

D&CP – BUREAU OF VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION

Resource Summary

(\$ in thousands)

Appropriations	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Positions	112	112	123	11
Funds	21,224	22,277	31,831	9,554

Mission

The Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI) leads the U.S. Government's development and implementation of robust verification and compliance policies related to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament and is responsible for leading implementation of certain agreements. The Bureau's core missions are to ensure that appropriate verification requirements and capabilities are fully considered and properly integrated throughout the development, negotiation, and implementation of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments; that other countries' compliance is carefully monitored, assessed, reported, and pursued; and that agreements under our purview are fully implemented. The Bureau works with governments and international organizations to acquire data and information for compliance assessments and to encourage Parties' compliance with their commitments. The Bureau is responsible for implementing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), Moscow Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Vienna Document 1999 Confidence-and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on Open Skies, and elements of the Dayton Peace Accords. The Bureau's unique mandate to serve as liaison to the Intelligence Community (IC) for verification and compliance matters is integral to ensuring that technical verification assets are in place to assist in verifying agreements and commitments, pursuing compliance with them, and articulating requirements to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Bureau's advocacy in support of critical collection systems and for funding technology programs in coordination with the IC and others is key to this effort.

Priorities

Verification

The verification priority is to develop, coordinate, and establish verification policies central to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. The success of verification regimes can be measured by the degree to which they provide confidence in deterring and detecting noncompliance. Verifiability is enhanced when policy is clearly articulated, intelligence is robust, credible information can be collected, and data analysis is rigorous. The Bureau will focus its verification efforts on: strengthening our strategic security relationship with Russia through development of a strategy for achieving and leading negotiations on a verifiable post-START agreement; assessing the verifiability of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); developing a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT); pursuing Russia's return to implementing the CFE Treaty or development of an alternative approach; working towards verification of the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program; developing verification requirements for eliminating Iran's nuclear programs; and developing verification requirements for destruction of the former Iraqi regime's chemical weapons program.

Compliance

The Bureau will prepare, coordinate, and submit the annual Presidential Report on *Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments* and use the Report's findings to underpin diplomatic efforts to maintain and bring countries back into compliance. In addition, the Bureau will focus its efforts on reliable attribution of deliberate biological use events to a particular State or non-State actor and promote and pursue compliance through diplomacy and other methods, as appropriate. One of the Bureau's objectives is to increase the understanding of and support for the U.S. approach to verification and compliance by building an international constituency in support of compliance. Inspections and results of data declarations and exchanges pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be tracked, and ongoing

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compliance dialogues with China and Russia regarding CWC compliance issues will occur. The Bureau will continue to lead efforts by U.S. and NATO Allies to return Russia to compliance with the CFE Treaty and continue to pursue utilization of the U.S.-UK-Libya Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee to monitor Libya's compliance with its agreement to verifiably eliminate its WMD programs, associated weapons, and long-range missiles.

Implementation

In coordination with Allies, the Bureau will work with Russia to resolve the CFE impasse, create the conditions to allow entry-into-force of the Adapted CFE Treaty, and solidify Russia's resumption of its CFE obligations. The Bureau will also strengthen its security relationship with Russia through implementation of the START Treaty, a START Follow-on agreement, and the Moscow Treaty. The Bureau will expand the scope of sanctions cases for review and prepare semi-annual Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Reports, which identify sanctionable activity and facilitate a timely U.S. Government response.

Research & Development Coordination and Verification Technology Deployment

The Bureau will advocate for utilizing intelligence resources to support verification and compliance requirements. The Verification Assets Fund (V Fund) was authorized by Congress to help the Department preserve critical verification assets and seed development of new verification technologies to support verification of and compliance with arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. Congress mandated that the Department act as a coordinating entity within the Federal Government to leverage the use of the V Fund to assist other departments and agencies in the development of programs critical for proliferation detection, verification of agreements and commitments, and ensuring compliance. Funds will be utilized in this regard for: the development of new sensors for detecting covert biological and chemical weapons programs; new platforms to deploy radionuclide collection sensors (which provide data on nuclear weapons developments in countries of concern); and improvements in the analysis of seismic data to refine our understanding of covert nuclear testing. Under the Verification Matrix Project, the Bureau will conduct a rigorous review, involving multiple players across the government as well as key outside players, to identify technologies or programs to improve our collection posture and our ability to verify arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments. Through the work of experts, many of whom chair key focus groups of the interagency Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technology Working Group (co-chaired and managed by STATE/VCI), important new technologies can be identified that will improve our ability to detect and locate weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery. This effort will result in the identification of projects and technologies to be funded by the V Fund. The five matrices being developed under this Project are nuclear, biological, chemical, missile, and sanctions regimes/interdiction. These matrices visually present and weigh verification requirements with detection methodology options and collection environments. Technologies and R&D efforts identified for funding will be assessed based on criticality of the gap, payoff associated with new information to be collected, technical maturity of the technology, and the impact of providing limited funds.

