li> <li>• 11 trainings events were conducted for Iraqi personnel and 9 for Libyan personnel.</li> <li>• Performed 3 new country assessments and secured funding for 9 new projects to combat nuclear smuggling in countries of concern.</li> <li>• 6 more states committed to security radioactive sources with IAEA standards, bringing the total to 94 states.</li> </ul>
FY 2007 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: New Indicator, No Rating</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Global Initiative began with 13 partners; we now have over 50. During this first year of implementation, three senior-level political meetings were held -- in Morocco, Turkey, and Kazakhstan.</li> <li>• A small group of GI partners, called the Exercise Planning Group, was created to contribute to the development of exercises and scenario planning.</li> <li>• A two-year roadmap of activities was agreed, with 17 activities held in calendar year 2007, with at least one Plan of Work activity addressing each principle.</li> <li>• A GI web portal, called the Global Initiative Information Portal, has been created to manage GI information.</li> <li>• We received 5 statements of support from Fortune 500 companies.</li> <li>• We organized 13 activities to engage former WMD personnel in Iraq and Libya.</li> <li>• We completed 4 nuclear smuggling country assessments and funded 16 projects.</li> </ul>
FY 2006 Rating and Result	<p><b>Rating: New Indicator, No Rating</b></p> <p>The first meeting of the Global Initiative was held in October 2006, in Morocco. There, 13 partner countries, including the G-8 states, Australia, China, Kazakhstan, Morocco and Turkey, agreed on a Statement of Principles and to develop a plan of work.</p>
<b>VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION</b>	
Methodology	On a daily basis, offices within the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation monitor and assess information received from the data sources.
Data Source and Quality	Performance data is developed from information from GICNT partners; consultations with foreign governments; IAEA documents and consultations; intelligence reporting; embassy reporting; and from ISN Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related programs -funded program activities. The Data Quality Assessment revealed minor data limitations. Accurate information on terrorist activities difficult to obtain.

### *Justification of Request*

The Department's FY2011 request of \$50.0 million for the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation includes increases to maintain current services and support several key initiatives. The Department is requesting an increase of \$1.124 million over the FY 2010 enacted level of \$48.9

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million for the ISN Bureau in FY 2011, which includes \$586,000 for inflationary adjustments and LES wage increases.

### **Personnel: \$538,000 including 7 Positions**

An increase of \$538,000, including funding for 7 positions, is requested above ISN's FY 2010 base of \$48.9 million and 264 positions for existing programs. This increase will allow the Bureau to enhance its nonproliferation expertise, especially regarding NPT and IAEA issues, and to be able to meet the added new challenges of the President's ambitious arms control and nonproliferation agenda.

### *Resource Summary*

	Positions			Funds (\$ in thousands)			
	American		FSN	Pos Total	Bureau Managed	American Salaries	Funds Total
	Domestic	Overseas					
FY 2009 Actual	250	13	0	263	17,452	28,623	46,075
FY 2010 Estimate	251	13	0	264	20,206	28,717	48,923
FY 2011 Built-in Changes							
Annualization of FY 2010 COLA	0	0	0	0	24	137	161
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	138	0	138
FY 2011 American COLA	0	0	0	0	94	173	267
LES Wage Increase	0	0	0	0	20	0	20
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	276	310	586
FY 2011 Current Services	251	13	0	264	20,482	29,027	49,509
FY 2011 Program Changes							
Position Increase Request	7	0	0	7	79	459	538
Total Program Changes	7	0	0	7	79	459	538
FY 2011 Request	258	13	0	271	20,561	29,486	50,047

**D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION**

***Staff by Program Activity***  
*(positions)*

<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	259	260	267	7
Public Diplomacy	4	4	4	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>263</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>7</b>

***Funds by Program Activity***  
*(\$ in thousands)*

<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	45,426	48,255	49,370	1,115
Public Diplomacy	649	668	677	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>46,075</b>	<b>48,923</b>	<b>50,047</b>	<b>1,124</b>

***Program Activities***

<b>Department Of State</b>	<b>Positions</b>			<b>Funds (\$ in thousands)</b>			
	<b>American</b>			<b>Pos</b>	<b>Bureau</b>	<b>American</b>	<b>Funds</b>
	<b>Domestic</b>	<b>Overseas</b>	<b>FSN</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Managed</b>	<b>Salaries</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Conduct of Diplomatic Relations</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>20,553</b>	<b>28,817</b>	<b>49,370</b>
Domestic Administrative Management	4	0	0	4	396	432	828
Domestic Financial Services	11	0	0	11	399	1,187	1,586
Domestic General Services	10	0	0	10	389	1,079	1,468
Domestic Personnel Services	15	0	0	15	524	1,619	2,143
International Security Affairs	202	13	0	215	17,652	23,204	40,856
Mission Direction	12	0	0	12	1,193	1,296	2,489
<b>Public Diplomacy</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>669</b>	<b>677</b>
Public Diplomacy - Program Costs	4	0	0	4	8	669	677
<b>Total</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>20,561</b>	<b>29,486</b>	<b>50,047</b>