Reliable Communications and Technology for Diplomacy

The Bureau will increase efficiency of automated notification processing pursuant to current and future agreements through IT modernization.

Public Diplomacy/Public Affairs

The Bureau will build support among foreign publics, institutions, and media to promote U.S. policies on verification, full implementation, and compliance with agreements and commitments.

Information Management and Verification Operations

The Bureau will expand Data Archive, Analysis and Verification Environment on multiple networks.

The indicator, "Verification of Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," was chosen because verification is critical to the viability of agreements and commitments in the short- and long-

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term. Verifiable agreements provide the framework for determining if countries are complying with the obligations they have undertaken and underpin national and global security. The misuse or covert use of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technology in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability -- either as a current State Party to a treaty or as a former State Party that illicitly circumvented treaty prohibitions while a Party—is a fundamental challenge to the nuclear nonproliferation regime in general and to the NPT, in particular.

STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY	
Strategic Priority: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons	
Indicator: Verification of Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments	
Target FY 2010	<p>START- Strengthen our strategic security relationship with Russia through development of a strategy for achieving and leading negotiations on a verifiable START Follow-on agreement, and providing Congress with a timely verifiability assessment.</p> <p>Nuclear—Assess the verifiability of the CTBT and ascertain whether a verifiable FMCT is possible. In connection with phased dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, participate in selective monitoring of facilities; begin fissile material removal; assist with application of IAEA Safeguards and return to NPT. Monitor cessation of Iran’s nuclear weapons program and return to NPT.</p> <p>Chemical—Press for North Korea’s accession to the CWC.</p> <p>Biological—Engage internationally on biological weapons issues. Pursue dialogue with North Korea on biological issues. Continue preparations for 2011 BWC Review Conference.</p>
Target FY 2009	<p>START - Pursue verifiable START Follow-on agreement.</p> <p>Nuclear - Conduct comprehensive review of the verifiability of the CTBT and a FMCT. Continue activities related to nuclear-related phased dismantlement in North Korea. Establish mechanism for U.S. monitoring of North Korea's denuclearization. Monitor Iranian nuclear weapons program cessation and NPT compliance.</p> <p>Chemical—Seek negotiations on North Korea's CWC accession and elimination of its chemical weapons program. Consider bilateral Article IX CWC compliance dialogue with Iran. Address Russia and China. Monitor Libya's CWC compliance.</p> <p>Biological – Develop strategy for achieving transparency into North Korea’s biological capability. Encourage development of Confidence Building Measures.</p> <p>Missiles - Pursue negotiations with North Korea on verifiable missile export ban and limitations on indigenous missile programs.</p>
Target FY 2008	<p>Nuclear - Continue denuclearization activities with North Korea and further refine framework for verifiably dismantling their nuclear program. Monitor cessation of Iran's nuclear weapons program, including uranium enrichment and plutonium production activities.</p> <p>Chemical - Continue to press for North Korea's accession to the CWC. Pursue CWC compliance concerns with Iran and Russia. Continue bilateral compliance dialogue with China. Monitor Libyan CWC compliance.</p> <p>Biological - Compile information key to engaging North Korea on biological weapons issues, including components for a BW verification system.</p> <p>Missiles - Seek negotiations with North Korea on a verifiable missile export ban and limitations on indigenous missile programs.</p> <p>START -Continue efforts to develop transparency and confidence-building measures for post-START arrangement.</p>
Results FY 2008	<p>Rating: Improved over prior year, but not met</p> <p>Nuclear-North Korea. Significant progress was made on refining the framework for verifiably dismantling North Korea's nuclear program: U.S. maintained experts at Yongbyon continuously since Nov. 2007 monitoring disablement activities; in May 2008, North Korea provided operating records for the 5MW(e) reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. In June 2008 North Korea declared its plutonium program and, along with the other Six Parties, agreed to a set of principles on verification. However, North Korea did not agree to the proposed verification protocol, halted its disablement activities in August, and began the process of reversing its disablement activities in September.</p> <p>Nuclear-Iran. Iran has enhanced, not ceased, its uranium enrichment and plutonium production activities.</p>
Impact	<p>Nuclear – The continued defiance by North Korea and Iran of applicable United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Resolutions and relevant Treaty obligations demonstrates the significant challenges confronting the international community in its efforts to enforce compliance, an essential element of enhancing international security; and may result in encouraging other States to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.</p>

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Steps to Improve	Continue to take steps to verify declaration and eventual dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program which will include substantial analysis. Engage with Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and the IAEA, on the conduct of verification activities -- on-site baselining, installation of equipment designed to verify total plutonium production, and review and confirmation of North Korea's declaration, etc.
Results FY 2007	<p>Nuclear-Continued developing framework for verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program. Continued building international consensus on measures that Iran must undertake to permit restoration of international confidence in the peaceful purpose of their nuclear program, to include verifiable and enduring cessation of proliferation-sensitive activities that could lead to a nuclear weapons capability.</p> <p>Chemical-No dialogue was held with North Korea on chemical weapons. The U.S, UK, and the Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons assisted Iraq with preparation of their CWC initial declaration; accession likely in late 2008/early 2009. Continued monitoring of Libyan CWC compliance.</p> <p>START - U.S.-Russian experts-level discussions held on potential transparency/confidence-building measures for post-START arrangement.</p>
Results FY 2006	<p>Nuclear – The U.S. developed and continued to refine its framework for verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program and began discussions with participating States on their possible contributions toward dismantlement efforts.</p> <p>Chemical – No dialogue occurred with North Korea relative to chemical weapons, as the focus was on the nuclear arena. The U.S.-UK and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons worked with Iraq to prepare for its accession to the CWC.</p> <p>Missiles – Developed initial draft plans and refined planning for possible negotiations with North Korea on a verifiable missile export ban and limits on indigenous missile programs.</p> <p>START - Initial efforts made towards development of transparency and confidence-building measures for post-START arrangement.</p>
Results FY 2005	<p>Nuclear - Significant "unknowns" prevented completing the dismantlement framework for North Korea. After 15 months, during which time North Korea refused to negotiate, the Six-Party Talks resumed in July 2005. In September, the parties adopted a Joint Statement of Principles and North Korea committed to "abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards."</p> <p>Chemical - No dialogue with North Korea. The U.S.-U.K.-and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons continued to work with Iraq to prepare for its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention.</p> <p>Missiles - As the priority relative to North Korea was nuclear, there was no initiative for a missile export ban or limitation on indigenous missile programs.</p>
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Data Source and Quality	Data sourced and quality verified by independent and government-sponsored monitoring. Reporting is from international organizations and meetings; IAEA inspections in North Korea; declaration review pursuant to Six-Party negotiation process; and IAEA inspections in Iran. Both North Korea and Iran have conducted their nuclear programs clandestinely.

The indicator, "Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," was chosen because the value of any arms control, nonproliferation, or disarmament agreement or commitment is largely derived from all Parties adhering to the obligations set forth in said agreements. Rigorous compliance assessment and U.S. leadership in the international community to address any acts of noncompliance, including inducing a return to compliant behavior, enhances national and global security. It also lays the necessary groundwork for negotiation of new verifiable agreements and commitments. The Congressionally-mandated Presidential Compliance Report produced by the Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau is the only comprehensive U.S. Government assessment of adherence by the United States and other nations to their obligations in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments.