***Staff by Domestic Organization Unit***  
*(positions)*

<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
Budget and General Services	10	10	10	0
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction	13	13	13	0

**D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL  
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<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	16	14	14	0
Cooperative Threat Reduction	10	11	12	1
Coordinator for Threat Reduction	1	1	1	0
Counterproliferation Initiatives	19	19	19	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations	2	2	2	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls and Negotiation	2	2	2	0
Export Controls Cooperation	16	15	16	1
Human Resource Division	15	15	15	0
Missile Threat Reduction	10	8	9	1
Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs	13	13	14	1
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund	14	14	15	1
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	21	21	21	0
Office of Assistant Secretary	12	12	12	0
Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy	8	10	10	0
Office of the Executive Director	4	4	4	0
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation	2	2	2	0
Regional Affairs	21	19	20	1
Resource Management Division	10	11	11	0
Senior Advisor to the International Atomic Energy Agency	1	1	1	0
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation	2	2	2	0
Strategic Planning and Outreach	11	13	13	0
WMD/Terrorism	17	19	20	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>7</b>

***Funds by Domestic Organization Unit***  
*(\$ in thousands)*

<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
Budget and General Services	1,497	1,463	1,468	5
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat Reduction	2,378	2,223	2,235	12
Conventional Arms Threat Reduction	2,676	2,437	2,449	12
Cooperative Threat Reduction	1,812	1,767	1,894	127
Coordinator for Threat Reduction	127	128	128	0
Counterproliferation Initiatives	2,698	2,737	2,747	10
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations	306	361	363	2
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export	322	323	325	2

## D&CP – BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION

Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation	FY 2009 Actual	FY 2010 Enacted	FY 2011 Request	Increase / Decrease
Controls and Negotiation				
Export Controls Cooperation	2,155	2,132	2,260	128
Human Resource Division	2,295	2,135	2,143	8
Missile Threat Reduction	1,485	1,228	1,351	123
Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs	2,409	5,021	5,186	165
Nonproliferation Disarmament Fund	1,707	1,685	1,806	121
Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security	3,440	3,472	3,490	18
Office of Assistant Secretary	2,540	2,472	2,489	17
Office of Missile Defense and Space Policy	1,717	1,496	1,501	5
Office of the Executive Director	921	823	828	5
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation	283	333	335	2
Regional Affairs	3,033	2,779	2,908	129
Resource Management Division	1,531	1,581	1,586	5
Senior Advisor to the International Atomic Energy Agency	186	200	202	2
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation	245	244	244	0
Strategic Planning and Outreach	1,882	2,472	2,493	21
WMD/Terrorism	2,452	3,077	3,211	134
<b>Total</b>	<b>40,097</b>	<b>42,589</b>	<b>43,642</b>	<b>1,053</b>

### *Staff by Post* (positions)

International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN)	FY 2009			FY 2010			FY 2011			Increase/ Decrease		
	Actual			Enacted			Request			Decrease		
	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total	Amer	FSN	Total
Commissioner to Conf on Disarmament & Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	6	0	6	6	0	6	6	0	6	0	0	0
Commissioner to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Vienna)	2	0	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	0
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	5	0	5	5	0	5	5	0	5	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

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***Funds by Post***  
*(\$ in thousands)*

<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
Commissioner to Conf on Disarmament & Special Rep for Nuclear Nonproliferation	3,215	3,328	3,367	39
Commissioner to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Vienna)	1,073	1,044	1,056	12
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	1,690	1,962	1,982	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,978</b>	<b>6,334</b>	<b>6,405</b>	<b>71</b>

***Funds by Object Class***  
*(\$ in thousands)*

<b>Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation</b>	<b>FY 2009 Actual</b>	<b>FY 2010 Enacted</b>	<b>FY 2011 Request</b>	<b>Increase / Decrease</b>
1100 Personnel Compensation	24,916	24,911	25,777	866
1200 Personnel Benefits	5,806	5,818	6,114	296
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	2,865	3,180	3,247	67
2200 Transportation of Things	10	10	10	0
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	1,090	1,124	1,147	23
2400 Printing & Reproduction	324	361	368	7
2500 Other Services	10,033	11,822	11,652	(170)
2600 Supplies and Materials	283	268	273	5
3100 Personal Property	43	53	54	1
4100 Grants, Subsidies & Contrb	705	1,376	1,404	28
AA00 Transfers	0	0	1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>46,075</b>	<b>48,923</b>	<b>50,047</b>	<b>1,124</b>