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STRATEGIC GOAL: ACHIEVING PEACE AND SECURITY	
Strategic Priority: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Destabilizing Conventional Weapons	
Indicator: Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments	
Target FY 2010	<p>Compliance Report - Prepare, coordinate, and submit 2010 Compliance Report to Congress.</p> <p>START Follow-on and Moscow Treaty - Assess compliance with any START Follow-on agreement and continue to assess compliance with the Moscow Treaty.</p> <p>Chemical - Prepare and submit the 2009 CWC Condition 10C Report to Congress. Begin compliance discussions with those States Parties that have not made an initial declaration under Article III. Address CWC compliance concerns with Iran, Russia, and China. Maintain efforts to ensure Iraqi CWC compliance.</p> <p>Conventional - In coordination with Allies, work with Russia to resolve CFE impasse and create conditions for entry-into-force of the Adapted CFE (A/CFE) Treaty. Once it enters into force, assess compliance with adapted Treaty requirements.</p>
Target FY 2009	<p>Compliance Report - Prepare, coordinate, and submit 2009 NCR to Congress.</p> <p>START - Continue to assess Russia's compliance with START.</p> <p>Chemical - Prepare the 2007-2008 CWC Condition 10C Report to Congress. Take steps to bring those Parties that have not made initial declarations into compliance.</p> <p>Conventional - If resolution with Russia is achieved resulting in ratification of and entry into force of the Adapted CFE Treaty by all States Parties, take steps to implement new regime and lay groundwork for compliance assessment.</p> <p>Missiles - Continue to monitor compliance by Libya and North Korea with their commitments. Continue to assess nations' compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime.</p>
Target FY 2008	<p>Noncompliance Report - Merge 2008 information in next Report to Congress.</p> <p>Chemical - Transmit to Congress 2004-2006 CWC Condition 10C Report. Report on the assessment of the CWC's OPCW inspection regime's compliance with Treaty requirements and effectiveness of verification of declared military and industrial facilities. Identify in the Condition 10C Report those Parties that have not made initial Article III and VI declarations.</p> <p>Conventional - Prepare 2007 CFE Condition 5 Report to Congress. Assess impact of Russian suspension of CFE Treaty obligations. Press Russia to fulfill its Istanbul commitments and resume implementation of CFE so Adapted CFE Treaty can enter into force.</p> <p>Missiles - Monitor compliance by Libya and North Korea with their commitments. Assess nations' compliance with MTCR.</p> <p>START - Implement START and assess compliance.</p>
Results FY 2008	<p>Rating: Below Target</p> <p>Noncompliance Report - Worked to merge 2008 information in next Report. Up-to-date information, including compliance challenges posed by Iran to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, is scheduled to appear in 2009 Report. DNI's "Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products" have been implemented in Noncompliance Report preparation process and should streamline coordination of future reports.</p> <p>Conventional - CFE Condition 5 Report completed and transmitted to Congress. U.S and Allies responded to Russia's and others' concerns; pressed Russia to resume CFE implementation and fulfill Istanbul commitments; maintained CFE viability despite Russia's suspension of CFE obligations.</p> <p>Chemical - CWC Condition 10C Report drafted. CWC's on-site inspection regime to verify declared military and industrial facilities assessed. Parties without initial declarations identified.</p>
Impact	<p>Noncompliance Report-Non-submission of Report impedes U.S. ability to bring countries back into compliance and build international constituency for compliance enforcement.</p> <p>Conventional-CFE Treaty supports European security environment by controlling conventional weapons. Russia's CFE suspension (end of 2007) raised serious concerns. U.S. worked cooperatively with NATO/Treaty partners to respond.</p>
Steps to Improve	<p>Noncompliance Report - Director of National Intelligence's "Sourcing Requirements for Disseminated Analytic Products" have been implemented in NCR preparation process and should streamline coordination of future Reports.</p> <p>Conventional -Take steps to hold Russia accountable. NATO solidarity is an effective tool for managing Russia, especially a post-Georgia strategy for NATO-Russia and for CFE.</p>

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Results FY 2007	<p>Noncompliance Report - Worked to merge 2007 information in next Report.</p> <p>Chemical - CWC Condition 10C Report to Congress drafted. Assessed CWC's OPCW inspection regime to ascertain Treaty compliance and effectiveness of verification of declared military and industrial facilities.</p> <p>Conventional - CFE Condition 5 Report completed and transmitted to Congress. Assessed compliance with Treaty requirements. U.S. and Allies responded to Russia's concerns; sought to maintain CFE regime in face of Russia's threatened suspension of its CFE obligations.</p> <p>Missiles - Resolved replacement issue for Libya's SCUD missiles; addressed other missile-related issues.</p> <p>START and Moscow Treaties - Resolved many longstanding START issues and assessed Russia's implementation of Moscow Treaty limits through START implementation.</p>
Results FY 2006	<p>Noncompliance Report - No Report was submitted in FY 2006. Up-to-date information, including a discussion of the serious compliance challenges posed by Iran and North Korea to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, is scheduled to appear in the next Report.</p> <p>Chemical - Continued to assess CWC's OPCW inspection regime to ascertain compliance with Treaty requirements and effectiveness of the verification of declared military and industrial facilities.</p> <p>Conventional/Open Skies - Assessed compliance with Treaty requirements. Condition 5 Report sent to Congress (late due to slow resolution of interagency differences).</p> <p>Missiles - Took steps to address implementation issues and ensure compliance with Libya's missile commitments.</p> <p>START and Moscow Treaties - Assessed Russia's implementation of its START Treaty obligations and its Moscow Treaty limits.</p>
Results FY 2005	<p>Noncompliance Report - Report was submitted to Congress in August 2005.</p> <p>Chemical - CWC Condition 10C Report submitted to Congress in August 2005 covering 2002-2004 data. Continued to work with Libya regarding CW destruction. Continued to assess CWC's OPCW inspection regime to ascertain compliance with Treaty requirements and effectiveness of verification of declared military and industrial facilities.</p> <p>Conventional - CFE Treaty Condition 5 Report transmitted to Congress (late due to slow resolution of interagency differences.)</p> <p>Missiles - Took steps to address implementation issues and ensure compliance with Libya's missile commitments.</p> <p>START and Moscow Treaties - Assessed Russia's implementation of its START Treaty obligations and its Moscow Treaty limits.</p>
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION	
Data Source and Quality	Assessments in the Compliance Report and the core verification and compliance work carried out by the VCI Bureau are based on data from: intelligence reports; reporting cables; inspection reporting; statements from U.S. and foreign representatives; reporting from international organizations; UN actions; and United Nations Security Council Resolutions.

Justification of Program Change

In an effort to ensure the verifiability of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments in certain areas, and assess and promote compliance with such agreements, the Department is requesting \$9.6 million in FY 2010.

To meet FY 2010 priorities for verification, compliance, and implementation of arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments, 11 additional positions are needed. The President and the Secretary have made clear that this Administration will focus on negotiating and concluding a follow-on to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START); seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); pursuing the verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs; and negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). In support of the lead role that VCI Bureau will play in these and other high priority areas, the Department is requesting \$2.1 million (\$1,513,000 in American Salaries, \$220,000 in position overhead support, and \$398,000 in built-in current services adjustments for pay annualization, cost-of-living adjustments, and inflation). This funding will support a mix of Civil Service Foreign Affairs Officers, Physical Science Officers, and Foreign Service officers in the following areas: Biological, Chemical, Nuclear, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Verification; Nuclear Materials Life-cycle Production; Proliferation Response; and WMD and Missile Sanctions

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Technology. In the future, VCI will face challenges on many fronts, including WMD threats from state-sponsored and non-state actors. Having the right mix of technical and policy expertise to manage these difficult issues is imperative. Without these positions, VCI will be in serious jeopardy of neither being equipped to understand the technical dimensions of WMD activity nor to formulate and implement informed policies to deter proliferation and promote and enforce compliance.

Verification Assets Fund - \$1 million

In support of verification efforts related to negotiating a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the Department is seeking an increase of \$1 million. Attesting to the verifiability of these agreements requires that the Department articulate sensor collection requirements (that derive from policy decisions) to the technology, intelligence, and research communities to support the development and acquisition of verification technologies and assets for START-Follow-on, CTBT, and FMCT.

Pathogen Strain Library - \$613,000

In support of addressing the weapons of mass destruction threat in the biological arena, the Department is seeking \$613,000 to provide rapid and unfettered access to a Pathogen Strain Library which will consolidate currently scattered data from multiple agencies into one biological weapons database. These funds will also support compliance activities related to the Biological Weapons Convention.

North Korea Verification Activities - \$2 million

In order to verify dismantlement of all of North Korea's nuclear programs, the Department is requesting \$2 million to support technical requirements relating to disablement and dismantlement activities in North Korea, including the substantial analysis that will be required by U.S. technical experts. These funds will facilitate engagement with Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, for the conduct of verification activities.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center - \$3.8 million

The Department operates the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week Watch Center for message receipt and handling of notifications and other communications to support implementation of arms control and other security agreements. In order to maintain this effort in keeping with national security requirements, the Department is requesting \$3.8 million to support Information Technology modernization; an Updated Watch Center to handle increased notifications and future arms control agreements; and Continuity of Operations and Emergency Planning.

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***FY 2010 Request
Resource Summary***

	Positions			Funds (\$ in thousands)			
	American		FSN	Pos Total	Bureau Managed	American Salaries	Funds Total
	Domestic	Overseas					
FY 2008 Actual	110	2	0	112	6,839	14,385	21,224
FY 2009 Estimate	110	2	0	112	7,270	15,007	22,277
FY 2010 Built-in Changes							
Annualization of FY 2009							
American COLA	0	0	0	0	22	74	96
Domestic Inflation	0	0	0	0	17	0	17
FY 2010 American Cost of Living Adjustment	0	0	0	0	59	226	285
Total Built-in Changes	0	0	0	0	98	300	398
FY 2010 Current Services	110	2	0	112	7,368	15,307	22,675
FY 2010 Program Changes							
North Korea Verification	0	0	0	0	2,000	0	2,000
V Fund	0	0	0	0	1,000	0	1,000
Biological Weapons Threat Analysis	0	0	0	0	613	0	613
Enhanced Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Operations	0	0	0	0	3,810	0	3,810
Staffing Increase Request	11	0	0	11	220	1,513	1,733
Total Program Changes	11	0	0	11	7,643	1,513	9,156
FY 2010 Request	121	2	0	123	15,011	16,820	31,831

Staff by Program Activity
(positions)

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	112	112	123	11
International Security Affairs	112	112	123	11
Total	112	112	123	11

Funds by Program Activity
(\$ in thousands)

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	21,224	22,277	31,831	9,554
International Security Affairs	21,224	22,277	31,831	9,554
Total	21,224	22,277	31,831	9,554

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*FY 2010 Request
Program Activities*

Verification, Compliance and Implementation	Positions				Funds (\$ in thousands)		
	American			Pos	Bureau	American	Funds
	Domestic	Overseas	FSN	Total	Managed	Salaries	Total
Conduct of Diplomatic Relations	121	2	0	123	15,011	16,820	31,831
International Security Affairs	121	2	0	123	15,011	16,820	31,831
Total	121	2	0	123	15,011	16,820	31,831

Staff by Domestic Organization Unit
(positions)

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Compliance Policy	0	2	2	0
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Verification and Implementation Policy	2	2	2	0
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center	21	21	21	0
Office of Assistant Secretary	11	11	11	0
Office of Biological Weapons Affairs	10	10	10	0
Office of Chemical and Conventional Weapons	14	14	14	0
Office of Nuclear Affairs	11	11	15	4
Office of Strategic Issues	11	11	11	0
Office of Technology and Assessments	13	13	20	7
Office of Verification and Operations	15	15	15	0
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Complia	2	0	0	0
Representation and Special Advisors for Verification, Compliance, and Implement	2	2	2	0
Total	112	112	123	11

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Funds by Domestic Organization Unit

(\$ in thousands)

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Compliance Policy	0	325	330	5
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Verification and Implementation Policy	375	393	399	6
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center	3,285	3,439	3,507	68
Office of Assistant Secretary	2,523	2,654	2,701	47
Office of Biological Weapons Affairs	1,485	1,554	2,198	644
Office of Chemical and Conventional Weapons	2,664	2,797	2,847	50
Office of Nuclear Affairs	1,863	1,952	4,616	2,664
Office of Strategic Issues	1,800	1,885	1,920	35
Office of Technology and Assessments	3,305	3,481	5,639	2,158
Office of Verification and Operations	3,309	3,479	7,351	3,872
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Complia	311	0	0	0
Representation and Special Advisors for Verification, Compliance, and Implement	304	318	323	5
Total	21,224	22,277	31,831	9,554

Funds by Object Class

(\$ in thousands)

Verification, Compliance, and Implementation	FY 2008 Actual	FY 2009 Estimate	FY 2010 Request	Increase / Decrease
1100 Personnel Compensation	12,566	13,109	14,693	1,584
1200 Personnel Benefits	3,089	3,222	3,611	389
2100 Travel & Trans of Persons	1,128	1,169	1,192	23
2300 Rents, Comm & Utilities	270	280	285	5
2400 Printing & Reproduction	64	66	68	2
2500 Other Services	3,897	4,214	11,760	7,546
2600 Supplies and Materials	152	157	161	4
3100 Personal Property	58	60	61	1
Total	21,224	22,277	31,831	9,554